CONCLUSION
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The analytical survey presented in the foregoing five chapters of the study has sought to throw light on the doctrinal evolution of the theories of the foreign policy articulations of Soviet Union during the period ending in 1939 when the political crisis in the world finally escalated into the terrible clash and holocaust of the Second World War. The above evolutionary process holds a seminal importance inasmuch as it went through all its polemics and controversies and also its various shifts and adjustments, imposed upon it by the swirling course of events in Soviet Union's post-revolutionary period, to gain for the nation's foreign policy a pragmatic pattern and a sense of direction. The spinal strength and support, of course, came invariably and inevitably from the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. But the foreign policy, as such, in its practical and implementational bearings, though developing along the above doctrinal paths, assumed its typical character as the uniquely new nation was drawn more and more into the vortex of international politics where it had to hold its own amidst nations that were positively hostile to it, at any rate suspicious of it. At home too the Soviet leadership was riven with doctrinal discords, the controversial heat often reaching the boiling point, and consuming many a leading figure within the steaming cauldron of controversy and dissension. In course of all these ordeals the tints deepened giving the picture the clarity of perspective, of dimensions and of articulatory effects, which in the longer run provided the foreign policy with its purposive
firmness and steadiness. Till 1939, therefore, the Soviet foreign policy remained wedded to certain basic goals, and this specifically on account of the doctrinal interpretations of Marxism-Leninism given from time to time by the Soviet leaders. The dynamics of policy formulation, closely dependent upon and interrelated with the changing scenario of home and foreign politics, did necessitate adjustments and modifications of the stances and strategies, but it was entirely due to the doctrinal genius which from within continued to vitalise the policy that the foreign policy of Soviet Union, at times rigid and at times resilient, remained on the whole set in certain uniform patterns. It is this important aspect which is explained in the following remark by a scholar in his examination of the Soviet foreign policy till the guns began to boom on the two sides of the Maginot Line:

The War did not bring a basic reorientation in Soviet foreign policy because nothing during its last stages or the immediate post-war period affected the cardinal point of the Soviet analysis of international relations: the self-destructive tendency of the capitalist world and its utter inability to reconstruct a feasible social order...

With some modifications the guiding principles of post-war policies remained the ones of 1921-39. 1

In the present study the Soviet foreign policy articulations until the beginning of the Second World War have been attempted to be seen in the correct perspective by tracing their courses and contours within the magnetic field of Marxism-

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Leninist doctrine. The examination of the various concepts, i.e., the magnetic forces, expressed through the actual process of policy formulation, has been pursued by the proper correlation of theory and practice. Thus the aim motivating the study has been to unfold the vital core of Soviet foreign policy during the important formative stage of its growth, development and implementation. The process, thus thrown to light in this study, has a strong rationale in the field of international relations. Stronger still it goes to highlight how the socialist order, which has ever kept its aim of revolution in order to destroy the capitalist-monopolist order and usher in the dictatorship of the proletariat on the forefront of its national and international policies, has used its theoretical light to guide its course in the maelstrom of contentions and conflicts both in the domestic and international arenas where the acute differences in theoretical interpretations have been accompanied with the nation's difficult position in international politics in which the capitalist powers have always treated it with indifference, contempt, suspicion and hostility.

The rationale behind the present study is further affirmed if the Soviet foreign policy is examined in a still larger perspective (which, however, is beyond the scope of this study). Although after the Second World War nothing really new or original was added to the basic theories of Soviet foreign policy, which have been fully examined in the five preceding chapters of the present study, these went through recurring processes of reinterpretation in order that the policy might fully square up with the new
international situation. Hence the theories as examined in the present study also hold the strong rationale for any examination of the Soviet foreign policy even in the completely changed world situation after 1945. The top Soviet leaders themselves have never failed to underline the doctrinal basis of the nation's policies. And the present study in this respect seeks its validity as the fully traced out graph of these doctrinal currents.

For example, in The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, Stalin's last major work published in 1952, it was stated that war among the capitalist states was more likely than a war between the capitalist states and the Soviet Union. This was just a timely interpretation, in the perspective of the post-Second World War period, to the Leninist theory of War. Lenin had taught that war between capitalists was inevitable. The capitalist system had within it the unavoidable and inherent contradictions and cross-purposes that caused war within the system itself. Lenin also believed that the capitalist states would try to destroy the Soviet state by war, and the period of intervention from 1918 to 1919 provided the evidence for this theoretical belief. The present fallout of this, as we see, is the global confrontation of the Soviet bloc and the American bloc with the danger of a thermonuclear war deepening every day.

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Under Stalin no other doctrinal reinterpretation in this regard took place in Soviet foreign policy. But after Stalin's death Nikita Khrushchev did make some slight modifications.

Under Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1953-64) and Chairman of the Council of Ministers (1953-64), the theory of war and coexistence was adapted to the changed international political situation. Stalin's approach to war, as indicated above, was further modified by Khrushchev. At the 20th Party Congress of 1956 he described nuclear war as avoidable. At the 21st Party Congress of 1959 he stated that owing to the predominance of the Socialist system a world war would be impossible and at the Bucharest Conference of the Eastern Bloc in 1960 he declared that even local war could be prevented. However, he regarded wars of national liberation and civil wars as inevitable.


5 In the Programme of the CPSU adopted at its 22nd Congress it is stated, "It is possible to avert a world war by the combined efforts of the mighty socialist camp, the peace-loving non-socialist countries, the international working class and all the forces championing peace". See The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Adapted at the 22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U. October 31, 1961, Soviet Booklet No. 83 (London, December 1961), p. 41.

From the avoidability of international wars Khrushchev deduced the long-term nature of peaceful co-existence, which for him assumed the quality of a positive force not only in tactics but also in strategy. This has been explained, asserted and reasserted in thousands of speeches by Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders of this phase of Soviet foreign policy.

Ponomaryov even went so far, in 1960, as to describe peaceful co-existence as the highest form of class struggle. The 1961 Party programme speaks of a "specific form of class struggle", of which economic competition is one of the elements. In this respect the theoreticians went in for making a fine distinction between two types of partners.

These principles of peaceful co-existence, according to this duality of approach, apply only to relations between states with different social systems, whereas within the

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7 Khrushchev told this fact in an interview given by him to William Randolph Hearst, the editor-in-chief and owner of Hearst Newspaper: "We have declared repeatedly that the Leninist principle of co-existence of all countries, irrespective of their social system or state structure, is the unshakable foundation of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries". See N.S. Khrushchev: Verbatim Reports of Two Interviews Granted to American Newspaper Men, Soviet News Booklet No. 20, 49 (London, n.d.), p. 29.

8 Many reasons are given to support this theory. One of them is this: Peaceful co-existence has reached "a time when socialism is increasingly asserting its superiority and when new class alignments are taking shape in the capitalist countries ... in the final analysis, go over to socialism much more quickly", Boris Ponomaryov, Some Problems of the Revolutionary Movement (Prague, 1975), pp. 12-15.


10 Ibid.
socialist camp itself they take second place to the principles of proletarian internationalism. The latter is thus assumed to function as the driving force among the socialist countries. In this connection it could be seen that various factors had worked behind this reconsideration of the concept of co-existence. On one side, for the first time in the world, Communists were able to seize power in a number of countries outside USSR in some of which, as in Yugoslavia, Albania and People's Republic of China there were symptoms of intolerance of Soviet Union's leadership over all the nations in the socialist-communist bloc. The fear of schisms in the international communist movement loomed large. At home Soviet Union was facing mounting problems in regard to adequate production of foodstuff and essential consumer goods. This also necessitated a cautiously conciliatory policy towards the non-communist nations of the world from where alone the Soviet Union's domestic shortfalls could be replenished.

Khrushchev recognized the uncommitted status of the Leninist theory of colonial revolution and its further interpretations by Stalin -- the idea of national democratic revolution. But he was concerned to induce the developing countries, most of whom had gained independence from colonial

11. Khrushchev stated regarding this, "We are guided by the principles of proletarian internationalism, friendship and brotherly co-operation between peoples, in mutual relations between socialist states. When we talk about co-existence, we have in mind socialist and capitalist states. Those forces oppose each other; antagonistic contradictions exist between them". Quoted in Wladyslaw W. Kuiski, Peaceful Co-existence: An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago, 1959), p. 134.
rule, to take the non-capitalist road and to combine only with
the socialist countries in forming a "broad peace zone" or
united anti-imperialist front. Khrushchev attributed only
secondary importance to national liberation movements. At the
20th Party Congress he explained that there were many forms of
transition to socialism, thus making it possible to bring about
the revolution by peaceful or even by parliamentary means at
least in the most favourable cases. This, he added, did not
imply renunciation of the use of force, and hence of interven-
tion, as a political instrument, which retained their validity
as the ultimate weapons. But less strident and less aggressive
methods, even some of the 'bourgeois' methods were not precluded
by the revolutionary imperative.

Within the communist system of states mutual socialist
aid and coordination of activities were turned into an obliga-
tion for the hegemonial power, i.e. the Soviet Union, to
intervene in order to safeguard the interests of and maintain
an existing Communist regime and its socialist achievements
(s.e., of Hungary in 1956). This might appear as a completely
new line. But in reality the idea behind it stemmed from the
leninist line of securing the fullest development and
consolidation of the socialist cause in the international

12 Khrushchev, n. 3, p. 23. See also Wassil'eva,
"Raspad Kolonial'noi sistery imperializma",
13 Ibid., pp. 44-45.
14 See the speech by Foreign Minister Shepilov in the
General Assembly of the United Nations, November 19,
1959 in H. Hanak, Soviet Foreign Policy since the Death
arena round the pivot of Soviet Union as the first Communist state in the world against the capitalist-imperialists.

As far as the theoretical contents of the Leninist-Stalinist foreign policy are concerned, after the fall of Khrushchev no essential change took place, though the emphases in certain important points have had to be rearranged and readjusted in order to face new emergencies brought about by changes in the world situation. Quite evidently the Leninist-Stalinist views of capitalism and imperialism, war, national liberation and peace have not been abandoned by the Soviet leaders. The concepts of world revolution and peaceful co-existence still hold the same value. Hence the logical bases of the long-range and short-range strategies that were founded and implemented at Brest-Litovsk in the wake of the October Revolution, have continued to inspire Soviet policies during the past 65 years. When the same phenomenon is seen in another way, it is discernible that the theories developed by 1939 remain in effect to this day.

This doctrinal continuity of Soviet foreign policy is undoubtedly due to its certain constant elements, the exposure to which has been given and examined in the preceding chapters of this study. As it can be seen, these constant elements are the cardinal elements, that have been often shuffled round and grouped in different patterns according to the necessity of particular periods and situations. For instance, during Stalin's period, the concept of co-existence took on a certain programmatic aspect and was elaborated as one part of a
comprehensive Soviet light on international relations and foreign policy in what was called the "imperialist epoch of wars and proletarian revolutions". But the basic set of elements as such have always retained the same validity, relevance and application rationale. These elements, already elaborated in the previous pages, may be listed here in a succinct manner. There are in the main four such essential elements:

1. Ensuring the strength and security of the Soviet Socialist system.
2. Proletarian Internationalism intended for the unity of the world Communist movement.
3. The co-existence of states with differing social systems to allow breathing space for the consolidation of the world communist cause.
4. The ultimate goal -- to bring revolution all over the world.

The first and the third elements had been the interpretations, as it were, forced upon the Soviet leaders, by the reality coming up during the course of the application of the concept of world revolution by the Soviet Government. The second and the fourth elements are purely Marxian principles. Thus the theories of Soviet foreign policy are a synthesis of Marxist principles and the cognate ideas that emerged during the course of its application by the Bolsheviks after the successful October revolution. In this connection, the noted authority, E.H. Carr, has remarked:

What, therefore, ultimately resulted from the long debates over Brest-Litovsk was not the dramatic defeat of one principle by another.
but the slow hammering out of a synthesis which was to shape Soviet relations with the world for several years to come. 15

As a result of this synthesis a dynamic line of thinking was evolved, which helped the Soviet leaders to effect an identification of the national interest of USSR with the interests of world Socialism. For instance, at the very beginning when Lenin adopted the peace policy it was a peace essential for the Russian Revolution to go its full course in a smooth manner as well as for the security of the young Soviet Government. Even otherwise, no country's foreign policy is entirely unrelated to its internal policy. In the case of the Soviet Union its foreign policy is an extension of the Soviet political system. This extension is clearly visible when the Soviet leaders try to explain specific developments both inside and outside the Soviet Union. A stage comes when the policy is modified or readjusted to meet a changed situation. In the course of this change there may take place retreat in the application of certain programmes to achieve the main goal. Such retreat, as we have seen, has become peaceful co-existence, albeit as a purely temporary measure, a practical necessity.

In the first phase (during the initial emergence of Soviet foreign policy) the concept of 'peace' was projected. In the second stage the necessity of co-existence with different political systems revealed itself as an inevitable

tactic solely for the advantage and gain of the socialist cause. But these were not exclusive of each other. Thus in the third period both joined together — peaceful co-existence — to enable the construction of socialism in one country and ensure greater proletarian headway and unity in other countries.

As Marx had no faith in the frontiers of nations and instead believed in the solidarity of the workers of the entire world to make world revolution, the Soviet Government has followed the same line and constantly appealed to the workers of the world to unite against their own rulers and support the real representatives of their interests, the Russian Bolsheviks. And the Bolsheviks expected revolutions in other countries, at least a greater leeway for the proletarian forces all over the world simply because this would be helpful for the survival of the Soviet Union and the ultimate victory of socialism. On the basis of this principle of proletarian solidarity or proletarian internationalism, the Soviet leaders repudiated the traditional concept of "foreigner" and the legal concept of "citizenship". Armed with this principle, the Soviet Government assumed even the right to intervene on behalf of its supporters in other countries who were being persecuted under the laws of bourgeois states. This 'go tough' policy, however, was fitted into the synthetical framework so as to proceed alongside the policies of co-existence or peaceful co-existence of nations, and all with a view to gaining greater leverage for the socialist cause both at home and abroad.
The theory of national liberation movement developed by Lenin was intended to mobilize deliberately all dissatisfaction and bitterness of the peasants of the East and to put the same to political use. Here the Soviets even effected a modicum of change in the Marxian principle of the different stages of attaining Communism. In short, in the process, Lenin himself had given a sharpened expression to the doctrines of Karl Marx especially in evolving a foreign policy for the first state, progressing rapidly and inevitably towards the be all and end all — the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The signal success, this seminally Leninist foreign policy achieved from 1917 and especially through World War II, is one of unparalleled magnitude in the history of diplomacy. Founded upon principles directly hostile to the established international order and frankly proclaiming its hostility to the principles upon which every capitalist government was based, the Soviet state not only avoided being crushed by the forces of the entrenched bourgeois order but step by step, and upon the level of equality, entered into normal diplomatic and commercial relations with the world of capitalism.