CHAPTER III

THE WAR OF LIBERATION AND THE ABOLITION OF THE CALIPHATE
The Turkish political system which began to acquire a new shape in 1919-1922 appears to have drawn its features from three historical periods, with their specific characteristics. The first was the Ottoman period with its political culture going back to the 15th Century; the Second was the period encompassing the socio-economic changes which culminated in the young Turks era - an era that was in fact a transitional period marking the end of traditional politics and broadening of the social bases of political system. The third period from which the modern system acquired its characteristics, was the Republican era that began with the war of liberation. It was a period distinctly different from the preceding two in origins and goals.1

Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, reforms and changes had been initiated by a handful of people associated directly with the government or the second or third echelon of government personnel, the bureaucracy and the army. The Republican era originated in a resistance movement against foreign occupation and grew into a war of liberation. Thus began the Turkish national movement variously called "the

national struggle", "the war of national liberation", or "the Anatolian Revolt".

No major Allied power contributed more to the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, nor championed more jealously the cause of Greek expansion in Asia Minor, than Great Britain. Between the drafting of the Armistice of Mudros\textsuperscript{2} in October, 1918 and the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the catastrophic drifting of events was discernible to a number of British statesmen. However, their observations were ignored or rejected by the key British statesman Lloyd George. Within the ranks of the British diplomatic corps and the military high command, there was much cause for consternation in 1919. The progress of the Paris peace conference in drafting a treaty had been practically nil. The failure and equally disastrous delay compounded the gravity of situation in Turkey. The long interval aggravated the jealousies of the victorious powers and created a crisis that actually marked the beginning of the Greco-Turkish war, and it provided Mustafa Kemal with both the pretext and opportunity to defy the Allies.\textsuperscript{3} In exaspera-

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\textsuperscript{2} For details see, Gwynne Dyer, The Turkish Armistice, Middle Eastern Studies, 1972, May & Oct.
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tion Lord Curzon Secretary of state for foreign affairs, branded the Izmir episode as the greatest mistake, made in Paris\textsuperscript{4} .... In a similar vein Admiral Richard Webb, who served on the British high commissioner's staff in Istanbul, condemned the Allies sanction of Greek intervention in Izmir. The Allies, contended Admiral Webb, had thrown 'an apple of discord' amidst the Greeks and the Turks.\textsuperscript{5}

Italy felt, as if she was the step child of the peace conference. The Italians did not believe they were receiving an adequate share of territorial concessions. Consequently Italy, acting unilaterally sent troops to Anatolia and dispatched a small naval force to Izmir, which alarmed other Allies who sought to neutralise Italian ambitions and prevent a possible massacre. On May 15, a Greek force landed at Izmir with the support of British, French and American warships.\textsuperscript{6} The Greek occupation of Izmir fired the hatred of the Turks, and spurred them to resist the Allies.

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\item \textsuperscript{4} Curzon to Kennard, 22 October 1919, E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds. \textit{Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939} (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1925), first series, IV, 838.
\item \textsuperscript{5} Admiral Richard Webb to Sir R. Graham, 28 June 1919, ibid pp. 655-656.
\end{itemize}
The Turks found a leader in Mustafa Kemal Pasha who would never tolerate the shame and dishonour of being subject in any way to people whom they had fought against for centuries and whom they still regarded as *riaya*, their 'protected flock'. The Turkish reaction was violent and instantaneous. Four days after the occupation of Smyrna, 19 May 1919 Mustafa Kemal reached the port of Samsun, the black sea coast of Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal had been sent by Istanbul government as the Inspector-General of the Ninth Army. He had been assigned a number of tasks, including, to supervise the disbanding of the remaining Ottoman forces and to restore internal peace in the area under his jurisdiction. Before Mustafa Kemal had arrived at Samsun, various resistance associations mushroomed all over Turkey and mainly in Anatolia and Thrace to preserve national independence.

Kemal knew the noble and patriotic spirit of his people, and was easily understood by them; he was able to make them feel that their hopes could be realised, and made them vibrate with enthusiasm and faith, the indispensable fac-


tors in great victories. The people would follow him, because in following him, they would follow their own ideals.

Thus, Mustafa Kemal through his ability as an organiser and statesman, and through the prestige as a successful fighter and dedicated patriot, was able to unite the whole nation under the banner of his ideals. He made an appeal to various associations, civil and military authorities in Anatolia and Thrace. His initiative was received with general approbation. He began by intensifying nationalist propaganda and invigorating popular enthusiasm. Territorial integrity must be maintained at all costs; the cabinet of Ferit Pasa, through weakness or treason, was to blame for the dismemberment of Turkish soil, of the land of her people. Mustafa Kemal resigned his commission on 8 July 1919 and within a short time, this fiery resistance became a wave of defiance that surged throughout Anatolia.

The Amasya Protocol

Mustafa Kemal had already been building a new base of support to replace the authority he derived from his official position. On June 19, 1919, he met in Amasya with some

of the men who were to join him in leading the nationalist movement: Rauf Orbay, former minister of the navy and Ottoman delegate to Mundros, Ali Faut Cebesoy, Commander at Ankara and Refet Bele, who commanded several corps near Samson. On June 21, the three signed the Amasya Protocol, soon after Kazim too accepted, which became more or less the first call for a national movement against the occupation. The message was a simple one.

1. The unity of the Fatherland and national independence is in danger.

2. The Istanbul government is unable to carry out its responsibilities.

3. It is only through the nation's effort and determination that national independence will be won.

4. It is necessary to establish a national committee, free from all external influences and control, that will review the national situation and make known to the world the people's desire for justice.

5. It has been decided to hold immediately a national congress in Sivas, the most secure place in Anatolia.

6. Three representatives from each province should be sent immediately to the Sivas Congress.
7. To be prepared for every eventuality, this subject should be kept a national secret.\textsuperscript{11}

Kemal also wrote to a number of leading figures in Istanbul, inviting them to join the national struggle and he was very anxious to avoid any open act of rebellion against the still legitimate Ottoman government.

The Erzurum congress, July 23-August 9, 1919

Even before the Sivas congress was called the society for the Defence of the Rights of Eastern Anatolia had arranged a regional meeting to be held in July in Erzurum in response to the threat of further Armenian aggression in the east, Kemal also attended it. The declaration drawn up at the Erzurum Congress, became the basis for the national pact that followed. The declaration set forth the principle on which the war of independence was to be fought and won. It reads:

1. "The province of Trabzon, the district of Samsun, and the province of Erzurum, Sivas, Diyarbekir, Elazig, Van and Biltis, sometimes called the "six provinces" are an

integral whole which can not be separated from each other or from Ottoman territory for any reason.

2. To preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and to protect the Sultanate and the Caliphate, it is essential that the national forces be put in charge and the national will be recognized as sovereign.

3. As all occupation and interference will be considered as undertaken on behalf of establishing Greek and Armenian States, the principle of United defence and resistance is resolved. The bestowing of new privileges on Christians in a manner, to alter political control and social balance will not be allowed.

4. In case the central government, under foreign pressure, is forced to abandon any part of the territory, we are taking measures and making decisions to defend our national rights as well as the Sultanate and the Caliphate.

5. We reaffirm the legal rights, as indicated in the laws of the Ottoman state, for non-Muslims with whom we share our motherland. The protection of their property, life, and honour, being among the basic tenets of our religious practices, national traditions, and legal principles this policy is confirmed by the consensus of our congress.
6. We are calling for a decision based on right and justice, one that respects our historic culture, and religious rights, and that rejects totally the theory of dividing lands and separating peoples who are within the boundaries established by the armistice signed by the Allies on October 30, 1918 and in eastern Anatolia, as well as in other regions, inhabited by majority of Muslims and dominated by them culturally and economically.

7. Our people, honour and respect humanitarian and progressive developments and are appreciative of our own scientific, industrial and economic conditions and needs. Therefore, on conditions, that the internal and external independence of our people and our state, and the territorial integrity of our country shall be conserved intact, we will accept with pleasure the scientific, industrial and economic assistance of every state which will not nurture imperialistic tendencies towards our country and which will respect the principles of nationality as indicated under article 6. we await for the sake of preserving humanity and peace, the Urgent signature of a peace based on these equitable and humanitarian conditions, which we consider to be our great national objective.
8. In this historical age, when nations determine their own destinies, it is essential that our central government submit itself to the national will. As made clear by past events and their results, government decisions not based on the national will have no validity for the people and are not respected by foreign nations. In consequence, before the nation is forced into taking matters into its own hands, to look for a remedy to its anguish, our central government should proceed without delay to convoke the national assembly and submit to it all the decisions to be taken relating to the fate of the national and the country.

9. The society to defend the Rights to Eastern Anatolia is the union of societies born out of the sufferings and calamities experienced by our land. This assembly is totally free of party interest. All Muslim compatriots and the natural members of this assembly.

10. A Representative committee chosen by the congress will work in its name to establish unity on all levels from the village to the province.12

Thus Kemal and his colleagues at this point were still-declaring that they were working to preserve the Ottoman nation, that all subjects, Muslim and non-Muslim, would have equal rights; that since the government in Istanbul was controlled by the occupiers, the national movement in Anatolia was assuming the burden of protecting the nation's rights. But all this was done in support of the Sultan-Caliph and to rescue him and to protect in particular the eastern provinces.

The Sivas Congress:

Mustafa Kemal opened the Congress at Sivas, the delegates came not only from the east but from all over the country, including the far off Thrace. The resolutions adopted at Erzurum now were transformed into a national appeal, and the name of the organization changed to the society to Defend the Rights and interests of the province of Anatolia and Rumelia. The resolutions adopted in Erzurum were reaffirmed with minor additions, such as a clause added for article 3 stating that the formation of an independent Greece on the Aydin, Manisa, and Balikesir fronts was unacceptable. In content and spirit the Sivas Congress basically reinforced the stance taken at the Erzurum Congress.¹³

The two Congress provided a platform for discussion of the political situation in Turkey and the deliberations of these Congress culminated into national pact.

The truly revolutionary character of the provisions of the National Pact are quite evident. They made a sharp break with the imperial past and initiated a new political system. The first and the paramount idea contained in the pact was the concept of a nation state based on territorial sovereignty; two years later the identity of this national state was defined as Turkish. The second basic principle clearly defined the national will, that is, the collective will of the people, as the source of the authority, superseding the Sultan-Caliph's power in all matters concerning the national survival and progress.

There arrived at Sivas in the month of September an important American mission, led by General Harbord, which was making studies in Anatolia. The American general and Mustafa Kemal had a long interview. Kemal explained the General Harbord the causes which had brought about the nationalist movement in Turkey and his commitment for the cause of nation. "A people which makes all its efforts and every imaginable sacrifice in order to ensure its freedom and independence cannot see its wishes frustrated." General Harbord left that interview convinced that with a leader
like Kemal, the Turkish people would achieve its goal.  

In the face of the increasing national resistance, Damad Ferid Pasha's government was replaced by Ali Riza Pasha on 2nd October, 1919. However, the latter had cooperated with Kemal and his associates even more than the previous cabinet. This reflected that even the Istanbul government had started reckoning the nationalist forces. Several days after the establishment of the new cabinet, De Roebeck (British commissioner at Istanbul) sent a memorandum to Curzon, describing that, he had information from reliable source that informed nationalist Turks regarded High commissioner Calthrope's replacement by De Roebeck, as an admission on the part of Great Britain, that, she had committed blunder in supporting the Greek cause in Izmir. He followed this statement with the admonition, that England should acknowledge the nationalist movement.  

At that time, Ali Riza Pasha sent his minister of the navy, Salih Pasha to negotiate with Kemal, to secure some kind of agreement about national issues, with Istanbul government promising co-operation with the nationalists in return. Some sort of agreement was reached. The government


was asked, to accept all the resolutions of the Erzurum and Sivas congress and to recognize the legality of the society, promising also that the forthcoming session of the chamber of Deputies would not be held in Istanbul, so that it would be free from foreign influence. provinces inhabited by Turks, would not be ceded to enemies. The integrity and independence of the Turkish Fatherland, would be safeguarded. Only delegates approved of by the National Representative committee, would be sent to any peace conference, with the Entente powers. However, Salih Pasha failed to get the cabinet in Istanbul to ratify the agreement. Ali Reza later announced, that elections would be held for a new chamber of Deputies, but it would meet in Isabelin the following January; a flagrant violation of the agreement.

In December 1919, as a result of nationalist persuasion and pressure, new elections were held for the Ottoman Parliament. But since most of Anatolia and Thrace, were under the control of the nationalists, it was inevitable that their members would be and were elected, with Mustafa Kemal himself being elected deputy from Erzurum.

The chamber of Deputies met in Istanbul, on January 12, 1920. After the Sultan's speech was presented, a welcome telegram from Mustafa Kemal was read in the name of the representative committee, thus manifesting its claim to be the rightful government of Turkey. The British began to sense that the Istanbul government was not doing, what it could, to suppress the nationalists. So, they secured the dismissal of both the minister of war and the chief of the general staff. On Jan 28, the deputies met clandestinely. Proposals were made to elect Mustafa president of the chamber, but this was deferred in the certain knowledge that the British would prorogue the chamber before it could do what had been planned all along, namely, accept the declaration of the Erzurum and Sivas congress.

The Ottoman Parliament met for the last time, from 12 January 1920 to 18 March 1920. On 28 January, it accepted the National Pact, formulated on the basis of the principles of the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses. Thus, putting the parliament itself, on record, as expressing the will of the Turkish people, to regain full national integrity and independence.

Mustafa Kemal and the 'Representative committee', now established in Ankara, were in a strong position, with a sympathetic parliament in Istanbul and some measure of
recognition from the government. The Allies pressured Ali Reza to arrest the leading nationalist sympathizers in Istanbul and to condemn Kemal and his associates. And when he refused, they forced him to resign, with the far more malleable Saliah Hulusi Pasha replacing him. The full weight of the government now turned against the nationalists for the first time. On March 15, 1920, 150 leading Civil servants and army officers in Istanbul were arrested and turned over to the Allies for internment in Malta. The next day Istanbul was put under martial law, and Allied troops replaced the Ottoman police in control of the city. Police entered the parliament and arrested some of its leading members, after which it was dissolved on March 18. 17

The Salih Pasha cabinet was replaced, with one headed once again, by Damat Ferit Pasa, a puppet of British, who was now determined to carry out the Allied desire to suppress the nationalists.

The harsh measures taken against the nationalists, by the Istanbul government inaugurated a distinct new phase in the Turkish war of independence. For the first time, the nationalists claimed the sole right to rule. Kemal declared the Representative committee in Ankara, the only lawful government of Turkey and ordered all civilians and military

officials, to obey it, rather than the Istanbul government, since the latter was now fully under Allied control.

To make sure, that everyone knew he was still fighting in the name of the Sultan to rescue him from the Allies, plans were made to organise a new government and parliament in Ankara, and the sultan was asked to accept its authority. A number of patriots were moved from Istanbul to Ankara, included among them were Halide Edip, her husband, Adnan Adivar, Ismet Inonu and many others. On March 19, 1920, Kemal announced that the Turkish nation was establishing its own parliament in Ankara under the name "Grand National Assembly". Some 100 members of the Istanbul Parliament, who were able to escape the Allied round up, joined 190 deputies elected around the country by the national resistance groups. In the meantime, the sultan sent the caliph's army into Anatolia to break the Nationalist Movement. There was resistance and the spectre of civil war could be seen. The Greeks started to advance from Smyrna while the Caliph's Army occupied Ismid. The news of the British Army and the advance of the Caliph's Army, aroused the patriotism of the Anatolian peasant, hitherto, loyal to the Sultan, but now slowly realising, that he was but a tool of foreigners.  

On April 23, 1920, the new Assembly gathered for the first time, making Mustafa its first president and Ismet Inonu now deputy from Edirne, chief of the General Staff. The new regime's determination to revolt against the Istanbul government but not the Sultan and Caliph was clear. It should be noted that the nationalists declared their loyalty to the Sultan and the Caliph out of practical consideration but not conviction.

It was resolved that:

1. The founding of a government is absolutely necessary.
2. It is not permissible to recognize a provisional chief of state nor to establish a regency.
3. It is fundamental to recognize that the real authority in the country is the national will as represented by the Assembly. There is no power superior to the Grand National Assembly.
4. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey embraces both executive and legislative functions. A council of state, chosen from the members of the Assembly and responsible to it, conducts the affairs of state. The president of the Assembly is ex-officio president of the council. The Sultan-caliph, as soon as he is free from the coercion to which he submits, shall take his
place within the constitutional system in the manner to be determined by the Assembly.¹⁹

The Assembly thus was the real govt. with the council of state carrying on the daily affairs of government. The fate of the Sultanate was postponed to a more propitious occasion, presumably after full independence was achieved. A parliamentary committee was set up to draw up a constitution.

Before passing the Assembly resolutions, on 5 April 1920 the Sultan opened a new and bitter attack on the nationalists. On 11 April the Seyhul-Islam Durribide Abdullah Efendi issued a 'fatwa' declaring that the killing of rebels, on the orders of the Caliph, was a religious duty; the Grand Wazir published a proclamation denouncing the false representatives of the nation; the circumcision Anzavur, who had been fighting against the nationalists since September, was given the title of Pasha. Mustafa Kemal and other nationalist leaders were solemnly sentenced to death, in absentia, by a court martial in Istanbul.

The Grand National Assembly appointed a council of ministers on 3-4 May. On 5 May, the Mufti of Ankara, Borek-

cizade Mahmed Rifat Efendi, issued 'fatwa' endorsed by 152 other mufti's in Anatolia, declaring that a 'fatwa' issued under foreign duress was invalid, and calling on the Muslims to liberate their Caliph from captivity. On 19 May, the Assembly declared Damad Ferid Pasha a traitor.20

The first constitution of the Turkish nation, passed by the Assembly on Jan 20, 1921 as the law of the fundamental organization. Both executive and legislative authority were "manifested and concentrated in the Grand National Assembly, which is the sole and rightful representative of the nation." The state of Turkey was to be run by the Assembly itself through the government of the Grand National Assembly. As a legislative body it would promulgate or abrogate all laws, conclude treaties, proclaim war and the like. As an executive, it would administer "the departments into which its government is divided through the minister it elects," and give direction to the ministers, if necessary changing them". The president of the Assembly, Mustafa Kemal, was ex-officio president of the council of Ministers, but he and the minister were subject to Assembly direction on all matters. The 1876 constitution's division of the state into provinces, districts and countries was retained.

All the nationalist forces were incorporated into a united army with a central command. The ministers were to be appointed by and responsible to the Assembly. Elections for the national and provincial assemblies were to be held every two years, for two-year term, with the session being extendible for one additional year in emergencies. The constitution of 1876, as amended in 1909, remained in force in all areas not covered by the new regulations.²¹

The outstanding factors, which stiffened the resistance of the Turks were: the Allied coup in Istanbul, against the last Ottoman National Assembly on March 16, 1920 and the signing by Damad Ferid Pasha, the Grand Vazir, of the Sevres peace treaty. Thus, the final break between Ankara and Istanbul came when the latter officially accepted the Treaty of Sevres, which incorporated the will of the Allies as to how the Turks should be treated. It was indeed, a vindictive and shameful document imposed on Turkey.²²

Although the Sevres Treaty was never enforced, Greek, French and Armenian military begun to move even before the treaty was actually signed.

²². See Appendix - A.
Meanwhile the Turkish Nationalists, began to prepare their ground, in the field of diplomacy. Mustafa Kemal, rejected the ideas and practices of the Ottoman Empire, the ideology of pan-Islam and Pan-Turanism and the aggressive foreign policy based on this ideology. Speaking in the GNA on 1 December 1921, he stated Pan-Islamism and Pan-turanism as 'illusions, which are a long way from any practical value' and which 'aroused fear and anxiety in the rest of the World'. The Government of the GNA has a firm policy of its own. It is aimed at ensuring the life and Independence of Turkey in the framework of its set national boundaries. Information to Mustafa Kemal, that all was not well in the camp of the western Allies, he sent emissaries to France and Italy, to suggest a separate peace treaty with the Nationalist Turkey. These overtures could not have come at a more favourable time. It was soon possible to secure, that Italy should withdraw her troops from Adalia and South-West Anatolia, in return for economic concessions. At the above two places and Heraclea, the Italians were offered a share with coal-mines. Soon it was possible to secure the withdraw of the French troops from cilicia in return for concessions on the roads and railways of Eastern Anatolia linking up with French transport concessions in Syria. A Franco-Turkish Treaty was finally signed in October 1921. Greece and Great
Britain were thus isolated. Mustafa kemal now started negotiations with Russia, which resulted in the signing in Moscow on 16 March 1921 of a Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity. All the clauses of the treaty were imbued with the spirit of mutual confidence and co-operation. The treaty set forth the solidarity of the two sides in the struggle against imperialism and solved a number of major practical problems. It substantially strengthened the Kemalists' positions at home and abroad.

The nationalists, already militarily engaged against the Greek, the signing of the treaty of Sevres caused further revulsion of feeling in Turkey, against the Istanbul Government that had accepted it. In Istanbul, on 17 October 1920, Damad Ferid Pasha, under strong Allied pressure, resigned for the last time and gave place to Tevfik Pasha. In Ankara, in January 1921, the ministers elected as chairman Fevzi Pasha, who had resigned the Ottoman Ministry of war and joined the nationalists. Thus the progress of struggle against the Greeks identified the Ankara regime with the national cause, and opposition to it rather seemed like treason and impiety in Turkish eyes.

23. M.P. Price, op.cit., p.120.
24. Ibid, p. 121.
The Greeco-Turkish war falls into three stages, corresponding roughly with the campaigns of 1920, 1921 and 1922. In the first, the Turks, hopelessly outmatched in numbers and materials, were badly defeated, and Greek forces advanced in both Anatolia, and Rumelia. The second Greek campaign, in 1921, also opened well for the invaders, who made several important gains. The Turks, however, rallied, and in April, a Turkish force under Brigadier Ismet Inonu drove back the Greeks near Inonu. It was from this engagement that Ismet Inonu, the collaborator and successor of Mustafa Kemal, later took his surname. 25

However, it was the battle of the Sakarya, which proved Waterloo for the Greeks and it decided the destiny of modern Turkey and the real victory of the nationalists. Unlike Mondros at Mundanya, now it was the turn of Turkey, represented by Ismet Inonu, while the British and the Greeks who were the Vanquished. The Armistice of Mundanya, was signed on October 11, 1922. By its terms, Thrace would be evacuated, but Istanbul and the straits would remain occupied until the final conclusion of peace. Thus the last gesture of Greek in her crusade for 'the Great Megali idea' was an

Inglorious one, since later she had to accept the conditions imposed upon her.26

In the aftermath of Sakarya war - two forces remained sole contender in Turkey. On the one hand, victorious nationalists with popular support, on the other hand, Ottoman Government, however, discredited by defeat and collaboration; still having immense prestige and authority in the eyes of Orthodox Muslims.

The final rupture between the nationalists and the Istanbul Government was precipitated by the Allied powers, who still insisted on recognizing the Sultan's government in Istanbul, and invited them as well as the nationalists to the peace conference at Laussane. This two-fold invitation intended to divide the Turkish authority at a crucial time, led Mustafa Kemal to terminate, once and for all, the political power of the Sultan.27

In order to execute his long cherished programmes, Kemal presented a motion signed by more than 80 members, which affirmed that the rights of sovereignty belonged to the nation, as was declared in the national pact. The Kemal quoted Islamic and Turkish history to show, with support

27. B.Lewis, op.cit., p.252.
from facts, that the caliphate and Sultanate could be separated in such a way, that sovereignty would remain in the hands of the Grand National Assembly. As for the spiritual and religious power, the caliphate would continue in the reigning dynasty.

Kemal's proposal was perfectly feasible. On the death of prophet Mohammed, the founder of the Arab Empire and creator of the Islam, in which he was considered the highest religious authority, his father-in-law Abu Bakr was chosen to succeed him with the title of "Caliph", which means "successor". The prophet's family lost the caliphate, before thirty years had passed from his death. It was the Sultan Selim, the "Grim", who had brought back the title of Caliph, from his Egyptian expedition in the sixteenth century. He had forced the symbolic Caliph Motawakkil, a remote descendant of Abbasid to pass it over for him. The Ottoman Emperors, gave themselves, the title of Sultan "Sovereign" in Arabic, which had first been used by the Caliph's generals, and then by all the monarchs of Muslim peoples, as the title of the king was used in other countries. It, therefore, the Ottoman sultanate had been separated from the Caliphate upto Selim I, and would never have been united for
it without Selim's venture, the original situation could perfectly be restored.28

The resolution passed on November 1922 contains two articles. The first declared that the Turkish people consider that the form of government in Istanbul resting on the sovereignty of an individual had ceased to exist on 16 March 1920 and passed for ever into history. The second recognized that the caliphate belonged to the Ottoman house but laid down that the caliphate rested on the Turkish state, and that the Assembly would choose as Caliph that member of the Ottoman house who was in learning and character most worthy and fitting. Mohmet VI Vahiduddin, with view to the developments, on 17 November, slipped out of the palace and boarded a British warship, on which he fled to Malta. Next day, the Grand National Assembly in Ankara declared him deposed, and elected his cousin Abdul Majid as caliph.

The peace conference opened at Lausanne, on 20 November 1922. The Ankara government was represented by Ismet Inonu, who had a colossal task before him. He was representing the newly born nation, that had overturned the vindictive Sevres peace settlement, but the arrogant Allies still tried to treat him as the representative of a defeated nation. Ismet

had been chosen, because of his firmness at Mundanya. Ismet, maintained the basic position of the Ankara govern-
ment, that it had to be treated as an independent, a sover-
eign state, equal with all others at the conference. In
discussing matters regarding control of Turkish finances and
justice, protection for the minorities, the capitulations,
the straits, and the like, he absolutely refused to budge on
any proposals that in any way would compromise Turkish
sovereignty. Lord Curzon, the British delegate, "openly
assumed the role of a weary schoolmaster admonishing a
stupid pupil. Ismet refused to learn. When the American
observer brought the two men together to discuss the judi-
cial capitulation in Turkey, Curzon shouted and beat the
wall with his cane—Ismet held out for complete sovereignty
and said that the adjustment of such matter took time". One
of the British representatives reported that "Ismet Pasa,
who was well attended by a phalanx of forbidding-looking
Turks seemed impervious to all arguments on the subject, and
his obtuseness and obstinacy put the patience of the Allied
delegates to a severe test". As the conference went on,
kemal further strengthened the Turkish position by occupying
the last towns in eastern Thrace. He improved his political
position at home by organising his own political party, the
people's party on December 6. After long haggling and
finally on July 24, 1923, the articles of the Treaty of Lausanne\(^2\) were signed.

In this treaty, a victory for Kemal's patriotic labours, the frontiers established in the national pact were respected. The capitulations regime was completely abolished, and no clause appeared which was irreconcilable with Turkey's absolute sovereignty.\(^3\)

For Turks, the war of liberation was both a deadly struggle, for survival and a process of radical political transformation. While fighting the war, they were establishing also the foundations of the modern national Turkish state. Thus are nations often born through violence and strife that separate them from the past and bring them into the world, as new entities, with new identities and new aspirations.

After the successful completion of Turkish war of independence, Kemal started the process of secularization of Turkey, which begins with the abolition of the caliphate. The question of whether the caliphate should be looked upon, as a political or a religious one, is difficult to give an absolutely unequivocal answer to. That the Prophet Muhammad,

\(^{29}\) See Appendix B.

\(^{30}\) For details see Shah Stenford and Ezelkural, J.B.Village, and Bernard Lewis.
at first the spiritual leader of the believers, became their temporal and political ruler as well, and that this new role was not a burden, he had to take on by accident, but the fulfilment of his mission, is symbolised by the fact that Islamic chronology starts with the establishment of his community at Medina, where he had to fill both function.\textsuperscript{31}

In this light, it would seem logical to consider the caliphate, a concept in which both the political and religious aspects were blended in complete unity. When after Mohammed's death, however, Abu Bakr became his Caliph (successor) and took over authority, it was one exception: he succeeded him only in his capacities of a ruler, judge, and commander-in-chief, but had no spiritual powers, as the Muhammad had been the last prophet.\textsuperscript{32} The Caliph's rule thus became that of defending the faith and implementing Divine law; he had no religious but only political authority, though he had religious functions. There is a hadith, which says: "After thirty years of prophet's death, the caliphate would become a tyrannical kingdom and mundane institution". There is also unanimity amongst the doctors of Islam, that first four Caliphs strictly adhered to the

\textsuperscript{31} W.C. Smith, Islam in Modern History, pp. 15-16.

\textsuperscript{32} Niemeijer, A.C. The Khilafat Movement in India, 1919-1924, The Hague, 1972, p. 43.
principles of Shariat and after that this institution degenerated into worldly kingdom.

"The Turks had given the same arguments: The sunni ulema differentiate between two kinds of caliphate. The first is true caliphate which is strictly according to the principles of Islam based on Quran and hadith. The another one is formal, i.e. Caliphate only in appearance. In actual reality it is a Sultanate, a kingdom, a monarchy and hangs on oppression and tyranny. The Umayyads and the Abbasids, come under the same category; for they were not the creations of the desire and choice of the Muslim nation, they established themselves through force, aggression, compulsion and usurpation. The Ottoman caliphate too fall under this category. It was an oppressive, tyrannical kingdom and a sultanate."  

After the sack of Baghdad the Abbasid caliphate had been restored in Egypt, but the Caliphs in the next two and a half centuries were mere show pieces, serving only to legitimize the actual rule of Mamlukes. The Caliph's name was not even mentioned in the khutba, nor did his picture appear on coins. Moreover, Mutawakkil, a puppet of Mam-


34. Arnold, op.cit, pp. 99-100.
luk, having no real power, was no true Caliph, so how could, he hand down an office he never really held? Modern Western scholars have the opinion that the story of a formal deed of transfer in 1517 was a fiction, dating from the last part of the 18th century and proped up by the Ottoman sultans because it served theoretical political interest.

The Turks, thus distinguish between two kinds of caliphate and restricted the true caliphate for the rule of the first four Caliphs. The subsequent Caliphs were no Caliphs but worldly kings whose rule was, according to the shariat, not beyond reproach. The Turks concluded their logical argument by saying that it was impossible to have a true caliphate in modern times.

Mustafa Kemal, successfully completed his first revolution, when in October 1923, Turkey was formally proclaimed a Republic. Nationalist and secularist tendencies, now defined as progress, became more evident and more clearly defined after 1923, as indicated by the following statements of Kemal. "Those people who governed Turkey for centuries might

35. This argument is given by Abdul Ghani, Thoughts on Caliphate, Karachi, 1914, p.8.
37. Prof. Mohammad Sadiq, op.cit., p.34.
have given thought to many things except Turkey. The Turkish homeland and Turkish nation have incurred, because of this neglect, losses which can be remedied in only one way, namely by thinking about nothing else but Turkey. We can reach targets of happiness and security only if we act with this mentality... the purpose of our national ideal is to become a truly advanced social body. Do you know that the existence, the value, the rights to independence and freedom of a nation in a world is proportionate to its progress? It is an absolute consideration to follow the road to progress and become successful. On marching along this road those who are ignorant and look backward rather than forward are condemned to be crushed under the wave of progress".  

The House of Osman had discredited itself because of collaboration with aggrandiser. At this time contacts had been established between Constantinople and the khilafatists (in India) through Marmaduke Pickthak (a convert to Islam), the editor of Bombay chronicle and a member of the central khilfat committee. He wrote to Dr. M.A. Ansari, after a meeting with Ismet Pasha that unless something was done in

concrete the Caliph will become a shadow, and his power nil.39

Later on he visited Constantinople and wrote to Muhammad Ali "There is a very large party in Turkey which regards the separation of the Khilafat from the Turkish government with great disfavour. They are not what we call khilafatists, but simply monarchists, conservatists, men loyal to interested tradition and the ancient dynasty".40 He further suggested that a delegation should visit Constantinople to seek the khalifa's blessings and extend their missionary work for mobilizing support in central Asia and Afghanistan in the name of khalifa.41 Earlier, Seth Chotani of the Bombay khilafat committee had also sent a letter to Ismet Pasha at Lausanne. Outlining the main principles on which the Indian Muslims would like the khilafat to continue, he advised the Turks to convene a Muslim conference after the conclusion of the peace talks.42


40. Middle sex, 21 June 1923, this letter was censured by the Punjab Govt. on 28 Sept see Serial no. 130 Ibid

41. Ibid.

42. 3 March 1923, Telegram, Serial No. 2 F & Poll. Deptt. F. No. 611-x secret, NAI.
Mustafa Kemal, too, received critical letters from abroad. Abdur Rehman Siddiqui had managed to see the Khalifa, and he also carried a letter from the khilafat committee to Kemal. These letters greatly annoyed the leader, who began the preparation for the final stage of his revolution. After the declaration of the Turkish Republic, the Khalifa was advised to move either to Bursa or Konia.

43. Kemal told the Turkish Deputies. "The republic must finally become a secular state", that the Caliph and the remains of the House of Osman must go", quoted in H.C. Armstrong, Grey Wolf, 1923, P.247. On another occasion he said, "we cannot allow any person, whatever his title may be to interfere in questions relating to the destiny, activity and independence of the new state which our nation has erected. The nation itself watches the preservation and independence of the state what they have created, and they will continue to do so for all time."

For centuries our nation was guided under the influence of these erroneous ideas. But what has been the result of it? Everywhere they lost millions of man. "Do you know." he asked, "how many sons of Anadolu (Asia minor) have perished in the scorching deserts of the Yemen"? Do you know the losses, we have suffered in holding Syria and the Iraq and Egypt and in maintain our position in Africa? And do you see what has come out of it?

Those who favour the idea of placing the means at the disposal of the caliph to brave the whole world and the power to administer it the affairs of the whole of Islam, must not appeal to the population of Anadolu alone but to the great Muhammadan agglomerations which are eight or ten times as rich in men".

"New Turkey, the people of new Turkey, have no reason to think of anything else but their own existence and their own welfare. She has nothing more to give away to others".

(Speech delivered by M.K.PUsa, P.592, published by ministry of education Ankara).
BUT he refused and threatened to abdicate. The Indian Khilafat committee in the meantime demanded that the khalifa should be allowed full liberty of action and should not be subjected to anything, and that the Constantinople distt should be placed directly under his jurisdiction and control. 44

At the same time, Mustafa Kemal sent a firm reply to the Indian khilafat committee on 27 November 1923, saying: "I would recommend that you should act with prudence and foresight before reaching a definite decision on such an important and delicate issue as that concerning the khalifa". 45 He further said: "I am convinced that this propaganda which is being disseminated by agents of the khalifa, by Vahiduddin and by the English", is having considerable effect in India. He expected "saner and more logical decisions on this question". 46

As a matter of fact, Khilafat, whether vested in the house of Osman or not, was not consonant with the modern republican structure of the Turkish state as envisaged by Mustafa Kemal, the architect of Modern Turkey. Just about

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44. See notes, Foreign & poll deptt. 1923, F.No. 945-x, secret, NAI.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
this time, a joint letter from the Agha Khan and Syed Ameer Ali, addressed to Ismet Pasha, was published on 24 November 1923, in three leading newspapers of Istanbul even before they reached their destination. The writers urged that "by diminution in the prestige of the Caliph as a religious factor from the Turkish body politic would mean the disintegration of Islam". They asked that the khilafat should be placed on the basis which would command the confidence and esteem of the Muslim nations and people and thus impart to the Turkish state unique strength and dignity.47

Mustafa Kemal, seized this opportunity, to prosecute the press supporting the khalifa in Constantinple. At the same time he professed to be outraged to see man loyal to British imperialism advising Turkish nationalists, on their policies so "a Shii and a Khoja telling the Turkish Muslims how to behave".48 Ismet Pasha ridiculed the Agha Khan and Syed Ameer Ali, for not possessing right knowledge and

47. The "Tanin" and Ikdam" published this letter without any comments and any indication of how it had reached them. In "Tanin" it appeared as a letter to Mustafa Kemal. Next day the "tevhid-i-Efkir" also published it. A French evening paper "Stamboul" published its French version.

See Home Poll. F.NO 328(3) - x - secret of 1923 NAI, also in A.J. Toynbee, Survey of international Affairs, 1923, Vol. I, PP 571-72. Also see, M.P. Prince, A history of Turkey; B.lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey. Also see Appendix-C.

experience to forward observations and suggestions from a religious point of view. The letter was dismissed as the product of the British, to promote schism in Turkey under the cover of the khilafat. The point of view also found an echo in India. The Jamait-ul ulema-I-Hind, condemned the propagandist activities of the enemies of Islam and deplored the fact that even some Muhammadans have allowed themselves to be used by the enemies of Islam for this purpose.

Mushir Husain Kidwai thought that the kemalists were justified in questioning the bonafides of Agha Khan and Syed Ameer Ali. But he asserted that the matter of Khilafat was too serious to be dealt with precipitously on the spur of the moment.

The Khilafat committee and the Indian National Congress resolved to send a Khilafat delegation to Turkey to present the Indian point of view to Mustafa Kemal. But it was already too late. The very emphasis on the Khilafat's "link


52. Qidwai, op.cit. p.192.
with the past and incompatibility of modern times" gave sufficient reasons for Mustafa Kemal to abolish it.\textsuperscript{53}

On March 1, 1924 Kemal opened the new session of the Assembly. In his speech he emphasised three main points: the safeguarding and stabilizing of the Republic, the creation of a unified national system of education and the need to cleanse and elevate the Islamic faith, by rescuing it from the position of a political instrument to which it has been accustomed for centuries.\textsuperscript{54}

The meaning of this third point was defined next day at a meeting of the people's party group. The president's proposal were discussed, and agreement reached on a series of motions which were read to the Grand National Assembly on March 3, 1924. This provided for the deposition of the Caliph, the abolition of the Caliphate, and the banishment of all members of the Ottoman house from Turkish territory.\textsuperscript{55}

Thus, the abolition of the Caliphate accorded the idea of secularism, which facilitated the attempt to free religion, from the domination of an institution.

\textsuperscript{53} B. Lewis, \textit{op.cit.} p.263.

\textsuperscript{54} Nutuk, 11,849, cf. speech, 684 quoted in B. Lewis \textit{op.cit.} p.259.

\textsuperscript{55} B. Lewis \textit{op.cit.}259. Also see, appendix-D.