Chapter V

INDONESIA, THE PHILIPPINES
AND MAPHILINDO
Indonesia's Attitude Towards Regional Grouping

Since it had acquired independence, Indonesia had never been willing to join in any regional cooperation, except the Colombo Plan and Specialized Agencies of the United Nations. Indonesia steadfastly exercised its active and independent foreign policy, which was essentially to avoid being involved or committed in the Cold war during this period. In exercising its active and independent foreign policy it did not mean that Indonesia remained passive in viewing world events. This was clearly demonstrated by Indonesia in giving wholehearted support to the struggle of the Afro-Asian peoples against colonialism.

As has been noted earlier, the Philippines in the early 1950s, made several attempts to form a regional grouping among Asian nations. Most of these Asian nations however, particularly India, Indonesia, Burma and Ceylon had no intention of forming a regional grouping. They were aware that such a regional grouping was meant to protect its members from danger; they also realized that ultimately such groupings could be used for containing the growing menace of Communism. As such they would directly be involved in the Cold war issue. For these countries the only way to ensure their freedom was to dissociate themselves not only from power blocs, but also from any association which they feared might finally be used for the own interest of the big powers. Although in the 1950s the Philippines too was not a member of any
regional or military association, yet it had aligned itself with the United States.

Following the defeat of the French in Indo-China, a military regional cooperation, the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was established in Manila in February 1955. Efforts by the Philippines to have a broad-based membership of Asian countries were not quite successful, because only two South-East Asian countries, namely Thailand and Pakistan, joined the SEATO.

India's success in playing the role of mediator in the Korean and Indo-China wars undoubtedly influenced the thinking of the Indonesian leaders and other Asian countries. For Indonesia and other like-minded countries in Asia, the best way to safeguard their freedom, and to maintain peace and security was to cooperate closely among themselves without interference or assistance from either blocs. For this purpose they convened the First Asian-African Conference in Indonesia in April 1955.

From 1955 until early 1960, there was no significant move by the Philippines or any other Asian country to launch a project for regional cooperation. Domestically, Indonesia had to struggle for its survival, because an upheaval broke out in the outer regions. In international affairs, Indonesia had to maintain its active and independent policy. It was a very delicate period, because the superpowers were still at odds with each other, when the Cold War was the order of the day. Relations between the Philippines and Indonesia, too, were not at their best, for the Philippines was suspected of involvement in the internal affairs of Indonesia.
While Indonesia's relations with the neighbouring South-East Asian countries were not very cordial, Philippine-Malayan ties, on the other hand, were close. The idea of creating a regional association among South-East Asian countries had been revived by Malaya and the Philippines. And has been mentioned in the preceding chapters, the Malayan Prime Minister, Tengku Abdul Rahman, took the initiative together with President Carlos Garcia of the Philippines to launch another regional grouping.

Indonesia declined the invitation to join the proposed regional grouping, and was of the view that it would be best to strengthen ties with the countries of the South-East Asian region only through bilateral cooperation.

Ever since Indonesia successfully convened the First Asian-African Conference, followed by the personal diplomacy of President Sukarno, Indonesia had persistently geared its image among the Asian and African countries. Malayan and Philippine involvement in the Indonesian upheaval of 1958-60 was one of the reasons for the latter to stay aloof from any regional grouping. Another factor in Indonesia's rejection of the proposed regional cooperation in South-East Asia was that the proposal was not put forward by Indonesia, but by the Philippines and Malaya, whose alignment with the Western blocs were very obvious. Although Malaya was not a member of any regional grouping, it had a defence pact with the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries. For these and other reasons, Indonesia ruled out any close collaboration with other South-East Asian nations. Thus, while Indonesia's relations with far-away Asian and African countries were undoubtedly good, this
was not quite the case with its South-East Asian neighbours. The Philippines and Malaya in the meantime went ahead with the creation of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASA) with Thailand as a third member.

**Malaya and Philippine Claim Over North Borneo**

While ASA was yet to be born, another idea to establish regional cooperation in the form of a federation emerged on May 27, 1961, when Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman announced his well-known concept of the Federation of Malaysia. Unlike previous concepts of regional cooperation in South-East Asia, the proposed Federation of Malaysia was to comprise only former British colonial territories in the region, namely Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak.

Neither Indonesia nor the Philippines paid any attention to the Tengku's proposal. Indonesia was on the brink of military confrontation against the Dutch in West Irian, and the Philippines was fully preoccupied with the general elections. When the presidential election was over, public opinion in the Philippines began to focus attention on the Malaysia project, which coincided with Macapagal's assumption of power. Macapagal's earlier dreams never faded from his memory. His biggest concern was that his claim to North Borneo, which he initiated in the 1950s, was still unrealized. During his tenure as Vice-President of the Philippines from 1957 to 1961, he had had enough time to work out his project not only to run for Presidentship, but also to make good his earlier claim to North Borneo, and to develop an idea for creating regional
cooperation in South-East Asia. There is no doubt that the Tengku's proposal for establishing a Federation of Malaysia was one of the main factors pressing Macapagal to advance his North Borneo claim after he became President, and counter the Malaysian claim with his own. Because once the Federation of Malaysia came into being, it would be difficult for the Philippines to pursue its claim.

When Macapagal assumed the presidency, the preparation for establishing Malaysia was in progress. The Philippines deemed it necessary to discuss the North Borneo claim with Malaya, when Foreign Secretary Emmanuel Pelaez met Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman in Cameron Highlands, Malaya, in April 1962, on the occasion of the ASA conference. According to the Philippine version, Tengku Abdul Rahman suggested that the Philippines lodge the claim with the British Government. Tengku Abdul Rahman also believed to have said that he would welcome the inclusion of North Borneo in the Federation only on "a clean slate". (1)

On April 24, 1962, Congressman Ramos tabled a resolution, which was adopted unanimously, urging the President of the Philippines to take necessary action for recovering the North Borneo territory. (2) Notes between the Governments of the Philippines and the United Kingdom were exchanged from May until December 1962. The formal claim was lodged on June 22, 1962, when Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs Salvador P. Lopez requested the British Government


(2) Ibid., Vol. I (Manila, 1964), pp. 146-8, and 149.
to hold a discussion over the Philippine claim to North Borneo. (3) On July 27, 1962, President Macapagal launched his own proposal for establishing a Greater Malayan Confederation among the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak. (4)

In the meantime events moved swiftly. The Governments of the Federation of Malaya and the United Kingdom signed an Agreement on August 1, 1962, in London to establish the Federation of Malaysia on August 31, 1963. The Philippines had to act quickly. While felicitating the British and Malayan Governments, President Macapagal also urged the British Government to discuss the North Borneo Question as soon as possible. On September 27, 1962, speaking before the United Nations General Assembly, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Emmanuel Pelaez hoped that the North Borneo issue would be solved peacefully on the pattern of the West Irian solution. (5)

Although at the beginning the British Government was rather reluctant to hold talks with the Philippines, finally it agreed to the

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(5) "We have placed on record our gratification over the peaceful settlement of the West Irian question. It is our earnest hope that the spirit of accommodation that led to the settlement of this long-standing dispute will likewise prevail in the settlement of similar problems. I have in mind particularly the claim of my government to the territory of North Borneo which was annexed by the British Crown in 1946." Official Records of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 17th Session, 1134th Plenary Meeting, September 27, 1962, p. 167 (emphasis added).
Philippine request. (6) The British decision to hold talks with the Philippines came after the Azahari rebellion broke out in the Brunei town on December 8, 1962. The talks between the Philippines and the United Kingdom were held in London from January 28 to February 1, 1963. The Philippine delegates were headed by Emmanuel Pelaez, Vice-President and concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the British delegation by the Earl of Home, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. (7)

The Philippine claim was mostly based on the legalistic point whether the Document of 1878 signed by the Sultan of Sulu and the British Government was "a contract of lease or deed of cession". (8) The British delegates rejected this legal claim and said "that the British Government did not rely on the 1878 document alone, but also on a series of acts and events that had occurred thereafter". (9) The Philippines' delegates forwarded other objections to the inclusion of North Borneo in the proposed Malaysia,

(6) From the Joint Communique issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs and the British Embassy in Manila on December 29, 1962, reproduced in Philippine Claim to North Borneo, Vol. I (Manila, 1964), p. 159.

(7) Ibid., Vol. II, p. 66.


(9) Philippine Claim to North Borneo, Vol. II, p. 86. (Hereinafter Philippine Claim).
such as the proximity of North Borneo to the Philippines rather than to Malaya. Further, the Philippines put some arguments based on security, feasibility and the viability of Malaysia Plan, and the plan for self-determination for North Borneo once the territory was included in the Philippines. When the Philippine arguments were exhausted, it put forward Macapagal's proposal for establishing a Confederation of Greater Malaya as an alternative for Malaysia. However, the Philippines was unable to win the British Government's understanding for its objections to including North Borneo in the proposed Malaysia. Neither would the British accept Macapagal's concept, for the Malaysia plan itself was already in an advanced stage. Apart from this, the British were unable to abandon their previous commitment to Malaya for establishing Malaysia in favour of the Macapagal's proposal for another confederation. (10) The United Kingdom and Malaya saw Macapagal's plan as a hindrance for the already advanced Malaysian plan. (11)

Unlike the West Irian claim of Indonesia, the Philippine claim over North Borneo was never fully supported by all layers of society in the country, much less by the whole nation. Intensive campaign, such as occurred during the West Irian confrontation in Indonesia were never mounted in the Philippines. The hub of activity was the capital city of Manila. As expected, the London talks failed. Instead of concentrating their attention on the North Borneo claim, the Philippines and the British delegates discussed

(10) Ibid., p. 82.
(11) Ibid., p. 81.
Anglo-Philippine cooperation in general, such as prevention of piracy, problems of smuggling, and illegal immigration into North Borneo territory. (12)

With the failure of the London talks, the Philippines spearheaded a new move to frustrate the Malaysia plan. While trying to defer the realization of the plan, the Philippines attempted to convince Indonesia and Malaya of the viability of Macapagal's plan as an alternative for Malaysia.

The Concept of Confederation of Greater Malaya

Upon his return from London, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Emmanuel Pelaez put forward a suggestion that it would be desirable to hold a meeting between the leaders of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines to discuss their differences. Apart from this idea, the Philippines was also thinking of including Indonesia in the proposed confederation. Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs Salvador P. Lopez had been instrumental in advising President Macapagal to bring Indonesia into the Confederation plan. (13)

It should be noted that the original draft of the Confederation was only to include Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei, Sarawak and the Philippines in order to be able to counter-balance Indonesia. (14) The Philippines feared not only that Indonesia

(13) Interview with ex-President Diosdado Macapagal in Manila on May 16, 1969.
(14) Interview with Alejandro Fernandez, Executive Secretary to the President of the University of the Philippines in Quezon City on April 21, 1969.
would ultimately become the dominant factor in the Confederation, but was also concerned about the possible entrance of Indonesian Communists through the backdoor into Philippines territory once Indonesia became a partner in the Confederation.

The Philippine move was not so much of a delaying tactic in the establishment of Malaysia, as a device to protect its national interest on the North Borneo territory. By rallying Indonesia to its side, the Philippines would have an ally which was also opposing the Malaysia plan. Indonesia's participation in the proposed Confederation was also meant to divert Indonesia's attention to North Borneo itself, because the Philippines was also very much concerned that sooner or later Indonesia would grab the North Borneo territory. (15)

Geographically speaking, North Borneo is much closer to Indonesia than to the Philippines. A certain portion of North Borneo territory was also supposed to have belonged to Indonesia. Macapagal had to seek a way out to clarify Philippine claim over North Borneo to Indonesia. An opportunity came when, following the first Tokyo Summit meeting with Tengku Abdul Rahman, President Sukarno made a stop-over in Manila. During a brief meeting in Manila, President Macapagal explained to President Sukarno his idea of establishing the Confederation of Malaya, which would include Indonesia as well. President Sukarno, was impressed not only by Macapagal's idea, but also by his dynamic action in handling his country's foreign policy. Macapagal also made clear that

the Philippine claim to Sabah would not include the Indonesian portion of North Borneo. (16)

As has been noted earlier, President Macapagal told the press in Manila on July 27, 1962, of his proposal for creating a Malayan Confederation. Referring to his Confederation plan, he said among other things:

The unity of the Malay peoples is an objective that goes back to the beginnings of their history. Realized once or twice in historic times, this unity was destroyed, first by dissension among themselves and in more recent times by the coming of the western colonial powers.

Now that the colonial powers are on the point of finally liquidating their empires in our region, the time has come when we, the Malay peoples, must try to discover anew a broader basis for more effective cooperation and unity.

I do not believe that we should leave this vital task to the outgoing colonial powers. This is a task which we Malay peoples must ourselves do. If they have a project for territorial integration, let us go them one better by having our own broader project for political, economic and cultural unity. If they advance a project for national federation, let us go beyond that and think in terms of a regional confederation.

Accordingly, I suggest the idea of a greater Malayan Confederation comprising, to begin with, the Federation of Malaya, the Philippines, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo. In this way, the great arc of islands consisting of the Philippine archipelago, North Borneo, Singapore and the Malay Peninsula would form a formidable geographical cultural, economic and political unity that would be a power force for freedom, progress and peace not only in Asia but in the world.

We must forge it ourselves by our own efforts, out of our sense of history and our recognized community of interests. We should not accept

(16) From an interview with Diosdado Macapagal in Manila on May 16, 1969.
a European project as a substitute for an Asian project, planned and carried out by Asians themselves, in the true and enduring interest of the Asian world. (17)

Accordingly, he ordered the Department of Foreign Affairs to ask the University of the Philippines to set up a Committee to undertake a thorough research of the feasibility of creating a greater Malayan Confederation. The University of the Philippines' Study Team comprising some prominent historians, political scientists, and economists, would formulate the Macapagal's plan. Among them were Cesar D. Majul as Chairman of the Study Team, and Alejander M. Fernandez. The latter was considered to be one of the young nationalist intellectual. He was aware of the far-reaching consequences if Malaysia was formed. He wrote an article in the *Philippines Free Press* on February 24, 1962, entitled "Threat from Malaysia". He was of the view that the Philippine national interest would be affected by the formation of Malaysia.

First, the inclusion of North Borneo in the proposed Federation would amount to forfeiture of our claim to sovereignty over that territory...

Secondly, with the formation of the Federation of Malaysia, the subversive potential of the Chinese of Singapore, of which Malaysia is so afraid, will become a matter of real concern for our national security.... The formation of Malaysia would increase the possibility of more intense extremist socialist and Communist activity in Borneo. (18)

The University Study Team was commissioned on August 9, 1962, and submitted its report in September 1962. Bonifacio S. Salamanca

(17) See n. 4 of the *Statement of President Macapagal before Press Conference in Manila on July 27, 1962*.

(18) Reproduced in the *Proposed Outline of A Greater Malayan Confederation*, Study made by the University of the Philippines, mimeographed (Quezon City, 1962), pp. 176-7. (Hereinafter University Study Team).
was responsible for the study of "The Theory and Practice of Confederation and Federations". He analysed the definitions of the above-mentioned terminology and motivating factors and background conditions for integration. Stating the conclusions at this research, Salamanca said among other things: "A stage of supranationalism can be arrived at from the situation of national sovereignty. It can accomplish more than inter-governmentalism". (19) On the economic sphere he said: "Supranationalism over economic matters can be autonomous, that is, it can remain viable and independent of political development. Conversely, it does not necessarily lead to the partition of similar steps at integration in the political sphere." (20) Salamanca evidently tried to justify the creation of a Confederation.

Agustin Kintanar Jr. made an analysis of "Some Economic Implications of the proposed Malayan Confederation". He was of the opinion that the formation of a Malayan Confederation "would not have an earth-shaking economic significance for the Philippines at this time". (21) He mentioned also that the proposed Confederation was relatively smaller than the ASA, and "there is not one country which is a significant rice exporter so there would be no source from within the confederation to meet occasional shortage of rice in the Philippines." (22) The non-availability of domestic

(19) Quoted from "A Preliminary Study on the Theory and Practice of Confederations and Federations" in ibid., p. 20.

(20) Ibid.

(21) Ibid., p. 44.

(22) Ibid.
petroleum in the Philippines could be eliminated if Brunei joined the Confederation. However, Kintanar pointed out, "...so long as there is an oversupply of oil from the Middle East, this advantage of proximity may not amount too much". (23) Other economic factors which would be beneficial to the Philippines were among others:

1. In sugar marketing; "with the decreasing preferential treatment of Philippine sugar in the United States, the proposed confederation offers an alternative market." (24)

2. On the timber and log industries, "The availability of timber and logs in Sarawak and North Borneo offers alternatives sources for the plywood industry in the Philippines". (25)

3. On the steel industry, "...there are no formidable prospective competitors from among the other five (proposed) confederating states based on known iron ore deposits and sources of power." (26)

The most extensive research was done on the Greater Malayan Confederation Proposal itself. The report was prepared by Alejandro M. Fernandez and it covered all aspects and areas intended to be covered by the Confederation plan. Fernandez focused the study chiefly on cultural, economic and political considerations. In the analysis and conclusions, he brought out among others: the confederation proposal and the North Borneo Question, a suggested course of action on North Borneo, difficulties in blocking the launching of the Federation of Malaysia, and a suggested matrix for Confederation

(23) Ibid., p. 44.
(24) Ibid., p. 45.
(25) Ibid.
(26) Ibid.
proposals. (27) In his introductory note, he explained why Indonesia was excluded from the proposed confederation.

Indeed, the prospect of enticing Indonesia to join the proposed confederation is very dim. Indonesia pursues a neutralist policy in foreign affairs and tends to stand off regional arrangements outside the context of the Asian-African bloc itself in line with the spirit of Bandung. It may also be noted in passing that, surface manifestations to the contrary notwithstanding, Indonesia, is still nursing a grudge against the Philippines for its role in harboring Indonesian rebels and unofficially aiding them during the 1958-1961 civil war between Djakarta and the Outer Islands. Indonesia's attitude towards Seato and the United States should be enough warning of the futility of trying to bring Indonesia in at this time. (28)

In analysing the confederation proposal and the North Borneo Question, Fernandez pointed out that:

Some special circumstances impelled President Macapagal to make his bold confederation proposal at this time. Aside from her keen interest in forging closer ties in her neighbors, the Philippines had a specific interest in the territory of North Borneo.... Without going into the details of the North Borneo Question, certainly the Philippines has every reason to assume that she has a more rightful claim to North Borneo than Indonesians ever had to West Irian on historical and cultural grounds. (29)

According to Fernandez, the first action being pursued by President Macapagal to form the Confederation would serve two purposes:

1. to prevent the British from unilaterally transferring sovereignty over North Borneo to a federation which excludes the Philippines; and

2. to keep open the avenue to a negotiated settlement of the status of North Borneo. (30)

(27) Ibid., Appendix III.
(28) University Study Team, n. 18, pp. 47-8.
(29) Ibid., p. 94.
(30) Ibid.
The second action was to realize the North Borneo claim through negotiations before the formation of Malaysia. Since the Philippines was racing against time, Fernandez suggested President Macapagal "to press the North Borneo claim initially through the peaceable channels provided by international law...." (31)

A more elaborate way to solve the North Borneo question was put forward by Fernandez in "A Suggested Course of Action on North Borneo". He proposed to use military force if the Philippine diplomacy failed. (32) According to Fernandez,

If the Philippines moves, notably an indication of our unwavering stand on North Borneo, could convince the British, that eventually they would be in for a protracted conflict from which they have much to lose and little to gain, our claim to North Borneo may have greater chances of being realized. Otherwise, through the creation of the Federation of Malaysia next year or earlier, British will confront us with a faith accompli regarding the status of North Borneo. (33)

Other actions which should be followed by the Philippines were to integrate "Filipino Muslims into the body politic by giving them the feeling of being Filipino at the forefront of a national movement". (34) Since the population of the Philippines in the southern areas, particularly in the neighbouring North Borneo area, was predominantly Moslems, efforts to ingrain in them the feeling of being Filipino first were very important. In so doing, the

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(31) Ibid., p. 95.
(32) Ibid.
(33) Ibid., p. 96.
(34) Ibid.
Government would be able to present the North Borneo claim as being a national cause. With the Filipino Moslems as the vanguard in pursuing the claim, it would create less suspicion among the Malay and Indonesian Moslems. In line with this action, he suggested "a direct confrontation with the British on the issue of colonialism would boost our prestige in the eyes of fellow Asians, who up to now tend to regard us as American puppets." (35)

Fernandez, however, saw some difficulties in blocking the formation of the Federation of Malaysia. First of all, the British themselves had their own interests in the Malaysia plan. It was "another form of safeguard for British economic interests is the existence of military bases in Singapore". (36) Apart from the British, "Malaya poses another obstacle to the Philippines' confederation proposal. She is not disinterested in the untapped wealth of the Borneo territories, in sharing the oil richness of Brunei, and in general in falling heir - the chosen heir - to the South East Asian colonies of the disintegrating British Empire". (37) He did not deny "the possibility of Indonesia's encroachment in the British Borneo territories is partly responsible for British enthusiasm in endorsing the Federation of Malaysia plan". (38) Fernandez suspected that the British of not only welcoming the idea of Malaysia,

(35) Ibid.
(36) Ibid., p. 97.
(37) Ibid., p. 98.
(38) Ibid., p. 99.
but also of authoring it, "...as a means of denying British Borneo to the Indonesian, who might attempt to grab these territories on the pretext of throwing out the remnants of colonialism from the immediate boundaries of Indonesian soil". (39)

Apart from the Malayan, the British and the Indonesian viewpoints, Fernandez also feared that the "Opposition to the Philippines' confederation plan might come heavily from Singapore, whose population is predominantly Chinese". Fernandez was not worried about the reaction of the Borneo territories. According to him they "...will not have any say on the Philippines' confederation proposal. It is the British who will have the final word for the three territories." (40)

In a suggested matrix for confederation proposals, Fernandez brought out several points. In his view, the countries intended to be covered by the confederation should forge closer cooperation in the cultural, economic, political and technical fields. (41) He also suggested that "There should be a provision for leaving this door open for other Malaysian countries to join the confederation, if not initially, then at a more propitious time." (42) Through closer economic relations among the Malaysian peoples, he anticipated the confederation "will certainly satisfy their nationalist

(39) Ibid. According to P. Selvadurai, a Singaporean MP, who gave a talk before the ISIS (Indian School of International Studies) students in New Delhi on February 12, 1970; Malaysia plan was of Tengku's origin, and the British were not aware of it.

(40) Ibid., p. 100.

(41) Ibid., p. 105.

(42) Ibid., p. 106.
longings to reduce their colonial bounds and will, it is hoped, work to the mutual benefit of all and promote the welfare of the people". (43) He, however, did not wish "to preclude the proposed confederation from going beyond ASA in projects of economic cooperation and coordinated action." (44)

As has been noted earlier, Fernandez feared that a sizable part of the Chinese population in the Northern Borneo territories, Singapore and Malaya, whose orientation was towards Peking, would jeopardize the real existence of the Confederation itself. Apart from these dangers, he foresaw the potential threat from the Indonesian Communists, and their ultimate objective of grabbing the North Borneo territories from the British. It was to eliminate this menace that a joint effort for strengthening defences among the Confederation member-states was suggested. He referred to this by saying that: "one of the cardinal aims of the proposed Confederation should be to secure the member-states in mutual defense system against outside aggression in any form and against internal subversion." (45)

During the London Talks between January 28 and February 1, 1963, the Philippine delegation expounded the Greater Malayan Confederation which would comprise Malaya, Singapore, the three British North Borneo territories and the Philippines as an alternative to the Malaysia plan. (46) Under-Secretary Salvador P. Lopez

(43) Ibid.
(44) Ibid.
(45) Ibid.
elucidated the substance of the Confederation plan and stressed that it "...would have a population of 40 million, would be enormously rich in natural resources and would be one of the most important political units in all Asia". (47) He further envisaged that "Unlike the proposed Federation of Malaysia, which even now is serving to divide and embitter relations between peoples, the Confederation would unite people with common interests and bring them together for the accomplishment of constructive tasks." (48)

Naturally, it was not an easy decision for the British, just to give up its Malaysia Agreement for the sake of Macapagal's Confederation plan. Even if the Confederation plan was more practical and advanced, as stressed by Under-Secretary Lopez, the British could not abandon its former colonial territories. In the words of Fernandez: "The British realized too that Malayans are British friends, and inherited British tradition. The British too were aware that they were friends of the Philippine people. Nonetheless, they preferred to give Sabah to the Malayans instead of to the Philippines, since the Malayans are more friendly to the British." (49)

Although the British delegation were not unsympathetic to the Philippine proposal, the former were of the view that "...it would take a great deal of time and thought and planning to realize". (50) The British persisted in their stand, and stated that they would consider

(47) Ibid., pp. 81-82.
(48) Ibid., p. 82.
(49) Interview with Alejander M. Fernandez, Quezon City, April 21, 1969.
(50) Philippine Claim, Vol. II, p. 82.
the Confederation idea "but only after the Federation of Malaysia has been established". (51) However, once the North Borneo territory had been incorporated into Malaysia, it would be difficult for the Philippines to pursue its claim, much less to reopen talks on the Confederation proposal. And as pointed out by Under-Secretary Lopez, "by giving North Borneo to Malaya a sword would have been planted forever between Malaya and the Philippines." (52)

Following the failure of the London Talks, the Philippines realized that it was impossible to take advantage of the decline of this mighty British Empire alone. The only possible aid the Philippines could have expected was from Indonesia, which incidentally was also opposing the Malaysia plan. By admitting Indonesia into the common struggle against Malaysia, the Philippines would not only be aided by more than 100 million Indonesians, but also by other African and Asian peoples whose stand in world affairs was similar to that of Indonesia. And it was a fact that Indonesia at this period was highly respected in this African-Asian world. However, to attract Indonesia to the Philippines' side, the latter had to modify the Confederation proposal. (53)

On March 18, 1963, the Department of Foreign Affairs requested the University of the Philippines to modify the first concept to make possible the inclusion of Indonesia in the Confederation plan.

(51) Ibid.
(52) Ibid.
(53) See Esterrela D. Solidum, "Background Paper on Indonesia", in University Study Team, n. 18, pp. 270-71, and also n. 15, Appendix X, p. 483.
Accordingly, an ad-hoc committee was formed for the purpose of studying the viability and feasibility of Indonesia's membership in the proposed Confederation. The modified version of the Confederation plan which was submitted on May 14, 1963, did not differ much from the original one. Two new appendices were added, e.g., entitled "Further Economic Implication of the Proposed Greater Malayan Confederation" written by Reynaldo J. Gregorio, and the second one was "Background Paper on Indonesia", by Esterrela D. Solidum.

Although Gregorio also expressed scepticism about the proposed confederation, he put forward some constructive proposals which might smooth the implementation of the confederation plan. He pointed out that the proposed Confederation "would not have a great economic significance to the Philippines in the short run". (54) He envisioned however, that "...in the long run as the political and economic aspects of the confederation are specified, the economic implications of such a confederation will become clearer and more relevant to the common problems of economic growth and economic stability of the region." (55) Some of the economic proposals he suggested were: 1) the creation of a Malayan customs union which according to Gregorio "could solve the problem of insufficient effective demand by increasing the aggregate consumption potentialities of the region through the consolidation of markets". (56) 2) As a consequence of this customs union, Malayan

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(54) University Study Team, n. 18, p. 214.
(55) Ibid.
(56) Ibid.
entrepreneurs would be encouraged to undertake joint ventures among themselves, and in turn they "could help generate large capital formation." (57) 3) "Abolition of imports quotas and import tariffs as a consequence of a customs union would lead to disequilibrium in the balance of payments accounts of some member countries in the short run, but this effect might not necessarily persist in the long run". (58) 4) With the establishment of confederation, another benefit might be expected, namely "the possibility of coordinating economic development planning for the area". (59)

Estrella D. Solidum produced a new appendix in the form of a Background Paper on Indonesia. She furnished an extensive study of Indonesia covering geography, economy, politics, government, armed forces, the Chinese and Communism. According to Solidum "the proposed Greater Malayan Confederation could possibly contribute to the solution of the problems of Indonesia if it could be drawn its membership." (60) She was of the view that "Indonesia could be attracted to the confederation if it could be demonstrated beyond doubt that the bloc would be free from foreign influence and interests and that the rest of the peoples involved would have displayed popular support for the confederation." (61)

(57) Ibid.
(59) Ibid., p. 217.
(60) Ibid., p. 270.
(61) Ibid.
Solidum also foresaw some disadvantages which would be detrimental to the Philippines' interests should Indonesia be left out of the proposed Confederation:

(a) It might not be comfortable for the Confederation to have for a neighbor a hostile country with a population of 96 million, twice that of the Confederation, with rich resources, both of which could be harnessed for aggressive or provocative purposes towards the Confederation.

(b) Indonesia might feel that the proposed Confederation would be inimical to its interests, and for defense, it would easily turn to the communist bloc for military aid or even call for actual communist manpower assistance as it did in the case of West Irian, thereby, opening the area to greater communist interference.

(c) With such a hostile attitude fanned by communist agitation and by economic and political necessities, Indonesia may exploit the issue to satisfy its territorial ambitions beyond Kalimantan.

(d) The PKI would still use Singapore as a clearing house for communist activities in the area and may exploit Singapore's membership in the Confederation to expand its activities among the local Communist Party's of the Confederate member.

(e) Philippine and Indonesian relations will be strained in view of the anticipated hostile attitude of Indonesia. It would then become necessary to evaluate whether the defense arrangements of the Confederation would offset or neutralize Indonesia's attraction to the Muslim population in Mindanao which situation would pose a grave threat to Philippine political security. (62)

In regard to the advantages and disadvantages should Indonesia accept membership in the proposed Confederation, Solidum mentioned among other things:

(a) The Philippines could serve as a restraining force to the political tendencies of Indonesia which may be described as becoming increasingly favorable towards Communist objectives.

(62) Ibid., pp. 270-72.
(b) Indonesian officials have been broadly hinting at solidifying the Malay population of South East Asia at some future time in the face of the growing threat from Communist China. This Confederation would therefore be the opportunity for bringing the Malays together politically. Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio has endorsed this idea.

(c) Indonesia's culture can further enrich the whole area of Malaysia once the barriers are removed. Already it has some agreements with Malaya regarding this matter......

(d) Indonesia's rich resources will certainly be developed under an economic plan for the region and contribute to the Confederation's strength, but its economic relations with the Communist bloc may not be completely acceptable to the other members.

(e) By virtue of its population and its demonstrated regional and international leadership, Indonesia could also be expected to aspire for dominance in the area....

(f) The PKI will use the Confederation as a bridge to span frontiers and borders for its activities, just as the Philippines now fears Singapore would be in the Malaysian Federation plan. Synchronized communist development in the area may be expected and it would probably be more difficult to cope with the situation because it is accepted that the Overseas Chinese are more politically sophisticated in their tactics than the Malays. (63)

From the above-mentioned proposals it was clear then that without Indonesia's participation, the Confederation plan would be meaningless. Nevertheless, it was not that easy to draw Indonesia into the Confederation plan, amidst the militancy of Indonesian foreign policy during this period. No South-East Asian leader was better qualified to persuade President Sukarno to join the regional association than President Macapagal himself. Philippine foreign policy since Macapagal came to power had undoubtedly

(63) Ibid., p. 273.
attracted Indonesia. Philippine opposition to Malaysia was identical with Indonesia's. Thus President Macapagal had paved the way for Indonesia's membership in the proposed Confederation. The establishment of the Confederation would be beneficial for Indonesia, too, since it would frustrate the realization of the Malaysia plan. As has been noted earlier, President Macapagal was able to convince President Sukarno of the advantages in joining the Confederation. (64)

**Maphilindo**

There were at least two factors which led Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaya together in Manila from July 31 until August 5, 1963. After the return of West Irian to Indonesia in May 1963, the domestic situation in Indonesia was generally stable. Although on the economic front conditions were rather disheartening, President Sukarno had at least proclaimed the Economic Declaration meant for the betterment of the Indonesia's lot. Indonesia wanted to display to the outside world that Indonesia sincerely believed in solving the Malaysian problem among the Malays, and without any outside interference.

The Philippines on the other hand, was motivated by the wish to protect its Sabah claim, and not by any real desire to solve the overall issue of Malaysia. It was clear that the Philippines was vigorously and actively working for the convening of the three Malay countries to solve their disputes. The Philippines' (64) Interview with Macapagal, n. 18. For detailed account of Indonesia's response see under the head: "Reactions to Maphilindo" of this chapter.
drive for a Summit Meeting of the Heads of State of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines was more in evidence following the failure of London Talks. Although in the later years of confrontation, Philippine public opinion disowned Indonesia's partnership in the Malaysia issue, the moves of the Philippines at the beginning clearly indicated its desire to draw Indonesia to its side to strengthen the Philippine stand against Malaysia.

While it took almost two years from the inception of the concept to the realization of Malaysia, it hardly took one year for Macapagal to realize his Confederation concept. No doubt, the concept of Greater Malayan Confederation had been formulated in haste. Macapagal was racing against time to halt or at least to defer the formation of Malaysia, particularly to safeguard his interest in North Borneo. The British and Malayan accused Macapagal of putting up obstacles by promoting his own concept of a regional grouping. The Malayan leaders also agreed to come to the summit meeting in Manila because they wanted to demonstrate to their neighbours, which were antagonistic to the Malaysia plan, that they were willing to live peacefully and that every issue should be solved amicably. However, the Malayan leaders would not have gone to Manila for the summit meeting had they not been convinced that the Bornean peoples were solidly behind the Malaysian plan. For it was rather illogical for Malaya to give up its Malaysia plan, which had been originated and formulated by the Malaysans themselves, just to let it be replaced by the newly created concept of Greater Malayan Confederation. Their presence in Manila to meet the Indonesian and Philippine leaders was to
seek the latter's assurances that they would recognize Malaysia after it had been proclaimed. As has been mentioned earlier, during the London Talks, the British Delegates did not object to the Philippine proposal of Greater Malayan Confederation. However, the British wanted to discuss it only after the formation of Malaysia. Naturally, the British did not wish to dispose of their former colony of Borneo to the Confederation, some of whose members were not in the family of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

It should be acknowledged, however, that Macapagal's role in trying to solve the Malaysian dispute was indeed great irrespective of all his motives. Macapagal had at least made an attempt to reunite what he called "...triplets who, after birth, were placed under the care of three different foster parents". (65) To implement his idea of Greater Malayan Confederation, President Macapagal had been assisted by Emmanuel Pelaez, the Vice-President, and Salvador P. Lopez, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. These two men were indispensable in formulating Macapagal's concept of Confederation, and for fostering closer relations, especially between the Philippines and Indonesia. Apart from these two able assistants, President Macapagal also had been encouraged in his drive to realize the Confederation concept by the nationalist intelligentsia of the University of the Philippines and a section of the press in Manila.

As has been stated in the preceding chapters, before the three Heads of State of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines met in Manila at the end of July 1963, a series of meetings took place.

in Tokyo and Manila. The most important was the little summit meeting between President Sukarno and Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman in Tokyo on May 31, 1963, to ease the tension in South East Asia, and to smoothen the way for the forthcoming summit talks in Manila. (66) The second meeting, on the Ministerial level, took place in Manila between June 7-11, 1963. These preliminary meetings greatly facilitated the proceedings of the Summit Meeting in Manila. The real bargaining actually took place during the Ministerial Conference of June 1963, when the Foreign Ministers of the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaya devoted their time and energies to solving this complicated issue of Malaysia. By now, the Philippines already possessed a formidable weapon in its armoury, namely the modified concept of Malayan Confederation, which also included Indonesia. The Philippines was not alone in its opposition to the Malaysia plan, as Indonesia was on the Philippines' side. The three Foreign Ministers were in favour of Macapagal's plan of Malayan Confederation, and the Indonesian and Philippine representatives would welcome the formation of Malaysia. However, the Philippines and Indonesia failed to obtain Malaya's agreement for a plebiscite in North Borneo, instead the three foreign ministers agreed to asking the Secretary General of the United Nations to ascertain the wishes of the peoples of Northern Borneo territories. (67)

(66) See Malaya-Indonesia Relations, 31 August 1957-15 September 1963 (Kuala Lumpur, 1963), pp. 16 and 94, Appendix XII.

The result of the tripartite Foreign Ministers' Conference in Manila in June 1963, brought relief to the peoples of Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaya: finally a formula had been found to ease the tension in the region. However, another new development took place before the convening of the Manila Summit Meeting which almost scuttled the conference. Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman and President Sukarno gave different interpretations to the Report and Recommendations of the Foreign Ministers' Meeting. The former was of the opinion that the Manila Agreement and the ascertainment of the wishes of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak by the United Nations were only formalities which would facilitate the formation of Malaysia. Accordingly Tengku Abdul Rahman finalized the Malaysian Agreement with the United Kingdom in London on July 9, 1963. President Sukarno, on the other hand, had a different view on the Reports and Recommendations. According to Sukarno, the Malayan leaders should not have concluded any agreement whatsoever until after the Summit Meeting. To show the Malayan leaders that he was serious, he expressed his reluctance to go to the proposed Manila Summit and ordered the renewal of confrontation against Malaya.

Despite persistent arguments between Sukarno and Abdul Rahman, as to whether the latter had violated the Tokyo or Manila Agreement, in the sequel the former agreed to go to the Manila Summit Conference, thanks to the persuasion of Macapagal. Once the barriers were removed, it was easier for the host country to convene the Summit Conference. The Report and Recommendations of the three Foreign Ministers were meant to facilitate further the Summit
Meeting. As had been expected the three Heads of State accepted the Report and Recommendations in what was known as the Manila Accord.

Apart from the Manila Accord, the three Heads of State issued a Joint Statement and Manila Declaration. Regarding Maphilindo, the Joint Statement approved the recommendations made by the three Foreign Ministers as embodied in the Manila Accord. It may be noted that the three Foreign Ministers "supported President Macapagal's plan envisaging the grouping of the three nations of Malay origin working together in closest harmony but without surrendering any portion of their sovereignty. This calls for the establishment of the necessary common organs". (68) Further, paragraph 7 of the Manila Accord says that "The three Ministers agreed to take the initial steps towards this ultimate aim by establishing machinery for frequent and regular consultations". (69)

In the Joint Statement, an important passage in relation to the Maphilindo is paragraph 9, which *inter alia* says:

That initial steps should be taken towards the establishment of Maphilindo by holding frequent and regular consultations at all levels to be known as Mushawarah Maphilindo, it is agreed that each country shall set up a national secretariat for Maphilindo affairs and as a first step the respective national secretariats will consult together with a view to coordinating and cooperating with each other in the study on the setting up of the necessary machinery for Maphilindo. (70)

This paragraph, as clearly stated, was pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7,

(69) Ibid.
(70) Ibid., pp. 102-3.
8 and 9 of the Manila Accord, and also the fifth principle of the Manila Declaration, which says:

that in the context of the joint endeavours of the three nations to achieve the foregoing objectives, they have agreed to take initial steps towards the establishment of Maphilindo by holding frequent and regular consultations at all levels to be known as Mushawarah Maphilindo. (71)

The turn of events following the Manila Summit Conference yielded neither solution of Malaysia's problems nor the realization of the Maphilindo regional grouping that had been envisaged by the participants in the conference. We have seen in the foregoing chapters the persistent efforts on the part of Malayan leaders to proceed with the formation of Malaysia. The Malayan leaders were of the view that one of the cardinal objects of the Manila Summit meeting was to facilitate the formation of Malaysia. Apparently they were not fully convinced that the proposed Maphilindo would ever bring any brighter prospects than the Malaysian federation.

The prospects of Maphilindo had got nowhere after the formation of Malaysia on September 16, 1963. The Philippines and Indonesia on the other hand, still believed that the overall questions of Malaysia could be solved only through the machinery of Maphilindo. They were of the opinion that the chapters of Maphilindo provided ample scope for cooperation, consultation and the solution of any problem arising among the member countries. The so-called Mushawarah Maphilindo (mutual-consultation among the member countries), was thought to be the best way to prevent any conflict within the Maphilindo countries.

(71) Ibid., p. 105.
Indonesia and the Philippines, however, had different ways of solving their respective disputes with Malaysia. While Indonesia reaffirmed its confrontation policy, in the form of military, economic and political action against Malaysia, the Philippines on the other hand tried its best to utilize diplomatic efforts. Nevertheless, both Indonesia and the Philippines shared the view that it would have been possible for the conflicting parties to return to the principle of **Mushawarah Maphilindo**, as clearly envisaged in the Manila Documents.

Why, then, did Kuala Lumpur agree to the principle of Maphilindo, when after all it had chosen to create Malaysia? The promises and allegiance at the Manila Summit among the three Malay leaders were only empty slogans. Prime Ministers Tengku Abdul Rahman attended the Manila Summit in order to buy time to execute his Malaysia Plan and to calm the temper of President Sukarno, as well as to pander to President Macapagal's ambitious claim over North Borneo. Tengku Abdul Rahman's determination not to yield to the pressure of Indonesia and the Philippines had been clearly indicated even before the opening of the Summit. He concluded the agreement for the Malaysia Plan with the British in London on July 9, to the displeasure of President Sukarno. For Tengku Abdul Rahman, the Manila Summit was a delaying tactic to buy time to carry out his Malaysia Plan. He seemed to be certain that even by giving support to the Maphilindo Plan, his Malaysia Plan would not be disturbed. Indeed, Malaysia had become a fait accompli for the Indonesian and Philippine leaders: one of the agreements stipulated that these two countries would welcome Malaysia after the wishes of
the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak had been ascertained.

Reactions to Maphilindo

Whatever the shortcomings of the Manila Summit, it was considered to set the seal on the Philippines' diplomatic success. President Macapagal's great accomplishments had been praised not only by his countrymen, but also by other foreign statesmen. It could not be denied that the image of the Philippines in international politics had been enhanced. Most of the world public opinion agreed that President Macapagal, aside from successfully averting a protracted conflict over Malaysia, had been able to localize the dispute among the conflicting parties. More than that, Macapagal had also succeeded in bringing Indonesia's President Sukarno into the family of South-East Asian nations. The readiness of President Sukarno to solve the Malaysia dispute amicably and to join the Maphilindo was no small achievement for Philippine diplomacy. (72)

It was not without reason that the Philippine people were proud of their leaders' success in boosting the Philippines' image

in world affairs. Since the Philippines obtained independence, other newly independent nations in Asia had refused to accept the Philippines as one of them. The rest of the Asian countries looked on the Philippines more or less as an American mouthpiece in Asia. The efforts of the Philippines in the 1950s to lead Asian nations into some kind of regional groupings met with failure. It was only after the Manila Summit, which led to the Maphilindo project, that the voice of the Philippines began to be heard with respect by fellow Asians. (73)

Particularly with Maphilindo, President Macapagal not only succeeded in making the Philippines part of Asia, but also in convincing non-aligned Indonesia to cooperate with neighbouring nations. As Ople puts it:

Not matter how deviously arrived at, with the claim to North Borneo as the starting point, Maphilindo represents the first major Filipino initiative in world affairs, comparable only perhaps to the campaign for recognition of the first Philippine Republic in 1898. Maphilindo is a triumphant assertion of the Filipino national will and of our Asian identity. (74)

To prevent anxiety among the Chinese population in Malaya,


(74) Blas I. Ople, "Maphilindo: A Homecoming", Sunday Times (Manila), August 25, 1963, pp. 18-19. See also S.P. Lopez' speech at Manila Rotary Club on August 29, 1963, in which he said that following the Summit Meeting the Philippines was moving closer to Indonesia, Malaya and other neighbouring South-East Asian countries even at the expense of its traditional ties with the US if necessary. According to Lopez, "Maphilindo was in perfect harmony with a contemporaneous political movement in the world", Indonesian Herald, 31 August 1963, and Straits Times, August 31, 1963.
Singapore, and the three northern Borneo territories, Macapagal found it necessary to clarify the objective of Maphilindo. Speaking before the Manila Overseas Press Club on August 21, 1963, he said:

**Maphilindo is not a racialist grouping. It is not a super-state and none of its common organs will exercise supra-governmental powers. The three countries who form it will retain their independence and sovereignty. Maphilindo has enabled us to gain new friends without losing old friends.** (75)

Aside from safeguarding its own claim over North Borneo and delaying the creation of Malaysia, the Philippines' Maphilindo Plan had simultaneously achieved other ends as well. For example, the Philippines did not consider itself to be completely dependent on Washington in executing its foreign policy. (76) By demonstrating a friendly attitude towards Indonesia and identifying itself with Indonesia's foreign policy, the Philippines had indirect access to the Afro-Asian world. Moreover, there existed a common view in the Philippines and Indonesia that the setting up of Maphilindo would become a more formidable weapon in containing the Chinese menace than Malaysia would be.

Generally, the reaction in Indonesia towards Maphilindo was favourable, owing to the great influence President Sukarno exerted on all layers of society. This was the period when President Sukarno was at the zenith of his popularity. It was the custom in the country at this time to abstain from criticism of the President

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(76) Interview with Diosdado Macapagal, Manila, May 16, 1969.
as far as possible. Whatever Sukarno said or did, it was considered to be good for Indonesia. As all members of Parliament were either nominated or appointed by the President, they had become the mouthpiece of the President instead of the people. It was only the PKI and its associates that occasionally dared launch criticism against the regime.

President Macapagal's habit of wooing and praising the personality of President Sukarno, as well as of recalling the former glory of Indonesia, were factors in fostering much closer relations between the Philippines and Indonesia. (77) As in the case of the Philippines, Indonesia's approval for Maphilindo was motivated by its own interests. By joining Maphilindo, Indonesia would enjoy several advantages. First of all, it would frustrate or at least delay the formation of Malaysia. Had Maphilindo been firmly established, Indonesia would no doubt, have become the leading partner. During the Manila Summit it was widely acknowledged that the Indonesian delegates demonstrated their skill in diplomacy by influencing the course of the conference. (78) For

(77) Indonesian Herald, 24 August 1963. According to Macapagal, Sukarno began to like him when he made drastic changes in his country's foreign policy. Although originally Indonesia was not included in the Maphilindo plan, in the process however Indonesia was allowed to participate. At the beginning the Philippines wanted to confine its North Borneo problem, but as the things moved fast, and Indonesia also opposed the Malaysia idea, Indonesia was included in the proposed Maphilindo upon advice from Salvador Lopez. (Interview with Diosdado Macapagal, Manila, May 16, 1969).

instance, the Philippines and Malaya had agreed with Indonesia that the military bases in their respective areas were temporary in nature.

On the other hand, Malaya and the Philippines succeeded in pulling Indonesia into their own orbit. Indonesia did not raise any objection when one of the joint communiques proclaimed that "the three countries share a primary responsibility for the maintenance, stability and security of the area from subversion in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their respective national identities...." (79) However, one might wonder where the subversion was expected to come from. The only possible subversion in the area would arise from the Communist Chinese or the local Communists. By supporting this communique (Manila Accord), Indonesia not only committed itself, but also disengaged itself from its traditional non-alignment policy. Viewed from this angle, it was perfectly understandable why the PKI was so vehemently opposed to the Maphilindo Plan. (80)

It was quite often mentioned in international circles that Macapagal and Sukarno had strong personal ties. Each admired the other for his method of conducting affairs of State. Long before the Manila Summit meeting was convened, Sukarno and Macapagal had a private talk in Manila during the former's short visit on his

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way back from Tokyo to Djakarta in November 1962. (81) The ques-
tion before us now is whether Macapagal was the only person who
exerted influence on Sukarno. To trace this aspect of relationships
between the Philippines and Indonesia, we have to consider the
possible involvement of outside power in the affairs of the South-
East Asian nations. Despite clear affirmations that the affairs of
the region would be best handled by the peoples of the region them-
selves, the influence of big powers in the Manila Summit could not
be ruled out.

The emergence of the Macapagal Era in the Philippines and
the rise of President Sukarno's power in Indonesia could not be
separated from the existence of the enlightened policy of the
United States under President Kennedy. This was the period when
the foreign policy of John Foster Dulles was on the retreat from
the American scene, and President Kennedy began to appreciate the
policy of non-alignment of Indonesia as well as other countries in
Asia and Africa. Kennedy's view of the concept and practice of
non-alignment had become pragmatic and tolerant. Apart from this
the personality of President Kennedy himself won great admiration
from non-aligned leaders such as President Sukarno. President
Sukarno is believed to have said to President Kennedy in Washington
in 1961, that Indonesia was the best bulwark against Communism in

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(81) Interview with Macapagal, Manila, May 26, 1969. See also
Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "The Troubled Birth of Malaysia", 
Granada, "The Reason Behind Maphilindo", *The Chronicle
Magazine* (Manila), Vol. XVIII, No. 33, 17 August 1963,
pp. 8-9. Bernard K. Gordon, "Problems of Regional Coopera-
tion in Southeast Asia", *World Politics*, Vol. XVI, No. 2,
January 1964, p. 251.
South-East Asia. (82)

It could not be denied that the United States was in favour of Tengku Abdul Aman's Malaysia project as a stabilizing factor in South-East Asia. However, when the Philippines and Indonesia began to oppose the Malaysia Plan, and at the same time President Macapagal advanced the Maphilindo Plan, the United States saw the plan as reasonable and strong enough to contain any outside subversion into the area. (83)

Before the Soviet Union and Communist China awoke to it, the PKI had opposed the Malaysia Plan from the beginning. The oft-quoted PKI slogan during this period was that the Malaysia Plan was merely a perpetuation of British imperialism in South-East Asia. Nor did the PKI see any advantages in supporting the Maphilindo Plan. From the inception of the plan, the PKI saw the real danger Maphilindo posed to the very existence of the Communist movement not only in Indonesia, but also throughout South-East Asia.

(82) See Material on Malaysia, Vol. XV, March 1-31, 1965, p. 91; also in Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. ALVII, No. 9, March 4, 1965, p. 358. See also Bernard K. Gordon, "The Potential for Indonesia Expansionism", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4, Winter 1963-64, p. 393. In an editorial comment "Laying the foundations of unity for Malaysia", the Manila Times, August 6, 1963 said, "It is no exaggeration to say that the formulation of Maphilindo is owed in no small part to the enlightened foreign policy of the Kennedy Administration. By calling Sukarno out of the dog-house, so to say, the U.S. has won one more friend in Asia and made it possible for staunch U.S. allies like the Philippines to promote their own good-neighbour ends without having to break up old friendship."

(83) "Although never mentioned, some influence is believed to have been exerted on the Manila conference by the United States. The United States Ambassador in Indonesia, Mr. Howard P. Jones, who is regarded by some as a close confidant of
Because once Indonesia actively become a member of Maphilindo it would be indirectly associating itself with the United States, Britain and other western countries. In his lecture before the Army Staff and Command College in Bandung, D.N. Aidit, the Chairman of the PKI said: "The Maphilindo Plan was imperialistic because the Philippines was a member of Seato, and Indonesia should not join it". (84)

Meanwhile, M.H. Lukman, the Vice-Chairman of the PKI, in an interview with the correspondent of the Observer, London, stated:

...that the PKI did not consider there was any basis for the Malay Confederation between Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaya, for each of these three countries differed and opposed each other in its domestic and foreign policies. The racial affinities only, in this respect, the Malay race, could not possibly be made the basis of a confederation...as the Philippines was a Seato member, Maphilindo too would ultimately become the cousin of Asa or Seato. (85)

However, when President Sukarno gave final approval to Maphilindo in the Manila Summit, all political parties in Indonesia including the PKI did not raise any objection. Interviewed by Bruce Grant of the Australian newspaper The Age, M.H. Lukman said the PKI viewed the Manila Summit results as a reality. Regarding Maphilindo, he expected the Philippines and Malaya would become more radical in their foreign policy outlook. "Maphilindo is an

President Sukarno, was present in or around Manila throughout the talks." The Straits Times, August 6, 1963. See also President Kennedy's letter to President Macapagal on September 14, 1963 in Macapagal, n. 15, Appendix II, pp. 507-8.

(84) See the Straits Times, July 4, 1963.
(85) Harian Rakjat (Djakarta), 1 August 1963.
arena of the forces of the United States-British imperialism. Therefore the Malayan and Filipino peoples must and no doubt will move to give an anti-imperialist purport to Maphilindo". (86)

Speaking at an airport interview in Singapore, M. Subchan, Chairman of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said that Maphilindo might become the world's third biggest economic force after the United States and Russia. "The economic implications of Maphilindo are that it will strengthen the bargaining position of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines over the price of rubber, tin and copra." (87)

As Indonesia had been actively engaged in the confrontation policy against the Malaysian Plan ever since the beginning of the year 1963, the short break for the Manila Summit, which produced the Maphilindo Agreement and others, passed almost unnoticed by the majority of the Indonesian people.

While Malaya hesitantly supported Maphilindo in the interests of safeguarding the Malaysian Plan, Indonesia and the Philippines for their part vigorously touted the viability and the feasibility of this Maphilindo regional grouping. On the cultural front, for instance, the famous Filipino Bayanihan Cultural Group had been invited by President Sukarno to join the Indonesian independence day celebration. Speaking on its arrival in Djakarta, the leader of the group, Conrade Benitez said, "We have come here in the spirit

(87) See *Straits Times*, August 14, 1963.
of Maphilindo and the rebound friendship between our two countries." (88)

Even though the Malayan leaders paid little heed to Maphilindo, on one occasion or the other they had to make statements to their people about the objectives of this regional association. That Malayan leaders remained uncommunicative for most of the time could be understood, in view of the dangerous task ahead, should Maphilindo be actively propagated in the regions intended to be covered by Malaysia, which otherwise would seriously hamper the Malaysia Plan itself. Speaking at the session of the Malayan Parliament on August 12, 1963, Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman explained the meaning of the recent Manila Summit and Maphilindo:

...while Indonesia and the Philippines overwhelmingly come out in support of Malaysia and, come what may, it is our task and our duty to see that we do not fail them. On the other hand, we also value the goodwill of our neighbours. The people in Indonesia and the Philippines are bound together with our people by close historical ties and culture back for several centuries. At the same time we share with them and other countries in the region, the responsibility for maintaining peace and stability particularly in our part of the world. (89)

Although Macapagal, as the architect of Maphilindo categorically denied that Maphilindo was exclusively for the Malay race, the Chinese in Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak, particularly Singapore, were disturbed at the prospect of Maphilindo.

(89) See Straits Times, August 13, 1963, and August 6, 1963 (Editorial: "Triumphant Summit"). See also The Economist (London), August 20, 1963. According to Macapagal, Tengku Abdul Rahman was very impressed on the Maphilindo idea. Macapagal suspected that influential people around him, like Tun Abdul Razak and Ghazali were not very enthusiastic about it. Interview with Macapagal, Manila, May 16, 1969.
Lee Kuan Yew feared that the formation of Maphilindo would ultimately push the Chinese minority in South-East Asia into a corner. He accused Maphilindo as a racial concept. (90)

The Development of Maphilindo: September 17, 1963 to December 31, 1965

The long cherished dream of Macapagal to unite the triplets of Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia under the Maphilindo scheme was shattered once Malaysia came into existence on September 16, 1963. Instead of coming closer, the Philippines and Indonesia drifted further away from the new-born Malaysia. Maphilindo, which was still only an idea, lost its value as Malaya, one of the signatories of the Manila accords, became a part of Malaysia. (91) Indonesia, while frequently expressing the need to revive Mushawarah Maphilindo, escalated the pace of the confrontation policy against Malaysia. Indonesia's hostile moves towards Malaysia, made it impossible for the Tengku to give a second thought to the Maphilindo idea. Naturally, the main concern for the Tengku at this juncture was how to preserve the security and stability of Malaysia. Therefore, any attempt either by the Philippines or Indonesia to revive Maphilindo could not be separated from the solution of the Malaysia problem. It was out of this conviction that both Indonesia and the Philippines consistently propagated the necessity of resurrecting the abortive Maphilindo as a means towards solving the overall

(90) See Straits Times, August 9, 1963.
problems of Malaysia. Thus, the parting of the ways between the Philippines and Indonesia on the one hand, and Malaysia on the other, in seeking a solution to the Malaysia problem, "...consti-
tutes the first real test of the capacity of the three Maphilindo countries to overcome this differences and prevent them from hardening into permanent hostilities". (92)

It has been explained in the preceding chapter how difficult it was for these Maphilindo countries to solve their own problems. The severance of diplomatic relations by Malaysia with the Philippines and Indonesia on September 16, 1963, the intensification of Indonesian confrontation and the half-hearted attitude of Malaysia, further complicated peaceful settlement. Some fresh attempt by these disputants or by third countries from within or without South-East Asia towards the solution of the Malaysia dispute and also towards the revival of Maphilindo was eagerly looked forward to by the Philippines and Indonesia. However, neither the solution of Malaysia nor the revival of Maphilindo materialized.

The real effort to revive Maphilindo, at least in spirit, was made during the exchange of visits of President Sukarno to Manila and President Macapagal to Djakarta. (93) If there occurred any Mushavarah Maphilindo during Sukarno's visit to Manila, it was held only between the Philippines and Indonesia. Not only did both Heads of State urgently need to revive Maphilindo and use the

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(93) See Ichtisar Antara (Antara Annual), 1964, p. 100.
principle of Mushawarah (brotherly consultation) to solve the problems of Malaysia, but they also felt the need to expand Maphilindo. Indonesia and the Philippines were planning to include Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Burma. Expanded membership, it was believed, "...would result in a better balance or equilibrium with the federation". (94)

The campaign for expanding Maphilindo went into higher gear during the first half of 1964. This period was marked by frequent abortive negotiations in Bangkok, Phnom-Penh, Manila, and Tokyo in quest of a peaceful settlement of the Malaysia issue. The peaceful negotiations in those Asian capitals were exploited by the Philippines to inject the ideas of reviving Maphilindo. So was President Macapagal's visit to Indonesia in February 1964.

The emergence of the so-called Sukarno-Macapagal Doctrine had been partially responsible for encouraging President Macapagal to undertake an active campaign not only to revive but also to expand Maphilindo. (95) It is difficult to assess whether the Sukarno-Macapagal Doctrine was the only inspiration for reviving Maphilindo. It is worth noting that prior to the emergence of the Sukarno-Macapagal Doctrine, President Macapagal had paid a state visit to

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(95) Ibid., p. 159. See also Statement of Salvador P. Lopez before Seato Ministerial Meeting in Manila on April 14, 1964, Ichtisar Antar, 1964, p. 155, and Material on Malaysia, Vol. IV, 1964, p. 167. This doctrine was the reaffirmation of Macapagal's and Sukarno's faith in Maphilindo as an effective vehicle for devising an Asian Solution for Asian problems by Asian themselves. See Manila Chronicle, 12 January 1964.
the United States to attend the State funeral of President Kennedy. (96) During the month of January 1964, President Johnson also sent Attorney General Robert Kennedy to Tokyo, Manila, Kuala Lumpur, Djakarta and Bangkok to help solve the Malaysia crisis. (97) The presence of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Manila at this juncture added to the particular importance of the diplomatic activities, as he was also on a peace mission to mediate in the Philippine-Malaysia conflict, as well as to normalize Cambodian-U.S. relations. (98)

To avoid racial prejudice, the new Maphilindo Plan would welcome the admission of non-Malay race nations. According to Alberto M. Alfaro,

The Philippines' aim in forging this expanded alliance is to let Asians assume responsibility for the problems of the region without any outside interference. It also hopes to assume the role of a bearer of the message of democracy to countries which are now ruled by dictators and to wean away neutralist Southeast Asian States from the communist orbit. (99)

If the Philippine leaders were very enthusiastic in promoting the revival of Maphilindo, there was a lack of equal response from the Indonesian side, except some occasional and incidental.

(96) During this visit President Macapagal had conversations not only with President Johnson, but also with General Nasution who was in Washington. See Manila Times, November 29, 1963.


(99) "Maphilindo spreads out", Manila Chronicle, 10 February 1964. A visiting Indian political scientist, Prof. Sib Narayan Ray of the University of Melbourne, expressed his scepticism about the prospects of Maphilindo. Addressing the Far Eastern University in Manila, he said, "The whole notion of Maphilindo is as baseless as Pan Asianism or a Buddhist Asia", Manila Bulletin, 15 January 1964.
statements. Nazir Datuk Pamuntjak, Indonesian Ambassador to the Philippines, had the opportunity in expressing the Indonesian point of view with regard to the idea of reviving Maphilindo. Speaking before the Rotary Club at Caloocan City, a Manila suburb, the Ambassador said that not only would Maphilindo grow and expand, but also one day become fortress of peace and self-determination, a fortress of democracy and cultural development, a fortress of economic victory for new emerging forces in South-East Asia. (100)

In the month of May other new developments took place in Manila and Kuala Lumpur. President Macapagal relieved Salvador P. Lopez as Secretary of Foreign Affairs and replaced him with Mauro Mendez. Pending his appointment as the new ambassador to the United Nations, Macapagal had instructed Lopez to act as a special emissary to Kuala Lumpur and Djakarta to persuade Tengku Abdul Rahman and Sukarno to come to the Tokyo Summit. The appointment of Lopez as special envoy was warmly welcomed by the Philippine press, because he was considered to be the right man to handle this difficult job. Commenting on his appointment, the Manila Times said that the chance for reviving of Maphilindo would become brighter, now the UN Ambassador designate, S.P. Lopez, was fully concentrating his attention on preparing the Tokyo Summit. "S.P. Lopez knows his ground thoroughly on the summit, and this is a happy arrangement." (101)


In Kuala Lumpur, Tengku Abdul Rahman won the elections and returned to power. The Philippines welcomed his victory, which might be expected to review the whole Malaysia issue. Moreover, at this time the two countries were on the verge of resumption of consular relations. Kuala Lumpur, on the other hand, was happy with the departure of Lopez and that the Philippines' Department of Foreign Affairs had been taken over by a wholly new man. Kuala Lumpur was always suspicious of Lopez, as he was considered to be pro-Indonesian in his foreign policy outlook. These new developments were a pointer for the Philippines that sooner or later Maphilindo would be revived. (102)

The PKI, however, far in advance already sensed a dangerous move bearing on the survival and progress of the Communist movement if Maphilindo was allowed to be revived or expanded. Addressing the commemoration of the Labour Day on May 1, 1964, at the PKI Headquarters in Djakarta, D.N. Aidit, the PKI Chairman, said that he suspected possible US moves to substitute Malaysia with a new Maphilindo. The new, greater Maphilindo project, in which Indonesia and the Philippines were supposed to be members, would also include the free countries of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak. In Aidit's view the people's revolutionary movement in the new Maphilindo plan would be seriously oppressed. Apart from this, Indonesia would have to face more puppet countries in the new projected Maphilindo. (103)

(102) Benedicto David, "Will Maphilindo, ASA be revived?", Manila Times, 4 May 1964.

(103) Material on Malaysia, Vol. IV, 1964, p. 54. For further (Contd. on next page)
As has been mentioned before, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore disliked the idea of Maphilindo from the very beginning. As an ardent supporter of Malaysia, he was also suspicious that if Maphilindo was given a chance to revive, Malaysia would certainly be dissolved. (104)

The attempt to revive Maphilindo and simultaneously to solve the Malaysia problem reached its climax when Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman, President Sukarno and President Macapagal met in Tokyo on June 20, 1964, to resolve their differences. There were high expectations for the success of the Tokyo Summit in view of the recent victory of Tengku Abdul Rahman, who would attend the summit with fresh ideas. "Even the British, who were having reservations about Maphilindo before, are now conciliatory, and other Asian nations, Thailand and Pakistan patching into big peace among the quarreling Maphilindo partners". (105)

To the dismay of President Macapagal especially, the much-talked about Tokyo Summit did not yield any desirable result. The controversy between Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman and President Sukarno proved too wide. Nevertheless, President Macapagal did not lose hope, but advanced his own proposal as a face-saving discussion of the view of the Philippines' leftist group see also Jose Ma. Sison, "Prospects for Maphilindo", Eastern World, Vol. XVIII, No. 7, July 1964, pp. 9-10, 30.


(105) See Manila Times (editorial), May 9, 1964; and also Indonesian Herald, 8 May 1964, which stated that the changing attitude of the British towards Maphilindo was a victory for Macapagal.
device for the solution of the Malaysia dispute. His formula was known as the Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission, consisting of four Asian and African countries. (106) The Western world press generally blamed President Sukarno for wrecking the Tokyo Summit. (107) After this unsuccessful meeting, not only had the prospect of solving the Malaysia problem become bleak, but the hope for reviving Maphilindo had become more remote than ever.

By now the Maphilindo triplets had drifted further apart. The absence of Salvador P. Lopez as an important factor in fostering the Indonesian-Philippine relationship had an after-effect on Macapagal's foreign policy. Following the abortive Tokyo Summit, President Macapagal seemed to lose interest in his venture of reviving Maphilindo, as well as acting as mediator. This was due also to his preoccupation with his domestic problems, and the hardening Indonesian attitude towards Malaysia. President Macapagal was very much displeased and disappointed when President Sukarno shifted and escalated his area of confrontation from the Borneo borders to the Malaysian mainland. In his memoirs, Macapagal pointed out that the disputed territory was northern Borneo and not the Malaysian mainland. (108)

The landing of Indonesian paratroopers on the Malayan peninsula made the efforts for peaceful negotiations more difficult. Following his visit to the United States in October 1964,

(106) See Macapagal, n. 15, pp. 264-5.


(108) See Macapagal, n. 15, p. 266.
President Macapagal expressed the view that unless Indonesia withdrew its guerrillas from the Malaysian mainland, the prospect of solving the Malaysia dispute would not be bright. (109) The Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mauro Mendez, expressed the opinion that in spite of the escalation of confrontation by Indonesia, the deadlock over a Malaysia solution would be only temporary in nature. In connexion with Maphilindo, Mauro Mendez said that this project too was not dead. He preferred to say that Maphilindo was still sleeping. (110) In the light of this deteriorating situation in the Malaysia conflict, the Philippines had given up its mediation efforts. Towards the close of 1964, the idea of reviving Maphilindo too almost disappeared. (111)

A sudden new development took place in the middle of December, 1964, when the Philippines, on the suggestion of South Korea, spearheaded a move to form a new regional alliance on the pattern of Maphilindo. It was assumed that the two original partners of Maphilindo, Malaya and Indonesia, would not take part in the proposed association, for several reasons. The new association would consist of the Philippines, South Korea, South Vietnam, Nationalist China, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia. (112)

(110) Ibid., p. 127.
(111) Manila Times, 7 December 1964.
(112) Manila Chronicle, 12 December 1964. The same newspaper wondered whether the real motive behind the proposed regional association was to isolate Indonesia and force it to make peace with Malaysia. As a matter of fact, all members of the proposed alliance were anti-communist nations, and in one way or another had associated themselves with the United States in defence matters. Ibid., 14 December 1964.
Although after the withdrawal of Indonesia from the United Nations, the prospects for negotiations between Malaysia and Indonesia were not bright, efforts had been made by Japan to mediate in their dispute. Japan practically took over the Philippine efforts in mediating in the Malaysia dispute. Japan's friendly relations with the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia were of great significance for the settlement. As has been mentioned in an earlier chapter, the Japanese attempt had almost been successful. Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman and President Sukarno were about to meet each other in Tokyo in May 1965. Nevertheless, owing to the pressure of the so-called Nasakom parties at home, President Sukarno cancelled his departure for Tokyo. Despite the representations of all parties in the Nasakom (Nasionalis, agama, Komunis-Nationalist, Religious and Communist Group), it was understood that the PKI's pressure was much heavier than the Nationalist and Religious parties. (113)

Moreover, Indonesia was of the view that as the Philippines was one of the signatories of the Manila Agreement, any attempt to bar the Philippines from the negotiations would not be acceptable. (114) In an editorial comment, the Indonesian Herald stated that:

We in Indonesia must avoid every appearance that we are ignoring our Philippine brothers. Especially so, because of late Necoim elements have been hard at work in order to drive a wedge in the friendly

(113) See News From Indonesia (Embassy of Indonesia, New Delhi), No. 448, May 6, 1965.

relationship between Indonesia and the Philippines. In short, a lasting solution to the Malaysia dispute can only be achieved if all three Maphilindo countries participate in the process of seeking settlement. (115)

At the outset, Britain and some Western countries had opposed the Maphilindo idea. In subsequent years, however, their attitude had undergone many changes. The tour of the British Under-Secretary of State in 1964 to Tokyo, Manila and Djakarta was of particular importance for the relaxation of the British attitude to the Maphilindo Plan. The New Zealand Prime Minister, Keith Holyoake, also expressed his approval for the Sukarno-Macapagal Doctrine as a means for solving the Malaysia dispute. Although he did not explicitly express his disappointment, he noted that owing to the Indonesian confrontation Maphilindo had been set aside. (116)

A British labour leader, Fenner Brockway, also suggested a speedy solution for the Malaysia issue, by reverting to the Manila Agreement. According to his view, the present arrangement of the Confederation should be reviewed. "It might be best to accord independent self-determination to the nations (particularly by Sarawak, Brunei, and Sabah) in the first instance, so that the eventual coming together could be that of equals, it might be that the three ex-British territories in Borneo might wish to form a federation within the confederation." (117)

Following the secession of Singapore from Malaysia on August 9, 1965, another ray of hope reviving the Maphilindo Plan had emerged. This was due to the expectation, particularly on Indonesia's part, that soon the States of Sarawak and Sabah would withdraw from the Malaysia Federation. (118) The statement of Singapore's Foreign Affairs Minister, S. Rajaratnam further increased the hope for reviving Maphilindo. In an interview with Harvey Stockwin, S. Rajaratnam expressed his optimism, that "Not only the smaller countries but all countries in the region - including Indonesia - should all try to find ways to come closer together, to share their skills and experience. The best way of realizing the dreams that people had when they fought for independence is through economic, technical and cultural cooperation." (119)

In the meantime, a Communist upheaval broke out in Indonesia on the night of September 30, 1965. In the Philippines, President Macapagal seemed to be directing all his attention and energies to domestic affairs, as the Presidential election campaign had already begun. (120) It was understandable, then, that neither Indonesia nor the Philippines paid any heed to a Malaysia settlement or to revival of the Maphilindo idea. The swift action of the Indonesian Army led to the failure of the communists in their attempted coup d'etat. The sudden changes in the domestic political situation had

been cautiously watched all over the world, by Western countries particularly. They expected that this might have drastic repercussions on Indonesia's foreign policy. Commenting on the Indonesian Army victory over the Communists, Tengku Abdul Rahman said that his country would be willing "to join the free world to help Indonesia in its rehabilitation and reconstruction." (121) In an attempt to convey the impression that Indonesia was still capable of conducting confrontation despite turbulent internal situation, the Indonesian guerillas stepped up their activities in the border areas of Kalimantan. (122) Indonesia also stated that despite the coup, Indonesia's foreign policy had not changed, including that of confrontation against Malaysia. (123)

On November 14, 1965, Ferdinand Marcos defeated Diosdado Macapagal in the Philippines' presidential elections. Although on the surface, Indonesian leaders seemed to be not too disturbed at the victory of Marcos, a study of their statements would reveal their anxiety over the fate of future cooperation between the two countries. This was of significance because Macapagal had to retire before he was able to realize his Maphilindo concept, normalization of his country's relations with Malaysia, and settlement of the North Borneo issue. As those objectives had been striven far


(122) Ibid., FE/1990 - 20 October 1965; and see also the Editorial in the Indonesian Herald, 13 October 1965, "Correct Reply".

(123) Ibid., FE/2030 - 6 December 1965.
together with Indonesia from the beginning of Macapagal's assumption of power, the bowing out of Macapagal from the political scene in the Philippines in particular and in South-East Asia in general was very much missed by Indonesian leaders. Indonesia was worried lest the new Government under Marcos would change the course of the Philippine foreign policy and make a rapprochement with Malaysia. This would lead to the further undesirable consequence that Indonesia would be left alone in its struggle against Malaysia. In the light of this new development, the Indonesian leaders urged the new leader in the Philippines to uphold Macapagal's principles for seeking a Malaysia solution, and maintaining a close relationship with Indonesia. (124)

With the deteriorating political and economic situation within Indonesia, it was impossible for Indonesia at this juncture to focus attention on the Malaysia problem. Nonetheless, some Indonesian leaders tried hard to divert the people's attention from the domestic problems towards the Malaysia confrontation. Foreign Minister Subandrio offered a peaceful solution to the Malaysia problem provided Indonesia could conduct separate talks with the representatives

(124) See for example the statement of Vice-Chairman of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly, Dr. Iuham Chalid "... that it will be the continuing responsibility of whoever is in power in the Philippines to enhance the Sukarno-Macapagal Doctrine, which is the best policy for the solution of any Asian problem in an Asian way and in the interest of Asia", World Broadcasts, FE/2013, 16 November 1965. President Sukarno and Foreign Minister Subandrio expressed the hope that President-elect Marcos would continue to foster the relationship between Indonesia and the Philippines; while First Deputy Foreign Minister, Suwito Kusumowidagdo also expected that "the future Government of the Philippines would further strengthen the friendly relations between the two countries created by Presidents Sukarno and Macapagal". World Broadcasts, FE/2016, 19 November 1965.
of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei. (125) This idea, of course, indirectly was another attempt to revive the Maphilindo plan in another form. (126) Although the Singapore and the British Governments reacted rather favourably, the other member-states of Malaysia refused to entertain Indonesia's suggestion. (127) The Maphilindo concept was suddenly brought out into the open again during the month of December 1965, when President Sukarno stated that "Indonesia is hostile to Malaysia, but not to people of these territories, and would help them gain their independence, when Indonesia and the Philippines would set up a confederation that would be greater than Maphilindo". (128)

After Marcos came to power, further attempts to realize Macapagal's ideas, especially on Maphilindo, were abandoned. In Indonesia, an attempt by Sukarno to revive the Sukarno-Macapagal Doctrine as well as Maphilindo was futile. This was owing to the further decline of the Sukarno regime, and the decline in its image in the Afro-Asian world. (129)

It cannot be denied that Macapagal had succeeded in fostering closer relations between the Philippines and Indonesia through his Maphilindo concept. Macapagal's ability to exert influence on

(125) World Broadcasts, FE/2037, 2038 dated 14 and 15 December 1965 respectively, and also FE/2035, 11 December 1965.
(126) Ibid., FE/2027, 2 December 1965.
(127) Ibid., FE/2036, 13 December 1965.
(128) Ibid., FE/2032, 8 December 1965.
(129) Ibid.
Sukarno's foreign policy, which led the latter to agree with the Maphilindo regional grouping, was not little achievement. The Philippine leaders at this period believed that only through collaboration with Indonesia, would they be able to subdue Indonesia's extremism in its foreign policy outlook. From the Philippine point of view, Maphilindo was clearly set forth to contain the advancement of Communism in South-East Asia, particularly the Chinese. (130) At the same time, the Philippines would have also gained certain economic, domestic and international political advantages. (131)

Indonesia was also fully aware that by joining Maphilindo it would sooner or later become the leading partner. Indonesia could use Maphilindo as a stepping stone for achieving a dominant position in South-East Asia. (132)

Maphilindo failed to be realized, because each of the intended member placed its own interest above the interest of the collective grouping. As Maphilindo was originally intended to block the creation of Malaysia in order to safeguard Philippine claim over North Borneo, the concept was formulated in haste.

In launching his Maphilindo concept, Macapagal had


demonstrated his determination to be independent from western political influences. (133) Despite the involvement and intervention of some western nations (Britain, Australia and New Zealand), the disputants made their efforts to settle their disputes by themselves. They had fully utilized the availability of devices for solving their problems such as Mushawarah Maphilindo and the Sukarno-Macapagal Doctrine. Despite its shortcomings, Maphilindo as a concept had been sufficiently attractive to make the disputants want to solve their differences in a peaceful way. Through Maphilindo spirit, Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia had put forth their best negotiators in the search for a settlement. This had a wider repercussion, for the hectic diplomatic activity was not only confined to the Maphilindo signatories, but also spread out to almost all neighbouring countries, Japan and the United States. (134)
