CHAPTER V: THE MARATHA AND OTHER POWERS
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A. THE MARATHAS AND THE SIDIS

RELATIONS BETWEEN SHIVAJI AND THE SIDIS

Shivaji was quite aware of the Konkan part of his kingdom being exposed to the danger of attack by sea. He foresaw the necessity of creating his own navy capable of withstanding any attack by any sea power. And so the navy was created. Naval ships were built and Maulat Khan was appointed the chief of navy. His formidable enemies on the sea were, the Sidis, the Portuguese, the Dutch and the English.

Quarrel between Shivaji and the Sidis broke out since the conquest of Janjira and its adjacent region by Shivaji, on which Sidis had laid their claim since long. This continued for quite some time. The Sidis on the other hand were in possession of Janjira island, an inaccessible fort in the Arabian sea. It had strategic position on the sea waters and controlled the sea routes.

The island of Janjira included Surud, Sandgaon, Mandle, Shrivardhan Nhasale, Covale and five other villages. The total area covered by this island is 323 square miles.
North of it flows river Kundalika and the creek of Kohā, the East is part of Kohā, Sāngāon and Mahād, to the south is the river Evitri and the creek of Bankot and to the west lies the Arabian sea. The greatest advantage it afforded to the shipping was coast worthy of shipping.

In 1639 Venkoji latto totally defeated the Sidis and captured all the territory except Janjirā under their command, where the Sidis were forced to take shelter. From a few years since this time, hivaji could not launch any campaign against the Sidis. But there was a persistent desire in his mind to capture Janjirā along with Bandarajpuri. In 1661, hivaji made an attempt with the help of the English to drive away the Sidis. But the English did not cooperate much and the attempt failed. In April 1669, Shivaji besieged Bandā Rājpuri, but failed. Again in 1676 Moropant with a force of ten thousand strong marched to Bandārājpuri in order to capture the same.  

1677 Sidi Ėsim, who was then at Bandārājpuri defeated the design of Moropant. 4

In 1677 Sidi Ėsim came to Bombay and stayed there till the end of March 1678. During this period Shivaji sent Laulat Khan, the chief of his Navy, with the armada to destroy the ships of Sidis anchored at Mazgaon. But before Laulat Khan could reach Mazgaon the Portuguese opposed him near Lavel and he had to return without accomplishing the mission. In August 1678, once again
Shivaji attempted to take Jarira. He sent his forces to lay siege to the island. The siege was carried on for a long time but it did not yield fruitful results.

In 1679, another development took place. Shivaji captured Khandari. The Ides and the English were equally opposed it, as each one pretended its claim to this island. The Sidis started from Surat in November and launched an attack on Khandari. But the attack was successfully repulsed by Shivaji's men. Then the Ides got into their usual activities of looting and burning the country and landed their men successfully at Underi, another island close to Khandari.

In January 1680 an agreement was reached between the English and Shivaji in respect of the menace of Sidis to the subjects and territory of Shivaji. It was generally agreed upon that the enemy of Shivaji (the Idis) would not be allowed to cross Nagothana and Ben. Iqbal Khan, who had caused great damage to Shivaji's territory would be driven out of Bombay. The Idis were to be asked by the English to remove their armada at Underi. If this was not done alternatively the English were not to supply food grains, gun powder, ships and manpower to the Idis.

Thus having secured the support of the English immediately on 27th January Iqbal Khan was ordered to assault Underi. But to the ill luck of it, the intelligence about
the intended attack had already leaked out. The assault only brought the disastrous results to the Maratha general. Not having satisfied with this attempt, four days later, on 31st January Isulat Khan once again attacked Underi. The results were not very different than those of the previous occasion.

Such was the chequered history of various battles fought between Shivaji and the Idils. They were open enemies, yet nobody had been able to establish the supremacy over the other, or subdue the other. The period of ten years or so had been marked with continuous battles. This gave an opportunity to Shivaji to build his navy and a formidable armada. Yet it did not prove to be very effective against the Idils, who were considered for along a strong sea power and who had occupied the strategic island of Janjira.

CAUSES OF CONTROVERSY BETWEEN SAMBHAJI AND THE IDILS

The enmity which began in the days of Shivaji between the Marathas and the Idils continued even during the reign of Sambhaji. The causes of it were the same as those in the past. Idil's fleet had occasionally visited coastal ships from Surat used to come to Bombay for shelter during monsoons. Idil who settled in Numem began to ravage the Kaurle apte territory which belonged to the Marathas. The
Sidis used to bring into Bombay harbour their Maratha prize-vessels and the captives seized by them in the villages of the mainland for ransom. The Bombay council could not prevent such outrages, though by an agreement reached between them and Shivaji, they were very much bound on their neutrality. Shivaji in turn threatened the English and offered them his alliance if they would only exclude the Sidis from this harbour, but the President of the Council of Surat feared more of the Muzal's displeasure than Shivaji's, ordered the admittance of the Sidis fleet. The Maratha vessels under admiral Doular than being small in size and armament than Sidis lay sheltered up the Nagothana creek and in Khanderi harbour during the monsoons without venturing pitched battles. The Sidi's presence in these seas closed the passage of the Maratha trading vessels. This was certainly not to be tolerated by Sambhaji. Thus Sambhaji always looked forward for an opportunity to destroy the Sidis and their armada.

The first battle on record given during Sambhaji's time is dated 1st August 1660. A party of Marathas landed in the dark on the island of Khanderi. The Sidis promptly resisted. Many Marathas were killed and a large number were taken as captives. As the report goes '80' heads of the Marathas were brought to Sidi who was at Mungaon. Thus the first venture of the Marathas ended in a disastrous failure.
Subsequently, in October, ambaji lodged a protest note to the English stating that they had allowed the Sidis to remain in Bombay and also they had supplied them arms and ammunition which was in contravention to the agreement reached between Shivaji and them and finally threatened them that if they failed in driving out the Sidis and allowed the supplies to the Sidis would be made responsible to pay such cost as incurred by ambaji in driving away the Sidis.

This protest note of Ambaji hardly created the desired effect. On 20th November, Ambaji sent Avaji Pandit to Bombay with a similar protest. Then Bombay factors wrote to Murat on 27th November seeking their advice in the matter.

Thus passed one year without such activity. In the middle of August 1681 'Ambaji's Flotilla consisting of 22 gallivaters tried to land 4 thousand men on Underi, but were beaten off by the Sidis' fleet after a fight of four hours.

On 7th December 1681, the Sidis burnt Apte, 10 miles south of Panvel and again was once again a scene of plunder, outrages and insolent captures by Sidi Trim. Glated with these series of successes which the Sidis had gained over the Marathas, the Bombay Gallivaters sailed along the shore of Faurle, carried off the inhabitants
of the place as prisoners and treated them mercilessly. 16

The news of the outrages soon reached Lambhaaji at 
Mandwad. He immediately left Mūrgadh at the head of 20,000 force for Janjira. He also ordered his artillery to move there. Janjira was bombarded from a hill opposite for 30 days incessantly. The fortifications were raised to ground. 17 Another strong force of the Marathas was sent to Bandārajpuri. It bombarded the town for fifteen days and destroyed the fortification completely. The Sídís took shelter in the hills and asked help from the Portuguese. They also threatened them to burn Choul in case the help was refused. 16

But the Maratha success appeared to be illusive. They did not command the sea and their vessels were unable to transport their army across the base of the channel half a mile breadth to the island in the teeth of Sídī Azīm's fleet stationed there. 19

Lambhaaji more determined than ever, set fifty thousand men to fill the channel eight hundred yards broad and thirty yards deep with stones in order to form a causeway for his storming parties. 20 Had this been accomplished not a single sailor of troublesome Sídís would have escaped alive. But to the misfortune of the Maratha king the Mughal invasion of the North Konkan and the capture of Kālyān on 4th February 1662 forced him to
hasten to Tāgāghā. The very existence of the state was in peril. He was compelled to leave only ten thousand men behind him to continue the siege work. As a consequence of this, success was ill achieved and once again Sidi got off lightly. Finally Sambhaji raised the siege of Bandarājpurī.

The English continued doing their job in a most unabated way. They paid least response to the protest lodged and requests made by Sambhaji. They constantly engaged themselves in supplying goods to the Sidiis. They did not give much importance to the good relations they were to maintain with Sambhaji.

For the next six months, Saraswati squadrons did not indulge in warlike activities with the Sidiis. They kept on preparing and in July 1662 the Saraswatis delivered an assault on Danjira with a few boats that were at their disposal. They could hardly gain footing on the coast and had to retire with heavy losses. Prabhū made commander. The soldiers were given a lot of encouragement and even gold and silver coins were distributed. In spite of such heavy preparation and inducement the success was ill achieved. The Saraswati losses in killed were heavy and not more than 500 returned alive.

Within a month of this disastrous failure of Bād
Trabhu, the Tidis ravaged Purla (18th August 1662). The
Maratha havaldar Cawan was taken captive and as a mark
of humiliation, the Tidis cut off the noses of several
inhabitants and carried away many from Nāgothana.

This act of Tidis did not pass unnoticed. Soon in
October, Dhwaj ordered Sidi Hīri, another of his naval
commander to attack Sidi Ārim near Bombay. In October,
Sidi Hīri with 30 gallavats gave battle near Bombay to
Sidi Ārim who had a squadron of 13 vessels. After a
pitched battle, Sidi Hīri was mortally wounded and thus
suffered a defeat. But he had captured four vessels of
the enemy. Maulat Chān who was in the Nāgothana river was
expected to come for the help but did not turn up in time.

From 1662 till the end of 1665 practically there were
no activities of the Tidis. In 1666 the Tidis departed
from Vagāoon. From this time onwards Bombay was no more
the headquarters of the Tidis winter sports.

The peace in Bombay seems lasted till the beginning
of 1666. In February Sidi Ārim departed from Bundā-
rājpuri. Then he besieged the port of Salyan with
the hope of capturing it soon. This was done with the
sole intention of cutting off supplies and trade with
Khanderi and thus take that island by forcing a virtual
blockade. But contrary to the expectations, the siege
did not last long. Sidi Ārim was ordered to proceed to
In March the Sidis landed at Fatakpur by way of 
Barjapur. The Aratha squadrons who were after him gave 
a fight. Sidis lost 100 in killed. He himself received 
four wounds and very narrowly escaped the death and lost 
life gallivants.

Then there was news of his moving towards Bandarajpur.
In spite of severe defeat in March, the Sidi continued 
their activities of ravaging the Aratha territory.

In October, he took to a fortress of Cambhaji and re-
covered a big gun. After this apparent success the 
Sidi had big plans of invading and capturing Chanderi.
The English at Bombay wisely wrote to urat council that 
the Sidi is resolved to attack 'Sandrey.' It will have bad 
effect on the island of Bombay. The letter advises that 
the urat Governor should send a man to Cambhaji and re-
quest him to hand over the island of Chanderi to the English 
untill it becomes a part of their possessions and then 
to return it to him again. As a result of the activities 
of the Sidis Pen was certainly in a danger of being 
lost to the Sidis.

From October 1668 till February 1669, the country 
remained peaceful. The Sidis did not come to Nizamun or 
Bombay. But in February 1669 the Sidis fleet which was
at Landárjpurí consisted of 11 ships and 7 small vessels. The English at Poíbay appear to have been worried as they suspected a surprise attack on them. And shortly their suspicion proved true. On 11th February Sidi Yáquut Khan landed in Poíbay with 25 thousand men, looted it and carried away 11 cannons, 2 mortars, some powder shots and shells. The English deserted Poígaon. This cowardly behaviour of the English further emboldened Sidi Yáquut Khan to despatch a party of his men towards Kálíím where they plundered the poor peasants to their hearts content. But to the good luck of the English the arathas hastened to their help and thus the free passage of the Ídís was stopped.

Finally in June 1690, the Ídís left Poígaon for good. Poígaon went in the possession of the English who posted 10 Englishmen, 200 Hindus and 80 Christians for the defence of the place and Sevree Bay. This brought to an end fighting between the arathas and the Ídís which consumed a lot of energy of the aratha kings in maintaining peace and independence in the territories adjoined by the sea under their rule.
During the reign of Shivaji, the Portuguese were considered only to be a small community mostly engaged in trade activities. Though they built small naval ships, yet they never exhibited an ambition of becoming a great maritime power. Their chief concern was expansion of trade and along with it spread of Christianity which they considered as their religious duty. For the expansion of trade, they indulged in political activities, though it was not their basic aim or policy. The naval ships which they had built were only sufficient to carry their trade and not any prolonged war at sea with a formidable enemy. But it does not mean that they did not build up their army with utmost care and discipline. They also made use of more modernised weapons of war than any other eastern country. Their army was well trained, well disciplined and well maintained. Similarly they carried out systematic expansion of Christianity. Their primary means of achieving their objective was through conversion of the local population to the Christianity. And this was certainly done with more than the missionary zeal. The churches and the local priests were regularly paid by the Portuguese government. This aim was certainly very ambitious on their part. Mostly the local population was Hindu.
Therefore in order to carry out their plan of spreading Christianity they had to induce the people. Wherever the usual inducement or abetment failed, they resorted to force. Coercion became a more prominent method of converting Hindus. This forced conversion had its effects on the people. The local population certainly protested against it.

Thus during Shivaji's time this was one of the important problems before the Hindus in Goa and in the adjacent regions. The subjects on the bordering villages were kidnapped and forcibly converted. Then followed the horrors of inquisition. This problem greatly disturbed the mind of Shivaji. Though there was no direct war between the Portuguese and Shivaji, yet in the heart of the Portuguese Viceroy at Goa well knew the strength of Shivaji. Therefore as far as possible, the attitude of the Portuguese was to maintain peaceful relations and settle down their problems amicably.

As early as 8th December 1667, a treaty was signed between Shivaji and the Portuguese. In that it was agreed upon that Lakham Savanta and Vasava Naik were to be treated as the vassals of Bijapur. Therefore they were not to be granted any shelter by the Portuguese in Goa and were also not allowed to invade Shivaji's territory. Traders were permitted to carry out trade freely provided
they paid the customs duties. Similarly in 1670 an agreement took place between Shivaji and the Portuguese in respect of their affairs on the western sea-coast the plying of the boats of each nation in each other's territory and other mercantile matters. The Portuguese showed willingness to help Shivaji against the Imam of Baniketh in Arabia but not against the Sidi of Janjira whom they called as their vassal.

Thus on the whole the relations between Shivaji and the Portuguese were more or less amicable. The Portuguese never directly declared any war nor invaded Shivaji's territory. At the end of Shivaji's career there were long drawn out negotiations between him and the Portuguese about the payment of 'Chauth' near the Nasam border in the north. The haunting problem of forced conversions did not figure in any of the agreements; this might have been due to the might and the potentialities of Shivaji. From the historical records it appears that these friendly relations continued till the death of Shivaji. In fact on the death of Shivaji the Portuguese offered condolence to Sambhaji and assured their friendship to him.

### CAUSE OF FECTION BETWEEN SAMBHAJI AND THE PORTUGUESE

If such were the cordial relations existing between Shivaji and the Portuguese then, after the death of Shivaji,
what made his successor to take up arms against this foreign power. On Shivaji's death, the Portuguese extended their hand of friendship to Sambhaji. The treaties which were made by Shivaji were not at all nullified or withdrawn.

It is therefore evident that the trouble with the Portuguese does not appear to have developed suddenly. The foremost cause of friction is traceable as early as January 1677. From January 1677 till March 1678 Shivaji was out on his grand expedition of Karnātaka while Sambhaji who stayed behind in maharashtra was looking after certain affairs of the state. He demanded from the Portuguese sixty villages on the ground that they belong to the fort of Shonda. These villages were under Maratha domination. The Portuguese refused to concede. As a result of it the Marathas made an attack on this so called Portuguese possession.

According to the treaty signed by Shivaji with the Portuguese the merchants of either territories were permitted to carry on the trade freely after payment of the requisite taxes. But a little later it was found that the merchants of Goa, who were to get passage through Nicholi up the ghat were refused the same.

The Maratha Subahdār of Nicholi tyrannized and robbed the merchants. It certainly created a feeling of in-
security among the merchants from the Portuguese territory. Soon Sambhaji transferred the Subahdar from this place. In Daman the Portuguese killed some Marathas and Sambhaji seems to have sent a force against them as contemporary records speak the Portuguese at Daman being in great trouble. At the end of 1661 Sambhaji besieged Janjira, a strong hold of the Idia who had been menacing the Maratha subjects for long and requested help from the Portuguese of Chaul. The Portuguese refused the same. Sambhaji having seen his political cause being weakened, threatened to burn Chaul, in order to bring pressure upon the Portuguese. The Portuguese viceroy reacted to it in a most violent way. The viceroy led an expedition against Phondē, a Maratha possession, in order to create a diversion in favour of the besieged Portuguese at Chaul. In this encounter with the Portuguese, Kumār Kank and his son Krishnājī, the two notable Marathas gave determined fight to the invading Portuguese. This has gone in the history of Marathas as a great act of valour and bravery of these two men, who were severely injured. Subsequently Krishnājī Kank succumbed to the injuries and died. Both were meritoriously rewarded by their king Sambhaji. In spite of this the matters did not inflame much. In 1682 island of Anjivī, south of Barwar, was vacated by Portuguese and the English, due to bad climate. Sambhaji wished to occupy it and sent a Maratha force for necessary occupation.
The Portuguese Viceroy, Conde de Alvar sent Portuguese soldiers loaded in ships to drive away the Maratha force, and began to fortify the island. Not only this, the Portuguese added insult to injury to the Maratha Raja by an unfriendly act of passing the Mughal ships under the Portuguese fort of Thana up the creek to Kalyan, carrying provisions, for Mughal army under H contestants under Pan Phane, then ravaging the district. And the last straw was added to this mounting tension between the Portuguese and the Marathas, when, on 9th May, 1652, the Portuguese demolished a Hindu temple and turned it into a church. This act of the Portuguese brought in the most devastating results. According to contemporary record, “The Portuguese have done such actions already in burning men alive and destroying pagodas that Sambhaji will not easily put up with them.” As a result of possible retaliation, 200 families (Portuguese) migrated from the territory of Sambhaji. The Portuguese desired to settle down these families as well another 500 families in the island of Anjiv. By now they well fortified the island of Anjiv against a possible attack from the Marathas. Sometimes before July, Sambhaji, sent a strong force of 4 thousand men under Vaid Prabhuj in order to take possession of Vandarapur. A fierce battle ensued and the Marathas lost 300 in killed. The campaign did not bring any success to the Marathas.
In the last week of March, 1663, the Mughal army under Shah Alam, after having disasterously blown up, withdrew from north Konkan. Thus Sambhaji was temporarily freed from the worry of Mughal invasion. And without loss of much of time, by 16th April he launched his attack on the Portuguese territory. His army consisted of two thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry. The first town to be the victim of this invasion was Tarapur. It was burnt and looted and then followed a mass action. All other villages from Daman to Basaien were destroyed by the mighty force of Sambhaji. Manuel Alvarees, a native of India and captain of Tarapur resisted the attack and according to the Portuguese source of information as many as 700 Marathas lost their lives in this combat.

OCCUPATION OF CHAUL - A HOME OF CONTENTION

Chaul, a small territory near Alibagh, Bombay was divided into two parts, upper Chaul, and lower Chaul. Upper Chaul was under the possession of the Marathas and the lower Chaul was governed by Don Francisco da Costa, a captain of the Portuguese. The territory of Chaul controlled the passage of march of army by the sea to the Portuguese territory of Goa. Therefore, each state, tried to exercise full control over the entire territory of Chaul. Each one was on the look out of an excuse and attack the other,
in fact all the strategy was directed to catch the other one unaware.

In the beginning of May, 1683, the Portuguese captain of Lower Chaul bombarded and partly demolished upper Chaul in reprisal for the detention of a Portuguese priest in prison there. The news speedily reached the Maratha Headquarters. Lomthaji hastened to take action. By 10th August 6000 infantry and 3000 cavalry of the Marathas arrived at Chaul and besieged Lower Chaul. After eight days since the siege, i.e. on 16th August an assault was made by the besieging army. The night watch had dispersed and the men, weary from their vigil, were resting and others were withdrawing to their houses. The Marathas attacked the walls, with many scaling ladders, which they easily set up there being very few to oppose them. But the alarm being sounded religious and lay men flew to the walls, slew those who were already upon the walls and threw down all the scaling ladders. The Marathas suffered great loss and in a short time were forced to abandon their attempt.

On the same day the Marathas made a gallant attempt to storm the fortress of Mirvo which is situated at the mouth of the bar of the town of Chaul. Six persons were sent in advance to get the intelligence of the enemy. They were to scale the fortress walls, kill the sentries,
there and give a signal by sounding the trumpets, so that the rest of the Maratha army could follow them and attack the enemy unaware. But to the ill luck of the Marathas, the things did not go as planned. The six persons after scaling the wall of the fortress, were captured by the Portuguese most unaware. They were put to severe torture and thus confessed the purpose of their visit. The captain of the fort promptly ordered to load the guns and gave signal of attack by blowing trumpets. And now it was the turn of the Maratha soldiers to get surprised by their enemy, by falling in their own trap. As soon as the Marathas heard the signal, they made a singular dash towards the fort wall and with equal swiftness, the Portuguese guns burst open, with thunderous sound and earth shaking noise. The Marathas fell before the artillery fire like ants, helpless, powerless and astonished. More than five hundred were lost in this surprise venture. As the realization dawned upon the Maratha leaders, they withdrew from the attack. Thus on two different parts Marathas faced severe defeat at the hands of the Portuguese. Sambhaji's desire of delivering a blow to the Portuguese power remained unfulfilled. 

Then for a month or so there was no major battle fought between Sambhaji and the Portuguese. But certain skirmishes did take place. In the plain of Gauhati...
outside the fort is Capuchin convent and church of the Virgin, with a watch tower in one corner of the enclosure. It was held by a small force of Indians and Portuguese soldiers for over five months. Marathas wanted to bring it under their possession, for commanding the interior of the fort. They attacked it several times but could not capture.

Some time later, Francisco de Favers, the Viceroy of Goa, received the report of Sambhaji's march to his territory with a large army. On 27th August, he promptly called out and armed all the monks of the city. Then within a few days he took the decision of invading Sambhaji's territory. On 7th September, at midnight, he assembled all the Indians on the island and ferried them across the river to the mainland of Sāvantwādi with a general licence to plunder.

BATTLE OF PONDA

Before November 1683 Sambhaji was at Bājpuri. He was constantly receiving the reports of increased activities of the Portuguese. He was much annoyed to learn that the Portuguese soldiers landed at Sāvantwādi and burnt the villages. The Viceroy of Goa planned to lay siege to Pondē, 10 miles s.s.e. of Goa town. He disembarked at Turbahat on the right bank of Bachol river, 3 miles s.w.
of Pondicherry. He had 2000 white and 3000 Mararese troops and 5 pieces of artillery with him. An exchange of fire took place between the Portuguese and Maratha troops for three days. The Portuguese fired their guns at fortress wall and breached it with great difficulty. On 9th November they decided to scale the breach of the inner wall. But to the ill luck of the Portuguese, a Maratha force under Sambhaji arrived that very day and the Portuguese soldiers were in appalling condition. On 11th November the Portuguese decided to retreat from Surbhat to Goa. A hill dominated the place of embarkation. The Portuguese Viceroy ordered to take its possession from the Marathas for their safe retreat. The Marathas who were in ambush behind the hill retreated quietly and waited for an opportunity to attack. The Portuguese infantry followed them and reached the plains. The Portuguese in their elusive chase and in the wild happiness of seeing Marathas on their heels, forgot the Maratha tactics of war. As the infantry appeared in open the Maratha cavalry fell upon them ruthlessly. The Portuguese army was put in total disorder and many soldiers were trampled under the hooves of the Maratha horse. Of the Portuguese infantry nearly a whole company of seamen were killed....the dead and wounded amounting to two hundred. Thus at the battle of Surbhat, the scales were turned against the Portuguese and the Marathas became victorious. Marathas not only
The island is small one and located to the east of Goa. It is also called Santo Estevoao. It was under Portuguese possession and was considered vital in view of war strategy, if an attack was to be launched on Goa. The Maratha Baja, Lambhaji, thought it fit to occupy the island in view of the attack and occupation of Goa. On 24th November, 1683 at 10° clock by means of a dry channel which could be forded at low tide with the water to the knees, forty Marathas entered the island of St. Stephen, and climbing the hill they reached the fort. They placed scaling ladders against the walls, without any resistance entered fort and killed the Portuguese captain. An alarm was sounded and the Portuguese arranged themselves in order to resist the attack. Next morning (25th November) the Portuguese viceroy himself disembarked at the island with 300 picked men. The men climbed the hill and were ordered to attack the Marathas. On the hill were 40 Maratha musketeers. As they were attacked by the Portuguese, they did not resist, but started retreating. Shortly a reinforcement of 300 cavalry joined them. And then they fell back on the Portuguese soldiers. The Portuguese
soldiers had least expected such an action and were put to flight. A great confusion prevailed. The Portuguese Viceroy was attacked by cavalrymen. But owing to his good luck, he managed to escape from the hands of the Marathas. He took to flight. The Portuguese suffered a loss of 130 in dead and wounded. Thus Marathas successfully occupied the small island of St. Stephen.

But the Portuguese gained a striking success immediately afterwards. They pretended to evacuate the small island of Cambarji, immediately to the east of Coa and south of St. Stephen. The Maratha army fell into the Portuguese trap. Sambhaji occupied this island with 7000 picked troops. The object in occupying the island was to get clearer to Coa. The Portuguese flotilla had occupied the two wide streams that enclose Cambarji, while on the remaining side, the guns from the fort kept on pouring fire on the invading army of the Marathas. The Marathas suffered heavy loss of human life. To the good luck of the Marathas, their leader and King Sambhaji had left the island after its siege immediately. Thus Cambarji brought disastrous results to the Marathas.

The immediate effect of this battle looked to be great on the Maratha war strategy as at the same time Shāh ʿAlam's invasion of South Konkan began. The Marathas King Sambhaji engaged himself in making peace with the
Portuguese. He employed Jurgadas as an ambassador to negotiate peace with the Portuguese. But nothing seems to have come out of these efforts.

By the end of year 1683, the conquest of Goa was almost in sight of the Marathas, rest of the satellites of small islands and villages surrounding that small island had already accepted the domination of the Marathas. Everything seemed to be going all right and it was expected that in a short period Maratha flag would be flying high over Goa. Sambhaji's dream of bringing that territory under Maratha rule and bringing the culprits to the books for indulging into forced conversions and inquest did not seem to be far off.

But such was not the course of destiny. In the political field of Marathas a new factor appeared and it was in the shape of prince Shāh 'Alam's invasion of South Konkan. This shook the very foundation of the Maratha Kingdom. The very existence of the state came into close danger. As a natural consequence of this campaign Sambhaji was forced to change his strategy of war and divert most of the forces now engaged against the Portuguese, to protect Konkan. As a result of this action of the Maratha King the Portuguese, who were almost beaten got a little breathing time. They took this opportunity and made peace with Sambhaji on the condition that Paranja was restored to them.
On account of being forced to fight at two different fronts, Sambhaji chose the wise course of making peace with the Portuguese, which eventually came to be known as treaty of Bhimgadh. Bhimgadh is jungle 27 miles east of Goa. After his invasion of Goa in December 1683, here he retreated and made dash towards Hajgadh in order to make military arrangements to meet Shah Alam's army which was descending Ramghat in south Konkan. Behind him at Bhimgadh he left prince Akbar and Kavi Kalash to negotiate the peace treaty. On 2nd January 1684, Manuel Sarava de Albuquerque set out as an envoy to conduct the peace treaty on behalf of the Portuguese. Shortly the terms of the treaty were drawn and fighting ceased between these two powers. The Portuguese prisoners of war captured at Salsette and Bardesh were released. At least temporarily peace prevailed among the Portuguese and the Maratha lines. Sambhaji expected that for some time to come he would be free to attend to other affairs of the state he did not expect Portuguese to play any mischief, as contemporary records inform us. "There is now a cessation of arms and (we) hope there may be peace, the Portuguese having been soundly banged and all their aldeas (villages) and battee (foodgrains) ground burnt and ruined," By March the conditions had turned favourable to Sambhaji.

Shāh Alam who had invaded South Konkan with monstrous Mughal force received a crippling blow in the shape of famine and
pestilence. In the trip of devastation, he proposed to
retreat. And Sambhaji was not the king to let go such
fine opportunity without exploiting it to his advantage,
and settle the old score with his Portuguese neighbour.

He issued orders for fresh attack on the Portuguese.
On the 10th March his armada seized several rice boats
which were brought into Karwar port by the Portuguese.
He ordered his army to march towards Ponda and make a sur-
prise attack on Goa. Inspite of those orders, nothing
seems to have come forth. In June Portuguese Viceroy
visited all his forts and important places. He had not
paid the tribute as demanded by Sambhaji and he certainly
was anticipating an attack by the Maratha army. Inspite
of such anticipations, when the Portuguese Viceroy saw that
Marathas had not made dash on to his territory, he in turn
played a mischief. On 19th September the Portuguese attacked
and recovered high hill in Karanja island, that had been
occupied by Sambhaji nine months back. The entire Maratha
garrison was made prisoner. Even then there was no out-
break of hostilities between Portuguese and Marathas.
Certain minor incidents did take place, but they can be
discarded only as skirmishes. From now onwards till the end
of Sambhaji's reign though no major battle took place between
him and the Portuguese yet the languid hostilities continued
till the end of his reign. The Portuguese war remained an
open sore for years and continued to drain the blood of
the Maratha State.
C. MARATHAS AND THE ENGLISH

RELATIONS BETWEEN SHIVAJI AND THE ENGLISH

In the beginning of 1670 Shivaji took possession of most of the forts in Maharashtra, which were earlier either under Adil Shahi or the Mughal rule. Immediately the first reaction came from the English factors at Bombay, who wrote on 30th March, 1670 that "Shivaji has become our neighbour near Bombay. He has taken Kalian and Bhivandi. He will prove to be a better neighbour than Moors." The English, showed preference to Shivaji's rule than that of any one else. Again Surat factors wrote to Bombay on the 16th April, 1670 that they have given full consent to the correspondence opened by Bombay factors with the Subahdar of Bhivandi and they need not unnecessarily be worried about the threats from the Moors. But none the less they were advised not to involve themselves in quarrel with any power, but they should try and remain neutral. Their sole purpose should be to carry on trade in the country. Thus they were asked to maintain friends to all. Though openly the English pleaded for the friendship of all and particularly that of Shivaji, yet secretly, they supported the activities of the Sidi in Kalian Bhivandi region, who was a sworn enemy of Shivaji. They avoided open conflict with Shivaji on any issue. Shivaji on his part also acted in the spirit of
friendship and proper understanding. This is particularly evident, when he sacked Surat for the second time; he took particular precaution of doing no damage to the English goods there. The English factors though pretended friendship with Shivaji, yet did not actually help him, when he needed their help. In 1671 Shivaji asked for some guns and ammunition from the English. Far from supplying, they even postponed a reply to his urgent request. This attitude appears to be very much in keeping with their earlier policy of neutrality. Probably this act of being unhelpful to Shivaji was weighing uppermost on their mind, and as they got an opportunity they did help Shivaji, though indirectly by not allowing the idis to rest in Bombay for passing the monsoons (1671). But they were forced to give way to the Mughal fleets. But Shivaji did not condone this act as is evident, from the records, that when Thomas Nicholes, the representative of the English went to Shivaji to negotiate some concessions in respect of Hubli, Shivaji turned them down promptly.

Still, as a result of these talks Shivaji permitted them to carry on their trade (December 1679) which had ceased for quite a long time. In addition to this, they sent Ram Shenvi for conducting talks with Annaji Patto the Subâhârdâr of Chaul. In the agreement reached at it was decided that, the English would not supply any ammunition
and funds to the Sidiis, they would not allow any enemy of
Shivaji to pass through Bombay harbour, the traders from
Shivaji's territory would not be put to any inconvenience
or harassment and finally Saud Khan, who had joined the
service of the Sidiis and ravaged the territory of Shivaji
would be punished by them and driven out of the island.
This agreement was a singular triumph of Shivaji's diplo-
macy and his most tactful handling of the problem of foreign
power on Indian soil. Thus the relation existed between
Shivaji and the English were quite cordial. From time to
time, it is seen that the English were quite afraid of
Shivaji's strength, particularly since their defeat at
Khānderi. Since then they chose the role of being more
friendly and thus achieve their object of trade.

But then that was not the end in itself as far as the
English were concerned. They never lost sight of an oppor-
tunity if they were to be benefited by it and if they were
to sacrifice the friendship. They always looked upon time,
opportunity and the relative strength of the concerned
power and unhesitatingly furthered their motives. This
necessarily forced Shivaji not to rely upon the English
as his allie or relieve upon their word when occasion
demanded so.
After Sambhaji’s accession to the throne in 1680, he appointed a new Subahdar to the territory of Chaul. In May, 1680, the English wanted to wind up their trade in Rajapur. They requested Sambhaji to permit them to leave Rajapur. But during this period, Sambhaji was much occupied with the internal affairs and could not pay any attention to the request of the English. In October, English factors of Rajapur received the news about the movements of the Maratha troops and heard that a large number of them including an armada was being positioned at Bombay. This was mainly to counteract the Sidis who were becoming powerful. Meanwhile, a representative of the English came to the court of Sambhaji and requested for an amount of money. He had to return in disappointment as he was told that the English had given shelter to the Sidis and also supplied them with guns and ammunition. This was in contravention to the agreement concluded between them and Shivaji in 1679. And till the time the English did not drive out the Sidis from Bombay and stopped the supply of arms, the Maratha king would not care for the English. But if they did drive out the Sidis, they would certainly get large amounts as gifts and also compensation for losses. Thus in the early days of Sambhaji’s reign, a friction started between the smooth relations of the Marathas and the English. Inspite of such
strong note of protest from the Maratha king, the English hardly did anything to improve them. As a consequence of it, on 6th November 1680, the Bombay factors informed Surat that Sambhaji was busy in the preparation of an armada at Rajapur manned by 4 to 5 thousand fighting personnel. On 20th November 1680, Avaji Pandit arrived at Bombay and informed the English that if they did not honour the agreement between them and Shivaji, and drive away the Sidi, then Sambhaji would be forced to declare a war against them. The cost of getting rid of the Sidi menace to the Marathas was very high. Sambhaji had to raise a standing force of ten thousand men. The Sidi ravaged the country from Apta to Kurla.

This visit of Sambhaji's envoy to the English had the desired effect. On 20th December, the English sent Garry and Robert Tharbin to the Sidi and got in writing from them that they would not ravage the territory of Sambhaji. After this the Sidi left for Vengurla and were chased by Daulat Khan, the naval commander of Sambhaji. But that was not the end of the Sidi's menace. In the beginning of March 1681, the Sidi returned in the vicinity of Bombay and seized a boat and four persons of Sambhaji. Immediately, the Subahdar of Chaul demanded the return of the same from the English. No doubt the English were put in a difficult position, still they
managed to overcome it. By 12th April, the English made arrangements of returning the men to the Subahdar of Chaul.

In June 1673, the English sent a certain Narayan Shenavi as their representative to Shivaji's court. But nothing seems to have come out of it as Narayan Shenavi returned along with a courtier of Shivaji. They however did not give up the hope about their mission and sent Narayan Shenavi again on 24th March 1674. On the occasion of Shivaji's coronation the English sent costly presents in order to earn the good-will of Shivaji. But the English had put their own limitations and when in 1674 he pressed for his demand for supply of guns, the English politely declined telling 'so far and no more'. Similar story was repeated in July 1675. But Shivaji never misconstrued policy of the English and always extended concessions and facilities to them to carry on trade and business in his territory. In 1678 Shivaji gathered his troops near Mannagar. This certainly caused alarm in the mind of the English. But Bombay factors advised Surat not to get worried over it. And reciprocated by driving the Sidis from Bombay during the monsoon of 1678. This brought a great deal of satisfaction to Shivaji. Immediately followed a more dreadful news about Shivaji's intended attack on the Sidis under his veteran naval captain Baulat Khan. As a result of this the English vacated Cossipur and
suffered a loss in the trade. Shivaji, realizing this opened talks with them and asked them to resettle at Jajapur.

In 1679, Shivaji occupied the island of Khanderi much against the desire of the English. In addition to it he equipped that island with guns and ammunition and built a fortress wall. He posted enough men for its protection against any attack. The English disputed having their claim over it. According to Shivaji the strategic importance of this place was great, as this was stepping stone towards wiping out the menace of the Sidis to his subject. With the control over this island he could forcefully stop naval movements of the Sidis or the Dutch. The English made an attempt to take over this island from Shivaji, but the same ended in a disastrous failure. Having faced the miserable failure, the English were quick enough to turn their stand and opened peace talks with Shivaji. This was done, again with more selfish end, so that their rivals like the Portuguese and the Sidis should not be benefited by their defeat. They also expected the Sidis to come down to Band Jajpuri during this period.

On 17th April the Sidis left for Surat with their ships. But meanwhile another blow was given to the relations of the Marathas and the English. On 12th February, Sambhaji sacked Bhorangaon. The English factors sustained
some losses and demanded compensation from Avaji Randit, the Maratha representative. Avaji Randit had earned the good-will of the English. The matter did not go beyond control and in June he left for Bajgadh in order to represent the case of the English to Cambhaji. The English company in London became aware of the situation and before the English at Tharangaon could take any retaliative measure, they were instructed to refrain from any fighting with any of the powers. Thus a direct clash between the English and the Marathas was avoided. But the problem of the Sidis remained unabated and unsolved. The English had accepted the responsibility of doing away with this menace; as a result of this, whenever Sidis appeared near Bombay, or in the territory of Cambhaji, they were confronted with very peculiar situation. The English could neither afford to break the old agreement with the Marathas or accept open hostilities with the Sidis, who were quite powerful at the sea.

In December again, the Sidi ravaged and burnt the territory of Apte-Kurle. As a result of it the food supplies of the English were stopped and the Marathas forced a virtual blockade on the English factors. It was lifted only when the English gave an undertaking that they would do away with the menace of the Sidis. After that only they were permitted to carry on trade in Apte-Kurle
territory. The English factors at Bombay always looked for advice from their head office at Surat. In January 1682, Sidi Āsīm anchored at Bombay. Promptly they wrote to Surat as to the action to be taken. Sidi Āsīm was very likely to ravage the territory of Sambhajī and hence their relations would not have remained harmonious. The Mughal general Hasan Ali Khan was also ravaging the territory of Kalyān. The English factors at Bombay were really on the horns of a dilemma. Surat factors advised them to help secretly Sambhajī against the Sidis. But they were also asked to supply arms and ammunition to the Mughal general. To this the Bombay factors expressed their helplessness as on an earlier occasion when Sambhajī visited Portuguese at Chaul and had got the information that if were the English who helped the enemy of Sambhajī. Then Sambhajī had sent his representative to Pen and requested them to prohibit the entry of the Sidis.

Surat factors could not properly judge the situation that the Bombay factors were confronted with. They coolly advised them to help the Sidis. On 25th April they also advised Bombay factors to maintain good relations with Sambhajī. It was a most delicate and equally explosive situation that the Bombay factors had to confront with. Finally, judging the situation for themselves the Bombay factors took the decision and did not allow Sidi Āsīm
to anchor in Bombay harbour. They also lodged a protest that the Sidis were not keeping the verbal promises made to them and were indulging into ravages and loot of Sambhaji's territory. This decision of the Bombay factors of not giving shelter to the Sidis was much resented by Surat council. By October, Surat was informed about the likely mischief, the Sidis would play in Sambhaji's territory, which meant incurring wrath of Sambhaji. And as a consequence of this Sambhaji stopped all supplies of grain. They requested Surat to send them armada for their rescue. But this did not relieve the situation. Finally they wrote to Surat that unless the Sidis clear off from there, they had no hope of getting any supplies. Thus Sambhaji effectively controlled the English factors.

In November 1662, a rumour obtained currency that Daulat Khan, the chief of the Maratha Navy had received positive orders from Sambhaji to invade Bombay without fail and before the arrival of Sidis there. But it soon proved to be false. The Maratha ambassador who came to the English brought the news about the likely surprise attack from Aurangzeb on Bombay. 67 This attempt on Sambhaji's part points out his effort to win more allies to face the invasion of Aurangzeb. It is not known from the available records if the English acted favourably or not. But in all likelihood it seems that they did not.
Right from the early times, the English considered the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb as their enemy. Probably and more likely as a result of poor response to Sambhaji's call, he attacked the English ship 'President'. 11 people of the English were lost in killed and 35 in wounded. Sambhaji lost three ships out of six.

Next year passed without much of activity. By the end of April 1661, Keigwin/chief of English factor sent captain Garry to Sambhaji for certain negotiations. "I'm Shenvi and Thomas Watkins had accompanied him. Keigwin was informed by Sambhaji that the English should treat the enemy of the Marathas as their enemy and similarly a friend of theirs be treated as friend of the English.

Many times Sambhaji had informed the English about driving out the Sidis, but nothing definite in that respect had happened. If only the English could destroy the Sidis the Marathas would give the necessary help. And almost within a month's time a settlement was reached between the English and the Marathas, which later on came to be known as a settlement of the 15th May 1664. By this the English were permitted to open godowns in Karnatak in Sambhaji's territory. The Maratha Subahdār was made responsible for any theft of the English goods and to bring the offender to the books. 2 1/2% duty was to be charged on the goods imported by the English but
they were prohibited from buying any person for slave
trade and indulge into forced conversions to Christianity.
The English were given assurance of other facilities,
which other Christians were enjoying. A special mention
was made with regard to the relations of the Bombay factors
and the Marathas. They were to remain friendly and were
to forget the past quarrels. The permit for export and
import of goods was granted. If perchance, Marathas
captured any English goods during any loot of the Mughal
territory or ships, the same would be returned to them
after necessary verification. And finally if there was
any misgiving about the settlement, the same would be
settled mutually rather than overthrowing the agreement
itself. 70

Thus at last, Sambhaji got some relief from one foreign
power atleast. According to this agreement Sambhaji did
pay compensation to the English wherever it was necessary
and convincing. The English on their part also much
desired peace with the Maratha king and the agreement seems
to have worked well for some more years. At the end of
1687, the English complained to Sambhaji about non-payment
of dues for driving away the Midis and maintenance of their
armada, and finally threatened to withdraw their armed
help at sea, if in due course of time compensation demanded
were not paid. 71 However, there are no documents avail-
able to show, how this complaint was disposed of by Sambhaji. But on the whole it seems that the English maintained harmonious relations with Sambhaji. And the same attitude was continued ever after 1690. The authorities of the company tried to be on good terms with their troublesome enemies - at one moment siding with one party at another helping a weaker party, whose ruin might contribute to the downfall of the English themselves.

This policy they followed in their dealings with the Sidis and the Angrey. They were not slow to realize that the Sidi power was waning nor did they fail to understand that Angrey was becoming as dangerous as, if not more dangerous than the Sidis. To crush the Angrey was absolutely impossible; therefore the only choice left to them was to consolidate their position and to multiply their resources, and in the meantime to give all possible support to the Sidis to use them as a foil to the Angrey. Such was the real attitude of the English towards the Marathas. And the Marathas had grasped this policy in time and kept the English well under their control, sometimes by way of threats, and some times by giving many concessions and permits for trade. The Marathas unmistakingly used the English, to all possible extent against the Sidis.
FOOTNOTES

1 BS, pp. 10-11
2 BS, p. 13
3 Ha, pp. 56-57, BS, pp. 24-25
4 BS, p. 29
5 Ha, pp. 87-88
6 Fryer, pp. 169-70
7 BS, p. 31
8 BS, p. 31
9 BS, p. 29. Shivaji had gathered 22 masted galleys, 40 gallivats.
10 Ha, Vol. IV, p. 265
11 Ha, Vol. IV, pp. 263-66
12 BS, pp. 32-33
13 BSNC, Vol. Ia, p. 13. The author has not given the source of his information.
14 BS, p. 216
15 Ha, Vol. IV, p. 266
16 BS, p. 33
17 Ha, Vol. IV, p. 266
18 BSNC, Vol. Ia, p. 13. The author has not given the source of his information.
19 Ha, Vol. IV, p. 267
20 Ha, Vol. IV, p. 267, BS, p. 223.
21 BS, p. 221.
23 HS, p. 223.
24 HA, Vol. IV, p. 262. Appendix A No. 242. J. Sarkar mentions that the fight was given to Sidi Asim, whereas Akhbarat dated 4th November give the name of Sidi Sambal. It further informs us that 40-50 Marathas were captured. Those who converted to Islam got pardon, and those who refused were ordered to be killed. Accordingly 13 persons were killed.

25 HS, p. 38.
26 HS, p. 38.
27 HS, p. 38.
28 HS, p. 38.
Fatahpur?
29 HS, p. 39.
30 HS Letter No. 18, p. 192.
31 HS, pp. 43-45.
33 HS, p. 52.
34 PNM, I Shivaji, p. 19.
36 SBPM, pp. 15-16.
37 A preliminary report on the Historical Records at Goa, p. 22.
38 SBPM, p. 15.
39 SBPM, p. 15.
SCF, Vol. II, No. 397, pp. 399-400, p. 51. Letter from
Kavi Kalash to Dharmaji Nag Nath, Sarsubandar of Phonda
dt. 2 Jan. 1684 speaks clearly about intention of
Sambhaji.
41. HA, Vol. IV, p. 270.
42. HA, Vol. IV, p. 270.
43. SBPM, p. 17.
44. BISW, Vol. IX, p. 19. The author has not indicated
the source of his information.
45. HA, Vol. IV, p. 270.
47. HA, Vol. IV, p. 271.
54. Collections of MS in the Public Library, Vol. 3-16-7 or
Portuguese Records, Noticias do India, Vol. I, Pt. II,
unpublished as quoted by Mr. Bendre in his book
Sambhaji, pp. 304-5.
55. Collections of MS in the Public Library, Vol. 3-16-7 or
Portuguese Records, Noticias do India, Vol. I, Pt. II,
unpublished as quoted by Bendre in his book Sambhaji,
pp. 309-10.


60 HA, Vol. IV, p. 280.

61 Factory Records as quoted by Bendre in 'Sambhaji', p.420.

62 Bombay to Surat dated 27 Nov. 1630 and Bombay to London, dt. 1 Jan. 1681.


66 Factory Records and Orme, Vol. 116-9, p. 303, Bombay to Surat dt. 16-3-1681 as quoted by Bendre in Sambhaji, p.422.

67 28, p. 34.


69 Sambhaji to Bombay (Keigwin) April 1684 Surat Vol. 109, p. 55 and Orme as quoted by Bendre in Sambhaji, p. 438.
71 SFPE No. 243, p. 61.
72 Rise of Bombay by Edward, pp. 140-41.