CHAPTER – III

TREATMENT OF *ANUMĀNA IN* SĀṀKHYA-YOGA PHILOSOPHY:

A. Definition of *Anumāna:*

Indian logicians have attached much importance to *anumāna* chiefly because it is accepted as a valid source of knowledge. Every system of Indian philosophy, except Cārvāka has tried to discuss it in the light of its own metaphysical background and secondly because it serves as the most authentic source of knowledge of supra-sensuous objects. The Sāṁkhya theory of knowledge was developed by Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati Miśra through their commentaries in the *Sāṁkhyakārikā,* especially by the latter. In the Sāṁkhya-Yoga system, *anumāna* is defined after perception and before verbal testimony. In the system of Sāṁkhya-Yoga*,* the definition of *anumāna* is influenced by Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra*. The *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, most authentic work on Sāṁkhya logic defines *anumāna* as the knowledge derived from sign and signate.[153] Vācaspati Miśra explains this definition elaborately. He opines that *liṅga* means pervaded (*vyāpya*) and *liṅgī* means pervasive (*vyāpaka*).[154] In other words, they are called probans and probandum. Because, as a rule probans should be pervaded by probandum in the process of *anumāna*. Vācaspati Miśra states that the probans and probandum stand for inferential knowledge. The inferential knowledge arises through the knowledge that probans like smoke is pervaded and probandum like fire is pervasive.[155] Vācaspati

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[153] prativiṣayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam trividhamanumānamākhyātam /

  talliṅga liṅgīpūrvakam āptaśrutirāpta vacanantu //   SK, k. 5

[154] liṅgam vyāpyam liṅgī vyāpakam.   STK on SK, k. 5

[155] dhūmādirvyāpya vahnyādirvyāpaka.   *Ibid*.

Miśra however, realizes that mere knowledge of invariable concomitance cannot lead to the inferential knowledge. Anything like light or burnt up ashes existing on the mountain may not be helpful in inferring fire from smoke. In the same way, the smoke existing at other places cannot lead to inferential knowledge. Therefore, there is additional requirement of an application of probans on subject or the place where probandum is inferred. In the words of Vācaspati Miśra, the word *liṅgī* in the text of the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* should be considered as an example of *ekaśeṣa samāsa*. While explaining the *kārikā,* it should be repeated. The first gives an idea of pervasive, i.e.,*vyāpaka* or probandum forming the part of invariable concomitance. The second means that (subject) which is possessed of probans, thus leading to the idea that probans is endowed with the condition of being present in subject (*pakṣadharmatā*).[156] The definition of *anumāna* in general can be stated thus: *anumāna* is the process which involves the cognition of invariable concomitance between the major term and the middle term and the cognition of the presence of the middle term in the minor term.

The *Sāṁkhyacandrikā* also gives a different interpretation of the above statement of the *Sāṁkhyakārikā*. It explains *liṅga* as probans and the *liṅgī* as probandum. The perception following probans and probandum is deliberation *(parāmarśa)*. It means the *pakṣa* is possessor of the probans which is pervaded by probandum. This deliberation is called *anumāna*. It gives rise to the *buddhivṛtti* that

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[156] Vide Kumar, Shiv., *Sāṁkhya Yoga Epistemology*, p.112

mountain is fiery. It is the internal mediate operation and the inferential knowledge follows it immediately.[157]

Māṭhara[158] and Gauḍapāda also interpret the above statement of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. They also establish the necessity of both probans and probandum for *anumāna*. But they draw further conclusion that sometimes *liṅga* leads to the knowledge of *liṅgī,* and sometimes *liṅgī* leads to the knowledge of *liṅga*. For example, in inferring cuckoo from her voice *liṅga* leads to *liṅgī*. Again in inferring her voice from the cuckoo, *liṅgī* leads to the knowledge of *liṅga.*

Sometimes *liṅga* like *tridaṇḍa* leads to the knowledge of mendicant and sometimes *liṅgī* like mendicant leads to the knowledge of *liṅga* like *tridaṇḍa*.[159] According to the *Sāṃkhyasūtra*, *anumāna* is the knowledge of the invariably associated *(vyāpaka)* after observing through the knowledge of invariable association[160]. *Anumāna* is the knowledge of pervade (*vyāpaka*, the major term), following the knowledge of the pervaded (*vyāpya*, the middle term), on the part of one who sees the relation of *avinābhāva* or of one not being without the other. The word *pratibandha* means pervasion (*vyāpti)* or invariable accompaniment of one thing, e.g., fire, by another thing, e.g., smoke. The knowledge of the pervade

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[157] *Sāṃkhyacandrikā*, 5

[158] talliṅgaliṅgīpūrvakamiti liṅgena tridaṇḍādi darśanenadṛṣṭo api liṅgī sādhyate nunamasau parivrāḍasti yasyedam tridaṇḍamiti.   MV on SK, k. 5

[159] liṅgena liṅgī anumīyate yathā daṇḍena yatiḥ……liṅgīnā liṅgamanumīyate yathā dṛṣṭvā yatimasyedam tridaṇḍamiti.   GB on SK, k.5

[160] pratibandhadṛśaḥ pratibaddhajñānamanumānam.   SS, 1.100

(*vyāpaka*) or what is so accompanied, which results from seeing the pervasion, is the proof called inference (*anumāna*).This is the meaning. While *anumiti* or the result of inference, i.e.,the knowledge produced by inference, is the knowledge belonging to *Puruṣa*. The *Sāṁkhyasūtra* defines it in terms of inferential knowledge of which invariable association serves as the cause. Vindhyavāsin also interprets this same definition of *anumāna*. Aniruddha, however, offers a different interpretation. He interprets *prtibandhadṛśaḥ* as a case of man who has known the invariable association. According to him, *anumāna* is the knowledge of pervasive after knowing the pervaded in case of one who has observed the invariable concomitance between the two.[161] Vijñānabhikṣu in his *bhāṣya* interprets the *sūtra* thus, '*anumāna* is the knowledge of the pervasive through observing the invariable concomitance.'[162] He holds that it refers to *buddhivṛtti* as a means of knowledge.

In the system of Yoga, we find the definition of *anumāna* in the *Yogabhāṣya* of Vyāsa. According to Vyāsa, *anumāna* is the modification of *citta* brought about by the relation which exists in objects of homogenous nature and does not exist in the objects of heterogenous nature and ascertains chiefly the generic nature of an object.[163] The modification of *buddhi* in the form of an object is the common factor to all the pramāṇas. The distinguishing factor of *anumāna* is that such a modification is caused by the knowledge of relation. According to Vyāsa, *pramāṇa* is defined as modification of *citta* in the form of object cognized, viz., moon and stars are moving

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[161] avinābhāvadarśino vyāpyajñānādanuvyāpakajñānamanumānam.   SSV, 1.100

[162] vyāptidarśanād vyāpakajñānamanumānam.   SPB, 1.100

[163] anumeyasya tulyajātīyesu anuvṛttau bhinnajātīyebhya vyāvṛttaḥ sambandho yastadviṣayā sāmānyāvadhāraṇa pradhāna vṛttiranumānam.   YB, 1.7

object, and *pramā* as its false identification with *Puruṣa*. The knowledge of *sambandha* and *pratibandha* is the commonly used expression in the definitions of *anumāna* by Vārsagaṇya, Vyāsa and the *Sāṃkhyasūtra* of Kapila. Here, *sambandha* means relation or invariable concomitance. We can say that the definition of *anumāna* in Sāṃkhya-Yoga means the modification of *citta* brought about by invariable concomitance.

The above definitions of *anumāna* require some explanation of the concept of *vyāpti* for their comprehension. *Vyāpti* is regarded as the logical ground of *anumāna*. In *anumāna*, the knowledge of the *sādhya* or major term as related to the *pakṣa* or minor term depends on the knowledge of *vyāpti* between the middle and the major terms. In the Sāṃkhya system, Vācaspati Miśra's discussion of 'pervasive' and 'pervaded' gives an idea of *vyāpti*. He accepts *vyāpya* as that which is invariably and naturally associated with the nature of an object without involving some condition suspected or ascertained.[164] The *vyāpaka* is that with the nature of which the former is related.[165] The relation stands here for invariable association which is denoted by the term *vyāpti*. The relation of invariable association involves three things -- the two correlatives and a particular association in them. In the present case, the association should be natural and invariable. It should not be conditional. The case of relation involving condition can be explained thus-- when one infers smoke from fire, then fire would be pervaded (*liṅga*) and smoke would be pervasive (*liṅgī*). But it is generally observed that fire is not naturally related to

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[164]*śaṃkitasamāropitopādhinirākaraṇena* vastusvabhāva pratibaddham vyāpyam. STK, 5

[165] yena pratibaddham tad vyāpakam.   *Ibid.*

smoke. If fire would have been invariably associated with smoke, then it would always be accompanied with smoke and would never have been found without smoke. But in some cases like iron-ball fire exists without smoke. That is why the association of fire with smoke involves condition. The fire requires wet fuel in addition to itself to give rise to smoke. Thus, fire does not accompany the smoke naturally. On the contrary, it involves further condition of wet fuel.

In the *Sāṁkhyasūtra*, it is stated that constant co-existence of both, i.e., the *sādhya* and the *sādhana* or of one is called *vyāpti*.[166] The word *dharmasāhityam* means association or concomitance in being properties, in other words, going together or being in co-existence. *Ubhoyoḥ*, the word has been stated in respect of the case of equal pervasion (i.e., *sādhya* and *sādhana*). And regularity *(niyata)* is cognizable by means of favourable arguments. Hence, there is no impossibility of the apprehension of *vyāpti*. The strength and validity of *anumāna* depends not only on the inclusion of all possible similar instances, but and much more on the exclusion of all possible contrary instances, which go to establish the general proposition underlying it. *Vyāpti* cannot be a separate principle, because of the necessity for the supposition of an entity. The first part of this definition, viz.,'in case of two' refers to the case of equal pervasion which is called *samavyāpti*. The latter half, viz., 'in case of one' of them refers to the case of unequal pervasion, which is called *viṣamavyāpti*. The former is found in the case when both the *vyāpya* and *vyāpaka* are always found together without exception as that in createdness and non eternity.[167] The second is found in cases where the pervasion is not equal or the

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[166] niyatadharmasāhityamubhayorekatarasya vā vyāptiḥ.   SS, 5.29

[167] SSV, 5.29

pervasives is more than pervaded in pervasion just as that found in case of fire and smoke.[168]

The *Jayamaṅgalā* mentions seven kinds of relation between sign and signate, viz., (i) master and servant, (ii) original and its modification, (iii) cause and effect, as between cow and calf, (iv) pot and its possessor, (v) association, (vi) opposition, as between cold and hot and (vii) the object and the being for which it is meant as between an object of enjoyment and its enjoyer.[169]

According to the *Sāṁkhyasūtra*, *vyāpti* is not a different category from the co-existence of properties, otherwise it would lead to the cumbrousness of postulations as it would compel to consider *vyāpti* as an independent category.[170] Aniruddha states that if *vyāpti* is considered to be an independent category, then the invariable association would require separate mention. That is why it is said that invariable concomitance itself is *vyāpti*.[171] According to Vijñānabhikṣu, if *vyāpti* is an additional entity to those admitted by Sāṁkhya, then it would lead to the acceptance of the substratum of *vyāpti* as another additional entity and it would be difficult.[172] Again some Acārya opines that *vyāpti* is the result of the power of

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[168] *Ibid.*

[169] kadācilliṅga pūrvakam kadācilliṅgīpūrvakam dṛśyate…gamyagamakatvam satisambandhe.   JM on SK

[170] na tattvāntaram vastukalpanāprasakteḥ.   SS, 5.30

[171] tattvāntarasvīkāre apyavyabhicāro vaktavyaḥ.   SSV, 5.30

[172] niyatadharmasāhityātirikta vyāptirna bhavati vyāptitvāśrayasya vastuno'pi kalpanāprasaṅgāt.   SPB, 5.30

objects and as such as an additional entity.[173] Aniruddha opines that *vyāpti* is the power in pervasive, e.g., fire and pervaded, e.g., 'smoke' and is observed through observing the two. Pañcaśikha opines that *vyāpti* means the relation connected with power of being maintained or sustained.[174] The three technical terms of Hindu logic, viz., *vyāpya*, *vyāpaka* and *vyāpti* practically summarise the whole theory of inference. The word *vyāpya* means that which is pervaded and the word *vyāpaka* means that which pervades and *vyāpti* means the pervasion. Thus from the denotative view-point, in the example of fire and smoke, the denotation of fire is perceived as wholly contained within the denotation of fire. Hence, smoke is the thing pervaded; fire is the thing pervading; and the denotation of smoke under the denotation of fire is the pervasion of smoke by fire. It is the *vyāpti* which forms the basis or principles of all inferences. It is different in different cases and the number of *vyāpti* is manifold, according to the various combinations of objects. According to the Sāṁkhya system, every effect must be contained in its cause before its manifestation and after unmanifestation. Therefore, the cause possesses a power of sustaining the effect while the effect has got a power of being an object located (*ādhāra*). *Vyāpti* or invariable concomitance is the power of being associated in the pervaded. So, Vijñānabhikṣu states that causes like *Prakṛti* are said to be pervaded and in this way, *vyāpti* comes to be in possession of the power of being pervaded. According to Aniruddha, the word *ādheyaśakti* means that it should be the power of being related as pervaded and not the object itself.

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[173] nijaśaktyudbhavamityācāryāḥ.   SS, 5.31

[174] ādheyaśaktiyoga iti pañcaśikhaḥ.   *Ibid*., 5.32

In the systems of Indian philosophy, *anumāna* depends on *vyāpti* (universal relation). Now, the question naturally arises as to how such an invariable association between two objects can be ascertained. The Sāṁkhyas ascertain *vyāpti* through perception. But Vijñānabhikṣu, the commentator on *Sāṁkhyasūtra* refers to *anukulatarka* as a means of ascertaining *vyāpti*. He holds *vyāpti* as an invariable concomitance of reason with the consequent and refers to *anukulatarka sahakṛta darśana* as the method of arriving at such a concomitance.[175] According to Vijñānabhikṣu, if one has to know the relation of smoke with fire, one perceives smoke associated with fire and starts thinking that smoke is invariably associated with the fire. Again, if smoke would not have been invariably accompanied by fire, it would have been perceived without fire, but such a case is not observed. There is no possibility of smoke without fire. That is why the invariableness is ascertained through such confutation.

As regards the forms of *vyāpti,* the Sāṁkhya-Yoga system has not discussed the problem clearly. In the Yoga system, the *Yogabhāṣya* implies the division of *vyāpti* into positive invariableness which is called *anvaya vyāpti* and negative invariableness which is called *vyatireka vyāpti. Anumāna* is said to be caused by the relation which is found present in the similar cases and absent in the dissimilar cases.[176] In the case of *anvaya vyāpti,* the probans and the probandum are present in the same place. On the otherhand, in the case of *vyatireka vyāpti*, the probandum is absent and the probans should also be absent. Vācaspati Miśra refers *vyatireka*

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[175] niyamaścānukulatarkena grāhya iti na vyāptigrahāsambhava iti bhāvaḥ.   SPB , 5.29

[176] YB, 1.7

vyāpti as the basis of *avīta anumāna.*[177] In the system of Sāṃkhya, Vijñānabhikṣu[178] and Aniruddha[179] admit two other kinds of *vyāpti,* viz., *samavyāpti* and *viṣamavyāpti.* When the probans and probandum are co-extensive or equal in pervasion then it is a case of *samavyāpti.* Both of them are never found separate, just as createdness and non-eternity. On the other hand, in *anumāna,* the probans as a rule should be pervaded by the probandum. The pervasive is one which is found at more places than the pervaded. For example, when fire is inferred through smoke, then fire is pervasive. The fire exists in more places than the smoke. This is a case of *viṣamavyāpti.*

B. Divisions of *Anumāna* :

In Indian logic, *anumāna* has been classified into different ways, viz., (i) *pūrvavat, śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa,* (ii) *kevalānvayi, kevalavyatireki* and *anvayavyatireki*, (iii) *svārtha* and *parārtha* and (iv) *vīta* and *avīta*. In the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system, the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of Iśvarakṛṣṇa divides *anumāna* into three kinds which according to its commentators refer to *pūrvavat, śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa.*[180] The *Yuktidīpikā* and *Māṭharavṛtti* [181] imply the division into *anumāna* for its own self (*svārtha*) and that for others (*parārtha*) in their discussion of

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[177] STK, 5

[178] ubhoyoriti samavyāptipakṣe proktam.   SPB, 5.29

[179] ubhoyoriti samavyāptikayoḥ …viṣamavyāptikasya.   SSV, 5.29

[180] trividhamanumānamākhyātam.   SK, k.5

[181] MV, 5

anumāna. The *Yuktidīpikā*[182] and Vācaspati Miśra[183] discuss the division of *anumāna* into *vīta* and *avīta*. According to Aniruddha, in addition to the above three kinds of *anumāna*, i.e*., pūrvavat, śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* there are another three kinds of *anumāna*, viz., *kevalānvayi, kevalavyatireki* and *anvayavyātireki* raising the number of kinds of *anumāna* into six.

(i) *Pūrvavat, Śeṣavat* and *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* :

The *Sāṁkhyakārikā* takes the division of *anumāna* into three as well established which is offered by Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra*. Vātsyāyana in his *Nyāyabhāṣya* offers two alternate explanations of the nature of *pūrvavat anumāna*. With regard to this classification of *anumāna,* the Sāṁkhya adopts the Nyāya view.

A *pūrvavat anumāna* means an effect that is inferred from its cause. A *pūrvavat anumāna* is that inference which infers an object belonging to the class of objects perceived,e.g.,the inference of fire by means of smoke, for, objects of the class of fire have been perceived before in the kitchen room and other places. A *śeṣavat anumāna* means the condition in which the cause is inferred from its effect. Again, a *sāmānytodṛṣṭa anumāna* is illustrated as the perception of something at some other place caused by movement, e.g. the sun is perceived at different places. Therefore, it is inferred that there is movement of the sun, though it is imperceptible.

It has been already stated that the *pūrvavat anumāna* means either the *anumāna* in which the effect is inferred from its cause. According to *Yuktidīpikā*, the

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[182] tatra proyogamātrabhedāt dvaividhyam vītaḥ avītaḥ iti.   YD on SK, k.5

[183] tābadvividhaṁ vītamavītañca.   STK on SK, k.5

term *pūrva* means cause and *pūrvavat* means that which has cause as a probans.[184] It means the *anumāna* in case of which after observing the cause one comes to know the future effect. For example, one infers future rains after observing rise of cloud in the sky.[185] The *Yuktidīpikā*, however realizes the difficulty involved in the above example. The valid probans by its very nature should necessarily lead to the probandum and failing it the probans ceases to be a probans. But, the above example lacks in the above condition and hence ceases to be a proper example. According to the author of the *Yuktidīpikā*, the rise of cloud in the sky is not necessarily the cause of rains. We cannot establish invariable relation between rise of clouds and rains, because there is the possibility of obstruction by wind and the rest.[186] The author of the *Yuktidīpikā* opines that in that case the definition of *pūrvavat anumāna* should be understood as that – through which observing the causal power seized amongst the assisting powers free from obstructing elements, one comes to know future rise of effect just as after observing the clay possessed by the potter who is active and having the instruments like the iron rod and the rest, one comes to know the future manifestation of a pot.

In the view of Māṭhara and Vijñābhikṣu, *pūrvavat anumāna* is based upon past experience. They explain *pūrvavat* as it was observed earlier.[187] For example, one infers rains after observing rise of clouds in the sky. The *Jayamaṅgalā*, the

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[184] tatra pūrvavat yadā kāraṇamavyuditam dṛṣṭvā bhaviṣyattvam kāryasya pratipadyate. YD, on SK,5

[185] tad yathā meghodaye bhaviṣyattvam bṛṣṭeḥ.   *Ibid*.

[186] *Ibid*.

[187] MV,5

Sāṃkhyacandrikā and Gauḍapāda follow the *Yuktidīpikā*. They explain *pūrvavat* as the *anumāna* which has cause as the probans. Here, the term *vat* can be explained in the sense of like or similar to or possessed of. Māṭhara takes it in the former sense. On the other hand, the other commentators take it in the latter sense.

A *śeṣavat anumāna* is various as understood in three ways, viz.,(i) from effect to cause,(ii) from one part to the rest and (iii) through elimination. According to the *Yuktidīpikā*, a *śeṣavat anumāna* is defined as that in which after observing the accomplishment of effect one comes to know the prior existence of its cause. As for example, one comes to know the meeting of the couple after seeing a boy. The *Yuktidīpikā* however feels that such a reasoning is also not faultless. There is no invariable concomitance between meeting of the couple and birth of a boy. The birth of a boy does not necessarily lead to the knowledge of meeting of the couple. The birth of Droṇa, etc. is heard to be without the meeting of the couple.[188] For this reason the probans is non-conclusive and that is why the example is rejected by the *Yuktidīpikā*. It records another example as after seeing the sky red, one comes to know the rise of the moon or the sun. This is also not a faultless example. Therefore, the *Yuktidīpikā* gives a faultless example. As after seeing the leaf one comes to know the root of water lily or after seeing the sprout one comes to know the seed.[189]

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[188] na hi dayasamāpatipūrvaka eva prāṇabhṛtaṁ

prādurbhāvaḥ,droṇādīnāmanyathotpattiviśeṣaśravaṇāt,   YD on SK, k.5

[189] parṇam dṛṣṭvā śālukam pratipadyate aṅkuram vā dṛṣṭvā vījamiti tadā śeṣavat. *Ibid.*

The second interpretation of *śeṣavat anumāna* mentioned above is given by Māṭhara[190] and Gauḍapāda.[191] It is exemplified by them as after finding a drop of water from the sea to be saltish, one infers that the rest of water is also saltish. Vijñānabhikṣu gives the third of the above mentioned interpretations. Vācaspati Miśra followed Vijñānabhikṣu and he gives the third interpretation. According to him, *śeṣavat anumāna* is the knowledge with reference to the residual after eliminating the undesirably involved objects when there remains no undesirable involvement of something else.[192] *Śeṣavat* means that which has *śeṣa* or an object not known before as its subject matter. In other words, it is the inference (*sādhya*) which does not belong to the class of any known object. For example, the inference of the difference of earth from all other things by means of earthiness.

In the *Sāṁkhyasūtra*, it is stated that a *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna* is the proof of both *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*.[193] A *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* is that inference which is neither *pūrvavat* nor *śeṣavat*. It is from where the apprehension of the *vyāpti* or pervasion, by generalization (*sāmānyataḥ*) from the cases of object belonging to perceptible classes, etc., an object of a different class, i.e., an imperceptible object etc., is established by the force of the mark of inference being a property of the subject of the inference. The *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna* is understood in two ways-(a) based

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[190] samudrodakavindum prāsya śeṣasya lavaṇabhāva anumīyate iti śeṣavat.   MV on SK, k.5

[191] samudrādekam jalavalam lavaṇamāsādya śeṣasyāpyasti.   GB on SK, k.5

[192] śiṣyate pariśiṣyate iti śeṣaḥ sa eva viṣayatayā yasyāstyanumānajñānasya tat seṣavat. STK,5

[193] sāmānyatodṛṣṭāt ubhayāsiddhiḥ.   SPS,1.103

upon analogy and (b) inferring a characteristic in other cases after observing it in one case. Some of the commentators of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* give both of these interpretations. But some commentators give one of them. In *Māṭharavṛtti*, Māṭhara gives the second interpretation. He exemplifies it as – observing the mango tree having flower, one infers the flowers on the other trees as well.[194] Gauḍapāda gives both of the above interpretations in his *bhāṣya*. For the first interpretation, he gives the example as follows-

"The moon and stars have movement because they change the place. Whatever changes the place has movement just as *Caitra.* The moon and stars change the place. Therefore, they have movement".[195] The *Jayamaṅgalā* also gives the same example. For the latter interpretation, Gauḍapāda gives the same example given by Māṭhara. According to *Sāṃkhyacandrikā*, in case of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna,* we have some factor other than causal relation as leading to the inferential knowledge. The *Yuktidīpikā* discusses the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* type of *anumāna* elaborately. According to it, *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* is defined as that after observing the invariable concomitance of the two objects one comes to know the invariable association of the objects of the same group at some other place at some other time.[196] For example, some times after observing the relation of smoke and fire, one comes to know at other time the existence of some other fire through some other

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[194] puṣpitāmradarśanāt anyatra puṣpita āmarā iti,   MV,5

[195] deśāntarāddeśāntaram dṛṣṭam gatimaccandratārakam, caitra,   GB,5

[196] sāmānyatodṛṣṭam yatra arthayorvyabhicāramupalabhya deśāntare kālāntare ca tajjātīyayoravyabhicāram pratipadyate.   YD,5

smoke.[197] The *Yuktidīpikā* opines that the above factor is common to the other kinds of *anumāna* also. Therefore, it cannot serve as a distinguishing feature of *anumāna* based on general observation. That is why the *Yuktidīpikā* gives another explanation of *anumāna* based on general observation. After observing the invariable association of some, observing later on one characteristic out of those, there arises the knowledge of some other unobserved characteristic in some dissimilar object. As for example, on observing Devadattas attaining to some different place through movement, the movement is inferred in case of the invisible planets through their attaining to some different place. Similarly, on observing that the length in case of castle etc. is caused by growth, the growth is inferred in case of the medicinal herbs and trees by observing their length. The *Yuktidīpikā* is aware of the difficulty involved in this explanation also. It can very well be a case of *śeṣavat* type of *anumāna* because the movement and growth are the effects of attaining to some other place and length respectively through which they are inferred. The *Yuktidīpikā* alleviates the above difficulty on the ground that in case of *śeṣavat anumāna* there is necessity of the knowledge of cause from effect. But this is not a condition for an *anumāna* based on general observation.

(ii) *Kevalānvayi, Kevalavyatireki* and *Anvayavyatireki* :

In the Sāṁkhya system, Aniruddha mentions these three kinds of *anumāna,* viz., *kevalānvayi, kevalavyatireki* and *anvayavyatireki*.[198] But he does not discuss

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[197] *Ibid.*

[198] anenānvayi, vyatireki, anvayavyatireki, pūrvavat, śeṣavat, sāmānyatodṛṣṭañca saṁgṛhitam.   SSV, 1.100

them elaborately. Actually, these divisions are introduced by Uddyotakara on the basis of the nature of *vyāpti*. In the *kevalānvayi anumāna*, *vyāpti* is affirmative only and there is no possibility of counter example. In the *kevalavyatireki anumāna,* *vyāpti* can be stated in negative forms and there is no possibility of any homogenous example. Again, in the *anvayavyatireki anumāna*, *vyāpti* is stated in both positive and negative forms. The *kevalānvayi anumāna* is exemplified as that sound is non eternal, because it is produced'. The *kevalavyatireki anumāna* is exemplified as – 'the living body is not devoid of a soul, because then it would be devoid of life'. The third, i.e., *anvayavyatireki anumāna* is exemplified as the inference of fire through smoke. Here, both the homogeneous and the counter examples are possible.

(iii) *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna* :

In the Sāṁkhya system, the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* does not refer to such a division of these kinds of *anumāna*. The *Yuktidīpikā* and *Māṭharavṛtti* seem to imply such a division in their discussion of *anumāna*. In the view of *Yuktidīpikā*, the five components of *anumāna*, viz., proposition (*pratijñā*) reason *(hetu)* exemplification (*udāharaṇa*). application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigamana*) are meant for making someone else known. This means by implication that these are not necessary for knowing the things oneself. The *Yuktidīpikā* is not very strict for the use of these components in making the others known. These components are to be used in accordance with the necessity of the party enquiring about the object. According to Māṭhara, one establishes the object for knowledge of others through the use of five components of *anumāna.* This is called *parārthānumāna*. Māṭhara considers three components of an *anumāna*, viz., *pakṣa*, *hetu* and *dṛṣṭānta*. Here, *pakṣa* is called *pratijñā* and *dṛṣṭānta* is called *nidarśana*. For example, (i) *Vahnimānayam pradeśaḥ*

(*pakṣa*). (ii) *Dhūmavatvāt* (*hetu*). (iii) *Yathā mahānasam* (*dṛṣṭānta* or *nidarśana*).[199]

Though Īśvarakṛṣṇa does not clearly state about the components of *anumāna*, yet his *kārikāvalī* gives an idea about the *pañcāvayava anumāna*. For example, (i) *puruṣo'sti* (*pratijñā*), (ii) *saṁghātaparārthatvāt* (*hetu*), (iii) *natavat vyavatisthate liṅgam*(*dṛṣṭānta*) (iv) *kṣīrasya yathā pravṛttirajñānasya tathā pravṛttiḥ pradhānasya*(*upanaya*) (v) *tasmāt tṛvidham karaṇam dvāri* (*nigamana*).[200] In the system of Sāṁkhya, Vijñānabhikṣu[201] and Aniruddha[202] record the five components of *anumāna* in the terminology current in Nyāya system and accepted in its essentials by other systematists too.

Some scholars arrive at an opinion from such remarks that for the *svārthānumāna* one uses the three components of *anumāna.* According to Māṭhara, both the sets of components are to be used in formal *anumāna* for making the others known. There is no need of formal use of these components in *anumāna* for knowing the thing for one's own self (*svārthānumāna).*

(iv) *Vīta* and *Avīta Anumāna :*

Following the Sāṁkhya tradition, Vācaspati Miśra classifies the *anumāna* into two kinds, viz., *vīta* and *avīta.* The division into *vīta* and *avīta* is attached much importance in the Sāṁkhya texts especially in the *Yuktidīpikā* which describes the

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[199] trisādhanam trayavayava pañcāvayavamityapare. pakṣahetudṛṣṭānta iti

trayavayavam.   MV,5

[200] SK,17, 42, 35

[201] SPB,5. 27

[202] SSV,5. 27

nature of these varieties in detail. The *vīta anumāna* means that which functions through an affirmation.[203] Again, the *avīta anumāna* means that which functions through negation.[204] We do not find this division of *anumāna* discussed in some other texts of Sāṁkhya-Yoga. The division has found an important place in the system of Nyāya also. However, the early texts of Nyāya system like the sūtras of Gautama and the *bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana do not discuss it explicitly though Uddyotakara makes an unsuccessful attempt to trace the reference to them in the sūtras of Gautama. Uddyotakara is the first logician in the Nyāya system who discusses the division into *vīta* and *avīta*. The *vīta anumāna* gives rise to the knowledge of an object when employed in its own essential form while the *avīta anumāna* does so through refuting the other's stand.[205] It has been already stated above that Vācaspati Miśra divides *anumāna* into *vīta* and *avīta.* According to him, *vīta anumāna* means which is present in various ways i.e., besides its presence in *pakṣa* it is present in *sapakṣa* and is absent in other dissimilar cases i.e.,*vipakṣa.* On the otherhand, the *avīta anumāna* is different from it. It means that the *avīta* is not found in *sapakṣa.* Of these two, *avīta* is called *śeṣavat anumāna.* A *śeṣavat anumāna* is that in which some of the likely properties of an object are denied and eliminated, the likelihood of their belonging to some others being also denied. We have cognition of that which remains. This kind of *anumāna* is found in establishing *śabda* as a *guṇa.* Through certain grounds *śabda* can be shown as distinct from other objects. When such distinctive grounds are eliminated, there remains a ground by

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[203] anvayamukhena pravartamānam vidhāyakam vītam.   STK, p.51

[204] vyatirekamukhena pravartamānam niṣedhakam avītam.   *Ibid.*

[205] NV, 1.1.35

which *śabda* can be shown as a *guṇa*. Since we proceed with the *anumāna* on a ground that remains, after elimination of other grounds, this inferential process is known *as śeṣavat* Vācaspati Miśra further gives the example of *avīta anumāna* as –

"Cloth is not different from threads, because it is a quality of them, whatever differs from something can not be a quality of that, just as the cow cannot be a quality of the horse, this is however not a case with the cloth, therefore, cloth is not different from threads.[206] The *vīta anumāna* is of two kinds, viz., the *pūrvavat anumāna* and the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna.* Of these, the *pūrvavat anumāna* has for its object that universal of which a specific individual has been perceived. The term '*pūrvavat*' means well known. It is that inferential cognition of which such a universal in the object is called *pūrvavat.* For example – when from the presence of smoke we infer the presence of fire in general in the hill, this in general is one, of which a specific individual in the shape of a particular fire has been previously perceived in the kitchen[207]

The second form of *vīta anumāna* is *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* which is the general cognition having for its object a general instance of which a specific instance has not been perceived.[208] As for example, when we have an inferential cognition of the sense organ, how could we know about the existence of the eye? For every action to take place there should be an instrument. Seeing is an action. Therefore, we have to

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[206] STK, 9

[207] yathā dhūmāt vahnitvasāmānyaviśeṣaḥ parvate anumīyate tasya vahnitvasāmānyaviśeśasya svalakṣṇaṁ vahniviśeṣaḥ dṛṣṭaḥ rasavatyām.   *Ibid.*, p.53

[208] sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṁ adṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇasāmānyaviṣayam.   *Ibid.*

infer the eye as a means to the action of seeing. This is *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna.* In the term, *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, dṛṣṭa* stands for *darśana*, cognition and *sāmānyataḥ* stands for *sāmānyasya* of the universal, the affix '*tasil*' being capable of signifying the sense of all case endings. Thus, the term *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna* stands for the *anumāna,* inferential cognition of that particular 'universal' of which a specific individual has not been perceived.

The *Yuktidīpikā* states that *anumāna* is of two kinds, viz., *vīta* and *avīta*. Both of these kinds are meant for explaining something for others. In the view of *Yuktidīpikā*, the *vīta* is that when the probans is applied in its very form. Again, the *avīta* is through elimination when other possibilities are eliminated. The further explanation offered by the *Yuktidīpikā* brings out the difference between the *vīta* and *avīta* more clearly. It states that the essential form of probans can be of two types, viz., generic and particular. In the case of *vīta anumāna* the probans is employed in its essential form without any reference to the exclusion of other's stand. In the case of *avīta anumāna*, the probans does not prove the probandum directly but wards off other possible alternatives. It is employed to prove something through elimination. According to *Yuktidīpikā,* if the *vīta* yields particular results without the need of eliminating other possibilities, the *vīta* alone is sufficient. If, however, there is the need of eliminating other possibilities, the *avīta* is resorted to for the purpose. That also runs in the way of an argument as, 'if it is not admitted so, there arises the undesirable contingency of admitting some other undesirably involved object'. If the elimination of undesirably involved object is not intended, there is no need of *avīta*. For example, past rains are inferred through flood in river as the cause of the latter. But it involves an undesirable contingency of possibility of considering melting of

snow, break of bridge and sports of elephants as the cause of flood. The possibility of these are warded off through *avīta* as these are negated through the probans like space, time etc. For example, through the place as there is no Himalaya in south. Through time is illustrated as it is the rainy season which leads to admit that it should be rainy water. The *Yuktidīpikā* seems to hold that the *avīta* is meant for confirming the *vīta* but not an independent type of probans. Thus the existence of the cause of universe is inferred through *vīta* type of *anumāna,* but it is established through *avīta* that it can be *pradhāna* only. The *Yuktidīpikā* explicitly states that probans is of two types, viz., *vīta* and *avīta.* The former is subdivided into five.[209] The *vīta* is again said to be containing ten components, viz., inquisitiveness, doubt, purpose, conjecturing, to throw aside the doubt, proposition, probans, example, application and conclusion. It is, however, not clear as to how many kinds and components an *avīta* would have.

The illustrations of application of *avīta*, however, are found in the context of *śeṣavat* type of *anumāna*. Hence, it should not be misunderstood that the probans of *anumāna* based on analogy only are divided into *vīta* and *avīta.* This makes it clear that *avīta* is only an assisting factor for *anumāna.* According to *Yuktidīpikā*, the *vīta anumāna* should be used first, because otherwise the definition of *avīta* will be contradicted. The nature of *avīta* is to assist establishing of a particular thing through elimination of other possible alternatives. If the elimination is warded first and then the establishment of the thesis, it would go against the purpose of *avīta.*

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[209] Vide Kumar, Shiv., *Sāṁkhya Yoga Epistemology*, p.158

The division of *anumāna* into seven kinds is also attributed to the Sāṁkhyas. But Vācaspati Miśra attacks the Sāṁkhya view that espouses seven kinds *anumāna*.[210] Vācaspati Miśra states that the Sāṁkhyas divide *anumāna* into seven kinds on the basis of sevenfold inferential marks in the relation in *vyāpti*. These seven kinds of relation are as follows :

(i) measurement, (ii) cause, (iii) contact, (iv) opposition, (v) association, (vi) master and servant, and (vii) killer and the killed.[211]

Vācaspati Miśra states against the view of the Sāṁkhya. He opines that it is illogical to postulate these relations in *vyāpti*. The theory of Sāṁkhya does not account for the temporal factor as for instance, in the case of opposition. The rain is said to be opposed to the contact of cloud with wind. The past rain however is not opposed to the future contact of cloud with wind. On the contrary, the past rain is favourable to the future contact of these two. The future rain is also not opposed to the past contact of cloud with wind. Hence, the opposition cannot serve as an inferential mark or the relation in *vyāpti*.

In the available texts of Sāṁkhya, the seven inferential marks and their relations in *vyāpti* are not found mentioned. The *Jayamaṅgalā,* however, refers to seven kinds of relation in *vyāpti*. But, these are not same as recorded by Vācaspati Miśra. The relations like those of master and servant, association, opposition and cause and effect are common to both. Instead of measurement, contact and killer and killed, the *Jayamaṅgalā* mentions the modification and its source, pot and its

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[210] *Ibid.*, p.146

[211] *Ibid.*, p.147

possessor, and the object and the being for which it is meant. The *Jayamaṅgalā* and Vācaspati Miśra have recorded these seven kinds of relation in *vyāpti* from some ancient text which have been lost to us. Vācaspati Miśra enumerates these varieties of relation in *vyāpti* but does not illustrate them from which it is possible to deduce a few possibilities. Firstly, forms of *vyāpti* are those which cannot be favourably applied to the basic Sāṃkhya assumption. As for instance, the *prakṛtivikāra* or the *nimitta-naimittika* etc.

C. Fallacies in *Anumāna* :

No extant text of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga discusses the fallacies in *anumāna*. The *Māṭharavṛtti* makes reference to them without making any explicit explanation on them. It states that there are thirty three fallacies of *anumāna*. Out of them nine like contradiction by perception, etc, refer to the fallacies of *pakṣa*; fourteen like unproved (*asiddha*), non- conclusive (*anekāntika*) and contradictory (*viruddha*) etc. are the fallacies of probans, and ten are the fallacies of example.[212] The subject of fallacies in *anumāna* might have been referred to in the earlier texts of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system but their unavailability has rendered the matter hazy. Again, the extant texts of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system are silent over the important issue of fallacies in *anumāna*. The statement of *Māṭharavṛtti* that *anumāna* has thirty three fallacies, is without explanation and therefore bears little significance.

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[212] *Ibid*.,p.168