CHAPTER-4

ON THINKERS AND THOUGHTS: MAKING SENSE OF THE TRAJECTORY OF REVOLUTION

This chapter examines the discourses of five prominent thinkers in order to comprehend the social trajectory of the Iranian society. Before we begin to discuss their ideas, it is important to write about the need to study the discourse of the intelligentsia. Social scientists like Karl Manheim (Ideology and Utopia, 1936: 9-36) have written a great deal on the formation of modern intelligentsia and their critical consciousness of ability to negotiate with multiple ideological perspectives and arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the social nudity. In other words, the freedom, criticality and self-reflectivity are important characteristic features of the intelligentsia. Possibly, it would not be wrong to say that the task assigned to the intelligentsia is to educate and sensitize the people. When we look at the Iranian intelligentsia and their contribution to the construction of a civilizational ideal we encounter complex problems which were rooted in the conflict between tradition and modernity or Islam and westernization.

If we look back the constitutional movement of Iran (1906), we see the assertion of modernity. These intellectuals debunked the authority of the religious leaders, they saw great possibility in western modernity and condemned religious tradition as a source of backwardness. In fact, the intellectuals like Mirza-malkum Khan, Akhond Zadeh, Talebov, Mirza Agha Khan Kirmani and Taghizadeh were early modernist thinkers in Iran.
However, the social hold of the clergy was so powerful that modernist intellectuals were almost sidelined and marginalized. In this context, we can refer to the book “Maktubat” of Akhondzadeh which had been written in 1863 and published after one hundred years for the first time outside Iran. It was only in 1971 that five hundred copies of the book published in Tehran secretly in note was attached to the book. He writes:

If Ulema come to know about me and my book, they will announce religious decree (fatwa) and people will kill me without any mercy. Among our people, there is no imagination of freedom, if my fellow religious come to know that I have written such a book, they will show their enmity sense to me and I am frightened of my fellow religious which had not known me.

(Azedanloo, 2001:125-6)

This shows the power of clergy and the resultant failure of the modernists to mobilize the middle class to introduce the ideas of freedom, constitution and civil liberty. There was however another kind of intelligentsia who claimed they were instrumental in introducing religious “enlightenment” as opposed to western modernist enlightenment. Alavi Tabar—a leading voice of this trend—writes:

Religious intellectual is some one who has got a few characteristics. He has got rational and critical viewpoint, gives a prominent importance to man, feels responsibility about other’s fate and destiny. He has got religious beliefs and accepts the judgments of religion. He considers religiosity as necessary condition for happiness and feels responsibility about religion.

(Alavi Tabar, Nouruz Newspaper, 4 Nov. 2001)

Between these two trends there are many layers and possibilities. The richness of this intellectual discourse would become clearer to us when we begin to study the works of five prominent thinkers whom we have chosen for this chapter.
There is no doubt that Shariati is the most famous social thinker and social activist, a revolutionary intellectual in Iran's contemporary history. Without considering Shariati's role, analyzing the post and the pre-revolution of Iran's social movement particularly in the sphere of thought is almost impossible. He was born in 1933, in a village in the Khorasan province in the east of Iran. He belongs to a clergy family whose ancestors professionally were religious teachers. His father is also known as a great religious thinker and Quran commentator. Shariati grew up in such a condition and environment, along with his own specific personality, that made him look different from other children of his age since childhood. His wife writes: Ali had a romantic personality, interested in readings, and was sensitive and cared less towards life. (Shariatrazavi 1997: 46, 58). He loved solitudeness, but when this solitudeness imposed on him by pre-revolutionary regime which he was fighting against it, he felt so distressed and disappointed. In a letter from Paris he writes:

My future is not clear, and everything around me looks bad, ugly. Falsehood, hatred, trick, disgracefulness, immodesty, idiocy, problems, all failures and all hopelessness surrounded me and I am alone, alone and alone. At home alone, in street alone, among religious people alone, even among crowded people when the people with great enthusiasm come to me and calling me I feel more alone (Ibid, p. 165).

It was here in Paris he felt so lonely and came to criticize the western civilization by referring to the social behaviour, morality and
unchastity of western women. In a letter to his wife he writes: "Here the city is beautiful, but it is also wild, cold and tasteless, most of the women here have become like a goose, more beautiful than Bregit Breaurdue but cheaper than a box of cigarette, all lust, all colour, and in all, unfaithfulness, untruthfulness, and helplessness. In 1959, Shariati despite being a social and political activist against the Shah regime, got scholarship from Iran's government and left for France to study sociology. He stayed there, for five years, studying history but doing research in sociology. At the same time, he was fully involved in political affairs against the regime of Shah and participated in Algerian independence movement in Paris and met a few famous revolutionary leaders such as Frantce Fanoon.

At the age of twenty one, he had written three books, but his real and serious academic works begins after coming back from the west. His lectures at Hossein-e-Ershad'a religious institute attracted not only six thousand students who had registered in his summer classes, but also many thousands of people from different backgrounds who were fascinated by his teachings.

The first edition of his book ran over sixty thousand copies which were quickly sold-out, despite the obstructive interference by the authorities in Iran. Faced with the outstanding success of Dr. Shariati's courses, the Iranian police surrounded Houssein-e-Ershad Institute, arrested many of his followers and thereby put an end to his activities. For the second time, he underwent an eighteen month prison term under extremely harsh conditions. Popular pressure and international protests obliged the Iranian regime to release Dr. Shariati on March
20,1975. However, he remained under close surveillance by the security agents of Iran. This was no freedom at all since he could neither publish his thoughts nor contact his students. Under such stifling conditions according to the teachings of the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet Mohammed), he realized that he should leave out of the country. Successful in his attempt, he went to England but many suspect that he was martyred three weeks later on 19 June 1977 by the ubiquitous SAVAK.

Dr. Shariati studied and experienced many philosophical, theological and social schools of thought with an Islamic view. One could say that he was a Muslim Mahajir who rose from the depth of the ocean of eastern mysticism, ascended to the heights of the formidable mountains of western social sciences, yet was not overwhelmed, and he returned to our midst with all the jewels of this fantastic voyage.

Shariati was not able to see his life times fruit, but his ideas and followers have made a great effect and controversy in post-revolutionary Iran. In an approach to Shariati's works we are faced with a few fundamental issues, which left a considerable effect on social thought in post-revolutionary Iran. In Shariati's collected works which comprise more than thirty five volumes he has discussed a series of important issues. However, the following topics are found more considerable and more relevant to analyze the social movement in the sphere of social thought in post-revolutionary Iran. These topics are:

1) Freedom and liberty
2) Ideology
3) Government
4) Intellectuals and enlightenment
5) Leadership
6) Movement and revolution
7) Jurisprudence and clergy.

**Freedom and Liberty**

To prove that there is freedom in Islam, he refers Islam in its initial stages, the period of prophet Mohammad and his successors and particularly to the “Imam Ali”, Shia’s first Imam and Prophet’s son in law. Shariati says, there was not even a single political prisoner in that period (Shariati, collected works, vol.2, pp. 144-45). While he criticizes western individualism and liberalism (Shariati, Vol. 30, pp. 598-99), he offers his theory on liberty and equality with three elements of “Gnosticism, equality and liberty. (Shariati, vol. 2, pp. 59-60). Referring to shariati’s idea that there has been no other type of force or imposing of religion or way of thinking in Quran, Prophet’s own way of life (Sonnati), and Muslim leaders of heydays of Islamic civilization. (Ibid, vol. 30, pp. 22-77) question arises how and why imposing religion has produced in Islamic ideology imposing ideas that totalitarian regimes had practiced during Islamic period. These are the questions that make controversy in Iran.

**Ideology**

Shariati believes that ideology means technique- a technique for living, that shapes society and in brief the fate that man makes for himself, his society and history. (Shariati, Vol. 4, p. 94) Ideology is a belief that answers to the social, national and class orientation of man and it is also a system of values and social order of life. Ideology

How to live, what to be done, what kind of society should be made, and how this social form should change to an ideal way, man as a responsible individual, what kind of duty man has got toward society, all these questions and answers to them can be called ideology. (Ibid, Vol. 29, p. 610). For Shariati, the real ideology is like a technique which enables human to conquer over nature and impose his ideals upon it. That is a technique by which human beings will be able to employ the historical determinism to study society for his own benefit. Ideology as a "self conscious belief" goes against "scientific progress, and civilization. In brief, culture shapes the world and creates power and civilization.

But a movement is always a belief pattern in its initial stages and in due course of time, it may adapt from the school of faith its aims and responsibilities, which would constitute the foundation of the movement in the long run. Consciousness about it makes them move ahead, then ideology goes down and culture which contains philosophy, sciences, literature, and art, goes up to take control over the condition. As culture attains upperhand, the belief-consciousness and self-consciousness make faith stronger. (Shariati, vol. 26, p. 275-77). Islam, in the beginning had been an ideology too, and later, it became a civilization and lost its capability to lead and manage the Muslim societies.

Ideology mostly is the guideline of the intellectuals, and intellectual is one who has got a conscious ideology and leads the society and masses towards the ideals (Ibid, vol. 23, p. 94-95). Shariati accepts
that ideologies are enemy of each other but he is seriously against the idea that "science and scientist" should be neutral and he argues that this was a great disaster of the twentieth century (Ibid, p. 87-94). Revolutions are to be created for achieving the classless society and real democracy and it is a part of keeping the ideology. In fact, at the same time he does not believe that there could be a real democracy. He believed that we have to make Islam as an ideology and in Eqbal's word "reconstruction of Islam". To Shariati, this Islam is Abuzar's Islam. Abuzar was one of the prophet Mohammad's followers, a layman and illiterate who, after split in Islamic camp, took Ali's side and never compromised till death. He was an extremist revolutionary and Shariati was very much fond of him.

**Government**

Shariati mentions different types of political systems such as inherited, democracy, aristocratic, monarchy, oligarchy and revolutionary democratic. He says that revolutionary democratic model is a new type that has recently been established in Africa, Latin America and Asia during their struggle against colonialism. This type of government, though elected by people, never pays attention to public ideas or votes.

It is a revolutionary government based on strong ideology and its duty is to give orientations and lead the society to a better position and to reach better ideals without considering public ideas. This type of democracy was introduced in Bandung Conference and implemented in Algeria during the revolt against colonialism. Though he believes that democracy is the best type of government, he also argues
that the real democracy means that every individual should have true choice of selection. But in tribal or primitive societies, the masses do not have such consciousness and choice of choosing. If their chieftain gives his vote to a particular person or idea, the others also would give their votes to the same candidate. To avoid such a dysfunctional aspect of democracy, first society has to be led by a "devotee revolutionary leadership (Shariati, Vols: 5, 12,29).

While criticizing democratic liberalism, he argues that without having a safe society every kind of freedom could lead to immorality. If society is an immoral society, then liberty and freedom will lead to the increase of to immorality, and this is not real democracy. For him majority is not necessarily legitimated, because people in a normal condition believe in traditional situation and they are not in favour of change. Therefore, whoever interested to bring about the changes in such a society, he will not get vote and society will remain in a statique and conservative condition. (Shariati, Vol. 12, pp. 218-228).

Shariati divides democracy into two: first is liberal democracy and the other "devotee democracy". This democracy though depends on public vote, does not depend on people's vote. That is a revolutionary type of government that wants to improve the society and promote the people's life towards devotee life. All hindrances of any type, even people who try to misuse their power or money to disturb the government and all traditions which are against the change, should be removed by revolutionary government. (Shariati, vol: 26, pp. 617-18).
Intellectuals and Enlightenment

Intellectual is some one who has a critical viewpoint. Intellectual is not a philosopher, neither a scientist nor writer or artist. Intellectual is a self-conscious bigoted person who understands the spirit of time and needs of his/her own society. (Shariati, Vol. 4, p. 83). The wisdom of leading and guidance is the intellectual's criteria. They are the ones who continue the prophets' responsibilities. Everybody could be an intellectual only if he has got consciousness and social orientation. If the intellectual goes back to his/her traditions it is a conscious return and there is always one purpose behind it. When Gandhi returned to tradition, he was not becoming a primitive Indian, but he was much more progressive than any Indian who acted and behaved like the British. (Ibid, pp. 154-59).

Shariati makes distinction between intellectuals and enlightened people. For him, the enlightened person is the one who is self-conscious and responsible towards his/her society and people. Each and every intellectual is not enlightened. Intellectual is some one who works with his mind and brain but he/she might not be a self-conscious and responsible to social orientations. He believes that many intellectuals are occidensis but they are not enlightened. He criticizes Iran's intellectual movements and says that Iran's intellectuals think that intellectualism requires nihilism and anti-religious ideology (Shariati, vol: 28, pp. 593-95), which they neither understand their own people nor people understand them. The modern intellectuals of Iran, were supposed to go against tradition, religion, past and historical background and self-confidence. All they did was in favour of modernity,
civilization, progress, modern science and industry, but they did not know that they were giving up their bigoty which was necessary to protect a culture and a society (Shariati, Vol:4, p.130).

It was Muslim enlightened people who, for the first time, discovered the ugly face of imperialism and colonialism. Shariati believes in Muslim enlightenment. Abuzar and Imam Ali were the most enlightened revolutionary people of their own time. Intellectuals in Islamic countries should create an Islamic Protestantism. European Protestantism did not get any support from Christianity for its movement and struggle but in Islam there have been many dynamic elements particularly the tradition of martyrdom, to make a movement successful. For this reason, intellectuals must return to their own self— an Islamic self. The idea of Islamic Protestantism made a major controversy in Iran's post-revolutionary era and at the time of writing this thesis, one of Shariati students who proposed and recalled for the project was in prison under the death sentence issued by conservative block of power in Iran. In his theory of Islamic Protestantism, Shariati intended to encounter with Islamic fanaticism. By criticizing and de-constructing, he wanted to re-construct the elementary essence of Islam. Shariati believed that there were two types of Islam: the inherent Islam which is pure Islam of Quran and Prophet and the other is historical Islam which is official, institutionalized Islam that has emerged through history with the help of Islamic authoritarians. In Pure Islam, there is no clergy, no hierarchy and no mediators of God and Leyman.

Renouncing his background as a religious revolutionary elite and a war wounded person, he called for an Islamic renanaissance with
the theoretical background of Shariati’s Islamic Protestantism project. Hashem Aghajari radically revolted against Iran’s post-revolutionary fundamentalists who have become more totalitarian. (Aghajery 2002) This made him a controversial prisoner waiting for his execution date.

**Leadership**

Shariati’s concept of leadership is the same as his concept of government. He was of the view that there has to be a devoted revolutionary leader, who is not concerned with the public idea, but he has to extend dynamic leadership to the society in order to raise it from the existing condition to a prosperous society in future. The distinction between the leader explained above a dictator is the ideology to which Imam or leader belongs to.

What differs between leadership and dictatorship is not the form, but the content. "Imamat" or leadership is not like the president of the U.S.A, but a leader who is devoted to lead the society to a better condition within the available means.

There might be suffering for the people, but majority consciously have accepted that the only checkpoint is ideology of Imam and one should be devoted to that ideology. While society reaches to the point that people become aware and conscious of political propagandas, society becomes a dynamic one. Then there will be free election and real democracy.

**Movement and Revolution**

Sahriati believes in constant revolution and movements. First of all, there should be a social movement followed by cultural
movement. Once finally when society and people accept this cultural
movement, then culture will be established. There are three ways of
bringing about an evolution: (1) Conservative type of reform (2)
Revolutionary (3) Reformism or evolutionism.

Shariati says that prophet Mohammad had employed all
these three types plus tradition. He kept the forms of many traditional
Arab rituals but changed the content and spirit of that which was
superficial. Like "Hajj", a primitive tradition of Arabs, had been
employed by him in a revolutionary way into the Islamic culture.
Shariati says that a movement never comes to an end till it achieves
equality and justice all over the world and man gains an absolute victory
and this is the meaning of “Shia”(Shariati, vol: 23, pp. 57-61). By this,
Shariati proposes the idea of perpetual revolution.

**Jurisprudence and clergy**

Jurisprudence is one of the most important characteristics
of Shia. It means after completion of rules, regulation and principles of
Islam through revelation some new events and problems have come into
being in order to cope with he ever changing society. Hence,
jurisprudence will take responsibility to interpret the new issues in an
Islamic society (Shariati, Vol: 9, pp. 231-32).

The sources of jurisprudence are Quran, tradition, reason
and consensus. Jurisprudence acts as a “constant revolution” in
Islamic thought and school. Shariati believes that since 1950s most of
the youth in urban areas have gone to the modern educational
institutions to continue their studies and most of the village youth have
gone to religious schools to get education. This has made clergy as a
non-urban class in Iranian society. Therefore the jurisprudence has been affected by these developments leading to the loss of its power of understanding and analyzing the "new events" in modern Iran. But at the same time he argues that clergy in Iran were independent and not depend on government, thus they were from grass roots of society and were matched with public opinion and their needs. The traditional clergy is the first and most powerful critic or enemy of Shariati.

**People and leadership (Ommat-va-imamat)**

Imam is a complete and ideal man. He is a model that has come into being on an Islamic base and a true Muslim, who gets closer to his own ideal nature (Shariati, vol: 14, p. 112). Imam is not a leader but a guide, he is not a ruler but a "model and pattern of truth", a complete and "ideal type". In order to solve the leadership problem in Islam, the Imam should be a popular person. Imam is not a supernatural creature or a "super-man" but is a "better man". Therefore, to have an Imam as leader of a nation, people or body of believers are not to elect, select or appoint him but we have to discover him. Even if people are not able to discover or know him he is still Imam and will remain as Imam. A poet, a writer or an inventor who remains writer and inventor even though they are not known widely. There is no election in choosing Imam who has got the right to rule and lead people to an ideal life. This is people's duty to find and recognize him and his right. The relation of Nation with Imam is not like that of their relation with government, but that is a relation of people with "reality". They are not choosers but finders (Shariati, vol: 26, pp. 564-579).
In Bandung Conference in 1954 many leaders, sociologists, and thinkers of Asian and African countries questioned the system of democracy. They asked how a country or a nation that recently has got its independence would be to lead the society from a chaotic condition to an ideal position through a democratic system. Shariati believes that in such a society, everything is corrupted and so only a revolutionary change is a valid selection. In this situation, the best selection is "devoted leadership", and Imam is the most devoted leader. Democratic government, despite containing a sacred meaning, is against revolutionary progress. Shariati writes that; nowadays the revolutionary societies of the world are reliant on revolutionary system which is different from the traditional system, dictatorship and democratic system, but the revolutionary system acts according to a law belonging to a particular school of thought in order lead the society towards the achievement of certain goals. (Shariati, Vol: 15, pp. 42-45).

Shariati is a controversial social thinker in Iran and there are paradoxes in his ideas and theories. Shariati has borrowed his modern ideals such as liberty and equality from the west. Mixing these ideas with Islamic ideology creates paradoxes. His triangle theory about "gnosticism, equality and liberty" itself is a source of paradox, since gnosticism does not go with modernity and technological society. In ideology, he reaches to a point of relativism but he never confesses. When he says that the scientists should not be neutral he reaches a very much ideological peak and when he calls Abuzar a revolutionary Leyman he becomes an absolutist. With over referring to ideology, he naively
trusted the ideologies too much and did not care about the probability of ideological absolutism even in Islamic Shiat.

Though he was fond of people and their freedom, he rejects all other aspects and types of government except that "Revolutionary devoted leadership". For him, legitimacy does not derive from majority, but from reality which looks for know and discovering the Imam. The paradoxes become more clear when he talks about self-conscious and responsible intellectuals or enlightenment. Though he believes that intellectuals continue the prophet's responsibility, but practically in his analysis they are only discoverers of a leader called Imam. They are not selectors and electors. Shariati never said that a religious revolutionary leader will turn to a totalitarian Imam. What people must do is to get back the power that they have given to leader. There has been misuse of Shariati's ideological emotions by post-revolutionary conservatives.

Though he believes in Islamic Protestantism, but he wants enforce Islamic ideology and Muslim revolutionary ideal characters and types, without any departure from ideology. Finally Shariati remains in favour of theological-ideological theocracy, but at the same time, he tries to control and reduce the power of clergy and clerics. On the one hand, during all his life time, he tried to make people free from dictatorship but on the other hand, he tried to lead them to a revolutionary devoted government or leadership. According to Shariati, concept of meaning has got an absolute and specific position which is above constitution and public opinion. These paradoxes transformed the theocratic system of post-revolutionary Iran leaving behind their own controversial effects.
ABDOLKARIM SORUSH: Post-revolutionary religious intellectual

Dr. Abdul Karim Soroush is one of the most controversial social thinkers of the post-revolutionary Iran. He is well-known within the country and outside Iran and many of them consider him as Iran's Martin Luther who had initiated a great reform in Christianity in the Middle Ages of Europe. In 1972-73, Sorush had gone England to continue his advanced studies and there he studied both "Analytic Chemistry" and "Analytic Philosophy". In those days, the political opposition against Shah's regime was very active and Sorush, as a Muslim devotee, participated in religious intellectual associations. He met Dr. Shariati in England and when Shariati died he was one of the persons who knew about it and subsequently they made all arrangements for his burial in a famous shrine in Syria. After the Revolution all those people became ministers except Sorush who even suffered for his controversial ideas. Even more than Shariati, now he is considered to be an anti-clergy Muslim intellectual. Sorush's analysis ultimately calls the institutions of divine law- such as the function of the supreme leader, fatwas and inequality between men and women-as totally illegitimate.

For Sorush, religion is a private affair and social life is the responsibility of people who should manage it as democratically as possible. What the Islamic Revolution did in 1979 was to take over society by means of supposedly religious rules, which the system then
used to perpetuate itself in power. Sorush advocates total separation between religion and politics.

Sorush's criticism, of course, is the most subversive: he always said that if the sacred is the domain of people's inner life, the outside world simply can not be the world of an Islamic absolute. According to him, it is a total misunderstanding of Islam to try to exercise power in its name under a totalitarian conception where the religion is mixed with the socio-political norms. For him, civil society and “religious civil society” are the same in the case of Iran.

Sorush knows western and Islamic philosophy very well. He knows natural sciences and is devoted to Islamic gnosticism. This is why, scientific debate with him has become a difficult task for his opponents. Hence, some religious extremists tried to stop him from teaching and speaking and even threatened his life. It may be argued that after Shariati, Dr. Sorush is the second social thinker in contemporary Iran who has made a great evolution in Iran’s social thought as well as social change. His civilizational ideals of modernity and its encounter with post-revolutionary Iran are being discussed below.

**Tradition and Modernity**

The central focus of Sorush's doctrine is to understand the West as a general phenomenon and not as an absolute one. According to him, the West enjoys relative but not inherent unity. Nor is it defined as a specific existence or entity. The West should be seen as a relative
value and because of the relation between its elements it can be united. (Sorush 1991: 224). While refusing to politicize his perception of the West and rejecting Hegel and Heideggerian approach towards the West, Sorush seeks a healthy psychological attitude concerning western thought. According to him, failure to understand the West by means of a positive approach will lead to westernization or entail a struggle with the West through political means. The westernization process itself means borrowing everything from and blindly imitating the West. He urges a return to the genuine dynamism of tradition. Sorush rejects the western approach and maintains that the West does not manifest a whole or a part of a whole. He says that this whole does not exist except in thought, the West being merely a relative value can therefore be replaced. (Ibid, p. 240). Sorush tries to understand the West; in doing so he opens up the debate about modernity, tradition and modernism or an analysis of the west and the technique of dealing with the West.

Sorush argues: "Only those people who have abandoned tradition can speak about tradition and those who have departed from modernity can speak about modernity. Therefore those who are sunk in tradition can not speak about it. He who speaks about a subject must be able to remain aloof from it and comment about it from a distance. Nowadays people are speaking about modernism and this shows that they are gradually keeping aloof from modernism. Modernism has become a topic of discussion, leading to the creation of its own paradox."
Nowadays people are discussing both tradition and modernism because they have departed from both these cultures. (Sorush 1997a: 351-52).

The old and new world is the symbol of differences between old and new generation. If a common person is asked about modernity he will say: "our present world differs greatly with the past. It is enough for a person to open his eyes in order to see the obvious difference in art, science and industry. This modernization of the outside world, that is sometimes construed as modernity, is a modernization that does not require much contemplation. It can be distinguished visually. One can see and distinguish modern elements such as the printing machine, electricity and the airplane, all of which belong to the modern world and they had not existed at all in the ancient world." (Sorush, Ibid, p 350)

But if the same question is asked to an elite, he will say: "we are viewing a novelty in thought. In fact, whatever new phenomena we see in the outside world is a process that has taken shape in the brain. Just as the differences between old and new world, what Iran witnesses today is the confrontation between tradition and modernity. According to the common man, the dissimilarity between the old and new world is due to the following reasons:

1. In the domination of nature by man
2. This includes the domination of applied science as against theoretical science,
3. There is also the difference between the mentality of modern man and traditional man
4. The old world was markedly more religious than the modern world.

5. Thinkers of the ancient world attempted to define the world whereas in modern times they are trying to change it.

6. In the ancient world people had lived in a limited environment whereas modern man exists in a vast expanse and knows that the geographical universe is too much for human emotion or intellect to understand it all.

7. Sorush adds: “The modern world is a continuation of the old world and nothing else... this is a type of modernization in which although the new man differs with the past, he is in fact continuation of the past. Of course people argue that such drastic changes have taken place in the world that next generation could never have imagined to what extent the world has been revolutionized.

8. Sorush does not believe in common precepts and looks at things from an intellectual point of view. He maintains that novelty means distance, departure or exit from the past.

9. He has recourse to science and introduces the understanding of science in his description of modernity (Athary Maryan 2000:7).

Sorush asserts: “Posterity followed reason but did not probe or discuss reason. They were immersed in religion but they did not question religion. Posterity has its own ideology but they did not question knowledge. The essence of modernity and modernization of the
present world is the appearance of second hand knowledge ending with the suffix “ology”. As a consequence, we can see that subjects discussed in modernism can not be understood by those who have not left tradition. The world has not become modernized due to modern science and industry; it has become modernized through a second hand modern perspective. (Sorush 1997a: 352).

Iran must select different options of modernity and the success of the choice depends on its adaptability. He says that those cultures, which will succeed will be able to adopt excellent values among various modern values. Sorush prefers science, but he rejects a general approach to modernity and believes that “Muslim scientists obviously receive science from other cultures and were leased with this adoption. But they never classified science at the level of ethics, customs and traditions of their nations in order to avoid being dominated by foreign ethics. The original Muslims acquired science from those who were alien to their religion and they benefited from foreign wisdom as seeking precious jewel from every source. (Sorush, 1994:5)

He considers this natural acquisition but does not approve of intellectual submission to adopted sciences. As a consequence Sorush invites us to return to our history and observes that at one time in history Muslims had proved that they had strong digestive powers, sharp eyes, and intelligent selective capacity. They neither feared the dragon of history nor were intimated by the Hellenic culture and spirit, but like perfect men they even improved those cultures.
Following this line of reasoning, Sorush argues that Iran failed to achieve modernity because it did not open the gates to acquire the outstanding values of modernity. He considers admirers and promoters of modernity in the beginning of the Constitutional Movement (1906) as ignorant and vassals of modernity. He further argues that the foolish and arbitrary invention of philosophy and self-submission to the western storm will not solve the problem of backwardness and under development.

In a final conclusion, he posits that we need science to understand religion and exchange culture and create a balance between Iranian, Islamic and western identity and approach modernity through a carefully selected option. He says: We need a science which is both offspring of modernity and western culture but which differs essentially with the other children of modernity. We speak of a universal, inherent and non-exclusive modernity-capable of adapting to all cultures, while avoiding enslavement by alien cultures. The challenge is to accept the essence of science and not to wholly submit to the rules and limitations imposed by the modern science. We can and must acquire modern knowledge and separate such sciences from the body of western culture without any trepidation. (Sorush 1991:6).

Such learning is an essential expedient for development. In fact, development can not be achieved without science. The reality of this is so real that no wise man will reject it and its healing power is so strong that no sick man will avoid it. Thus, it is necessary to clear the
path for this science. If a person wants to pursue this science, he must clean and prepare the house for his guest. If he can choose, he must welcome the offering hand and if politics, the government, economy and ethics must be modernized through a process of adjustment and adaptations. And "if science has not yet been given birth or dwelt among us it is because our brains and eyes have objected to it. Our minds have grown as an enemy of science and our eyes have refrained from looking at it." (Ibid, p. 5).

But Sorush seems to refer to other topics such as religious understanding and exchange of culture which will help us overcome backwardness and stunted growth if considered with right perspective. Since religion is studied within the province of tradition, some scientists have understood that they must amend religion. While calling our attention to the role of religion in politics and the reformation of clerical establishment, Sorush says that before the Iranian revolution of 1979, religion had been a private and superficial affair in the community. At that time, the people discharged their religious duties but lacked a deep knowledge about them. It is the basis of a publicly practised and accepted religion.

Instead of reforming our religion, Sorush invites us to understand it and urges Muslims not to try to change their definition of religion when challenged by modernity and instead adapt their precepts of religion with the changes made outside religion. According to Sorush, this calls for an understanding of religion as something that accepts a
change of human precepts about religion as indispensable. He says that along with this doctrine, the seminary must also be criticized and must be capable of adapting itself to the developments of the age. (Athary Maryan 2000:9).

Sorush says that no culture can be everlastingly superior and all cultures change in the course of time. Acceptance of arbitrary history makes us reject the possibility of change of culture. In his analysis of cultural relations, he says we must move beyond the westernization label and select aspects of western culture that will benefit Iranian culture provided that the replacement is made in a democratic manner. The only alternative for cultural growth for Iran is to open its gates to other cultures so that in the course of a free and critical dialogue, it can engage foreign cultures and developments taking place outside Iran. According to Sorush, such a free and optional approach to the West will not lead to blind imitation of its culture. However, if the chance to make a choice is denied, the country will succumb to the westernization.

Considering the fact that the culture of Iran is a combination of Islamic, western and Iranian, he warns that over-emphasizing pre-Islamic Iran or Islamic Iran and rejecting western influence is as dangerous as being wholly westernized. He says the extremist nationalists or religious radicals endanger the rational atmosphere for cultural dialogue and its growth. While recognizing the three distinct identities, Sorush notes that it is dangerous to sacrifice
they will accuse us that we are anti-proletariat, and will try to close the scientific debate. This is the Satanic ideology. (Ibid, p.27). Intellectuals have to think in terms of replacement by reason.

When the emotion and personal tastes are combined with bigotry, the first victim will be humanity. (Ibid, p.72). While referring to Isia Berlin, Dr. Sorush explains two sorts of freedom: the negative and the positive freedom. He argues that with the pretext of giving positive freedom, some regimes or dictators are cancelling the so-called negative freedom of people and forcefully lead them in a way in accordance with their interests and interpretation. Sorush believes that this kind of interpretation ends up in Stalinism, assuming that they know people's interests very well. (Ibid, p.76). For Sorush, there is no other external reality except God. Ideologies and values are valid as long as they are matched with the ultimate value and fact, that is God, beyond that, all realities are fake. He argues that even the values which have come from God can be implemented in society.

Though all these reasonings were against Marxists in post-revolutionary Iran, but in a note to the third edition of the book published on 1994. He writes: now the crisis of Marxism and the revolt of leftist parties are over but it is interesting that the book and its content is still relevant. With this short note, Sorush converted the orientation of the book from Marxism, for pleasing the high authorities involved in religious revolutionary activists in Iran.
one of these three values for the benefit of the other two. With this assertion, he apparently seeks a balance between Islamic, western and Iranian identities (Ibid, p.10).

**Ideology**

One of his books, "Satanic ideology", had been written in hey days of the revolution, when Sorush also was an ideologue and defender of the revolution and revolutionary regime. This discussion is against left trend in Iran, which only for a year or two after the Revolution, had opportunity to express their ideas and ideology. When communists had been driven away from Iran's socio-political scene, his debates on ideology returned to challenge the religious extremist ideologues and activists. From then on, cleavage between him and authorities of the as Islamic regime began to take place.

In criticizing the ideology, he explains two kinds of dogmatism: the "masked dogmatism" and "unmasked dogmatism". For him, unmasked dogmatism is the most hated kind of ideology which appears in a violent and fanatic society that expels out all other opponents. Masked dogmatism is such an ideology that covers himself or itself behind logics and scientific methods and employs ideology for his/her own benefit. (Sorush 1995a: 18-19). Sorush believes that post-revolutionary Iranian society has become open and free for leftists to propagate their ideology without bordering themselves to scientific and methodologic discussion. But they talk according to their party's ideology not for the people. If we try to challenge their idea immediately,
Theoretical Shrink and Spread of Shariah

"Shariah" means Islamic faith which has come from God through prophet Mohammad. This theory made a great challenge in Iran's post-revolutionary society. For the first time in 1986, this topic was published in a prestigious journal called "Keyhan-E-Farhangi" (Cultural Keyham). The essence of this theory is that religion is made by God, but knowledge of religion or religious knowledge is made by man. Shariah is from God, but understanding of Shariah is carried out by man. Understanding and knowledge at any age has got its geometry and religious understanding which depend on time and space. Even evolution of religious belief depends on evolution of knowledge and economic condition of man. Therefore, the theory of shrink and spread of Shariah is a hermeneutics kind of interpretation. (Sorush 1997b:57) Everybody's faith or belief is the result of what one understands through Shariah. Differences of understanding of Shariah naturally will lead to differences in beliefs and faiths.

Iran's clergy claims that this is absolutely against the universality and centralization of Islamic religion. Sorush believes that our understanding depends on our knowledge from other branches of knowledge and particularly scientific knowledge. If there is a new theory in science it will affect our understanding in all aspects of life as well as religion. Sorush argues that when he claims that our understanding of religion gets freshness and becomes new, from time to time, he means that our religious knowledge should be matched with other knowledge.
and understanding of our time. (Ibid, p.200). This is the rule of epistemology. There is a relation between religious knowledge and non-religious knowledge. If man's knowledge is faced with shrink and spread, our understanding of religious knowledge will also shrink and spread, i.e. there is no ultimate and absolute understanding of knowledge, particularly religious knowledge.

Some critics, particularly great clerics argued that this theory leads to relativism, which has no stability in any sort of idea or religious believers. They believe that according to this theory, the idea that religion is fixed and proved and sacred, is not constant and firm idea, because in near or far future, this kind of understanding will change (Amoli 1982: 88). They also say that purity and profane, sin and cleanness in God's words are and must always be fixed and it is unchangeable. But this theory does not contain any fixed sin or profane. Finally they want to know from Sorush whether there is any defect in a religion. They are interested in knowing whether the prophet has left anything without explaining. They asked Sorush that what kind of defect was in religion that he tries to solve it. What matter in Islam left without explanation by the prophet that he wants to explain it. He wants to play prophet. Why instead of following Ulema, he insists to lead and reconstruct (ibid).

For clergy in Iran, this was a big issue, since by this theory, personal understanding also true and valid as for as clergy is concerned.
Hence, it was not necessary to follow them as there is no while explanation and interpretation.

Sorush, in response, states that the whatever the changes which some people want Islam to introduce need not be applied to Islam because Islam had been revealed to the prophet. (Sorush 1997b: 41). The matter is not to add some more purity and drop some sins or profanes from religion. Sorush asserts that the main epistemological question in the theory of “Shrink and Spread” is that: religious knowledge and particularly its evolution nourishes from the following sources: first the internal base i.e. the Shariah and second the external source. If there is any other source, the critics have to bring it to the notice and refute the theory (Ibid, p.330). The relative understanding is different from relativity of “truth”. (Ibid, p.332). Sorush further argues that understanding relativity does not lead us to the idea that every form of understanding is true and valid, but who is going to pass judgment or wrong and right. That is the problem which remains unsolved throughout history (Ibid, p. 342).

Enlightenment and Clerics

The version of Islamic jurisprudence has no other meaning than that of “Houzeh’s (religious schools) traditional version of Islam. It is considered to be against the intellectual Islam and mixed Islam. That is a pretext to suppress any kind of new thought. Nowadays, if even simplest things are not considered to have come from heaven and if there is no religious justification for that, it would not be accepted.
Rationalizing thought and thinking or acting rationally is considered to be the same as irreligious and unbelievable. (Sorush 1998: 94)

According to Sorush, the Islamic enlightenment means Islamic thought mainly derived from "Houzeh" (but not necessarily against that). He has been preoccupied with the decline of Muslims decline and is thinking about political and religious thought reform (Ibid, p. 79-80).

Ayatollah Naeini had been one of the great clerics during the period of Iran's Constitutional Revolution on 1906. He was an Islamic theoretician who stood against conservative clerics such as Ayatollah Noori. But Naeini in his theory about government acts within the religious jurisprudence and he believes that governance is the right of the Jurist Consults. Imam Khomeini, the leader of Iran’s revolution goes ahead and argues that the domain of jurist consults will be equivalent to prophet’s will. This theory is completely new and beyond the expectations. There is no legitimacy of people’s rule or popular government in both Naeini and Imam Khomeini’s (Sorush 1998:92) interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence. Even Ayattollah Montazeri is concerned with people’s rights and has done a considerable research on “Velayate Faghih” (mandate of the jurist), which has not gone further ahead of others. Hence, there is a lack of progress in the political theory of the Islamic religious thought which not only talks about people’s duty and religious rights, but should talk about people’s pre-religious rights.
that they had possessed in the state of nature or natural kingdom of God.

Islam lacks the theory in the sphere of religious thought in order to approve ruling and management based on wisdom and rationality. (Sorush 1998: 93) This is the one controversial arena of intellectuals with clergy in Iran's post-revolutionary period. Religious enlightenment of Iran desires to add the legitimacy of people's sovereignty or popularity of government on the theory of mandate of the jurist (Velayate-Faghih). But for Iran's clerics, this desire means interference of intellectuals in the religious zone, which should remain clean and pure.

Bazargan is one of the religious intellectuals who has interpreted Quran, according to the new sciences. Bazargan, who has been basically an engineer and a revolutionary leader before Iran's Revolution, was selected as the first Prime Minister of Iran after the revolution. But due to his interpretation of Islam, Government and people's rights, he was dismissed by clerics who had been the leaders of the revolution. Bazargan believed that unlike repeatedly claimed by some revolutionary leaders, the West is not corrupted, but disciplined, lover of freedom, science and technique, conscience and efficiency in work place. Social ethics have been the most important positive aspects of the westerners. For him, the west does not morally distinct itself from prophets. Do not betray others, trust each other, stand for justice, and
respect justice and freedom are the prophets teachings that can be found in the western culture also. (Bazargan: 1974).

At the same time, Bazargan criticized the "Feghh" (Islamic jurisprudence) and believed that "Feghh" had cancerous growth among other religious knowledge. He says that religion is not able to answer all our questions; therefore other sciences in the sphere of management, economics, psychology and sociology are required for the development of Iran. We need modern knowledge too. According to Sorush, knowledge about over subjects is essential to understand religion and one should be neutral to examine religion as such. Finally, Bazargan as a Muslim intellectual had believed in religious ideology, but in post-revolutionary Iran he claimed that he believed in the separation of religion and ideology with his emphasis on secularism. (Keyhan Hawaei, 1994-95).

Unlike Shariati and Bazargan, from the beginning Dr. Sorush argued that religion should be separated from ideology. Sorush's concern is that if religion becomes ideologic, it will become this worldly as ideology is concerned with this world affair and the ruling classes will misuse it.

Some critics of Sorush said that he does not allow religion to become secular. By interfering in public affairs, religion becomes secular. They further argue that for the development of the society, it is necessary for religion to become secular and gradually shift from totally sacred to this worldly problems (Salehpur, Keyan Magazine, Vol. 16, 1995). Sorush says that in history wherever and whenever religion had
become ideologic, it turned out to be the servant of religious jurisprudence and the rulers virtually misused it. Today's Islamic jurisprudence is also a sort of ideological religion. The jurisconsults have dominated all aspects and areas of religion, history, interpretation and society (Sorush 1998: 149).  

In such an ideological religion, there won't be any place for reason, rationality and wisdom. To Sorush, fluidity of religious knowledge means its conformity with the reason of time. He believes in the unity of religion and politics, because in a religious society the form of government inevitably should be religious. But for Sorush, people who control and observe the religious society's progress are religious intellectuals as well as religious jurisprudents. Shariati and Bazargan believed that in association with religion (Islam), we can make better world. On the other side, we had Suffism in Islam that totally ignored worldly life and they isolated themselves from society and people. But Sorush' way is third solution, i.e. in better world we can have better religious practice and rituals. Sorush argued that government at first should supply the people's worldly needs to meet their primary requirements and then secondary needs such as faith and worship or religious life will come into existence (Sorush 1998:193). Hence, the main concern should be the purity of religion and non-ideologic one, which supplies our material needs in order to prepare a better life. The whole point is that this world should be managed by rational planning not with a jurisprudence planning, because religious jurisprudence (Feghh) is order, but for life and economic management we need plan
and program. Nowadays the conservatives claim that they brought about revolution for material needs of the people and this worldly life. They say: we have gone it for the sake of Islam and those think something else are the betrayers of people and Revolution (Mesbah Yazdi, Resalat Newspaper, 3 Nov. 2002).

Religion and democracy

Some believe that conformity of democracy and religion (Islam) is impossible due to the following reasons. Lack of equality between women and men's rights, inequality of Muslims and non-Muslims in Islamic "Feghh" theocracy and mandate of the Islamic jurist (Velayate-Fagih) law of execution of apostates, impurity of unbelievers or pagans, fairness of believers on their idea and their inflexibility and rules and laws of Feghh are all evidences of poverty of democracy in Islam (Paydar, Keyan magazine, Vol.19, 1994).

Dr. Sorush, in response to these critics, argues that: first, democracy is not liberalism, second, Feghh is not separated from its base i.e. Islam, and third, they confused the religious democratic government with the government of religious jurisprudence. The matter of religious democratic government is different from Feghh or jurisprudence. (Sorush 1998:304). People can make a religious democratic society. It means that religion and democracy can go together. Belief in religion does not go against free will and freedom. Democracy believes in respect towards others, thoughts, faith and
religion. Religious society is also based on faith and spirit and not based on jurisprudence and material affairs.

The "Democratic religious government" proposed by Sorush is another theory which is derived from his main theory "the shrink and spread of Shariat". Sorush believes that reason in understanding "Shariat" is the first basic theory of democratic religious government and rationalizing understanding of religion. He ignores the public sphere, since in public sphere, the laymen do not think and understand rationally all the time. Therefore, Sorush's model of democratic religious government leads us to an aristocracy of owners of wisdom and knowledge (Intellectuals). Hence, instead of having clergy we will be having religious intellectuals and again religion will be out of public access (Kashi, Keyan Magazine, Vol. 14, 1995). The theory of Dr. Sorush is based on philosophical theoretic approach, which does not consider the social structure and complex network of social relations. (Ibid).

Sorush believes that in a religious society everything, including politics and government, will be religious. But the problem of Sorush is his "holistic" approach towards society. But society is a multi-dimensional one, comprising various institutions including religion. Therefore, presence of religion even in a large scale does not mean that society is or should be religious. In western societies today, religion does not rule people, but at the same time, society is not non-religious one. (Farasatkhah, Keyan Magazine, Vol. 18, 1994). When Sorush talks about religious government, he did not discuss the religious minorities. In a
religious society, government inevitably will be democratic religious. However, it is to be examined the kind of freedom the minorities will have in such a society. For example, in Iran's contemporary society the following questions emerge: kind of veil or cover other religious women should wear. The kind of propaganda freedom they will have to express their idea and ideology.

In "Satnic ideology", Sorush himself severely accuses Marxists and calls their ideology as masked dogmatism. Sorush believes in free and democratic religious society controlled by religious intellectuals and clerics. But his critics believe that his theory is more philosophical and abstract than sociological and practical.

The obstacles to the development of the country

Sorush says that two things have always been obstacles to the development of Iran. First, Iranians who consider that they have got everything and their only duty is to return to our sources or to repeat things said by them. This idea belongs to “Hauzeh” (Religious schools in Iran). Second is the problem of intellectuals, who blamed colonialism and the foreigners for all of their problems.

Though both of them more or less are correct, but both also some how will disturb the progress of the country as it will ignore the domestic issues. People should not only blame others for the problems of the country; but they have to take into considerations of the internal deficiency. (Sorush, 1998:96). According to some Muslim intellectuals, the decline of Muslims civilization is due to misunderstanding of
religious knowledge. But Sorush says that when Muslims corrupted, they misunderstood religion. Giving old answers to the new questions is one of the reasons for the decline of the Muslim. Another problem is that the religious society does not allow thinkers to express their idea; therefore they leave the country and migrate to other countries bringing the brain drain which is the most important problem of post-revolutionary Iran.

**The Paradoxes of Gnosticism and Modernity**

In the introduction to his book "Qesseyeh Arbabe Maarafat". (The story of the masters of knowledge) Sorush writes:

> On 1351 (1972) when I was going to England to continue my studies, I took four books with myself; a book from Molla Sadra (Islamic Pure Philosophy), a book from Feiz-e-Kashani (an explanation about sufism), Masnavi Moulavi (poem), Divane Hafiz (Poem)

(Sorush 1995b: 21-23)

Sorush says that the first book was food for his mind and the other three food for his heart. But his attachment and dependent on Moulavi is something. Moulavi is a great Gnostic, who’s collection of poems in this sense is incometatable.

Sorush is one of the most famous followers of Moulavi in Iran who has been criticized for making use of Moulavi’s poems to provide support for his theories. Moulavi’s poems are quoted in all the books of Sorush and almost there is no writing or lecture by him which does not refer to Moulavi. He asserts that he is in love with Moulavi and will do so by the end of his life. The emotional and sentimental
attachments to Moulavi made Sorush to be brave enough to express his ideas without any consideration or fear, but the weak point is that he tries to prove his scientific arguments with the help of the poem. That means science and poem do not prove same thing or atleast poem is not a methodology towards scientific approaches.

In Feizeh Kashani's “Mohajat-al-Beiza”, he came to knowing about “Qazzali” a great suffist of Islam, who did not involve in worldly affairs. Qazzali severely criticized jurisconsults and believed that clerics should not go for income and financial affairs. Sorush also believed that after the revolution, clergy in Iran dominated all the key positions and it distanced them from their main duty. Sorush says that the institution of the clergy, according to its configuration, rejects any kind of control from outside, unlike universities that are open for any kind of control. Sorush suggests that a society of professionals should take control over the clerics. (Sorush, 1998:31).

Referring to Qazzali, Sorush also believes that “Velayate Faghih” (The mandate of the jurist) is or should be a mandate on hearts but not on life. Velayate Faghih is the most controversial issue in post-revolutionary Iran, and all Islamic system is based on that, but there is serious criticism against that which can not be tolerated. Sorush is one of the serious critics of “Velayate Faghi” particularly, and “Fegh”(Islamic jurisprudence) generally, and in criticizing Fegh, he repeatedly refers to Qazzali.
The other masters of Sorush i.e. Hafiz and Moulavi also are criticizing "Feghh" and "Faghihan" (religious jurisconsults). Sorush mixed up the gnosticism, suffism, poetry and philosophy with natural and social sciences. Most of his critics among clerics in Iran are accusing him of being pro-Popper and teaching Popperism in Iran. In his theory on "Shrink and spread of Shariah", he used methodology in social sciences and particularly that of Popper's Locatous and others. Therefore, they believed that Sorush is spreading western liberalism in Iran. Sorush himself argues that he is concerned about core of Islam and we have to study and know the self to understand the core. Understanding of core is a personal interest and government should not force people to be religious. They are free to be or not. Some of his critics claimed that he is a relativist. Though he rejects this idea but senses of relativism is appearing in Sorush's teachings.

Finally, Sorush also like Shariati, has got a paradoxical view and theories towards socio-political affairs in Iran and Philosophical-religious issues in Islam,. There is secularism and fanaticism, rationalism and gnosticism in Sorush's ideas and its consequence is also observable in Iran's socio-political development and change, which can be found third in world countries is some how paradoxical.
III

JAVAD TABATABAEI: Deconstruction of Old Tradition and
Reconstruction of modern tradition

East, West and Iran

Javad Tabatabaei was born on 1945. In 1984 he received his Ph.D. degree from Sorbon University in France for his thesis titled, “Political thought of young Hegel”. Tabatabaei is one who believes that we have to return back to our tradition, analyze it, re-construct it, in case of necessity, or else put it aside or use it consciously. He tries to re-define the notions and create a new concept from the tradition.

In his definition about the west he writes: in my idea the West in its nature is a cultural reality. This cultural reality had emerged in Greece in 7th or 8th century B.C and the Gracco-Roman and Christian culture then to in Rome and from there, it transmitted Christianity into modern culture of the west-Europe. (Tabatabaei, Iran Farda Magazine, 1994:5).

The western world has emerged since the “city states” appeared in Greece. In core of these cities with consultative governments, a cultural reality under the title, “Philosophia” was formed, which in post-Islamic period in Arabic language was called “Phalsapheh”.

Therefore, two characteristics of the West are:
1) A distinguished regime of government and its distinction from that of ancient East.

2) Philosophy as a rational-mental activity without loyalty to religion.

These two were against the East, because in India, Japan and China such a government or such a rational-mental kind of thought i.e. philosophy had not existed in the real sense of the term. Philosophy in a way had origined in Greece. If there is philosophy in Islam, that is the expansion of Greek philosophy in Islamic period. As philosophy is based on a sort of rationality without feeling loyalty towards religion, whatever is derived from divine religion is theology not philosophy (Ibid). But Iran’s condition is different as it has been in between the west and the East.

Tabatabaei believes that Iran’s civilization both in Islamic and pre-Islamic period, in many aspects such as reason and rationality, have been close to the West, rather than to the East. In ancient period, Iranians supported the philosophers who had migrated from Greece, and as a result, even some sort of rationality came into existence. Though Iran’s rationality did not progress like that of Greece, but Iran had that capacity to absorb the thoughts and rationality of Greece. (Ibid).

Islam, like other divine religions needed to be understood according to a philosophical system. It is only the word of a thinker that gets expression in philosophical system. On the other hand, the divine religions carry the message of man’s salvation in the domain of revolution. Therefore, they need a philosophical system to be understood exactly. Hence, the “Translation Movement” began and Muslims started
to learn the logic of Aristotle to interpret religion. Therefore, in ancient Islamic era, Iran had been between the west and the east. Unlike other part of the east in Islamic world, there is a rationality in Iran which is close to the western one. In Europe and particularly in Germany, there has been special attention towards Iran. Hegel says that world history begins with ancient Iran, because world history is the evolution of states, and this starts with Iran. It is assumed that the first primitive state had come into existence in ancient Persia. Hegel believed that if a westerner moves towards the East, unless he is in Iran he will not feel strange. Up to Sind a westerner feels at home, because their rationality is the same as that of other countries of the western. (Ibid, p.6)

In India and other countries, the values are completely different.

For Sohrevarid, a medieval Islamic thinker, the west and the east are not a geographical division. For him, people who believe in the Eastern philosophy are eastern, even if they live in the west. Therefore in studying the west, the first issue is its cultural origin and the origin of rational thought. The other issues such as economy, politics and geographical boundaries are secondary elements that should be related to western rationality and thought. (bid, p.7). Therefore, the main thing is western rationality and we have to see how it expands. So far if we did not progress in this sense, it was because of the existing politics, imperialism and colonialism or economic activities which constituted the main characteristics of the west. Hence, the nature of the west remained undiscovered. Reason originally is against religion. If it comes in the
realm of religious law, it will become religious rationality, which is different from pure rationality or western rationality.

**Modernity and Tradition in Iran**

According to Tabatabaie, modernism in the West is composed of two essential elements:

1. Democratic wisdom after Machiavelli is wisdom deriving from the people and employment of public wisdom in all the spheres of human life including the relation between culture and people.

2. Technological wisdom i.e. rational exploitation of all resources.

Hegel says that the difference between the ancient man and modern man is that as soon as the modern man sees a river flowing, it occurs to him that it is better to lead it to a turbine to generate energy. His ancient counterpart had not possessed such a mentality. But the ancient man and his conception of a stream was to sit beside it and watch the passage of life. Comparing these types of men, Hegel concludes that modern man is capable of making a revolution in the world because he wants to find out the reason for every phenomenon and then to exploit these phenomena, while ancient man had not acted in that way. As a result, according to Tabatabaie, for an Iranian to embrace modernity he must employ democratic and technological wisdom.

Tabatabaei continues by saying "with the start of a new era (Renaissance) in the west they raised the question of growth and without being conscious of it they achieved growth. This is unlike ourselves who are consciously seeking growth. In other words, the West
first had changed its mentality and culture and then achieved growth. Therefore, the question of development or growth is a side issue. What is important is to discuss modernism from the angle of growth which has not come into existence in Iran. (Tabatabaei, Farhang Touseah Magazine, 1992:34).

Therefore, we must approach modernism and modernity through our philosophy and culture and it is the only channel for a full understanding of western style development. Tabatabaie says: What we must discuss further is modernism because modernism has not been understood in Iran and we have focused only on the apparent aspects of modernism. What happened in the recent century in Iran was the arrival of modernism with the start of a new historical and epoch culmination of conditions that led to the constitutional revolution (Mashrutiyat). This was an ideology which can be considered as the basis or as Antonio Gramsci says the concrete ideology of a new period of modernism. Therefore, we must link development with modernism because development is one of the fruits of modernism. But in a traditional world one cannot speak about development. Thus we have to first ascertain where we start our discussion. (Ibid).

Tabatabaie says that the majority of those speaking about modernity in Iran are irrelevant because the whole foundation of modernity is not clear to us. Hegel refers to identity in western philosophy and questions western awareness that has left tradition behind and confronts an identity crisis. As long as man is confined to tradition he cannot speak about an identity crisis. When he leaves
tradition for whatever reasons, then he focuses on the question of self-identity. He has left what is familiar and needs to establish a new tradition if one can call it tradition to solve his identity crisis. This is what Hegel attempted and after Hegel we come across German Idealism, new European philosophy and the establishment of a fresh outlook of modernity for the whole of western culture and civilization. (Tabatabaei, Nameh Farhang Magazine, 1993:12-14)

The question for us is whether we have moved from tradition into modernity and if so, then what is our identity which versus growth. Why we cannot question and analyze the identity question. The fact is that apparently the West has consciously discarded tradition whilst we have unconsciously distanced ourselves from tradition. During the past hundred years we have gradually abandoned tradition without thinking about it. On the other hand, if we are unable to establish a new philosophic foundation, it is because we have given up rationality and thought. In other words, where we claim to be traditional we are so distant from tradition that we have no faculty of thought left to think about it. (Ibid, 13-14)

With regard to consciousness about our incorrect perception, Tabatabaie suggests the methods to exit from the crisis. He says: "To be aware of our incorrect perception is the first step. I believe that we can not do anything except by Ijtehad (jurisprudence). When I say that our deterioration started after the fourth and fifth century it is because at that juncture, our jurisprudence came to an end. In other
words, since then, we have had no jurisprudent like Avicenna or Farabi to issue juridical verdicts.

Concerning the establishment of imitation he explains: "I don't mean that we must not imitate the West. we have to imitate their method of a shaping a culture and it does not mean that we should blindly imitate the west. We must establish a foundation according to our own desired values. (Ibid, pp. 24-25). In traditional society, it is possible to have political development or development in general which is generally the product of latest scientific and technological differences.

Tabatabaie believes that if a society decides to remain traditional, naturally achieving modernity is impossible. That is true that we are a traditional society, but whether we have to remain traditional is another question. We are not able to remain traditional, because whether we like it or not. The developments that have been taking place for the last two or three hundred years in various walks of life tempt the traditional society to go for modernity. Either we can claim that we are traditional and remain traditional or we can evolve tradition and give a new interpretation to it. In the first case, we will destroy tradition and traditional term and that, will destroy us in the long run. In the second stage, we are able to claim that we are within the parameters of tradition. Today the west claims that they are in tradition because they came back to Greek philosophy and re-interpreted Plato and Aristotle. Despite claiming that we are in our tradition, we do not know our classic thinkers such as Farabi and Ibn-e-Sina or Qazzali (Nameh Farhang Magazine, II year, Vol. 3, p.18)
If we intend to find a solution for our problems, the only way is to return to our tradition and not to imitate them. At the same time, to study and understand their methods consciously and establish a new school of thought for ourselves is very essential. We have to learn to create questions and try to find answers in our own tradition. (Ibid, p.19). One of our problems in developing countries in the sphere of progress and development is that we are not able to set fourth the questions. Our rationality has remained in the shadow of religious law or canon. As long as reason and rationality, which are characteristics of modernity, are suppressed, there won't be philosophy or thought.

The question is whether reason should be under Canon's domain or reverse. Tabatabaei believes that according to history and world experiences, religious laws should be in domain of reason and rationality, but it does not mean that reason is against canon. (Tabatabaei, Iran Farda Magazine, Vol.12,1994:7). There is no conflict between canon and reason, but in case of clash, canon should be interpreted by reason. We either will go in Ibn-e-Roshd's way or will remain in Majlesi sphere. (Ibid, p.7).

Allameh Majlesi is considered to be one of the greatest Shia clerics, who had collected speeches of all twelve Imams. From intellectual side, he is considered to be ultra-traditionalist and has been criticized frequently, but Islamic regime takes him as a saint, and does not accept any kind of criticism against him. Tabatabaei suggests that we have to go on Ibn-e-Roshd's way which is the rational way of great philosophers from Plato and Aristotle to Farabi and Ibn-e-Sina. The modern world acts on the basis of reason; therefore, inevitably we must
set the reason to interpret the religious laws. This will match with culture and tradition. He believes that philosophy and rationality from Frabi to Molla Sadra as rational tradition of Iran's history is revivable.

Mysticism and over implementation of social and human sciences projects in Iran have been an obstacle to propose our traditional philosophy and rationality (Ibid, p.8). In ancient Islamic Iran, Iran's civilization in the sphere of thought had been very active in world's scene and participated in history and civilization of the world, but in modern era, Iran has not been able to share the world's achievements, because modernity (i.e. thought) has not been possible in Iran's modern history. The domination of ideology, expansion of ideologies and separation of boundary between ideology and thought have led us to a position where we are not able to understand modern period and western thought. (Tabatabaei 1994:27).

**Mysticism, philosophy and rationality**

The first part of history of Islamic thought is the period of rational interpretation of religious law. Since religious thought is considered to be divine and the product of revelation, it can not be against reason. Therefore, religious orders should be understood within a rational system of thought. Farabi and Ibn-e-Roshd tried to solve this problem. In third, fourth and first half of fifth century of Islamic history, a movement emerged that we can call it, "Rational Movement" (Tabatabaei, Iran Farda Magazine, Vol. 12, 1994:7).

In this period there was an effort to understand religion in the paradigm of reason. Therefore, we can claim that this period witnessed the establishment of philosophy by great philosophers in the
history of philosophy in Islamic epoch. After that, Qazzali attacked philosophy and gradually situation changed in reverse direction. Canon or religious law replaced reason and canon became the criterion of reason. In other words, this period is the era of interpretation of reason on the basis of Islamic canon. After Mongols conquered Iran, suffism expanded and then during Safavaid, it mixed with shiasim and monarchy and consequence of this confluence is great pious Allameh Majlesi (Ibid p.7).

Rejection of philosophy is the same as the rejection of in western rationality or our own rationality. If we move in the right direction we can undertake an evolution in our rationality and tradition. Thus, we would be able to create our own social and human sciences. As it has not been done so, it has been concluded that all those agendas are useless and we have to import the social sciences. Some others also hide themselves behind mysticism because mysticism stood against philosophy and kept aloof from rationality. One of the main problems of political thought in Islamic period Iran had faced with was Gnostic thought. In total, it has been said that mysticism is a respected part of Iranian culture and spirituality. Iranian man, by nature, is mystic man. But in modern period, one can't have a critical approach towards mysticism, unless there is "pure reason" and this also requires philosophy which does not exist in Iran. Mysticism has been dominant of all areas of thought in contemporary Iran. (Tabatabaei 1994:161) There was a trend in Gnostic thought in Iran which tried to link the idea of mysticism to the idea of "Iran-city", i.e. the Iran's ancient state policy and government management.
Shahab-ed-din Sohravardi was one of the chief mystics who tried to link mysticism to the ancient philosophy of Iran. But we have to emphasize that on the basis of mysticism we will not be able to establish a political thought, because this is the matter of reason, rationality and its opposite (Ibid, p. 188). Here two eminent social thinkers of contemporary Iran are to be recalled in this context, that is, Shariati and Soroush who were very much inclined to mysticism.

Paradoxes and development in Iran's Social Thought

Paradoxes and contradiction in Iran's social thought started with Imam Mohammad Qazzali, who, for the first time, rejected philosophy and gave priority to Islamic canon. Qazzali is a complex and exceptional character. Though there is an ideal political system in Qazzali's thought, but he himself rejected the probability of proving to be true such an Utopia. Here his idealism paves the way to his realism and this is one of the contradictions. Idealism and realism in Qazzali's political thought go together and this has been the main problem in Iran's socio-political thought. This dualism creates contradiction and paradoxes in post-revolutionary Iranian society.

All thoughts in ancient Iran are Utopian and idealistic which is not relevant to social reality. These Utopian societies were established only to lead people towards ultimate spiritual goal. There is no "Revolution" in social relations in order to change the political system. In real society and social relations there was a "cheating affairs" and sinful desires that were against the divine society or ideal society. Mystics never intended to inter into profain and unclean affairs like government, state and social orders (Ibid, 1994:80). Qazzali's two books
are also opposite to each other. One of them totally rejects this worldly affairs such as philosophy, rationality and government and the other one completely is concerned with political affairs. (Ibid, p.82).

Farabi is another social thinker who had lived in early centuries of Iran's Islamic empire. He was the first thinker who had brought about the philosophical debate in Islamic ideology. There was crisis among Muslims in regard to the successor of the prophet Mohammad. In fact, he had learnt his philosophical views from Greek thought.

In order to find solution for the existing crisis, he also proposed the “King Philosopher” theory. But his philosopher was a divined and devoted, complete man (Tabatabaei 1995 : 120). With this theory, he comes to the conclusion that the only decent and suitable personalities for Prophet's succession are Imams, which in Shia begins with Imam Ali, prophet's son-in-law and ends with twelfth Imam who is "hidden" and some day will come as a world saviour. Though Farabi gives absolute right to the chief of his ideal Utopian society, but at the same time her, argues that chief's attachment to reason and rationality is the first condition of validity.

From one hand Farabi gets close to the idea of “Iran-city” in ancient Iran, that reminds the ideal “monarchic theory” and on the other hand, he tries to prove the theory of prophecy and Imamate in the thought of Islamic period, and finally offer a new theory by mixing them. But it was paradoxical because this theory excludes the other Muslim sects who did not believe in “Imamate” as Shia believers. In Farabi's ideal type which is his “ideal city” or “Utopian society”, there is no sense
of concern about public interest. His philosophy that had come from Greece did not end up with democracy as it did in Greece. Here in Islamic countries the idea of Caliphate succeeded to be a totalitarian type of government and absolute monarchy (Ibid, p.139).

These paradoxes landed in Muslim intellectual minds and led them to be carriers of contradictions in Iran's social system. We have seen paradoxes in Sorush ideas which have been mentioned in previous chapters. One aim of the thesis is to understand and analyze the process of paradoxes in Iran's social change and development and set forth the question: whether there is a way to development through paradoxes.

Tabatabaie observes that in order to exit from our crisis and give birth to a new type of modernism three steps have to be taken into consideration. The first conduct is building a philosophical foundation for modernism in Iran. That has to be followed by abandoning the present dual system of imitation as second step. At present, the people of the country imitate the west and also the past in its confrontation with the realities of the western ideology. As a third step, the people should criticize the tradition and raise fundamental questions about the new age and devise necessary definitions for the issues that will inevitably crop up... This calls for a correct historical understanding of Iran and a systematic dissection and analysis of modernism in the West (1995:289). Accordingly, the combination of these elements will serve as preliminary steps to give birth to a new political philosophy in Iran. In this same context, he focuses on the essentials of developing a modern political philosophy as a pre-requisite for establishing modernism in the country.
IV

REZA DAVARI: A Conservative Religious Philosopher

Legacy of Fardid

The notion of "occidentosis" has been expressed in two forms in Iran's intellectual society. One is the West as a "plural" entity and the other West as a "wholist" entity. In the first view, the west as a whole is divisible into different components. This is acceptable and the other part should be rejected. Science, technology and art are the positive aspects of the western culture and civilization, and moral corruption, sex, family instability, consumerism, war and violence are the negative aspects of the west and should be avoided. Shariati, al-e Ahmad, Kasravi and Taleb-of- are the representatives of this interpretation of the west. The second interpretation believes that the West as a whole can not be divided into sub-elements. The West is a historical entity and has got a total nature, which is derived from Greece. It was expressed in the Middle Ages through Christianity and effected Islamic philosophy too in due course. In the third stage of "occidentosis", the West as a total entity, effected the non-western world and it means detaching from sacred heaven in this world to satisfy the people and convince them to forget the revelation and prophecy. Modernism is the principle of this outlook towards the world. (Madadpur, Sobh Magazine, Vol. 68, 1997:16).
'Wholism' is the sphere of Dr. Fardid's thought which was affected by Heidegger particularly and other western critics generally. Dr. Fardid died few years back and never wrote even an article, but influenced many intellectuals of Iran by his teachings and lectures in post-revolutionary period. Fardid was an expert in linguistics and toxicology. Referring to these skills and mixing them with Islamic knowledge and concepts, he was able to have great deal of effect on whom they were interested to cope with western hegemony and American egoism in post-revolutionary Iran. Along with western civilization, modernism also was criticized by this trend of thought and other intellectuals who believed that the western civilization being a plural entity is to be considered anti-revolutionary (ibid). They also believe that western rationality is “instrumental rationality”. Therefore, it is a Satanic rationality. Positivists reject both God and Satan, despite the fact that even Satan did not deny God. (Ibid, p.17). From that introduction they wanted to reach this conclusion that those who are positivists are worse than Satan. Though nobody dared to claim as positivist in post-revolutionary Iran, but even those who scholars like Popper in their writings are also blamed to be positivist, occidentosist and anti-revolutionary. Dr. Sorush is one of them, who is severely accused by Fardid and his revolutionary followers.

Davari is more considered to be Fardidian philosopher though he is not happy to be under the shadow of another philosopher. Fardid is also known as a Heideggerian, though he also denies full compatible with Heidegger. He argues: “I am with Heidegger upto the
point that he negates the West, its humanism and its 2,500 old metaphysics. I have in sympathy with him, but not following fully. I am a Muslim, I am a Shiat and an Iranian and I am not able to share fully with Heidegger, the German philosopher and a Christian,” (Rajabi, 1994: 7) Davari believes that Fardid is a Heideggerian philosopher and particularly in the philosophy of “anticipation”, he very much is fond of Heidegger. Shiat Sect believes in twelfth Imam Mahdi, who is anticipated to return from the mysterious hidden period and spread justice in the world. Heidegger also somehow believes in Saviour philosophy. In believing so, Heidegger criticizes the western modernity by referring to divinity, and this is the point that is appreciated by both Fardid and Davari. In the middle years of the twentieth century of Heidegger, “modern” world, is faced with world war II, Auschwitz, Freudism, Darwinism, “Independent revolutions” of third world countries, development in technology and so on. Heidegger seems a voice of gloom, but he means to offer hope. He fears we must endure an age of iron, yet as he often quotes, Holderlin; where the danger is, there grows the saving power. The danger of the modern world is also open to new possibility that goes beyond the previous western tradition (Kolb 1986: 119).

In Fardid and later on Davaris idea, the Islamic Revolution of Iran could be a serious alternative and possibility that Heidegger pointed out. Heidegger condemns the endless “more” that result from modernity’s subjectivity, efforts to affirm its identity and power over objects, especially in the expansion of civil society. Like Hegel, Heidegger
traces the origin of modern subjectivity to something more fundamental in the process by which the world comes to have the meaningful shape it has today. (ibid, p.120).

Referring to philosophical critique of metaphysics of Heidegger, Brayan Turner asserts that it has been very difficult to dissociate Heidegger and deconstructionism from the legacy of fascism. Turner further argues that: "Heidegger's work is essentially anti-modernist in my view, and his writings on technology shows all the signs of a massive conservative reaction to democracy and modernization (Turner, 1994:7)

While Davari believes that modernity is such a tree with dried branches, which we have to remove, along with branches (intellectualism, humanism, secularism), but also the root of the tree of modernity (Athary Marian 2000:13). Heidegger does not suggest that we try to change or escape modernity. Nor does he try to incorporate it into a fuller totality after the Hegelian manner. Nevertheless, he does not want us to believe that subjectivity and universal imposition are the final words on the human situation. There is a sense in which modernity can be overcome (kolb 1986:151). However, much post-structural and post-modern thinking has been influenced by the work of Martin Heidegger who was, of course, highly critical of modern technology, modern capitalism and the modern state which threatened to destroy many of the traditional forms of spiritual life (Turner, 1994:207)
It is in this way that Fardid and Davari followed the Heideggerian line and ended in the same accusations which Heidegger is faced. Fardid believes that democracy belongs to Greece, which is the symbol of devil (Taghoot). Humanism means ultra-westoxication and self-reliance (Fardid 2002:79). He argues:

*The world today is the world of chaos, agitation, wars and turmoils and day by day human goes off to “end of the time”. The third world war has accrued and we are not aware, neither it is war, nor peace. There is chaos and rebels and time is ready to the return of “Hidden Imam”. Some are also trying to prevent the return of hidden Imam and suppress the thought of anticipation* (Ibid, p, 79).

Fardid argues that: my way and method is hermunitcs. My philosophy is theoretical pass from Existentialism. I am opposed to Kante and Hegel; right or left, I believe in Heidegger but with Islamic interpretation. Heidegger is the only thinker who is compatible with Islamic Republic of Iran(Ibid). Accordingly, those who are propagandig liberalism are devils. Sorush, who is Popperian and Bazargan, is the explicit agent of infidelity. Defending liberalism, they don’t allow revolutionary leadership of Imam Khomeini to succeed completely, and as such, they are against the appearance of Hidden Imam (Ibid, p. 74-75). Bazargan, the first Prime Minister of Post-revolutionary Iran, was a popular believer in Iran who passed away few years back. Sorush is also considered to be very popular philosopher of Reformation Movement which is still continuing in Iran despite hindrances.

It can be said that Fardid was a most pessimist philosopher who after the Islamic Revolution, shifted to a most conspiratory ideology.
defending the Imam Khomeini and Islamic Republic as well as rejecting and condemning other Republics and thinkers such as Bergson, Sartre, Hanry Corban and Gostave Lebon, including Iranian social thinkers. Fardid had many followers among those conservatives of Iran and this led to a great deal of controversy in post-revolutionary Iran.

His pupils also continued to criticize harshly the reformists generally and Dr. Sorush particularly. Instead, reformists mostly Sorush followers labelled them as “Fascist-Nazist”. Conservative trend believe that the theory of the “religious-democratic government” of Sorush, along with his theory of “shrink and spread of Shariah” is a relativistic idea which will end up in western liberalism, capitalism, western values, developmentalism and deny revolutionary Utopianism. They argue and examine the joining link of all modernist, intellectuals and westoxicated technocrats of Iran in the framework of Islamic Protestantism theory (Mashregh Magazine:1995:5).

Conservatives further argue that : freedom in each and every epoch and society had a particular meaning which differs from time to time and place to place. For us, freedom never brings forth truth, and the truth of humanity will flourish with “Gardianship” (valayat) and coming closer toward God. Freedom, without “Velayat”, is a lie and cheating. Freedom in the realm of religious thought is to follow the Shariah and obey velayat, suppressing the free “will” and “self” and getting closer to God(Mashregh Magazine, Vol. 16, 1995:6). The concept of freedom among the so-called religious enlightenment is only a tactic
of the westernized trend of intellectuals who penetrate in authentic
Islamic thought and corrupt and decay the Islamic system based upon
velayat (Ibid, pp. 6-7)

For them, reason is inferior to spirit and heart. Through
reason, the West attacks the East and injects its poisonous Nihilism in
our culture (Madadpur, Sobh Magazine, Vol. 68, 1997:17). For this
trend, Nietzsche and Heidegger are the sources of inspiration of
criticizing the West. Fardid’s pupils believe that their “guru” has
passed from the point that Heidegger had stopped. While Heidegger
could not solve the problem of metaphysics, he was astonished in this
domain. Fardid, by attaching to the Islamic faith, broke the boundaries
from metaphysics and reached to religion and settled there. (Ibid.) This
religious settlement propagated an idea that something will happen to
the western civilization and messenger will come through God and will
improve every corrupted aspect of this world, particularly the west. (Ibid,
p.23). In between, the Shia Islam and “Velayat” will resist against the

Davari and the West

Dr. Davari is a philosopher who is influenced by Fardid. He
is the main character of Fardid school of thought. His view towards the
west is that the west is a “whole”, and we are not able to accept the
positive dimensions of that civilization and reject the negative ones.

In his book, “what is philosophy” he argues that philosophy
itself is Ocidentosized, because hegemony of imperialism has been some
how has embedded in western man and philosophy. If there was not such a philosophy in the west, there would not have been such imperialism and arrogance among western people. Here we can recall Tabatabaei's idea on importance of creating philosophy for Iranian modernization agenda. Therefore, in comparing philosophy with theology, Davari believes that theology and sufism are less occidentosised (Davari 1980:15). The path of the west ends in imperialism which is not an incidental phenomenon but "Pharaohism" is in the nature of western history (ibid, p.17)

According to Davari: "The West has historical method of thought and action that had started in Europe 400 years ago, and spread around the world by various methods. The west means from the west or the setting of the sacred reality and emergence of a man who considers himself the centre of creation from the beginning to the end. This man is the master of himself and believes he should possess this world and even the next world if he has achieved perfection. Even when the West attempts to substantiate God's existence it is not to obey or submit to God but to prove his own existence. (Davari, 1993: 18).

Davari who is influenced by Farabi, the founder political philosophy in Islam, was concerned with religious ethics and recommends the idea of the philosopher king to Iranian Islamic community. His suggestion is not plucked from Plato but refers to the messengers of God. For him, the past evils in Iran had originated from political power and therefore, he suggests that instead of guiding
mankind by reason we must resort to religious inspiration. He points out that the Prophetic guidance was based on inspiration and not on human reason. While agreeing that modernity originates from the western political philosophy he holds that ideas rooted in ancient Greek philosophy and later perfected by Hegel and Nietzsche could not remain progressive in the long run. (Broujerdi 1994:239).

The defective aspect of the West such as secularism and materialism have badly degraded and converted man into an individualistic realm and distanced him from God and destroyed mankind. Davari says the solution is to return to the Islamic identity and to assess reason on the basis of religion, to give up individual and collective selfishness, to refuse intellectualism and uproot the decayed tree of modernity. Yet, he notes that such steps can not be taken in all types of cultural dialogues (Broujerdi 1994:242).

Nevertheless, Davari refuses to resort to philosophy in fighting modernity and its political and social manifestations. Instead, he responds to the present age according to his understanding of Islamic philosophy and specially Frabiis doctrines. Rather than offering a solution, he criticizes modernity and the opinion of other intellectuals.

A reason that gives priority to human understanding, instead of divine inspiration, is a reason centered in humanism leading to secularism. The Iranian advocates of modernism were not equal to the task. Iranian intellectuals had no correct understanding of modernity; their missionary effort bled to westernization, western humanism and
secularism towards that end. Davari suggests that we must attack the west (meaning the fruit of its intellectual period) which is heading towards its historical end. We must resort to religion for our guidance. He says that if we fail to be guided by religion the west will sway us despite our own wishes. (Davari, 1986:11).

Davari believes that the west, occidentosis and philosophy all have reached to their end. Neither the next history is western history, nor, next thought will be philosophy (Davari, 1980:22). In our revolution, the reaction against occidentosis and the signs of coming to end the western imperialism hegemony is clear. This is the new age and relying on religion is its reason. The relation of religion and occidentosis is like the relation of flame and water. We separated ourselves from our cultural roots and could not participate in western science and civilization. We only accepted and selected the worst political regimes, consumerism, modern lewdness, and a little information of the west. But now if it is supposed to share in western science, culture and technology, this revolution may help us to pick up properly from the West. But Iran's revolution should pass from this stage and express the slogan of "resurgence" (ibid, p.23) and try to spread the revolution in all over the universe.

But it is not easy to conquer the West, and contempt or insult it without considering its science, culture and technology. It is also not acceptable to be frightened in front of the West. (Davari 1984:6). Davari believes that Islamic theology, though became weak, has
resisted against occidentosis for the last hundred years before the revolution. All modern science and intellectuals with orientalist's methodology were aoccidentosis that their era also came to an end with the revolution (Ibid, p.8).

Davari writes:

*Nowadays, beside that the war (Iran-Iraq war) which imposed on us there is one more important war ahead. As gradually this war is extending, it gets more depth. This war is against the world, which though still is dominant power, but it has reached to its end. In this war, military planning has no first priority, and even conceiving this war for whom does not believe the Revolution is very difficult. But war has begun and will continue until and unless the revolution spread and expand everywhere and the man becomes free from all the political, economic, ideologic and cultural prisons and captivity of the West. Though U.S.A. and Americans hate even the word revolution, and Leftist East consider themselves as the only revolutionaries and try to take it as its own exclusive right, but never could stop preventing revolution (ibid, p.8).*

These have been some of the ideas in post-revolutionary Iran that created a trend of political radicalism. As such, Islamic Revolution of Iran is considered as threat, not only for the region but for the western world as a whole. The consequent reaction towards Islamic revolution in the region and the world derives from these sort of philosophical orientations.

In Davari's idea, what will reinforce the revolution against western hegemony and imperialism is to regain the religious faith. Now two hundred years after the French Revolution, the man did not settle down in the Utopia as promised by the revolutionaries. In Europe and elsewhere of the world there have taken place great changes and no
longer the west is the master of freedom and equality. The west so
distincted itself from justice and from now onward will stand against
freedom movements. Therefore, violence will appear more and the
mask of love of freedom will remove from its face, but all these are the
pre-conditions of a revolution. Europe and the west need another
revolution (Davari, 1990:58).

Post-modernism also believes that humanism is faced with
crisis and accordingly freedom and reason are also faced with crisis. In
replying to a question Davari, argues that if post-modernism is a
civilization in the sense of technique and technology, it is clear that we
can not ignore modernity and shift from tradition to post-modernity.
For Davari, post-modernism is not only a civilizational issue, but a
mental and historical condition too. (Davari, in Ganji’s (ed), 1996:105)
Therefore, Davari believes even in traditional condition; we are able to
criticize the modernity from “post-modern condition. In programs of
development we need to consider the post-modern idea about the
“consequences of modernity”. Post-modern is not a historical period after
modernity, but it is final and critical stage of it. Post-modernism is a
stage of modernity that within it, modernity is questioned within its
parameters. It is obvious that such a question means losing the faith
which had been embedded since eighteenth century (ibid, p.119) and it
is a destructive question.
Paradoxes

The trend of Fardid and particularly Dr. Davari who is the main character in this trend, believe in perpetual "revolution" against the west as a "whole". Shariati also believed in perpetual revolution in Shiasm. Davari argues: they have a theoretical -philosophical analysis towards history and social change. In fact, Davari has no idea about the global condition in future and what will happen to the world order and social movements, but he writes: "I am no pessimistic towards future, but I believe that though the human condition will touch the most critical point but it was never collapse. I believe in God's grace, we all believe in a saviour (1996:113), as Heidgger believed that the world will go up to the edge of collapse but will never collapse because of saviour.

Davari further says that the "great revolution" and "opening of the just world" are the hope of all who are suffering and who are religious. The promise of the "just world" is not proposed by me, but it is a promise that has given to us. We need a faith to believe it. (Ibid, p.114). Davari's idea is subjective, theoretical and speculative about social change and order. In social change we need practical and realistic ideas to explain the changes. Davari believes that underdeveloped societies inevitably should go on the way and path of modernity, unless there is another solution or alternative. In the present situation, we are not able to ignore the development and no politician can do that (Ibid, p.133). Despite believing in development with modernity project, he claims that development is related to liberalism and he is rejecting the
liberalism (Ibid, p. 142). In response to a question, Davari asserts that modernity is only the development; otherwise he does not feel belonging to this type of idea (Ibid, p.15) He seems to be idealist when he says, if there is a dominant belief that there is no way to development except modernity, I believe that the way of history is not fixed and we have to find out the way (ibid, p.134). The sounds of Heidegger are coming from his throat.

He doesn't believe in ideological religion; he is against intellectuals, because they are occidentosist; he doesn't believe in modernity, but at the same time, he looks for a religious revolution. Revolution itself is a modern notion that belongs to modernity (ibid, p.136). Criticizing the West with their own tradition, critics seems to be controversial because many believe that as modernity always criticizes itself, it always renews itself. Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Frankfurt School, and now Post-modernists are criticizing the west, but modernity goes in its own way and tries to globalize itself. (Eshkavari 1997: 60).

Davari argues that human beings are now faced with a great danger. If we are not be able to find a solution, we will persist without finding a solution. It seems that Davari's solution is too theological and utopian which can not be practiced in total. A theoretical abstract sort of philosophy or more precisely theological-ideological approach toward future and social change will not be able to lead Iran in modernization process.
Daryush Shayegan is a former professor of comparative philosophy and Indology at Tehran University, former director of the Iranian centre for the study of civilizations and former director of the institute for Ismaili Studies in Paris. Shayegan is an Iranian intellectual who had been staying abroad for a long time and he is considered to be a “hybrid” as he uses the word in his writings frequently. He has written many books; among them the latest “the modern re-enchantment” has become controversial and provoked many critics. It was written in French originally and translated to Persian in 2001. After the publication of this book, which has touched its third edition, Iranian youth particularly, acknowledged and received it gladly. Shayegan turned to be an up to date intellectual in Iran, who unlike all other Iranian intellectuals, proposes the post-modern type of pluralism rather than that of moneism. So far we examined the idea of the Iranian intellectuals who were inclined to Islamic religion and Iranian tradition. But Shayegan is thinking beyond the religion.

Many believe that despite long term challenges of a person like Soroush with conservatives in Iran and being a popular social thinker, Shayegan has calmly left him behind and accelerated. Dr. Shayegan in a personal interview with the researcher claims that: “the era of Soroush is going to be over, that “era and Sorush have done their
task”. Sorush’s task of proposing the modernity project is over and he said that we are in post-Sorush era now. No matter to what extent Shayegan is right, the matter is that his ideas about “multiple identity and mobile thought” is very much appreciated by new generation of Iran.

His book “Asia against the West” has been criticized to be a stable or fixed idea about the west and the east and proposed the Asian discourse against western discourse. In this book he shows up his sympathy towards the east but he never pointed out a particular identity. He believes that it was a deliberate silence which is elaborated in the book “the modern re-enchantment” (Shayegan, 2002). In “Asia against the West”, Shayegan believes that the people who set forth the idea of “westoxication” were themselves already westoxicated. As westoxication is derived from unawareness of the west, no more they could be westoxicated. They might be westernized but not westoxicated. In “Asia against the West” he criticizes western negative aspect as well as the west, such as Jalaeh-al-Ahmad (Shayegan 1992: 59-63). In this book he somehow shows a sort of nostalgia which might be named as his inclination to tradition despite propagating modernity. He asserts; “yes! This topic is open, and I believe in a sense of “return” and this is why I am at home in Iran now, but I belong to nowhere, he said in interview. But everybody needs a “sense of belonging” in Isia Berlain’s word and my return to Iran satisfies my sense of belonging.
In his other book “cultural schizophrenia”, first published in 1982 in Paris and translated to English in 1997, he is more clear what he wants to say. However, this book is not translated to Persian language. Therefore, there is no discussion or critics about that. Dr. Shayegan in this book is more involved in social realities of Iran, and his critics of Iran’s intellectuals at that time are much more relevant at this time of Iran’s religious enlightenment.

_Ideologue intellectuals_

In referring to intellectuals, Shayegan says that a large part of the Muslim world’s intelligentsia is influenced the distorting field. We should also note that the functions of intellectual, scientist and manager are less distinct from one another than they are in the West. For the great mass of our co-religionists, an intellectual is probably anyone who knows how to read and write, anyone who works with his mind, whether he be doctor, writer, translator, engineer, teacher or manager. The intellectual as society’s ‘unhappy consciousness’, as a member of a separate group whose epistemological function is criticism, does not yet exist in our countries. That is why he does not really have a specific status. The most admired intellectuals, at present, are those who oppose the regime and whose activities are meant to be primarily political. These constitute, so to speak, the hard core of committed intellectuals, and are really closer to being ideologues.

Of the various jobs which fall to our intellectuals, one of the most important must be translation, which has an essential role.
particularly in countries which were never colonized and which therefore never used a foreign language as a vehicle for culture. As they have access to modern sources of knowledge, translators enjoy almost the same prestige as the thinkers whose work they interpret. They are the intermediaries of knowledge, the people who adapt the products of the human and natural sciences of an environment which is wholly alien, not to say hostile, to these ideas. In published works the name of the translator is given prominence at least equivalent to that of the author.

Next comes the bulk of essayists, writers and journalists whose knowledge of language is limited (of course there are many exceptions) and who therefore depend on these translations, most of which are extremely bad. (Shayegan, 1997:121-2)

May be in many societies, and as a general rule, but accordingly social change in post-revolutionary Iran, has been based upon this hierarchy of knowledge/power in Foucault's idea and magazine/journalists played a crucial role. The latest City Council Election (2003) in Iran indicates to what extent the absence of student class in Iran's social movement affected the process. The students were getting their ideas from journals and spread them in lower layers of society. From intellectuals to Ieyman in the street, the unity of socio-political idea and votes depends on this process. In the latest election of 2003, the Reformists were defeated by conservatives harshly because of disappointment of journalists and students from Iran's religious
intelligentsia and political elites. Shayegan, while criticizing intelligentsia asserts:

Another reason for the importance of translations is the fact that we have done very little thinking on our own behalf. Our culture, which is rich but medieval in structure, hardly enables us to understand the great treasures of the modern age, let alone turn them to account. We have been 'out of step', effectively unable to make sense of the great transformation affecting the rest of the world for several centuries. These displacements have made us even more dependent on Western science. The dependency is more cultural than economic or political.

Through their role in forging a vague, imprecise terminology, bad translations have become the active agents of an immense field of conceptual distortions (Shagan 1997:123). A further complication is the problem of translations. An English work will be translated into Persian from its French version or a German one from its English translation. Translations into Persian, which have already lost something in translation multiply the scope for misunderstanding and strengthen the distorting field of ideas.

Most Iranian Islamic thinkers owe their entire knowledge of Hegel to Hamid Enayat's Persian translation of a book by W.T. Stace. The translation is certainly excellent, but is not an adequate basis for any solid conclusions on the German thought of that giant. A large part of the comparative work of Morteza Motahhari, a theologian and
philosopher of high renown, is inspired by this translation. In fact, Motahhari often gets Stace and Hegel confused, and the quotations given in some of his essays are Stace's words, not Hegel's. If it was just trying to understand Hegel this attitude might still be legitimate; but Motahhari also tries to criticize a thinker whose language and world are totally foreign to him, cut off by the epistemological fissures resulting from changes of paradigm and world vision. Even if Motahhari had been a virtuoso of brilliant perspicacity, the Persian translation of an English work on Hegel would never have enabled him to grasp the genealogical connotations of the German thinker's mind. For example, Motahhari is astonished beyond, in all measure, by the distinction Hegel establishes between Cause and Reason (Ibid, p.124).

It is also worth noting that there are quite large number of intellectuals who know Western thought but are not capable of translating it into their mother tongue. These are people who, after studying abroad since childhood or adolescence, have lost contact with their home countries; some have never left the country but learnt about the West through bad translations by indigenous' occidentalists. Both Occidentalists and so-called traditionalists are in a dilemma. There is always something wrong somewhere, a missing link, some lacuna that needs to be filled; wherever one looks there are these unsightly holes in the tissue of knowledge.

There is a split between modernist and traditionalist tendencies every where and usually two types of intellectual reclectic
and traditionalist are being formally recognized. But in the case of Iran, these two types need to be subdivided in other ways, for they are by no means homogeneous groups. One may be faced with a secular intellectual of left or right; an intellectual educated in western style but keen to restore traditional values (a sort of nostalgic Muslim version of the counter-culture); someone who wants to reconcile Islam with modernity, like the enlightened Islamic tendency of Mehdi Bazargan; an Islamic ideologue eager to overthrow the established order to hasten the socio-messianic revolution (the People's Mojahedin); or a fundamentalist fanatic of Hezbollah type. It is quite clear that the categories are not sufficiently defined. There are a number of dualisms which cut across one another at different levels. There is a dualism of education between those with direct access to modern knowledge and those who are dependent on translations; there is an ideological dualism between progressives and traditionalists.

The progressives may belong to either educated group (with direct or indirect knowledge of the west), just as traditionalists may be people who have received a modern training abroad, like most of the bearded 'Islamic' technocrats whose qualifications were earned in the United States. (Shayegan 1997: 127) Whatever the ideological make up of the intellectuals, their education, their political learnings, their ambivalent relationship with Tradition, they are placed between the two structured poles of Iranian society: the technocrats and the ulemas. The same dualism is reflected in the various institutions of Post-
revolutionary Iran, which is discussed in this thesis particularly in chapter 3.

However, intellectuals are suspended between two poles of attraction: the technocracy and the *ulemas*. Pulled apart between these two worlds, the intelligentsia has neither the precise, utilitarian skills of the technocrats nor the organic, homogenous, scholastic learning of the clergy; nor has it succeeded in establishing an autonomous status of its own by wielding the redoubtable weapon of criticism.

The great debate on westernization and the relationship between modernity and tradition in Iran during the 1960s and 1970s might have been fertile, if the protagonists had refrained from confusing the two discourses with one another, if they had not been unconsciously preparing the ground for the onslaught of a new obscurantism. But by putting the cart before the horse and effectively undermining the foundations of secularism, the Iranian intelligentsia made the cardinal error of abandoning modernity in favour of a nostalgic archaism. For after the revolution the intelligentsia was literally swept away and, having failed to weather the storm, gave up and sank into a kind of clandestinely, vegetating ineffectually on the fringes of the new system. (Ibid, p.130).

Being an intellectual in our world means, just for a start, putting up opposition to the regime. This is understandable since most of the regimes in place are at least repressive and often nakedly totalitarian. But unfortunately this opposition remains coarse and
visceral, unaccompanied by critical analysis, by an objective, distanced attitude or any coherent perspective. The opposition rises against the regime as an individual would rebel against his father or mother. The regime’s cultural context is not taken into consideration and the basic questions are not even formulated for that matter. Why this regime rather than another is a vital question. Now the question arises why the same models go on stubbornly and remorselessly recurring. How it happens that the most laudable efforts are always doomed to failure. Where does it come from this repeated failure, proof against all defences, infallible cause of derailment after derailment? Analysis of the socio-economic factors- almost standard practice since instruments were provided by vulgar Marxism- is not sufficient. The overthrow of the old order by a revolution is not, alas, equivalent to setting up a more equitable order.

Far from it, according to Gaston Bachelad: “First and foremost you have to know how to formulate problems. Say what you like, problems do not formulate themselves in the world of science. This sense of problem is the defining mark of the scientific spirit. To a scientific mind, all knowledge is an answer to a question. If there was no question, there could be no scientific knowledge. Nothing is self-explanatory. Nothing is given. All is constructed.(Quoted in Shayegan 1997: 136). Result is that over time/ ideology in all its forms has become the ultimate importable commodity, the meeting point between two worlds and the only form of thought accessible to non-western civilizations through which they can still aspire to a historical role.
It could be said of our intellectuals in Iran that they are for the most part ideologues and as Shayegan formulates it, you can be nothing at all, and be a hero at the same time. All you have to do is to enroll in the potential martyrs club. This enables you to dispense with all effort, to do without any talent. To allow yourself to be detained by the regime for a few months is to guarantee a hero's welcome on release, followed by a dazzling social success. Under these circumstances, the most useless collection of ineptitudes, slung together and called a book, will sell thousands of copies. Prison becomes the essential prelude to heroic status and the golden key to social success. Of course the regime, stupid as ever, gets drawn into the game, lumbers through its own moves and cheerfully foots the bill. (Shayegan 1997:141)

Though this idea belongs to 1982, when Post-revolutionary intelligentsia of Iran was not formed yet, but genealogically the pathology of Iranian intellectualism is the same and that idea is very much relevant today. The young Journalists such as Ghuchani, Ebrahim Nabavi and many others in this spectrum-after the Reformation Movement in 1997(Second of Khordad 1376) as apart of the Iranian post-revolutionary intelligentsia wrote few political articles leading to conviction in jail for a few days and thousands of copies of their authopiographical books were sold in the labour market. In prison, they confessed to being guilty and regretted for that matter. They enjoyed social success and left behind the movement and people following them. Not even these youngster intelligentsia of contemporary Iran, but even the hero of Reformists, Abbas Abdi, very well-known
Journalist and political activists in jail, confessed to be guilty in many ways. The only logic to support their own idea of confessing in jail and feeling guilty in court is to undertake the "heroism" in modernization process. They argue that there is no hero in modernity but there were many in traditional society.

The critics, who come from radical spectrum of movement, had enjoyed the fruits of heroism. In their capacity as elites of their own era, they can not just walk away when the system is in crisis. Unfortunately when the intelligentsia of a nation has got a lot of problems, simultaneously there would be many problems in the field of social development as well. Shayegan further says that:

An ideologue who is excessively active by temperament can easily drift into the radicals camp and even, under the right circumstances, become a terrorist. But not every ideologue is necessarily an out-and-out militant. He can stay out of trouble, behave in a prudent and circumspect manner, and still remain an ideologue at heart: someone who is held in the closed system of an egocentric consciousness cut off from the outside world. The ideologue flourishes best in lands where modernity is still very lame, having neither taken root nor found its way into customs and morals: in other words, in countries where the modern age arrived through procurement, and whose thinkers played no part in the festival of the great changes. That is why the ideologue dislikes the sudden mutations and metamorphoses of the age. He is anti-dialectical and anti-historical. His natural categories are the reification of outlook, the idealization of the self. When he feels threatened, he sees plots everywhere, and for this reason he is also Manichean. This characteristic is as natural to him as intellectual detachment to the sage or doctrinal tolerance to the intellectual. (Shayegan 1997: 142)

The ideologue does not live in time but in space. He can not feel comfortable until he has converted the movement of time into a frozen space where everything is in its correct place: where, say, the
wicked are on the left, the good on the right, the discarded forms of the past behind, and in front a transparent future, visible right down to the immovable surveyor's stakes marking out the roads of utopia. The ideologue believes in progress, but a predictable progress, pre-determined by the decrees of history whose innermost working is known.

As is stressed in the case of Dr. Shariati and Dr. Sorush, the mysticism plays a crucial role in Iranian intellectualism. Shayegan also believes that mystic is a spiritual meta-reality which assumed a mental space of the so-called traditional civilization. The split between psyche and intellect, myth and rationality, which were products of modernity and secularization, have not yet occurred in Iran. The co-presence of these two orders of reality is safeguarded in the mystery of being (Shayegan 1997: 144)

Two orders of reality (myth and reason) were to be counterbalanced by the dialectics of their opposition. But as Adorno and Horkheimer tell us in their remarkable study on the dialectics of the enlightenment, this opposition is a two-edged weapon. Myth is already reason, but reason can turn back into mythology. In other words, in a world of emptied symbolic images and deprived of dialectic, there is a natural tendency to turn reason back into myth. It is this near-natural perversion that nourishes the ideologue's Manichaean behaviour. He is a seeker after totality in a world reduced to the paltry dimensions of a raucous squabble around the parish pump. (Ibid, p.145)
Linking the myth to the reason and mysticism to the rationality was a long term project of some western modern utopianists, but here in Iran there has been a long term practice of implementing them paradoxically. Not even those intellectual elites whose names have been mentioned in the thesis along with many others including Dr. Shayegan, seeks a world" behind mirror"(Shayegan:2001)

**Technocrats and Ulema**

In general terms, technocrats are the managers of the technical, political, economic and scientific spheres of a modern society. They are powerful because they programme production and distribution. They also take on the depersonalized, neutral quality of the world for whose efficiency they are responsible. They symbolize pure function stripped of all personal connotations. Like the technical and bureaucratic rationality whose order they represent, they are indifferent to the ethical purposes of what is produced.

The technocrat tends to stay in touch with the current ideology or ideologies: without being opportunistic, he nevertheless picks up the atmosphere by osmosis. For example, the secret police of the Iranian old regime, the Savak, easily became the new regimes Savama (Security forces); apart from the dismantling of a few ultra-sensitive departments. Most Savak officials managed without too much difficulty to move their rifles to the other shoulder. The same happened in the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) where, apart from one or two spectacular sackings on the highest level, the team of technocrats
running the enterprise remained almost intact. This does not mean, however, that technocrats have no personal political preferences, or that their ideological conviction can not change from one regime to another. For example, although the technocrats of the old regime exercised the same functions as those of today (who have voluntarily joined the Islamic Republic), they had different attitudes to culture, history and the West. They were pro-western, and nostalgic about the country's classical and pre-Islamic culture, while the new lot shows a marked interest in religious culture and is sternly anti-western- at least in appearance.

But when technocrats trying to ideologize or religious system seeks to Islamize the economy in the same way as it managed the socio-political field in obedience to God's law, the paradoxes of development also come to the scene. The technocrat, after all, like the intellectual and the cleric, is a victim of patching and grafting. He seeks to graft models of development or productivity according to local environment. His love of figures, statistics and quantitative measurement to economy and techniques never touch the people's lives. When Hashemi Rafsanjani, in his each and every press conference or speeches, was giving the boring technical fact and figures it was a bit amazing that now a revolutionary with ambitious ideals sticks on figures like this. But when President Khatmi went in the same way and reduced the great ideals of people to a countable quality, then it was no more surprising that in the third world countries such as Iran, the
intellectuals became ideologue. In fact, the ideologues became technocrats and vis versa.

As the nation is ideoloized, it affects material things too. These things occurred in post-revolutionary Iran under the Ulema leadership. This course of the Iranian revolution, an event which so far has proved unique in the third world, has raised with exceptional urgency a question which, in the late twentieth century, seems entirely new: the political resurgence of a caste of Priests hitherto thought to have been neutralized.

The ulema have always had enormous influence in Iran. Some respected historians believe that this state of things has historical antecedents: that the ulemas are in some sense the Shia Islamic version of the priestly caste (the Mobadan) which had existed under the Sassanids in pre-Islamic Iran.

The mullah is the verbal expression of the people, the externalization of its internal world. What one thinks, the other says; what one wants, the other puts into effect. This long-established symbiosis, based on collusion, does have historical antecedents. For centuries, the mullahs have been the exclusive holders of knowledge, both in the traditional schools (maktab khaneh) and on the more sophisticated and learned level of the higher schools of theology (madraseh) in the urban centers. Thus, for many centuries, they have been the country's main intelligentsia until the late nineteenth century when, under the increasing influence of the West, secular thinkers
inspired by the enlightenment began timidly to make their appearance. At first, these were designated "monawar ol-fekr" (enlightened thinker) and later came to be called "rowashanfekr" (the Persian equivalent of an enlightened thinker); this term became more or less a synonym for intellectual. (Shayegan 1997:158)

Ulema in Iran always had power to mobilize the masses which no other group or class in Iran had such a potentiality so far. Shayegan believes that it is because of their own social status which had originally derived from villages they have been successful in the mobilization of the people. On the foundation of the mass support, they could resist modernity by clinging to tradition. From the beginning of first waves of modernity in Iran during the Constitutional Movement of 1906, the ulema had to face both modernism and intellectuals who derived their discourse from modernity. From that time onwards, the two sorts of accusations, the westernizers and fundamentals have been the main controversial domain of discourse in Iran.

Apart from those intellectuals, the Ulema had to cope with mystics whose thinking was not in the domain of ulema's rule. On the other hand, there was a radical break between the world of mystics and that of the intellectuals. The differences of tradition and modernity here played a profound role. In any case, the introduction of modernity was unquestionably the achievement of the secular thinkers who, like those everywhere else in the Islamic world, were aware of the backwardness of Islam and employed all their ingenuity to find compromises and bridges between Islam and modernity (ibid, p.167)
After the Islamic revolution of Iran, all these historical controversies have turned to be social contradictions and paradoxes, which remain so even now. As Shayegan also refers without finding any solution; the traditional clergy of Iran never wanted to constitute a political government in the absence of “hidden Imam”. They have been trapped in a game of either resist violently or quit in vain. Shayegan argues:

*The Islam which confronts us today is an Islam ideologically marked by the era of revolutions. It is an Islam which rejects the equality between the modern and traditional systems on which the former constitution of the country was based. It assumed the absolute superiority of Islamic Sharia' over all other juridical and social systems; and is thus very different from the more or less critical Islam of the period of renaissance. What one might call the three pillars of Persia's 1906 constitution—religion, monarchy and modernity—have undergone major mutations. When we scratch the surface of the new Islamic order we see that each of these concepts has been profoundly modified. Modernity is no longer perceived as a rational whole embodying the liberal values (principles of the enlightenment, classical democracy, fundamental liberties and so on) which had once inspired the majority of innovators and reformers in the Islamic countries. Instead, it has become a modernity radicalized by revolutionary struggles, debased by totalitarian regimes and above all, in our own cultural environment, disfigured by a pervasive infrastructure derived from the Marxist vulgate, a sort of omnipresent, airborne ideology which has infiltrated the vision of the majority of Islamic thinkers, even the most orthodox.*

*Shiasm itself has diverged from its traditional course. From being an organ of spiritual and moral control, it has now turned into a sort of ultimate oppressive regiem, pre-empting the apocalyptic role which, in Twelver Shiite terms, belongs exclusively to the Mahdi, the Twelfth Imam who is to bring the cycle of Time to close. In a way the establishment of an Islamic Republic anticipates the saviour's messianic task.*

*(Shayegan 1997:173).*
Modern reenchantment

The researcher asked Dr. Shayegan, whether he could be called a post-modernist, and he said that he can be called so. He denies all meta-narratives. Just like post-modernists, he is not learnt about post-modernism. He argues that in the world of globalization, we need at least hybrid identity, a moving type of thought (*Pensee nomade*) (Shayegan, 2001: 15). Despite disenchantment, the collapse of dominating cultural systems and hegemonic ontologies, have activated the psychological unconsciousness of man. This gives way to any sort of illusion, and mixes all the symbols, like a forest, the signs of various cultures tie to each other, mixes, and creates new forms of complexes. In short, according to Michael Haiem, the American thinker, a type of “Ontological shift” will develop in due course (2001:18). Shayegan explains the transformation of his thought as follows: I do not know if my eventful and tormented experience of this dying century can serve as some kind of example to future generations, yet I am a most complex product of it. Having lived on the margins of the great changes of this century, I have been subjected, often to the point of having to defend myself physically, to all its positive and negative consequences, without having had the opportunity to participate in its creative process.

When I look back on the path I have taken, I am surprised and sometimes even frightened by these episodes fraught with obstacles. For how can I put it? I lived in a world devoid of colour or form. The old civilization to which I had belonged had more or less thrown in the
towel: modernity had won the day and everything that came from the west had the irresistible attraction of the siren's song. I had to learn the languages and the cultures of the countries of which I was a passive admirer (2002:1)

He further asserts: as far back as I can remember, I lived in disjointed worlds where nothing was in its place, where disparate and incoherent pieces of knowledge had been patched together, pieces which, juxtaposed in random mosaics, jarred with one another, with the result that I always had the impression of living in a no man's land. By this, it means that the present generation received the full brunt of the clash of cultures. All this happens at an unconscious level. It was later on that I became aware of the fissures that had, in some way, fashioned my being. Gradually, through the process of bringing to the surface the contradictions of my own being and the different milieu in which I lived, I succeeded, as best as I could, in recognizing the mechanisms at work both in terms of behaviour and knowledge.

Taking an interest, first of all, in the great spirituality of India, then in the great moments of Western thought where anxiety is the main driving force, then in Iran and Islam, I became a specialist in comparative religions, then a committed observer of the fractures which constantly opposed the traditions of the past with the great changes of modern times. (2002:1) Shayegan very much relies on modernity and says: there are constant arguments about the tragic sunset of reason. They say that reason has become instrumental, the subjective or partial
reason has overcome the premier reason (logos) and following a devilish dialectic, the reason with becoming instrumental, has turned to be a new myth (Aderno and Horkheimer), reason is lost in technique and became a technicized (Heidegger) and simulation, the last form of technique, consequently has ended in "killing" the imagination (Bauldrillard).

All of these claims are true, but if this evolution had not happened, there was no plurality and mosaic ontologies (2001:24-25). We can sit and mourn on the burned ruins of myth, existence and reason, but, if there was no such a frequent destruction, could we be disenchanted human of today? According to Shaxjgaav, the evolution of philosophy from that of Aristotle up to Descart has never been in vain. But the research says that sorrow on the process of Nihilism as Nietzsche minded and feeling regret and nostalgia over the loss of old metaphysics is quite useless. Shayegan further asserts that modernity destroyed both the over-custody of political authoritarians as well as the sacredness of human affair. The modern man has fulfilled all his material tendencies. He has created all the institutions which were imaginable, and implemented all the plans that stickled his mind. In short, he is exposed by inner side with all artificial products and now feels vanity and frivolous and extremely denies all the successes.

The nostalgia is derived from an empty inner side of man. He compares this world with the world in the past. Denying and negating the modern and post-modern world is not an ideal one. It
appears that the westerners are like spoiled child who have access to everything, but they do not know what to do next and then ask themselves: whether this game is working enough to pursue (2001:25-27). Perhaps with the exception of the universal discourse of modernity, whose tenets deriving from the enlightenment have become, for better or for worse, the heritage of all humanity, no claim prevails exclusively, no ideology becomes so dominant that it overshadows all the others. While there are quite a number of exceptions, this current thought remains, nonetheless, an unprecedented example in the history of humanity. But, what does the analysis of this new state of affairs reveal? First of all, that rigid identities, nation-states and ideological hegemonics are progressively disappearing in a world where ‘relational thought’ is replacing truths set in stone. All great changes happen in this manner: the rejection of the monolithic blocks belief, the fundamental bricks of matter and tree-like systems of thought. Instead, they pace value on nomadic thought, relational modes of developing empathy, hybridism and the cross-fertilization of cultures. From this spring three inevitable consequences which, in the opinion of the researcher, are going to determine our future in the next millennium (Shayegan 2002)

First, on the level of cultures and identities, it emphasizes on rhizomatous relations through a sort of a mosaic pattern where all identities fit into one another. Hence, the phenomenon of multi-culturalism and the emergence of plural identities, go-between who traverse the historical faults of consciousness. In this crisis-crossing chaos of identities, one thing is certain: modernity is not a
superfluous phenomenon that we can do without. We are all 'western', whatever our ethnic background may be, to the extent that we embody certain inescapable aspects of the enlightenment. Whatever identity we have, we have to add on this last one which connects us to all other human beings on the planet, independently of our race, religion and cultural origins. In other words, it is our modern identity alone that is endowed with a critical faculty, it is this identity alone which, paradoxically, can strip away the most archaic strata of our consciousness and facilitate their multiple articulations, linking worlds' living in different ages.

If we withdraw from the constantly changing world, preferring to live in a bell jar, looking for fictitious genealogies and founding myths, we are jumping out of the frying pan into the fire, going from immobility to obscurantism. It is possible for a dialogue if we take the necessary precautions. First of all, by putting the rhetoric of resentment aside, the discourse of 'anti-this', 'anti-that', which, for lack of convincing arguments, resort to anathema, while all the time accepting that we are no longer dealing with autonomous cultures in the literal sense, but with modes of being which can only flourish within the prevailing modernity that the articulations of these dislocated modes begin to represent the dialogue of man with himself; that the problem is above all epistemological, even if there are inevitably social and political consequences.
Second, these relational links, which govern our modern world also manifest themselves in terms of knowledge through the array of possible existing interpretations. To the extent that the great metaphysical truths which founded the ancient ontologies have collapsed and lost their value, the fragmented self becomes itself an infinite process of diverse interpretations, with every person being able to interpret each aspect of existence according to his or her subjective values. The ancient structures of our intelligibility have been shattered. People speak of the return of the sacred. This ‘divinity’, which is so longed for by some, will never again be able to don the masks of the ancient gods who used to reveal themselves, as Rene Girad put it, through violence. Rather, it makes itself felt in the weakening of tribal ties in the infinite opening of our choices.

We are no longer confronted with a Kierkegaardian alternative ‘either.. or’, neither are we caught in insurmountable dilemmas. Our choice is opening out like a fan. It is iridescent with the colours of a rainbow. We are all pilgrims, but our pilgrimage is not restricted to a pre-ordained route. We have retained a sense of quest, without it being necessarily for the Grail. It changes according to the playful patch working of mankind. It sometimes takes the form of Samsra, sometimes that of Maya, and sometimes that of Shamanic initiation rites.

Curiously, as a result of the retreat of the gods, our world has become more magical and more irrational than before. Yet,
paradoxically, this re-enchantment is related to secularization. Without secularization, we would never have seen the birth of this new pantheon of hybrid images.

Third, as media are concerned, this new state of affairs is giving rise to a 'virtualization' which is weaving a network of interconnectedness on a global scale. The instantaneousness, the immediacy and the ubiquity which characterize it, result in the fact that, besides the contraction of time and space, we are witnessing the synthesis of all the senses, thus giving us multi-sensorial perceptions. At this point, we are seeing on the one hand, all the floating ideas that are coming to us from incredible traditional ideas which are creating a kind of meta-reality hanging over our world. On the other hand, the revolution in communications is bringing real time into play through new technologies and is creating a virtual world parallel to the tangible world around us. If we choose to compare these two modes of 'virtualization'—by which the world of visions, myths angles and the feats of the computer age as manifested in cyberspace through digitization and the internet—we realize that we are confronted with two parallel worlds which can never coincide on the same level of reality.

Virtualization, as Baudrillard puts it, eliminates illusion by making reality a hyper-reality; even a simulation, whereas the other transforms the illusion by making reality a hyper-reality, even a simulation, whereas the other transforms the illusion into active imagination, which is consistent with the idea of angels. But in spite of
this, it remains the case that their modes of virtualization offer surprising similarities. In a certain sense, the world is re-discovering enchantment in the transmission of information which passes through the stratosphere at the speed of light. The ubiquity that mankind dreamed of in days gone by is being achieved through the fax machine, e-mail and teleconferences- all things that, just a few years ago, would have appeared impossible and the products of the most fanciful imagination. (Shayegan, 2002).

Shayegan is celebrating modernity and is very optimistic about the changes happening in post-modern era, but he, in one aspect, is criticizing modernity, in one aspect- the loss of spirituality. He says that modernity lacks the spirituality; it doesn’t have the strong affinities that shiver the heart. There are many emotional vacuums in modernity: the mysticism and its romantic symbolism, the unique feelings of unity, spiritual reflexivity and so on. Modernity only cares about juridical, political and economic needs of man, but the aspects of inner life are out of its influence. Modernity considers these aspects as private part of human life and everybody comes over it, according to his/her personal abilities. But, in our time, the realm of private is very much disturbed by public. The success of religions is mainly due to that but today religious thought is not appearing in its origin or nobility as it is influenced by modernity.

The re-Islamization of society in Iran, from 1970’s to the middle of 1980’s was from above which ended in achieving political
power. Although Islamization of society from the grass root, since 1980's symbolizes change in the strategy of Islamists, they negated the modern state, but it is clear that the consequences of both Islamization from bellerower above is confronting with modernity. Overall, they think that modernity and western morality is corrupted and spoiled. One thing is clear that religions have put their step in the field and involved in problems that historically and psychologically beyond their qualification. Speaking about the forbidency of birth control in the world, which is faced with population explosion crisis, efforts to establish the reign of sacred personalities like “Rama”, symbolize ancient fanciful utopias and dream. More importantly, the religion in this filed loses its sacredness and turns to a secular and usual topic. If there is a divinity and spirituality, it is only derived from spirit which Rodulf Otto calls as "mystic of spirit" (Seelenmystick). This mystic has no affair with jurisprudency and has no eye on our private life, and will only flourish in a field that politics and sacredness are separated from each other. (Shayegan 2001: 32-34).

Here Shayegan explicitly proposes the idea of secularism and non-religious government, unlike Shariati and Sorush strategy of establishment of a “revolutionary” or “democratic” Islamic government. Davari seeks a universal Islamic revolutionary government under the domain of “Velayat”. But Shayegan is all against these projects and he enjoys a lot of appreciation from new generation of Iranian intellectuals.
After such a harsh criticism of conservatives and monoeist by Shayegan, when he is asked by the researcher in the interview (Nov. 2002) “What is to be done?” He said: he does not know, may be behind the “mirror”, there is unity. As we see four eternal mystics of four different time and space; India’s Adishankar of the nineth century (A.D), Germany’s Mayster Ekhart of the thirteenth century (A.D.), Arabian Ibn Arabi twelfth/thirteenth century (A.D), and China’s Chawang Teso of the fourth century (B.C) were four eminent personalities having almost similar ideas. This similarity is not possible this side of “mirror” because it needs a meta-history dialogue. This dialogue is possible only by strength of spirit and in other side of mirror of life and the world which appear to us.

Like Heidegger, and all other trends of intellectuals in Iran, he also believes in saviour, but unlike others his saviour has to come from the West. where man has deteriorated morally. The modernity and its basis has wounded man and that modernity itself should and would be able to find the curer. Shayegan then concludes that if there is a light of emancipation it would come, nowhere except from the west (2001:22).

These are the contradictions, which have been discussed in this thesis. In Shariati’s idea, we saw some paradoxes in terms of democracy, liberalism, people’s freedom and revolutionary leadership. While believing in people’s participation and dignity, he criticizes the western democracy and proposes ideological revolutionary leader. His power has no limitation and people are not able to replace him.
Shariati's revolutionary approach towards government, political power and political arrangements in Shia ideology has left many controversies in post-revolutionary Iran. Sorush also deals with science, rationality and gnosticism at the same time. In contemporary Iran, some believe that religious enlightenment of Iran for that Sorush is the main architect has many paradoxes in its essence.

Not only Shariati and Sorush, but even Darvari and Shayegan are living in the vague domain of paradoxes. Davari, while truly believing in development, denies the western way of modernity, instead proposes Velayate-Faghih (guardianship of jurist) as the only way of development but he never characterizes his methodology. His ideas rather seems to be a revolutionary slogan. May be the one who is less controversial and more clear, is Tabatabaei. Dr. Tabatabaei emphasized on the deconstruction of tradition and establishment of new tradition in order to obtain modernity.

With such a chaos in ideas, ideology, philosophical thought as well as in socio-political realm, Iran steps into the post-modern globalization era.