INTRODUCTION

Uttar Pradesh (UP) is one of the most important state of India and had been one of the strongholds of the Congress party from 1947. However, the decade of 1980s witnessed the collapse of the Congress, all over India, and in UP in particular. The spectacular rise of the BJP in UP is one of the major phenomena in the history of Indian politics. From its low position during this decade, when the BJP had no solid base to speak of, it was gradually transformed into an important political force in UP, having a solid and distinct support base. The present enquiry is located within the above premise and the study is designed to explore the ideology, strategies and the story of a construction of a distinct social base by the BJP in UP. This is essentially an electoral study which tried to explore the social base of the BJP in UP. The argument postulated is that the BJP is not merely a Hindutva party but is also a conservative upper caste, middle class phenomena which appeals to a new upwardly mobile consumer-oriented middle class in small towns and villages of UP. The fieldwork conducted in two cities of UP, namely Meerut and Bulandshahr identifies this caste-class, its electoral preferences and issues at the local level. This new social bloc mainly consists of the upper caste, middle and upper class, as well as the economically well off sections of the Other Backward Castes (OBCs) and Scheduled Castes (SCs). Again, within every caste it is the upper class and upper middle class section of the population which give maximum support to the BJP. These findings are supported by an earlier scholar like Yogendra Yadav who argues that "In its multi-pronged attempt to win an electoral majority and create for itself somewhat stable support base the BJP has created a new social bloc, which is formed by the convergence of traditional caste community differences and class distinctions. Although religious exclusions continue to mark the boundaries of new social constituency, religion is not the principal fault-line in the creation of this new
social bloc.\textsuperscript{1} The elaboration and testing of these hypotheses is the major objective of the thesis.

**AIM /OBJECTIVE OF PRESENT WORK**

The thesis attempts to study the ideology and social base of BJP in UP in the 1990s. Broadly speaking the main aim/objectives are as follows:

- To document and analyse the ideology and strategies of electoral mobilisation of BJP.
- To document and analyse the social base of BJP in Uttar Pradesh. Has its appeal widened to attract voters from different social backgrounds? Or, has it merely strengthened its hold on its traditional support base?
- To analyse the measures adopted by BJP to expand its base in UP.
- To record and analyse as to how stable is this social base of BJP in UP.

In order to analyse the ideology and social base of BJP in UP, we primarily begin our work by looking into the inside story of BJP as a party. While looking into the BJP as a party, we will also look into its predecessors i.e. RSS and Hindu Mahasabha and more importantly its immediate predecessor i.e. the Jana Sangh. As RSS and Hindu Mahasabha only indirectly linked with it, they will not be studied in detail, but as Jana Sangh, is the ancestor of BJP, its aim, objective and policies will be studied closely. This will help us in understanding the nature of the base of BJP prior to its emergence as a party in 1980. The central questions with respect to the study of BJP with specific reference to the U.P. experience are:

- What are the circumstances under which BJP was founded?
- What are the ideology and founding principles of BJP?
- What is the organisational structure of BJP?
- What are the patterns of party building adopted by BJP?

\textsuperscript{1} Yogendra Yadav with Sanjay Kumar and Oliver Heath, "The BJP's New Social Bloc" *Frontline*, November 19, 1999:31-40.
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE VOTING BEHAVIOUR STUDIES

Since the present work makes a modest effort to unravel the mystique of voting behaviour in the specific context of the study of social base of the BJP, therefore, before undertaking the present discussion any further it is important here to begin with a general understanding on voting behaviour studies and a general understanding of the term social base. Although politics is a subject of great concern to a large section of population in a country, yet all people in all countries at all point of time do not take same kind of interest in the country's politics. Usually the involvement is at its highest during the time of elections. Elections lend legitimacy both to the democratic system and to the authority of a particular ruling group. Voting is one of the most important elements of the democratic system. It is an important activity which takes place which takes place within the community and is greatly influenced by a number of factors both political and non-political. Ganguly and Ganguly's study shows that the voting is the key instrument for building up of consensus and resolving conflict among various groups. A closer examination of voting behaviour study is important for analysing the complexity of today's society.

The process of vote formation, as Eldersveld thinks, in general, although he wrote in Western context, requires an analysis of individuals thinking process, namely perception, emotion, motivation in particular. For, he intends to build the collective behaviour on the basis of individual behaviour. The communication or propaganda process is also an important factor. Following an early election studies in USA by some academicians, that reveal the importance of events of the period i.e. issues including economic conditions, security, personality, character and affiliation of the candidates; and the interplay

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of these issues and events and voter's psychology, election studies in India were undertaken inspired by them.\textsuperscript{5} In short, the voting behaviour is a study of socio-cultural processes which influence the psychology of voters.

However, the voting behaviour studies do not take place in a vacuum for many factors operate in the formation of a votes. Studies have shown that social, psychological, economic and political factors, all play an equal role in the vote formation process.\textsuperscript{6} A voter is viewed not as an independent individual, but as one whose voting choice is determined by the various socio-environmental factors as well as the pressures affecting him/her.\textsuperscript{7} In a voting behaviour study why, how and whom a voter votes for are the three most important questions for investigation. In order to analyse the voter's intentions and actions, it is necessary to consider all the factors that affect voters choice.\textsuperscript{8} Vote formation is a continuous process in which the voters are influenced by political events, political activities and political actors over a period of time. The voters in the vote formation process are influenced by a host of factors like ideology, symbol, campaigns of different parties along with views and perceptions propagated by the family, friends, caste group, a work group or a neighbourhood group.\textsuperscript{9} According to Roy, the Voting behaviour study makes use of background variables like age, sex, caste, income, occupation, property holding, education etc. to understand the "social variation of voters located in different regions. At another level, they are treated as explanatory variables for explaining variations among voters on some chosen dimensions pertaining mainly to political attitudes and voting patterns. The assumption underlying such an approach is that

\textsuperscript{6} V. M. Sirsikar \textit{Political Behaviour in India} Manaktalas, Bombay, 1965.
\textsuperscript{8} Ramashray Roy \textit{The Uncertain Verdict: A Study Of The 1969 Elections In Four Indian States}, Orient Longman, Delhi, 1973.
\textsuperscript{9} V.M. Sirsikar \textit{Political Behaviour in India} Manaktalas, Bombay, 1965.
similarity of life situation induces or promotes similar political orientations which, in turn, influence voting behaviour."^{10}

Thus, in short, community, class, gender, age and educational background, all play an important role in the creation of a social base of a party. A particular section of a population gives support to a party either by looking into the issues of the party or by looking into the image of the party. These people may sometime form the hard-core support base of the party or they may at times form the fluid support base of the party, depending upon their changing demands and needs as well as the changing strategies and actions of the party. The thesis is an attempt to look into the voting behaviour and social base of the BJP in UP. In doing so, the ideology and strategies of the BJP is also studied accordingly to assess the voting behaviour and social base of the BJP.

The study of voting behaviour necessitates a brief description of the place—its recent history, the geographical surrounding and the socio-political environment, because voting never takes place in vacuum. It is a process having a backlog of events, socio-economic and political, behind it, and having consequences for different fields of life of the community. Therefore we will begin the present discussion by giving a general background of Uttar Pradesh—socio-economic and political.

**UTTAR PRADESH: A GENERAL BACKGROUND**

UP is India's largest state, and one of the most socially and economically backward in the northern heartland. Most of the states in north India are comparable to medium sized countries. Indeed, the population of UP, which according to the 2001 census is 1,66,052,859 in which 52.67 percent is male and 47.33 percent is female, is equal to the most populous countries of the world. In fact UP ranks first in terms of population and fifth in terms of area(2,40,928 sq. km) among the states, according to the 2001 census. As per

^{10} Ramashray Roy *The Uncertain Verdict: A Study Of The 1969 Elections In Four Indian States* op cit.: 61
the 2001 census about 79.22 percent of the population is rural and 20.78 percent of the population is urban. As per the 2001 census, UP is divided into 70 districts among which Allahabad has the highest concentration of population followed by Kanpur, Azamgarh, Jaunpur and Gorakhpur. Mahoba is the least populated district of UP. As per 2001 census the literacy rate in UP is 57.36 percent. Female literacy rate (42.98 percent) is below male literacy rate (70.23 percent).  

UP is a very large state and can be divided into six or at times seven distinct geographical regions. These are Uttarakhand, Ruhelkhand, Western UP, Bundelkhand, Central UP, East UP and Far East UP. 

On the question of development “UP is the largest state where the growth has been the slowest.” UP has the largest number of poor people and has the lowest per capita income as compared to the national average, the third lowest ahead only of Orrisa and Bihar. According to the World Bank, ‘The gap between UP and the rest of India widened substantially in the 1990s as annual growth in the per capita income slowed down to less than 1 percent’. Moreover, no correlation exists within UP between resource flows and the degree of backwardness of a region or a district. In UP only there are 17 districts which falls in the category of the 100 poorest and the most backward in every respect in India. These include Sitapur, Hardoi, Unnao, Rae Bareli, Jalaun, Lalitpur, Hamirpur, Banda, Fatehpur, Pratapgarh, Bahrai, Barabanki, Siddharthanagar, Maharaiganj, Jhansi, Mau and Kanpur Dehat. Apart from this, Basti, Budan, Etah, Lalitpur, Mirzapur, Rampur, Moradabad, Gonda, Jaunpur, Pilibhit, Bareilly

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13 Ibid.
are severely lagging behind in terms of social indicators like age at marriage for girls, proportion of married females, female literacy etc.\textsuperscript{14}

The economic growth of the state has decelerated since 1991. The expenditure on administrative services eats the major chunk of the revenue receipts in UP. As a result, government’s ability to attend to civic needs and real developmental works is negligible.\textsuperscript{15} While some states in India have exhibited increased economic growth since 1990, UP is unable to increase appreciably its per capita income.\textsuperscript{16} The low per capita income implied higher rate of poverty, low wages and less employment opportunities for all sections of population in UP. As per capita income growth continued to be very low, poverty has not declined at all. Thus the development policies of the UP government have not "substantially reduced inequalities in terms of food, education, health care, and productive assets."\textsuperscript{17}

Further there has been no proper implementation of the public service programmes in UP. A study mentions that the funds allocated for the anti-poverty programmes in UP like Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS), Jawahar Rojgar Yojna (JRY) and the Million Wells Scheme were grossly inadequate and often misused by the officials. There has been reports of mismanagement and often theft of food grains and resources that are allocated for these programmes. In a number of cases it was found that the people for whom these programmes are

\textsuperscript{14} Jairam Ramesh, "Future of UP" \textit{Economic and Political Weekly}, July 31, 1999: 2127.

\textsuperscript{15} Kripa Shankar, "In a Debt Trap" \textit{Economic and Political Weekly}, July 22, 2000: 2618-19.


undertaken are not even covered under these schemes. They are either left out, or if covered they are paid below the prescribed minimum wages or there are delays in payment to them.\textsuperscript{18} Infact, Kripa Shankar in his study of JRY in two districts in UP had shown that wages given to the people under this programme was as low as 29 percent when it should have been 60 percent.\textsuperscript{19} Similarly, the government has failed in its attempt to implement properly the Public Distribution System to eradicate poverty.

UP ranks low with regard to human development particularly in the field of female literacy. After Rajasthan it has made the least progress in narrowing the gender gap.\textsuperscript{20} The region is characterized inter alia by exceptionally high levels of mortality, fertility, morbidity, undernutrition, illiteracy, and social inequality, and a slow pace of poverty decline. The reasons for this are: (1) inadequate public provisions for primary health care (including child immunization), and (2) low educational levels and (3) the suppression of women's informed agency in the family and society, including in matters relating to child survival.\textsuperscript{21}

Uttar Pradesh is essentially an agricultural state where almost 80 percent of the population lives in the villages and are engaged in various agricultural activities. The agriculture and agrarian assets determine the economic positions of different section of population in UP. The Land reform policy has not been implemented in the state properly. Although it gave some ownership rights over land to section of tenant farmers, yet it neither eradicated landlessness nor the


massive inequalities in terms of land ownership in the state.\textsuperscript{22} The rural structure in UP is characterised by the presence of large category of big landowners and large number of poor peoples. The urban structure characterised by the absence of bourgeoisie due to the low levels of industrialization; and the presence of a large category of middle class "created through privileged and restricted access to education, government employment and politics and a comparatively large lower middle class generated through the expansion of petty traders and commerce in small towns and cities across the state. Economic changes have modified the structure of society as new groups of upwardly mobile castes and communities have entered the middle classes."\textsuperscript{23}

Caste and class form the two most important bases of the UP society. Approximately 20 percent of the states population comes from the Upper Caste. The Backward caste and Other Backward Classes (OBC) account 35 to 40 percent of the population. In more recent years due to economic development the Backward castes can be broadly divided into two categories on the basis of class. While the middle castes or OBCs like Yadav, Kurmis, Gujars, Lodh, Jat etc. are usually economically well off; it is the MBCs or Most Backward Classes like Dhiwars(Kahar), Jogis, Kumhars, Nais, Sainis, Faquir, Teli etc. who constitute 26 percent of the population and form the poorer section. At the bottom of the social hierarchy are Scheduled castes forming 21 percent of the population. The 1991 Census shows there are 66 SC groups in UP. Among them the more prominent are Jatav/Chamar, Balmikis, Weaver, Pasis etc. Of these, Jatav/Chamar are the dominant Dalit group and Pasis and Balmikis constitute poorer and backward Dalit group.

The Upper Caste- Dalit and Muslim alliance had elected the Congress to power in UP from 1947. Apart from the brief period of the Janata rule it remained in power. The populist policies of Mrs Gandhi enabled it to do so. However after

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.:38-39.

mid-1980s, the Congress has not been able to capture power in UP and had entered into the period of steady decline.

The BJP, although it emerged from the Jana Sangh, started as a new party. It is a new party whose social and regional base in UP, has been reconstructed since the mid-1980s. As the study will show, in the 1950s and 60s, the Congress represented the upper-and lower castes especially in the rural areas, while the Jana Sangh represented the urban upper and middle castes. Region-wise the Jana Sangh was predominant in the northern districts stretching from Bahraich to Gonda, and in the Central plains from Sitapur to Hardoi. The rise of BKD in 1969 altered the fortunes of Jana Sangh and there was interchange of votes among the three main parties and the Jana Sangh lost much of its stronghold to the Congress, though later as part of the Janata party it gained in the Oudh. The BJP founded in 1980 by its ex-Jana Sangh supporters based itself on the principles of Gandhian Socialism, Positive Secularism, Nationalism and National Integration, Democracy and Value based politics. Integral Humanism remained the basic philosophy of BJP. In the 1980s, although the party opted for tactic of openness as the pattern of party building and for widening its appeal among all sections of society, yet it did not perform well in elections. The BJP’s choice of a pragmatic strategy of openness proved to be ineffective. The BJP changed its line back to one of relying on the Sangathanist network as developed by RSS. The Shah Bano case and the opening of the Babri Masjid locks by the Congress government at the Centre gave the BJP leaders the opportunity to strategically reposition their party at a time when their adoption by the Congress had given these themes a wider appeal and, perhaps more importantly, a larger respectability. The outcome was a situation in which the Congress was reduced to non-entity, and its disintegration created a vacuum in UP politics which the BJP filled. The BJP assumed the mantle of the Congress and gradually expanded its base in U.P in the 1990s.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Our review of literature has led us to the conclusion that very little work have been done from the perspective we suggest, as pointed out clearly in the aim/objective of the work. In order to have a clear understanding of the kind of literature available, in the BJP, we have divided them into following categories:

1. Ideology of the party
2. Electoral performance
3. Social Base in UP


The main argument postulated by these authors can be summed up in few words as that the Hindu nationalists desire is to transform Indian ‘public culture’ into a ‘sovereign’, ‘disciplined national culture’ which have its roots in the superior ancient Hindu past, and to impose a ‘corporatist and disciplined social and political organization’ upon society. The main supporter of the Hindu nationalism largely consisted of the large and expanding middle class section of population and could not establish themselves among the millions of marginalized poor and illiterate Indians. It is in these large and expanding middle class usually located in the urban areas, highly educated, ‘associational life’, ‘civic engagement and social capital’, that the Hindu nationalist movement found its most receptive audiences.
The Hindu nationalist movement has oscillated between two different sets of strategies. While the members of BJP usually supported a moderate and pragmatic approach, the party cadres, the RSS and VHP, showed a strong preference to doctrinal purity and radical strategy. The BJP on the whole has oscillated between the moderate and radical strategy according to their needs.

The Sangh Parivar is also deeply divided on the issue of economic policies. While a section of members in BJP favours liberalization, the conservative and ideologically purist forces in the RSS and VHP opposed liberalization and foreign investment as an introduction to consumerist culture in India. Although the Jana Sangh and then BJP used to strongly support swadeshi, the BJP-led NDA government at the Centre has been the most enthusiastic supporter of the liberalisation and globalisation of the Indian economy.

Christophe Jaffrelot in his book 'The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics (1925-90)' (1996) traces the origin and development of Hindu nationalists since 1925, starting with the origin, ideology and development of Hindu Mahasabha, RSS, Jana Sangh and finally the BJP. He argued that the Hindu nationalist movement have always oscillated between two sets of strategies. While the moderate combination relied on an 'ideological rapprochement with Hindu traditionalists', 'mobilisation on socio-economic, populist issues and co-option of notables'; the radical combination was based on a 'strategy of identity building through the stigmatisation and emulation of other', 'ethno-religious mobilisation' and the 'development of a network of activists'. The adoption of different strategies at different points of time is guided by the adoption of the communal attitude by the Congress party, the growing dissatisfaction among the Hindus due to the preferential treatment of the minorities and the role of the RSS activist network and religious leaders. Jaffrelot argued that the BJP in the initial years of its formation in 1980 did not exclusively relied on the RSS method of party building and building social base and communal themes. But as this strategy failed to deliver any positive
result during the elections in 1984-85, the BJP changed its line back to the adoption of radical strategy of 'ethno-religious mobilisation' by taking up the Ram Janamboomi Babri-Masjid issue. The adoption of this movement was one of the principal reason for the success of the BJP in the elections in 1989 and 1991. But this strategy also proved to be counter productive since 1993 onwards. As a result the BJP leaders from 1993 onwards adopted a more moderate strategy by downplaying communal issues and emphasising on socio-economic populist policies and the problem of corruption, etc. Christophe Jaffrelot in his article “The rise of other backward classes in the Hindi belt” argued that the BJP in post 1993 period opted for “indirect mobilisation”, that is forging alliances with parties representing the lower castes.

Thomas Blom Hansen in his book “The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India”(1998) tried to understand the precarious and contingent process through which the dispersed grievances and sentiments in various parts of the Indian society were reframed by the Hindu nationalist discourse, organized by its movement and party, and hence aggregated into what appeared to be, and indeed, was staged as, a spontaneous surge of social or cultural identity in public arena. Hansen attributes saffron wave of the last 15 years, not just to ‘imaginative political strategies’ or ‘reserves religious nationalism’ but locates the growth in the broader realm of “public culture—the public space in which a society and its constituent individuals and communities imagine, represent and recognise themselves through political discourse, commercial and cultural expressions and representations of the state and civic organisations.”

While B. D. Graham, Craig Baxter, Anderson and Damle and Balraj Puri trace the history and development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh; Yogendra K. Malik and V.B. Singh, Partho S. Ghosh, Keonard Elst, Manini Chatterjee and Salim Lakha trace the origin and the development of the ideology, structure, organisation and economic policies of the BJP.
B. D. Graham in his book *Hindu Nationalism And Indian Politics: The Origins And Development Of BJS*(1990) trace the history and development of Bharatiya Jana Sangh. He argued that the Jana Sangh, formed in 1951, is the only party, which did not emerge from within the Congress. Jana Sangh during the initial year of its formation, was closely linked to the RSS and adopted the RSS method of mobilisation which relied on gradual organizational expansion rather than rapid electoral mobilization. The party emphasized on the primacy of the Hindi as against the English language and essentially appealed to the liberal, educated middle classes in North Indian small and provincial cities. A major reorientation of the Jana Sangh in a more populist direction took place from 1965 onwards, when it adopted a new program based on Upadhayay’s ‘Integral Humanism’. The party since the 1967 election adopted the mixed strategy where they emphasized on socio-economic populist policies. However inspite of this in the 30 years of its existence, the BJS failed to emerge as a major force in UP, because its convictions were not even shared by a substantial majority of Hindus.

Craig Baxter in his book *The Jana Sangh: A Biography Of An Indian Political Party*(1969) also traced the history, ideology and development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. Baxter argued that the Jana Sangh declared its fundamental policy as one country, one nation, one culture and the rule of law. Jana Sangh argued that the feeling of nationalism can be expressed in terms of complete allegiance to Bharat. Baxter in his book clearly identifies the principles and policies of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh.

Yogendra K. Malik and V.B. Singh in their book *Hindu Nationalists In India: The Rise Of Bharatiya Janata Party*(1994) trace the heritage and leadership, strategies, policies and issue orientations, organization and electoral performance of the BJP. The study by the authors may be conveniently divided into three parts dealing with the nature and origin of Hindu nationalism in India; reasons and factors for the rise of the BJP; and finally psephological account of the party in terms of national and state level elections held in the last fifteen
years or so. They argued that the BJP, in the initial years of its formation, in 1980s, adopted a broad based secular policy by giving primacy to the principle of Gandhian Socialism as a mechanism for resolving India's socio-economic and political problems. However, the party failed to achieve any electoral success in the 1980s which forced it to revive its Hindutva identity. The adoption of the Hindutva posture enabled the party to gain electorally by exploiting the Hindu sentiments of the majority community. They further argued that the party performed better in the urban and in Muslim constituencies which indicate that the party has the capacity to attract urban people who are generally better informed than their rural counterparts and that it can unite the majority to its favour to oppose the minorityism of other national political parties.

Partho S. Ghosh's book 'BJP And The Evolution Of Hindu Nationalism: From Periphery To Centre'(1999) is largely a biography of the BJP which covers the entire spectrum of the rise of Hindu organisations in the first part of the twentieth century, and catalogues all the major political events in the post-independence period leading up to the rise of BJP. It also delineates in detail the social, economic and the political agendas of the BJP. Partho S. Ghosh viewed the rise of the BJP as the logical culmination of Hindu communalism. He linked it further to the dynamics of electoral politics in which the Hindu-Muslim dichotomy together with other variables such as caste, matter.

C. P. Bhambri in his book 'Bharatiya Janata Party: Periphery to Centre'(2001) argues that the rapid rise of the BJP in Indian politics for the last one decade or so is perplexing. He argued that the opportunistic politics of alliances and coalition made by the secular parties was partly responsible for the BJP to move to the centre stage. Prof. Bhambri said that the BJP became "a party of, by and for Hindus and its goal is to establish Hindu Rashtra". There are two faces to the BJP: first face is when the BJP was in opposition or when it was striving to gain the upper hand in politics. And the second face is visible when the BJP came to power by aligning with a large number of parties based on regional, caste, religious identities. In the first case it used caste and communal
idiom, symbolism and images, including the violence to its advantage. Here its larger agenda is clear. Nonetheless, when it became a partner in coalition politics, it was forced to compromise to hold on to power. This does not mean collapse of the original agenda.

Amrita Basu in her article ‘Mass Movement or Elite Conspiracy? The Puzzle of Hindu Nationalism’ (1996) argued that the Hindu nationalist or Hindutva campaign of the Sangh parivar is the product of both an ‘elite conspiracy’ and of a ‘mass movement’. However none of these two opposing positions can explain the phenomenal growth of Hindu nationalism in the 1990s. She argued that the phenomenal success of the Hindu nationalist movement is deeply rooted in the malaise both within the civil society and the state. The Hindu nationalist campaign derived its strength from two principal conditions: a party that stood up to the popular hopes, fears, and aspirations of the majority community i.e. Hindus; and a people that because of various diverse reasons was receptive to the ideas propagated by the BJP. In another article “The Transformation Of Hindu Nationalism? Towards a Reappraisal ”(2000) she argued that although the BJP assumed importance by associating itself with a disruptive, violent movement in Ayodhya, but it has moderated its stance in terms of actual functioning, once it come closer to the exercise of national power. However, while the party at times have moderated its aggressive public stance due to the social and political pressure, yet it periodically adopt the militant Hindu nationalist strategy of mobilization. In her another article “The Dialectics Of Hindu Nationalism”(2001) she argues that the BJP have adopted the alternating strategy of ‘militant social movement’ and ‘moderate political party’ at different points of time, principally guided by the desire to achieve electoral success. While the party gave prominence to its movement posture from 1989 to 1992, yet it adopted a more ‘moderate’ posture particularly from 1993 onwards.

While Keonard Elst and Manini Chatterjee looks into the changing strategies of the BJP since 1991 onwards, Salim Lakha and Baldev Raj Nayar looks into the economic policies of the BJP. Manini Chatterjee in her article “The
BJP: *Political Mobilization for Hindutva* (1994) argued that the BJP since its inception in 1980, has moved through three broad phases of development and is now in its fourth phase. The first phase was under the Presidentship of A. B. Vajpayee, and dated from 1980 to 1986. The second phase started since 1986 onwards with the appointment of Advani as President in 1986 and continued till the general elections in 1989. The third phase can be subdivided into two or three distinct sub-phases. The third phase continued up to the November 1993 when the BJP faced setback in the Assembly elections in four Northern states. The BJP has since then entered the fourth phase. She argued that the BJP is and will always remain as a right wing party which adopted flexibility and dynamism primarily to prevent any radical onslaught on the power structure of the present system while using the space provided by the bourgeois system to further a reactionary agenda.

Baldev Raj Nayar in his article, "The Limits Of Economic Nationalism In India: Economic Reforms Under The BJP Led Government, 1998-1999" analysed the economic policies of the BJP led government at the Centre. He argued that the BJP’s economic policy is not essentially different from the one followed by the Congress and United Front government. The main reason for the similarity in the economic approach among all political parties during governance are two fold. First, it lies internally, in the centrist tendency of Indian politics in the context of the country’s immense social diversities and the considerably institutionalized nature of its political framework of democracy. Second, it lies externally, in the nature of the modern international system, primarily in terms of the substantial incentives to participation in a highly, though asymmetrically, interdependent world economy. Thus, the BJP which initially argued that the swadeshi simply means “India First”, in 1999 the then Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha argued that “swadeshi actually means competition, going out to the world and winning. Globalisation is the best way of being swadeshi".
Gyanendra Pandey in his book “Hindu And Others”(1993) argues that Hindutva, despite its attempt to create an undifferentiated monolithic Hindu identity vis-à-vis the Muslim ‘other’ is in essence the domain of the upper caste male, north Indian Hindu.


Oliver Heath in his article “Anatomy Of BJP’s Rise To Power: Social, Regional And Political Expansions In 1990s”(1999) explores the transformation of the BJP from a localized party with a restricted political presence into the main political force with a mass following and the effects of its expansion on its social base. He analysed the regional expansion of BJP all over India which has taken shape in three distinct waves, i.e., primary states(1950s and 1960s), secondary states(1980s) and tertiary states(1989 onwards). The primary states (Delhi, UP, MP, HP, Rajasthan) are the states where the Jana Sangh emerged as a viable opposition party in the 1950s and 1960s. The second wave includes the secondary states (Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Maharashtra and Punjab) where the BJP was present before the 1989 boom, but won only a few seats in 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s remain as a minor opposition party. The third wave emerged after the 1989 election, when the BJP emerged as an important force in tertiary states (Andhra, Assam, Goa, Karnataka, Kerala, Orissa, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal). The BJP has the longest political presence in the primary states and is still the most successful party. The BJP+’s vote share in the secondary state increased significantly in 1996 and the party is only marginally less successful than it is in the primary states. The BJP+’s growth has been most significant in
the tertiary states where the BJP+ vote percentage rose from 10.2 percent in 1991 to 35.4 percent in 1998. He further argued that the upper caste still constitute the most significant section of the population which support the BJP in the primary states and the percentage of support from this section has not changed essentially from 1991 to 1998. The OBC support to the party has been slightly erratic in the primary states. While there has been a little increase in the support of the OBCs to the BJP+ in the primary state in 1991, yet there has been a bigger drop in the party’s support among this section in 1996. The Scheduled tribes support to the party have increased in the primary states, and remained fairly stable in the secondary and tertiary states.

Yogendra Yadav in his various articles “Reconfiguration In Indian Politics: State Assembly Elections In 1993-95”(1996);“Understanding The Second Democratic Up surge: Trends Of Bahujan Participation In Electoral Politics In The 1990s”(2000); “Electoral Politics In The Time Of Change: India’s Third Electoral System, 1998-1999”(1999) discusses the emergence of the third electoral system between 1989 and 1991, which saw the rise of BJP to prominence and its expanding social base. He in his another article “The BJP’s New Social Bloc”(1999) further argued that the BJP since its emergence in the 1980s have created a new social bloc of support for itself, which is formed by a coalition of various social groups. This bloc formed by the BJP comprised of a ‘new kind of majoritarianism’, which is not simply ‘Hindu majoritarianism’. While religious symbol still constitute one of the important instrument of mobilisation for the BJP, yet it is not the principal strategy for mobilisation of this newly created social bloc. This new social bloc is created by the ‘convergence of traditional caste-community differences and class distinctions’. However this social bloc is not a permanent one because it is not created by a ‘harmonious coming together of various groups’. It is artificially created by an interaction of traditional caste community configuration and the clever calculation of the logic of our electoral system. There is no clear cut guarantee of durability and survival of this bloc.
Subrata Mitra and V.B. Singh in their book "Democracy And Social Change In India: A Cross-Sectional Analysis Of The National Electorate" (1999) looked into the BJP support base in 1996 and 1998 Lok Sabha elections. They argued that it is the urban, educated, affluent and younger section of the society who constitute the greatest support base of the party. The upper class caste image of the party is enhanced by the fact that the BJP gets fewer number of votes from the lower section of the society. This upper-caste and upper-class image of the party is further corroborated by the fact that person’s chances of voting for the BJP increases as he/she climbs up in the class ladder. Class based support for the BJP is so significant that as the SC and OBC move up occupying higher rungs on the class ladder, their preference for the BJP also increases.

Zoya Hasan in her book "Parties and Party Politics in India" (2002) argued that BJP’s social base is no longer limited to that of being a Brahmin-Bania party. The party has created a new social bloc and religion is not the principal instrument in the creation of this new social bloc. This new social bloc is formed by a convergence of caste and community and class distinctions, and an ‘overlap of social and economic privileges’. This fact is further demonstrated by the tendency of Scheduled caste and OBCs to favour the BJP as they climb up the social ladder.

Asghar Ali Engineer and H. Gould have analysed the performance of BJP in 1989 and 1991 elections. Jafferlot and Hansen in their book "The BJP And Compulsion Of Politics In India" (1998) analyse the BJP’s performance in 1996 elections and argued that the strength and tenacity of BJP and Hindu nationalist politics in India will be determined by their ability to adopt to the characteristics of regional politics, of specific configurations of caste politics and peculiar compulsions and idioms of the different political fields it engages with. If that does not happen, BJP is likely to shrink to a party limited to northern and western India.
3. **SOCIAL BASE IN UP**: As far as availability of literature on the social base of BJP in UP is concerned they are few in number. The prominent among them are by Zoya Hasan, Sudha Pai, Paul Brass, Jasmine-Zerinni Brotel etc.

Zoya Hasan in her book "Quest For Power: Oppositional Movement and Post-Congress Politics in Uttar Pradesh"(1996) and a host of articles in several books and journals, prominent among which are "Community And Caste In Post-Congress Politics In UP"(1998); "Communal Mobilization And Changing Majority In Uttar Pradesh"(1998); "Representation And Redistribution: The New Lower Caste Politics In North India"(2000) explores some of the themes which brought about social and political changes in contemporary UP. She argues that three factors were responsible for creation of an communal atmosphere in UP which played an important role in the success of the BJP. These were the Urdu-Hindi controversy, communal violence and upper caste opposition to governments decision to implement the Mandal report. She argued that although the party still uses the Ayodhya movement and the upper caste opposition to implement Mandal Commission report, yet the party is no longer relying on these issues only. This is corroborated by the fact that the party have managed to secure a respectable chunk of the OBC vote, especially of the middle castes excluded from the Mandal list. In a more recent article "Transfer of Power? Politics of Mass Mobilisation in UP"(2001) she argued that although the BJP has not been able to remove totally the divisions in its ranks, it has managed to weaken them by winning over some sections of the lower caste to its side. The BJP government under the then Rajnath Singh government before the 2002 Assembly election proposed a quota within quota (15 percent) of reservation for the MBCs to win them over with some promise of government jobs.

in various Lok Sabha and Assembly elections in UP since 1991 onwards. She argued that the social base of the BJP has undergone a change since the early 1990s. In the 1993 Assembly and 1996 Lok Sabha elections while gaining upper caste votes from the Congress, the BJP also gained support from the Backward Castes of Sainis, Lodhas, Kurmis etc. Besides this, it has also wrested the support of the MBCs and the Balmikis and Pasis, who are unhappy over the domination of the powerful Chamar-Jatavs, to their fold.

Amresh Mishra in his article "Uttar Pradesh: Politics in Flux" argued that the upper caste middle class principally form the support base of the BJP in UP as they were disheartened with the centrist politics of the Congress and the opposition which they find ridden with corruption and criminality. They believed that the BJP will bring things like a clean public life, stability and economic opportunities for them. It is therefore that they extend support to the BJP.

Paul Brass in his articles "Caste, Class And Community In The Ninth General Elections For The Lok Sabha In UP" (1993); "The Rise Of The BJP And The Future Of Party Politics In UP"(1993); "General Elections, 1996 In UP: Divisive Struggles Influence Outcome"(1996) analysed the performance of various parties in UP since 1989 onwards and argues that the Hindu nationalist vote remained centred among the members of the urban Bania caste, some Brahmins, and a segment of the educated middle class, particularly technical, managerial and professional cadres.

Jasmine Zerinini Brotel in her article "The BJP in UP: From Hindutva to Consensual Politics?"(1998) analysed the changing electoral strategy, performance and social base of BJP in UP. She argued that the BJP tried to introduce the notion of 'middle ground politics' in UP from 1996 onwards in order to remain in the power. This can be seen in the flexibility of approach of the BJP which is demonstrated by the party's alliance with the BSP, and the softening of the anti-Muslim attitude and new arguments of equality before law etc. She argued that although the BJP is now trying to build up a support base among the Scheduled caste and OBC, yet it always work to retain its original identified
supporter i.e. the urban upper caste middle class section of society. The BJP consider it as their duty to restore legitimate dominance of this class in a crumbling social order.

A fairly review of literature helps us to conclude that there is scope for work on the social base of BJP in UP, which actually encouraged me the need to pursue this agenda. The Oliver Heath’s article “Anatomy of BJP’s Rise to Power” can be considered as the only reference point from the point of view of the data analysis for my thesis work, but his article also looks into the growth of BJP all throughout India.

HYPOTHESES

The social base of a political party comprises of those communities which support a particular party. This support is clearly manifested at the time of elections in terms of vote that they give to that party, and at other times by extending support to the policies undertaken by the party for their development. While analysing the social base of BJP in UP, it is very important that we begin our study by looking at it from two vantage points i.e. from the point of view of the BJP and the voters.

From voters point of view, three concepts stand out as being crucial to our understanding of their voting behaviour in UP:

i) Issues  ii) Identification  iii) Image

The central question with respect to issues are:

♦ To what extent do the voters have an issue awareness and issue perception?
♦ To what extent do an issue orientation and issue preference affect their party choice and thereby leading to issue voting (or policy voting)?
♦ How do voters relate issues to party and party policies?

The superstructure of the so called industrial complexes leading to the imbibement of everything Western, namely, dresses, music and so on, on an existing socio-economic structure of the country as a whole, that is not in harmony with our culture, has been created. A section of middle class, especially
in the urban areas of UP, could not reconcile themselves with this superstructure and a part of them joined in revolutionary politics while another part readily accepted BJP's issues like fostering Hinduism in every way, and criticism of Congress for pampering Muslims in every way. BJP sought to impress on people that Hindus and Hindutva should get priority over all others. Hence upper caste, namely, Brahmins, petty traders and banias, middle and lower middle classes, in particular, were attracted towards BJP's slogans or issues. When the lower caste people of SCs and OBCs moved up economically, a section of them also exhibited preference for BJP.

Issue voters having issue perceptions and issue preferences are often contrasted with identified voters i.e. the voters who identify themselves with a given candidate or party symbol. They always vote for the same candidate or the same party regardless of what it says or does. However, there are voters who are neither aware of issues nor identified, whose motivation for voting may simply be social pressure, or 'negative voting'-voting against some feared enemy or outcome. On account of negative voting feeble identifiers, who are not identified voters, may well turn out to be the deciding factor in an election.

With respect to identification the central questions are:

♦ How to identify the section of voters to whom the issues appeal to?
♦ Why is it that these issues appeal to this particular section of society only?
♦ How to differentiate an identified voter from a feeble identifier?

The identified voters of BJP consists of the merchant Bania caste or the Hindu trading community in urban areas of UP. The BJP emerged as a party of the upper caste and the new middle class, comprising of teachers, traders, lawyer, and civil servants. These classes, located in small towns across the state, are themselves the product of the economic change but they are against further social transformation and fearful of the upsurge from below which could upset their status quo. It is this new middle class-upper caste which is now included into the group of identified voter who are highly informed on the issues. Infact the BJP has over the years created a new social bloc which is formed by
an overlap of caste and class, and social and economic privileges. This new social bloc mainly consists of upper caste Hindus and some sections of dominant Hindu peasant castes like Jats. The Jats in Western UP are also identified voters of BJP, as they were excluded from the Mandal list. If we turn on to the economic dimension of the emerging social bloc, its class structure, we find that the poorer the voter, the lesser are the chances of voting for the BJP. Accordingly the higher chances of voters voting for the BJP obtain from the group that is both upper and middle class and upper caste and the lowest among the lowest class dalits. This social bloc formed by the two principal cleavages of caste and class is reinforced by several auxiliary divisions that more or less overlap with caste-class divisions. The BJP in fact gets a greater amount of support from the urban areas.

The Lodhs and Kurmis belonging to the OBC group form the feeble identifiers who support the BJP in UP because they are against the Yadav’s gain in the struggle for power. Apart from this, there is negative voting by MBCs in UP for BJP, because of their inability to identify with either the BSP or SP/JD. Their support to BJP is part of their search for an alternative political party following the decline of Congress.

The third concept is that of the image of the BJP among voters. The central questions are:

- How do the issue voters link themselves to the BJP and select one among the parties?
- Whether they look into the leadership quality or something else?
- Why is one party believed while another is not?

In UP while the identified voters voted for BJP on the basis of the image of the party, the informed identified voters, i.e., voters who are not only identified voters but also voters who are informed of issues, voted for the party by looking into both the issue and image of the BJP.

The parliamentary party can forget its political party at times, but will need, if only at election times, the involvement of a political party i.e. a vote
collecting and ultimately a vote seeking instrument. If votes are to be sought, grievances must be attended to, and demands must be to some extent satisfied. If demands are to be satisfied and grievances are to be attended to, it is very important that the party must effectively communicate to the voters. In UP, BJP communicated to the voters through their:


The central question with respect to the issues are:

♦ How does the BJP select the issues in UP?
♦ Why is it they give prominence to some issues while rejecting the others?
♦ How do they make an otherwise non-political issue enter to the politics?

Issues raised before an impending election are necessarily to be topical as well as appealing to the voters mind and heart for immediate impact. For long term effect, issues are so chosen and propagated over long period of time such that voters do not and cannot forget them, i.e., indoctrination. Some of the issues that polarise the voters towards BJP in UP are Hindu-Urdu controversy, Hindu-Muslim violence or riot, conversion of Hindus to other religions, pseudo-secularism or plainly speaking appeasement of Muslims, Ayodhya campaign related to Babri Mosque, and implementation of Mandal report.

Political parties, in general, have to adjust themselves with the objective conditions prevailing in the country during election and BJP was no exception. For they accepted the reservation policy of the Mandal report in words, for example, in 1996 election. In 2002 election they went one step forward and offered quota within quota reservation policy for the most oppressed in UP. In 1996 they tried to garner Muslim votes by offering some incentives to them without success. In 2002, the BJP however introduced POTA to suppress Muslim organisations like SIMI in UP.

The parties communicate to mass electorates via party images, and that much of their electoral strategy is concerned with building up the appropriate image for the public from which they expect votes.

The central question with respect to party/position images are:
How does the BJP build up a particular party image among the voters?

What is the criterion of the party in the selection of some slogans?

The BJP combined two very different identities that of a militant social movement and a moderate political party. In this perspective, BJP in UP formulated issues and policies in such a way as to convey to the electorate at large the party's position images, and the competitive pre-occupation of party leaders bears precisely on the position manoeuvrings that are believed not to disturb the party's identifiers and, at the same time, to attract new voters (or to retain potential defectors). The BJP used the concepts like pseudo-secularism and minorityism, which imply giving special privileges to Muslims by the Indian state, in contradiction to positive secularism which supposedly means to being fair to all communities to build its pro-Hindu image and thereby win the sympathy of the majority community, i.e., the Hindus in UP. In fact BJP used majoritarianism as a political idiom to build the permanent electoral majorities based on census definition of Hindus through the deployment of ascriptive symbols. The BJP argued that true secularism meant Hindu majoritarianism and the subordination of cultural minorities, for the term minorities according to them essentially include Muslims. The Sangh combine's conception of unified nationhood, the threat to national unity stirred a positive response in UP because the middle classes of the region strongly identified with the concept of a unified nation and strong central authority. The BJP in UP used slogans like 'Save Hinduism', 'Ek rajya, ek bhasa, nahi chahiye dusri bhasa' to strengthen its image of a right wing party. At a later stage of the campaign, the BJP in UP gave the concept of 'Social engineering' and 'Social harmony' to broaden its support base among the OBC's and MBCs.

Political parties adopt different political strategies and tactics for the mobilisation of the masses.

The central question with respect to party strategies are:

What are the mobilisational strategies of the BJP?

How do they select a particular mobilisational strategy?
• Does BJP adopt the same political strategies for mobilising different sections of population? Or Does it adopt different strategies?

• What is its strategy vis-à-vis other parties?

The Jana Sangh and then the BJP has regularly oscillated between a militant to moderate position and vice-versa. The party's strength has dwindled in the years since the mid-1970s when it had adopted a Gandhian Socialist platform; in the eighties and nineties the BJP was determined to maintain its distinctive characteristics. The BJP in 1991 publicised issues like pseudo-secularism and minority appeasement policy of Congress to build up a distinct and solid support of Hindu base for itself. Communal ideologies, communal violence as well as the Hindi press all were used by political leaders to create a broad based support base for the party. Following the introduction of Mandal Commission the BJP identified tensions between the different class and caste, and tried to build support among upper caste whose hegemony was threatened by the emergence of backward caste and Dalit movements.

In the post-1993 period the BJP brought some changes in this strategy. The BJP in 1994 began to portray a liberal picture of the party. The BJP while on the one hand, began to invent new techniques of mass mobilization and on the other hand, tried to popularize themselves in order to go beyond middle class, higher caste support base. The BJP in its attempt to incorporate the backward caste demand, not only admitted that the existing quotas in favour of Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Castes would continue, but went one step forward by advocating quota within quota for the MBCs, to win over their support.

Participating in a coalition government where the coalition could survive only on the support of the coalition partners, the BJP had to compromise on its own programme. Yet BJP has not given up its core commitments; for they will keep them to the politics of Hindutva.

Thus, in short, the BJP is not merely a Hindutva party but is also a conservative middle class phenomena which appeals to a new, upwardly mobile
consumer oriented middle class, in small towns and villages of UP. According to Yogendra Yadav, et al.

"In its multi-pronged attempts to win an electoral majority and create for itself somewhat stable support base, the BJP has created a new social bloc, a new coalition of various social groups, that now lays claims to political power. Although religious symbolism has been a trademark of the BJP’s mobilisational strategy, and religious exclusions continue to mark the boundaries of the new social constituency, religion is not one of the principal faultlines in the creation of this new social bloc. The new social bloc is formed by the convergence of traditional caste-community differences and class distinctions."\(^{24}\)

The elaboration and testing of this hypotheses is one of the major tasks of this theses.

**METHODOLOGY**

The social base of the BJP in UP is analysed region-wise. Since UP is one of the biggest state of the Indian Union, we begin our task by dividing the state into seven broad geographical regions. These are Uttarakhand(Hill region/Kumaon), Ruhelkhand, Western UP (Upper Doab and Lower Doab), Bundelkhand, Central UP, Eastern UP and Far East (Poorvanchal). Such a division has been done as BJP is confronted with different parties i.e. SP, BSP, Congress in different regions of the state and a region-wise study will allow a better understanding of its position and strategy vis-à-vis other parties. For example in Western UP, Rohilkhand and eastern UP, the challenge to BJP is from SP; and in Bundelkhand, Eastern UP and parts of Central UP the challenge to BJP is from BSP. Such analysis based on such divisions gives a clearer picture of the support base of BJP in UP. A comparative study of different

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regions is done and on the basis of such analysis, a comprehensive picture on the social base of BJP in the entire state is drawn. As our study includes the period prior to the formation of Uttarakhand as a separate state, for the time being we are going to include it in our study as a part of UP.

The methodology is divided into three sections. Section I deals with the different sources from where data are collected. Section II deals with the method used in data collection—both by me and by the CSDS. Section III deals with the methods of data analysis.

I. The data needed for analysing the social base of BJP in UP, collected from different sources, is broadly divided into two categories:

A) Primary Sources of Data Collection: Fieldwork was conducted by the researcher in two districts of western UP i.e., Meerut and Bulandshahr, in the beginning of 2002.

B) Secondary Sources Of Data Collection: It mainly consists of the books and articles on the UP politics. It also includes the CSDS data. The CSDS, a pioneer of quantitative research in Indian politics, conducted a survey in U.P. region-wise during the 1996 and 2002 Assembly and 1996, 1998 and 1999 Parliamentary elections. Apart from this, it will also include data from the Census of India, 1991 and 2001, and the Parliamentary and Assembly election results of the Election Commission of India.

II METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION: The data collection method is again divided into two sections. Part A chalks out the detail methodology of data collection for the fieldwork conducted by me in two districts of UP. Part B deals with the methodology of data collected by CSDS.

A) In the beginning of 2002, fieldwork was conducted by me in the urban areas of two districts of Western UP, i.e., Meerut and Bulandshahr. Two districts from Western UP were selected, as economically it is the most developed region of the state, and politically the BJP has done comparatively well in this region of the state for the last few years.
The survey was conducted by this researcher at two district towns of UP, namely Bulandshahr and Meerut. Our objective was to get an overall picture of the people's sentiments and inclination with respect to their proposed choice of their party's candidate in the ensuing Assembly election scheduled to be held in February 2002. In order to achieve this objective we proceeded in the following way. (Questionnaire given in Appendix B). The essential points are tabulated here:

1. An appropriate questionnaire was framed in order to find out from respondents whether they were going to cast vote for BJP or not. Additionally the questions were framed in such a way that the respondents would also divulge the reasons for choosing BJP or rejecting BJP.

2. In the two towns, we have chosen different areas/localities representing different caste, religion, profession and economic status of people as far as practicable. And in each of these categories, for example, for a particular caste, people belonging to both economically weak and economically better off sections were chosen.

3. In each town, we have for practical purposes confined ourselves to a 100 or a little more respondents. This figure of 100 or a little more for one town contrast well with respect to national surveys for the entire country conducted by professional bodies and research institutes equipped for this purpose.

4. In selecting respondents from each category as detailed in item number two above, we have as usual followed the random selection procedure.

5. It was my experience as an individual researcher conducting a survey that the respondents behaved and responded in general very courteously. It was also my experience that they spoke out or based their mind only when they learnt that the survey was conducted by a research student for her PhD work.

(B) The CSDS, a pioneer of quantitative research in Indian politics, conducted a survey in UP region-wise during the 1996 and 2002 Assembly elections and
1996, 1998 and 1999 Parliamentary elections. The CSDS\textsuperscript{25} for conducting the fieldwork have followed the probability proportionate to size methodology. In 1996 elections, they selected 20 percent of Parliamentary Constituencies (PC) and Assembly Constituencies (AC), while in 2002 Assembly election only, they selected 10 percent of constituencies. For the purpose of selection of 40 Assembly Constituencies, the probability proportionate to size circular random sampling method was followed, in order to ensure that bigger constituencies were included in the sample. Three polling stations were selected from each chosen AC (totalling to 120 polling stations) by using the simple circular sampling method. And in every PS, 40 respondents (totalling to 4800 respondents) were selected from the voters list using the circular sampling with a random start method.\textsuperscript{26}

**DATA ANALYSIS**

Voting behaviour is a function of several variables and its exact nature cannot be assessed by analysing its association with the particular variables taken separately. In this study, we have adopted a multivariate analysis technique. Multivariate analysis is a branch of statistics which is concerned with analysing multiple measurements made on one or several samples of individuals. For the purpose of data analysis, we will include in our model—caste, class, education, gender, age, occupation and locality. All of these play important parts, yet class and community distinguish themselves as very significant. The class variable produced is cross tabulated with other background variables, i.e., caste and education in order to establish the social profile of the poor and the well to do. A cross-sectional analysis of the entire population of UP is done in order to analyse the social base of BJP.

\textsuperscript{25} For the details on research methodology adopted by the CSDS see: Subrata Mitra and V.B. Singh *Democracy and Social change in India*: A Cross Sectional Analysis of the National Electorate Sage Pub, Delhi, 1999: 285-93.

As far as analysis of the data is concerned, by looking at the internal composition or column percentages of the BJP we analysed the distribution of different caste, class, age, sex etc. within the party. This will tell us as to what percentage of BJP voters are upper caste, OBC, SC, male, female etc. Secondly we also looked at the degree of support that each community gives to the BJP by looking into the row percentages and odds ratios. While the row percentages only show the absolute increase, the odds ratio show the relative increase i.e. whether any change in terms of support base of the party has actually taken place or not. Besides, we looked at the overall effect of community on voting.

"Chi2 is a measure for the difference between the expected and the observed results. The expected results assume null association. That is one would expect all groups within the variable to give same degree of support to the BJP. The greater the difference between the relative levels of support, the greater the Chi2."  

**ODDS RATIO:** "Odds ratio can be understood as a ratio of two different ratios. This summary measure provides a standardised base for comparison, both over time and between groups."  

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28 Ibid.: 2511-17.

EXAMPLE: BJP SUPPORT BY COMMUNITY, ROW PERCENTAGES AND ODDS RATIO IN WESTERN REGION OF UTTAR PRADESH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ROW PERCENT</th>
<th>ODDS RATIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper Caste</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>84.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CSDS Data Unit

For example, in Western UP in 1996, 78.6 percent of upper caste voted for the BJP. This can be expressed as odds of 3.6:1(=78.6/(100-78.6)), which in other words mean that for every 100 Upper Caste people who did not vote for the BJP, there were around 360 Upper Caste people who did. The turnout for all other communities was 39 percent which reduces to odds of 0.63:1(=39/(100-39)). For every 100 people, belonging to different caste, who did not vote for the BJP there were 63 people who did vote for BJP. Thus the ratio between these two odds is called the odds ratio, can be calculated as (3.6:1)/(0.63:1) which equals to 5.8. In the similar fashion in 1998 in Western UP, 84.3 percent upper caste voted for the BJP, which can be expressed as odds of 5.36:1. The turnout for other communities voting for the BJP was 50.4 percent, which can be expressed as odds of 1.01:1. The ratio between these two odds can be calculated as (5.36:1)/(1.01:1) which equals to 5.3. This calculation enable us to analyse that although the row percentages suggest that the support base of the BJP among the upper caste has increased from 1996 to 1998 (from 78.6 percent to 84.3 percent), but it is only by looking at the odds ratio(5.8 in 1996 and 5.3 in 1998), we can argue that the support base of BJP among upper caste has actually decreased in Western UP.
CHAPTERISATION

The work on the subject included in the Ph.D. is divided into five chapters. The introductory chapter outlines the basic argument of the thesis. It also presents a review of literature and the methodology adopted in the study.

In chapter I titled "Ideology, Social Base and Strategies of Electoral Mobilisation of the Jana Sangh in UP: A Background" the ideology of the Jana Sangh, quite akin to that of RSS, and the various attempts to create a viable social and support base that remained, inspite of their efforts, confined to limited sections such as upper caste Hindus, petty traders, business people and educated people with strong liking for Hinduism are discussed.

Chapter II titled "The Bharatiya Janata Party in UP: Construction of a New Ideology in the 1980s" deals with the adoption of new tactics rather than ideology, for example, the adoption of Gandhian Socialism with a view to approach wider section of the people in order to become a viable alternative to Congress. But it did not work.

In Chapter III titled "Electoral Mobilisation and the Performance of the BJP in UP in the 1990s" the BJP's reversion to Hindutva and its short term electoral strategy or strategies in the 1990s along with electoral performance are discussed here. The experience of running coalition government is also discussed here.

In Chapter IV titled "The Social Base of the BJP in UP in 1990s: An Analysis" processing of data obtained from sister research organisation (CSDS) followed by an empirical, yet fairly critical, analysis of the processed data that provide a good fillip of the BJP's social and economic support base in 1990s, namely, for the period 1996-1999 Parliamentary and for 1996 and 2002 Assembly elections are included. A general decline in support in the every section of the support base is noticed.

Chapter V titled "Social Base of BJP in two districts of Western UP: An Analysis of 2002 Assembly Election" deals with my experimental work of undertaking pre-poll field survey, 2002 Assembly election in two districts of UP,
namely, Meerut and Bulandshahr followed by processing the survey data into appropriate data. A fairly critical analysis of the data is done, and the results or conclusions are presented here.

The last section title "Conclusion" covers, in brief, the salient results and analysis issuant principally from preceding works.