CHAPTER - II

INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT (1971) AND LIBERATION OF BANGLADESH

The India-Pakistan conflict of 1971 was one of the most notable conflicts in South-Asia in the seventies. It was the third war between the two traditional rivals India and Pakistan. The two states have fought against one another earlier once in 1947 and 1965. However what made this conflict noteworthy was the secession of East Pakistan from West Pakistan. The conflict concluded with the emergence of Bangladesh, as an independent state in South-Asia in December 1971(1). The liberation of Bangladesh was the major issue in the South Asian crisis of 1971. Nevertheless continuing differences and disputes in India-Pakistan relations were embroiled in this war. This issue was internationalised with the involvement of the super powers, the United States of America (USA) and the Soviet Union. It also drew the attention of the western states as well as the Arab world and also China amongst others.

This chapter is an attempt to understand and explain the Indo-Pak conflict of 1971 focusing on three major dimensions. First, the chapter spells out the variations or differences between East and West Pakistan which eventually resulted in the separation of East Pakistan. Second it discusses the Indian role which helped East Pakistan to liberate itself from West Pakistan. To build a more comprehensive understanding of the Indo-Pak bilateral ties and place the Bangladesh liberation in a
perspective, the study has dealt with the main areas of differences between India and Pakistan with emphasis on the Kashmir question. Finally, the chapter analyses how this regional conflict became a part of the rivalry between the superpowers. In the process it underlines the implications of the U.S.S.R.'s support to India and the U.S.A.'s support to Pakistan.

Before discussing the conflict, it would be important to note the major factors leading to the Civil War in East Pakistan and its demand for separation. A study of the geo-politics, social, economic and cultural nature of East and West Pakistan can provide a clear insight into the causes leading to the dismemberment of East Pakistan.

Pakistan - a bifurcated state:

The Muslim State of Pakistan was carved out in 1947 out of the British Indian colony. The independent state of Pakistan was created out of the Muslim dominated areas of the Indian subcontinent. This division was on the basis of population. India was left with the Hindu dominated regions. The major part of the sub-continent was left with India. This arrangement resulted in the origin of two independent states namely India and Pakistan. In reality the sub-continent was divided into three units, India, East Pakistan and West Pakistan.

The geographical distribution of the three units affected the geopolitical integrity of Pakistan. The state was comprised of two parts
located at the Eastern and Western frontiers of India. The two wings differed in size and density of population. West Pakistan was six times the size of East Pakistan territorially. According to the 1961 census the population of East Pakistan was 50.8 million as against 42.9 million in West Pakistan.\(^{(3)}\)

West Pakistan, covering an area of 307,374 square meters was located to the west of the Indo-Gangetic plain. It shared borders with Iran in the west, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan to the north, and China in the north-east. It shared its borders with India in the east and south-east. The Arabian Sea was its southern limit. The physiographical dimension of West Pakistan made it more a part of the semi-desert and mountain region of Central Asia and the Western sea board. The Indus plain was the only relief. It was the most prosperous agricultural region in West Pakistan covering an area of 200,000 sq. miles in the east. Seismic activity was common in most part of the country. The climate was continental with extreme variations in temperature.\(^{(4)}\)

The continental and natural vegetation, tough grasses, bushes and scrubs made West Pakistan more an extension of the semi desert region of the sub-continent. Except for the mountainous forests and some riverine forests along the lower Indus River, the landscape was generally harsh.\(^{(5)}\) Comparatively East Pakistan was climatically and ecologically much more a part of the monsoon lands of South-East Asia. The Eastern wing was located in the Ganges and Brahmaputra delta in the northeastern part of the Indian sub-continent. It was bounded
by the Indian states of West Bengal to the west and the north, Assam in the north east and Tripura and Mizoram in the east. It shared its south-east border with Burma and the Bay of Bengal washed its southern shores.\(^6\)

Both the wings were separated by approximately 1,100 miles of Indian territory.\(^7\) The shortest air-route between Dacca and Karachi or Islamabad was over India. The sea route too skirted the Indian Peninsula or Indian territorial waters. Very often land connections as well as air and sea routes between East and West Pakistan were adversely affected because of the hostile or even suspicious relations between India and Pakistan since 1947. The geographical divide between East and West Pakistan added to the ethnic and cultural gap between the two parts. The gap disallowed any assimilation of a single Pakistani culture. The only commonality they shared was their relative bond of Islamic religion or faith.

East and West Pakistan differed in almost all respects right from its inception. There was a pronounced difference in the ethnicity, culture, language and economic life-style of the people. The racial difference between the people of the East and West wings exposed the differences in their temperaments as well. Pathans, Punjabis and Sindhis were the major ethnic groups of West Pakistan. They were more ruddy and aggressive both in their physique and nature.\(^8\) East Pakistan on the other hand was inhabited mostly by Bengalis except for a few tribal belts along the south-eastern hill tracts. Bengalis were both an ethnic
as well as linguistic group. They were a heterogeneous racial group originally, who could be discerned by their different head shapes and skin colour. However all the differences of race was submerged into one Bengali culture which became their identity. The people of East Pakistan were more inclined towards arts, literature, politics and philosophical rhetorics. [9]

One very important distinction between East and West Pakistan was the difference in their language. Bengali was the most popular language in the East, while Urdu was the common language of the people of West Pakistan. The people of East Pakistan were unwilling to accept Urdu as the national language as was expressed since 1948. This was expressed clearly when Mohammed Ali Jinnah visited East Pakistan's capital city Dacca. [10] The linguistic and ethnic disparities were reinforced with the geographical division and steadily divided Muslim Bengal as a part of Pakistan.

The fissiparous tendencies began to emerge right from the formative years between 1947 and 1956, which were the years of constitutional debate in Pakistan. Pakistan's first political constitution was formulated in 1956. [11] The constitution allowed the President of Pakistan far reaching power, and authority. He could suspend the federal and provincial legislatures. The first constitution lasted hardly for two years and was abrogated in 1958 and a military rule had taken over. [12]
The military take-over in 1958 further widened the relationship between the two wings. The military administration of West Pakistan deprived the people of East Pakistan of their rightful share in the country's economy as well as their political right of participation. The economic policy of Pakistan was generally in the hands of decision makers in West Pakistan. Most often the policies tilted in favour of West Pakistan. For instance Pakistan earned 50% of its foreign exchange by the export of jute from East Pakistan. However a major part of the investments and its development funds were meant for West Pakistan, since 1947. Major factories, public work projects, foreign aids, imports and defense facilities were mostly concentrated in West Pakistan. This non-uniformity in dealings continued between East and West Pakistan.\(^{(13)}\)

An estimated study of the regional distribution of the per capita income and Gross National Product (GNP) in 1950-55 in East Pakistan showed a per capita of Rs. 297.7 which increased to Rs.330.7 in 1965-68. At the same time the per capita income in West Pakistan was Rs.318.6 which increased to Rs. 377.3 in 1965-68. In 1950-55 the GNP of East Pakistan was Rs.1352.4 crores which increased to Rs. 2131.1 crores in 1965-68. Over the same period the GNP of West Pakistan was lesser than East Pakistan at Rs. 13051.1 crores\(^{(14)}\). However by 1965-68 it had overtaken East Pakistan by 222.2% and stood at Rs.4464.2 crores. There was an imbalance in the regional distribution of plan development expenditure in 1965-66 and 1966-68. The expenditure for East Pakistan was fixed at Rs. 2941.9 million and
for West Pakistan was Rs.5817.2 million out of a gross total of Rs. 8759.1 million.\textsuperscript{(16)}

There was a marked difference in the private sector investment as well. It mostly weighed in favour of West Pakistan. In 1965-'66 and '67 - '68 period private investments was to the tune of Rs. 837.5 million in East Pakistan. It was Rs. 2957.4 million in West Pakistan in the same period. Industrial infrastructural facilities and atmosphere that prevailed in West Pakistan did not exist in the East. For instance in 1958 industrial capital in the whole of East Pakistan was Rs.148 crores. Whereas Karachi city alone had an industrial capital of Rs.114.6 crores and West Pakistan totally accounted for Rs.308 crores.\textsuperscript{(16)}

Economic condition in East Pakistan deteriorated as a result of the one-sided economic policy pursued by the leaders in West Pakistan. Minimal industrial investments both in the public and private sector, lack of growth and an increasing density in the land, population ratio created a near famine like situation in East Pakistan. The population density was 800 persons per square mile in 1958 which increased to 1,200 persons in 1970.\textsuperscript{(17)} It was an endless fight for economic survival for the people of East Pakistan. The policy makers in West Pakistan did nothing to bring relief to their eastern counterparts.

The economic and political destiny of East Pakistan rested with the political leadership in West Pakistan. Although more Pakistani's lived in the East they were under the political and administrative
domination of West Pakistan. The political leadership in West Pakistan was increasingly influenced by the bureaucracy. Within a short period of Pakistan's formation Mohammed Ali Jinnah's failing health conditions forced him to rely on the bureaucracy. The bureaucratic officials were mostly West Pakistani officials and staff. According to a 1955 statistics the civil services comprised of 51 officials from East Pakistan and none of them were in the rank of secretary. There were 690 West Pakistanis occupying key positions in the bureaucratic set-up. Therefore all administrative and policy naturally tilted in favour of the Western wing.  

The domination of the bureaucracy was furthered by the lack of strong political leadership within the newly emerged state of Pakistan. The Muslim League which was the most important political party did not have the required mass base in Pakistan. This shortcoming affected the nature of political leadership in a Parliamentary Democracy. Lack of political leadership and excessive dependency on the bureaucracy denied any mass base political state or a party system from emerging in Pakistan. This characteristic was more common in West Pakistan. However, East Pakistan could hardly contribute or participate as its lifeline was controlled by the rulers of West Pakistan.

West Pakistan was not willing to allow the emergence or spread of mass base politics or democratisation of East Pakistan. For instances in 1954, elections were held to the Constituent Assembly in East Pakistan. The Muslim League which was Pakistan's dominant party was routed. A combination of Awami League and the Krishak Samaj Party, known as
the United Front won 224 out of 227 seats. The results were not accepted by West Pakistan and the government that was formed was dismissed. The political leaders of East Pakistan were arrested. Karachi assumed direct administrative control over East Pakistan. Iskander Mirza was appointed the Governor of East Pakistan in 1954 to take charge of the administration there. During his tenure he systematically suppressed all attempts to establish democracy in East Pakistan. He was assisted by Pakistan's ground and naval forces.\(^{20}\)

The Constituent Assembly in West Pakistan however remained. In October 1954 the assembly in West Pakistan demanded certain amendments in the constitution which would reduce the powers of the Governor General. It also demanded more legislative authority. The Governor General declared a state of emergency in Pakistan following this demand. The constituent Assembly in West Pakistan was also dissolved and the Governor assumed full charge of the political machinery.\(^{21}\)

The year 1954 was an important year in the political history of Pakistan. Hopes of democratic civilian and political institutions in Pakistan steadily receded hereafter. The state's administration was conducted by the combined efforts of the bureaucracy and the military. Three personalities who ruled Pakistan were Governor General Ghulam Mohammad, Iskander Mirza and General Ayub Khan the commandeer-in-chief of Pakistan's army. In 1956 Iskander Mirza replaced Ghulam
Mohammed. The post of Governor General was abolished and Mirza became the first President of Pakistan.\(^{(22)}\)

In October 1958 a political coup was engineered by Ayub Khan and Iskander Mirza in Pakistan. The coup did not have any elements of violence, or seizure of power by violence. It did not result in any political uprising as well. As a consequence of the coup military control of domination over the administration increased further. This was evident as General Ayub Khan became the second President on the 24th October 1958 replacing Mirza. Ayub Khan’s government comprised mostly of civilians even though the government was controlled by the army. Both the Governors of East Pakistan namely G. Faruque and later Zakir Hussain were bureaucrats. Akhtar Hussain the Governor of West Pakistan was also a Civil Servant. A new constitution was also framed by the new regime in 1962.\(^{(23)}\)

The guiding principle of the 1962 constitution was ‘Basic Democracy’ that assured the creation of Civilian institutions. Under the new scheme there was to be a National Assembly located in Karachi and provincial assemblies in the different provinces. President and the members of the National Assembly and the provincial assemblies were to be elected indirectly. They were to be elected by the members of the local council in towns and villages. These local councils in Pakistan were dominated and controlled by the landowners, power brokers, and the local bureaucrats.\(^{(24)}\)
The ‘Basic Democracy’ programme of the 1962 constitution allowed extensive power in the hands of the local councils. The local councils were dominated by the landowners who often exploited the people. Protests and revolts marked the implementation of the democratic process. In East Pakistan the administration was still under the combined control of the army and bureaucracy. There were no institutions of democracy. The situation in entire Pakistan went beyond the control of Ayub Khan’s administration by 1968-69. There was a mass demand for structural changes in Pakistan’s politics. They demanded more people’s participation. The political upheaval resulted in the fall of Ayub Khan’s government in 1969.\(^{(25)}\) The military regime however, proclaimed a Second Martial Law in 1969 to gain control over the Law and Order situation. A nominee of Ayub Khan, General Yahya Khan was made the Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan.\(^{(26)}\)

Yahya Khan tried to placate both the people of East and West Pakistan. He promised to restore civilian government in Pakistan by constitutional means. Accordingly Yahya Khan relaxed the Martial Law regulations on the 1st January 1970. A five point Legal Framework was announced on 31 March 1970 following the relaxation. According to the 5-point framework the power of final arbitration rested with the military and the bureaucracy. For instance the Legal Framework laid down that a constitution should be framed within 120 days of the election results. However the constitution was to be submitted to the President for his approval. Here after the electoral process in Pakistan began in earnest following the Martial Law relaxation in January 1970.\(^^{27}\)
With increasing political activity the differences between East and West Pakistan came to the forefront. In the East, the Awami League was the most popular political party. Its leader was Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. The election manifesto of the Awami League was based on a six-point programme framed in March 1966. The Party Programme outlined certain political guidelines for the political future of East & West, Pakistan. Pakistan was to be a Federation with a Parliamentary executive. It demanded full regional autonomy for both East & West Pakistan. The election manifesto was a reflection of the disparity experienced by East Pakistan since 1947. The indifferent attitude of West Pakistan towards East Pakistan was once again reconfirmed in November 1970.\(^{(28)}\)

In November 1970, a devastating cyclone and flood caused extensive damage to people and property in East Pakistan. About 3000 sq. miles of the Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta region was devastated and more than 2,000,000 people were affected by the floods.\(^{(29)}\) The Administration in West Pakistan once again showed a lack of apathy or concern for the people of East Pakistan. The administration failed to provide the necessary relief to its people. The inefficiency and incompetence of West Pakistan's official renewed the Awami League's demand for full autonomy to East Pakistan. This demand finally was emerging in the form of a Bengali nationalism. Elections were conducted amidst the increasing feeling of Bengali oneness, resulting in a landslide victory to the Awami League. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Awami
League won 160 out of 161 seats to which elections were held in East Pakistan.

In the 313 member National Assembly of Pakistan, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman emerged as the leader of the party with an absolute majority. In West Pakistan Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) won a clear majority of 83 seats. The election results instead of stabilising the political scene in Pakistan lead to further complications. Mujibur Rehman requested Yahya Khan to accordingly convene the National Assembly. Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto who had emerged as the most popular leader in West Pakistan refused to occupy the opposition benches. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman could do little inspite of having won a absolute majority in East Pakistan as well as in the National Assembly. President Yahya Khan in the meanwhile continued to postpone the convening of the Assembly leading to a political stalemate.

Z.A. Bhutto threatened to boycott the Assembly in case M. Rahman was nominated the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The convening of the Assembly was thus postponed by the President. Z.A. Bhutto seemed to be in a better bargaining power than Rehman. Bhutto thus proposed a formula to end the stalemate and also allow him to share power with Mujibur Rehman. Both the majority parties and the military rulers were to reach a consensus on the basic framework of the constitution before an Assembly session could be called. President Yahya Khan visited Dacca on the 13th and 14th January 1971 in order to negotiate an agreement with Sheikh Mujib. On his return to West Pakistan Yahya
Khan did not make any announcement about his meeting with Mujibur Rehman. Z.A. Bhutto followed Yahya Khan and visited Dacca on the 27th to the 30th January 1971.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman refused to compromise on any thing less than convening the National Assembly. A series of negotiations followed between Z.A. Bhutto and Pakistan's President after his return from Dacca. The President announced the date for convening the Assembly to the 3rd March 1971.\textsuperscript{[32]} The PPP refused to attend before any consensus was reached on the constitution. Z.A.Bhutto called for a general strike in West Pakistan and President Yahya Khan dismissed his civilian cabinet replacing it with military Governors.\textsuperscript{[33]}

On the 1st March 1971 the President postponed the meeting of the Assembly sine die. The Governor of East Pakistan was replaced by a new governor and Martial Law Administrator. People and political parties organised civil disobedience rallies and political demonstration in different parts of East Pakistan. Demonstrators and protesters were put down sternly by the new administration. On 3rd March 1971 Sheikh Mujib announced a series of hartals in East Pakistan. The President had called for a Round Table conference which Sheikh Mujibur Rehman refused to attend. The public opinion in East Pakistan expected Mujibur Rehman to announce the independence of Bangladesh from West Pakistan. However Yahya Khan announced that the National Assembly would be convened on the 25th March 1971.\textsuperscript{[34]}
Yahya Khan also made another visit to Dacca on the 15th March 1971 for a preliminary meeting before the Assembly session. On the eve of the President's visit, Z.A. Bhutto had put forward certain proposals to resolve the deadlock. It was proposed that political power should be transferred simultaneously to the majority parties in their respective region. The Awami League accepted the proposal on the 22 March 1971 and it suggested that the National Assembly was to meet as two different constitutional committees for East and West Pakistan. The government in Pakistan rejected the proposal and decided that the committees would be constituted only after the Assembly was convened. It also decided that the members from both the wings would constitute the committees. The Awami League’s proposal was considered to be a constitutional formula for secession by the Pakistani authorities.\(^{(35)}\)

East Pakistan rejected the government’s white paper and there was widespread demonstration against it. Pakistan Day was celebrated on the 23 March 1971 was announced as the Independence Day of East Pakistan in 1971.\(^{(36)}\) Flags of the independent state of Bangladesh were hoisted in all the buildings. Protesters and people demonstrated on the streets of East Pakistan. Even as political unrest continued unabated, the Awami League and President Yahya Khan were discussing the draft proclamation in Dacca on the 24th March 1971. On the 25 March 1971 all negotiation ended and Yahya Khan returned to West Pakistan. Rioters put up barricades in Decca.\(^{(37)}\) On the 26 March 1971 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested. He was charged with treason against the state of Pakistan.\(^{(38)}\) Simultaneously the army raided the offices of the
newspapers, residences of the Awami League supporters and the University of Dacca. It removed the barricades in Dacca and let loose a reign of terror throughout East Pakistan killing thousand of civilians. In the genocide that continued the ire of the Pakistan army was directed against the Bengali majority rather than the Urdu speaking minorities comprising of West Pakistan is and Biharis.\(^{39}\)

Amidst the confusion the surviving Bengali military and para-military personnel responded in different ways to the situation. On many occasions they fought and resisted before they withdrew towards the Indian border. In this way a core group of the future Bangladesh army was able to cross the borders into India. They combined with the Indian Army to launch their final operation later in that year. India, particularly the border states also became a shelter for the civilians fleeing their homes in East Pakistan.\(^{40}\) The members of the Awami League and others political leaders aspiring for the complete liberation of Bangladesh were also exiled in India. India was therefore turned into a base for the liberation of Bangladesh.\(^{41}\) India’s involvement eventually erupted into a full-scale war against West Pakistan on the 3rd December 1971. It was the third direct conflict between India and Pakistan since the two states came into existence. However before we discuss India’s role in the war for the liberation of Bangladesh, it would be worthwhile to dwell on the basic parameters of Indo-Pak relations since 1947.
Indian and Pakistan - a relationship of conflict:

The strained relationship between India and Pakistan can be traced to the very basis of partition that created the states of India and Pakistan. The Muslim League in pre-independent India had advocated a two nation theory under the leadership of Mohammed Ali Jinnah. The Muslim League wanted British India to be partitioned on religious lines. While the Indian National Congress (INC) which was a secular organization never welcomed the partition of India on religious lines.\(^{(42)}\)

Eventually the Indian sub-continent was partitioned in 1947 under traumatic conditions. The state of Pakistan had two wings, separated by more than 1,100 miles of Indian territory. Thus the state of Pakistan emerged on the basis of religion with no geographical continuity. Unlike Pakistan India emerged as a secular state. It incorporated within itself all the religious groups in which the Muslims were the largest minority. In line with its secular Credentials Government of India treated the Muslim minority as an integrated part of the Indian population. However Pakistan had evolved on the basis of Islamic course and unity and the Islamic factor dominated its relations with India most often.

Infact the problem of religious minorities affected the domestic politics of the two states even after independence. This resulted in a great number of people migrating from one state to another even in the 1950's. Hindu population from East and West Pakistan crossed over into India and the vice versa. However this problem was resolved by an agreement
between the Indian Prime Minister Nehru and his Pakistan counterpart Liaquat Ali Khan on the 8th April 1950. Thereafter the flow of forced migrants were considerably reduced, but did not cease completely.\(^{43}\)

Apart from the Muslim factor dominating Pakistan’s relationship with India there were other points of divergence between the two states. One such dispute was over the stoppage in the flow of the Indus waters into the irrigation canals of Pakistan. This problem was resolved between India and Pakistan under the auspices of the World Bank. The World Bank Plan, 1954 decided that the waters of the western tributaries of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab were for the exclusive utilisation of Pakistan. The eastern tributaries namely the rivers Beas, Ravi and Sutlej were meant for Indian use. The draft Treaty accepting the clauses of the World Bank Plan was signed between the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Ayub Khan of Pakistan on the 19 September 1960.\(^{44}\)

The relationships between India and Pakistan was affected often by the territorial claims along the Indo-Pak border in the East and West Claims and counter claims along the disputed territories was most common. The British Colonial Administration had appointed two commissions to demarcate the Indo - Pak border along East and West Pakistan border in 1947. The actual task of demarcation was taken up only after 1956. East Pakistan’s border dispute with the Indian states of West Bengal and Assam was resolved first following a summit agreement between India and Pakistan in 1958.\(^{45}\)
However in the Western sector the boundary question could not be easily resolved. One such important border conflict was the dispute over the Rann of Kutch (a marsh land in western India-Pakistan border) along the Gujrat state of India and the West Pakistan border. Pakistan laid claim to more areas in the Rann. In 1956 some of its troops crossed into the Indian territory in the northern end of the Rann and attacked the Indian patrol posted there. In 1960 representatives from India and Pakistan tried to resolve the crises over the Rann, but it remained inconclusive. In 1965 open hostilities broke out over the Rann of Kutch leading to a full scale war between Indian and Pakistan troops.\(^{(46)}\)

The Rann issue threatened to become a lasting bone of contention between India and Pakistan. British attempt to bring about an agreement between India and Pakistan failed. And the matter was referred to an Arbitration Tribunal. The chairman of this Tribunal was appointed by the United Nation Secretary General and comprised of a nominee from India and Pakistan. The majority decision of the Tribunal was submitted in 1968. The Tribunal conceded 380 square miles of the Indian territory to Pakistan. This decision was accepted by India and Pakistan thus the conflict which threatened to become another Kashmir issue in Indo-Pak relations was resolved.\(^{(47)}\)

The Kashmir issue which dogged Indo-Pak relations issue since 1947 continues to dominate and influence all aspects of relationship between the two states. Observers of Pakistan's foreign policy such as Keith Callard had stated that Pakistan's external policies reflected a
major obsession about India. Pakistan has always held the view that Kashmir has never been a part of India. It would not be wrong to state that the failure and success of Pakistan's foreign policy was measured by the extent it was able to convince the world of India's wrongful hold over Kashmir. One such incident could traced to 1949 when Liaquat Ali's government failed to get any help from the Commonwealth in the Kashmir dispute. The Kashmir question was once again a part of 1971 Indo-Pak Conflict which led to the separation of East Pakistan.

The Kashmir Question:

The territorial dispute over the Jammu and Kashmir region at the northern most part of India, has involved India and Pakistan in three major wars. Bilateral exchanges, summit talks, agreements, international mediations have all been a part of the effort in resolving the Kashmir affair. This tension had its origin in 1947. Kashmir was one of the princely states which had refrained from signing the Instrument of Accession with India. It had also opted not to join Pakistan. In this situation tribal intruders operating from the north-western provinces of Pakistan tried to capture Kashmir and moved towards Srinagar its capital in 1947. The ruler or Maharaja of Kashmir was caught in a dilemma. He was incapable of saving the state independently and required military immediate assistance.

The Indian government offered its assistance only after the ruler of Kashmir opted to sign the Instrument of Accession. It acceded to the
Indian Union on the 26 October 1947\textsuperscript{(51)}. The ruler had signed the Instrument in consultation with the leader of the largest political party in Kashmir namely Sheikh Abdullah. However it was clear that the Instrument was not popularly accepted in Kashmir. The British Government endorsed the accession of Kashmir conditionally. The condition was that once law and order was restored in the state a plebiscite would be conducted to ascertain the will of the people.\textsuperscript{(52)}

India accepted the condition laid down by Britain. Meanwhile as Kashmir signed the Instrument, the Government of India rushed in military assistance. The Indian troops stopped Kashmir's occupation by the armed intruders, across the border. However several square kilometers of Kashmir's territory remained under the occupation of the intruders. The India government requested Pakistan not to offer any kind of support to the armed intruders. Pakistan instead launched a full scale operation for the liberation of Kashmir in 1948. By the 1 January 1948, India had already approached the UN Security Council on the issue under Article 35 of UN Charter.\textsuperscript{(53)}

Pakistan responded by stating that both sides were to withdraw from Kashmir. In 1949, the UN had begun its mediation efforts. Discussions at the UN concentrated on whether Jammu & Kashmir should accede to India or Pakistan. A special mission called the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was established. It was to amicably end the conflict and ensure a favourable atmosphere for conducting a plebiscite in Kashmir.\textsuperscript{ω}
The UNCIP visited India and Pakistan and discussed the issue with the representatives of both the states. It proposed an agreement between the two governments. The agreements comprised of two resolutions which were divided into three parts. The first proposed a cease fire; the second called for a truce between the two parties; and the third part included the holding of plebiscite. The first proposal became operational from the 1st January 1949. The last two proposals could not be realised as differences arose between India and Pakistan regarding the interpretation of the proposal.\(^{(53)}\)

The stalemate situation in Kashmir made the relation between India and Pakistan an explosive one. In 1951 the U.N. appointed a new representative to study and present its recommendations to the Security Council. The report was presented to the Security Council in 1953. The U.N. representative Dr. Frank Graham recommended, direct negotiations between India and Pakistan in order to resolve the Kashmir issue. This proposal was accepted by India and Pakistan. Talks between the two parties began in Karachi in 1953, on stabilizing the cease-fire line in Kashmir.\(^{(56)}\)

The talks to resolve the issue ended in New Delhi in August 1953. There was a general agreement between India and Pakistan to set a date for the plebiscite and for the appointment of a plebiscite administrator. However no further progress was made thereafter. Between 1952 and 1957 the Kashmir issue was raised in the U.N. Security Council Agenda. In 1957 deliberations on the Kashmir dispute was initiated at the behest
of Pakistan. Pakistan blamed India for failing to honour its international commitment of holding a plebiscite in Kashmir.\(^{57}\)

Pakistan was successful in moving the U.N. Security Council to introduce a draft resolution on Kashmir in 1957. The resolution proposed the withdrawal of both Indian and Pakistan's forces from Kashmir. They were to be replaced by the U.N. forces. The resolution was however not acceptable to India. The Soviet Union acting on India's behalf vetoed the U.N. resolution. It was decided that the President of the U.N. Security Council G.Jarring would investigate and present his proposal to settle the Kashmir dispute by April, 1957.\(^{58}\)

The U.N. representative visited both India and Pakistan and held deliberations with their respective governments. The Jarring Report that was submitted failed to resolve the Kashmir crisis.\(^{59}\) India considered Kashmir as an integral part of itself. Pakistan pledged support for its liberation from India. Both states continued to hold on to their respective positions. In August 1965 when hostilities broke out between India and Pakistan the Kashmir region formed an important part of the war zone. Pakistan's intention to capture Kashmir was clear from the very beginning. It tried to isolate Kashmir by trying to cut off its link to the Indian mainland during the 1965 conflict. It failed in its mission and the twenty-two war days ended after a cease-fire resolution was passed at the U.N. Security Council on the 20th September, 1965.\(^{60}\)
India and Pakistan accepted the UN Resolution on the 22 September 1965 and the cease-fire became effective from the 23 September 1965. Both states held considerable amount of each others territory. While Pakistan occupied 210 square miles of Indian territory approximately, India controlled 740 square miles of Pakistan’s territory. India and Pakistan withdrew from the respective territories after signing the Tashkent (USSR) declaration on the 10 January 1966. The Tashkent meeting was held at the behest of the Soviet Union which had offered its good offices to resolve the differences between India and Pakistan.\(^6\)

The Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistan’s President Ayub Khan signed the declaration agreeing to undertake measures to establish better relations in the future. These measure which were to be implemented immediately were as follows: (i) Withdrawal of armed forces to be completed by 25th February 1966; (ii) exchange of high commissions and restoration of normal diplomatic mission and (iii) repatriation of prisoners of wars of both the states. Both would work towards lasting peace and stability in the sub-continent and in South Asia.\(^6\)

The Tashkent declaration (1966) only had a momentary impact. The rivalry over Kashmir remained and India continued to ‘preoccupy’ Pakistan’s foreign policy. Therefore when civil war and political disturbances began in East Pakistan in 1971, India was considered to have a role in it. However such a view had no evidential proof.\(^5\) In India, General Elections to the Lok Sabha had just been completed. The Congress
Party led by Mrs. Indira Gandhi had won a landslide victory. All attention was focused on the nature of the cabinet and ministry that was at its formative stage.\(^6\) The Government of India's reaction to the Pakistan army action in March 1971 was cautious but supportive of the Bengali cause. Anti-Pakistan sentiments in the country were high following the hijacking of an Indian aircraft by Pakistan on the 30th January 1971\(^6\). India did not opt for a military option immediately. However, India could not remain indifferent for long and was soon involved in Bangladesh's fight for liberation from West Pakistan.

**India-Pakistan and the Liberation of Bangladesh:**

India could not deny humanitarian assistance to the masses of people crossing into India along its borders with East Pakistan. It was compelled to assist the people despite several inconveniences that it faced. The four states of India namely Assam, Manipur, Tripura and West Bengal faced a major threat of social imbalance in its population. These states had earlier faced a similar situation arising out the partitioning of the sub-continent in 1947. In addition to the imbalance in its population pattern India faced an additional economic strain as well.\(^6\)

The economic burden on the government of India was an estimated 700 million annually.\(^6\) Externally India was faced with the problem of the disintegration of Pakistan as its own borders were threatened. Humanitarian concern for the people fleeing East Pakistan prevented India from sealing its borders in order to stop the influx. Most importantly
military experts in India advised against any military action at that time. As both the terrain and the climate was detrimental to troop movements in view of the approaching monsoons in East Pakistan.\(^{(63)}\)

Therefore the Government of India resorted to diplomatic means to draw international attention to its own situation and the situation in East Pakistan. India however did not accord any international recognition to the exiled government of Bangladesh stationed in India.\(^{(65)}\) India's diplomatic pressure on the international community to intervene in East Pakistan was mainly based on human rights considerations. Moreover India stressed further that Pakistan's action was responsible for endangering the peace and security of the Indian sub continent. Pakistan matched India's statements by calling it India's interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan. East Pakistan was an integral part of Pakistan and within Pakistan's administrative jurisdiction. Therefore the first phase of the South Asian crisis 1971 was marked by the exchange of diplomatic rhetorics between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan's stand regarding East Pakistan was internationally vindicated. For instance most states including Britain, France, the Arab and non-Arab Muslim states accepted Pakistan's stand on East Pakistan. They however hoped that the issue would be resolved at the earliest. The only Arab state not to extend complete support to Pakistan was Egypt which was sympathetic to the India's stand on East Pakistan. One of the major diplomatic support for Pakistan came was from China. Amongst the super powers the U.S.S.R was the first to react and was
sharp in its pronouncements against West Pakistan Government initially. However the Soviet Union's criticism of the Pakistan's action was mellowed to a great extent later. It offered proposals for economic investments in Pakistan towards the later stages.\(^{(72)}\)

The American reaction was delayed and also aimed in a different direction. The U.S.A voiced its concern for the sufferings faced by the people in East Pakistan. To that extent it tried to persuade the Pakistan administration to accept international humanitarian aid. The aid was to be rendered to the people under the supervision of the UN and its specialised agencies. Pakistan initially refused the U.S request for help stating that the situation was well within its control. Beyond such appeals the U.S administration refrained from taking any political stand.\(^{(73)}\)

The U.S was against the situation in East Pakistan from causing a hurdle to its growing relations with China. Pakistan which played a prominent role in building Sino-U.S relations could not be antagonised at this stage. U.S.A's policy has been dealt in detail later.\(^{(74)}\)

Therefore Pakistan's viewpoint that East Pakistan was an internal part of Pakistan and it could be controlled by its own administration received major support in the international community. However India relentlessly pursued its own stand point against Pakistan's action in the East. To that extent the Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and also the Prime minister Indira Gandhi made official visits to different countries in Europe and Soviet Union to put across their stand personally. The result of one such visit was the signing of the Twenty Years of Friendship
and Cooperation between India and the Soviet Union on the 9th August 1971. Suffice it to mention here that the Indian position was internationally strengthened considerably following the agreement. The details leading to the signing of the Treaty have been dealt in detail later in this chapter.

The last round of international diplomatic campaign was conducted by the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi from 22nd Oct 1971. Apart from some major European capitals USA too was included in the itinerary. Simultaneously Zulfiqur Ali Bhutto the elected P.P.P leader led a high level Pakistani military delegation to China. It was to augment China’s support in the event of a war in the sub-continent. While the Governments of India and Pakistan were trying to gather international opinion against one another the situation along the Eastern borders deteriorated. Border clashes were on the rise. The Bangladesh’s liberation force, (Mukti Bahini) were involved in a number of skirmishes with the Pakistan troops stationed there. The Mukti Bahini operated from its bases within the Indian territory. They had been gathering strength and training in India covertly and later openly since May 1971. Therefore during the war they were actively supported by the Indian troops as they tried to liberate the territory of East Pakistan from West Pakistani forces.

The Indo-Pak War 1971:

The Government of Pakistan declared a state of emergency on the 25th November 1971. Simultaneously clashes between the Indian and
Pakistan troops increased in the Eastern sector. On the 3rd December 1971 the war between India and Pakistan was announced formally following the air-raids by the Pakistan Air force (PAF) on Indian territory. The PAF carried out simultaneous attacks on Indian bases in north west India. Its ground forces also opened the battlefront along the Indo-Pakistan borders in the north west. India retaliated with its airforce (IAF) striking at major air-bases within Pakistan including Peshawar and Karachi. The battle line in the western sector was drawn from Jammu and Kashmir to the Rann of Kutch, South of Rajasthan. The Indian and Pakistan's military were involved in some major combats in the western sector.

The Indo-Pak war 1971 was fought along the eastern borders as well. The domination of the Indian troops along this sector was evident from the very beginning of the war. The military preparedness of the Pakistan troops in this sector was comparatively inferior to its western counterpart. In this sector it was reduced to a defensive position while facing the multi pronged Indian attack. Eventually the Pakistani resistance in East fell apart as it was routed by the 16th December 1971. The Pakistani forces stationed in East appealed for a cease fire which was initially not accepted by India. On the 17th December 1971 the Pakistan troops surrendered unconditionally to the Indians. The Indian government accepted the cease fire. Thereafter Pakistan’s President Yahya Khan also ordered a cease fire of the Pakistan forces both in the Western and Eastern sectors.
Pakistan's friendly relations with both the U.S.A on one hand and China on the other was favourable in preparing the ground work for a new Sino-U.S relation. For services rendered Pakistan received an armament package from the Nixon Kissinger administration. It comprised of 20 aircraft's and 300 armoured carriers which was valued at $ 40-50 million in 1970.\textsuperscript{165} Pakistan's role in establishing the Sino-U.S relations considerably influenced U.S.A's policy during the 1971 crisis. From the beginning U.S.A was clear about not jeopardizing its relations with Pakistan.

As mentioned earlier the U.S administration reacted much later to the West Pakistan's military action in the East in March 1971. The U.S.A reacted later than the Western States and also the Soviet Union. On the 2nd April 1971 it expressed its concern for the loss of life, hardship and suffering of the people of Pakistan. On the 7th April 1971 a State Department spokesman further emphasised that Pakistan should try to end the strife peacefully.\textsuperscript{166} The U.S administration also tried to bring pressure on the Pakistan government to accept humanitarian aid through the U.N.O., Pakistan's President however refused any international aid.\textsuperscript{167}

Thereafter the U.S administration worked in close cooperation with the British government in order to revert Pakistan's rejection of material help. The Western and U.S pressure coupled with the deteriorating economic situation changed the hardlined approach of Pakistan. Pakistan
accepted the humanitarian aid to East Pakistan on May 1971, conditionally. Pakistan's condition was that the disbursement of aid was to be coordinated by its officials only. The U.S and British administration was successful in changing Pakistan's attitude because of its worsening foreign debt payment. The latter was in need of economic assistance in order to come out of its indebted situation.\(^{88}\)

Apart from the UN aid for East Pakistan the U.S administration continued its economic assistance programme to Pakistan. Britain also continued to invest in the developmental projects in Pakistan.\(^{89}\) Though U.S. military assistance to Pakistan was to expire after 25th March 1971 the licences for export of arms continued for some more months. As a result arms flow from the U.S.A to Pakistan continued till November 1971. The ammunition supply continued despite the Senate sub-committee's note for suspension of U.S arms sale to Pakistan.\(^{90}\)

The arms sale from the U.S.A continued through June 1971 despite Congressional criticism of the administration's policy decision. Western aid to Pakistan was also forthcoming following the meeting of the Aid-Pakistan Consortium in June 1971. The U.S.A supported the Consortium's decision. The World Bank aid to Pakistan was suspended on 21st June 1971 following a critical report by the World Bank team. Peter Cargill heading a ten member World Bank study team for East and West Pakistan presented an adverse report based on its findings.\(^{91}\) The World Bank report resulted in a set back to most bilateral economic programmes of the Western powers and Pakistan. On the 15th July 1971, the U.S.
House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee voted against continued U.S. military and economic assistance to Pakistan.\(^2\)

The gap between the peoples' representatives and the U.S. administration's policy widened further. There was a difference in the administration's policy rhetorics and actions as well with regard to Pakistan. For instance on the 14th July 1971, Nixon administration announced a halt to economic and technical assistance to Pakistan in view of the situation in East Pakistan. However the official declaration stated that the previous American commitment of 188 million dollars of economic assistance to Pakistan would be appropriated.\(^3\) Simultaneously humanitarian assistance and restoration of communication networks in East Pakistan by the U.S. was be enhanced.

Pakistan's bargaining power within the U.S. administration further increased following the visit of Dr.Henry Kissinger, the U.S. Secretary of State to the sub-continent in July 1971.\(^4\) After his visit a new chapter in Sino-U.S. rapprochement opened-up. The U.S. President's visit to China was announced following Kissinger's tour of Delhi and Islamabad.\(^5\) Sino-U.S. rapprochement was a major diplomatic achievement for Pakistan which had played a principle role of an mediator between China and USA. Pakistan was in a position to request or bargain for more U.S. support through its relationship with China. What is more Pakistan could aspire for more support in the UNO if China was to gain entry as a permanent member of the Security Council.
Sino-U.S. relations resulted in increasing opportunities for Pakistan presumably in gaining international support. U.S.A. and China in turn were increasingly getting involved in Pakistan’s affairs. The support of both the states provided Pakistan an opportunity to bring pressure on India from interfering in East Pakistan. After the 3rd December 1971 when the war formally broke out, the U.S.A. introduced a resolution against India at the U.N. Security Council. The U.S. ambassador to the UNO George Bush called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of all armed personnel to their own side of the border.\(^{(95)}\)

The resolution also proposed the positioning of UN observers along the India-Pakistan border.\(^{(96)}\) The resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union while France and Britain abstained from voting.\(^{(97)}\) The same resolution was once again introduced in the UN General Assembly by the USA on the 7th December 1971. At the General Assembly it was passed with 104 votes for it.\(^{(98)}\) The U.S.A. also demonstrated its support for Pakistan logistically. On 12th December, 1971, it ordered its 7th Fleet of the navy comprising of an aircraft carrier U.S.S. Enterprise to take position in the Bay of Bengal.\(^{(99)}\)

The war however concluded on the 17th December 1971, when Pakistan’s troops surrendered in the eastern sector. The U.S. naval presence could not deter the Indian military victory over Pakistan in Bangladesh. The U.S. administration had to incur global and internal embarrassment for its role in the 1971 crisis. This happened due to the leakage of some confidential policy papers of the U.S. administration.
The papers contained the working procedures and policies of the National Security Council (NSC) and the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG). Jack Anderson, a columnist was the person responsible for making these papers public. These papers were popularly known as the "Anderson papers." It revealed the nature of Nixon-Kissinger domination at the meetings and in the policy making process relating to the 1971 crisis in South Asia.\(^{(100)}\)

Nixon and Kissinger often framed policies that were against the reports and suggestions of their diplomats posted in the sub-continent. The U.S. policy which began with a 'limited objective' in South Asia eventually ended by supporting Pakistan. The U.S. support however could not prevent the disintegration of Pakistan. The Soviet Union like the U.S.A. had also restricted its involvement in the South Asian crisis. It had reacted sharply first when the West Pakistan military carried out its action in East Pakistan. Apart from this initial reaction it had tried to appease Pakistan's leadership later. It tried to promote economic and diplomatic relations with Pakistan. With the progress of events in the sub-continent and growing relations between U.S.A and China, Pakistan preferred Chinese and American support rather than that of the Soviet Union. Soviet Union's efforts of building closer ties with Pakistan was sidelined by the latter in preference to China and the U.S.A. This could have considerably undermined the Soviet Union's position in South Asia. As India and Pakistan headed towards an inevitable show down, the Soviet Union eventually supported India. An analysis of the Soviet

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policy during the Indo-Pak conflict 1971, provides an insight into the nature of Soviet policy in the regional crisis.

The Soviet Union and the 1971 Crisis:

Soviet policy was an outcome of many regional and global issues which could have challenged the Soviet position in South Asia. Soviet support for India during the conflict was aimed more at maintaining a status quo. Soviet policy was therefore not offset by its willingness to settle the Bangladesh crisis against Pakistan's wishes. As the crisis blew over, many issues became embroiled in it. These issues influenced Soviet Union's stand in the crisis.

Initially, the Soviet Union did not want to abandon the idea of drawing India and Pakistan closer in order to form the 'Asian Security Zone'. This had been the major motivating factor of Soviet Union's policy in the Indian sub-continent. The idea of the Security Zone became more important particularly after the Sino-Soviet split in 1957. The establishment of the Zone could act as a buffer against the spread of Chinese influence in the region. The other regional states that were included in the Soviet plan were Afghanistan and Iran. The effort towards fulfillment of this plan increased particularly after the Indo-Pak war, 1965. At the end of this conflict the Soviet Union had played the role of a mediator between India and Pakistan at Tashkent.
An Asian security zone would have been instrumental in keeping the influence of the major external powers from spreading in South Asia. The external powers were of course China and U.S.A. However Soviet Union's policy goal did not take shape as Pakistan acted as a deterrent factor from the very beginning. Pakistan's lack of response was there even when the Soviet Union tried to intensify its relationship with it with a weapon supply package in 1969\textsuperscript{[100]}. Pakistan instead drew closer to China. Air Marshal Nur Khan of Pakistan visited Peking the same year to solicit China's support against India's position in Kashmir.\textsuperscript{[102]}

When West Pakistan carried out military action in East Pakistan the Soviet Union at first reacted sharply against the act. However it refrained from endorsing the liberation of East Pakistan in its statement. Instead the Soviet Union wanted West Pakistan to restore normalcy in the region and prevent a break up of Pakistan. The final break up of Pakistan could have involved Pakistan's traditional rival India. Any confrontation between India and Pakistan would end Soviet Union's plan for an Asian security zone. Moreover a confrontation between India and Pakistan would result in Pakistan soliciting increased Chinese support. Increase in China's influence in the region could have further jeopardised the Soviet interests in South Asia.

However the Asian security zone plan of the Soviet Union did not manage to take off. The breakthrough in Sino U.S. relations with Pakistan's mediation challenged the Soviet position even more than ever before. The Soviet Union also failed to stop India and Pakistan from yet another
confrontation. The changed scenario changed the Soviet Union’s position from neutrality to committed involvement when the crisis in East Pakistan precipitated into a full scale war between India and Pakistan. The result of the change in Soviet Policy was the Indo Soviet Treaty of Friendship 1971. It was signed in August 1971 between Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister and Swaran Singh the minister for External Affairs for India.(103)

The treaty was beneficial to both India and the Soviet Union. For India the treaty, assured it of Soviet support in the sub-continent. For the Soviet Union the Treaty strengthened its position in South Asia vis-a-vis, Pakistan-China and U.S combination. India was also able to secure Soviet Union’s support at UNO when the U.S.A introduced a resolution against its interference in Pakistan’s affairs.(104)

The Indo-Soviet Treaty crystallised the political scene in the Indian sub-continent before the out break of the war. India and Soviet Union formed one group while Pakistan supported by the U.S.A and China formed the rival group. Each group comprised of the regional state and its extra-regional allies. However, despite the Treaty of Friendship the Soviet Union refrained from recognising Bangladesh as an independent state. It was also able to impress upon India to follow suit. This difference in the position between the Indian and Soviet leadership persisted for a while.
Numerous visits were exchanged between the leadership of both India and the Soviet Union over the issue of recognising Bangladesh. Soviet Union’s support for India’s position in the crisis was achieved only in November 1971. By this time the political condition in the sub-continent was fast heading towards a show down between India and Pakistan. At this period of time the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firiyubin visited New Delhi in November 1971(106). Following Firiyubin’s visit the Soviet Commander-in Chief of its Air Force, Air Marshall P.Kutakhov also visited India. The Indo-Pak War 1971 broke out on the 3rd December 1971. Moscow blamed Islamabad, for leading the sub-continent into a crisis. It simultaneously warned all outside powers not to intervene in the conflict. At the international level, particularly in the U.N forum, the Soviet veto defeated three attempts made by the USA to introduce resolutions against India on the 5th, 6th and 13th December 1971.(106) Soviet naval vessels were also present in the Bay of Bengal waters.(107)

As the war ended, following the cease fire on the 17th December 1971 by India and Pakistan the Soviet Union’s role received widespread public appreciation in India and Bangladesh. However the Soviet hopes of an Asian security zone including Pakistan receded with this conflict. Nevertheless Soviet Union’s position vis-a-vis the U.S.A was an envious one. The Soviet policy was hailed both within and in the international arena while the U.S administration had to face embarrassment both at home and globally.
The respective positions for the Soviet Union and the U.S.A at the conclusion of the 1971 conflict may have ended differently. At the initial stages both powers were only reacting rhetorically to the situation in the sub-continent. As the conflict became a reality the U.S. and the Soviet Union faced each other in rival camps.

Regional conflicts in the Indian Ocean region have often drawn the U.S.A and the Soviet Union into antagonistic warring camps. Sometimes such crisis and their involvement have proved to be an embarrassment for the two powers. It has also threatened the possibilities of summit talks between the two super powers. The conflicts also adversely affected the bilateral relations between the U.S.A and the Soviet Union which influenced global politics. One such conflict was the Ogaden Conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977-78 in the Horn of Africa. We can now proceed to discuss this conflict in the next chapter.


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27. Jackson, Robert op cit p 22


29. Owen, John E 'The Emergence of Bangladesh', op cit p 209


32. Jackson, Robert op cit p 27

33. Ibid p 29

34. Bangladesh Documents pp 197-198 & pp 213=216

35. Ibid pp 241-246 & pp 249-250
36. Ibid pp 264-265

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44. Ibid pp 64-68
45. Ibid pp 68-69

46. Ibid pp 69-70

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82. Ibid


84. Ibid p.44

85. Ibid


87. Ibid p 52


90. Ibid.


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95. Ibid. pp. 46-47.

96. Jackson, Robert. PP. 126.

97. Ibid. pp. 127-128

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid p. 139


102. Jackson, Robert. op cit, p. 49.


104. Ibid.

105. Gandhi, Indira. India and Bangladesh p. 92.
