CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion on *anumāna pramāṇa* presented on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th chapter of the thesis from the standpoints of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Mīmāṁsā-Vedānta schools respectively, confirms the contention that *anumāna* (inference) can be a proper means (*pramāṇa*) of attainment of valid knowledge. Thus *anumāna* might well be construed as a knowledge wherein we pass from some perceived mark to something unperceived on the basis of the universal relation of invariable concomitance between the middle and the major terms. It is an admitted fact that the notion of *anumāna* has been enriched with the contributions of the Nyāya doctrines and this rich tradition seems to have been adopted by other philosophic systems with minor modifications. Hence, in order to find a detailed and systematic approach to *anumāna* we cannot help referring to the Naiyāyikas. They are found to have defined *anumāna* as the process of knowing something not by means of contact between the senses and the objects of the world and not by observation but rather through the medium of a sign or *liṅga*, that is invariably related to it. It can be stated that *anumāna* consists in analysing memories, co-relations and uncontaminated arguments. The Naiyāyikas assert that the validity of an inferential knowledge can be tested flawlessly owing to the basis that *anumāna* is comprised of some inseparable constituents; and if any of these parts are missing or if there is any defect in the parts then the knowledge inferred would be invalid.

Gautama's statement of *anumāna* as found in the *Nyāyasūtra* is significant. Here instead of making any explicit statement, he simply opines that *anumāna* presupposes perception and it is of three kinds such as *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. Then

Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara have given their own interpretation of *anumāna* though viewing it from the same standpoint. Their concept of *anumāna* is based on a previous knowledge of some sign or the remembrance of some sign. However, Jayanta's interpretation of *anumāna* seems to be quite unique and novel in as much as his notion of *anumāna* consists in the instrument of the knowledge of an unperceived probandum (*sādhya*) through the apprehension of a probans (*sādhana*) aided by the recollection of the relation of invariable concomitance between the two.

On the other hand, in the Vaiśeṣika system, Kaṇāda's interpretation of *anumāna* as the knowledge of probandum derived from the knowledge of the probans is more or less in the line of Jayanta's theory of *anumāna*. It may however be noted that Kaṇāda uses the term '*prasiddhi*' for *vyāpti*- the invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum which is the pre-requisite of *anumāna*. As regards *anumāna*, Praśastapāda, Annambhaṭṭa, Viśvanātha have more or less centred their attention on the same point. Whether Praśastapāda's interpretation of *anumāna* as the knowledge resulting from the apprehension of a sign (*liṅga*) or Annambhaṭṭa's definition of *anumāna* as *anumitikaraṇaṁ anumānam* or yet Viśvanātha's distinction between *anumāna* and *anumiti*- are all viewed from the same standpoint. Thus, all these definitions of *anumāna* offered by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers seem to have dealt with the conditions of validity instead of making any explicit statement on the essential nature of *anumāna*.

Nevertheless, it is unanimously accepted by all the philosophical schools except Cārvāka that *anumāna* has three propositions – major premise, minor premise, and the conclusion. The three terms of *anumāna*　—the *liṅga*, the *sādhya*, and the *pakṣa* are synonymous with the middle, the major, and the minor term respectively. The *liṅga* is

said to be the ground of our knowledge of the *sādhya* or what is inferred. Thus the *liṅga* or *hetu* (reason)is that which assists something to be known by means of an invariable concomitance. The *sādhya* is that component of syllogism which needs to be known or proved by means of any inference whereas *pakṣa* is interpreted as the subject in which the inferable object is doubted or sought to be proved. Thus with the *sādhya* being the object, the *pakṣa* takes the position of the subject of *anumāna*. Further, the *liṅga* is said to be marked by five characteristics such as *pakṣadharmatā, sapakṣasattva, vipakṣāsattva, abādhitaviṣayatva,* and *asatpratipakṣattva*. However, Gautama and Vātsyāyana slightly differ from the position by recognizing three characteristics of the *liṅga* or *hetu*. In the Nyāya system, the treatment of *anumāna* is presented on the basis of three different classifications. Such classifications divide *anumāna* into *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* in the first category, *pūrvavat, śeṣavat,* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* in the second category, and *kevalānvayi, kevalavyatireki,* and *anvayavyatireki* in the third category. Out of these the first category, i.e., *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna*, had not been mentioned in Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra* and Kaṇāda's *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* while Praśastapāda had mentioned this division in his commentary on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* besides sub-dividing *svārthānumāna* into two kinds, viz., *dṛṣṭa anumāna* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna*. Moreover, in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, Annambhaṭṭa and Keśavamiśra too cited this classification of *anumāna*. The second category, i.e*., pūrvavat, śeṣavat,* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa,* had been mentioned by Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra.* However, as regards this classification, Jayanta is found to have maintained a unique stand by way of interpreting these three kinds in a different way. His interpretation shows *vat* in *pūrvavat* as the remainder of the suffix *vati*. Jayanta defines *pūrvavat* as discovering the universal relation of

concomitance between the reason and the consequence on the strength of the previous perception of the same homogeneous reason with the same homogeneous consequence. Thus, the act of *anumāna* has been shown to be at par with that of perception. In the Nyāya system, Uddyotakara is the first logician to have recognized *kevalānvayi*, *kevalavyatireki*, and *anvayavyatireki* as the varieties of *anumāna*. His rejection of *pūrvavat* and *śeṣavat* in this regard deserves mention. It is worth mentioning here that this division of *anumāna* by Uddyotakara has not been accepted by Jayanta but the same has become an accepted theory for Vācaspati Miśra, Gaṅgeśa, and Viśvanātha while on the other hand Annambhaṭṭa and Keśavamiśra also accept these three but not as a division of *anumāna* but as the types of *liṅga*.

The Nyāya system asserts that *parārthānumāna*, i.e., a syllogism in inference for others, consists of five constituent propositions (*pañcāvayava*) which are: *pratijñā*; *hetu*; *udāharaṇa*; *upanaya*; and *nigamana*. These five constituent members of the Indian syllogism are called *avayava*. It may be mentioned that the Vaiśeṣika system too recognizes five members of syllogism which are named by Praśastapāda as *pratijñā*; *apadeśa*; *nidarśana*; *anusandhāna*; and *pratyāmnāya*.

In the treatment of *anumāna* in Indian philosophical system *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* are attached much importance. Significantly, *vyāpti* is recognized as the logical ground of *anumāna* while *pakṣadharmatā* as the psychological ground of *anumāna*. It goes without saying that *vyāpti* has a significant role in the operation of *anumāna*. It was clearly stated in the previous chapters that *vyāpti* is the invariable relation of the reason (*hetu*) with the predicate. However, it is worth mentioning that Gautama uses the synonymous term *niyama* to replace the term *vyāpti*. Again, Vātsyāyana uses the term *avinābhāva* instead of *vyāpti*. His sense lies in the relation of

the reason with the predicate. Even though Vātsyāyana does not use the term *vyāpti* yet he regards *vyāpti* as the logical ground of *anumāna*. In this context Jayanta refers to other terms such as *vyāpti, avinābhāva* etc.besides using the term *niyama* as introduced by Gautama. In Indian philosophy, *vyāpti* is ascertained to be of two types: *anvaya vyāpti* and *vyatireka vyāpti*.

After *vyāpti*, the concept which is more elaborately discussed in Indian philosophy is *liṅga*. The three types of sign, viz., *anvayavyatireki, kevalānvayi*, and *kevalavyatireki* as enumerated by Annambhaṭṭa deserves to be mentioned.

In Indian philosophy and more particularly in the Nyāya system of philosophy a systematic and detailed account of fallacy is offered. In Indian logic, a word called *hetvābhāsa* has been synonymously used for fallacy. In the account of the Nyāya system *hetvābhāsa* is stated to be a fallacious reason which apparently looks like a *hetu* but in actuality not the same. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system *hetvābhāsa* or the fallacies of reason have been classified under multifarious kinds. The logicians like Gautama, Gaṅgeśa, Bhāsarvajña, Kaṇāda, Praśastapāda, Keśavamiśra, Annambhaṭṭa, and Viśvanātha have come up with their own interpretation as regards the kinds of *hetvābhāsa* or fallacies of reason (detailed classification in this regard is enlisted in the 2nd chapter). Above all, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas are unanimous except slight difference in classifying the fallacies of reason under five heads which are: *savyabhicāra; viruddha; prakaraṇasama* or *satpratipakṣa*; or *asiddha*; and *kālātīta* or *bādhita*.

Showing due conformity to the vast philosophical convention of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, the logicians in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga system have endeavoured to dwell on the subject *anumāna*, covering nearly all the areas (except the fallacies of reason)

touched on by the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. Having summed up the contribution of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system to the development of the theory of *anumāna* as a distinct source of valid knowledge, let us now have a recap of the main points in the treatment of *anumāna* as formulated by the Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophers. It is well evident in the discussion presented in the 3rd chapter of the thesis that *Sāṁkhyakārikā* has significantly contributed towards the formulation of the Sāṁkhya theory of knowledge. In this connection, the commentaries of Gauḍapada and Vācaspati Miśra on the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* deserves considerable mention.

In the Sāṁkhya-Yoga*,* the interpretation of *anumāna* is found to have been influenced by Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra* in a large measure. *Anumāna* as defined in Sāṁkhya logic is that knowledge which is derived from sign and signate. This definition of *anumāna* receives elaborate explanation in the hands of Vācaspati Miśra whose commentaries pin-point the idea of *liṅga* (*vyāpya*) and *liṅgī* (*vyāpaka*). Thus, in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga system *liṅga* and *liṅgī* are synonymously used for probans and probandum respectively. Sāṁkhyacandrikā's interpretation on the above statement of Vācaspati Miśra is worth mentioning. Besides considering *liṅga* as probans and the *liṅgī* as probandum, *Sāṁkhyacandrikā* refers to *pakṣa* as the possessor of the probans which gets pervaded by probandum. Regarding this interpretation, Māthara, Gauḍapāda and *Jayamaṅgalā* too assert that probans and probandum are necessary for *anumāna*. It may be pointed out that the *Sāṁkhyasūtra* defines *anumāna* as the knowledge of the invariably associated (*vyāpaka*) after observing through the knowledge of invariable association. According to this interpretation, *anumāna* lies in the knowledge of pervade (*vyāpaka*—the major term) following the knowledge of the pervaded (*vyāpya*—the middle term) with the observer seeing the relation of *avinābhāva*. Thus, *Sāṁkhyasūtra*

puts forward the argument that the invariable association can be basis of an inferential knowledge. Then in the system of Yoga as part of the concept of *anumāna* the idea of the modification of *buddhi* and the modification of *citta* is convincingly illustrated. Further, Vārṣagaṇya, Vyāsa, and the *Sāṁkhyasūtra* of Kapila have referred to the knowledge of *sambandha* and *pratibandha* in their definition of *anumāna*. The forgoing definitions of *anumāna* given in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga system can be best understood in relation to the concept of *vyāpti*.

It is seen that *vyāpti* has been the main thrust of discussion among the Sāṁkhyas. It appears to be their assertion that no knowledge can be inferred without the knowledge of *vyāpti*. Vācaspati Miśra's discussion of pervasive and pervaded brings out the very essence of *vyāpti*. In Vācaspati Miśra's definition, *vyāpti* can be envisaged as the unconditional and constant concomitant relation between *vyāpya* (the pervaded) and *vyāpaka* (the pervader). It is further stated in the *Sāṁkhyasūtra* that as the invariable concomitance of one or the two, *vyāpti* can be divided into *sama* and *viṣama*. To be brief, the three technical terms—*vyāpya*, *vyāpaka*, and *vyāpti* implying 'the pervaded', 'to pervade' and 'the pervasion' respectively—are the very basis of the whole theory of *anumāna*.

The *Sāṁkhyasūtra* contends that *vyāpti* cannot be treated as a separate category; the invariable concomitance itself is *vyāpti*. Thus in the Sāṁkhya system of philosophy, *vyāpti* is recognized as the fundamental principle of all inferences. In further deliberations made by the Sāṁkhya philosophers, the use of *Prakṛti* in the sense of being pervaded and *ādheyaśakti* in the sense of being related as pervaded serve to consolidate the idea of *vyāpti*. Thus having considered the function, denotation and nature of *vyāpti*, the Sāṁkhyas proceed for enunciation of the means of ascertaining it.

The question of ascertaining the invariable association between two objects seems to have been answered by Vijñānabhikṣu who by the strength of his commentary in the *Sāṁkhyasūtra* wants to assert that such an invariableness should be apprehended through appropriate confutation (*anukulatarka*).

After the theory of *vyāpti*, the subject which has drawn much attention of the Sāṁkhya philosophers is the classification of *anumāna*. The thinkers in the Sāṁkhya system have significantly contributed to this area despite their differing views on the same. In the *Sāṁkhyakārikā, anumāna* is shown to be divided into three kinds: *pūrvavat, śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. Mentionably, besides these aforesaid three kinds, three more kinds of *anumāna* have been pointed out by Aniruddha; they are: *kevalānvayi, kevalavyatireki*, and *anvayavyatireki*. Thus, what can be understood from the Sāṁkhya interpretation of the divisions of *anumāna* is that in the *pūrvavat anumāna* an effect is inferred from its cause while in the *śeṣavat anumāna* the cause is inferred from its effect. On the otherhand, *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna* is said to be the perception of something at some other place caused by movement. Again, Yuktidīpikā's interpretation of the terms *pūrva* and *pūrvavat* deserves mention. The inherent idea has been presented through the illustration of someone inferring future rains after observing rising cloud in the sky. It is however stated in the *Yuktidīpikā* that the rise of cloud in the sky is not necessarily the cause of rain since there is still the probability of the invariable relation being affected by wind etc. The implication here is that the invariability in the relation between the probans and the probandum should be free from any obstructing elements. In the wake of the difficulty involved in the example of "rain and cloud", *Yuktidīpikā* gives another illustration which serves to exemplify how one comes to know the root of water lily after seeing the leaf. As regards *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*

anumāna an explanation is given in the *Sāṃkhyasūtra*. It states that *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* *anumāna* involves inferring a characteristic in other cases after observing it in one case. *Sāṃkhyacandrikā* has interpreted *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* as having some factor other than causal relation in leading to the inferential knowledge. Thus whether it is *Sāṃkhyasūtra* or the *Sāṃkhyacandrikā*, none can give us an elaborate explanation on this type of *anumāna*. It is, however, *Yuktidīpikā* which has dealt with this subject quite elaborately by supplementing the definition with sufficient exemplification. In one of the interpretations it is contended that after observing the invariable concomitance of the two objects one becomes aware of the invariable association of the objects of the same group at some other place at some other time. It can be pointed out here that the factor mentioned above is common to other kinds of *anumāna* as well. Another explanation given by *Yuktidīpikā* on the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna* speaks volume of the difficulty involved in the first explanation. Based on general observation, this explanation assert that after observing some cases of invariable association, observing one characteristic out of these on a later occasion, the knowledge of some other unobserved characteristic in some dissimilar object can be attained.

Anumāna as classified under *kevalānvayi*, *kevalavyatireki*, and *anvayavyatireki* in the Sāṃkhya system is significant from the point of view of the nature of *vyāpti*. In the *kevalānvayi anumāna, vyāpti* being affirmative any possibility of counter example is ruled out whereas in the *kevalavyatireki anumāna*, *vyāpti* being in negative forms the possibility of any homogeneous example is ruled out. On the other hand, the Sāṃkhya system explains the *anvayavyatireki anumāna* as having both positive and negative forms.

Anumāna as divided into *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* has been suggested in the *Yuktidīpikā* and the *Maṭharavṛtti* while as regards this division the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* has maintained silence. Then, Vācaspati Miśra's classification of *anumāna* as *vīta* and *avīta* brings in a sense of novelty to the concept. Although the division of *anumāna* into *vīta* and *avīta* is an earlier theory implied in the Sūtras of Gautama and the *bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana and pointed out by Uddyotakara in the Nyāya system the same cannot be regarded as an accepted theory until and unless it is convincingly contended by Vācaspati Miśra. Importantly, a detailed account of *vīta* and *avīta anumāna* is found in the *Yuktidīpikā*. According to one of its explanations, the *vīta anumāna* is based on affirmation while the *avīta* has the basis in negation. It is further stated that the *vīta anumāna*, like the *śeṣavat anumāna*, involves denial and elimination of some of the likely properties of an object. Again, the *pūrvavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna* are referred to as the two kinds of the *vīta anumāna*. Yet another explanation of *Yuktidīpikā* asserts that the *vīta anumāna* consists in the application of the probans in its very form while the *avīta anumāna* involves elimination of other possibilities. Thus the apparent contention of *Yuktidīpikā* is that *avīta* is meaningless if the elimination of undesirably involved object is not intended. The subject of fallacies in *anumāna* might have been referred to in the earlier texts of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system but their unavailability has rendered the matter hazy. The extant texts of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system are silent over the issue of fallacies in *anumāna*. The statement of *Māṭharavṛtti* that *anumāna* has thirty three fallacies, is without explanation and therefore bears little significance.

Like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system of Indian philosophy, the Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta system has also dealt with the subject of *anumāna* in an

elaborate way. In the Mīmāṁsā-Vedānta system as well *anumāna* is recognized as a distinct source of valid knowledge. In the Mīmāṁsā system, to develop the theory of *anumāna*, Kumārila and Prabhākara have drawn upon the basis of Śabara's statement on *anumāna :-- anumānam jñātasambandhasya……buddhiḥ*. Their endeavour has been to recognize or establish *anumāna* as the source of our knowing through the medium of a sign or mark, the basis of which has earlier been emphasized in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṁkhya-Yoga systems.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's explanation of the compound *jñātasambandhasya* needs to be looked into for forming an estimate of the Mīmāṁsā view of *anumāna*. According to his first explanation, a person who is well aware of the invariable concomitance between two things, e.g., smoke and fire, remembers the constant relationship between smoke and fire, having seen smoke rising from a hill on a later occasion. By this explanation, the cognition of fire on the part of the person leads to inference (*anumāna*). According to his second explanation, the compound *jñātasambandhasya* is suggestive of the substratum (*ekadeśin*) wherein the concomitance of fire and smoke is apprehended. This known smoke-fire relationship is termed as *sapakṣa ekadeśin*. In the third interpretation of Kumārila the word *jñātasambandhasya* implies a known relationship. To him, existence of many relationships cannot be the ground of *anumāna*. Then in the fourth explanation, the known relationship between the *liṅga* and *liṅgī* taken together, is stated to be the basis of *anumāna*. Commenting on the above explanation, Prabhākara contends that this relation must be an unfailing and permanent one which is known to exist between cause and its effect, between the whole and its parts and so on. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas also approve of this explanation. Again it is found in the Mīmāṁsā definition of *anumāna* that when one of the two terms involved in an invariable relation

is apprehended, the other term can also be apprehended. In this connection Śālikanātha Miśra has made a statement, exemplifying fire and smoke being perceived as qualified by virtue of a certain qualifying relation and by the strength of specifications of time and place.

The Mīmāṁsā system also has accepted *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* as the grounds for the operation of *anumāna*. Kumārila seems to have insisted on repeated observation of the concomitance of two general properties of the reason and the predicate for attainment of knowledge about *vyāpti*. He goes on to expound his assertion that knowledge of *vyāpti* can be consolidated by non-observation of contrary instances of their non-concomitance. Kumārila further considers *vyāpti* as a necessary judgement, the reason being that smoke together with fire is a compulsory concomitance. Pārthasārathi Miśra has given a similar view on *vyāpti* by stating that the observation of the concomitance of smoke with fire in numerous previous occasions and the non-observation of such concomitance in all non-fiery objects can lead to the knowledge of *vyāpti*. Pārthasārathi Miśra, however, wants to contend that the knowledge of *vyāpti* stems from sense perception. Thus the essence of his statement is that the apprehension of the invariable concomitance occurs in the very first observation itself and the subsequent observations of the invariability of such concomitance, e.g., of smoke and fire, helps in elimination of the extraneous conditions (*upādhi*). Quite significantly, Pārthasārathi does not intend to consider *vyāpti* as a necessary relation. He puts forward his explanation thus that *vyāpti* cannot be a necessary relation owing to its being limited to such places and times as were actually observed in the past.

Then, as regards the means of knowing *vyāpti*, the Mīmāṁsā system has given a detailed explanation, examining pramāṇas like perception, inference, mental perception

etc. But their contention appears to have accepted none of them to be the means of *vyāpti*. According to Sucaritamiśra, the ascertaining of *vyāpti* involves three stages: in the first *vyāpti* is suggested through a uniform positive experience while the same is confirmed in the second stage through a uniform negative experience, and more significantly, in the third stage there is the process of reasoning. Thus, the Mīmāṁsakas differ in their views regarding the function of *vyāpti* despite their insistence that *vyāpti* is integral to an inferential process.

After *vyāpti*, the topic which is elaborately illustrated in the Mīmāṁsā system is the classification of *anumāna*. The most commonly accepted divisions of *anumāna* as *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* have been examined by logicians like Nārāyaṇa a follower of Kumārila and Dharmottara. Their explanations can, however, be considered as valuable contributions towards formulation of the theory of *anumāna*. The explanation dividing *anumāna* into *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna*, has not been favoured by most of the Mīmāṁsā philosophers including Kumārila, Sucaritamiśra and Umbeka. On the other hand, Śabaraswāmī's interpretation of two other kinds of *anumāna* as *pratyakṣatodṛṣṭasambandha* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭasambandha* deserves to be examined. Kumārila names the former as *dṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇaviṣaya* and the latter as *adṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇaviṣaya*. Again, Kumārila's adoption of the term *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa* instead of *pratyakṣatodṛṣṭa* bears significance. Moreover, Kumārila agrees to two kinds of *anumāna* as: *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. However, Prabhākara gives a significant explanation on Śabara's divisions of *anumāna*: *pratyakṣatodṛṣṭa* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, thereby naming them as *dṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa* and *adṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa* respectively. Prabhākara expounds his view by asserting that the specific individuality of the probandum is sometimes perceptible and the same can be sometimes

imperceptible. He further states that since in matters of the specific individuality being imperceptible there arises a difficulty for establishment of its relation with *vyāpti*, hence in such cases *vyāpti* is to be seen not specifically but generally. Thus it can be contended that *anumāna* always has a basis in an observed relationship and it must be remembered that an observed relationship can be possible if and when both the terms of the relationship are perceptible.

As regards the avayavas of *anumāna*, the Mīmāṁsā system proposes a three-membered syllogism, rejecting the five-membered syllogism expounded by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. Thus, three propositions or avayavas of *anumāna* are stated as *pratijñā, hetu*, and *udāharaṇa*. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas and Prābhākara school both are known as *trivayavī*. According to Prabhākara, *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* are both consist of these three members of syllogism. Śālikanātha Miśra also has accepted these three avayavas of *anumāna*.

Furthermore, as part of the inferential process the significance of fallacies (*hetvābhāsa*) cannot be ruled out. Like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, the Mīmāṁsakas have also examined the fallacies of *anumāna* with illustrations. But the Mīmāṁsāsūtra and the śabarabhāṣya do not discuss about fallacy. Kumārila and Pārthasārathi Miśra have stated about three kinds of fallacies which are: *asiddha*, *anaikāntika*, and *viruddha*. Among these, *asiddha* is further sub-divided intio five kinds which are: *svarūpāsiddha*, *sambandhāsiddha*, *vyatirekāsiddha*, *āśrayāsiddha*, and *vyāptyāsiddha*. The second kind, *anaikāntika* is stated to be of two sub-divisions: *savyabhicāra* and *sapratisādhana* or *satpratipakṣa*. The second kind is called *viruddhāvyabhicārī* by Kumārila. Besides these two sub-categories of *anaikāntika*, Kumārila mentions one more kind called *asādhāraṇa*, thereby contending about three

sub-divisions of *anaikāntika*. Then the third kind of inferential fallacy, *viruddha* or *bādhaka*, is further sub-categorized generally into two kinds such as *dharmasvarūpabādha* and *dharmaviśeṣabādha*, and some Mīmāṁsakas add four more sub-kinds to the list: they are- *dharmīsvarūpabādha*, *dharmaviśeṣabādha*, *ubhayāsvarūpabādha*, and *ubhayāviśeṣabādha*. However, it may be mentioned here that Pārthasārathi Miśra holds that *bādha* is divided into two kinds such as *dharmaviśeṣabādha* and *dharmīviśeṣabādha*. Again, Śālikanātha Miśra agrees to the three main kinds of inferential fallacy mentioned above, further sub-dividing *anaikāntika* into three more kinds such as *sādhāraṇa*, *asādhāraṇa*, and *savyabhicāra* while sub-dividing *asiddha* into two more kinds such as *svarūpāsiddha* and *ekadeśāsiddha*.

Like other Vedic schools of Indian philosophy, the Vedānta system has also its share of contribution to the theory of *anumāna*. But in their approach to *anumāna* the Advaitins differ from the Naiyāyikas who are known to be the authority of the Indian logical system. But at the same time it must be said that there are points or areas where the Advaitins have shown consensus with the Naiyāyikas. Hence, a comparative study of the view-points between the Naiyāyikas and the Advaitins can help us conceptualize the notions like *anumāna* and its kinds, *vyāpti*, its nature and function, and ascertainment of *vyāpti* etc. in a comprehensive manner. As regards the five-membered syllogism expounded by the Naiyāyikas, the Advaitins have reacted by asserting that only the first three steps or the last two would be sufficient for arriving at a truth. The order of reasoning advocated by the Advaitins is intended to have the premises first and the conclusion last, or the conclusion first and the premises last. Again, it is seen that the Advaitins do not agree with the Naiyāyikas about the classification of *anumāna* into

three kinds: *kevalānvayi*, *kevalavyatireki*, and *anvayavyatireki*. On the contrary, the Advaitins have advocated only one kind of *anumāna*, viz., *anvayi*, from the logical point of view. This *anvayi anumāna* is based on universal affirmative propositions. After *anumāna* and its kinds, the topic which is broadly discussed by the Vedānta system is *vyāpti*. In the Vedānta system the knowledge of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) has been accepted as instrumental for inferential knowledge. *Vyāpti* is defined in the *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* as the co-existence of the major term with the middle term in all the locus in which the middle term may exist. Regarding ascertainment of *vyāpti*, the *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* asserts that *vyāpti* can be recognized at the time of co-existence of fire with smoke and again at the time when they do not co-exist.

Quite noticeably, fallacy, a widely discussed topic in Indian epistemology, is left totally untouched by the Advaitins. Instead of fallacy the Advaitins have favoured an alternative concept of 'unreality of the universe' which is other than *Brahman*, *Brahman* being the absolute existence (*pāramārthikam sattvam*). This concept of unreality implies that the absolute non-existence should be so qualified as to convey the additional idea and the counterpositiveness relating to which is marked by absoluteness. Another important topic which is generally discussed by the Indian thinkers is *pakṣatā*. In the system of Vedānta, *pakṣatā* is known as the condition of being the object of some dispute. The Advaita view of *pakṣatā* is regarded as superior than the Nyāya view of *pakṣatā*.

In fine, it can be said that a detailed and systematic approach to *anumāna* can be gathered by making a comprehensive study of the Vedic schools of Indian philosophy. Efforts have been made to trace the comparative merits of the respective schools in enunciation of their individual interpretations as regards the definitions of *anumāna*, its

kinds, *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā*, *liṅga*, and fallacy (*hetvābhāsa*). Thus, the proposed study substantially justifies the objectives of the research.