CHAPTER II

RISE AND GROWTH OF PAN-ISLAM IN INDIA
The very concept of Pan-Islamism has been diversely understood by scholars; there is no unanimity of approach owing to the absence of a definition of the term in Islamic literature.¹

In theory Islam does not believe in any artificial/political, geographical division or nationalities among its followers. Therefore, defining pan-Islamism in a very general way as a sense of unity of all Muslims is in fact as old as Islam itself. However, this might be the case in theory but in reality the circumstances associated with the expansion of Islam did not make possible even the cultural unity not to speak of political unity. Nevertheless, some historians view that Islam transcends nationalism and argue that Pan-Islamism, as a political ideology, is a new phenomenon and emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century.² It seems that the term "Pan-islamism"


² Pan-Islamism has been the subject of studies by a large number of scholars, particularly in the west, over the past hundred years. Literature on the issue is conflicting, but the accepted view is that Pan-Islamism, as a political and ideological movement, was born from 1870 onwards, and put into practice by Abdulhamid. It seems that the main defect of such an approach is that the majority of those scholars who have written on Pan-Islamism, mainly confined their studies to the reign of Abdulhamid and therefore concluded that it was
could have been coined in imitation of "Pan-Slavism" which became popular in the 1870's. Its closest Ottoman equivalents, Ittihad-i-Islam or the terms Ittihad-i-Din andUhuv vet-i-Din carrying similar connotation, had long been used in the correspondence between the Ottomans and the Muslim rulers of India, central Asia and Indonesia.

The Central Asian Khanates utilized these terms while asking for help from the Ottomans. The three khanates of Bukhara (f.1500), Hive (f. 1511), and Hokand (f. 1700), having emerged as a result of the disintegration of the Uzbek empire in Central Asia, soon involved in power struggles among themselves and the external pressures of Russia

...Continued...


4. N.R. Keddie, although she described Ittihad-i-Islam to be a modern coinage, "correctly noted that there was no plausible reason why it could have been used in the classical period "pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism,"Journal of Modern History, Vol. 41, 1969, 20.
and Iran.\textsuperscript{5} The Ottoman Empire, being the strongest Muslim power was the natural country for them to be enamoured to. Moreover, the prestige of the Ottoman Sultans as caliphs had already been established among the central Asian Muslims.\textsuperscript{6} Thus, from the early seventeenth century to the mid-nineteenth century, we do find some Muslim rulers approaching the Ottoman caliphs for help which they thought of as a caliphal responsibility. In 1690, the Uzbek Sultan Subhan Kulu Khan (1680-1703) informed the porte of his difficulties in the expectation that "...the padisah of the Muslims (\textit{Ehi-i-Islam Padisahi}) should help all Muslims."\textsuperscript{7} Again in 1707, in another letter from Ubeydullah Khan (1703-1717), allegiance and prayers were offered for the Ottoman Sultan with the hope that Muslims all over the world would remain united and friendly with each other for it "is the teaching of our religion."\textsuperscript{8}


\textsuperscript{6} Syedi Ali Reis, \textit{Miratul Memalik}, (ed) N. Akyildiz, Istanbul, nd 75-76; quoted in Azmi Ozcan, op. cit., p.47.

\textsuperscript{7} Name Defteri, no.6, 66-70 Basbakanlik Osmanli Arsivi, quoted in M. Saray, \textit{Rus Isgali}, 10-11; quoted in Azmi Ozcan, op. cit., p.47.

\textsuperscript{8} Azmi Ozcan, op. cit., p.47.
The appeals of such nature continued to be made with great emphasis on the responsibility of the Muslims towards each other and the caliphate. There are numerous instances in which the Khanates offered their unconditional services to the porte in accordance with the Islamic spirit of solidarity. Thus, in 1719 when the Ottomans were at war with Russia, Ebulfeyz Khan of Bukhara offered help to Ottomans with a message, that "we are brethren in religion (your enemies) are our enemies and we, as allies (muttefikul Kelime), deem it necessary to destroy them..." 9 At times the Porte too asked for help on the same basis. For example, in 1786, the Sultan wrote to Syed Andulgazi Khan (1758-1785) of Bukhara stating that:

"because there is a unity and solidarity between the sublime porte and the rulers of the lands of Turans... we expect that if hostilities start with Russia, you would send all Muslim priests, and sufis around to pray for the victory of Islam... and mobilize all soldiers ... to the Russian frontiers for Gaza (religious war) and "Jehad". 10

The Sultan also emphasized the importance of his office as caliph and his mission to raise and uplift the name of God (Ila-yi Kelimetullah) and to revive the traditions of

9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
the Prophet (Ihya-yi Sunnet-i-Seniyye), in order to attain the blessings of God (Rizaullah). At the same time the Sultan laid stress on Ittihad-i-Islam as a measure to attain Islamic solidarity and unity. In another letter to the Porte, the Khan of Bukhara, again appealed that if possible a prince or a minister should be deputed by the Sultan to rule over them. He further stated that they were ready to strike coins and include the name of the Sultan in the Khutba because they considered themselves as the Sultan's most "obedient servants." Here it should be noted that these early examples of cooperation and mutual help have all the ingredients of what was commonly referred to as the Pan-Islamism of Abdulhamid in the second half of the 19th century. Thus it is abundantly clear that the extensive usage of religious notions and symbols, the idea of the mobilization of religious dignitaries like the sheikhs, and sufis, the emphasis on the unity and solidarity of the Muslims against foreigners had all been employed long before Abdul-Hamid.

The assurances received by the Ottomans must have been quite satisfying for them but since their power was gradual-

11. Azmi Ozcan, op. cit., p.47.
12. Ibid.
ly dwindling and the land of Turan was far away, the Porte was uneasy about not being able to fulfil its obligations if the offers of these allegiance were formally accepted.

In the Process, despite numerous appeals the Porte could not help, apart from sending some symbolic guns and ammunitions. This was largely because of the fact that the Ottomans were themselves deeply involved in internal conflicts and wars with a number of countries, Greece in 1821, Egypt in 1829, and Russia in 1829 and 1853.

The Central Asian, Khanates were not the only ones to approach the Porte for help. Muslims of Indonesia and Malaysia also sought help. Antony Reid informs us that "according to the Atjehnese (one of the Indonesia Islands) tradition, the Muslims surrendered themselves to the Suzerainty and protection of the Ottoman sultan in the sixteenth century." This was also corroborated by one of the letters to the Porte from Atjeh which stated that since the time of Sultan Selim II (1566-1578) they were under the Ottoman protection. Consequently, the Ottoman military help consisting of about twenty battleships, ammunition, and some


military officers was sent for use against the Portuguese who were engaged in attacking the Atjehnese territory. 15

The relations between the Ottomans and the Indonesian Islands were maintained as time went on. The Indonesians once again turned to the Porte to renew old ties in the face of the Dutch threat. From 1850 onwards, several appeals were made to the Sultan Caliph to declare some of the Islands Ottoman Vassal states so that the Dutch could not interfere. The Sultan responded favourably. For example, in 1850, Sultan Abdulmecid (1839-1861) issued two fermans reiterating the Ottoman protection over Atjeh. 16 However, because of the long distance, between the two countries, this was not more than a symbolic declaration of protection. In the late 1860s when the Dutch hegemony of the area was about to be completed, the Atjehnese Muslims again sought the Porte's protection. The Sultan was also reminded of the earlier grant of vassal status for the Islands and his responsibilities as the sovereign ruler. But the Porte was in no position to take a stand against the Dutch. It hence approached the Dutch government to end hostilities with an

15. Ibid, An Ottoman Canon and an Ottoman flag are reported to have survived to this day; (Ibid).

16. A. Reid, op.cit., 273-274.
offer of mediation, but of course with no outcome. 17

In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is quite clear that by the middle of the 19th century the Muslim of Asia, including India, had developed a strong affiliation with the Ottoman Empire and attachment for the Ottoman Sultan (caliphs). Muslims in these countries had the impression that the Ottoman sultans were the mightiest rulers in the world. They had no idea at all about the true strength of the Ottoman state. It was not only their belief in the Ottoman power, but also the threats posed by non-Muslim powers to their respective countries, that made them turn to the Sultan for help and protection. In their correspondence with the Sultan they emphasized that Muslims were brethren and the Sultan, as caliph of all Muslims, should fulfil his obligations of protecting them. However, by the middle of the 19th century, in practical terms, there was neither an effective universal brotherhood nor the Ottoman Empire a world power of their expectation. Thus, by the 1870s most Muslim countries were subjugated by European powers amidst appeals for help and hopes that the Ottomans would save them from extinction.

But the Ottomans were themselves suffering from a series of politico-economic, and military set backs at the

17. Ibid., 275.
hands of western powers. The frontiers of Islam had long ceased to expand after the unsuccessful attempt to capture Vienna in 1699. On the other hand, the Porte started losing lands to the Christians. The Empire had been heading towards economic crisis since the diversion of the world trade routes from Ottoman lands to the Atlantic Ocean after the establishment of the Dutch and English powers in Asia. Politically, the Empire was not in a position to match the superiority of Europeans. Though the Sultans claimed to be universal caliphs, they were unable to protect the Muslim world; and yet the facade of their power and strength lingered on. In this respect the treat of Kucuk Kaynarca, concluded after a devastating war with Russia in 1774 marked the separation of the first Muslim land, Crimea, from the Empire. It was a turning point in the history of Ottoman caliphate.

This treaty recognized the Ottoman claim to be Caliphate; it was the first international treaty involving the western powers. Article three of the treaty stated that,

18. In 1699, Ottoman failed to capture Vinna after a long Siege. The treaty of Carlowitz between Austria and the Ottoman Empire marked the beginning of the decline of the Ottoman military supremacy in Europe and subsequent territorial shrinkage.

"As to the practices of religion, the Tartars being of the same religion as the Muslims, and his Sultanian Majesty being as supreme Mohammedan caliph, they are to conduct themselves towards him as is prescribed in the rules of their religion, without however, compromising their political and civil independence." 20 There is a general perception that before this treaty, the Ottomans did not have any claim to universal caliphate. However, the evidence does not support such an argument. It is well established that long before the signing of the Kucuk Kaynarca Treaty, Sultan Ahmad III (1703-1730) in a Treaty with Ashraf Shah (1725-1729) of Persia in 1727, had called himself "caliph of the Muslims", and subsequently pressed Nadir Shah (1736-1747) to recognise the claim. 21 Nevertheless, the significance of the Kucuk Kaynarca Treaty lies in the fact that the Sultan's claim to a kind of formal religious jurisdiction over the Muslims outside his sovereign lands was recognised internationally.


The failure of the Tanzimat, the introduction of western liberal reforms, and the increasing doubts about the loyalty of the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire further caused the Muslims to feel that only they should unite to face the European challenge. Muslims were urged to return to traditional Islam under the leadership of the Sultan as the caliph of all Muslims.

It was against this backdrop that the Ottoman intellectuals began formulating ideas and programmes of a Pan-Islamic nature for the survival of the Ottoman Empire. The main thrust of the new current was to resist the European pressure and preserve the integrity of the Empire in the face of internal separatist trends. Their concern was not exclusively limited to the Ottoman Empire though its survival was of primary concern. They feared that if the Ottoman Empire disappeared, there would be nowhere for Muslims to turn.

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22. The Tanzimat were resorted to for seeking a way out guaranteeing the survival of the empire. They aimed to transfer and adopt modern western systems in almost every aspect of the Ottoman way of life. Reforms were introduced in education, the army, and administration. New legal codes were also put into practice and non-Muslims were given greater equality with Muslims. The Tanzimat also propounded a new ideology of "Ottomanism," the ittihad-i-Anasir, which aimed at uniting different nationalities of the Empire in common patriotism and loyalty. For more details see R.H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876, Princeton, 1963.

23. R.H. Davison, op.cit, p. 270.
Thus extensive discussions about the possibility and the necessity of a new state ideology of Ittihad-i-Islam, the Union of all Muslims, started in the press. To begin with, it was an alternative for the Tanzimat's unaccomplished ideology of the Ittihad-i-Anasir, the unity of Ottoman national groups.

The first expressions of the young Ottoman's Pan-Islamic ideology had appeared when they were in London in the late 1860s. They held that the only and the most effective remedy for guaranteeing the survival of the Empire was the Sharia; yet they favoured institutions of the European representative governments and political liberalism saying that these were in fact more Islamic than European. They were, however, firm in their belief the Sultan (caliph), who was entrusted to rule with justice by the Sharia, should remain as head of the state. Thus when they returned home in 1871, they followed the spirit of the ideas and through newspapers like the Ibret and the Basiret they gave expression to their ideas. The Basiret, in particular became an organ of pan-Islamic statements and served as a vehicle of


expression for the Ottoman intellectuals. 26 Pan-Islamism was given definite shape during the reign of Abdulhamid. Articles three and four of the constitution not only designated Islam as the state religion but also state: "The Ottoman Sultans, as the exalted caliphs of Islam, belongs to the eldest member of the house of Osman... His Excellency the Padish as caliph, is the protector of the religion of Islam..." 27

When Abdulhamid came to power, the nation was not only experiencing the legacy of the Tanzimat reforms but was also on the verge of a major confrontation with Russia. As a result of the collapse of the Tanzimat reforms, the Empire was in a state of bankruptcy under the heavy burden of foreign loans. Still worse, the growth of separatism among the non-Muslim subjects was increasingly encouraged by the interventions of the European powers. 28 The war with Russia reinforced the Ottomans's realization of their isolation. During and after the war, the porte had repeatedly asked the signatories of the Treaty of Paris (1856) to protect the


Ottoman integrity as they had guaranteed to do so but in vain. Abdulhamid felt particularly bitter about the British attitude.

The long pursued policy was forsaken with the coming of Gladstone to power in 1880. Britain was now more interested in the future of Armenia. Turkey was no longer a country to be wooed and won, but an Asiatic intruder in Europe to be kept in its place and an Islamic empire on the fringe of Christendom to be liquidated. How could a Muslim power maintain itself in Europe? The Ottoman Empire was an outdat-ed theocracy which had no further use for British interests. The earlier, it was wiped off the face of the earth, the better it would be for the west. In 1881 the Porte was forced by the European powers to cede considerable portion to Greece in the Balkans. Meanwhile Tunis was occupied by France in the same year. A year later Britain herself occupied Egypt pretending that she did so in the name of the Sultan-Caliph to enforce law and order.

It was in this background that Abdulhamid II was left with only one option Pan-Islamism. Abdulhamid's Pan-Islamism had two dimensions and distinct aims one regarding the Muslims within and the other the Muslims outside the Empire. Within the Empire, Islam was emphasized as the main pillar
of the state as opposed to Ottomanism. Abdulhamid held the view that his Empire was based on Islamic principles.

It was Islam that kept different groups of the Empire like the members of one family. Therefore, the stress should not be on Ottomanism but on Islam... because the social structure and the political of our Empire is based upon religion.29

In his memoirs he wrote: "In our Empire patriotism... (Vatan fikri) should not precede the love of religion and the caliph.30 He was fully aware of the shortcomings of the educational systems which did not impart adequate instruction about religion. He complained that the curriculum in the educational institutions were not enough to implant the love for religion, the Padish and the motherland in the minds of the students who as a result, cannot counteract the devious propaganda of the "ill willed".

The implication of such an understanding were that during his reign education, especially religious education, was encouraged and more funds were made available to improve its quality so as to enable Muslims to benefit from it, and


30. Abdulhamid, op. cit, p.181; (quoted in Azmi Ozcan, op.cit., p. 79).
compete more successfully with their Christian counterparts. Pensions and salaries, paid to ulema and other officials were increased, Mosques and other religious institutions were restored and more funds were allotted for their upkeep. 31 There was increasing emphasis on the concept and importance of the caliphate. "He (Abdulhamid) was especially sensitive on the subject of his position and authority as caliph," wrote Henry Lanyard, the British ambassador in Istanbul (1877-80). 32

As for the Muslims living outside the Ottoman Empire, Abdulhamid felt deeply about the fact that the majority of them were under foreign rule, but he did not consider them as an obstruction to unity as they could be spiritually linked to the caliphate. 33 Thus he expected that a world Muslim public opinion in his favour would strengthen his position in dealing with the European powers. He wrote, "we must strengthen our links with the Muslims of other lands and get closer to each other. The only hope for our future lies in this idea." 34 Again, he asserted,

32. Layard to Salisbury, Laylard papers, MSS 39132/16, 82.
34. Ibid.
As long as the union of Islam continues, England, France, Russia and Holland can be counted on my finger tips, because in the Muslim lands now under their domination even one word of the caliph would be enough for starting a Jehad against them which would be catastrophe for the Christians. 35

He particularly acknowledged the Indian Muslims' support and dedication for the cause of caliphate. He wrote, "The viceroys used to put pressure on the British government to be friendly with us. Obviously, this was making our affairs a bit easier". Regarding the Indian Muslims he asked.

Is there any Muslim governor, commissioner etc, in India? Do the Muslims possess wealth and power any more? Do they have any weapon in their hands in case they may have to defend themselves? Is there any Indian member of parliament in England, to defend the rights of millions of the Indians even by word? The British do nothing except exploiting the Indian wealth and power and treating them (Indians) like animals.36

35. Ibid.

36. Yee, 4-2006 72-4; (quoted in Azmi Ozcan, op.cit., p. 79).
On another occasion he predicted, one day the time for revenge will come for the Indians who then will liberate themselves from the British yoke. Indian with her millions of population could, if they really wished, easily expel the British who are sucking and oppressing them. However, these expressions of strong feelings seemed to be of a personal and private nature. In actual practice not much was done except the Porte protesting openly and officially whenever there was news of alleged maltreatment or oppression of Muslims.

There is no evidence to prove that Abdulhamid ever claimed political sovereignty over the Muslims outside his dominion. But he was persistent in exercising his caliphal rights to appoint religious officials to the former Ottoman territories, now under foreign rule in order to maintain his influence among the Muslim residents of these territories as well as meet their religious needs. He thus, personally selected and appointed the muftis, qazis, and teachers who were sent to Egypt, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Crimea and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

37. Abdulhamid, op.cit., p. 155
38. Ibid., pp 176-177.
Abdulhmaid II always wanted cordial relations with Iran. The Shah of Iran was reported to have expressed his deep conviction that the two countries should develop cordial relations in line with the spirit of Islamic solidarity. In the meantime the efforts made by the Christian subjects of the Porte for a union among themselves promoted a more radical approach to Shia-Sunni unity in 1894. In order to achieve this uphill task, Abdulhamid sought, Jama-luddin Afghani's help, then in Istanbul, and asked him to prepare a confidential report as to the possibilities and the means of such union. This sharp move seemed to have been partly the result of Afghani's earlier letter to Abdulhamid in this regard which had been written when the latter was in London in 1892.

After getting the imperial letter, Afghani responded enthusiastically. Although, Afghani's report is not available, but the formation of a society in 1894 by the Iranian residents in Istanbul suggests that Afghani's ideas were

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40. Yildiz Esas Evragi, I-156-XXV-156-3, BOA. Although Afghani's name was not stated as addressee, the evidence within the letter leaves no doubt that it was written to him.

41. The English translation of this letter is in J.M. Landu, "Al-Afghan's Pan-Islamic project", Islamic Culture, XXVI, July 1952, 50-54.
appreciated by Abdulhamid. In his inauguration speech of this society, Afghani presented the members with an allegory, suggesting that Islam was like a ship under the command of the Prophet with Muslims as its passengers. Today, he lamented, this ship has been caught in a storm and is threatened by various internal and external forces. He then enquired what were the responsibilities of the passengers. Should they save the ship first or help its sinking through discords and disagreements among themselves? Afghani, finally asked his audience to write every acquaintance and friends, especially the Shia ulema of Iran, India, and the Arab lands about the necessity of unity and solidarity among Muslims. It was reported that two hundred replies were received from different parts. These results are mentioned in the memoirs of Abdulhamid: "Jamaluddin kindled a ray of hope for Shia-Sunni unity. This would be an enormous accomplishment for Islam." However, despite all the progress, Abdulhamid did not trust Afghani fully due to his association with Wilfred Blunt and his scheme of an Arabic caliphate as well as his friendly relations with the "young

43. N.R. Keddie, op.cit., p.381.
44. Ibid.
45. Abdulhamid, op.cit., p.179.
Turks". The result was that Afghani, was kept under strict surveillance and his freedom was curtailed in various ways. In these circumstances, it was quite natural that Afghani lost all his enthusiasm and was so depressed that he was ready to do anything to escape from Istanbul and finally died in 1897.

The Anglo-Russian rivalry in the 1860 and the British efforts to build an Anglo-Islamic block against Russia and their policy of appeasing the sentiments of their Muslim subjects in India also played an important role in pan-Islamic movement. The British government consciously followed a policy of exploitation of the Ottoman Sultan's position as caliph to mobilise Muslim support for its imperial designs in Asia and particularly in India. As early as 1799, the British government had induced Sultan Salim III to write letter to Tipu Sultan, the ruler of Mysore, to establish cordial relations with the British. In the Latter half of the nineteenth century, this policy was followed on a large scale to prevent Russian expansion in Central Asia which threatened the British Empire in India. 46 They posed themselves as defender of the Sultan and frequently impressed upon the Indian Muslims that a close community

46. R.L. Shukla, Britain, India and the Turkish empire 1853-1882, pp., 124-25.
interests existed between them and the Sultan. There was a
great deal of talk about the British empire as being the
greatest Muslim power in the world. 47

At the outbreak of the Indian revolt of 1857 the Brit-
ish tried to win over the Muslims to their side by obtaining
the Sultan's condemning of the atrocities committed by the
mutineers. The note from the Sultan, warned the Indian
Muslims that they would incur his displeasure and fall in
his estimation, if they were not friendly to the British.
The British were mentioned as the defenders of Islam and as
a proof cited their help to the Sultan in the Crimean war. 48

In their efforts to organise an Anglo-Islamic front
against Russia the British utilised the services of some
newspapers published at Istanbul and circulated chiefly
among the Muslims of Central Asia, Afghanistan and India. A
pro-British Arabic newspaper Al-Jawaib was subsidized by the
government. One hundred copies of the newspaper were pur-
chased at the cost of £1.5 per annum and sent to India for
circulation among Muslim divines for promoting British
interest and Pan-Islamic ideas in India and Afghanistan. 49

47. Arnold j. Toybee, ed. Survey of International Affairs,
48. R.L. Shukla, ibid., p. 130.
49. R.L. Shukla, ibid., p. 130.
Two other papers in Persian, Alakhtar and the Akhbar dai-ul-Khilafat, established by the Porte for promoting its cause in the war, were principally meant for India and Central Asia, and enjoyed the blessings of the British. The British government allowed the Turkish consul-general at Bombay to get a wide circulation for them in India. 50

British use of the caliphate constituted an important chapter in her policy in Asia and more particularly in India. Britain deliberately magnified the position of the Sultan/Caliph in the eyes of the Muslim world. They were guided by twin motives, to ensure Muslim allegiance to their rule in India and to build an Anglo-Islamic block against Russia, their arch-rival in Asia. Deprived of their ruling status by the British, the Indian Muslims could not reconcile to the idea and posed an internal threat to the British rule. However, the British continued a well calculated policy of winning over the Muslim loyalty. On the other hand, Russian expansion in Central Asia, posed as an external threat to the British so they thought that Central Asian Muslims, who by themselves were unable to resist Russian pressure, could be brought into an Anglo-Islamic front to check her further advance. And for these purposes, the

50. Political and Secret Home correspondence, vol. XVI, Feb-April, 1877.
influence of the Sultan as caliph was sought to be put to good use.

Whatever might have been the outcome, the manner in which the caliphate was used by the British, clearly demonstrates British intrigue for their imperial interests. They did not hesitate to use and promote religious obscurantism. Thus pan-Islamism in India was partly the product of British policy and propaganda. Perhaps Pan-Islamism would not have developed into an important movement had there been no support from the British in the beginning.

The weakness of the Ottoman Empire as revealed by the crisis had a shocking impact upon the Indian Muslims. Hence, they followed the events in the Balkans and Eastern Europe with keen interest and anxiety. Their primary concern was to defend and to support the Ottomans. Indian Muslims active support for Turkey began in 1876. The Friend of India, referred to a significant movement among the Muslims for supporting the Sultan. They held numerous meetings throughout the length and breadth of India and sent addresses to the English queen and the secretary of state for Indian requesting them to take up the cause of Turkey against Russia.

Many appeals from Mecca and elsewhere called upon the Indian Muslims to help Turkey by raising subscriptions.
Saiyad Suleman Effendi, head of the Islamic community at Baghdad, sent his brother Khalifa Haji Mustan Saheb to India to encourage to contribute generously to the Turkish fund. On his arrival in Bombay he issued a circular for contributions to all Muslims in India, and his appeal bore fruit.

Meetings were held, subscriptions raised and relief fund centers were opened at many places, such as Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Hyderabad, Baroda, Lucknow, Amritasar, Muzaffarpur, etc. A Bombay meeting drew up a circular intended to be printed in Arabic, Urdu, Gujarati and English and to be presented after signature to the British government, and this appeal requested for maintaining old friendship with Turkey. The Anjuman-i-Islam of Bombay also decided at a meeting on 16 September 1876 to open a relief fund for the Turkish victims of war and to present a petition to the Empress of India for supporting Turkey against Russia.51

In May 1877, the Government of India initiated a secret and informal inquiry into the Muslim movement in India in support of Turkey. The various local authorities were asked to report confidentially and keep a careful watch over Muslim feelings and over their communications in the Muslims

51. The Friend of India, 16 and 19 August 1876, and the Hindu Patriot, 29 January 1877.
outside India. They were to inquire into the alleged appeal by some Muslim dignitaries at Mecca to the Indian Muslims to join the war and the reported attempt to enlist Muslim sympathy against the Christians and Christian rule generally. But Lytton, then Viceroy of India himself did not attach any importance to the alleged anti-Christian tendency among the Indian Muslims. He, on the contrary, believed that their sympathy for the Turks was co existen- sive with a feeling at present favourable to the British.

Following the instructions of the central government the Bengal authorities took measures to keep a silent watch over several mosques, the railway stations and over the arrival and departure of Arab ships. However, meetings continued to be held in Calcutta from time to time and Friday prayers at mosques were used to allude to the war, but the Bengal government noticed no general excitement among the Muslims. It did not anticipate the out break of a Jehad in Bengal, inspite of the resolutions passed at a meeting on 13 June 1877. But since the Sheikh-ul-Islam had declared the war to be a religious one, a Jehad was incum-

52. Home Deptt Public B Proceeding, Feb 1878 administra- tions, 10 May 1877.
53. Ibid
bent upon all Indian Muslims.\textsuperscript{54}

At about this time Anjuman-i-Islam of Delhi was founded, for collecting funds for the relief of the Turkish victims of war. Haji Qutbuddin was its president and Asghar Ali its Secretary. The Anjuman organized meetings every Sunday and kept open a subscription list at its office. The first consul-general at Bombay, Haji Qutubuddin received a letter of thanks from certain Moulvis of Mecca. The letter appreciated the zeal and efforts of the Indian Muslims in support of the Turks. It asserted that the Turkish empire and the followers of Islam were pleased at the conduct of the Indian Muslims and wanted them to continue their noble exertions, for it was incumbent on all Muslims to help the Sultan.\textsuperscript{55}

In Madras sermons calling for war against Russia were preached in mosques, but the government found no sign of hostility towards the Christians as such. All this was also true of Malabar. The Muslims there seemed to expect that England would ultimately come for the help of Turkey. At the same time, there was a feeling that if this did not happen,

\textsuperscript{54} R.L. Shukla, Britain, India and the Turkish Empire, 1853-1882.

\textsuperscript{55} Foreign Deptt. Secret, September 1877, Nos 2-3 and 7-8.

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it might give rise to anti-British sentiment in India.\textsuperscript{56}

The government of India watched Indian Muslims movement for some time and found that generally it was not anti-British. Hence it adopted a permissive attitude, which implied some measures of official encouragement to it. And this attitude proved to be wise, for the movement was directed against Russia only. Deep sympathy with Turkey was matched by corresponding hatred of Russia among the Muslims. An Arabic pamphlet, issued from Mecca and addressed to the Muslims of various countries, exhorted them to forge a united front and start a Jehad against Russia. It highlighted Russian oppression in Central Asia and other Muslim countries, and her designs on India and Turkey. According to it, assisting the Turkish empire amounted to constructing a strong fortification for protecting India from the machinations of Russia.\textsuperscript{57}

The Hindu Patriot's appraisal of the Muslim sympathy with Turkey is objective and dispassionate. A long editorial entitled "The Indian Mussalmans" tried to account for the usually keen interest taken by the Muslims in the Turkish question and analysed its scope and character. The editor

\textsuperscript{56} Madras government to Govt. of India, 25 June 1877, no. 226.

\textsuperscript{57} Crux of the Pamphlet circulated throughout India in the Summer of (1877).
wrote that the Muslims were utterly indifferent when the integrity of the Turkish empire was threatened in 1853 but they now took active interest in Turkish policies, made petitions for protecting the Porte, raised subscriptions and keenly watched the movements of the European powers.58

In another editorial entitled "The Hindu Feeling about the war", the editor tried to account for the Hindu sympathy with Turkey, which had puzzled some European writers. He expressed that although the Hindus had no common cultural and religious heritage with the Turks, they felt a sort of cosmopolitan interest in the war because the Turks were an Asian Power and their achievements had some value in the eyes of Asians.59

When the actual war broke out between the Ottomans and the Russians in 1877, it was obvious that the Indian Muslims concern, and support for the Ottomans was to increase in intensity and gain further momentum. Once again the government of India was showered with innumerable petitions condemning Russian action and demand British support for the Ottomans. Educated Muslims drew attention to the dangerous consequences if Britain failed to back the Ottomans. The

58. The Hindu Patriot, 29 January 1877.
59. The Hindu patriot, 29 August, 1877.


Aligarh Institute Gazette openly warned the government, that "... The Mussalmans will hate the English as they do the Russians now". The paper argued, its effect would be far-reaching as Muslims would be alienated from the British which may not be bridged even after thousand years. The government was also reminded that the Ottoman defeat would endanger the British interest in India because of the Russian threat. The Qaisar ul-Akhbar observed:

The Turks being Mussalmans have no ally in Europe. All the Christian powers form the opposite party. We ought to regret that in want of unity, the Muhammadan world left the Turks to shift for themselves. The Turkish empire was the pride of the Muhammadan world, therefore the present misfortune of the Turks grieve us more than the Turks. Another paper, the Anwar ul-Akhbar, went even further and carried, "If the integrity of the Ottoman Empire is injured, our recognition, our honour and our lives will be imperilled".

But the most outstanding contribution of Indo-Muslim concern was the enormous amount of money that poured into the relief funds opened throughout the country. There are

60. Aligarh Institute Gazette, 9 March L/R/5/55 India Office Records.


62. Anwar ul-Akhbar 1 August 1877, L/R/5/54, ibid.
contradictory accounts in the Muslim press as to how much money was collected in India.\textsuperscript{63} Although it is very difficult to estimate the exact amount, the official Ottoman registers show that it was around 124,843 Ottoman liras,\textsuperscript{64} which was above 10 lakhs of Indian rupees.\textsuperscript{65} Pro-Ottoman feeling was high to the extent that at some places women sold their ornaments in order to contribute to the funds.\textsuperscript{66} Its significance could be better judged when we bear in mind the fact that about the same time a terrible famine had engulfed Bengal, Bombay and Madras during which around six-million lives were reported to have perished.\textsuperscript{67} Yet the contributions of the Indian Muslims were by far the largest in the entire Muslim world. Hindus, too, contributed to the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{63} Some papers went to assert that as much as 33 crores of rupees were collected, see \textit{Shams-ul-Akhbar}, 30 June, 1877, \textit{Umat-ul-Akhbar}, 20 June, 1877, L/R/5/104 IOR.
\item \textsuperscript{64} \textit{Defter-i-Iane-i-Hindiyye}, 108. This was stated as the total amount that reached Istanbul by the end of the war through various channels such as the Ottoman Bank and the newspaper \textit{Al-Jawaib}.
\item \textsuperscript{65} \textit{Punjab-i-Akhbar}, 9 March 1878 K/R/5/55. IOR. The amount was given to the paper by the Ottoman consul general at Bombay.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Qeyamuddin Ahmad, "A study of the Attempts for Indo Turkish collaboration against the British," proceedings of Indian Historical Congress, session XXVII, Allahabad, 1954, Pub. 1956, p. 345
\item \textsuperscript{67} Florance Nightingale, "The people of India, "Nineteenth century, August, 1878, 195, in N.Y. Abbasi, The Genesis of Muslim fundamentalism in India and Pakistan, New Delhi, 1987, p. 120.
\end{itemize}
Ottoman relief funds in some parts of India. But Hindu support for the Ottoman was primarily due to the fact that the Ottoman Empire was an Asian power and therefore deserved help in its hour of need.⁶⁸

According to Lytton, the Muslim loyalty in India much depended on the policy of the British government to the Ottomans. Writing to Salisbury, he held that "THE strength of our rule will be seriously weakened if we deliberately alienate their loyalty by recklessly outraging their feelings".⁶⁹ To avoid this, Lytton repeatedly urged the Home government to help the Porte against the Russians. In order to convince the British government he tried various methods. He exaggerated the possible "Muslim danger" in India. "If the Muslims were convinced that England was helping Russia in the spoilation of Turkey and saw her sharing the plunder," he wrote.

We should not only have to reckon on a real Jehad all around our frontier, but in every Anglo-Indian home there would be a traitor, a foe, and possibly an assassin. Such a danger might possibly be more difficult to deal with than

⁶⁸. Benaras Akhbar, 5 April 1877, L/R/54, IOR.
⁶⁹. Lytton to Salisbury, 21 May and 23 June, 1877, Lytton papers, E. 218/19, vol. II.
the mutiny which cost us such an effort to suppress. 70

It will be relevant to note that even Lytton was not altogether against the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. He favoured, if the circumstances were propitious for the British interests. 71 Thus, he questioned the traditional British policy towards Turkey and wrote,

"I think during the last twenty years, at least, British policy should have steadily aimed, not at a chance shown in the Russian spoilation of Turkey but at the gradual inheritance of the whole Mediterranean East... Had English diplomacy in Turkey been far reaching, and as pertinacious as the Russian one, it ought to have enabled us to become the maires du Palais of the rois faireants of Istanbul, keeping the destinies of the Sultan in our own hands, but

70. Ibid., 21 May 1877.

71. Correspondence between salisbury and Lytton, the Viceroy of India. Salisbury wrote in 1877 that "the old policy of defending English interest by sustaining the Ottoman dynasty has become impracticable and I think that the time has come for defending English interests in a more direct way by some territorial rearrangement". Lady G. Cecil, The Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury, vol. II, 1921, 130. Lytton responded, "I fully share your impression that under certain circumstances the disintegration of the Turkish Empire must be as serviceable to British interests as maintenance of that empire, or even so; and I also agree with you, that were one free to choose between these two opposite policies the one best for us would be the one we believed ourselves best able to carry out to a distinctly foreseen and deliberately preferred result of our own choosing". Lytton to Salisbury, 23 June 1877, Lytton papers, E.218/19, vol.II.
imperfectly reducing him to much the same position as Pope. Thus if we could not keep our sister empire alive, we should at least have been the heirs of her property and the owners of her sepulchre". 72

The part played by the vernacular press during the war was not liked by Lytton. He suspected that its "vicious tone" would lead to some anti-British mischief. Therefore, he decided to gag it by vernacular Press Act. In a letter to Northbrook, he justified this legislation on the ground that the language press was spreading sedition. He further wrote"... what determined my decision finally in favour of prompt, and stringent repression legislation was the altogether abnormal, and daily increasing, excitement, of the native communities throughout India, in reference to passing events in Turkey. 73 The pro-Turkish movement in India during the Russo-Turkish war had not altogether been free from anti-British feelings. A Muslim meeting held at Matia- buraj in Calcutta on 30 March 1878 expressed anti-British feeling and talked of a Russo-Turkish alliance for driving the English out of India. But the government attached no significance to it, for the meeting was organized by the

72. Lytton to Salisbury 10 June 1877, Lytton paper, E. 218/19, vol. II
73. Lytton papers, 518/3, Lytton to Northbrook. 25 April 1878.
Muslims of Awadh whom the British considered to be notoriously hostile to their rule. 74 Another Muslim meeting held on 31 March 1878 at Haji Zacaria's Mosque in the same city accused England of behaving badly with the Sultan. It welcomed the conclusion of peace between Russia and Turkey and wished that the Porte should go to war with England with the help of Russia and Afghanistan. 75

Since the Russo-Turkish war the Khutba was read at the chief mosques every Friday in the name of Sultan Abdul Hamid, a sign of the growing Indian consciousness of the caliphate. The Calcutta Muslims generally believed that England was hostile to the Porte and that the news of Turkish affairs was intercepted by the government of India. Several Nakhoda merchants in Calcutta had obtained certificates from the Turkish Consul-general at Bombay that they were Turkish, and not British, subjects. 76

The Indo-Muslim enthusiasm during the Russo-Turkish war was in many ways unique and unprecedented. It was unique because nowhere else in the Muslim world there was such a large scale and heartfelt sympathy for the Ottomans. It was

74. Foreign Deptt. Secret, April 1878, Nos. 230-31/
75. Ibid.
76. F.D. Secret, Nov. 1881, No. 86.
unprecedented because Indo-Muslim public opinion for the first time manifested itself in a institutionalized form as a united body through several organisations and newspapers. The Ottoman activities among the Indian Muslims were primarily centered around financial benefits which were expected from them. In doing so, the obvious target was to appeal to the religious sentiments of the Indian Muslims, which evidently bore fruit and they were able to evoke support for their cause. The Ottomans failed to achieve their second objectives, i.e. that the Muslim support in India would force the British government in their favour against the Russians. This was not because of any lack of support by the Muslims but because of the firm stand of the British government. Salisbury was quite adamant on this point. "It is somewhat startling to have our foreign policy in Europe prescribed to us by people whom we have conquered in the East". 77

Nevertheless, by the time the war was over, it became clear that Abdulhamid's fame and prestige as the caliph of all Muslims had reached the remotest villages of India.

During the post-Turko-Russian war period there was a widespread resentment in Turkey against Britain because of

77. Salisbury to Lytton, 29 June, 1877 Lytton paper, E.4 a. IOR.
her alleged attitude during and after the war. This resent­ment, coupled with the burgeoning anti-British feelings, was also bound to manifest itself in India.

The assessment of the government in general and that P.D.Henderson (Govt's special agent) in particular seems to have underrated the anti-British feelings of the Muslims. Henderson found "no deep sympathy" between the Indian Mus­lims and Turkey, and the idea of spiritual supremacy of the Sultan did not seem to him likely to take firm roots among them. The large sums described by the Muslims were not index of their sympathy with Turkey, but merely a diversion to attract popular attention when there was nothing else to do. He thought that "smallest skirmish in Afghanistan would attract more attention than half a dozen plevnas". If the British could arrive at a successful settlement of the Kabul question he did not think they "need have any other cause of disquietude".78 A.C. Lyall, Secretary to the Government of India's foreign department, sharply differed from Hinderson and attached much more importance to the influence of Con­stantinople on India than that of Afghanistan. He stated that "when the Afghan war has ended the present political sympathies with the Afghans will quiet down. On the other hand, I have for some years held that the interest of Moham-

78. F.D. Secret, March 1881, Nos. 49-90.
madans in the fortunes of the Turkish Sultanate is keen and growing, and I believe that the collapse of the Osmanli power will be much felt in India. No Mehommedans of political instincts and ambition can fail to realise the serious blow to Islam that of the Sultan's fall must involve".

Further proof of the intensity of a pan-Islamic sentiment in India is furnished by correspondence on the Egyptian affairs. It shows the British nervously apprehending a serious outburst of Muslim feelings in India, if the Sultan were not persuaded to tolerate their policy in Egypt. Ripon, privately wrote to Harington that if the British got involved in an open quarrel with the Sultan over Egyptian questions, there would be a serious flare up of Muslim feelings against the British in India. 79 When the question of sending Indian troops to Egypt arose lord Northbrook, the first lord of the Admiralty, was advised against it, "to avoid the pan-Islamic sentiment penetrate into the Muslims in the Indian army. It was feared that every Muslim soldier sent to Egypt would return an apostle of Pan-Islamism and be a focus of intrigue against the British. 80

The newspaper, which unnerved the British government was Paik-i-Islam, published in urdu and Turkish in Istanbul under the full knowledge of the Porte.81 The first issue of the paper came out in May 1880. Its object, as described by its Indian editor, Nusrat Ali Khan, was to forge close relations between the Indian Muslims and the Ottomans, to explain to the Muslims in India the necessity of their recognizing the caliphate of the sultan; and to inform and address the Indian Muslims on religious and political matters.82 After the first issue, it was reported by the British Embassy in Istanbul that a large number of copies had been sent to India with a view to promoting the interest of Islam by advocating a kind of Islamic union hostile to the British rule.83 The Indian government was instructed by London to take necessary measures.84 The paper appeared to be seen only in Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, and received by only a few persons. Elsewhere, it was almost unknown, therefore it was unlikely to have had any influence.85

81. F.D.Sec. June 1881, nos. 297-311 NAI.
82. Ibid.
83. F.D. Sec. March, 1881, no. 89, NAI.
84. Govt. of India to secretary of State for India, 28 Sept. 1880, F.D. Sec. Nov. 1881, no 89 NAI.
85. "Memo by Major Hendorson," F.D. Sec. Mar 1881, no. 90 and See E.Aug. 1881, nos. 146-1161 NAI.
According to Major Hinderson, the government's special agent, the paper did not even contain any seditious material. The only expression to which an objection could be raised was the title of Khalifa-i-Hind which was applied among others to the Sultan. 86 Nevertheless, even before the views of the Government of India were received, the British Foreign office strongly demanded its suppression. Thus the Porte was obliged to stop the publication of the Paik-i-Islam shortly after its appearance. 87

The Pan-Islamic policy of the Sultan was not without success. It undoubtedly made Muslims all over the world more conscious of the geo-political situations of the time. This can be noticed in the widespread concern among the Muslims around the world over the relatively insignificant Greco-Turkish war of 1897.

The year 1911, marked a new phase in the development of the Pan-Islamic movement, in the subcontinent and gave a new dimension to Indian Muslim solidarity with the rest of the Muslim world. In September 1911, Italy attacked Tripoli, the last outpost of the Ottoman Empire on the African continent, and on 4th November 1911 formally proclaimed her

86. Ibid.
87. F.D. Sec. June, nos. 279-311 and Nov. 1881, nos. 81098, NAI.
annexation of Tripoli and Benghazi. 88

The news of the war created a sensation among the Indian Muslims and anxious inquiries were made whenever possible as to the latest situation. 89 Once again subscriptions were raised and virtually hundreds of meetings were held throughout the subcontinent to express support for Turkey and to condemn what they regarded as "Italy's brigandage". 90

Syed Ameer Ali, President of the London branch of the All India Muslim League, recorded his protest in a letter published in the Times of London. He pointed out that the Italian example would provoke a war of creeds and races for the spoilation of Turkey, and the process of reconciliation,

88. Shaw and Shaw, op.cit., 289-290.

89. Comrade, 7 Oct. 1911. A weekly: "the war is now the one topic of conversation among Muhammadans, who are daily growing more and more excited over the wrongs suffered by Turkey. passengers in the Durbar Railway trains also are seen eagerly reaching and discussing the latest newspapers war supplements, and even Khansamahs and other muhammadan Servants employed in various camps are said to be taking an extra-ordinarily interest in the war news. The sober treatment of the subject that first characterized the utterances of leading muslim journals is fast disappering, and is giving way to denunciation of European powers in general and of Italy in particular: H. Poll. B. Jan. 1912, nos. 121-123.

90. See for the names of organizations and the places of the meetings, L/Pes/10/196, no. 1804, 1824, IRO.
presumably between Christian and Muslims, would be thrown back by centuries. 91

The Bengalee expressed deep sympathy for Turkey. The paper remarked that when she was rapidly assimilating western methods of government, a European nation embarked upon war of spoiliation against her. 92

Meetings were held at several places in India to express sympathy for the Turks. A private meeting claimed to be held in Calcutta and resolved to start a movement to collect funds for the Ottoman Red Crescent Society. For this purpose a central committee was formed, and it was proposed to set up similar committees throughout India. 93

The council of All India Muslim League passed a resolution voicing the feelings of Indian Muslims against Italian aggression and advised Muslims to boycott Italian goods of all kinds. The Government of India received numerous representatives and resolutions from Individuals and Muslim Organizations, mostly passed at public meetings after Friday prayers in mosque. 94

91. Letter quoted by Comrade, 7 Oct, 1911.
92. Bengalee (Calcutta), 6, Oct. 1911.
93. Comrade (Calcutta) 7 Oct. 1911.
94. F.D. Section E, Feb. 1912, Nos. 265-317, NAI
The opinion of non-Muslims, though less exciting, was hardly different. The Bengalee of Calcutta, contended that a "strong and settled" Turkey would be a best guarantee to European peace, whereas a weak 'dismembered and disintegrat-ed' Turkey would be a prey to her strong neighbors and menace to European peace. The paper argued that in the present instance it was Italy, tomorrow it could be Australia and day after Russia, because "the strong are never made an excuse to attack the weak". In its view, it would be shortsighted policy of England to allow them to fight.95 It was also apprehended that the Italian occupation of Tripoli might make the position of Persia inevitable between England and Russia.96

When Britain refused to allow the Turkish troops and reinforcements passing through Egypt to Tripoli, it caused further resentment among Indian Muslims.97 It was expressed that the war was not a simple struggle between Italy and Turkey. If Turkey surrendered today it would be the turn of Persia and Afghanistan next.98 Viquarul Mulk's immediate response was that Muslims could no longer place their reli-

95. The Bengalee, 10 oct. 1911.
96. The Nayak (Calcutta), 15 Nov. 1911.
97. Aligarh Institute Gazette 1 Nov. 1911.
98. Urdu-i-Mualla (Aligarh) Nov. 1911.
ance on Government and they have to rely on the grace of God and themselves. 99

The North-west-Frontier Province had been lying aloof to these developments, but gradually its isolation was breaking down owing to the improved means of communication and the spread of education. Hence there was now a general interest in politics among the educated and a steady growth of Pan-Islamic feeling among all classes and all regions of the sub-continent. 100

In Bombay there existed widespread sympathy for Turkey on the Tripolitan war. It was interpreted as a step in the general policy of European repression against Islam. This belief was supposed to have been strengthened by visiting emissaries from Persia, Turkey and Egypt in order to spread pan-Islamism. 101

In Bengal, Muslim newspapers moulded the opinion of the educated classes. The boycott of Italian goods was strongly advocated and a Red Crescent Society was established to


100. George Ross K. Chief commissioner, NWFP, to H. Wheeler Secretary to Govt. Fo India, Home Deptt. 6. Sept 1912, Pro No. 47 NAI

101. C.C. Watson, Acting Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Bombay to the Secretary to the govt. of India, Home Deptt. 21 oct. 1912. pro No. 50 NIA.
collect funds for Turkey. In these circumstances the Bengal government believed that Turkish success might have more embarrassing than Turkish reverse.\(^\text{102}\) Interestingly, this report made no mention of the enthusiastic support and sympathy extended by the nationalist press like the Bengalee of Surendranath Banerjee, the Amrit Bazar Patrika of Calcutta and nationalist leaders like B.C. Pal, Shyam Sundra Chakravarty and the Swadeshi advocate Maulvi Liaqat Hussain to the Turkish cause.

In the light of foregoing observations, it could be concluded that the events of 1911 paved the way for a further but this time better organized and broad based pan-Islamic developments. The Hindus, too, were moved by this upsurge and supported the Muslims in their desperation, but this was generally for different reasons as they saw the possibility of Hindu-Muslim unity against the British government. "All Indians felt the sympathy and anxiety", wrote Nehru, but in the case of Muslims this was Keener and something almost personal. The last remaining Muslim power was threatened with extinction; the sheet-anchor of their faith

\(^{102}\) C.J. Stevenson Moore, Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Bengal to the Secretary to the Govt. of India, Home Deptt. 28-29 Oct 1912, pro. No. 51, NAI.
in the future was being destroyed.103

For the first time, from British point of view, the pan-Islamism of the young Turks as being "offensive", contrary to its "defensive" nature under Abdulhamid.104 They knew that the pro-Turkish movements in India did not yet take an anti-British character,105 but Muslim feelings in general were sensed as being much less satisfactory than before.106 Nevertheless, it became clear that pan-Islamism in India had developed into a major force.

The years 1912 and 1913 gave a boost to the pan-Islamic movement in India. Hardly the wounds of the Italian invasion had been cured that Turkey was stormed by yet another crisis of a high magnitudes when Montenegro, Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia attacked Turkey. The war popularly known as the First Balkan war started in October, 1912 and continued upto May, 1913 resulting in defeat and loss of territory to Turkey.107

103. J. Nehru, The Discovery of India, Bombay, 1960, p. 349,


105. Questionary by the Army and Note by H. White, H.POLL D, July 1912, no. 16. NAI.

106. H. POLL A, Mar 1913, no. 53, NAI.

Great Britain adopted a neutral policy throughout the war, despite repeated requests made by the Indian Muslims to intervene in the interest of Turkey. The neutral stand of Britain caused resentment against the British Rule and widened the scope of pan-Islamism in India. The Balkan wars caused wide spread anxiety among the Indian Muslims as regards the British and convinced the Muslims of the machiavellian trait in British diplomacy and they were led to feel that the British professions of friendship were insincere. 108

Indian Muslims, especially among the articulate section of the Muslim community. It was thought that the real aim of the conspiracy was that the young Turks might not successfully carry out reforms and consolidate the Turkish Empire. Nehru wrote, "the Balkan wars aroused an astonishing wave of sympathy in the Muslims of India and all Indians felt that anxiety and sympathy". 109

Muslim feelings were shared, with some moderation by the nationalists. Bipin Chandra Pal and some other leaders attended meetings and spoke in support of Turkey. Pal

asserted that Turkey be preserved in Europe with its different races, creeds and religions because it was only place where nationalism would grow in perfection. At Surat in a public meeting presided over by Sardar Ali-El-Edreess, a local notable, several resolutions were passed. One such resolution thanked the non-Muslims communities of India for expressing sympathy for Turkey. Bipin Chandra Pal's argument was respected on the ground that if the Turks succumbed then the whole of Asia would go under the western Imperialism.

In the circumstances the Turks were advised to join Afghanistan, Persia, Arabia and India in order to check the European expansion. They should do so on the principle that Asia for Asian and unless they act on this principle, Europe would remain a terror for them.

The Indian national Congress also shared the sorrows of the Muslim brethren in India and expressed its concern over the fate of Turkey and emphasised the need for a peaceful settlement of the disputes. Mazhar-ul-Haque, the chairman of the Reception committee of the twenty-seventh Session of

110. Home Poli, B.Dec. 1912 no. 88-91 Pro No. 89, NAI.

111. BIRBHUMVASI (BENGAL), 3 April 1913.

112. Nawa-i-Muqaddas, Hablul Matin (Calcutta), 9 June 1913.
the Indian National congress, declared that the Balkan war was not a war against the Turks but a war to turn Muslims out of Europe, a war between the cross and crescent and a war between the Asiatics and the Europeans.\textsuperscript{113}

However, it was a medical mission under Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari, a prominent physician and a leading nationalist, which left Bombay for Turkey on 15 December 1912 overcoming all obstacles formed the most concrete example of India's solidarity with Turkey.\textsuperscript{114}

The ulema of Deoband in order to express their solidarity with Turks issued subscribe towards the fund, and declared lawful the sale of skins of the animals sacrificed on the occasion of Iduzzuha and money thus obtained donated to the Turkish Relief Fund.\textsuperscript{115}

The Balkan war created such a perturbing situation that there were various proposals like establishing a colony at Anatolia for the refugees of Macedonia and Thrace, a Islamic Bank at Constantinople with branches all over the world, and

\textsuperscript{113} Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty Seventh INC, 1912 (1912) p. 5.

\textsuperscript{114} Prof. Mohammad Sadiq the Turkish Revolution and the Indian Freedom Movement, 1983, Delhi, p- 31-33.

\textsuperscript{115} Al-Mushir, 11 Nov. 1912.
a proposal to found a university at Madina to fulfil the requirements of the Muslims of the world.

But the most exciting scheme was to form a private militia to protect the Holy places of Islam. Consequently, an association called Anjuman-i-Khuddam kaaba was formed following the threat of Italy to bombard the Holy places of Islam. Its architects were Mushir Hussain Qidwai and Maulana Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal, Lucknow. They planned to collect one crore rupees in a year and utilize the money for acquiring sophisticated weapons like dreadnaughts, aeroplanes and establishing army and navy to protect the Holy places of Islam. The scheme was made public by Shaukat Ali at Amritsar in March 1913. He called upon all Muslims to combine in a Society called Anjuman-i-khuddam-i-Kaaba (Society of the servants of Kaaba) with the aim of protecting Holy places from non-Muslim aggression. Ostensibly the object of the society was to protect the holy places but the real purpose was to give substantial help to the Sultan/Caliph. It was given a religious garb to keep it safe from governmental interference. The protagonists of the society failed to get official recognition from the

116. BHome Poll F. July 1913, no. 7 NAI; Also see Mohammad Sadiq's *The Turkish Revolution and the Indian Freedom Movement*.

117. Ibid.
The Govt. was suspicious of the real motive of the society and were not ready to take it at its face value. It carefully watched the growth of the society. More so because the society was an organization in which young elements were associated, therefore perceived to be potentially dangerous in India.  

**The Govt and the Pro-Turkish Press**

Since the time of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, Indian Muslims had been increasingly involved in the affairs of Turkey. Since then the number of educated Muslims had also increased number of newspapers which carried much more weight among the people.

Mohammad Ali, the editor of Comrade, who was in the service of the their Broda state, left his job towards the end of 1910. He started his career as a journalist in January 1911, with a weekly paper of his own, in English. During the Tripolitan and Balkan wars his Comrade became the foremost spokesman of Indian Muslims on the Turkish question. Basically, he had gone to journalism to represent the interest of his own community in India.  

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118. Home Poll D. July 1914, No. 7, NAI

119. Home Poll, A. May 1914, No. 46, NAI.

120. Mohammad Ali, My Life, A Fragments, p. 34.
Muhammad Ali also brought out a Urdu paper The Hamdard from Delhi. Both were undoubtedly the organs of the young Muslim party and pan-Islamists. The Hamdard was intended to educate the people whereas the Comrade had to be their spokesman as well, and to act as a medium between them and their leaders.121

Another important Urdu weekly published from Calcutta which played a significant role during this period was Al-Hilal.122 Its editor and proprietor was Abul kalam Azad. Azad advised his co-religionists to make religion the basis of all their political activities. At the same he strongly decried obscurantism in the religious life of Indian Muslims. Through his paper he advocated the cause of liberty, equality, constitutional and parliamentary government, struggle for lawful independence and unity between the Hindus and Muslims.123

The Muslim Gazette of Lucknow which appeared during this period had a distinct approach edited by Wahiduddin Salim, a graduate of Aligarh College, representing the new liberal group of the Aligarians.124

121. Ibid., p.63.
122. Its first issue appeared on 13 July 1912.
123. Al-Hilal, 1 Sept. 112.

The government of India was sacred of the Pan-Islamic propaganda. It had already taken measures to check the flow of Pan-Islamic literature in India. With this view they took action against The Islamic Fraternity, an Urdu monthly published from Tokyo (Japan) edited by Maulvi Barktullah of Bhopal. It was said to be an anti-imperialist and anti-British paper.\(^\text{125}\)

The authorities in India were keeping a watch on some newspapers. Surveillance was kept over the movement of the editor of Al-hilal. In 1913 several newspapers were warned. More stringent measures were taken by demanding securities from a number of leading newspapers like, the Zamindar, Comrade, Hamdard, Al-Hilal, Urdu-i-Mualla, Muslim Gazzette and Tauhid.

**Britan at war with Turkey: the Impact in India**

Since the prospect of a major war clouded the atmosphere in Europe, not only the increased Ottoman activities in India but, most importantly the apparent leanings of the Turks towards Germany, had become matters of concern for

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\(^{125}\) Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 10 Sept. 1912. the Govt. of Bombay notified it under section 12, of the Indian under section 19 of the sea custom Act 1876.
Britain. In view of the signs of an approaching war, Britain had justification for her concern. Hence her primary concern was to keep Turkey neutral and to try and break German influence over the Turks.\(^{126}\) However the Turks were of a different opinion. Because of their disappointment with Britain they could no longer rely on her. Moreover, they correctly suspected the British dealings with the Arabs against the interest of Turkey and Britain's confiscation of two Turkish battleships which were being built in Glasgow, and the cost of which had already been paid, further strengthened this conviction.\(^ {127}\) In the volatile situation neutrality did not impress upon them, for they feared that Turkey would not be allowed to remain neutral after the

\(^{126}\) Hellar, J. *British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire 1908-1914*, London, 1983, pp. 120-140.

\(^{127}\) Turkey had ordered the building of two dreadnoughts in 1911 and its delivery was due in mid 1914. But because of the uncertain situation, Britain confiscated them stating that they would be given to Turkey when the war was over. This resented the Turks and consequently it became a matter of contention between the two countries.

It seems that the Turkish government tried to get the Indian Muslims to make a representation to Britain on the issue. A letter to the Turkish consul at Bombay from Istanbul dated 15 Sept 1914, which was intercepted by the Indian authorities, ran as follows; "England's seizure of the Turkish Ironclads... has given rise to a very profound feeling... what are the Muslims doing over there? What if you were to incite them to rebellion? At any rate can not a few protesting telegrams be sent? They would have a great effect at this period..." "Memo on the attitudes of the Indian Muslims towards the war, by DCI, L/P&S/518, no. 4265/1914, IOR

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outbreak of the war which might lead to its partition between the great powers which proved to be true later on. In search of an ally, they first approached the entente powers but in vain. Hence Germany appeared to be the power that could help the Turks to regain their lost territories. As a result, Turkey entered into an alliance with Germany through a secret treaty which was signed on the 2nd August 1914.\textsuperscript{128}

But the most effective work to prepare the Indo-Muslim mind for the war was done through imposing censorship on the Reuter and newspapers and only the official version of the developments was allowed to be published in India. Therefore, until September 1914 the Indian Muslims had only a vague idea as to whether Turkey would enter the war or not. But on the whole they were conceived that the war had nothing to do with the Muslims and the Ottomans.\textsuperscript{129} When the war first started between Russia and Germany in August 1914 there was wide-spread expression of Muslim sympathy for Germany, perhaps because of the memories of the Russo-Turkish war of 1878.\textsuperscript{130} Britain's entry into the war,

\textsuperscript{128} Shaw and Shaw, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 310-311.

\textsuperscript{129} Viceroy to SSI, 21 Aug. 1914, H. Poll. A Nov. 1914 nos. 1-27, NAI.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
however, transferred the focus of sympathies towards Britain.\textsuperscript{131}

Hardinge, the viceroy, played outstanding role in enlisting the support of the Muslims for Britain rapidly and smoothly. He not only highlighted the motives of peace and justice as the reasons for Joining the war but also appealed cleverly to the Muslims, by announcing that the British Empire was the greatest Muslim power in the world and that India was admittedly a \textit{Dar-ul-Islam} that the Muslims were free to practise their religion as they wished, and that Britain regarded the safety of Holy places as matter of paramount concern.\textsuperscript{132}

However, even at that stage, there was one section of the Muslim community who continued their pro-German stand. They were predictably centered around the Comrade Al-Hilal the Zamindar, and the Wakil\textsuperscript{133} Muhammad Ali of the Comrade proclaimed on behalf of the Muslim, "They have little enthusiasm for Europe, but they recognised their responsibilities". The Muslims were prepared even to forget the past wrongs done to Turkey and the Muslims in India.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{131} L/Res/10/518, no. 4265/19141, IOR.
\textsuperscript{132} H.Poll, A. Nov. 1914 nos. 1-27, NAI.
\textsuperscript{133} "Memo" by DCI, L/P&S/10/51, no. 4265/1914 IOR
\textsuperscript{134} Comrade, (Delhi), 12 August 1914.
In *Al Hilal*, Azad gave a critical assessment of Britain in the right and wrongs of the European conflict.\(^{135}\) He argued that it had been England's policy to gain friends by permitting the spoilation of the Muslim world.\(^{136}\) Since the paper presented Germany in more favourable way and predicted that Turkey would make efforts to regain some of her lost possessions, the Govt. of Bengal served a warning on the editor.\(^{137}\)

The loyalist Muslim in Bengal had warned Turkey that if she decided to side with Germany they would support their sovereign Britain. It was expected that Aligarh would also pass a resolution on similar lines. Aftab Ahmad Khan and Nawab Muzzamilullah Khan held a meeting in August and wanted to pass a resolution appealing Turkey to remain neutral, while urging the British Govt. to honour Turkish neutrality. But the meeting dispersed without passing any resolution, much to the annoyance of the local authorities.\(^{138}\)

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135. *Al-Hilal* (Calcutta), 12 August 1914.
136. *Al-Hilal* (Calcutta), 5 August 1914.
138. Sheikh Abdullah, trustee, of the Aligarh College consulted in Dist. Magistrate whether there would be any objection if the above stated resolution was passed at the meeting upon conquering later on by the Dist. Magistrate, Dr. Ziauddin Ahmad explained that it was considered not expedient to say anything about the
Immediately after the outbreak of the war in Europe, Turkey had made a declaration of her neutrality. Muhammad Ali wrote, "To us, who are at a distance, it seems to be safest and on the whole the most satisfactory position for Turkey to adopt and maintain". The general wish of the Muslims was that Turkey should remain neutral in the war. Therefore, appeals had been made to it, and in this regard the lead was given by thirty two prominent Muslims of Bengal including Nawab Salimullah of Decca by despaching a telegram to the Grand Vazir expressing their gratification at Turkish neutrality and at British assurance of respecting her integrity and independence.

However it was not possible for Turkey, to remain neutral in the given political scenario. On 1, November war brokeout between Britain and Turkey. In an interview Muhammad Ali said that what he had "feared for some month past had to his deep distress at least come to pass". He went...Continued...

attitude of Turkey. See in the F.Rt. of Chief Secretary, U.P. to wheeler, secretary of India, Home Deptt. 15 Sept. 1914, Home Poll Wheeler, 1 Oct. 1914, No. 61, NAI.

139. Comrade, 26 Aug 1914.

140. Indian Daily Telegraph (Lucknow) 28 August, 1914, Ittehad (Amroha) 28 Aug 1914, Mashriq (Gorakhpur), 1 Sept. 1914, Islamic Mail (Bombay), 13 Sept. 1914.

141. This was appreciated by the Tribune (Lahore), 28 August 1914.
on, "The Turks have now made their choice and it can cause Indian Mussalmans nothing but the deepest pain to find the armies of the servant of the Holy places of Islam and the king/Emperor who rules over the largest number of Mussalmans facing each other as enemies..their (Indian Mussalmans) worst foreboding have come true".142

Turkey joined the central powers and declared war on the Allies, not because she was an enemy of Britain and her friends but simply because she was mentally afraid of her ancient enemy, Russia, and when she found Russia, on the side of the Allies it was natural & a foregone conclusion that she would cast her lot with Germany against Russia.143

After the declaration of war with Turkey, public announcements were obtained from leading Muslim institutions, associations and prominent Muslims in support of the British government. It was mostly the pro-British papers and known loyalist Muslims. retired officials and honorary magistrates who responded to this pre-planned endeavour.144

142. Interview given to the representatives of the Associated Press and Reuter, see Comrade (Delhi), 7 Nov, 1914.

143. Muhammad Ali gave this argument in reply to Mr. Lloyd George's remark that Turkey had no quarrel with Britain and therefore should have not joined Germany.

144. Oudh Akhbar (Lucknow), 5 Nov. 1914, Musafir (Agra), 6 Nov. 1914.
Once the war was declared, by Turkey, Asquith the Prime Minister and Lloyd George, the Chancellor of Exchequer, made certain speeches which caused considerable resentment among Muslims and proved embarrassing to the Viceroy and the government of India. The Prime Minister made unguarded statement, that the Turkish Empire would be wiped off in Europe and Asia.  

There was strong criticism in the Indian Press and even the nawab of Rampur and the Raja of Mahmudabad had lodged their protests by taking up the issue with British officials. The Pro-Turkish papers like the Comrade, the Hamdard, the Al-Hilal and the Zamindar and their editors Muhammad Ali, A. zad and Zafar Ali Khan, stoutly protested the statement given by the Prime Minister. The government of INDIA made every effort to eliminate the influence of these preses. The pro-Turkish Muslim leaders were interned, their press muzzled and the activities of the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba was suspended. The British government was able to tide over these temporary outbursts of public feelings. However quiet the surface, resentment continued to simmer underneath, and was to breakforth with unprecedented  

145. Islamic Mail (Bombay), 15 Nov. 1914.

vigour for a revolutionary struggle against British Imperialism.

Though the entry of Turkey was followed by a declaration by the British government that the holy places of Arabia and sacred shrines of Mesopotamia would be immune to inroad by the British and her allies.¹⁴⁷ Again on 5, January, 1918, Mr. Lloyd George, the then British Prime Minister, had declared "we are not fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor or Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish by race.¹⁴⁸

However, the course of event during and at the end of the war showed that these promises were nothing but empty ones. Most revealing of all were the clandestine treaties between Britain, France, Italy and the Tzarist Russia by which practically the whole of the Ottoman Empire was to be

¹⁴⁷. Verney Lovelt, Indian National Movement p. 7, W.R. Smith, Nationalism and reform in India, p.307. The Governor General had extended this assurance to the Muslims of India in a public statement on 2 November 1914; "... in order that there may be no misunderstandings on part of His Majesty's most loyal Muslim subjects as the attitude of His Majesty's Govt. in this war," it was pledged that "the holy places of Arabia including the holy shrines of Mosopotamia and Jedda will be immune from attack or molestation by the British novel and military force. (cf. P.C. Bamford, Histories of the Non-Cooperation and Khailafat Movements, p. 138), Also T. Chand, History of the Freedom Movement, vol. III, p.415.

divided among them. The Sherifian policy of the British government was also intended to undermine the power of Turkey. This policy involved the creation of an Arab kingdom under the family of the Sharif Hussain of Mecca.

149. These secret agreements for partitioning the Ottoman Empire were: (1) The Constantinople Agreement of 18 March, 1915; (2) The Treaty of London of 26 April 1915; (3) The st. Jean Maurice Agreement, and (4) The Sykes-Picot Agreement. Having satisfied the main demands of Italy and the Tzarist Russia in the first three agreements, for joining the allied camp, the British & France governments proceeded in 1915 to adjust their own claims, to the Asiatic portions of the Ottoman Empire and appointed Sir Mark Sykes & Georges Picot to conduct negotiations which resulted in the agreement, known as Sykes-Picot Agreement, concluded secretly on 16 May, 1916 after securing Tzarist Russian approval. After the Revolution in Russia in 1917, the Bolsheviks renounced the Tzarist share of the spoils of the secret treaties. The promptly published the secret treaties found in the Archives of the Tzarist foreign Ministry, which showed the imperialist designs of Britain and her allies (For details about these secret treaties see, George Lenezowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, pp. 68-73).

150. Winston Churchill, later on gave a general outline of this policy in a speech in the House of Common on 14 June 1921; "Broadly speaking, there are two policies which can be adopted towards Arab race, one is the policy of keeping them divided... the other policy... is an attempt to build up around the ancient capital of her allies, an Arab state which can be reconcile and embody the old culture and glories of Arab race.... of these two policies we have definitely chose the later... if you are to endeavour to shape affairs in a sense of giving very best structure of the kind which is available is the house and family of Sharif of Mecca." (quoted in W.R. Smith op.cit., p. 309.

151. Sherif Hussain belonged to the Qureshi tribe and claimed to be descendent of the prophet. It was hoped by British that the Sherif's family would acquire great prestige as guardians of the holy cities and that the Sherif might perhaps supersede the Ottoman Sultans as Caliph of the Muslim world. But this hope was not realized. Although, the weight of Islamic tradition might have been expected to favour Hussain as a de-
as a counterbalance to the political influence of the Turks in the Middle East. It was in pursuance of this policy that the British helped Sherif Hussain in his revolt against the Ottoman Suzerainty who installed himself as the king of the Hijaz in 1916.152

The Muslim Press and the intelligentsia had immediately condemned Sharif Hussain's actions expressing the "consternation and painful anxiety" caused to the Mussalmans by the fear, that the uprising would "convert their most sacred places into fields of slaughter and carnage," the Sharif and his followers had been condemned of their alliance with the enemies of Turkey.153 Besides, by 1917 Jerusalem, Baghdad,

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scendent of the prophet, there were other influences working in the opposite direction. Hussain was not even able to unite the Arabs. Later, when the British military support was withdrawn in 1925, he was defeated by Ibn Saud, the Wahabi Amir of Nejd.

152. Sir Henry MacMahan, the British High Commission in Egypt, and Colonel Lawrence of British army were instrumental in bringing about the revolt of the Sherif of Mecca Sir MacMahon, since the beginning of the war, had been negotiation with Sherif Hussain of Mecca, promising an Arab Kingdom, if he would revolt against Turkey (for full details regarding MacMohan Sherif negotiations and agreements, see George Lonzowski, New York, 1938.

153. See for example, The Musalman, the Muhammadi, various issues in June-July, 1916. During this, some of the English owned newspapers had published critical articles, developing the question of the Khilafat with reference to the Seizure of the holy places and emphasizing the permanence of the Sherif's step. One of these articles in particular, published in the States-
Najaf and surrounding areas, which contained Muslim holy shrines, came under British occupation and control. These facts gave an impression that the holy places were no longer immune to military molestation, the prevention of which the British had pledged to the Indian Muslims. By the end of 1918, Turkey was completely defeated in the war and when, "in April 1919, Greek troops landed at Smyrna (modern Izmir) under the guns of British, French and even American warships,\textsuperscript{154} and advanced into the interior of Anatolia, it began to look as if the Byzantine Empire was to be recreated on Turkish soil, in regimes indisputably Turkish in population. Soon after Constantinople was occupied by the Allies and at this moment of Triumph, the British P.M., actively supported by the Archbishops of Canterbury began to use the

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man (Calcutta) on 25 June, which said in addition that "Muhammadens generally, were delighted with the news." These articles brought home to the educated class a realization of the far-reaching consequences of the Sherif's action and British attitude towards Turkey and Khilafat. In July 1916, the Bengal Muslim League met and condemned British activities in Arabia (see Govt. of India, Home Poll Deptt. Aug, 1916, No. 24). A confidential police report says, regarding its effect upon the Muslim in general, "... on the whole the general feeling seems to have been one of the depression and fear lest the safety of the holy places should be jeopardized and the condemnation of the Sherif from bringing them into danger." (cited in P.C. Bamford, op.cit., p. 127).

\textsuperscript{154} M. Phillips Price, \textit{A History of Turkey}. p.99.
language of the crusades, and it seemed that "the Christian west, was determined to reverse the verdict of the medieval crusading wars". As we have already mentioned earlier, under a series of secret agreements, Britain, France and their allies had virtually partitioned the Turkish Empire among themselves while the new revolutionary Russian government renounced her proposed share, Britain and France apportioned it to themselves, some of the finest parts of the Turkish Empire. Although the Sultan, was retaining Constantinople (though Constantinople itself was under allied military control) and some other areas, he became in effect a British puppet. This practical evidence of the tactics adopted by the victorious allies, particularly the British in dealing with the prostrate Turkey and its ruler, who was also the khalifa, enraged nearly all sections of Muslim opinion. It was believed by Muslims that the British, betraying their pledges, were committed to an anti-Muslim policy in pursuit of their imperial designs and that they were determined to extinguish the last visible symbol

155. Francis Robinson, Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces, 1860-1923, Cambridge, 1975, p.291. When General Allenby entered Constantinople, Lloyed George, the British P.M., congratulated him in a speech in the following words: "The name of General Allenby will be ever renowned as that of the most triumphant of the 'crusade;'. It was his good fortune by his skill to bring to a glorious end on enterprise which absorbed the Chivalry of Europe for centuries.: (see, the Musalman 19 Sept, 1919).
of Muslim temporal and spiritual authority. But, however, deep the resentment of the Muslims of India might have been, they were not in a position to take up arms against the victorious Britain and her allies in Europe. Therefore, all that they could think of doing was to launch an agitation against the British government in India.\footnote{156}

It was in this situation that All India Muslim League met at Delhi on 30 Dec, 1918.\footnote{157} Fazlul Haque, in his presidential speech which "consisted of a long account of the evil effects of British rule in India",\footnote{158} voiced the Muslim apprehension regarding the fate of Turkey at the hands of the British and her allies and observed that "to them (Indian Muslims) the fate of Turkey could not be but a matter of the deepest concern, for it was closely interwoven with the question of the Khilafat or the guardianship of the Holy places of Islam".\footnote{159}

\footnote{156. S.C. Bose, op.cit., pp. 40-41.}

\footnote{157. For proceedings of this meeting in detail (see, A.M. Zaid, Evolution of Muslim Political Thought in India, pp. 122-72, P.C. Bamford, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 131-134; Also government of India, Home Poll, A March 1919, Nos. 251-59.}

\footnote{158. P.C. Bamford, \textit{op.cit.}, p.132.}

\footnote{159. \textit{Indian Annual Register, 1919, Part V}, p. 78. T. Chand, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 416. In this speech he also demanded immediate "self government for India." Regarding the question of Hindu Communities to say that the Hindu was the natural enemy of Musalmans. He added, "we should re-}
The League, at the end of its meeting passed resolutions, "with strong protest against the occupations of Jerusalem, Najaf and other holy places by His Majesty's Forces," and demanded their immediate evacuation and urging the British Government to see that, in the territorial and political re-distribution to be made at the peace conference, "fullest considerations should be given to the requirements of Islamic law with regard to full and independent control by the Sultan of Turkey, Khalifa of the prophet, over the Holy places and over the Jazirat-ul-Arab as delineated in Muslim book.160 However, after Delhi session of the Muslim League, some Muslim leaders of Northern India such as Maulana Abdul Bari of Lucknow, Dr. M.A. Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan and many others went into action to organise a movement and to initiate a campaign among the people in favour of Delhi resolution regarding Khilafat and holy places. By June 1919, these leaders planned to convene an All-India Conference of Muslim leaders to discuss the problem. The initiative was taken by the All-India Muslim

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nounce lurking spirit of strife and quarrel with other communities and seek their help and assistance in our troubles and difficulties.... Experience had shown that we can have this help and cooperation for the mere asking." (I.A.R., op.cit., )p. 98; Also K.B. Sayeed, Pakistan the formation phase, p.45.

160. Quoted in A.M. Zaidi, op.cit., pp. 161-64; P.C. Bamford, op.cit., p.34.

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league which organised an All India Conference at Lucknow on 21 Sept, 1919. The Conference set up an All India Khilafat committee with its headquarters at Bombay and having branches in all the provinces. It also fixed 17 October to be observed as khilafat day and called upon the people of all communities to observe it. Consequently, the day was observed all over India through fasting, praying, suspending business and holding public meetings by people of all communities.

The arguments advanced by the Khilafat leaders of their claims on behalf of Turkey may be given as follows:

1) Turkey is the sole surviving Muslim political power in the world. If it disappears or is reduced to the position of a small, weak, third class state, it will be an irreparable loss to Islam.

2) So far Turkey and Turkey alone has stood in the way of ambitions of Russia and thus was instrumental in saving the British Empire in India. The British should ac-


162. M. Gandhi was over whelmed with enthusiasm of the people of all communities and the peaceful observance of the day. He expressed his feelings in young India on 22 Oct, 1919 (see, Young India, 1919 – 22 A Selected Collection of Writings of Gandhi, pp. 134-35).
knowledge this debt and they should also realise that a weak Turkey will mean the disappearance of an effective barrier between Russia and the British possessions in Asia.

3) In January 1918, Mr. Lloyd George had said publicly that Britain was not fighting to deprive Turkey of her ancient and renowned lands. The British Prime Minister must fulfil this pledge and maintain the integrity of the areas which are Turkish in race.

4) India's contribution to Allied war effort must be appreciated. Without Indian manpower, British arms would not have triumphed, particularly in the Near and Middle East. Now that victory has been won this precious help should be acknowledged by deferring to Indian wishes.

5) India is united in her concern for the future of Turkey. Hindus and Muslims equally share the feeling that the British government is not dealing with the Turkish issue with an open mind and the desire that the Allies should meet all reasonable demands of the Turks and their Indian sympathisers.

6) The powers of the Khalifa should remain intact. The temporal authority of the Khalifa and the means to exercise it are matters of religious belief which brook
no abridgement. To weaken this authority, will be a deliberate and calculated offence to Islam.

7) It is an integral part of Muslim belief that the holy places of Islam always remain under Muslims control. This overrules not only the laying of direct non-Muslim control over Arabia and other places but also the imposition of manadates and trusteeships over them.

8) It is also an essential tenet of Islam that the Khalifa must be the supreme overlord of the holy places. Therefore even if Hejaz is made politically independent of Turkish control, the king of Hejaz should receive his investitures from the Sultan-Khalifa.163

On 22nd and 23rd November 1919, the first open session of the All India Khilafat Conference was held at Delhi under the Chairmanship of Fazlul Haque from Bengal. M.K. Gandhi, Motilal Nehru, Swami Shardhanand and others were present. On the second day, by an unprecedented gesture, M.K. Gandhi was voted to the chair.164 The Conference resolved: (1) to boycott the peace celebration planned by government to be observed on 13 Dec (2) progressively to boycott British goods; (3) to send a deputation to England to put forward


the Muslim case regarding the Khilafat, holy places and Turkey, and (4) to withhold all cooperation from the government unless the khilafat and the holy places were treated in accordance with Muslim desire. 165

The resolution to boycott the peace celebration gained unquestioned approval from Gandhi. He also supported the resolution to withhold cooperation from the government hailing it as a "sublime decision but objected to the boycott resolution". 166 Gandhiji's support, and his subsequent appeal, to the Hindus, for the boycott from 'peace celebration' and his espousal of non-cooperation to redress khilafat wrongs, gave outstanding prominence to the khilafat question throughout India. These developments, were followed by release of Ali brothers at the end of Dec, 1919, which brought these matter of Muslim agitational politics to the head of the khilafat campaign. Immediately they plunged into the task of organizing the movement. They along with other leaders undertook intensive tours, attending public meetings and khilafat conference at the provincial level so


that, by the early 1920 the khilafat movement in India took a definite shape.

To sum up, the pan-Islamism which can be described as a vague idea in the 1860s, had blossomed into a full fledged movement by the turn of the century. It considerably enhanced the prestige of the caliphate. This rejuvenation of the image of the caliphate is clearly reflected in the Indian khilafat movement of the 1920s. The power of the pan-islamic theme of solidarity forced the British government to curtail its anti-Ottoman activities for some time. The chances of a call for Jihad by the Ottoman Sultan and its possible consequences also become a matter of grave concern to the allies during the First World War. The pan-islamic movement ceased to exist after the abolition of the caliphate in 1924.