CHAPTER III
Problems of Gender Identity in Postmodern Philosophy

In this chapter we will explore the issues concerning gender identity in postmodern philosophy more emphasizing on the feminist works. Postmodernism and feminist theories identify particularity where other theories identify universality. Bell Hooks goes on to outline her own definition of feminism: "Feminism is the struggle to end sexist oppression. Its aim is not to benefit solely any specific group of women, any particular race or class of women. It does not privilege women over men. It has power to transform in a meaningful way all our lives. Most importantly, feminism is neither a lifestyle nor a ready-made identity or role one can step into."\(^1\) The historical development of feminism is an evolution from being largely subsumed within another framework (liberalism-first wave of feminism), to a marriage with traditional theoretical frameworks, which involved inserting women into a modified male world of politics, to a period of separation and renegotiation of the marital contract (second wave of feminism), to an independent position or rather set of positions (third wave of feminism). Donna Haraway argues that feminism must begin from the recognition of multiple identities: "Identities seem contradictory, partial and strategic."\(^2\)

To organize the above we will divide this chapter as follows:

3.1.  K. Millet: Biological Sex and Patriarchy’s Gender

3.2. Judith Butler: Anatomical Sex, Gender Identity, and Gender Performance

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\(^1\) Hooks B. Feminist Theory. From Margin to Center (Boston: South End Press, 1984), p.26

3.3. Fluidity, Multiplicity and Contradiction: Concepts of Identity in the Third Wave of Feminism

3.4. Carol Gilligan: Care in the Context of Women's Moral Development

3.1. Kate Millett: Biological Sex and Patriarchy's Gender

Kate Millett - radical feminist of United States, writer, and sculptor whose book *Sexual Politics* (1970) was a landmark in feminist thinking. *Sexual Politics* is, however, one of the first serious theoretical attempts to come to grips with the specific nature of women's oppression without reducing it to any simple or complex class analysis. It was an important theoretical touchstone for the second wave feminism of the 70s. *Sexual Politics* was also extremely controversial. In Kate Millet's opinion, psycho-social distinction such as patriarchal religion, popular attitudes and the social rather than the physical sciences rest upon the biological differences between the sexes. A claim is always made that culture cooperates with nature to produce a sexual differentiation among human beings. Millett rejects a biological basis for male supremacy. She declares that scientific evidence does not support this claim.

Attempts to prove male superiority or dominance as a result of physiology or biology, according to Millett, have been unsuccessful. Gender or sexual personality structure is overwhelmingly cultural in character. Millett argues that civilization has always been able to substitute other methods (technique, weaponry, knowledge) for those of physical strength and contemporary civilization has no need of physical strength. Physical exertion is a class factor: "Those at the bottom, whether strong or not, have to perform strenuous tasks".

Millett wants us to remember certain crucial facts about role and temperament:

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The psycho-social distinction made between two sex groups which are said to justify their present political relationship are not clear, specific, measurable and neutral ones of the physical sciences. So, they are not amenable to be procedures of these physical sciences. Being vague and cultural in character, no scientific statement can be made about the natural superiority of the male temperament. "Endocrinology and genetics offer no definite evidence for determining mental-emotional difference." Millett states: "Whatever the 'real' differences between the sexes may be, we are not likely to know them until the sexes are treated differently, that is alike. And this is far from being the case at present". She accepts Robert J. Stoller's authority and follows his approach to sex and gender. As well known Stoller states that sex is biological, and gender is physiological, and therefore cultural. He has pointed out that "if the proper terms for sex are 'male' and 'female', the corresponding terms for gender are "masculine" and 'feminine'; the latter may be quite independent of (biological) sex." The psycho-sexual personality is postnatal and learned. "Psychosexually (e.g., in terms of masculine and feminine, and in contradiction to male and female), therefore, there are no differentiations between the sexes at birth."

Millet's conclusion is that "because of our social circumstances, male and female are really two cultures and their life experiences are utterly different- and this is crucial." The decisive factor is the conditioning of early childhood, of adolescence and of early youth. "Every moment of the child's life is a clue to how he or she must think and behave to attain or satisfy the demands which gender places upon one. In adolescence, the merciless task of conformity grows to crisis proportions,  

4 Ibid.,p.28  
5Ibid,p.29  
9 Ibid.,p.31
generally cooling and settling in maturity".\textsuperscript{10} This socialization process is so complete and so much under male controls that it dominates the marshaling of the temperamental traits to male and female.

Millett’s conclusion from her examination of the role of biological factors is that patriarchal ascriptions of temperament and role are arbitrary in character. Each person realizes little more than half his/her potential. However, this arbitrary division leads to a power or status division. “In the matter of conformity, patriarchy is a governing ideology without peer; it is probable that no other system has ever exercised such a complete control over the subjects”\textsuperscript{11}. “If knowledge is power, power is also knowledge, and a large factor in their subordinate position is the fairly systematic ignorance patriarchy imposes upon women”\textsuperscript{12}

Millett’s definition of patriarchy is centered around the concept of sexual domination of females by males and is treated by the contemporary feminist movement, and its radical feminist stream in particular, as authoritative and virtually definitive. Millett notes: “The fact is evident that the military, industry, technology, universities, science, political office, and finance- in short every avenue of power within the society, including the coercive force of the police, is entirely in male hands”.\textsuperscript{13}

This is the system which she calls patriarchy. All aspects of this system- the ethics and values, the philosophy and arts- are of male manufacture. In patriarchy, that half which is male controls the other half which is female. In Millett’s opinion, sex as a birth based status category with political implications generates patriarchy.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} Ibid.,p.31
\item \textsuperscript{11} Ibid.,p.33
\item \textsuperscript{12} Ibid.,42
\item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid.,p.25
\end{itemize}
The two two-fold principles of patriarchy, according to Millet, are: a) male shall dominate female and b) older males shall dominate the younger. However, as in all other institutions, there is frequently a distance between patriarchy in reality and patriarchy as an ideal. There are also contradictions and exceptions in the system. Patriarchy exhibits a great variety of forms differing from place to place and also according to the historical background of a society.

Millet’s concern is with male supremacy, and her broad definition of politics rejecting the biological base for male supremacy helps her to equate sexual politics with the politics of patriarchy. According to her, these eight factors that influence patriarchy:

1. **Ideological:** Millett argues that “sexual politics obtains consent through a “socialization” of both sexes to basic patriarchal values, norms and rules with regard to temperament, role and status... temperament involves the formation of human personality along stereotypical lines of sex categorization – masculine and feminine.”¹⁴ It serves the values and needs of the dominant group. “Sex role decree a consonant and highly elaborate conduct, gesture and attitude of each sex.”¹⁵ Status is decided by the operation of the above two items. It gives a pervasive assent to the prejudice of male superiority and allots “the female tends to arrest her at the level of biological experience”¹⁶ which means clearly an inferior status.

2. **Biological:** The temperament distinction, created in patriarchy (“masculine” and “feminine” personality traits), do not appear to originate in human nature, those of role and status still less. Since patriarchy’s biological foundations appear to be so very insecure, one has come cause to admire the strength of a ‘socialization’ which can

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¹⁴ Ibid., p. 26
¹⁵ Ibid
¹⁶ Ibid
continue a universal condition 'on faith alone', as it were, or through an acquired value system exclusively. What does seem decisive in assuring the maintenance of the temperamental differences between the sexes is the conditioning of early childhood. To take a simple example: "expectations the culture cherishes about his gender identity encourage the young male to develop aggressive impulses, and female to thwart her own or turn them inward. The result is that the male tends to have aggression reinforced in his behavior, of the with significant anti-social possibilities...The same process of reinforcement is evident in producing the chief 'feminine' virtue of passivity"\(^\text{17}\). As a result in contemporary terminology, the basic division of temperamental trait is "marshaled along the line of "aggression is male" and "passivity is female"\(^\text{18}\). "Whatever the 'real' differences between the sexes may be, we are not likely to know them until the sexes are treated differently, that is alike, and this is far from being the case at present"\(^\text{19}\).

3. **Sociological**: Family, society and the state are three separate but connected entities in which women enjoy decreasing importance, as one goes from the first to the third category. In the family, the male is normally designated as the head of the household. "Traditionally, patriarchy granted the father nearly total ownership over wife or wives and children"\(^\text{20}\). To ensure that the crucial functions and socialization of the young take place only within the family, the patriarchal family insists upon legitimacy. It insists that no child should be brought into the world without a man- and one man at that – assuming the role of sociological father. By this single measure, patriarchy decrees that the status of both child and mother is dependent upon the male. Millett has made an observation which

\(^{17}\) Ibid., p.31  
^{18}\) Ibid., p.32  
^{19}\) Ibid., p.29  
^{20}\) Ibid., p.33
is: “Although there is no biological reason why the two central functions of the family (socialization and reproduction) need be inseparable from or ever take place within it, revolutionary or utopian efforts to remove these functions from the family have been so frustrated, so beset by difficulties, that most experiments so far have involved a gradual return to tradition. This is a strong evidence of how basic a form patriarchy is within all societies, and how pervasive its effect on family members”.  

“Patriarchy’s chief institution is the family. It is both a mirror of and a connection with the larger society; a patriarchal unit within a patriarchal whole. Mediating between the individual and the social structure, the family effects control and conformity where political and other authorities are insufficient”.

4. **Class:** She writes: “In a society where status is dependent upon economic, social and educational circumstances of class, it is possible for certain females; to appear to stand higher than some males”. Millet adds that women as a group lead a parasitic existence. They are dependent on their male rulers and as “dependent class”, live on surplus. Their marginal life frequently makes them conservative. They identify their own survival with prosperity of those who feed them. “Hope of seeking radical solutions of their own seems too remote for the majority of women until consciousness of the subject is raised”. One of the chief effects of class within patriarchy is to set one woman against another woman, for example, between career woman and housewife. One envies the other her ‘security’ and prestige, while the envied yearns beyond the confines of respectability for what she takes to be the other’s freedom, adventure, and contact with the great world. Millets writes:

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21 Ibid., p.35  
22 Ibid., p.33  
23 Ibid., p.36  
24 Ibid., p.38
“One might also recognize subsidiary status categories among the women: not only is virtue class, but beauty and age as well”25.

5. **Economic and educational**: In modern reformed patriarchy, women have certain economic rights. But they are still economically subordinate. Their work at home is not paid. She notes that employed women have in fact two jobs, since they have to carry the burden of domestic service and childcare, too. “Nor, where they do participate in production of commodities through employment, do they own or control or even comprehend the process in which they participate”26. Women’s inability - not a natural but social product – to comprehend technology results in ignorance of it. She asserts: “If knowledge is power, power is also knowledge”27. Therefore, women are reduced to a secondary status. In the sphere of education, women are not trained in science and technology but are allotted humanist studies. Thus, the kind and quality of education is not the same for each sex.

6. **Force**: Kate Millet says that “Historically, most patriarchies have institutionalized force through their legal systems”28. For instance, strict patriarchies such as that of Islam, have implemented the prohibition against illegitimacy or sexual autonomy with a death sentence “In Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia the adulteress is still stoned to death with a mullah presiding at the execution”29. It means that force is diffuse and generalized in patriarchies. “Significantly, force itself is restricted to the male who alone is psychologically and technically equipped to perpetrate physical violence. Where differences in physical strength have become immaterial through the use of arms, the female is rendered innocuous by her socialization.

25 Ibid., p.38
26 Ibid., p.41
27 Ibid., p.42
28 Ibid., p.43
29 Ibid., p.43
Before assault, she is almost universally defenseless both by her physical and emotional training. This has most far-reaching effects on the social and psychological behavior of both sexes.30 Phenomenon such as clitoroidectomy, clitoral incision, the sale and enslavement of women under one guise or another, involuntary and child marriage, concubinage and prostitution, still take place.

7. **Anthropological:** Myth and religion: Millets refers to various taboos about menstruation, taboos against women touching ritual objects (of war or religion) or food, taboos against women eating with men, and finally, taboos about virginity, defloration and sexual segregation of all kinds. For instance: “In ancient and preliterature societies women are generally not permitted to eat with men. Women eat apart today in a great number of cultures, chiefly those of the Near and Far East”.31 She writes summing up that “The feeling that women’s sexual functions are impure is both world-wide and persistent”.32 That why “Patriarchal circumstances and beliefs seem to have the effect of poisoning the female’s own sense of physical self until it often truly becomes the burden it is said to be”.33

8. **Psychological:** Millett says that “status, temperament and role are all value system with endless psychological ramifications for each sex”.34 She notes that the effect of patriarchal social beliefs, ideology and tradition is bound to be pernicious for women. They suffer from a minority complex and tend to lead a marginal existence. “As women in patriarchy are for the most marginal citizens when they are citizens at all, their situation is like that of other minorities, here defined not as dependent upon numerical size of the group, but on

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30 Ibid., p.44
31 Ibid., p.47
32 Ibid
33 Ibid
34 Ibid., p.54
its status”. Millet’s brilliant argument establishes that relations between woman and men are socially constructed power relationships that oppress women, partly via myths about women’s bodily weakness.

In the above context the eight arguments given by Kate Millet can be read to be philosophical also. The construct of gender can be explained metaphysically, epistemologically, ontologically and ethically. The patriarchal influence factors can be categorized philosophically into the metaphysical to be Force, epistemological to be Ideological factor, Economic and education, ontological to be Biological, sociological and ethical to be Anthropological and psychological.

Acknowledging the Simone de Beauvoir’s influence on her book Sexual Politics, Kate Millet did admit that she had inadequately explained her great debt to Beauvoir’s work. Millet recalled in 1989 this fact writing that “I think de Beauvoir realized that I probably cribbed a whole lot more in what I was doing...I had a section on D.H.Lawrence which was, I now realize, painfully indebted to Beauvoir’s analysis of Lawrence in the Second Sex. I now realize that I owed a great deal to what she had said.”

Simone de Beauvoir, on the other hand, easily recognized her own book in Milet’s writing, repeatedly saying, “Sexual Politics is a very good book...But [Millet] should have given me credit for everything she took from me. She got it all, the form, the idea, everything, from me.”

The fact that Beauvoir had unveiled the taken-for-granted assumption about men’s power over women helped Kate Millet write her own book. “I am involved with power—that’s what politics is all about...But if Beauvoir

35 Ibid.,p.55
hadn’t shed some light on women condition, I couldn’t have done what I did.”

3.2. Judith Butler: Anatomical Sex, Gender Identity and Gender Performance

Judith Butler’s book *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* combines a queer perspective on the production of sexuality with a feminist concern with gender regulation and subordination. Butler argues that gender parody or drag is a potentially powerful political strategy through which to break down hegemonic sexual identities and to explore “a fluidity of identities that suggests openness to resignification and recontextualisation.” This shift from the construction of alternative conceptions of femininity—which still remains in the artificial logic of sexual polarities—to ‘a proliferation of gender style’, does not signify for Butler ‘the failure of feminism but rather a positive challenge for any future feminist politics’. Butler argues that it is necessary for feminists to radically rethink the ontological constructions of identity in order to reformulate a representational politics that might revive feminism on other grounds. This rethinking is necessary because by conforming to a requirement of representational politics that feminism articulates a stable subject, feminism exposes itself to charges of misrepresentation. As Butler explains: “The premature insistence on a stable subject of feminism, understood as a seamless category of women, inevitably generates multiple refusals to accept the category. These domains of exclusion reveal the coercive and regulatory consequences of that construction, even when the construction has been elaborated for emancipatory purposes. Indeed, the fragmentation within feminism and paradoxical opposition to feminism from ‘women’ whom feminism claims

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40 Ibid.,p.339
to represent suggest the necessary limits of identity politics.” An identity politics based on a seamless notion of ‘women’ is not only exclusionary in relation to an understanding of the differences of power and resources between women, but it are also normative in so far as it presents reified, heterosexual relations as the main grounding for feminist politics. This is because, to a large extent, the category of woman is stabilized and unified through what Butler calls a ‘heterosexual matrix’. According to Butler, an understanding of identity as an effect leads to possibilities of agency that are foreclosed by positions that take identity categories as fixed or foundational. For an identity to be an effect means that it is neither fully determined, nor completely artificial and arbitrary. The body forms the surface of gender identity in the sense that gender is the repeated stylization of the body, “a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being.” The task of feminists is to carry out a political genealogy of gender ontologies in order to expose the contingent acts that create the appearance of a naturalistic necessity. A deconstruction of identity need not necessarily mean a deconstruction of feminist politics. For Butler, such a deconstruction entails the challenge of redefining feminist politics outside of the binary of sexual difference upon which, up until no, it has been base. The displacement of a primary, fundamental gender identity holds the promise of complex and generative subject positions and coalitional strategies that neither presuppose nor fix their constitutive subjects in place. Butler argues that this does not result in a form of atomized and individualistic politics which celebrates difference qua difference. Rather, it is a case of redescribing “those possibilities that already exist, but which in cultural domains designated unintelligible and impossible. If Identities were no

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41 Butler, J. Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York and London: Routledge, 1990), p. 4
42 Ibid., p. 5
43 Ibid., p. 33

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longer fixed as the premises of a political syllogism, and politics no longer understood as a set of practices derived from the alleged interests that belong to asset of already made subjects, a new configuration of politics would surely emerge from the ruins of the old." As Butler points out, many women simply do not identify with a notion of femininity based on an aestheticized and non-phallic version of body and hence, rather problematically, risk being written off as 'male-identified' or 'unenlightened'. The sex/gender distinction represents an attempt by feminists to bypass some of the theoretical problems which arise from grounding a theory of gender inequality in an original sexual difference. If gender is the cultural meanings that the sexed body assumes, then a gender cannot be said to derive from the natural body in any one way: "gender is neither the casual result of sex nor as seemingly fixed as sex." By privileging the gender side of equation, the body is an effect neutralized and denied any salience whatsoever. Taken to its logical limit, the distinction between sex and gender suggests a radical discontinuity between sexed bodies and culturally constructed genders. Gender becomes a free-floating entity with the consequence that "man and masculine might as easily signify a female body as a male, and women and feminine a male body as easily as a female one." Such a deconstruction of the polarized terms into which sexuality is forced-What Kristeva calls the "demassification of difference"- may be the ultimate aim of some forms of feminism.

Gender is not to be conceived merely as the cultural inscription of meaning on a pregiven sex, but rather gender must also designate the apparatus of production hereby the sexes are themselves established. As Butler puts it, "gender is not to culture as sex to nature; gender is also

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44 Ibid., p.149
45 Ibid., p.30
46 Ibid., p.6
the discursive/cultural means by which 'sexed nature' or 'a natural sex' is produced and established as 'prediscursive', prior to culture".48

However, the very idea that the constitution of gender identity involves a process of interpretation attests to the possibility of dislocation of gender norms, to what Butler calls "the essential freedom at the origin of gender".

Butler writes: "The notion of an original or primary gender identity is often parodied the cultural practices of drag, cross-dressing, and the sexual stylization of butch/femme identities. Within feminist theory, such parodic identities have been understood to be either degrading to women, in the case of drag and cross-dressing, or an uncritical appropriation of sex-role stereotyping from within the practice of heterosexuality, especially in the case of butch/femme lesbian identities."49 The differences in how the feminist perspectives interpret the politics of butch/femme identity and relationship are summarized in following table50:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radical/materialist feminist analysis</th>
<th>Queer feminist analysis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Butch/femme relationships and sexual practice are politically suspect.</td>
<td>The relationship is a challenge to the 'straitjacket' of lesbian feminism.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The femme remains an object of the male gaze.</td>
<td>The femme challenges the notion that only heterosexual women can be feminine.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The butch appropriates masculinity</td>
<td>The bon butch challenges the notion</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

48 Ibid., p.7
49 Butler J. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York and London: Routledge, 1990), p.175
and brings it into the lesbian relationship.

The butch/femme relationship is unequal.

The femme remains hidden.

The contemporary emergence of butch and femme representations is a product of commodification.

that only men can be masculine.

The relationship can be a product of violence and pain, but is productive as a response.

Together the butch and femme challenge the gender norms of heterosexuality.

Queer butches and femmes use commodity cultures as political tools.

Further Butler argues that “But the relation between the ‘imitation’ and the ‘original’ is, I think, more complicated that critique generally allows... The performance of drag plays upon the distinction between the anatomy of the performer and the gender that is being performed. But we are actually in the presence of three contingent dimensions of significant corporeality: anatomical sex, gender identity, and gender performance.”\(^{51}\)

As we can see Butler explicitly rejects proposals to separate the analysis of gender from sexuality. Examining the processes through which is “if one identifies as a given, one must desire a different gender”\(^{52}\) produced the shared agenda for queer and feminist theorizing.

To summarize, Judith Butler’s main claims are\(^ {53}\):

1. Sex and identity are not determined but are discursive

\(^{51}\) Butler J. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York and London:Routledge,1990), p.175

\(^{52}\) Butler J. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’ (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), p.239

2. Heterosexuality, gender and the materiality of the body are interrelated regulatory fictions, and such as their analysis should be brought together.

3. They are maintained through performance, repetition and citation.

4. The processes of signification that create heterosexuality, gender and the correct body also produce their other, that which is outside signification.

5. There is scope for challenge and resistance.

6. Agency does not presuppose 'a choosing subject'.

7. Transgression opens up the possibility of dispelling notions of the normal or real.

3.3. Fluidity, Multiplicity and Contradiction: Concepts of Identity in the Third Wave of Feminism

The term "Feminism" may be understood as theory – “systems of concepts, propositions and analysis that describe and explain women’s situations and experiences and support recommendations about how to improve them." It may also be understood as “a kind of social movement, one that may generate and be aided by theory.” It “used to describe a political, cultural or economic movement aimed at establishing more rights and legal protection for women. Feminism involves political and sociological theories and philosophies concerned with issues of gender difference, as well as a movement that advocates more gender-specific rights for women and campaigns for Women’s Rights and interests.” According to history of feminism, it can be divided into three waves. The first feminist wave was in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the second was in the 1960s and 1970s, and the third extends

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54 Butler J. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex' (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), p.15
56 Ibid,p.195
from the 1990s to the present. Coming of the age in the 1990s, third wave feminists were especially concerned with issues facing adolescent girls and young women. Thus third wave of feminism(s) begin with a breakdown in the marriages between feminism and other theoretical schools and fundamental questioning of the categories that up until now have been adopted by feminists as their own theoretical underpinnings. “Feminists theories today no longer feel compelled to carry their allegiances ‘on their sleeves’ (Marxist feminism, Liberal feminism) in order to signal their authority to speak. Many contemporary feminist theorists no longer have faith in the utility of existing socio-political theories to explain or clarify the socio-political status of women. This ‘loss of faith’ in what has variously been named malestream, phallocentric or simply masculinities theories signals that many feminist no longer believe that these theories are marred by only a superficial sex-blindness or sexism. The problem is now located at a much more fundamental level.”

At the heart of third wave feminism(s)’ focus on identity is thus a challenge to the notion of ‘woman’ as a unified self within one perspective, albeit different from traditional masculine political theory. Three concepts with regard to identity enter the feminism lexicon: one is fluidity rather than fixed identity; the second is multiple rather singular identity; the third is contradiction. The first comes in part from French feminist arguments about the nature of the unconscious and how it lies outside the grasp of our unified sense of rational self. Identity or the ‘self’ is not fixed, but fluid and unstable. “A fixed identity is perhaps a fiction, an illusion- who amongst us has a fixed identity...All identities are unstable: the identity of linguistic signs, the identity of meaning and, as a result, the identity of the speaker. And in order to take account of this destabilization of meaning and of the subject I thought the term ‘subject in

process' would be appropriated." By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism, in short, we are cyborgs. The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics. The cyborg is a condensed image of both imagination and material reality, the two joined centers structuring any possibility of historical transformation." From another perspective, a cyborg world might be about lived social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints...Cyborg unities are monstrous and illegitimate; in our present political circumstances, we could hardly hope for more potent myths for resistance and recoupling. Donna Haraway has written: "A cyborg exists when two kinds of boundaries are simultaneously problematic: 1) that between animals (or other organisms) and humans, and 2) that between self-controlled, self-governing machines (automatons) and organisms, especially humans (models of autonomy). The cyborg is the figure born of the interface of automation and autonomy." Taking this definition as a working definition, one can consider any body a cyborg body that is both its own agent and subject to the power of other agencies. To keep to the spirit of this definition but to make it more specific, an organic cyborg can be defined as a monster of multiple species, whereas a mechanical cyborg can be considered a techno-human amalgamation. "A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social relations, our most important political constriction, a world-changing fiction. The international women's movement have constructed 'women's experience, as well as uncovered or discovered this crucial collective object. This experience is a fiction and

61 Ibid., p. 154
fact of the most crucial, political kind. Liberations rests on the construction of the consciousness, the imaginative apprehension, of oppression, and so of possibility. The cyborg is a matter of fiction and lived experience that changes what counts as women's experience in the late twentieth century. This is a struggle over life and death, but the boundary between science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion."\(^{63}\) Anne Balsamo writes: "It is difficult to determine if Haraway chooses the cyborg image because she believes that women are inherently cyborgian, or because the image is useful and potentially liberating...cyborg images reproduce limiting, not liberating, gender stereotypes."\(^{64}\)

Haraway argues that feminism must begin from recognition of multiple identities: "Identities seem contradictory, partial and strategic. With the hard-won recognition of their social and historical constitution, gender, race and class cannot provide the basis for belief in 'essential' unity. There is nothing about being 'female' that naturally binds women."\(^{65}\) Thus, one must be careful not to 'essentialize' or universalize 'women' as a single entity. Iris Marion Young and Anne Philips have attempted to incorporate differences into their analysis of politics by focusing on how to create practices and institutions which will ensure that previously marginalized voices are heard. For Young, this 'openness to difference' must become the very stuff of politics: "...A politics of difference lays down institutional and ideological means for recognizing and affirming differently identifying groups in two basic senses: giving


political representation to group interests and celebrating the distinctive cultures and characteristics of different groups."\(^{66}\)

Nancy Chodorow not only describes the differences between men and women but attempts to provide an explanation for them. Her argument is that men and women develop very different personalities from early childhood because women are the nurturers: "Women’s mothering, then, produces... crucial differences in feminine and masculine personality, and the relational capacities and modes which these entail... Feminine personality comes to be based less on repression of inner objects, and fixed and firm splits in the ego, and more on retention and continuity of external relationships... Boys come to define themselves as more separate and distinct, with a greater sense of rigid ego boundaries and differentiation. The basic feminine sense of self is connected to the world, the basic masculine sense of self is separate."\(^{67}\)

She concludes that men must be more involved in the task of ‘mothering’- that is, early childhood development and nurturance – if men and women are to overcome these differences. She is arguing that men need to become more like women, need to enter the private and natural spheres of reproduction more fully, rather than the other way around. Chodorow, having identified and celebrated women’s role as mother, nevertheless has as her goal, that men and women will become more or less the same.

Third wavers know in theory that as Bell Hooks wrote in 1984: "Broader perspectives can only emerge as we examine the personal that is political, the politics of society as a whole, and global revolutionary politics."\(^{68}\) First and foremost in theory of third wave of feminism is


notion of differences. "Many feminists now contend that difference occupies center stage as the project of women studies today."\textsuperscript{69}

Difference between men and women was the central to the French feminists, such as Helene Cixous, Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva. Cixous believed that the dichotomous pairs of western thought all originated in the most fundamental duality between men and women. Helene Cixous begins with the body. "Woman will confirm women in a place other than that which is reserved [when] she physically materializes what she's thinking; she signifies it with her body."\textsuperscript{70}

Luce Irigaray took on 'sameness' directly, arguing that for too long women have adopted a masculine femininity imposed upon them by a word constructed by men. Women need to find the 'feminine feminine', namely that which makes them different. The first is to avoid becoming the 'neutral voice' of science. The falsely objective voice of scientific analysis is inconsistent with the feminine feminine. Instead, woman should speak in an active subjective voice, taking responsibility for her words and thoughts. Second, women's sexuality is plural, as opposed to men's, which is singular and linear. All human expression until now has reflected the latter. Women must begin to express themselves in terms of the former: to celebrate their sexual and subjective difference. "One must listen to her differently in order to hear an 'other meaning' which is constantly in the process of weaving itself, at the same time ceaselessly embracing words and yet casting them off to avoid becoming fixed, immobilized... Moreover, her statements are never identical to anything. This distinguishing feature is one of contiguity. They touch (upon). And

\textsuperscript{69} Zinn M. and Dill B.T. 'Theorizing difference from multiracial feminism', Feminist Studies, June 22(2), Summer 1996, pp.322.

134
when they wander too far from this nearness, she stops and begins again from ‘zero’: her body-sex organ.”

Julia Kristeva distinguishes a difference between masculinity and femininity rather than men and women. This difference originates at the time when mother and child bond, called the ‘semiotic’- a time preceding language and marked by the omnipresence of the mother’s body. With the acquisition of language, one enters the paternal sphere, what Kristeva calls the ‘symbolic’. The symbolic attempts to repress the semiotic in language but it is nevertheless present. When the feminine, or semiotic, writing is freed it will embrace rhythm, sound and the maternal body. “Memories of bodily contact, warmth, and nourishment: these underlie the breast of the newborn body as it appeals to a source of support, a fulfillment of care...Voice is the vehicle of that call for help...and this is undoubtedly significant for the acquisition of language, which will soon be articulated along the same vehicle.” She concludes that while there is no ontological meaning to ‘woman’, there is a political meaning: “The belief that ‘one is a woman’ is almost as absurd and obscurantist as the belief that ‘one is a man’. I say ‘almost’ because there are still many goals which women can achieve: freedom of abortion and contraception, day care centers for children, equality on the job, etc. Therefore we must use ‘we are women’ as an advertisement or slogan for our demands. On a deeper level, however, a woman cannot ‘be’; it is something which does not even belong in the order of being.” These notions of difference are central to contemporary third wave feminism and it , as we have seen, begins with the celebration of the female body. Therefore the third wave feminism has made the body and ‘embodiment’ a central feature of its analysis.

71 Irigaray L. This Sex Which is Not One Translated by Porter C. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1985),p.29
Suming up we can say that first and foremost in theory of third wave of feminism is notion of differences, the difference between men and women. This is the central issue of discussion in this wave of feminism. Donna Haraway’s cyborg is a metaphor for a form of subjectivity that questions the boundaries between human bodies and the technological artefacts that come in contact with it. Her cyborg is an attempt to move feminism away from dichotomies between technology/nature and mind/body. Nancy Chodorow’s argument is that men and women develop very different personalities from early childhood because women are the nurturers. Helene Cixous believed that all the dichotomous pairs of western thought originated in the most fundamental duality between men and women. According to Luce Irigaray women have adopted a masculine femininity imposed upon them by a word constructed by men therefore women need to find the ‘feminine feminine’, namely that which makes them different. Julia Kristeva distinguishes a difference between masculinity and femininity rather than men and women. These various dimensions of differences create a major understanding of gender identity in terms of ontological, scientific, biological, political and social.

3.4. Carol Gilligan: Care in the Context of Women’s Moral Development

Care is a common word deeply embedded in our everyday language. Care ethics is significant for mainstream philosophical ethics in a number of ways. First, in focusing on caring attitudes and relationships, care ethics directs moral attention to aspects of human life that have undeniable human value. Second, care ethics seems to be much more merely a negative critique of existing moral viewpoints and more than simply a feminist perspective derived by adding gender considerations to a pre-existing theory such as Marxism. Third, as a moral theory in its own right, care ethics seems to be distinct from the
three paradigms of contemporary moral philosophy: utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and virtue theory. Some theorist, such as Margaret McLaren, defends an alliance between care ethics and virtue theory. McLaren argues care ethics suffers from certain theoretical flaws, among them that it reinforces stereotypic feminine traits that that happen to be products of oppressive conditions and that it ignores broad political concerns such as justice. Virtue theory, in McLaren's estimation, avoids these problems by emphasizing stereotypic feminine traits and encompassing the political realm in its theoretical scope.74

One of the definitions of the notion "care" is "Ethics caring or care is a moral sentiment and concern for the well-being of others. As an emotional attitude toward other individuals as individuals, care differs from benevolence or sympathy, which concerns other individuals as human beings in accordance with abstract moral principles. Hence, caring is much deeper and particularized than sympathy. It is certainly not merely a feeling, but also has a cognitive element, that, understands another person's real needs, welfare, and situation. Care has generally been taken as one among many important attitudes."75

The other description is "The ethics of care is a normative ethical theory; that is, a theory about what makes actions right or wrong. It is one of a cluster of normative ethical theories that were developed by feminists in the second half of the twentieth century. While consequenialist and deontological ethical theories emphasize universal standards and impartiality, ethics of care emphasize the importance of relationships."76

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74 Margaret McLaren, 'Feminist Ethics: Care as a Virtue', in Feminist Doing Ethics Edited by Peggy DesAutels and Joanne Waugh (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), pp. 101-17
Care consists of four elements (phases). They are: "caring about (recognition that care is necessary), taking care of (assuming responsibility for care), care-giving (the actual work of care that needs to be done), and care-receiving (the response of that which is cared for to the care)."\textsuperscript{77} "Caring about and taking care are duties of the powerful, and care-giving and care-receiving are left to the less powerful."\textsuperscript{78} From these four elements of care arise four ethical elements of care: attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness. It means that care is both a complex cultural construction and the tangible work of care and it is necessary to situate care differently as an integral moral and political concept.

In the second half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, feminist thinkers have considered care to be the fundamental ethical phenomenon and have attempted to construct an entire ethical approach on its basis, that is, the ethics of care or the caring perspective. Feminist ethics contrasts with the allegedly male-biased traditional ethics ignores women's issues and interests, fails to recognize feminine values and experience, and identifies human experience with male experience. The traditional lists of virtues are always gender-characterized. Hence, women's actual subordination is rationalized by traditional ethics, and this must be revealed and criticized for the liberation of women.

Towards the end of second wave feminism, the roots of this notion of 'difference' in perspective were being sown. Nancu Chodorow and Carol Gilligan were two key figures in the introduction of difference into Anglo-American feminist literature. "The enormous attention given to books such as Carol Gilligan's, \textit{In a Different Voice} (1982) and Nancy Chodorow's, \textit{The Reproduction of Mothering} (1978) can be said to follow from the usefulness of the former in elaborating difference between women and men and of the latter in accounting for it ."\textsuperscript{79} Thus the

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.,p.114
\textsuperscript{79} Nicholson L. 'Interpreting Gender', \textit{Sings}, 20(1), Autumn 1994, p.93
ethics of care was initially inspired by the work of psychologist Carol Gilligan. Early in her career, Carol Gilligan worked with psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg while he was researching his theory of moral development. Gilligan's work on women's moral development arose in response to the seemingly male-based results that arose from Jean Piaget's and Lawrence Kohlberg's studies. Piaget developed theories and models for understanding the acquisition of moral values and reasoning amongst children. Children move through different structures of understanding to become increasingly developed in their moral thinking. Morality can be thought of as a set of rules. The question is how children come to recognize the correct rules. Children learn how to be moral and follow rules through playing games. Piaget observed children particularly boys playing marbles. Piaget through watching their game outlined the staged development of moral thinking through different structures of understanding and judgment:

**Jean Piaget's Stages of Moral Development**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 1: Motor response</th>
<th>Marbles are played without any concept of purpose or direction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2: Egocentric response</td>
<td>Rules begin to influence play, but the child is still primarily playing by himself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3: Cooperation</td>
<td>Players play to win within the rules, but the rules retain a level of ambiguity and vagueness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 4: Codification of rules</td>
<td>The procedures and the rules of the game are shared and followed by all concerned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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80 Kohlberg, Lawrence and Carol Gilligan: 'The Adolescent as a Philosopher: The Discovery of the Self in a Post-conventional World', *Daedalus*, (100, 1971)pp.1051-1086

As children move through stages 2 to 4, they are developing different approaches to rules. Movement through the stages can be thought of as "a sort of law of evolution in the moral development of the child."\textsuperscript{82} Once they reach stage 4, they no longer follow rules because they are supposed to or because of coercion; instead, stage 4 rules are the result of mutual consent achieved through cognitive and rational deliberation. Rules no longer sacred and unquestionable; instead they can be renegotiated amongst those actors sharing the same structural framework. In adopting the rules as codified the child swaps personal fantasy for "a common and obligatory imagery which will go hand with the code of rules itself."\textsuperscript{83} Piaget argued, "radically for the time, that is better for the child to learn the processes involved in following moral rules, rather than simply being obligated to by others, particularly adults."\textsuperscript{84} From this study of games, Piaget drew inferences about the operation of moral rules in society. "Good judgments are those that are reached after careful discussion, the reason emerges in interaction and cooperation. The development of both autonomy and agreed rules of morality shared by all is an important aspect of the production of society. If society's rules are the product of cooperation and reason, then reciprocity and distributive justice take precedence over punishment and retributive justice. Notions of equity of treatment and judgment develop alongside the evolving development of rules and cooperation. At least some element of being equitable involves a reasoned ability to think of individuals in 'relation to the particular situation of each.'\textsuperscript{85} Then Piaget studied girls playing hide and seek, simpler game than marbles, because he was "questioning only girls."\textsuperscript{86} Hide and seek, as well as other girls play, requires fewer rules and

\textsuperscript{83}Ibid., pp.24-25
\textsuperscript{84}Laughlin J.M. \textit{Feminist Social and Political Theory. Contemporary Debates and Dialogues} (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p.72
\textsuperscript{85}Ibid
“never presents the splendid codification and complicated jurisprudence of the game of marbles.”\textsuperscript{87} Conclusion from Piaget’s study was that the girls do develop through increasing rule recognition, but they never reach the universal quality of rule cooperation obtained by the boys.

Specifically, Carol Gilligan was challenging Lawrence Kohlberg’s sixfold scale of moral development, which was moving from an early stage of obedience and reciprocity, to interpersonal concordance, law and order and eventually acceptance of rights, social contracts and ultimately a universal principles orientation. These stages are planes of moral adequacy conceived to explain the development of moral reasoning.

Lawrence Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development\textsuperscript{88}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. Preconventional Level</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At this level, the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but he interprets the labels in terms of either the physical or hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the following three stages:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Stage 0: Egocentric judgment. | The child makes judgements of good on the basis of what he likes and wants or what helps him, and bad on the basis of what he does not like or what hurts him. He has no concept of rules or of obligations to obey or conform independent of his wish. |
| Stage 1: The punishment | The physical consequences of action |

\textsuperscript{87}Ibid., p. 70
\textsuperscript{88}http://www.xenodochy.org/ex/lists/moraldev.html Retrieved on 2010,07.11
and obedience orientation. determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are values in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter is stage 4).

Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation. Right action consists of what instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms such as those of the market place. Elements of fairness, reciprocity, and equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical, pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch your", not loyalty, gratitude, or justice.

II. Conventional Level
At this level, the individual perceives the maintenance of the expectations of his family, group, or nation as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order and identifying with the persons or group involved in it. The level consists of the following two stages:

Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl"
Good behavior is what pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical
images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention -- "he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice".

**Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation.**

The individual is oriented toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists in doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.

**III. Post-Conventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level.**

The individual makes a clear effort to define moral values and principles that have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups of persons holding them and apart from the individual's own identification with the group. The level has the two following stages:

**Stage 5: The social-contract legalistic orientation (generally with utilitarian overtones).**

Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and standards that have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, right action is a matter of personal values and opinions. The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view", but with an additional emphasis
upon the possibility of changing the law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement, and contract, is the binding element of obligation. The "official" morality of the American government and Constitution is at this stage.

| **Stage 6: The universal ethical-principle orientation.** | Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles that appeal to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of the human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons. |

As Kohlberg summarized his point that "The more social stimulation, the faster the rate of moral development." At the highest stages of moral development reciprocity becomes generalized; the highest stage for Kohlberg is characterized as the ability to engage in ideal role-taking, or as Kohlberg puts it, "moral musical chair." Kohlberg’s theory provides an explanation for the differences in the

98 Ibid., p. 314

144
levels of moral development. If some individuals do not develop as far as others, it is a case of arrested or slow development, a result of inadequate 'role-taking opportunities'. Thus, Kohlberg explains the lower moral development of the working class: "It is abundantly clear that the lower class cannot and does not feel as much sense of power in, and responsibility for, the institutions of government and economy as does the middle class. This, in turn, tends to generate less disposition to view these institutions from a generalized flexible, and organized perspective based on various roles as vantage points." Kohlberg recognized that in our unequal society social class affects the level of an individual's moral development. He did not argue that those who are the most educated will be the most moral, or that the most powerful will be the most moral.

Carol Gilligan found that Kohlberg’s a scale reflected the general perspective of men on ethical issues but not women "...in the research from which Kohlberg derives his theory, females simply do not exist." She writes: "At this (the third stage of six-stage sequence of Kohlberg) morality is conceived in interpersonal terms and goodness is equated with helping and pleasing others. This conception of goodness is considered by Kohlberg and Kramer to be functional in the lives of mature women insofar as their lives take place in the home. Kohlberg and Kramer imply that only if women enter the traditional arena of male activity will they recognize the inadequacy of this moral perspective and progress like men toward higher stages where relationships are subordinated to rules(stage four) and rules to universal principles of justice(stages five and six).Yet herein lies a paradox, for the very traits that traditionally have defined the "goodness" of women, their care for and sensitivity to the needs of others, are those that mark them as deficient in moral development. In this version of moral development,
however, the conception of maturity is derived from the study of men’s lives and reflects the importance of individuation in their development."93.

"Instead, women’s approach to moral reasoning was less dependent on an individualistic moral self-legislating universal laws as on someone already engaged in a variety of human relations who was trying to work out, with other individuals, an agreed upon solution which would minimize the pain to both the individuals and relationships involved in the issue. The development pattern for women is therefore from self-directed care to altruism, or care for others, and finally to a relations, caring position, where everyone’s needs must be taken into consideration in relation to all others."94.

Care ethics is important because its focus on close personal relationships has helped to move those sorts of relationships to philosophical center stage. Gilligan’s writings suggested that there were substantial differences between the moral perspectives she found among women and those that were typical of men. Women’s moral concerns were more likely that those of men to focus on caring for particular others, not hurting them, responding empathically to them, and maintaining relationships with them. Men’s moral concerns were more likely that those of women to focus on abstract matters of justice and rights in relation to other persons considered impartially. Let us read the definition that Berenice Fisher devised: "On the most general level, we suggest that caring be viewed as a species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies,

93Ibid., p.18
94Arneil B. Politics and Feminism (Great Britain: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), p. 194
our selves, and out environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web".  

Chodorow and Gilligan argue that while “being for others” which has been upheld as the ideal of femininity has served to oppress women, it incorporates some very positive values- nurturance, caring, empathy, connection to and attentiveness to the particularities of specific, concrete others – which would be lost if women were to embrace the ideal of individual autonomy. Carol Gilligan argues that her studies of moral reasoning uncover two images of self- self as a separate and autonomous individual and self as connected to others- which are “fundamentally incompatible”. Gilligan and others have suggested that the history of ethics in Western culture has emphasized the justice view of morality because it is the outlook that has traditionally been cultivated and shared by men. By contrast, women have traditionally been taught a different kind of moral outlook that emphasizes solidarity, community, and caring about one's special relationships. This "care view" of morality has been ignored or trivialized because women were traditionally in positions of limited power and influence. The justice view of morality focuses on doing the right thing even if it requires personal cost or sacrificing the interest of those to whom one is close. The care view would instead say that we can and should put the interests of those who are close to us above the interests of complete strangers, and that we should cultivate our natural capacity to care for others and ourselves.

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Carol Gilligan's Stages of Moral Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-conventional</td>
<td>A focus on caring for the self in order to ensure survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Selfish orientation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional</td>
<td>Good is equated with caring for others’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Belief in conventional morality)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-conventional</td>
<td>Care becomes the self-chosen principle of a judgement that remains psychological in its concern with relationships and response, but becomes universal in its condemnation of exploitation and hurt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Female children start out with a selfish orientation. They then learn to care for others, and that selfishness is wrong. So in their second, conventional, stage, women typically feel it is wrong to act in their own interests, and that they should value instead the interests of others. They equate concern for themselves with selfishness. In the third, post-conventional stage, they learn that it is just as wrong to ignore their own interests as it is to ignore the interests of others. One way to this understanding comes through their concern with connecting with others. A connection, or relation, involves two people, and if either one is

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97 Gilligan C. *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 74
slighted, it harms the relationship\textsuperscript{98}. Without the development of the third level, it is difficult for women to encompass both a sense of moral response and a belief that it is not selfish to care for the self. At the third level care can become a moral principle, "a universal injunction, a self chosen ethic which, freed from its conventional interpretation, leads to a recasting of the dilemma in a way that allows the assumption of responsibility for choice."\textsuperscript{99} Here there is recognition that one is obligated not just to others, one has a duty of care to the self. "Instead of looking to abstract principle to resolve conflict and minimize hurt, the ethic of care looks to the particular. Universality exists, but it is the universal imperative to care for others and the self and to be cared for."\textsuperscript{100} This universal standard does not allow the "blind willingness to sacrifice people to truth, however, has always been the danger of an ethics abstracted from life."\textsuperscript{101}

Thus Gilligan produces her own stage theory of moral development for women, but for Gilligan, the transitions between the stages are fueled by changes in the sense of self rather than in changes in cognitive capability whereas Kohlberg's approach is based on Piaget's cognitive developmental model.

"The sequence of women's moral judgment proceeds from an initial concern with survival to a focus on goodness and finally to a reflective understanding of care as the most adequate guide to the resolution of conflicts in human relationships. The abortion study demonstrates the centrality of the responsibility and care in women's

\textsuperscript{98}http://acypher.com/BookNotes/Gilligan.html. Retrieved on 10.11.2010
\textsuperscript{99}Gilligan C. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 1982), p.90
\textsuperscript{101}Gilligan C. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 1982), p.104
constructions of the moral domain, the close tie in women’s thinking between conceptions of the self and morality..."\textsuperscript{102}

Thus, we can see the differences between Gilligan’s approach to Piaget and Kohlberg\textsuperscript{103}:

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{A Comparison of Gilligan’s, and Piaget and Kohlberg’s approaches} & \\
\hline
\textbf{Piaget and Kohlberg} & \textbf{Gilligan} \\
\hline
The development of morality moves through various stages, the order of which is universal and hierarchical. & The development of morality moves through various stages, the order of which is varied due to different life experiences and contexts. \\
\hline
The higher stages of moral judgement are premised in reason and rationality. & The higher stages of moral judgement are premised on relationships. \\
\hline
Reason and rationality allow moral judgement to be based on universal rules, agreed to by all. & Relationships allow moral judgement to be based on universal consideration of care and harm agreed to by the parties concerned. \\
\hline
Independent and autonomous actors are the most capable of moral judgement. & Interdependent actors with a sense of self-value are the most capable of moral judgement. \\
\hline
Women have difficulty obtaining the ability to follow and agree to rules. & Women and men can base judgements on an ethic of care or justice when notions of femininity or masculinity do inhibit their psychological development. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{102}Ibid., p.105
In essence, Gilligan makes two claims. "Feminine reasoning tends to view interpersonal relations as critical to understanding any problem among a group of people. Second, feminine moral reasoning is concrete rather than abstract. In coming to a resolution about any issue, feminine reasoning will examine the context, the interrelationships of the people involved, the concrete details. Gilligan terms this type of moral reasoning 'the ethics of care', as opposed to the more traditional abstract moral reasoning, which Gilligan describes as 'the ethics of responsibility'. The former has historically, at least in moral psychology, been either ignored or seen as less evolved than the latter. Gilligan argues that we have been trained to listen to the masculine voice, which exhibits a Cartesian style of reasoning that limits context and specific details, and a desire to find abstract general principles to govern unspecified individuals. Thus the contrast between male abstraction and female specificity is critical to the liberal ideas of justice being fundamentally about an abstract rule of law and universal sets of rights."\textsuperscript{104}

Gilligan's approach has been met with anxiety by feminists troubled with its perspective and conclusions. Representing women as morally responsive leaves them open to being the 'natural carers', a role for which there will always be a demand. Feminism "cannot assume that any attribute of women is automatically a virtue worthy of feminists embracing it."\textsuperscript{105} There are several ways in which Gilligan's different voice has been identified as conservative. For Card, it is systematic patterns of exploitation that "lead us to identify with service, find out value in our utility or ability to please."\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{104}Arneil B. Politics and Feminism (Great Britain: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), p.135
The Giligan’s third level which is “care becomes the self-chosen principle of a judgement that remains psychological in its concern with relationships and response, but becomes universal in its condemnation of exploitation and hurt”\(^{107}\) emerges from recognition that care of the other is a social demand imposed on women. At this level “women accommodate to the demand, but through some level of emancipation they also claim some right to care for their individual self too.”\(^{108}\)

The second area of conservatism is the way in which gender is identified as the factor creating variation in moral voices. The problem is that “if feminists think of the ethic of care as categorized by gender difference, they are likely to become trapped trying to defend women’s morality rather than looking critically at the philosophical promises and problems of an ethic of care.”\(^{109}\)

Although Gilligan herself was explicit about not necessarily identifying the different moral voices she discovered in her work as explicitly male and female, she nevertheless identified a different morality she called ‘the ethics of care’ which heretofore had been ignored in traditional psychological studies of ethical development. Gilligan’s contribution is seen in “the recognition that relativistic judgement can be thought of as a product of the development of moral thought, rather than a symptom of regression.”\(^{110}\) Gilligan writes: “In women’s development, the absolute of care, defined initially as not hurting others, becomes complicated through recognition of the need for personal integrity. This recognition gives rise to the claim for equality embodied in the concepts of rights, which changes the understanding of

\(^{107}\)Gilligan C. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 1982), p.74


\(^{109}\)Tronto J. ‘Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care’ in An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives Edited by Larrabee M.J (London: Routledge, 1993), p.241

relationships and transforms the definition of care. For men, the absolutes of truth and fairness, defined by the concepts of equality and reciprocity, are called into question by experiences that demonstrate the existence of differences between other and self. Then the awareness of multiple truths leads to a relativizing of equality in the direction of equity and gives rise to an ethic of generosity and care. For both sexes the existence of two contexts for moral decision makes judgment by definition contextually relative and leads to a new understanding of responsibility and choice.\textsuperscript{111}

A morality of care rests on the understanding of relationships as a response to another in their terms. It focuses on the moral value of being partial toward those concrete persons with whom we have special and valuable relationships, and on the moral importance of responding to such persons as particular individuals with characteristics that demand a response to them that we do not extend to others. Although the ethics of care was developed as part of a feminist movement, some feminists have criticized care-based ethics for reinforcing traditional stereotypes of a 'good woman'.\textsuperscript{112}

Within a moral tradition which stresses individual autonomy and self-sufficiency, concern with relationships appears as a weakness of women rather than as a human strength, and this insight is put to good use by Carol Gilligan when she realizes that "Women's deference is rooted not only in their social subordination but also in the substance of their moral concern. Sensitivity to the needs of others and the assumption of responsibility for taking care lead women to attend to voices other than their own..."\textsuperscript{113} Carol Gilligan's second level which is

\textsuperscript{111}Gilligan C. \textit{In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development} (Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 1982),p.166  
\textsuperscript{112}Bartky S.L. \textit{Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression}(New York: Routledge, 1990),pp. 104-105  
\textsuperscript{113}Ibid.,p.16
"good is equated with caring for others" ¹¹⁴ can mean that the patriarchy traps women in this level and it is the difficulty for women. We can see that sacrifice dominated women are rewarded for their femininity and sense of duty and obligation. "What is important that an ethic of care, which has been associated with women, should be valued as a form of moral thinking that the human community would be greatly diminished without, and one of equal value to an ethic of justice."¹¹⁵ The implication is that "in the end, morality is a matter of care."¹¹⁶ The moral sphere in which Gilligan discusses ‘care’ is an important aspect in the life of women which is developed by the social impact.

¹¹⁴Gilligan C. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982), p.74
¹¹⁶Gilligan C. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982), p.147