A fairly large number of books and articles are available on various aspects of the UN peace-keeping operation in the Middle East. There are also books and articles on the contribution of individual countries other than India, to the various UN peace-keeping operations over the years. But very little systematic work has so far been done on India’s attitude and contribution to peace-keeping under UN auspices or, for that matter, on India’s contribution and stand on collective security and other important aspects of the working of the world organisation. This study -- intended partially to fill this gap -- is therefore an attempt to assess India’s contribution to UN peace-keeping efforts with special reference to the United Nations Emergency Force — the first major United Nations peace-keeping operation recommended by the General Assembly in which India participated militarily as well as financially.

The main effort in the following pages has been to analyse India’s national interests or — to use Arnold Wolfers’ phrase — milieu goals of India’s foreign policy in the context of her co-operation with the United Nations and her contribution to its peace-keeping operation in the Middle East 1956-1967. Keeping in view the leading principles of theory of international organisation and foreign policy, an attempt has been made to undertake an objective, impersonal and analytical assessment of India’s contribution to the above mentioned UN peace operation.
This study includes an analysis of the mechanism of collective security as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. In view of changing international relations and the tendency of the Organisation, like any living organism, to grow and develop, the transformation of collective security into new technique of UN peace-keeping operation has been analysed.

Also — in view of the existence of a sharp political controversy on the subject — an attempt has been made to define the concept of peace-keeping and to differentiate it from collective security system. Some of the important determinants and motivations, which led India to play a quiet and persuasive role to ease the cold war in the forums of the Organisation and to extend co-operation to its various peace-keeping efforts have been examined and analysed. An attempt has been made to assess India's role with regard to interpretation of various constitutional provisions of the Charter and to the functioning of various institutional arrangements relevant to UN peace-keeping. A detailed study of India's efforts to avert the Suez crisis and India's contribution to the establishment and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force has been made. The fifth chapter of this work has been devoted to the study of the financial implications of the UNEF and to the evaluation of India's role therein.

Primary material in the form of United Nations Official Records, Indian Parliamentary Debates and statements and speeches of Indian and foreign statesmen and documents have been made use of. As the primary material is scattered over a period of 22 years (1946-68), I had to draw on the works of various learned
writers on India's foreign policy. Nevertheless the study has been based largely on primary sources.

I am extremely grateful to Professor K.P. Misra, under whose supervision and scholarly guidance this study has been made. It was as a result of valuable discussions with him that this study, which was originally conceived to cover a larger canvas, has been limited in its scope and is now confined only to the United Nations Emergency Force. My sincere gratitude goes to Professor S.C. Gangal who, in spite of his other academic preoccupations, went through the whole manuscript and gave many valuable suggestions. I therefore take this opportunity to thank them both for their keen and consistent interest in the completion of this study. However I should like to add that my sense of gratitude to these two teachers is too deep to be adequately expressed through the rather limited medium of the written word.

I am also grateful to the Library staff of the School of International Studies (Jawaharlal Nehru University) and of the Indian Council of World Affairs without whose willing co-operation and gracious assistance this work would perhaps never have been completed.

Nand Lal
New Delhi