Chapter - VII

CONFLICT OR CONGRUENCE?

THE ANATOMY OF THE MODELS

Nation-building is a process of socio-political change — a process of change which is partly planned and orderly, but conditioned by certain historical circumstances over which we have no control. Hence the complexity of the process and also the difficulty in explaining the same.

One of the most significant aspects of the process of nation-building is that it involves alterations and/or replacement of the structures of power and social cohesion. Centres of political power are either altered in significant ways (as it happened in India from 1919 onwards as the result of the introduction of partial democracy through the dyarchy system), or totally replaced by new ones (as it happened with the attainment of Independence by India in 1947), or undergo further alterations (as have been happening in India since Independence, through the operation of parliamentary democracy).

Similarly, the social structures of group cohesion such as religion, caste, traditional professions and value norms too undergo changes which are perceptible over a period
of time. The causes of such changes, the agents and
directions of those changes as well as the impact of such
changes on the political processes as such are aspects
which are complex on the one hand, and highly pertinent for
the study of nation-building on the other.

The significance, the complexity, and relevance of
attending to the above process of socio-political change
as an inherent aspect of the process of nation-building
would to some degree explain the growing concern for the
study of nation-building among social scientists.

I

STRATEGY FOR COMPARISON

This study has focussed its attention on the nation-
building models of both academicians and statesmen or
political activists, with a special focus on the underlying
assumptions of the same. And therefore, this study is
concerned with more than one model of nation-building. In
analytical terms, one can distinguish here at least the
following "models of nation-building":

1. the one of the scholars (discussed in
chapter one);

2. the one of the leaders of the nationalist movement,
with further sub-divisions of the same after the
reformist school, the revivalist school, the
conservative or the moderate school, the extremist
or radicalist school and the like (discussed in
chapters three and four);
3. the one of the national leaders constituting the "ruling elite" of the country at the centre between 1947 and 1977 (discussed in chapter three); 

4. the one of the regional leaders of Tamil Nadu between 1915-1967 (discussed in chapter four); 

5. the one of the regional leaders of Kerala between 1910 and 1957 (discussed in chapter four); 

6. the one of the local leaders of Tamil Nadu specifically probed in the context of this study (discussed in chapter six); and 

7. the one of the local leaders of Kerala specifically probed in the context of this study (discussed in chapter six).

The above "models" are, however, in the nature of a class or species which contain sub-classes or sub-species within each of them.

When faced with such a plurality of nation-building models, one cannot help asking the question how these models compare with each other. More pertinently, one is led to ask whether all these models are similar or different, and if similar, under what aspects, and if different, for what reasons. In other words, one is led to find out whether the plurality of the models of nation-building implies also a variety of models of nation-building. A further implication
of the same, of course, is the question whether there is any conflict between the different models of nation-building and if so for what reasons. In what follows, an attempt is made to answer some of the above questions.

The attempt is to make a comparative analysis of all the above models of nation-building. That would mean taking a single issue which is found in many (conceivably in all) of the models in question and seeking to analyse how that issue has been dealt with in each of them. A comparison can be made only of one aspect or a set of select aspects of a particular item or problem, and therefore, in order to compare the models of nation-building under study, it is necessary first to select either one aspect or a set of aspects of nation-building as a continuing frame of reference. If a set of aspects is selected, for comparative analysis here, that might prove too unwieldy a problem. And therefore, it has been thought expedient to select just one aspect for purposes of this study, that is the aspect of integration as it has been dealt with in all the models of nation-building in question. This aspect has been selected since no model of nation-building would be worth its name if it does not tackle the problem of integration in the political community.

Nation-building in the New States have been interpreted as an "integrative revolution" whereby primordial sentiments and civil politics undergo fundamental changes. It is a
process in which a host of problems going under references to "dual" or "plural" or "multiple" societies, to "mosaic" or "composite" social structures, to "states" that are not "nations" and "nations" that are not "states", to "tribalism", "parochialism", and "communalism", as well as to Pan-national movements and to sub-nationalisms of various sorts come up for solution in the attempts for forming coherent societies and politics. Even modernity of a society has been defined in terms of integration, as for instance, done by Edward Shils who holds that a modern society is not just a complex of modern institutions, but rather "a mode of integration of the whole society" or "a mode of relationship between the center and periphery of the society", with such implications as (a) entailing the inclusion of the mass of the population into the society in the sense that both elite and mass regard themselves as members of the society and, as such, as of approximately equal dignity, and (b) involving a greater participation by the masses in the values of the society, a more active role in the making of society-wide decisions, and a greater prominence in the consideration of the elite.

2. Edward Shils, "On the Comparative Study of the New States", in Clifford Geertz (ed.), op.cit. p.21
The absence of integration in the New States has even been characterised as a "pre-political matrix" of a rudimentary form, resting on fragile foundations upon which the state itself rests. The societies of the new states, which are constellations of kinship groups, castes, tribes, feudalities or smaller territorial societies, have been described as "not civil societies", "scarcely able thus far to produce a polity that can supply the personnel necessary to run a modern society", lacking "the affirmative attitude towards rules, persons, and actions that is necessary for consensus". It has also been suggested that in such societies the sense of membership in a nation-wide society is scant, as are the disposition to accept the legitimacy of the Government and interaction among the different sectors.

II

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: THE MODEL OF THE ACADEMICIANS.

As shown in chapter one, the overwhelming concern for the study of nation-building in the new States has been displayed by scholars belonging to the school of structural functionalism. An allegiance of loyalty to a tradition of

3. Ibid. p. 22

social analysis initiated by Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, and a commitment to explaining social change in terms of a plurality of variables have inspired these scholars to use such concepts as division of labour, social organization, industrialisation, modernization and socio-political development for describing and explaining the dimensions of social change inherent in the process of nation-building.\(^4\)

As defined by Reinhard Bendix, \textit{division of labour} is a concept referring to a universal social practice whereby the labour performed in a collectivity is specialised among the different sections constituting the same. Such division of labour is made on the basis of some principles over a period of time and these include sex, age, skill, etc. The division of labour on the basis of such principles over a time constitutes the social organisation of a particular society. In combination, these two constitute the social functions and social structures of a society. Apart from these two static dimensions, there are also more dynamic aspects to be explained, and the concepts of \textit{industrialisation}, \textit{modernization} and \textit{development} have been employed to do that job. The concept of industrialisation refers to economic changes brought about by a technology based on inanimate sources of power as well as on the continuous development

4. For a definition of these concepts, see Reinhard Bendix, \textit{Nation-Building and Citizenship}, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1964, pp.4-5.

5. Ibid.
of applied scientific research. The process of industrialization is thought of as having two inherent dimensions, modernization and development. Modernization refers to all those social and political changes accompanying industrialization and includes the processes of urbanization, changes in occupational structures, social mobility, growth of education as well as political changes from absolutist institutions to responsible and representative government and from a laissez-faire to a welfare state as it took place in modern Western Europe. The very process of modernization is alternatively called also socio-political development; but sometimes the concept of modernization is used only to refer to the cultural aspects, reserving the concept of development to refer to changes in the economic and political sphere in a less comprehensive sense.

While the above cluster of concepts have been developed and utilised to deal with the broader dimension of social continuity and change, the concepts utilised for dealing with the typically political aspects of a transitional society have a central concern for the process of political unification or integration. It has already been shown how nation-building has been defined as an "integrative revolution", passages could be cited from almost all the writers on nation-building to show such a concern with integration. One or two illustrations would be quite enough
here. Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, for instance, have employed a cluster of four fold concepts, viz., state-building, nation-building, participation and distribution, to deal with the political processes of the New States. According to these authors, State-building refers "to the Problem of integration and control", and nation-building refers to "the problem of group identity and loyalty", while participation is "the involvement of members of the society in the decision making processes of the system" and distribution is "the problem of the allocation of goods, services, and other values by the political system", 6. The overwhelming concern with the problem of "integration" is too obvious to need further explicitation.

The approach is not different for Reinard Bendix either. According to him, the point of common reference in the study of nation-building and citizenship is "the formation and transformation of political communities which today we call nation-states. The central fact of nation-building is the orderly exercise of a nation-wide public authority". 7 In the opinion of Bendix, order in a political community can be understood in terms of its opposite, anarchy. Anarchy is a state of affairs where each


7. Reinard Bendix, op.cit., p.18
individual or group takes the law into its hands until checked by momentarily superior force of an opponent. Therefore, some subordination of private to public interests and private preferences to public decision becomes the sine qua non of a political community. In the formation of a political community, the members agree upon at least an implicit consensus upon such a subordination of the private to the public in an exchange for certain public rights. This approximation of interests and the evolution of some degree of 'integration' is an inherent aspect of all working relations between the rulers and the ruled, serving as the corner stone of a political community.

Leaving the structural functionalists aside, even to the Marxist or class theorists, 'integration' is the central concern in political evolution. Revolutionary struggles of the deprived and exploited strata of the society have as their direct goal the elimination of classes — root and fruit — and the creation of an integrated classless communist society. It is in the understanding of the causes of the absence of integration and of the means for creating integration that the two schools of social scientists differ among themselves.

The models of the structural functionalists had an inbuilt bias towards a statusquoism or an a-historical

8. Ibid.
approach, as pointed out in chapter one. The construction of models of nation-building by clubbing together attributes of Western political systems would imply a suggestion that they are the virtues to be aspired after by the rest of the world. Implicitly, this would also mean a sort of pre-empting of the future; suggesting that the best has already been achieved, what remains to be done is replications of it and not experimentations for better ones.

III

THE ROOTS OF THE MODELS: THE WESTERN AND INDIAN PATERNs OF CENTER — PERIPHERY RELATIONS

Whether for scholars or for statesmen, their models of nation-building have deep roots in immediate or remote historical experiences. An analysis of each of the models in question would bear out this point.

1. The Western Pattern:

Nation-building or more appropriately "nation-growth" in the West was characterised by a process which has come to be called as role differentiation and structural specialisation — a process in which the differential character of social functions was increasingly recognised and appropriate structures for their efficient discharging were systematically
improved. Thus public authority and social relations came to be increasingly differentiated as did their appropriate social structures of institutions.

As recounted by Joseph Strayer¹⁰, the roots of modern European States go back to the barbarian regna or kingdoms which arose in the period of the collapse of the Roman Empire and the concomitant migration of peoples. The usual pattern of a regnum, which was far from a State in the modern sense, was that of a dominant warrior group, drawn from several Germanic peoples and ruling a subject population which was Latin or Celtic or Slav. By no means did the regnum have any resemblance to a state — it is doubtful whether in the early Middle Ages anyone had a concept of a State at all. Even though some memories of a by-gone governmental apparatus and public authority of the Roman Emperor still lingered on among the better-educated members of the clergy, there was no popular idea of an impersonal continuing power. As a result, loyalty was to individuals or to families, not to the State as such. This meant that political power more and more entered the domain of private law: it was a personal possession which could be transmitted by marriage or divided among heirs. Moreover, being a personal affair, political power was hard to exercise at a distance or through agents. This resulted in a constant tendency for local representatives of the King to become independent rulers.

and this tendency was aggravated by the low level of economic activity which made each district almost self-sufficient.

Thus, even long before feudalism came into being, its three-fold principles, viz., (a) the emphasis on personal loyalty, (b) the treatment of public power as a private possession, and (c) the tendency to local autonomy were existing in the regna which were the intermediary between the Roman Empire and European feudalism. In a way, these regna themselves were to set the stage for the evolution of the nation-state system in Europe. Amorphous and ephemeral, some of the regna survived, and by so doing, took the first step in nation-building in the West. As these peoples, occupying certain areas for so long, desired to go on constituting a certain regnum of their own, there began to be a feeling that they constituted a political community that should preserve its identity and survive for ever. The result was the gradual rise of the skeletons of the royal state, resting upon the bi-polar pillars of (a) the institution of judiciary and (b) a political theory upholding the sovereignty of the State and the supremacy of secular power, against a Church which was head and foot struggling to assert itself as the supreme authority on earth.

The above process of nation-growth in the West, whereby public authority and social relations came to be
increasingly differentiated, had some significant aspects. One such was the eventual evolution of the system of franchise as a mechanism for reducing the tension between the privileged rulers and the general public. In medieval Europe, the exercise of authority had given rise to the two competing structures of patrimonialism and feudalism—government as an extension of the royal household as against government based on the fealty between landed nobles and their king. This tension between royal authority and the society of estates was a characteristic of medieval political life, as was the duality between state and society in many Western societies since the beginning of the present era in the 18th century, thanks to the emergence of a nationwide market economy based on the capacity of individuals to enter into legally binding agreements between themselves and the State. As the latter legal and economic developments occurred at a time when public affairs were in the hands of a privileged few, a mechanism became necessary for taming the ensuing tensions, and the extension of the franchise was the outcome. As it evolved, the system of franchise has been thought of as a way of obtaining popular participation in public decisions—a practice which has come to be defined as the cornerstone and an inalienable virtue of Western democracies.

11. Reinard Bendix, op. cit. pp. 23–24
As the system of franchise ensured one form of legitimate relations between the "Centre and the Periphery"—geographically, structurally, and personally—there was also the need for a source of reference on "political morality" and this was especially important for people who were used to a Bible which served as a source of reference for morality in general. As the growth of a market economy and the gradual extension of the franchise gave rise to interest groups and political parties which mobilised people for collective action in the economic and political spheres, the social structure of modern society came to be radically transformed. Simultaneously, in the sphere of public authority access to official positions was gradually separated from Kingship ties, property interests, and inherited privileges, and as a result, decision-making at legislative, judicial, and administrative levels became subject to impersonal rules. Eventually, these attained a certain degree of freedom and autonomy from the constellations of interests in the society. This was a process which was aided, hastened, and insulated by the evolution of constitutionalism and the doctrine of "separation of powers" which too serve as the foundation of Western democracies.

Here was one more significant aspect—the liberation of popular minds from the hold of the Church. Medieval European culture was based on the belief in a supreme deity,
whereas in modern European culture, man, society, and nature are mostly thought of as embodying discoverable laws constituting the ultimate reality. This contrast has been spelt out by Carl Becker, in his book *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932, p. 47) as follows:

"In the thirteenth century the key words would no doubt be God, sin, grace, salvation, heaven and the like; in the nineteenth century, matter, fact matter-of-fact, evolution, progress..... In the eighteenth century the words without which no enlightened person could reach a restful conclusion were nature, natural law, first cause, reason....."¹²

It is this radical change in outlook which has come to be known as the secularisation of Europe.

Thus, in fine, the principle of integration in the European nations was a formula made up of franchise constitutionalism, separation of powers, and secularism.

But there was more significant development, and that was the principle of "federalism", as an extension of the principle of "separation of powers" in the context of establishing integration between more than one nationality. By federalism was usually meant "an associ-

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¹². As quoted by Reinard Bendix, *op. cit.* p. 24
ation of states, which has been formed for certain common purposes, but in which the member States retain a large measure of their original independence. This term has been applied alike to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, to the German Empire of 1871-1918, to the League of Nations, to the United States of America, and to the Union of South Africa—all of them "associations of States"; but each differing from the other in the form which that association has taken. But the modern idea of federalism has been determined by the association of the United States of America eventhough the words "federal" or "federation" nowhere occurs in the American constitution. Infact, it has even become customary to regard the United States of America nät only as an example of federal Government, but also as the most important and the most successful example.

2. The Indian Experience:

Being familiar with and sharing the aftermath of the above process of nation-building or nation-growth in the West, it was only natural that scholars trying to interpret the process of nation-building in the new States with reference to the Western experience would evolve a conceptual frame work centred around role differentiation, structural specialisation, separation of powers, constitutionalism,


13. Ibid.
participation etc., and remain ultimately caught up in some sort of "parochialism" or "provincialism"15. But what is more significant is the fact that the historical experience of nation-growth or nation-building in the West was, for more than one reason, something like a "model" or frame of reference even for the leaders of the nationalist movement and nation-building in India, just as it was for most of the scholars who sought to interpret the process of nation-building in India.

The nationalist movement in India essentially meant the struggle of a politically conscious people to drive out an alien political authority and to claim for themselves the right to decide their own fate. It is significant that this movement was initiated and led mostly by people who were trained in the legal profession within the constitutional frameworks of the West, which were the mechanisms evolved there for minimising the conflicts between public authority and private interests. It is not without reason, therefore, that several phases of the nationalist movement were marked by agitations for constitutional reforms from the beginning till the end, this was the main field of activity for the conservative and moderate sections of the movement. The Gokhale school, the Srinivasa Sastri School, the Justicites, and most of the Congressmen of Travancore and Cochin all were carrying on precisely this campaign.

15. See, Reinard Bendix, op.cit. p.10
But this should not blind one to the differences in the Indian situation. In India, the social structures and the economic climate were vastly different from those in the West at the time of the nationalist movement: no Church and State conflicts, no national bourgeoisies of a developed sort, no homogeneity of race and language. Thus even the "preconditions" of nation-building were, in a sense, absent in India. More than the consciousness of an identity, the moving spirit was more a protest against alien rulers as such.

Even the preliminary unification of the people under a nationalist movement was made difficult for several reasons: Brahmin domination of the nationalist movement in the earlier phases made it an elitist affair; when this was challenged and when the nationalist movement was converted into a mass movement, it assumed also the characteristic of an anti-Brahmin movement, as it happened in Tamil Nadu, leaving the nationalist cause itself into the oblivion; awareness of social identity and racial domination also brought in an element of racial conflict, as it evolved again in Tamil Nadu in the non-Brahmin movement as well as in the anti-Hindi agitations.

Equally important is the difference in the way center-periphery relations evolved in India. As observed by Reinard Bendix,

"For centuries prior to the modern period, Indian society has been divided between
centres of secular political rule and more or less autonomous, rural settlements inhabited by vast mass of the population.\textsuperscript{16}

Such a situation would suggest the existence of a real chasm between the actual centres of power — the capitals of the Empires or even of smaller Kingdoms — and the rural peripheries. According to A.L. Basham, "Ancient India had, however, a system of overlordship which was quasi-feudal, though it was never fully developed as in Europe and it rested on a different basis."\textsuperscript{17} The different basis too needs to pointed out:

"The Indian system differed from that of Europe in that the relations of overlord and vassel were not regularly based on contract, whether theoretical or otherwise, and ancient India had nothing quite comparable to the European manor, though institutions of a somewhat similar type were beginning to develop at the very end of our period.\textsuperscript{18}

Unlike in Europe, in India the Vassals usually became so by conquest rather than by contract and the amount of control exercised by the overlord varied greatly.\textsuperscript{19}

A further significant point is that though monarchy was usual in ancient India, tribal states also existed, governed by oligarchies, and often referred to as "republics."

\textsuperscript{16} Reinard Bendix, op.cit. p.216
\textsuperscript{17} A.L. Basham, The Wonder That Was India, Fountana Edition, 1971, p.95
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
where a large number of persons had some say in the government.20.

Plurality of the type of polities or the absence of uniformity among them were not the only differences to be noted. It is true that several types of States like republics, oligarchies, and monarchies were prevailing in India in ancient times, but eventually monarchy became the order of the day. But there was something more significant:

"The Hindu polity worked in a society that had accepted the principle of the caste system, which laid down that government was primarily the function and duty of the Kshatriyas, assisted to some extent by the Brahmanas."21

Neither Islamic invasions, nor indigenous or alien dynasties covering major portions of what later came to be known as India nor even the nearly two centuries of rule by Englishmen could entirely obliterate the above historical memories and their impacts upon the mind of the Indian masses and leaders. Centre-periphery integration in India has never been complete - neither geographically, nor administratively nor emotionally. Whatever achievements were made in this respect were always of a partial nature, including the extension of the administrative system during the emergency days of 1975-77.

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20. Ibid. p.97
Given the above situation, the significance of the efforts made by such nationalist leaders as Dayanand Saraswati (1824–1883), Bal Gangadhar Tilak (b.1856), and Mohandas Gandhi (1869–1949), to look into India's own past in search of a model for a modern India become clear: essentially it was a futile effort, for there never was a unified or integrated India in the past, even comparable to the one under the British rule. Whatever models were available were more fitting to smaller kingdoms and principalities rather than to a multi-lingual, multi-racial, and territorially phenomenal Independent India of the post-British days. And to that extent, the "model" of these nationalist leaders suffered from what could appropriately be termed as historical anachronism. In contrast, the efforts made by leaders like Ram Mohun Roy (b.1772), Gopal Krishna Gokhale (b.1866), and Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), to look to the Western experience of nation-building in the quest for a model for India's own future was more realistic because the political India of the British days and the post-British days had more similarities with the nation-state system of the West rather than with the amorphous state systems of pre-British India.
IV

THE OPERATIVE MODEL

The model of nation-building in India since independence (1947-1977), was essentially a continuation of the Ram Mohun Roy - Gokhale - Nehru tradition referred to above. It was under this operative model, discussed in detail in chapter four, that India could attain a level of political integration to the point of active support for a common state, with of course, continuing ethnic or cultural cohesion and diversity, leaving the next stage to be attained as the establishment of the coincidence of political amalgamation and integration with the assimilation of all the segments — ethnic, religious and linguistic — to a common language and culture. This was a unique process for two reasons: on the one hand, attempts were being made to evolve indigenous forms of political institutions (Panchayati raj system and the non-alignment strategy, for instance), and on the other, a critical phase of nation-building was inaugurated by grafting on the above an imported institutional framework consisting of the representational democracy originally evolved in the English polity, and even the strategy of planned development which was originally initiated by the Soviet Union.

The dawn of Independence for India in 1947 meant the inauguration of a combined process of State cum nation-building. While it was final extrication from the British colonial hegemony, it was also a break with the legacies of an ancient
and medieval past. While the establishment of a secular
and democratic state marked the successful culmination of
a century-long nationalist movement, it also implied the
acceptance of a new juridical identity, through the Constitu-
tion of India, as well as of the major goals of State-
building and nation-building that have been breathed into
the Constitution by the latter day leaders of the nationalist
movement.

This operative model of nation-building had two facets,
consisting of domestic policies and foreign policies. The
domestic policies by and large embraced (a) institutional
measures, such as participatory democracy, rule of law and
federal polity with concessions for regionalist aspirations
(as evidenced in the formation of the linguistic States, for
instance); (b) cultural measures such as attempts at
secularising polities, and a strategy of eclecticism for
accommodating the cultural conflicts; and (c) economic
measures, such as Five year Plans, profession of socialism
and a major thrust for industrialisation. In foreign policy,
a basic philosophy consisting of: (a) internationalism,
(b) peaceful co-operation, and (c) peaceful methods for the
settlement of disputes, was adopted, with an ideological
commitment to anti-colonialism and liberation struggles,
as well as to Afro-Asian socialist solidarity.
From the point of view of integration, the domestic policies and measures (participatory democracy, rule of law, federalism, secularism, eclecticism, socialism, and self-reliance through industrialisation) were ideally suited for its attainment, if pursued faithfully. But the internal crisis of the very leadership who designed and executed these policies and measures turned out to be the worst obstacles to their fruition, as evidenced by the political developments on the Indian scene during 1975-1977. The awareness of their failures and the deepening crisis led the ruling front to go in for such strategies as the 20 point programme, which were whatever their propaganda values, to some extent meant to be an attempt at rectifying the mistakes and minimising the social obstacles that were neutralising the fruits of planned development. But the declaration of the discredited emergency, and the politics of personalism that followed it, undermined the efforts at rectifications, and even cast a shadow on the till then operative model of nation-building itself, inaugurating a new phase of uncertainty regarding not only the fate of that model, but also about the goals of nation-building as well.
The rather detailed survey of the political styles and nationalist-subnationalist movements in Tamil Nadu and Kerala (chapter-four) has highlighted certain characteristics of the context and content of nation-building processes in these two States. These could be briefly summarised here as follows:

1. The popular upsurge in Tamil Nadu under the dravidian movement was essentially inspired by an excessive inward looking, as evidenced by (a) the cult of the Tamil language, even going to the extent of attributing divinity to it (Tamil has been described as "Theiyva Mozhfi", meaning "Divine Language", and the DMK Government got verses from the Tamil Classic Tirukkural, quoted inside the State Buses, so that the passengers could easily read them), (b) going to the period of the Tamil Classics to re-discover an identity of the Tamils and seeking to assert the same through an exclusion from other influences (Tamil puritanism and anti-Hindi movements); and (c) partly, even by the demand for secession in the early stages, and for autonomy in the later stages.

As against this "introvert political culture", Kerala presented an "extrovert political culture", which
was far from inward looking in any exclusive sense. True, attempts were made to re-discover a Malayalee identity from Ithihasa memories, but this never became an obsession as it did in Tamil Nadu. The Kerala popular upsurge was made more dynamic by its nationalist outlook on the one hand, and a concern for social reforms mainly drawing inspiration from Marxian thought. This external inspiration coupled with its economic concern was something which was conspicuous by its absence in the Dravidian movement, even conceding E.V. Ramaswami Naicker's devotion to Western atheistic writers (It never became a popular force, as Marxism did in Kerala). Moreover, if it was the Tamil puritanists who led the cultural literary renaissance in Tamil Nadu, it was the Marxist intellectuals, free from narrow puritanism but more fired by socio-economic revolutionary aspirations, that led the cultural cum literary renaissance in Kerala. As a result, when an obsession with the past glories of the Tamils (true or mythical) was a characteristic of the leaders of the Dravidian movement, it was a concern for redefining the identity of Kerala within the framework of the modern and even global ideologies of socio-political radicalism that served as the hallmark of the leaders of the popular upsurges in Kerala.

2. Given the above differences, it is not hard to understand the traditionalist bias of the Dravidian movement; neither the Justice Party, nor the Dravida Kazhagam nor the
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam had any truly revolutionary political ideology worth the name. What each of them had was a bundle of reforms for favouring the non-Brahmins (and mostly, as it turned out to be, non-Brahmin elites) and for disfavouring the Brahmins. By failing to present any socio-economic theories worth the name, these segments of the Dravidian movement betrayed their own poverty of understanding regarding the major socio-economic problems of the day - their doctrine of state-autonomy being a major exception. But the leftist leaders of the popular upsurges in Kerala were unique for their revolutionary outlook, their concern for socio-economic problems of the day, their ability to interpret the same in theoretical terms and to propose thought out alternative approaches for their solution. Whether it was in the sector of agrarian relations, labour problems, educational malaise, administrative backwardness, the case was the same.

3. This brings to a next major issue. The Dravidian movement was mostly based on personalities, despite the overwhelming anti-Brahminism of the earlier phases and the pro-Dravidianism and Pro-Tamilism of the later phases. While the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam was the glaring example of this, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam did have, initially, stronger organizational arrangements and policy commitments, but in the end, even this degenerated into personalism as evidenced by the factions centred around E.V.K. Sampath, M. Karunanidhi, Mathiazhagan,
Nedunchezhiyan, Satyavani Muthu and M.G. Ramachandran - in fact, there came to be as many factions as there were leaders. But this was not the case with the leftist leaders of the popular movements in Kerala. Even the split of the leftists in Kerala into different camps were based on ideology, and not personalities, and certainly not at all any way comparable with the state of affairs among the Tamil Nadu leaders.

4. Something more needs to be said about the leaders of the popular movements in the two States. In Tamil Nadu, the process of mobilising the Tamil masses for nationalist sub-nationalist causes was initiated and carried out by a diversity of leaderships with distinctive ideological commitments of their own. Thus one can identify at least five such major agents or streams of popular movements in Tamil Nadu: (a) the Congress, within which there were the Rajaji faction dominated by Brahmins and the Kamaraj - Annamalai Pillai faction dominated by non-Brahmins still remaining within the Congress fold; (b) the Justice Party, which had its glorious days from 1917 to 1935, and advocating the non-Brahmin cause; (c) the Dravida Kazhagam of E.V. Ramaswami Naicker with a sui generis radical approach to social reforms and Dravidian emancipation; (d) the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam stream of Annadurai, which later brought forth at least five
sub-streams centred around: (i) M. Karunanidhi, (ii) M.G. Ramachandran, (iii) Mathiazhagan, (iv) Satyavani Muthu (v) Nedunchezhiyan; and finally (e) the Communists themselves.

The situation in Kerala was different in this respect too. Till the formation of the Communist Party of Kerala in 1940, the major political agent for mobilising the masses for political actions was the Congress, which was nebulous no doubt, with also communal representation in it by the Christians, Nairs and Ezhavas, but its major factions were only two: the conservative leaders (concentrated mostly in Travancore and Cochin) agitating primarily for constitutional reforms, and the radical leftist leaders agitating not only for constitutional reforms in favour of responsible government, but also for socio-economic reforms in favour of the peasants, the cultivators, the tenants and such weaker strata of the society. Here again, the division was based on ideologies and policies rather than personalities or communal organisations. After the formation of the Communist Party of Kerala, the Congressmen and the Communists were the two major agents of social mobilisation, and that too following ideological polarities. It was only with the split of the Communists and the Congressmen into further subgroups that the situation underwent a major change. But even then, the developments were in no way comparable to those in Tamil Nadu, because the ideological and issue orientation still
continued to be a major basis of the divisions in Kerala.

These historical perspectives are important for more than one reason: they so to say constitute the foil for the empirical "model" or "image" or nation-building discussed in chapter six. Without these, the empirical model or image of nation-building under study cannot be fully understood, and would even lead to grave distortions of the actual state of affairs. Afterall, the individual respondents, whose image of nation-building has been analysed in chapter six, cannot be totally separated, even for analytical purposes, from their cultural and historical context. And hence the relevance of even the concept of "political culture" for image analysis (discussed in detail in chapter two).

But the historical perspective is not enough. It needs to be supported by also an appropriate theoretical perspective. And this is sought to be done in the next chapter (chapter eight), which is a discussion on the politics of nation-building and local leadership from a theoretical plane.