CONCLUSION
On the basis of the preceding analysis of ideology, strategies and social base of the BJP, we will conclude broadly from three vantage points:

1. The relationship between Jana Sangh and Bharatiya Janata Party
2. Changing strategies adopted by the BJP since 1980s onwards and;
3. Changing support base of the Bharatiya Janata Party—Caste, class and region-wise

Two major conclusions which emerge from the thesis are:-

a) Bharatiya Janata Party which had a small presence in UP in the early 1980s spread into wider areas and created a strong regional base during the 1990s. Its support base reached a peak in the mid 1990s after which it is facing decline.

b) BJP’s social base is mainly confined to the upper caste, middle class, Baniyas or businessman in particular, with only some support from OBCs and younger educated individuals drawn from all castes.

BJP owes its origin to the formation of Jana Sangh in 1951 end. Its founders included persons belonging to both the old Hindu Mahasabha and RSS, and both. Hindu Mahasabha and RSS are social organisations instead of political parties. Suffice it to say, the thinking of the founders had a profound effect not only on the Jana Sangh but also on the present BJP. True some changes have taken place in their attitudes, some by compulsion and some others due to the prevailing objective conditions in the country.

Since we started our study by looking into the formation of Jana Sangh, we will make a comparative study of Jana Sangh and Bharatiya Janata party. Although the Bharatiya Janata party started a fresh in 1980 by not reverting back to Jana Sangh in order to attract the new entrants, yet BJP has a number of similarities like that of its predecessor Jana Sangh. We list here the similarities as well as the dissimilarities between the Jana Sangh and the BJP, simultaneously.

The first and foremost difference between Jana Sangh and BJP relates to that of the genesis of the two parties. While the Jana Sangh was formed because of the initiative taken by a group of young RSS activists led by Balraj
Madhok, the BJP was formed by a group of ex-Jana Sanghis and ex Janata party members. The formation of the Jana Sangh by the RSS meant that in the initial days RSS exercised a greater control on the working, policy formation and in the organizational set up of the party, with the result that the party was looked at as an right wing party. As against this the BJP started of as a moderate broad based party with no role of RSS. RSS had a lesser control over the BJP. More than the Jana Sangh greater importance was given to the ex-Janata party members.

In terms of policies both BJP and Jana Sangh took up issues which are quite similar in nature. First, both the BJP and Jana Sangh opposed the idea of giving special preferential treatment to the minorities, criticised the Congress government for following the policy of pseudo-secularism and advocated the immediate implementation of Uniform Civil Code. Second, both the party stood in favour of making the Hindi as an official language as against the English. For both the parties, Hindi-Urdu controversy always remained as a primary issue for mobilizing the people. Both the parties opposed to the idea of giving second official language status to the Urdu. Third, for both the parties the abolition of cow slaughter always remained an important issue. Fourthly, as far as foreign policy is concerned for both the BJP and Jana Sangh, Pakistan and Kashmir remained as the most important factors. Both the party demanded the complete integration of Kashmir into India by abrogation of Article 370. In fact Shyama Prasad Mukherjee was the first one to oppose the grant of special status to Kashmir under Article 370. Both the parties oppose the policy of appeasement towards the Pakistan. Fifthly, very early the Jana Sangh formulated its view on democracy by declaring its fundamental philosophy as one country, one nation, one and rule of law. The Jana Sangh declared that their policy of secularism treats every one as equal as against the policy of Muslim appeasement. These policies of Jana Sangh is later adopted by the BJP. The BJP also gave the concept of positive secularism which emphasises the equal treatment of members of majority and minority community. Next in terms of economic policy
both the Jana Sangh and Bharatiya Janata party supported the view that greater encouragement and promotion must be given to the small scale and cottage industries. Both the parties opposed the notion of a state controlled economy. Both the parties advocated for setting up of state controlled industries or public sector undertakings in the field of heavy industries and in the sensitive areas like defence. In the other fields, according to them, the government should promote and encourage the establishment of small scale industries in private sector. Both the parties emphasized on the swadeshi aspect as an important aspect of their economic and industrial policies and programmes.

As far as differences between Jana Sangh and Bharatiya Janata party is concerned, in terms of policies and programmes, the Jana Sangh's view on federalism is different from that of the BJP. The Jana Sangh strongly advocated the creation and adoption of an unitary form of a government as against the federal system of government adopted by India. Jana Sangh always wanted to create a strong Centre and opposed federal system on the ground that the adoption of federal system will lead to division of the country into a number of small antagonistic states. As against this view of Jana Sangh, BJP started of by supporting a federal system of government with strong Centre. But the party soon changed its line because of the frequent arbitrary use of Article 356 by the Centre and therefore demanded the creation of a strong state. The party demanded that more and more power should be given to the state. The party even favours the creation of smaller states, which are economically and administratively viable, by breaking up the bigger states. In terms of foreign policy the BJP moved one step forward to that of Jana Sangh and advocated the development of nuclear capability and testing of nuclear bomb. In terms of economic policy again the BJP went one step ahead of the Jana Sangh and advocated the policy of liberalisation and globalisation of Indian economy. The BJP's economic policy can be termed as 'full liberalisation and calibrated globalization.' The term full liberalisation according to BJP denote complete liberalisation of the internal markets, deregulation, reduction in subsidies,
dismantling of large scale public industries. The term calibrated globalization according to the party denote opening up of only those sectors which is in need of technological upgrading. The party was against the opening up of the consumer sector industries for the foreign investment. However, lately the party has deviated its stand and now the party stood for complete liberalisation and globalization of the economy, as is evident from the BJP governments attempt to bring in reforms in insurance sector, banking and other financial sector, cut down in subsidies and government expenditure, dismantling of Public sector undertakings, etc.

In terms of organizational set up both the parties adopted a well organised elaborated democratic framework for selection and recruitment of members into the party. While the Jana Sangh in the initial days of its formation relied on the Sangathanist model of party building as developed by the RSS, yet the party after 1963 developed and adopted a democratic framework with a clear layout of the party framework at all levels starting of with the lower level i.e. Gram Panchayat or Municipal ward to that of the highest level at State, Regional and National level. The BJP on the other hand from the very beginning adopted a democratic framework of party building starting up with the local committee at lowest level of village.

In terms of strategies both the Jana Sangh and BJP have always oscillated between different set of strategies at different point of time in order to enlarge their support base. These two strategies can be broadly classified as militant and moderate. While the militant strategy emphasised on the development and application of the strategy of ethno-religious mobilisation and have an essentially an anti Muslim connotation in it, the moderate strategy emphasised on building up alliance with the other parties and emphasising on socio-economic populist policies. The Jana Sangh started of with the militant strategy of party building. In the initial years of its formation the party relied on the RSS for the development of the party’s support base in UP. However the over reliance on ethno religious mobilisation proved to be ineffective and the
party changed its strategy to that of a moderate one. After 1960 onwards the party began to relied on the support of local notables i.e. ex-zamindars to win the elections. The party began to distinguish between two types of membership. While, on the one hand, the active members who were at the core of the party, who strictly adhered to the party ideology of the Jana Sangh and RSS, and who used to work for the expansion of the party support base, on the other hand there were the notables, who were located at the periphery, who had a sphere of influence over a large area either because of the fact that he was the landlord or a local leader of a particular area, who helped Jana Sangh to win the election. Apart from that Jana Sangh also entered into alliance with other parties like Swatantra and socialists, and began to emphasise on socio-economic and populist policies. The BJP also since its formation have oscillated between the moderate strategy of emphasising on the socio-economic populist policies to one of the militant strategy of ethno religious mobilisation and the emphasis on the RSS for the development of the party’s support base among the masses. While the Jana Sangh started of with militant strategy and then moved on to adopt the moderate strategy of party building; the BJP on the other hand started of with a moderate strategy and latter on adopted the militant strategy, but again moved on to adopt a moderate strategy. A detail account of the BJP’s strategy will be dealt in the next section. However it must be noted that both Jana Sangh and BJP never exclusively focused on socio-economic and populist policies. Even when they consciously toned down their reliance on the militant strategy they still made some attempt to exploit those local grievances which have a Hindu Muslim connotation in it.

Secondly, the preceding analysis of ideology, strategy and social base of the party enables us to conclude that the BJP since its inception in 1980 has adopted different strategies at different points of time in order to enlarge its support base in UP. Before tracing the changing strategies adopted by the BJP at different points of time, let us look into the evolution of BJP vis a vis other parties in India. It has already been pointed that BJP’s fall will be attended by
some other party's rise and vice-versa. Let us, in what follows, sketch BJP's evolution vis-a-vis other political parties in India, since the political atmosphere of the country should be taken into account. Congress as Congress(I) lost its deep seated or deep rooted party structure not only at state levels but deep into village levels.

In the 1980s a number of developments helped in the growth of BJP in UP. One, was the decline of the Congress which provided the space for the emergence and growth of not only the BJP but also of the other parties. Second, the Congress since the Mrs Indira Gandhi's period had already introduced communal mobilisation in politics as an opportunistic steps purely to keep themselves in power. BJP had also to take the opportunistic step, as an antidote to caste politics, of raising Hindutva in a big way.

Thus, the BJP, which in 1980 started of as a broad based party by giving priority to the principle of Gandhian Socialism and projected issues like socio-economic policies affecting the common people, took on to the opportunistic politics in a bigger way partially due to the adoption by the Congress party of communalist politics like the Shah Bano case and the opening of the locks of the Babri Mosque by Rajiv Gandhi as PM, and partially due to its failure to expand its own support base in UP. As a result the party adopted the strategy of ethno-religious mobilisation particularly since mid 1980s onwards. The party participated in the Ramjanamabhoomi movement in a big way along with other Hindu nationalist organisations like RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal. The Ramjanamabhoomi movement helped the BJP in polarising the communities along the religious lines and in accumulating the Hindu support. However the BJP's attempt to unite people along the religious lines received a serious setback when the V.P. Singh government at Centre took the decision to implement the policy of reservation. The reservation policy broke down the BJP's hegemony over the Hindus by taking away the Backward castes Hindus from the BJP hold. The Mandal commission report forced the BJP to adopt the Ramjanamabhoomi movement in a bigger way. The strategy of ethno-religious
mobilisation enabled the party in 1991 to emerge as the single largest party in UP.

Soon after the 1991 election while the BJP wanted to give priority to the strategy of socio-economic populist policies under Kalyan Singh, but the VHP which helped the party in winning the election was not ready to give up the Ramjanambhoomi movement. The BJP's gain from the strategy of ethno-religious movement proved to be short lived particularly after the demolition of the Babri Mosque in December 6, 1992 at Ayodhya. The important BJP leaders themselves criticised the act of demolition and put the issue of building up of the temple at Ayodhya to the back burner. The actual impact of the Mosque demolition in terms of electoral politics was seen when the party performed badly in the 1993 elections. The BJP changed its strategy and began to project itself as a responsible party by focusing on policies for the welfare of larger section of the population.

In the 1996 election BJP in order to win the support of the Backward castes advocated the policy of reservation not only for them but also ten percent of reservation for the economically poor among all the castes. The BJP made an attempt to attract even the Muslims within its fold by promising to look into and solve the problems of education and employment of the Muslims. In 1996, 1998 and 1999 election BJP did not openly campaign on the issue of building of a Ram temple at Ayodhya. In the 1998 and 1999 elections, the BJP moderated its stance and issued a National Agenda of Governance along with other parties. It dropped four controversial issues like building of mandir at Ayodhya, creation of a Uniform Civil Code, creation of Human Rights Commission in place of National Minorities Commission and abrogating Article 370 which gives greater autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir. The party in 2000 in an attempt to expand and consolidate its support base among the dalits appointed Bangaru Laxman, a Dalit from Andhra pradesh, as the party President. The BJP in the 2002 Assembly election went one step forward by advocating quota within quota system of reservation for the Most Backwards among the OBCs. This strategy
was adopted in order to expand its support base among the largely hitherto unmobilized section of the Backwards.

Although the compulsion of gaining power and running a coalition government obliged the BJP to adopt moderation the BJP has never given up its militant policies altogether. While there have been enough instances of tactical shifts in the BJP policies, yet there has been few instances of actual shift in the BJP’s ideology. As a result BJP engages in double speak. For example although the BJP has over the years kept the issue of temple building to a back burner, in reality it has never forgotten the issue altogether. This is evident from the fact that in 1998 and 1999 election, the then UP Chief Minister Ram Prakash Gupta declared that construction of temple at Ayodhya had and would always remain an important aspect of BJP’s agenda. In 2002 elections the construction of temple at Ayodhya was again taken up as an issue in the election. There have been two faces of BJP—one when it sits in opposition and one when it form the government. The BJP when in opposition takes up the communally sensitive issues to polarise the Hindu vote along these lines. But when it comes to power in alliance with other parties, they keep these issues at one side. In fact the coalition politics forced the BJP to moderate their stances. However the party has not totally given up issues like abrogation of Article 370, creation of Human Rights Commission, creation of Uniform Civil Code and most importantly building up of the temple. The party takes up these issues whenever an election is due as a mobilisational strategy to gain votes.

Thirdly, the thesis attempted to look into the social base of the BJP in terms of caste, class and region. First let me summarise the essential conclusions drawn from the CSDS survey covering the 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2002 Parliamentary and Assembly elections; and my own fieldwork in Bulandshahr and Meerut city, leading to voters choices for BJP based on caste, class education, sex, age, religion and locality.

The fieldwork conducted in two districts of Western UP shows that in both the districts it is the Upper Caste (Meerut 51.2 percent; Bulandshahr 65
percent), upper class (Meerut 36.1 percent; Bulandshahr 50 percent), and the middle class (Meerut 56.1 percent; Bulandshahr 32.5 percent) which gives maximum support to the party. The second most important community which gives maximum support to the BJP is the OBC (Meerut 34.1 percent; Bulandshahr 20 percent).

The fieldwork conducted in two districts of Western UP helps us to conclude that the voters preference for a party is determined by the issues and the images of the party. It was found that although a number of the BJP supporters, who mainly belong to the Upper Caste-middle class category in Meerut and more of Upper Caste-upper middle class category in Bulandshahr, may not be happy with the working of the BJP government, but they still would go for the BJP because their community or the other members of the family would vote for the BJP. They vote for the BJP because they had been doing so for the last so many years. However even this identified BJP supporters are not completely satisfied with the BJP government’s rule in UP. This sections main allegation against the then ruling BJP government was that the government has not tried to improve their economic conditions over a period of time. Still another lot of people are their who would vote for the BJP, but they asserted at the same time that the BJP must try to improve its nature of functioning. While the people are usually not aware of the bigger economic and developmental issues, the everyday issues like price rise, education, corruption, etc. seemed to be the most important issues which concern the people the most. It is found that the local developmental issues affect the people’s choice of party. This is true of the middle class among almost all castes.

Next, we summarise the result derived from the CSDS result, in terms of caste:

1. In Ruhelkhand the Upper Caste support for the party has been 85.3 in 1996 Lok Sabha, 82.6 percent in 1996 Assembly, 88.9 percent in 1998 Lok Sabha and 51.5 percent in 2002 Assembly election.
2. In Western UP the Upper Caste support for the party has been 78.6 percent in 1996 Assembly, 70.6 percent in 1996 Lok Sabha, 84.3 percent in 1998 Lok Sabha, and 88.3 percent in 2002 Assembly. In Western UP the OBC support for the party has been 36.6 percent in 1996 Assembly, 60 percent in 1998 Lok Sabha, 75 percent in 1999 Lok Sabha and 57.1 percent in 2002 Assembly.

3. In Bundelkhand the Upper Caste support for the party has been 72.2 percent in 1996 Assembly, 95.5 percent in 1996 Lok Sabha, 91.7 percent in 1998 Lok Sabha and 84.6 percent in 2002 Assembly. In Bundelkhand the OBC support for the party has been 32.4 percent in 1996 Assembly, 56 percent in 1996 Lok Sabha, 81 percent in 1998 Lok Sabha, 50 percent in 1999 Lok Sabha, 31.5 percent in 2002 Assembly election.

4. In Central UP the Upper Caste support for the party has been 85.2 percent in 1996 Assembly, 81.5 percent in 1996 Lok Sabha, to 85.7 percent in 1998 Lok Sabha, and 61.3 percent in 2002 Assembly. In Central UP the OBC support for the party has been 48.7 percent in 1996 Assembly, 33.3 percent in 1996 Lok Sabha, 50.6 percent in 1998 Lok Sabha, 29.1 percent in 1999 Lok Sabha and, 23.8 percent in 2002 Assembly election.

5. In Eastern UP the Upper Caste support for the party has deviated from 78.2 percent (1996 Assembly) to 97.1 percent (1996 Lok Sabha) to 75.9 percent (1998 Lok Sabha) to 36.8 percent in (2002) Assembly.

6. In Far Eastern UP the Upper Caste support for the party has deviated from 75.3 percent (1996 Assembly) to 79.3 percent (1996 Lok Sabha) to 50 percent (1998 Lok Sabha) to 65 percent in (2002) Assembly.

On the basis of the analysis of the voting behaviour of the Upper Caste, it can be safely concluded that this caste seems to give their whole hearted support to the BJP in almost the entire UP. The support of this caste for other parties had been around 15 to 20 percent since 1990s. It is true that the support of this caste to the party has declined in 2002 and this decline had been more
significant in Eastern and Ruhelkhand region. The reason for the decline can be attributed to the lack of governance, corruption etc. during the BJP's rule in UP.

Second we summarise the result in terms of class:

1. In Western UP the BJP secured the support of 52.2 percent of the middle class (1996 Assembly); in 1996 LS the party secured 45.2 percent support; in 1999 secured 42.3 percent support; in 2002 the party secured 52.8 percent support of the middle.

2. In Bundelkhand the BJP secured the support of 39.6 percent of the middle class (1996 Assembly; in 1996 LS the party secured 67.9 percent support; in 1999 LS the party secured 57.1 percent support; in 2002 the party secured 50 percent support.

3. In Central UP the BJP secured the support of 49.6 percent of the middle class (1996 Assembly); in 1996 LS the party secured 50.3 percent support as; in 1999 LS the party secured 50 percent support; in 2002 the party secured 38.8 support of the upper middle class.

4. In East UP the BJP secured the support of 53.5 percent of the middle class (1996 Assembly); in 1996 LS the party secured the support of the 39 percent of the middle class; in 1999 in eastern UP the party secured the support of 28.9 percent of the middle class; in 2002 the party secured the support of the 35.7 percent of the upper middle class.

5. In Far Eastern UP the party secured the support of the 38.7 percent of the middle class (1996 Assembly); in 1996 LS the party secured 33.6 percent support; in 1999 the party secured 27.1 percent support; in 2002 the party secured 38.1 percent support.

Thus among the classes it is the middle class and upper middle class which form the identified supporter of the party.

In each region of UP as discussed above as well as in detail in chapter four the common observation is the following: The BJP’s capacity to catch votes can be expressed in decreasing order of magnitudes as Upper Caste, OBC and negligible fraction of SC and Muslim. If
one categorises on the basis of class, middle class followed by upper class are the principal supporters of BJP while the poor and very poor class form the negligible section. The well off section within every caste favours BJP. Interestingly the more the educated, the greater they support BJP. On the basis of sex, females inspite of strong bias to religion lend less support to BJP.

An analysis of the regional base of the party in UP shows that it has actually experienced a decline in all regions since 1999. Western UP where the party had developed a strong support base among the Upper Caste and backward caste Hindus like Jats has experienced a decline, inspite of the fact that the BJP has entered into an alliance with RLD in 2002. The BJP’s decline in the region is directly linked to the gain of seats in the region by the SP. Central UP where the BJP used to have a good support base among both the Upper Caste and OBC witnessed a decline since 1999 onwards. The Upper Caste who deviated to the BJP by deserting Congress during the Ayodhya movement have deserted the BJP during the recent times because of the BJP’s attempt to introduce reservation for the OBCs. The support base of the party even among the OBCs also declined to a great extent. Here both the SP and BSP is giving a tough competition to the BJP. Eastern UP also witnessed a decline in the BJP’s support base. The region has a large number of backward, most backward castes and dalits. The BJP’s is finding it tough to expand its support base among the OBC’s in this region due to competition from both SP and BSP. In short, the support base of the BJP in the entire UP has declined in almost all regions particularly since 1999.

Thus, the BJP created in 1980 had a ready made social base in certain parts of Uttar Pradesh built up by Jana Sangh during their existence for nearly thirty years, i.e., 1951 to 1980. Inspite of that available base, it took nine years for BJP to get an overall majority in UP Assembly by securing 223 seats, an all time record for BJP, in the 1991 election. The percentage of votes increased from 10.6 percent in 1980 to 31.6 percent in 1991. In 1993 and 1996 elections, it was able to maintain a respectable position by securing 177 and 174 seats
respectively. The year 2002 UP election gave BJP a rude shock when the number of seats sank to as low as 88.

Within UP economic reform has usually not been the basis of political mobilisation. Rather it was the Mandir and Mandal issue together with identity politics which has dominated politics in 1990s. However the situation has changed in the more recent times as observed by this scholar when she conducted her fieldwork in 2002. The economic and developmental issues are the most important issues at the local level for the people. All political parties in India are trying to create support base by using caste or religion based mobilisation to obtain electoral support. But the crux of the problem here lies in the fact that within a caste, say, SC or OBC, there are so many subdivisions along sub caste lines which are reflected in politics. It’s not possible to keep more than one caste division under one political party. In UP while the Jatav form the back bone of the support base of the BSP, it is the Balmikis and Pasis who formed the backward and poorer dalit group who give some support to the BJP out of their anger against the BSP, which they consider as a chamar party. Within the OBCs, the Lodhs, Kurmis and Jats give support to the BJP in UP, for they consider the SP as a Yadav party. However within these sections also, it is the well off section who usually vote for the BJP. The MBCs may vote for the BJP if BJP government promises to provide some opportunities to them in purely economic terms. What we have understood from our fieldwork is that these people usually fall in the category of floating supporters of the BJP in UP. Under such objective conditions, the permanent expansion of the support base in U.P. by BJP is farfetched. What we have observed from our analysis of the poll survey and the actual election results is that BJP’s overall support base is not permanent resulting in a drop of seats as seen in the last assembly elections, 2002. For example, BJP’s support base within upper caste, middle class, businessman or baniyas in particular in an Assembly area, say A, is now-a-days, not also permanent. A simple abstaining from casting their vote during the
election is enough to ruin the party’s success. In fact this is one of the primary reason for the poor performance of the party in UP.

The study shows that developmental issues and performance of the ruling party does play an important role at the constituency level. The impact of corruption, poor governance, meaning failure to provide civic amenities, like regular electric supply, good road, hospitals and health facilities, remunerative prices to the farmers and so on have an profound impact on the ruling party’s support base in the election ahead. The study shows that in many areas the same party finds it difficult to win consecutive elections from the same constituency.

The Jana Sangh and now BJP has support base in UP, whether permanent or floating, in any constituency—old or newly acquired, essentially only amongst upper caste, middle class, baniyas or business community( note: the term middle class indeed includes younger educated people) and is unable to widen its social base. When the Jana Sangh sought to enter into the UP politics, the space, was not vacant. They had to confront not only Congress but the Socialists parties such as the SSP, PSP and later on the BKD. These socialist parties introduced what may be termed as Indian brand of socialism, perhaps somewhat akin to Gandhiji’s thinking on socialism, namely village industries, small industries and so on. In effect these brands or groups of Socialists appealed to the Indian psyche. Additionally like Jana Sangh, the Hindu traditionalists within Congress, all wanted Hindi to be the national language of India. In this situation, Jana Sangh was able to put forward in the 1960s its own distinct ideology in the form of Integral Humanism of Deendayal Upadhaya, and carve out a social and regional base in the state. Jana Sangh was not content by appealing to Indian psyche, theirs was a compartmentalised approach: to approach the Hindus and the Hindu way of living as practised over centuries. The party relied on issues such as Hindi-Urdu controversy, cow slaughter, small scale industry etc., which appealed to the Hindu psyche.
Implicitly or explicitly, that approach resulted in the exclusion of Muslims in UP and in the entire country.

Consequently, when the BJP entered the UP politics in 1980, it built on the ideology and social base created by the erstwhile Jana Sangh. It is obvious that the party could appeal to UP Hindu residents, already entrenched with everything Indian, with the slogan of Hindu way of living, enhancing rather than protecting Hindus rights and consequently desiring lesser appeasement of Muslims. Naturally, they find the support amongst upper caste persons, who are fond of perpetuating and practising, at least, outwardly, the Hindu way of living, i.e. customs etc. Next, the middle class, usually the vanguard of social change as universally accepted, also belonged largely to upper caste who were eager to gain the benefits of economic development in the post independence period from the Congress party. And, since the Congress could not satisfy the economic, social and civic demands of the people, in general, and the middle class in particular, the middle class shifted to the Jana Sangh to some extent and more particularly to the BJP since 1991 onwards.

However by the late 1990s this support to the BJP from the Upper Caste and educated middle class has declined due to deteriorating economic conditions and increasing corruption in UP. In fact, it can be said that the support base of the BJP among all caste and class groups in UP has been experiencing a decline.

In conclusion it can be said that UP society and politics has undergone severe fragmentation along caste and religious lines. If the BJP wishes to enlarge its support base and emerge as ruling party in UP it will have to address economic and developmental issues which cater to the needs of the people, irrespective of their caste, creed and religion. In other words, this will require a policy where people in general will get the benefit in their daily life namely basic health facilities, drinking water and basic minimum food at the village level, and the generation of better purchasing capacity of the people. Also the BJP must eschew the use of identity politics in elections and must reform its internal
functioning and, must put forward programmes to meet the needs of the people. The BJP must realise that the doling out of benefits in the form of promises at the time of elections can work once but not twice. This is what we have observed through our study.