CHAPTER – V
IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND YUGOSLAVIA

The question of ideology as core component governing Soviet foreign relations remained central to the Soviet-Yugoslav split, later, the rapprochement and the normalization of relation in the sixties. The victory of Yugoslavia in the Second World War and the establishment of an independent regime under the astute leadership of Marshall Tito was the first major concern of the Soviet Union under the leadership of Stalin. This explains why Stalin increased the cohesiveness of ideology and used it as a weapon to promote unity among other East European countries and challenged the independence of Yugoslavia.

However, the independence of Yugoslavia had nothing in essence to challenge the Soviet model of socialism and development because Yugoslavia developed a system to cope up with its situation. The county had attained a certain level of political and economic development when socialism came to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs claimed that they had found a different model of socialism, which suited the situation in Yugoslavia. These were some of the major differences that led to the split with the Soviet Union. It must be noted that Yugoslavia was also implementing the Marxist model of development as had the Soviet Union, but its interpretation differed with that of the Soviet Union.

While it has been seen in the previous chapters that the two countries had major ideological differences in building socialism, it cannot be denied that
there were no basic differences on party structure, on the issue of
democratic centralism, centralized planning, ideological class struggle,
state ownership of heavy industries.

In this chapter Soviet-Yugoslav perception of ideology will be discussed in
three sections. It will be discussed in the regional and international
contexts. But the primary focus will be on what made Yugoslavia different
from the Soviet system. This will help in understanding the basic
differences and the disagreement between the two socialist countries.
Therefore, the understanding of ideology at the bilateral level will be
followed by regional and international level. This is important because
Yugoslavia's own road to socialism differed from the Soviet model of
communism. Yugoslavia began to see communism in its domestic context
and developed the system of management rather than ideology to maintain
the independence of the country and the economic development of the
people.

The Changing Scenario (Yugoslav Way)

Yugoslavia emerged out of the Second World War as an independent
state. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia seized power independently,
with only limited support from the Red Army. However, the foundations of
this seizure of power had been the Yugoslav communist's own programme
to end the conflict among the Yugoslav nations, resistance to the foreign
occupier, and to the satisfaction of some of the aims of the pent-up peasant
radicalism that was left frustrated by the pre-communist regime.¹ This gave the Yugoslav Communist Party a measure of domestically generated legitimacy. The circumstances after 1948 required the League of Communists of Yugoslavia to develop new theories to replace orthodox interpretations of Marx, Engel, and Lenin that did not suit Yugoslav conditions. Having their own "creatively developed" ideological views, the Yugoslavs began to drift away from other East European communist parties loyal to the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia proclaimed that the Soviet Union was a country with "state capitalist" system and affirmed that the only way to remain independent would be to abandon completely the Soviet theory of "ideological units," thus rejecting the Soviet Union tutelage in ideological matters.²

The break with Stalin constrained the Yugoslav leadership to re-examine the basis of its power to maintain its independence and to establish socialism. President Marshall Tito's post-war programme of modernisation, concentrated on economic change and advancement, attracted genuine political support to develop a system of self-management while using the Soviet union as a model. But President Tito put across the idea that the Yugoslav model is valid in Yugoslavia only and the Soviet one must be followed elsewhere (particularly in Eastern Europe). As such he insisted on various 'roads to socialism.'³ As a result, from the ideological point of view that was aimed at developing world communist movement, the Soviet-

² ibid; p. 271
³ ibid; p. 272
Yugoslav stand remained hostile to each other and often led to hard criticisms and open polemics till the break up of both the federations.

The open rift with the Soviet Union in 1948 deprived Yugoslavia external poles of legitimacy. But the development of self-management between 1950 and 1952 provided new ideological bedrock for the system. The emergence of non-aligned movement scuttled political centralism and moved Yugoslav communism far from the bloc applications. Thus in the process of their incremental adjustment and readjustments of the system, the Yugoslavs managed to invert the original contradictions of communism between control and efficiency on the one hand and between planning and democracy on the other, so that, in the Yugoslav "inversion," planning and democracy became compatible in a self-managing process that made sacrifices in both control and efficiency.

However, it should be emphasized here that no party (not even the League of the Communists of Yugoslavia) abandoned the Leninist formulations of the 'leading role of the party' and 'democratic centralism' in the conduct of its own affairs. An examination of the ruling party statutes shows that despite a number of small variations between parties (and over time), specifying criteria for membership recruitment, and the status of the party 'apparatus', the common features were more apparent than differences.

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4 Pedro Ramet (ed); Yugoslavia in the 1980s (London, 1985), p. 325
The party statutes all tend to be set out in a similar way. They start with a general introduction, setting out the party's version of its own history and future goals, and the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. A section on procedure for admissions, and the rights and obligations of membership, was followed by a fairly lengthy outline of the organisational principles of democratic centralism and the leading role of the party. The organisational structures were remarkably similar, although after 1969 in Romania, and even earlier in Yugoslavia, there were some variations.

In Yugoslavia the Party Statute adopted in 1946 initially adhered to the Soviet model, but was drastically revised after the Sixth Congress in 1952, when the Party changed its name from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). From that date on, with the exception of statute revision in 1974 and in 1982, there were changes at almost every congress, making the shift to an ever more decentralised and self-managed society. This meant allowing greater autonomy to the constituent republic party organisations, and changing the nature of the LCY role in supervising the administration. The tendency was towards decentralization within the Party structure.

The changes at the Eleventh Congress in 1978 represented Tito's efforts to prepare for the succession after his death, and to prevent centrifugal tendencies among the republics from leading to a constitutional crisis. The statutory changes of 1969 were devised with this in mind. President Tito

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7 Jill A Irvine, n 5 p. 293
8 ibid; p. 296
himself had ensured that there should be a rotation of senior cadres and fixed periods of office, and that he would remain at the head of the Party and the State for life. Indeed, the 1982 changes adhered to these principles. The only significant changes were the provision for a secret ballot and competitive elections for the next republican congress and for the Thirteenth LCY Congress. Another reason could have been President Tito's attempt to maintain unity in the face of diversity.

Yugoslav Road to Socialism

As mentioned earlier, the circumstances required Yugoslavia to redefine its own road to socialism. This, the Yugoslavs did in 1950 with the “self-management system,” including the Worker's Council, the abandonment of strict controls in the arts, the abandonment of collectivisation, the acceptance of aid from the West, the evolution of independent foreign policy, and the promulgation of the eventual withering away of the Party among other doctrinal and institutional innovations.

A retrospective glance seems appropriate here. Initially, even after the expulsion from the Cominform, Yugoslavia continued to profess its devotion to a model of socialism which essentially reflected the Soviet, and hence the Stalinist, experience.9 The Yugoslav road to socialism developed as it became apparent that a reconciliation with the Soviet Union was not feasible and that a policy based on this expectation would demoralise the party while preventing Yugoslavia from accepting Western aid, desperately

necessary in view of the communist boycott. This necessarily involved, first of all, a modification of the rigid Stalinist image of the two irreconcilable world blocs. Since it could not maintain indefinitely the stance of a rejected ally, and since Marshal Tito could hardly afford to announce his conversion to capitalism, a redefinition of international affairs was dictated by the imperatives of survival. Positive neutralism was the answer. It was to be based on the principle of peaceful coexistence between countries of differing socio-economic orders, and it explicitly rejected Stalin's view that coexistence was a tactical adjustment not vitiating the fundamental inevitability of war. In Stalin's view there cannot be co-existence between the forces of aggression.

Therefore, in dissociating themselves from Stalin's intransigent foreign policy, they inevitably became involved, willy-nilly, in mounting criticisms of the Soviet system itself. The turning point came in June 1950 with the passing of legislation handling "the ownership" of industrial enterprises to the workers themselves, who were to exercise the ownership through the worker's council. This reform, which became the keystone of Yugoslav assertion of ideological originality, was followed by decentralisation of the economy and the administration, revisions in the criminal code, and finally in 1953 by a new constitution, which broke with the earlier Stalinist model. Even the party did not come out unscathed and as if trying to live up to his

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10 ibid; p. 188
11 Harry G Shaffer, n 1 p. 240
12 ibid; p. 289
13 Speech by Tito, Kardelj and Dolanc: Ideological and Political Offensive of the LCY (Belgrade, 1972), p. 13
criticisms of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), President Tito decreed that the Yugoslav communists would no longer enjoy special privileges.\textsuperscript{14} The name of the party was changed to the League (Union) of Communists of Yugoslavia, symbolising its alleged voluntary and democratic character.

The reforms, some of them important and novel, altered the substantive power structure in the country. The Worker's Councils were balanced internally by effective party controls, or League cells, by technical controls wielded by the plant director, and by the norms of the national economic plan. In subsequent years, the degree of the Council's actual power varied and, on occasions, the regime felt compelled to move in so as to restore what competence remained.\textsuperscript{15} But there is no doubt that whatever the actual scope of the Councils; they played an important role internally in improving Worker's morale and externally in emphasising the Yugoslav claim to having established the true Marxist-Leninist method of constructing socialism.\textsuperscript{16} However, the central role of the Party was not undermined, and certainly President Tito's power was not affected.

The extent to which Yugoslavia's system is socialist or, more precisely, Marxist-Leninist in nature is one of the major points of dispute among communists of various ideological shadings. Each group (pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese, Trotskyist, or otherwise) appeared convinced that it alone has

\textsuperscript{14} ibid; p. 91
\textsuperscript{15} ibid; p. 195
\textsuperscript{16} ibid; p. 97
found the "correct" path for reaching the proclaimed goal (a classless society of abundance for all); usually each group was also able to back up its contentions with quotations from the writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. The Yugoslavs, however, insisted that the problem is not one of "correctly" interpreting Marxism-Leninism. Since socialism, they proclaimed, "never appears anywhere in its 'pure' form," each country needs to find its own road contingent on its own specific conditions. To put in other way, it was claimed that they have found their own road to socialism which is independent of foreign models. And that conception of proper socialism was restricted to their own borders.

To most non-Marxist the ideological "correctness" or "incorrectness" of the "Yugoslav road" (measured by Marxist-Leninist standard) is of little concern. They did not dig through the voluminous writings of the founding fathers to find passages which prove or disprove the ideological purity of the Yugoslav approach. Instead, they looked at the system as it was, analysed in its various aspects, passed judgment on its accomplishments and shortcomings, and attempted to predict its future development without concentration on the somewhat semantic question of whether Yugoslavia's reformist measures are "revisionism" or "creative Marxism." However, Western non-Marxist observers referred to the Yugoslav system as a deviation from, if not, a complete negation of Marxism. Non-Marxist commented that the Yugoslavs "are surprisingly unhampered by Marxist ideology," that "of all the communist nations, Yugoslavia has stayed fastest

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17 Harry G Shaffer, n 1 p. 250
18 Ducan Wilson, Tito's Yugoslavia, (New York, 1979), p. 189
and farthest from the well-beaten path of orthodox Marxism," and that the Yugoslav system "can no longer properly be called Marxist." In any case, there can be no doubt that the Yugoslavs apparently continued to give, a new, more pragmatic and a more liberal interpretation to Marxism-Leninism than was given in any other socialist country.

Yugoslavia's "own road to socialism" therefore, represented an attempt to combine aspects of capitalism, socialism, and communism into an unique system in which the economic advantages of a limited market economy were to be realised without altogether surrendering national planning or the social ownership of the means of production, and in which the desirable features inherent in political and cultural freedom was built into a new interpretation of Marxism-Leninism without entirely relinquishing "democratic centralism" and one party system.

**Workers Self-management**

One of the Yugoslav innovations was the system of worker's self-management, called a kind of "democratic humanistic socialist mode," which was introduced in June 1950. From this concept evolved the idea of the eventual "withering away of the party." By the beginning of the 1970s the idea of the party "withering away" was revised, although it was still emphasised that it "cannot be an agency outside self-management, a commander commanding other people, merely issuing resolutions which

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19 ibid; p. 255
everyone must listen to and implement." At the same time, the Party unquestionably remained the "leading force" in the country.\textsuperscript{21}

The proceedings of the Tenth Party Congress and the 1974 Constitution did not eliminate either workers self-management or nonalignment, nor did it impose Soviet style censorship. It merely sought to control those expressions of nationalism which went beyond the politically permissible parameters of the Yugoslav system, i.e, a quest for republic autonomy or independence on one hand, and demands that Yugoslavia resume its association with other socialist states within some Soviet-approved framework on the other hand.\textsuperscript{22}

According to the latest Constitution, which was adopted in 1974, the system was based on freely associated labour using socially owned means of production, self-management by the working people, and distribution of the social product. In theory the constitution provided every member of a working organisation with the guaranteed "right to a personal income and other rights stemming from labour to an amount and volume that ensured his economic and social security."\textsuperscript{23}

But President Tito's return to Leninism, through strengthening the party, did not stop with the purges of the party in 1970s. His policy from then on until his death was to strengthen party control at the expense of all other

\textsuperscript{21} ibid; p. 71
\textsuperscript{23} Richard F. Staar, Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, (California, 1982), p. 232
possible centers of authority. He broke the workers self-management system in 1976 by introducing a set of reform in which the Basic Organisation of Associated labors (BOAL) replaced the enterprise as the main unit of self-management.\textsuperscript{24} Thus the self-management system was destroyed through fragmentation. In 1976, a law on associated labour was prepared. It not only reaffirmed self-management but also encouraged limited private enterprise on a self-management basis. This anomaly of less economic control and more political control appeared to represent a "living Marxist contradiction" in Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{25}

However, the introduction of workers self-management was conceived as an ideology which in time led to the downgrading of most of the agencies of the central government, and substituted pluralised patterns of decision making. The authors of the new Yugoslav ideology considered the object of building socialism to be the direct participation by workers in the management of their enterprises. This was seen at the time of proclamation as a pathway to the withering away of the state. Therefore, the Yugoslav theory of worker self-management led to depoliticised economy by making each enterprise self-managing through elected representatives. Such productive units would then participated in a socialist market on a competitive basis.

\textsuperscript{25} Richard F Staar, n 23 p. 233
But it was a short-lived propaganda triumph and long-lived economic catastrophe. In the artificial prosperity of the 1962 and 1970 its deficiencies were hidden. Self-management gave Yugoslav socialism a global reputation for enlightenment it did not deserve. But either in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union, in many respect it was conceived as dogmatic as anything.

Yugoslavia and the Socialist Ideology

Yugoslav Version

The Yugoslavs maintained that “socialism is a social system based on socialisation of the means of production, in which social production is managed by the associated workers directly engaged in production. The distribution of income is based on the principle of “to each according to his work” and in which, under the leadership of the working class – which is also changing as a class-all social relationship are gradually being rid of class antagonism and of elements of exploitation of man by man.”

The important thing about this definition was that, it placed the accent not on just any kind of socialisation of the means of production, but on the kind in which the associated workers directly engaged in production, managed production and distributed income in accordance with the work done. It was only such relationship in production that provided a basis for the development of socialist society in Yugoslavia and opportunity to eliminate

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26 J F, Brown, n. 24 p. 222
27 Harry G Shaffer n. 1, p. 284
exploitation, class division and antagonism. Therefore, the Yugoslav version of socialism put more emphasis on the economic interests of the working class rather than enforcing the ideological parameters of class struggle for the well being of the people. They talked about a kind of socialism that suits the general situation of the particular country which they experienced in the post-war period. By doing this the Yugoslavs, especially Tito outrightly rejected the Stalinist theory of "socialism in one country."

Meetings of Communists and Workers Parties and Yugoslav Revisionism

In 1957, the Communists and Workers Parties of the socialist countries held a meeting in Moscow. The meeting was attended by the representatives of 64 Communists and Workers Parties. At the end of the meeting the participants adopted a "peace manifesto" in its declaration which was endorsed by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia themselves.

The Declaration of the meeting of representatives of the Communists and Workers Parties of the socialist countries adhered firmly to defend the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism and opposed modern revisionism. The Declaration further stressed on the theoretical foundation of Marxism-Leninism-dialectical materialism-refuted metaphysics and idealism, and held that "the application of dialectical materialism in practical work and the education of party functionaries and the broad masses in
Marxism-Leninism are urgent tasks of the Communist and Workers Parties."\(^{28}\)

The League of Communists of Yugoslavia not only openly assumed an attitude of opposition to the Declaration of the meeting of representatives of the Communists and Workers Parties of the socialist countries, but adopted an anti-Marxist-Leninist programme at its Seventh Congress, and set it against the Declaration of the Moscow meeting. At their Congress, in an effort to defend their anti-Marxist-Leninist programme, Tito and other leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia made a series of vicious attacks against the international communist movement and the socialist camp with the Soviet Union as its center.

The Seventh Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1957 adopted a "Draft programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia" which the Soviet Union held as an anti-Marxist-Leninist, out-and-out-revisionist programme.\(^{29}\) The Soviet leadership viewed the draft programme of the Seventh Congress of the LCY as deviating from the Leninist-Marxist theory. Therefore, the Soviets called it as revisionist. But from the Yugoslav point of view, there was nothing to deviate from the theory. The changes they had made were justified on the grounds of the requirements of their country. To sum it up briefly, the draft programme substituted sophistry for revolutionary materialistic dialectics in method of

\(^{28}\) In Refutation of Modern revisionism, Foreign Language Press, Pecking, 1958 (Collection of Major editorials and Articles on Modern Revisionism Appeared in the Chinese Press in May-June, 1958), p. 5

\(^{29}\) Ibid, p. 15
thinking politically; it substituted the reactionary theory of the state standing above classes for the Marxist-Leninist theory of the state, and reactionary bourgeois nationalism for revolutionary proletarian internationalism.

Differing Soviet-Yugoslav Perspectives on Ideology

(I) The Communist Concept of Sovereignty

The communist concept of sovereignty emanated from the communist ideology and evolved through the socialist strategy within the state as well as the relations with the communist and non-communist state. It oscillated between law and ideology. The principle of sovereignty was directly linked with the strategy and tactics to protect and build socialism. Under the power of the working class, Communists conceded, "The sovereignty is not an end in itself, it is a tool, serving to protect vital interests of the state." 30 Thus, sovereignty was not a form of power, but an expression of the essence of power. Hence, state sovereignty was meant to enforce "the right to preserve the achievements of the revolution, the right to build a new economic and social order, the right to construct socialism." 31 Sovereignty in ideological perspective implied that workers interests were supreme, and their interests lay in the pursuit of proletarian internationalism. To that extent sovereignty was limited.

This became evident when the General Secretary of the CPSU, L.I. Brezhnev, during his consolidation of power promulgated a new Soviet

30 **V S Shevtsov**, *National Sovereignty and the Soviet State*, (Moscow, 1974) p. 76
Constitution in 1977. Article 30 of the new draft caused apprehensions in the minds of the Yugoslav leadership. It was stated that as a component part of the socialist system, of the socialist community, the Soviet Union shall promote and strengthen friendship, cooperation and comradely mutual assistance with the socialist countries on the basis of socialist internationalism, and shall actively participate in economic integration and in international socialist division of labour. The authoritative Belgrade daily Politika expressed dismay at the implications for Yugoslavia and other dissident communist countries of this elevation of the Brezhnev doctrine to the constitutional status. This apprehension had arisen once again in 1968 when the Soviet Union militarily intervened in Czechoslovakia.

Major differences between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia occurred due to the military intervention in Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia strongly opposed the idea of socialist internationalism by exercising absolute power and interfering in internal affairs of other countries. But from the Soviet point of view the new concept, rather new interpretation, of socialist sovereignty (Brezhnev's Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty), basically attempted to answer the allegations that the measures taken to “defend the socialist gains of the Czechoslovak people” contradicted the Marxist-Leninist principle of sovereignty and the right of nation for self-determinations.”

The new theory indirectly imposed limitations on sovereignty calling it the ‘theory of the defence of socialism.’ The military assistance was considered

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32 Edvard Kardelj, Yugoslavia in International Relations and Non-Aligned Movement, (Belgrade, 1979), p. 139
33 ibid; p. 113
34 L I Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, (Moscow, 1972), pp. 144 –145
a form of "struggle for the Czechoslovak socialist Republic's sovereignty against those who would like to deprive it of this sovereignty by delivering the country to the imperialists." The Brezhnev Doctrine thus clearly affirmed the principle of armed intervention whenever there was a threat to communist rule.

What was supremely important to the Soviet Union in 1968 was the unity of communism expressed by adhesion to one model and recognition of its authority. In short, the Soviet Union reserved the right to intervene militarily or otherwise if developments in any socialist country inflicted damage upon either socialism in that country or the basic interests of other socialist countries. The intervention in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 demonstrated that the extent of their room for manoeuvre would be defined by the Soviet leadership (increasingly supported by the more conformist leaders of other socialist states). Brezhnev Doctrine also envisaged the dominance of communist party in the political system. Since the ideology was primarily a justification for rule by the party, emphasis upon "re-ideologising" of society necessarily tended to strengthen the party's dominant position. Thus the concept of "limited sovereignty" was taken to mean 'the dialectical (class struggle) subordination of traditional (nation-state) interests to supra-national (party-state) interests, reflected in the international solidarity of the communist parties in their global task of

35 ibid; p. 146
37 Margot Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations, (Sussex, 1988) p. 201
building socialism." In actual practice what was understood had now become obvious.

This was a formula that aroused reactions ranging from outright rejection to reluctant acceptance. Among others Romania, Yugoslavia and China vehemently opposed the new Soviet policy imposing limitations on the independence of communist states. The Yugoslavs were unremittingly opposed to the concept of limited sovereignty. Marshal Tito at the Ninth LCY Congress renewed his criticism of limited sovereignty in March 1969 saying that "This doctrine negates in the name of an alleged higher degree of relationship amongst socialist countries, the sovereignty of these countries and strives to legalise the rights of one or more countries to impose their will upon other socialist countries, according to their own judgment and even by means of military intervention." Whatever may have been the ideological justification for soviet military action in Czechoslovakia, the reason fro Yugoslav leaders to disagree with this doctrine was clear. Any support to the concept could invite Soviet armed forces in order to protect socialism.

(2) Role of State

The communist theory regarded the state as an instrument in the hands of the ruling class for domination and perpetuation of its rule. Thus, the dominant social class was a real bearer of state sovereignty, of supreme

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39 Stephen Clissold (ed ); In Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (London, 1975), p. 229
power in a state. Communists believed that the sovereignty of state was obviously a political and judicial expression of the plenary powers of the ruling class whose will was expressed through its organs. The state as the dictatorship of the proletariat was therefore, a class state and its sovereignty was class sovereignty. However, with the advancement of socialism, it was claimed that the dictatorship of the proletariat would develop into a state of the whole people. The Soviet theorists asserted that the sovereignty of the people was ensured through the leading role played by the Marxist-Leninist parties in the state and society. In a society which is not class ridden as the Soviet Union was after the attainment of the socialist stage, multi parties had no role to play. The Communist Party represented no other interests but the interests of the workers and peasants. Despite the fact that the socialist state system comprised a legislature, an executive and a judiciary of traditional forms, the Communist party had an unique position "....the party remained the key institution of rule." But in practice, state sovereignty rested with the party and the constitutions of the socialist regimes unequivocally recognised the dominant role of the party in the state policy.

The International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties of the Socialist Countries held in Moscow in 1969 proclaimed, ".....the new system depends on the Communist Parties in the leadership of the

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As a result, home and foreign policy of the socialist states was determined by the dominant communist parties. Inter-party confidence among communist nations promoted ideological and non-legalistic relations vitally affecting the issue of state sovereignty among them. Consequently, the exercise of sovereignty among communist nations was more influenced by ideological common interests rather than by legal interpretations under universally recognised principles of international relations.

Yugoslavia strongly opposed the oppressiveness of the state to protect the interest of the people. For instance, the Yugoslav Worker's Councils were seen as proving that the oppressive functions of the state were "withering away" in Yugoslavia, which was said to contrast favorably with contrary trends in the Soviet Union. Asserting that by definition the claim to universality of any one system was bound to lead to "reactionary results," the Yugoslavs insisted that true Leninist had to assert multiplicity of ways to socialism; they characterised their own way as that of "social democracy." 43

(3) National self-determination

Communist concept of state sovereignty was viewed "as a paramount proletarian right for national social reconstruction manifested in national self-determination and class struggle." 44 The principle of self-determination, however, endowed the nation with sovereign rights. A nation could be recognised as a subject of international law while it was still fighting for

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42 Documents and Resolution of International Meeting of Communist & Workers Parties in Moscow, (Prague, 1969), p. 22
43 ibid; p. 192
independent statehood. Communist theorists explained, "when the nation has not yet been able to form its own independent state, its sovereign right to self-determination constitutes the basis for its just struggle to establish such a state." 45 "..... a nation fighting for its emancipation and self-determination is a subject of international law even before acquiring independent statehood." 46 This theory recognised the two aspects of the right to self-determination of nation to determine its political and economic status in the international arena and to determine its political, economic and social system. It was only these two aspects taken together constituted the content of the right to self-determination and the expression of national sovereignty.

However, the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty, after the Czechoslovak crisis in 1968, led to the "transformation of the principle of national self-determination into the principle of socialist self-determination". 47 This new concept socialist sovereignty was upheld by the Soviets as an attempt to protect and preserve the socialist gains. Brezhnev particularly, justified the military assistance and the armed intervention in the affairs of the Czechoslovak people on the ground of fighting against certain dissident elements within the country who proved to be the pro-imperialists. Therefore, the new theory indirectly imposed limitations on the principle of national self-determination calling it the theory of the defence of socialism.

45 Victor Shevtsov, The State and the Nations in the USSR, (Moscow, 1982), p. 25
46 G I Tunkin (ed.), International Law – A Text Book (Moscow, 1986), p. 403
47 R J Vincent, Non-intervention and International Order, (Peinxwron, 1974), p. 177
(4) National Vs. International Interests

The Soviet attitude toward internationalism and the national interests of the individual non-aligned states cannot but produce sharp differences. One Yugoslav writer put it this way: "No socialist revolution can be carried out if national interests are ignored," and went on to stress the familiar Yugoslav thesis that class interest should not be identified with international interests must be linked with national interests. In other words, class interests must remain chiefly within the framework of national interests and only in this context can they lead to international interests. Therefore, the Yugoslavs maintained that the national interest should be given priority over the international interest.

The Soviet theory regarding 'national interests' and 'international interests' is quite opposite. A Soviet party history journal claimed that international interests must be given priority over national interests and that the only dangers to the unity of the international communist movement in the post-war period have been nationalism and "the absolutisation of one's own experience." Therefore, the Yugoslavs maintained that the national interest should be given priority over the international interest.

This was observed in the context of Yugoslavia's assertion of independence and its own road to socialism. For the Soviet Union, the strength of the international communist movement lay in the unity of the

49 ibid; p. 376
socialist countries. The Soviet leadership claimed to be the central point and leader of international communist movement. Therefore, they were insistent on giving priority to international interest over the national one. This explains why Lenin had espoused the idea of proletarian and socialist internationalism.

(5) Eurocommunism

Taking the case of Eurocommunism it was observed that Yugoslavia was a vigorous partisan of "various roads to socialism," which implied acceptance of a "special road" for the Italian, French, or Spanish Communist Parties. On the other hand, the Yugoslavs were afraid that the concept of Eurocommunism was an attempt "to dress the communist movement in Western Europe in a uniform, or to use it to mark out a new center for these parties."\(^{50}\) Despite the Yugoslav concerns about Eurocommunism, it nevertheless, welcomed the phenomenon of Eurocommunism as yet another example of different road to socialism which "differs from the Soviet one" and as a different approach by the parties in these [West European] countries to the CPSU.

At the level of inter-party relations, the Eurocommunists were regarded as useful allies in opposing Soviet hegemony over the International Communist Movement. Despite the emergence of Eurocommunism and its contradictory ideological threat to the Soviet theory of International Communist movement, the Soviets emphasised on the question of

\(^{50}\) ibid; p. 369
international interest for the success of world socialism. They were convinced that the struggle of the communists and socialist countries is against imperialism and hence all the communist countries need to be united and put their effort together to establish socialism. The East Europeans except Romanian and Yugoslavs accepted this view. For the Yugoslavs the basic understanding of the concept of “enemy” (that is the imperialist camp) was not the target to fight out socialism. Therefore, the Yugoslavs had their own way of experience to remain independent and emphasised on national interest to safeguard the interests of the working class, which was very much demonstrated early in 1950s by establishing workers self-management system. This contradiction on the issue of national and international interests continued till late 1980s. But it was the national interests that supercede the international one. Different ethnic groups in the East European region manifested this in the form of ethnic violence, territorial conflicts and the declaration of independence.

(6) Class Struggle

This theory has been fundamental to the ideology. Initially it provided the CPSU with simply a set of conceptual principles to understand the world. Under Stalin, however, it became an extremely effective political instrument for branding enemies in the name of class struggle. It legitimated the revolutionary identity of the CPSU as the domestic and international ‘vanguard’ party.\(^{51}\) Brezhnev, continued, however, to emphasise on the

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\(^{51}\) Ronald J Hill and Jan Zielonka (ed.); Restructuring Eastern Europe: Towards a New European Order, (England, 1990), p. 15
Stalinist concept of class struggle. He also maintained that the imperialist groups opposing the development of socialism are the enemy. Again in the regional domestic context, he identified the ruling communist party as an instrument protecting and promoting socialism.

President Mikhail Gorbachev by no means rejected this theory of class struggle outright. Crucially, he explicitly condemned its political exploitation as an instrument of repression by Stalin. "Any attempt to justify.....lawlessness by political needs, international tension, or alleged exacerbation of class struggle in the country are wrong" he stated in Perestroika.\textsuperscript{52} He also rejected the contrived ‘enemy image’ which was crucial to maintain Stalinist ‘Two Camps approach’. In the same spirit, Gorbachev abandoned ‘the definition of peaceful coexistence of states with different social system as a specific form of class struggle, which continued to be a cause of endless misunderstanding between the two super powers (the Soviet Union and US) in the past. That was the reason why Soviet foreign policy was deideologised and the cold war was ended. Class struggle would continue within the confines of each state. Class struggle would not be promoted from outside.

On the other hand, Gorbachev did not reject the relative function of Leninist theory. In Perestroika, he argued that class struggle would continue to be an objective reality in the world and that it could not, therefore, be neglected in the attempt to resolve the world’s problems, although global

crises such as pollution and the threat of nuclear war did set objective limits, beyond which the interests of class must be subordinated to the 'universal values' of common humanity. And at the Central Committee Plenum in January 1987, for example, he criticised Stalinist social theory for depicting the social structure of society schematically as lacking in contradictions and in the dynamism deriving from the multifarious interests of its different strata and groups.

One of Gorbachev's most daring and challenging decision was to challenge and undermine what he called the party's arrogance of omniscience, its presumption to absolute truth, which was a central spin-off of the party's putative pre-eminence in the class struggle and the central justification for its right to dictate theory and practice. He did this in two ways. 'No one party holds a monopoly on truth' 'no one has a right to claim a special position in the socialist world', as he insisted in 1987. He also argued that 'socialism does not and can not have any "model" that everyone must measure up to', and even suggested that all those notorious occasions for enforcing the 'general party line' – such as the 'binding international conferences' of previous years – should now be consigned to the past.

Yugoslavia had no basic difference with Gorbachev's interpretation of class struggle and maintained that the class struggle should in no way be antagonistic by nature in order to fight against imperialism. Also it was

53 David S Mason, "Glasnost, Perestroika and Eastern Europe", International Affairs vol 64, (Moscow, 1988) p. 436
54 Ronald J Hill, n 51 p. 88
stated that to protect the class interest it was not necessary to brand enemies or to oppose other systems of management that did not agree with their own ideological perceptions.

(7) Democratic Centralism

The second key principle of the Marxist-Leninist ideology was democratic centralism where once again the Soviet Union and the Yugoslavia had no basic differences. This principle had guided the internal workings and structures of communist parties. It was first enunciated by Lenin, when the brief experiment in Constitutional monarchy was initiated by Tsarist Government in the wake of 1905 Revolution. Later, it was insisted that all fraternal parties within the Third International (also called the Communist International or Comintern) adopt it as their key organisating concept.\textsuperscript{55} Communist parties thereafter copied the Soviet experience, giving them the same pyramidal top-to-bottom structure and creating within all parties the same powerful full-time corps of party cadres to control the weaker, democratically elected bodies of party members. It was this distinctive style of inner-party organisation, which historically distinguished communist parties from other socialist or social democratic groups. It was also the key to their success as both underground and ruling parties, since the structure of social democratic or other traditional political parties were not as well suited to the organisational demands of either of these situations. In essence the principles of democratic centralism sought to combine democracy with centralism.

\textsuperscript{55} V I Lenin, \textit{Collected Works}, vol 33 p. 278
The imposition of Soviet-style socialism in Eastern Europe, was accompanied by the imposition of this principle on the newly formed Marxist-Leninist parties, thereby ensuring that each communist party in Eastern Europe was organised to maximise central control first by indigenous party leaders and then, through fidelity to socialist internationalism, by Moscow.\(^{56}\) In combination, the two principles provided the Soviet Communist Party with immense opportunities for gaining information and exerting influence down to the lowest societal level in each of the East European communist parties.

If democratic centralism provided vertical control, it was the third principle, that of the “leading role of the communist party,” which ensured horizontal control.\(^{57}\) The relationship between the ruling Communist Party and other coalition parties, government ministries, state organs, or mass organisations was governed by the rule that they were free to carry out their prescribed function so long as they recognised that it was the Communist Party to which they were ultimately responsible. Such a principle, which was enshrined in the Constitution of all bloc states, gave Communist Parties the exclusive right to organise in every place of work and to maintain full-time party staff within all offices, educational institutions, social organisations, military and police units, and publishing houses. They could control all activities, supervise personnel’s, censor the


\(^{57}\) ibid, p. 89
news media, and do much more without ever having to write elaborate legal codes allowing it everything was covered by the simple constitutional formula making each of these parties "the leading and guiding force in the construction of socialism."58

(8) Peaceful Co-existence

The concept of 'peaceful coexistence' of states with different social system enunciated by Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the CPSU at its Twentieth Congress in 1956 and later strengthened by Gorbachev's policy of deideologisation was accepted by Yugoslavia as moving in a positive direction of building socialism. It may be added that the concept of peaceful co-existence was an innovation first introduced by Lenin in 1921 and later made a fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy in 1956. Communist concept of state sovereignty was determined by the principle of peaceful co-existence in relations with the states belonging to different social system. But in practice the concept of 'peaceful coexistence' contemplated three types of international relations: fraternal collaborations with the socialist states, "class-struggle" with capitalist states, and "generous" support for the forces of national liberation.59

In view of the differences between socialist countries causing cold war and the threat of a global nuclear conflict; peaceful co-existence was neither a matter of choice nor something which could be bargained. It was an

58 ibid; p. 90
objective necessity. With the world split into a bipolar one, the only basis for international security was full and scrupulous observance of the principles of peaceful co-existence and in particular non-interference in the internal affairs of states. But in Yugoslav perception peaceful co-existence did not consist of merely maintaining the political and social status quo but rather of growing democracy in international relations. As far as the Yugoslavs were concerned, peaceful co-existence was not a temporary tactic but a policy of enduring value which corresponds to the interests of progress.

N. Khrushchev being exponent of peaceful co-existence had clear perception in this regard, that "Peaceful co-existence among different systems of government is possible, but peaceful co-existence among different ideologies is not. While peaceful co-existence between socialist and capitalist precluded their armed struggle it did not mean the cessation of their economic, political and ideological struggle." In fact Soviet concept of peaceful co-existence served to articulate only the duties of the states outside the Soviet bloc and the rights of the states within the bloc. Peaceful co-existence was considered "a grim and hard struggle, above all a class struggle, against the most reactionary and aggressive forces of imperialism." The difference being that class struggle had shifted to the economic plane. Since war was no longer inevitable because a

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60 Georgi Shakh Nazarov- The Coming World Order, (Moscow, 1984), p. 81
61 Harry G. Shaffer n 1 p. 284
62 ibid; p. 284
conventional war could lead to nuclear war resulting in complete annihilation. Hence the emphasis came to rest on economic aspects.

**Politics of de-ideologisation under Gorbachev**

Gorbachev's new foreign policy reliably indicated the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine and an evident move for democratising the international relations. The communist concept of sovereignty was radically changed under the policy of *Perestroika*. The milieu of socialist internationalism and class struggle fanning East-West conflict evanesced mercurially and national sovereignty began to confirm to the universal principles of international law and relations. Emphasis on deideologisation and democratisation of international relations followed by the East-European revolutions in 1989 and ultimate disintegration of the communist international system transformed the communist concept into a general theory of sovereignty doing away with all its communist features.

Under *Perestroika* Gorbachev eliminated those elements of Stalinist and Leninist practice which kept the bipolar divide intact. He endorsed “the democratisation of political life, respect for the rule of law, and the superiority of market-oriented over centrally planned economies....”\(^63\) The radical changes that *Perestroika* brought about in Soviet-East European relations under the conditions of democracy and independence of Hungary, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria

meant that these countries were on their own and no longer needed the protective support of the Soviet Union nor interference to save "socialist gains" from the onslaught of counter-revolution.

Similarly, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in the Fourteenth Congress in January 1990 renounced its dominant role and affirmed "the first condition of our social reform is to rid the political system of anyone's monopoly, even that of the LCY..."[^64] Almost in all the East European states, the wave of de-ideologisation or anti-communism delegitimised the dominant role of the communist party. The renunciation of Marxist-Leninist ideology also resulted in the most important institutional change, the end of the leading role of the Communist Party in the formulation of the foreign and security policy.[^65]

With the breakdown of political power and with the absence of other extensive connections and identities, ethnic identity became a substitute for any broader set of connections.[^66] The Soviet empire broke up because its nucleus, the power monopoly and the centralism of the ruling Communist Party, was eliminated, whereas the situation in Yugoslavia reflected the absence of the Soviet pressure which forced unity upon the region.[^67] As a result Yugoslavia slid into a state of virtual civil war after Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from the Yugoslav federation.

[^64]: Bhagirath Prasad, n 59, p. 74
[^66]: John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester, 1993), p. 363
Gorbachev’s Perception of Socialism

Gorbachev’s approach to the issue was to deny the exclusive validity of Stalinist socialism, asserting that there are other conceptions of socialism that pay greater attention to the human factor. Socialism, in other words, does not simply mean a state-owned and planned economy with a relatively high priority given to heavy industry and to welfare provision. Socialism is also democratic, and must provide for popular involvement in the running of society, as a prelude to ‘communism’, when people will run their own affairs. Gorbachev’ approach, therefore, was to attempt to reform the system, but with an open-mind.

Gorbachev himself set the standard in revising these notions at the Twenty Seventh Party Congress of the CPSU, when, as already noted, he specifically emphasised “unconditional respect” for the right of every people to choose their own paths of development. Towards this end, Gorbachev enunciated the need for intrabloc relations to proceed according to principles which have at their root the “absolute independence” of every socialist state. As Gorbachev made clear, “the independence of each party, its sovereign right to decide the issues facing its country and its responsibility to its nation are the unquestionable principles.”

68 Ronald J Hill, n 51 p.p. 15-16
69 Karen Deivisha, n 56 p. 213
70 ibid, p. 165
In his address to the Seventieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution on 2 November 1987 in commemoration of the 70th, Gorbachev stressed the independence of all the communist parties. To counter scepticism emanating from the fact that already Khrushchev had said so, he continued: 'we talked about this as far back as the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956. True, we did not free ourselves of old habits at once. However, now this is an immutable reality.' Also in the declaration of Prague (April 1987), Belgrade (March 1988) and Warsaw (July 1988), Gorbachev stressed the right of every party to be "soviet" in the solution of "questions pertaining to the development" of the country governed by it.71 At the same time, Gorbachev expected the allied parties to accept a joint responsibility for the fate of socialism.

In a speech to the United Nations in December 1988 Gorbachev noted that "Differences often acted as barriers in the past." Now they can develop into factors of rapprochement and mutual enrichment. Moreover, since 'specific interests underlie all differences between social systems, ways of life, and value preferences' there can be no disguising the need not only to acknowledge them but also to empower them and give them voice.72 It is clear from the generality of what he said that Gorbachev intended an idea of unity and cooperation which is based on equality, negotiation and mutual reconciliation of interests through dialogue which is aimed at the essence of problems, not at confrontation. Indeed, some Soviet social scientists argued

that the ‘the paradigm referred to as new thinking’ can be traced back to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, when Khrushchev made his two path-breaking speeches. Certainly, the concepts of ‘peaceful coexistence’ and of ‘different road to socialism’, articulated at that congress, prefigured the recognition that ‘diversity’ did not need to connote antagonism, any more than unity necessitated uniformity, and that meaningful cooperation between both friends and enemies was therefore possible.\textsuperscript{73} It is plausible that Gorbachev might have anticipated that socialism had struck roots and therefore the Communist Parties can function independently.

**Ideological Perception and International Issues**

(1) Socialist Internationalism

The concept of ‘socialist internationalism’ was enunciated most explicitly by Brezhnev immediately after Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The basic objective primarily was to justify the military intervention in Czechoslovakia and then to foster unity among the socialist countries within the bloc. It also asserted the right of the Soviet Union to interfere in the internal affairs of the bloc countries and if necessary resort to military intervention to protect the socialist gains of the Bolshevik Revolution. Soviet party theoreticians pointed out that “every Communist Party is responsible not only to its own people but also to all the socialist countries.” They went on to state that “the sovereignty of individual socialist countries

\textsuperscript{73} ibid; p. 9
cannot be counterposed to the interests of world socialism and the world revolutionary movement.\footnote{74}

The Communist Parties not under Moscow's direct control (i.e., those of Romania, China, Yugoslavia, Albania and the Eurocommunists) refused to adhere to this principle from the very beginning. The Soviets subsequent attempt to foist it on them at the 1976 meeting of ruling and non-ruling European Communist Parties in the Berlin was failed to legitimize internationalism in building socialism. As noted earlier the main purpose was to maintain unity in the light of deteriorating relations with Chine and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a Super Power.

However, by 1969, the Concept 4 (as discussed below) contained a number of propositions presenting certain theoretical and practical problems for members of the international communist movement. Four key issues were associated with it: (1) acknowledgement of the Soviet Union as the center of the movement; (2) the legitimacy of pluralism within the movement and the question of its unity; (3) the existence of a model or regularities of socialist development; and (4) the question of national versus international interests and, accordingly, sovereignty.\footnote{75} The first issue which had divided the world communist movement essentially since the death of Stalin was the question of whether or not there should be an acknowledged center of movement.

\footnote{74}{ibid; p. 7} \footnote{75}{Jonathan C Valdez, \textit{Internationalism and the Ideology of Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe}, (New York, 1993), p. 60}
In addition to that aspect of socialist internationalism which stressed the need for a dictatorship of the proletariat, there was also that element which held that the success of socialism in the Soviet Union and its status (continually stressed) as the most "developed" socialist society suggested that its experience revealed the general laws of socialist development.\(^{76}\)

Finally, of course that element of socialist internationalism came to be known in the West after the invasion of Czechoslovakia as the Brezhnev Doctrine, or doctrine of limited sovereignty. At the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) Fifth Congress three months after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev held a detailed discussion and endorsed socialist internationalism as the basis of internationalist relations. This was an important endorsement at the theoretical level of that which had already been confirmed at the level of practice, and served as the basic statement of the official Soviet position on the issue until the early 1980s.\(^{77}\)

However, in the 1970s the key issues of socialist internationalism had been the question of the existence of more than one "model" of socialism; the leading role of the Soviet Union within the bloc; ideological pluralism; and, of course, the question of sovereignty. The debate in the 1980s revolved more or less around the same question but in a different language, through the use of different concepts. The communists outside the Soviet Union but loyal to the Soviet system tend to acknowledge the Soviet Union as the

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\(^{76}\) Terry Sarah Meiklejohn, *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe*, (New Haven, 1990), p.221

center. Most of them were dissident communists trying to please the Soviet Union it at all they could come to power by discouraging the ruling communist of their home land. This debate was confined to the Bloc countries and in some part to European communists. Another major point, which was raised during the debate, was whether there should be one or more model of socialism.

(2) Socialist Internationalism as an Ideology

As pointed by a leading Soviet ideologue O. V. Kuusinen, socialist internationalism emanated from a historical process in the communist world. After the emergence of numerous states and formation of the world socialist system, proletarian internationalism “acquired a new quality and became socialist internationalism, which incorporated relations between socialist states as well.” Socialist internationalism became “the predominant ideology not only within the socialist states but also in the mutual relations between them.” The most prominent feature of socialist internationalism was the solidarity based on class unity.

Communist regarded the principles of equality, independence and sovereignty as the integral components of socialist internationalism. It implied close alliance, fraternal solidarity and mutual assistance in the relations among socialist nations. Communists affirmed, “it is an inviolable law of the mutual relations between socialist countries to adhere to the

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79 F T Konstantinov, Theory and Practice of Proletarian Internationalism, (Moscow, 1976), p. 248
principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism.\textsuperscript{80} Socialist internationalism comprised two interconnected components. One recognised "the equality, independence and territorial sovereignty of each socialist state." The other affirmed "the need for unity and the obligation of mutual assistance of all socialist states." Consequently, inter-socialist relations were not confined to the observance of the universal legal norms of sovereignty but also relied on mutual aid and fraternal assistance, which emanated from socialist internationalism. However, the definition of equality and independence in Marxist thinking varied considerably from that of the Western view. Equality and independence in a class-ridden society were not real.

Within the world socialist system, principles of socialist internationalism were elevated as legal principles inter-state relations among socialist countries. The principle of sovereignty within the socialist system was designed to serve as an integrating force with a positive role in support of the new social order. The communists emphasised, in the words of Brezhnev "sovereignty of a socialist state implies not only the right to independence, but also responsibility to the community of fraternal counties, the international communists and working class movement for the destiny of socialism."\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{80} Dan N Jacobs (ed.); \textit{The New Communist Manifesto and Related Documents}, (New York, 1961), p. 21
\textsuperscript{81} L I Brezhnev, n 77, p. 136
(4) Policy framework under Brezhnev

By early 1969, the international environment in many ways had impressed upon Soviet leaders the necessity for further consolidation of the bloc and the world communist movement. Yet, throughout the first half of the 1970s, the principle of socialist internationalism was resisted by or subjected to criticism from three sides: from Romania and Yugoslavia, the East European renegades; from the independence-minded West European communist parties; and from Soviets within the intellectual establishment.

With growing differences within the international communist movement, the document adopted by the Moscow Conference of Communist Parties in June 1969 was only a general endorsement of the Soviet position on the key issues of socialist internationalism. Here, on the threshold of détente, the Soviets succeeded in achieving a fair measure of consensus and unity within the movement, while minimising the effects of the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia. The basic document adopted by 75 parties who attended the conference made repeated references to the “unity of the international communist movement.” This phrase was included in its title, and seemed that most of the parties would agree on it. The Italian Communist Party (PCI), for instance, signed only one part of the four-part document, that dealing with East-West relations. 66 parties did sign the document, but several added their qualifications orally. Among the later were the Romanians, who took a middle position and did not join

82 ibid; p. 137
several of the West European communist parties, such as the Spanish and Italians, in denouncing the intervention in Czechoslovakia at the conference.

The second section contained an analysis of the "world system of socialism", in which the key issues of socialist internationalism and their meaning in the current international situation were defined and elaborated upon. The Soviets gained acquiescence to the assertion that "the defense of socialism is the international duty of communists". This was not a ringing endorsement of socialist internationalism. Strong statements were, however, made in favour of the "regularities" of socialist construction: "The successful development of (socialist construction) presupposes a strict observation of the principles of proletarian internationalism". This was an endorsement of Soviet position.

In the final section of the document, devoted to the world communist movement, it was acknowledged that there existed no center of the international communist movement. In a significant concession to the independent-minded parties, the participants of the conference declared that the basis of the relations between communist parties was the principles of proletarian internationalism, solidarity and mutual support, respect for independence and equality, [and] non-interference in each others internal affairs. The document also stated unequivocally that "each party has equal rights." In language essentially similar to the

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85 ibid; p. 205
86 ibid; 203
Brezhnev formulation of the previous year, the document stated: "Each communist party is responsible for its activity before its own working class and people and at the same time – before the international working class. The national and international responsibility of each communist and workers party are inseparable."\(^{87}\)

These are but a few of the examples of how the Soviet Union succeeded in gaining qualified endorsement for its interpretation of socialist internationalism at the conference and in the basic document. It was significant that autonomy-oriented interpretations were counter posed to Soviet understandings of the basic principles guiding inter-communist relations. The 1969 conference was an important step forward on the road to the independence of what later became known as the Eurocommunist parties. It demonstrated that despite nominal unity, they could promote their own views and even oppose the Soviets.

As usual, these differences of opinion among Soviet theoreticians created concern within the world communist movement. This was achingly apparent in the negotiation in the run-up to the 1976 Berlin Conference of European Communist Parties. In the course of between twelve and sixteen meetings between October 1974 and June 1976, the Eurocommunists, joined by the Yugoslavs and Romanians, steadfastly defended inclusion of

\(^{87}\) ibid, 207
autonomist interpretations of fundamental principles in drafts of the conference document.  

In the face of Eurocommunist opposition, however, the document adopted at the 1976 Berlin Conference of European Communist Parties in June contained no reference either to proletarian or socialist internationalism, stating only that the participants would "develop their international comradely voluntary cooperation and solidarity on the basis of the great ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin in strict observance of the equality and sovereign independence of each party." Such a statement represented a significant concession by the Soviets to the Eurocommunists parties compared to the 1969 conference document. It included phrases meant to mollify both sides—the "great ideas" (not principles) of Marxism's founding fathers for the Soviets and their allies, "equality and sovereign independence" for the Eurocommunists, Yugoslavs and Romanians.

During the conference, each party attempted to clarify its position on internationalism in the speeches of the heads of delegation. From the Soviets and conservative East European point of view, the important aspect of the document's treatment of internationalism was that it was said to be "solidarity" based on Marxism-Leninism. For the Eurocommunists, Romanians, and Yugoslavs, on the other hand, critical characterisation of internationalism contained in the document was 'international comradely 

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88 Wolfgang Leonhand, Eurocommunism: Challenge for East and West, (New York, 1979) p. 142
89 ibid; p. 143
90 ibid; p. 75
voluntary cooperation in strict observance of the equality and sovereign independence of each party.⁹¹

The speech by General Secretary Brezhnev was rather less strident than those by delegates loyal to the Soviet position. He snubbed those who suggested that proletarian internationalism was "outmoded" or that calls to strengthen internationalist ties meant recreation of an organised center.⁹² He characterised proletarian internationalism as "the solidarity of the working class, of communists of all countries in the struggle for common goals, their solidarity in the struggle of the peoples for national liberation and social progress, [and] voluntary cooperation of the fraternal parties with strict observance of the equality and independence of each."⁹³ This obviously watered-down versions of internationalism failed to include the "dual responsibility, and mutual assistance, which had been considered mandatory in earlier interpretations. With such an approach, Brezhnev attempted to assume a middle-of-the-road posture in the context of the world communist movement. Thus, no single understanding of the concept of internationalism prevailed at the conference. The differences among the Marxists highlighted the fact that each Party was keen to keep its own domestic situation in mind. No Party willing to surrender its independence.

⁹¹ John William, Legitimacy in International Relations and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, (Great Britain, 1998), p. 310
⁹² ibid; 309
Disintegration of the unity of the world communist movement and failure to secure backing for its position on socialist internationalism at Berlin, it seems, caused the Soviet Union to turn inward and seek compliance within the Warsaw Pact. After 1976, the Soviets tended to succeed in gaining acceptance of certain phrases which were used to endorse their understanding of socialist internationalism. Documents before 1976 were much more circumspect. This suggested that after the Berlin conference, the need for unity within the Bloc and clear expression of loyalty to internationalism arose once more. But the Soviet inability to elicit the Eurocommunists endorsement of the principle further complicated efforts to enforce allegiance to the principle closer to home. In pursuit of its interests the Soviet Union wished to present a unify Bloc to the rest of the world. This would have an impact on its allies as well as the West.

The practical expression of internationalism, of course, is often taken to be armed intervention on behalf of a socialist state perceived to be in danger of collapse. The December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan may or may not technically have been a manifestation of socialist internationalism, since the young Afghan regime could hardly have been called "socialist." The overwhelming perception, however, was that the invasion was yet another manifestation of Soviet-style internationalism, and as such it was roundly condemned by the Italian, Spanish, Yugoslavs and Romanian parties, among others. No Marxists could support the Soviet perception that

94 William, n 93 p. 322
Afghanistan was a socialist oriented country and hence the defence of socialism by any means was justified.

(5) Change of perspective under Gorbachev

Since coming to power, Gorbachev gradually moved away from the restricted definition of socialist internationalism. In a major speech delivered on the Seventieth anniversary of the October Revolution, Gorbachev outlined his view of this principle. He reaffirmed Khrushchev's formula of different roads to socialism, stating that "all parties are fully and irreversibly independent." Going on to discuss the practice of socialist internationalism, he singled out the need for "unconditional and total equality, the responsibility of the ruling party for the affairs of its own state,...a serious attitude toward what has been achieved and tried out by friends, [and] voluntary and varied cooperation." The broadening of the definition of socialist internationalism, however, by no means symbolised its demise as a cornerstone of intrabloc relations. On the contrary, Gorbachev emphasised that "we also know what damage can be done by weakening of the internationalist principle in mutual relations of socialist states, by deviation from the principle of mutual benefit and mutual aid....."95

However, Mikhail Gorbachev's declaration of support for "new thinking" in international relations in the mid-1980s in fact seemed to be a way of accepting the Eurocommunist "new internationalism" and perhaps even

socialism "with a human face." At the Party Central Committee (PCC) meeting in October 1985, he stated that cooperation between the socialist countries should be based on the "harmonious combination of their national and international interests." 96

It was not until 1988 that signals began coming from Moscow indicating that the Soviet Union would no longer adhere to socialist internationalism as a principle governing its relations with other parties. An important mutual declaration with the Yugoslavs in March 1988 affirmed the principles of the independence and sovereignty of every state, the "inalienable right" of all parties "to make decisions on the choice of paths of social development" and the "impermissibility of interference in internal affairs under any pretext whatsoever." 97 In his speech to the Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988, Gorbachev emphasised that "the imposition from outside by any means – not to mention military means – of a social system, way of life, or policy constitutes the dangerous armor of past years." 98 This was end of the promoting of socialist internationalism by restricting one's independence and by use or threat of military intervention as had been the case with the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Soviet-Yugoslav declaration in 1988 formally accepted the independence of each socialist country and different roads to socialism.

96 Ben Ekhof, Soviet Briefing: Gorbachev and Reform Period, (Boulder, 1989), p. 29
97 ibid, p. 137
98 FBIS-Soviet, June 29, 1988, p. 12
At the Twenty Seventh Party Congress, Gorbachev was able to more clearly state his position, perhaps at odds with that of the central apparat. Gorbachev, however, referred to socialist internationalism as the basis of Soviet foreign policy, but to "strict respect in international practice for the right of each people to choose the ways and forms of its development independently."\(^99\) Although characterising differences within the community as "disagreements and divergences" rather contradictions,\(^100\) he did state that "unity has nothing in common with uniformity, hierarchy, interference by some parties in the affairs of others, or the striving of any party to have a monopoly over what is right."\(^101\) Such statements clearly indicated his intent to restructure not only the domestic environment, but also the international.

Gorbachev in some ways initiated this debate in two speeches at the end of 1987 and the beginning of 1988. The first was one of the more notable and comprehensive statements of his worldview, on the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution (GOSR). Gorbachev's comment on the meaning of socialist internationalism was somewhat ambiguous; depending on one's point of view they could be read as either supporting or rejecting the concept. For instance, speaking on the model of socialism, Gorbachev stated: Life has amended our conceptions of the logical patterns and the speeds of the transition to socialism.....We have also

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\(^100\) ibid; p. 97

\(^101\) ibid; p. 102
become convinced that socialism does not, and cannot have, a model against which all are compared. Furthermore, Gorbachev also supported the notion of non-interference in internal affairs when he asserted that "all [communist] parties are fully and irreversibly independent." In other words, socialist internationalism for Gorbachev did not entail any "dual responsibility" before both the national and international socialist communities.

The Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988 provided the "new thinkers" in the Soviet leadership an opportunity to proclaim the priority of common-democratic principles and common human values once again, this time from the second highest rostrum of the CPSU next to party congress. Gorbachev repeated that such values were the "core" of new thinking. In addition, he stated that "sovereignty, independence, equal rights, and noninterference" were becoming the "generally acknowledged norms of international relations," and that, as a consequence, "the policy of force in all its forms and manifestations has historically outlived itself."

The concept of socialist internationalism was rather used in attempts to legitimate the system in a number of ways. In the first place, it provided a raison d'être for the elites, at whatever level of the decision making process. Internationalism meant that one was part of something larger, part of the historical process. Second, that aspect of socialist internationalism
which stressed the universal applicability of the Soviet model and the general laws of socialist construction served to legitimate the Soviet system. It validated the Soviet system internally and externally by demonstrating that it was not a freak of historical development.

(7) Policy implication of socialist internationalism

The aspect of socialist internationalism stressed most often in this period, as may be expected given the centrifugal tendencies unleashed in the Bloc by détente, was the need of coordination of foreign policies. This may be seen as the use of theoretical concept to rationalise a policy: the coordination of Bloc policy was undertaken not primarily out of conviction, but rather for reasons of power politics. The East European states followed policies, such as orientation of trade toward the Soviet Union rather than the West, which appeared to contradict their best interest. Soviet interest in promoting the acceptance of socialist internationalism was threefold.¹⁰⁶ In the first place, there was the desire to maintain ideological uniformity in the interests of protecting the Bloc (and hence the Soviet position within it) from outside influence. Secondly, there was the need to present the image of a united front of socialist states which supported the political initiatives and international activity of the Soviet union.

As far as the East European stake in socialist internationalism is concerned, one should distinguish between the position of those who vigorously supported it and those who just as vociferously rejected it.

¹⁰⁶ M S Gorbachev, Perestroika and New World Order (Moscow, 1991), p. 85
Among the former were all of the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact allies, with the exception of Romania. The West European communist parties were divided, with the French decidedly more willing to declare allegiance to the Soviets by supporting proletarian internationalism on occasion.

Those who opposed the concept were the Romanians, Yugoslavs, and Albanians. Their refusal to be bound by socialist internationalism also acted as a legitimating device, both at the elite and popular level. In Romania, a categorical rejection of the Soviet interpretation of internationalism went hand in hand with a virulent nationalism which sought legitimacy in an identification of socialist Romania with its pre-communist and even medieval predecessors. A more concrete interest in rejecting socialist internationalism can be identified for Romania and Yugoslavia as well: a refusal both (a) to recognise the "general laws" of socialist development as manifested in the Soviet Union, and (b) to allow any intervention, open or overt, in their internal affairs.

**Nonalignment as the basis of International Policy Formulation**

**Yugoslav Non-alignment in the 1980s**

President Marshall Tito was one of the founder members of Non-aligned Movement (NAM). From the first summit meeting of non-aligned countries in 1961 in Belgrade till the time of his death, he was closely associated with this international movement. That first meeting included only 25 participants because most of Africa was still under colonial rule. But by the time of the
Sixth summit conference in September 1979, at Havana, the last in Tito's lifetime, the movement had grown to include some 117 countries.

President Tito described non-alignment as the basis of the country's overall foreign policy orientation and maintained the relevance of non-aligned principles to relations with all states. Within Yugoslavia, adherence to nonalignment was seen as tantamount to the maintenance of autonomy within the international system.\textsuperscript{107} In addition, Tito's role as a spokesman for the nonaligned, coupled with his ability to win endorsement of Yugoslavia's independence from the Soviet Union and the West, was also an important consideration explaining foreign policy consensus.

As its ability to shape the nonaligned movement declined in the 1980s, Yugoslavia confronted a widening gap between its own policy requirements and the goals and rhetoric of the movement. Like some other nonaligned states they remained part of the non-aligned movement in a declaratory sense. Yugoslavia's nonalignment represented a policy stance in a constituent sense; that is, Yugoslav communists insisted on the mutual dependence of socialism and nonaligned principles. And in the Yugoslav constitution, foreign policy goals were featured prominently alongside self-management.

Nonalignment enabled the Yugoslav government to keep a balanced approach toward all states externally and all nationalities domestically. It

\textsuperscript{107} Lazar Majsov, \textit{New Dimensions of Non-alignment}, (Belgrade, 1989), p. 263
enabled the leadership to maintain open lines to the Soviet bloc while concluding major economic agreements with the West. While this policy was functional in maintaining a national consensus, it also created serious strains, in so far as all the factions and the regime itself could never be sure that its conflicting commitments were not leading it to renewed isolation. Yugoslavia's foreign policy of non-alignment was therefore, closely related to the entire issue of regional autonomy in the diverse ethically conditioned preferences of its population. Furthermore, since the abandonment of socialism by the Leagues of Communists was unlikely, workers self-management and nonalignment formed the core of Yugoslavia's nationality policy.

The nonaligned movement as an association of states emerged on the basis of the recognition by each of its members of the obligation to pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence. The Soviet Union welcomed the Panchsheel (namely, sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence) principles as an universally accepted basis for interstate relations. The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU was held in February 1956, two years after the proclamation of these five principles and less than a year after the Bandung conference.

In its Resolution on the Central Committee's Report, the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU stressed that these principles could play a great

role in improving relations, enhancing confidence and developing cooperation between the Soviet Union and all countries.\footnote{ibid., n 112 p. 45} As is known, the same Congress proposed to the United States making these principles the basis of its relations with the Soviet Union.\footnote{ibid; p. 47} The principles were specified: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each others internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation. It was emphasised that these principles "are of now shared and supported by score of countries."

In the light of what has been said above, it is clear that when the delegations of 25 non-aligned nations met in September 1961 in Belgrade and formalised the foundations of their movement, they had no difficulty in formulating the fundamental principles of their unification. The message of the Chairman of the Soviet Union Council of Ministers Mr. Bulganin to the Chairman of the Belgrade Conference President Tito noted that "the government and peoples of the Soviet Union, who have set themselves the tremendous tasks of peaceful construction, regard as before, the ideas of peaceful cooperation and coexistence of states as the basis of their foreign policy. They therefore ardently approve and support all steps to curb the forces of war."\footnote{Klause Fritsche, "Soviet Views on Non-alignment", \textit{Review of International Affairs}, 77 (864), (April 5 1986), p. 15}

The policies of the countries of the socialist community, including the Soviet Union, had a different aim. At the Twenty Seventh Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in February-March 1986, it was emphasised that the "Soviet Union would continue to be consistent and persistent in solving the problems of international security, orienting its foreign policy towards strict pursuance of the course of peaceful coexistence. It is on the principles of peaceful co-existence that the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community build their relations with the non-aligned nations.

Supporting the newly free and non-aligned nations and with a view to consolidate peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union proposed that the great powers be guided in their relations with these nations by a definite set of norms. In particular, as General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out, "the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council should undertake to strictly observe in relations with the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America the principles of non-interference, non-use of force or threat of force, and not to draw them into military blocs. "The Soviet Union is ready to undertake such obligations. This accords fully with the principles of our foreign policy".\textsuperscript{112}

The countries of the socialist community thus were of the unanimous opinion that the non-aligned movement had become "a powerful factor in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism-the forces of war and aggression." Basing themselves on this conclusion, set forth in their joint Declaration adopted in June 1984 at their Top-level

\textsuperscript{112} ibid., n 116 p. 17
Conference in Moscow, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) member states "expressed their solidarity with the resolutions and message of the Seventh Conference of the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned countries in New Delhi, aimed at resolving the vital issues of that time – the struggle for the strengthening of world peace, peaceful coexistence."¹¹³

The readiness of the Soviet Union and some European countries of the socialist community to act in this direction was demonstrated by the signing in the early 1970s of a series of historic treaties and solemn declarations with the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Britain.¹¹⁴ Adherence to the principles of peaceful coexistence was reaffirmed in these documents. They not only confirmed the allegiance of the signatories to the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, but also laid down the obligation to practise them in world politics.

Additionally, they envisaged an organisational (consultations, joint commissions) as well as legal mechanism (declaration by the signatories that they have no, and will not have any, legal obligations directed against each other) to provide additional guarantees of the observance in their relations of the principles of peaceful co-existence. They consistently expressed readiness to cooperate with these nations in all areas, including

¹¹³ Shava Sanakoyer, "Peaceful Co-existence in the Context of Military Strategic Parity", International Affairs, (Moscow, 21 Feb, 1988), pp. 75-76
¹¹⁴ ibid; p. 78
the political sphere of struggle for world peace and security, but without infringing upon the movement’s principle.

**Soviet-Yugoslav Differences Over Non-alignment**

Although the Soviet Union adhered to the peaceful legal basis of the non-alignment, they differed in many ways from that of the Yugoslav one. The Soviet leadership while adhering to the principle of non-interference in one’s internal affairs reserved the right to protect the achievements of socialism if at all there is a threat in any bloc countries. The principle of limited sovereignty and socialist internationalism has been discussed at length in the earlier section. Adherence to the principle went against the Yugoslav view of complete non-interference of the individual countries. The Yugoslavs were therefore gratified when the Soviets accepted their thesis and permitted the claim that non-alignment was “one of the most significant factors in world politics” to be included in the closing resolution of the June 1976 conference of the European Communist Parties in East Berlin.

Moreover, the non-aligned countries were listed along with the socialist countries as “revolutionary and progressive forces in the developing countries and in all workers and democratic movements fighting to establish new international political and economic relations.”

Moscow’s change of mind was gradual; however, its hostility to non-alignment was particularly strong after the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, which Yugoslavia criticised. At that time a Soviet newspaper claimed that

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115 Stephen Clissold, n.39 p. 39
Yugoslavia's policy of non-alignment was actually "a policy of alignment, not with socialism but rather with anti-socialist forces in Czechoslovakia and the whole imperialist chorus."\textsuperscript{116}

In meetings with Tito, the Soviets gradually took a more diplomatic position in regard to Yugoslavia's non-alignment. After meeting with Brezhnev in 1973, Tito reported that the CPSU leader "completely agreed with the principle of non-alignment, (and admitted) that such a policy had been useful in the struggle to counter imperialism and various attempts at aggression." When reminded that initially the Soviets had taken a hostile stand in regard to non-alignment, Tito replied that they had obviously "needed a little time."

Thus, although the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia agreed in principle that non-alignment leads to socialism, they disagreed about how this happens and what kind of socialism will emerge. In December 1976, the Yugoslavia accused the Soviet Union of trying to divide the non-aligned movement by attributing to some of its members more and to others less positive significance.\textsuperscript{117}

As we know, the very strong common interests that tied the non-aligned countries together existed side by side with differences in social systems. Some of the basic differences among the Non Aligned Movement and the

\textsuperscript{116} Alex N Dragnich, The First Yugoslavia: Search for a Viable Political System, (Stanford, 1983), p. 163
\textsuperscript{117} ibid; p. 174
Soviet Bloc enunciated socialism was firstly; the goal of the Movement was to democratize the World Order and secondly to make it free, fair and equitable while that of the Soviet Union was the goal of World Revolution. The goal had remained constant, the means to achieve it changed depending on the international situation. Thirdly, as a corollary to the above idea of class struggle was modified as we have seen earlier. Class struggle was never part of the Movement to reject the Soviet sponsored theory of "Natural Ally" which was brought forward during the Havana Summit. The Soviet Union was keen to closely associate with the Non Aligned Movement. That all countries including Yugoslavia did not permit this to happen showed the differences existed at a fundamental level.

The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan demonstrated how far it was prepared to go in support of the national liberation forces in pursuit of its goal of a world revolution.\textsuperscript{118} It is a well-known fact that Afghanistan was not a socialist state. Moreover, Afghan-Soviet relations during the later half of President Mohammad Daoud's regime were under strain. In Soviet view Afghanistan was moving in the direction of reaction and conservatism, a disturbing trend posing a potential threat to the Soviet Union. It is likely that the Soviet Union took an active part in the events which led to the overthrow of Mohammad Daoud. Therefore, at the Seventh Summit Conference of the Non-alignment Movement in Havana in September 1979, a majority of the non-aligned countries condemned the

\textsuperscript{118} Nirmala Joshi, "Soviet Union and the Non-aligned Countries: Natural Allies", Problems of Non-alignment, 1 (1); (March-May 1983); p. 25
intervention in Afghanistan and disapproved the Soviet theory of ‘natural alliance’. Some non-aligned countries believed that the theory of natural alliance was an attempt to distort the very concept of non-alignment.

Although Yugoslavia condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan immediately, it took more than a year before the nonaligned states issued a collective condemnation. While the Yugoslavs battled against this lone delay, Cuba’s Castro was determined not to permit any condemnation of the Soviet Union as long as he was Chairman of the nonaligned movement. As it turned out, it was only in February 1981 that the special conference was convened in Delhi. Here, with the understandable exception of the Afghan representatives, there was unanimous agreement on “allround political solution on the basis of the withdrawal of foreign troops and a complete respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and nonaligned status of Afghanistan, and a strict observance of the principles of nonintervention and noninterference.” This resolution, to which even the “less nonaligned” states (Cuba, Vietnam) agreed, proved that the nonaligned movement was still capable of virtually unanimous verbal protest, in spite of the experience in Havana.

Naturally, Soviet-Yugoslav joint documents could not reflect a similar agreement, and indeed the joint communiqué of April 1982, issued on the

\[\text{\textsuperscript{119}}\text{ibid; p. 16}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{120}}\text{Nehad D Popovic, Yugoslavia: The New Class in Crisis, (New York, 1968), p. 285}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{121}}\text{Mirko Ostojic, “Yugoslavia and Her Neighbors”, Review of International Affairs, 37 (662; March 5, 1968), p. 8}\]
occasion of Foreign Minister A. Gromyko's visit to Belgrade, contained no reference to Afghanistan at all. Similarly, there was no mention of the subject in the Soviet-Yugoslav joint statement of March 25, 1983, which excluded all points of disagreement. Yugoslav Foreign Minister Mojosov while explaining the accomplishments of the seventh summit of the non-aligned states to the Yugoslav Federal Assembly in Belgrade in 1983, underlined, in particular, the demand registered by the nonaligned states for the unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the creation of conditions for Afghan self-determination. That the non-aligned movement had no political means of resolving the problem in Afghanistan was not at once clear to the Yugoslavs.

The above analysis shows that Soviet-Yugoslav perspectives on ideology differed; considerably on certain issues and marginal differences on other. While both the countries professed to be following the same ideology, they differed in their interpretation. For the Soviet Union, the changes in its ideology were primarily, due to pragmatism and actual condition on the ground, for instance, on the question of peaceful co-existence. Once the Soviet Union was acknowledged as a Super Power, it wanted that the principles of "Socialist Internationalism" should unify the socialist countries so as to meet the challenge of ideology. Similarly, after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, some of the earlier postulates had proved wrong and so he gave up some of the principles such as deideologisation, ended the Cold

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122 Ranko Petkove, "What is Changing in Yugoslavia's Foreign Policy", *International Affairs*, vol. 3, (Moscow, 3 March 1989), pp. 75-6
War etc.; which could help him in his task of reconstructing the Soviet Union.

For Yugoslavia, the prime concern was to maintain its independence. It wanted to build socialism in a way that suited the Yugoslavs and did not wish to follow Soviet instruction. That is why in Yugoslavia perspectives the degree of closeness with the Soviet Union was found in internal matters such as Role of the State, Class Struggle etc. In the international sphere except for the principle of Peaceful Co-existence which ensured Yugoslav independence, differences existed on issues like limited sovereignty, socialist internationalism and 'Natural Alliance.' It was therefore, important to chalk out its own road to socialism.