CHAPTER IV: AURANGZEB AND THE DECCANI SULTANATS
It is said that Aurangzeb was a born Muslim and died a Muslim and the mission of his life was to carry out into practice the tenets of Islam, to propagate that religion everywhere and rule the population according to Islamic law. If it be so, then it was quite natural for him to destroy and wipe out all that was non-Islamic, both in shape and form of animate as well as inanimate. It was more true regarding the destruction of a kingdom which was in existence and which was non-Islamic in faith. This was the primary concern of his life and ambition. Therefore, one can easily understand about Aurangzeb's motives behind his life long campaigns against the Rajputs and the Marathas. In the modern age his ideology might sound inconsistent, irrational and against human rights. But he made no pretentions about it. The contemporary events and the historical records bear witness to his ghastly design and his missionary zeal in carrying it out till the termination of his life. In the proper perspective of events and against the background of Islamic rule an ideology often pronounced by
Aurangzeb, a student of history fails to understand the real motives of Aurangzeb's destruction of the Deccani Sultanate, which were also Islamic states with sympathetic bias for spread of Islam. Why did their existence become a scar point for Aurangzeb and could Aurangzeb not have been able to carry out his mission with the assistance of these two Muslim kingdoms? So on and so forth, there is an unending train of questions which requires an answer.

To understand answers to these questions it is essential to have closer look at Aurangzeb's life and much deeper analysis of his Islamic faith. No doubt he was a firm believer in Islamic faith, but in his own way, he believed in Suni sect and despised as much the Shiya sect. To a great extent in this respect he was selfish and even when he was spreading Islam everywhere, what he actually did was to propagate Suni faith. And wherever he got an opportunity to do away with the followers of Shiya sect, he did it unhesitantly. What he longed for was a Muslim rule throughout the length and breadth of India, and what he ultimately wished was a Suni sect. Therefore, to his courtiers, he accorded a preferential treatment. Those who were Sunis, definitely benefited more than their deserving Shiya brethren. This particular trait of Aurangzeb's mind which was more often put in practice, explains to a
great extent his intentions in invading the Deccani
Saltanate. Aurangzeb who believed in Sunni rule every-
where, saw that both the Deccani states of Bijāpur
as well as Colkonda were firm believers of Shiya sect.
And he certainly was not willing to accommodate them
under his regime, least to talk about their flourishing.
This was one of the primary motives of his invasion of
these states. But he very cleverly camouflaged it,
when a deputation consisting of renowned religious men of
Bijāpur awaited on him at the time of his actual invasion.
He was confronted with the question of the deputation
that both were Islamic states and would it be proper on
his part to destroy the other one which was weaker than
his own. In fact did Qurānic instructions permit him to
do such an act of aggression against another Muslim state.
Aurangzeb with his shrewedness and tact avoided the basic
issue in the question and without revealing his real
motive, pointed out that, the invasion was a punishment
as the ruler of the state was actively but secretly helping
an infidel, that he has been found incapable of governing
people in accordance with the law of Islam. In addition
to the misfortune of these Muslim states being Shiya,
they did not cooperate in the past with the emperors of
Delhi. In the past the Mughal Emperors always tried
to destroy these kingdoms but they were not successful.
More recently in 1679, a fresh attempt was made to
conquer Bijāpur, but the Mughal general was defeated and
had to go back with utter disappointment. Now he found a ready excuse for invading these states, as they were engaged, so he believed, in helping the Maratha king, his sworn enemy. His grievance was more deep about Bijapur ruler than the ruler of Golkonda. But the acts of both of them greatly offended him. At a later date two envoys "Abid Ha’sam Khan and Bijd Bakhadum of Bijapur were sent to the Dakhil court for enquiring about why Aurangzeb made war upon them?" To this Aurangzeb replied that his action was directed not so much against them as against Sambhaji. From 1651, Aurangzeb was busy in preparing the necessary background for his invasion of the Deccani talwars. On 13th July 1661, he wrote a friendly letter to Charzakh, a general in Bijapur army. He was earnestly called upon to cooperate with the Mughal generals who were entrusted with the task of defeating Sambhaji and recovering the territory from him. It was further added "the emperor is going to the Deccan to punish Sambba and wrest the Bijapur forts from him. Don’t be alarmed but assist Khan-i-Jahan in his work." And a similar appeal was preferred by Shabhar Banu, a Bijapuri princess wedded in the Mughal house.

But nothing much of any consequence seems to have happened for next three years.

On 31st March 1664 a farsan was despatched to
Iqbal 'Adil Thân urging him to give Mughal army necessary supplies of a free passage and keep a force of 5 to 6 thousand ready to reinforce the Mughal army. He was also warned to keep off from Sabbhaji.

Neither the Bijapur king, nor his courtiers bothered about the orders from Aurangzeb. This poor response to his call made Aurangzeb to march against the king of Bijapur.

On 13th November 1683 Aurangzeb arrived at Ahmadnagar. Immediately he issued orders for the campaign of Bijapur. The Mughal plan of action was to establish a number of outposts in the Bijapur territory under Kaza in north west and Khân-i-Jahân in the north east. In June 1684, Shah 'Alam returning from Konkan arrived at Ahmadnagar and he was ordered to proceed to Bijapur territory.

The condition of Bijapur court was helpless because of internal feuds, dissatisfaction, personal jealousies and rivalries. Peace was no more to be seen. Iqbal Mas'ud after being prime minister for five years retired from Adoni in November 1683. He was succeeded by Abu Husrau but shortly death deprived him of that post. The king of Bijapur, Iqbal 'Adil was a young boy and could hardly match the diplomacy and statecraft of other courtiers. Thus no adequate arrangements of protecting
Hijaour could be made by him in view of the impending attack. Sharzā Khan was entrusted with the task of defending Hijaour. Sharzā Khan, who had the past experience of fighting the Mughals, got on to the job of organizing the defence. He invited Rām Naik of Vāriagerā to join him with two Rādar followers. A similar request was made to Prinivās Ramāi of Gadag. A letter was despatched to Rādā Sawant of Budāl that he should remain friendly with Sambhaji, should not keep any friendship with the Mughals, and keep the troops ready to descend the Ghats. Thus Sikandar Adil Shāh started moving with his defence preparations. Meanwhile he sent a spirited reply to Aurangzeb demanding return of tribute and territory that had been extracted in the past and withdraw the outposts from his territory. They should march through Sambhaji's territory alone. Finally he refused to banish Sharzā Khan, a demand which was made by Aurangzeb.

This last straw broke down the cause of friendship between the Mughals and Sikandar Shāh. Hostilities were openly declared. The wheels of Mughal artillery started rolling in the direction of Hijaour. The generals were ordered to plant outposts and in 1655 a regular war against Hijaour commenced.

Meanwhile Sikandar 'Adil Shāh wrote a pathetic letter
beseeching Lutb-ullah of Kolamb to come to his help and send some troops to him. A similar request was made to the Maratha king. The defence of the capital was entrusted to Shintu Chiman. Shara Khan and Abdur Rauf took the command of field army. They inflicted a severe defeat on Prince Nizam in August 1684. Then a series of events took place.

On 21st February a Maratha division under Miladi Bandit arrived at Bijapur. On 26th March Bibi Asi Abdul Rahimn the Mushal envoy was attacked by Bijapur troops. On 1st April 1685, the first trenches were dug and thus commenced the siege of Bijapur. The Mushal preparation of attack was quite extensive. 2700 Barkandaz, 110 pieces of artillery, 40 jazhal, 154 shurshar, 7501 pounds of gun powder and 23077 men were brought in at the line of the siege. Nuhulish Khan and Qasim Khan opened trenches on Shahpur, half a mile distance from the fort wall, Khun-i-Jahan near Subarapur in the west, and Nizam's supporting army was posted far away, south west on the bank of the Tungabhadra.

In early April Sharza Khan had attacked them. It was estimated that Sharza Khan commanded men twenty thousand strong. During the encounter prince Nizam received some wounds. On 24th May Surangzeb arrived at Sholapur. On 29th May Khun-i-Jahan was sent to Indi
to watch the road from Hyderabad. On 14th June Prince Hazam arrived at siege lines and took over the command of the army.

While the Bijapuris were trying their best to continue the resistance, a force consisting of thirty thousand men was fighting in the siege line, whereas another force, equally strong was out on ravaging and burning the Mughal territory. Thus one year of siege passed away. And the Bijapur force kept on fighting courageously. Many a time it attacked siege lines and inflicted casualties in Mughal lines. To the good luck of Sikandar 'Adil Shah on 10th June Titi Mas'ud with his troops arrived at Bijapur. On 14th August a Golconda force under Ambaji Bundit arrived and on 10th December arrived a Maratha force. This was diverted to ravage the Mughal territory.

On 2nd September 1665 the Mughal army captured an elevated place where they could raise a gun platform to mount their guns and thus the siege lines were pressed closer to the fort wall. On 14th June Aurangzeb left Sholapur and arrived on 3rd July near Nasulpurā, a suburb, west of the fort. The siege was pressed hard with the result that supplies to the besieged were cut off. Countless men and horses died in the fort. Inspired by this news the Mughals made an assault, but it failed.
Such losses were sustained by the Mughal forces. But the Mughals remained steady in their attack, and stopped all outside help to the besieged. With continuous fighting the garrison was reduced to a bare strength of 2000 men. At last forced by the circumstances, two Bijapuri generals Charz Khan and Abdur Rauf waited on Biruz Jang for the terms of capitulations. Next night, Sikandar 'Adil Shāh himself paid a visit and agreed to surrender the fort. Thus Sunday, the 12th September 1686 saw the downfall of 'Adil Shāhi dynasty and Sikandar 'Adil Shāh was made a virtual prisoner.

P. ULTH SHĀHI OF COLKONDA DESTROYED

For long, since Aurangzeb became emperor of India he wished to annex the kingdom of Colkonda to the vast map of Mughal dominions. He looked back at the past invasions of the Mughal army in 1656 and 1679 and in 1685 under various generals which brought him nothing but defeats. And every failure saw him getting more and more wild with anger. But the peculiar circumstances then in existence made him swallow these defeats and also the anger. However, the defeat was not forgotten.

Since then he had started listing down the sins committed by the ruler of Colkonda Abul Hasan and a follower of Shiya sect. The foremost sin of Abul Hasan, was the
appointment of Hathana and Akhanna, two Brahmins as his ministers and thus giving the supreme control of the state into the hands of infidels. These Fakis, in their turn extended active help to infidels like Shivaji and Sanhaji by making a pact of defence in case former was attacked. This was certainly intolerable to Aurangzeb, as it was contrary to the mission of his life, i.e. the extinction of the non-believers. The officers of Cutb Diwan had given an offence to the Mughals by seizing the districts of Malkhed, Sedum and some other places which belonged to the Mughal province of Bidar. The war indemnity promised in the treaty of April 1696, and tributes of two lakh boms a year, were in arrears. But this was not a very strange thing, as it was a normal condition of vassal states during those days. During the Mughal invasions of Bijapur, according to Aurangzeb, this Sultan, had the audacity of sending troops to Bijapur in order to continue its efforts against the invading Mughal army.

If helping a brother in peril in the absence of which the destruction was a certainty and which eventually meant bringing the noose closer to his own neck, and if it meant giving an offence to the Mughal Emperor then Abul Hasan certainly did offend Aurangzeb. King Abul Hasan, who publicly allowed all types of sins like public taverns, brothels, gambling houses, had himself indulged
in excessive sensual pleasures. This was in the opinion of Aurangzeb, contrary to the law and practice of Islam and for which he deserved punishment. Aurangzeb went to an incredible extent in his design and instructed Mirza Muhammad to play a deliberate mischief in the Colkonda court. And he kept his armies in readiness to march against Colkonda.

Evil was further aggravated by a letter of Lutb Shah written to the king of Bijapur sometime before 1st March 1655. In this letter he had stressed upon joint action by the king of Bijapur, Sambhaji and himself against the Mughals. Herein, he had argued out that this pact of common defence would be very useful in case of Aurangzeb's attack on anyone of them, as ultimate aim of Aurangzeb was to destroy everyone of them. Therefore it was in the interest of each one to help the other. Thus by the end of March 1655 he sent three thousand men and one lakh hons to Bikander 'Idil Shāh. But unfortunately, this letter was intercepted and Aurangzeb came to know the secret designs of Lutb Shah. In 1655, Shāh 'Alam with his vast army was ordered to march against Colkonda. Khān-i-Jahān was ordered to join him from his out post at Indi. Near Dalkhad they were opposed by Colkonda army, headed by prominent generals like Mir Muhammad Ibrāhīm, Shāikh Mīnāj and Rustumrō, the valiant nephew of Madansā and the Mughal march was stopped.
In the month of August Jān-āsār Khan took the fort of Pedum. For a few days there was no fighting. But a little later, the battle was resumed; Shaikh Minhāj and Rustum Rāo were wounded, and their army fled back to Hyderabad. The commander-in-chief of Golconda army Mir Muḥammad had secretly joined the Mughals. By October 1666, Mughal army started their march towards Hyderabad. 20

Abul Hasan, having heard this news, desperately fled away to the fort of Golconda. People were panic stricken and confusion prevailed in the city. By about 8th October, Shāh ʻAlam posted his troops in the city. Cutb Shāh begged for terms of peace. He was prepared to pay two lakhs of hona as tribute and one crore and twenty lakh hona as peshkash. He was to give up all claims over Malhred and Pedum. Finally, he was to remove Sadannā and Akannā from their posts. 21

Sometime in March 1666, Abul Hasan cut off and sent to Shāh ʻAlam the head of Sadannā as a proof of his own obedience and submission. 22 Till October-November 1666, the amount of peshkash was not paid. Immediately, Aurangzeb sent his men for recovery. Once again in December Cutb Shāh begged for mercy, but the appeal was rejected. On 20th January 1667, the Mughal army started digging the trenches two miles away from Hyderabad. Cutb Shāh retreated to Golconda fort and was besieged by the Mughal army.
In January-February, 1687, he surrendered Basavpattan and Hyderābād (Hūgānagar) to Aurangzeb. The Mughal army, at this time had the most prominent generals to lay siege to the Golconda fort, to mention a few, Prince Muazzam, Asad Khan, Ruḥullāh Khan, Sahābat Khan, Rāja Bhim Singh, Itigād Khan, Culich Khan and many others. Culich Khan was the first victim of retaliation by the Golconda army. On 7th February, the trenches were dug and the siege work was accelerated, even then the siege continued for next eight months. The garrison fought bravely, almost day and night. On 16th May the commander-in-chief of the Mughal army, Miruz-Jang made an attempt to take the fort by escalade, but he failed miserably. The garrison gave a sound rebuff. In addition to it there was general confusion in Mughal artillery on account of Saf Shikan Khan quarrelling with Miruz-Jang. And then came utter famine. The Mughal camp was in the grip of starvation. The Golconda forces joined by the Marathas prevented the movement of grain into the Mughal camp. The misery was aggravated by excessive rain fall in June. Everywhere there was mud and slush and no movement of any type could be effected. The siege work was damaged and lost. The Golconda soldiers, caught the opportunity and attacked the terrified Mughal troops. Every one deserted its post. Aurangzeb sent reinforcement and some transport elephants.
On 16th June Tufiullah Khan with an armed contingent was sent to face the enemy and progress the work. Meanwhile, Abul Hasan through the captive Mughal officers beseeched Aurangzeb for peace and promised to pay one crore of rupees as an indemnity. But Aurangzeb rejected this offer.

On 20th June a fresh attack was planned. Mines were laid and men were kept in readiness for assault. But to the misfortune of the Mughals the blast of explosion blew the outer part of the fort and thus killed the Mughal soldiers who were waiting in readiness for an assault. About 1100 men were killed. The defenders fell upon the Mughals and added to the confusion and killing. Biruz-Jang rushed to the scene of disaster with a large contingent. There was a fight between the two armies in order to overpower each other. Biruz-Jang Jusum Khan and Dalpat Beg were wounded.

"The men could not advance one inch in the face of the murderous discharge of muskets, rockets, chain shot and bombs." Such was the disastrous condition of the Mughal army. Aurangzeb himself in person rushed to avert the defeat and disaster. Asad Khan and Raw Khush brought reinforcement. The siege which was initially considered to be a matter of a few days, became a challenge for the Mughal prestige and power. Even immense wealth was spent but the siege dragged on. All hope of taking.
Collongh by escalade or breaching the fort walls was gone. On 6th July Prince Hazan was appointed commander-in-chief, in place of Miruz-Jang. New platforms for guns were raised and siege work commenced freshly, and thus eight months were lost without success being in sight for the Mughals. Then the month of September brought change in the situation. 'Abdullah Tani, an Afghan soldier and a trusted general of Cutch Shāh deserted his master and joined the Mughals.

He opened the poster gate of the fort. 'Abdullah Ḥan crossed the breach area and entered the fort unchallenged on 21st September 1677. Prince Hazan with his soldiers joined him and thus at last the victory was proclaimed, though Abdur Razzaq Ḥan Lāzi, a most loyal noble of Cutch Shāh gave a most gallant and heroic fight, almost single handed to the last, killed many of them and fell wounded and unconscious in defending his master. Abul Ḥasan was conveyed to prince Hazan's tent and then presented before Aurangzeb. He was made a virtual prisoner and finally lodged in the fort of Bauliābād.27

Thus after a great bloodshed and unbearable human sufferings, Aurangzeb succeeded in establishing the Mughal rule over the dominions of Cutch Shāh. Thus after a large scale massacre he put down the only surviving Shi'i state in order to establish the superiority of Sunni sect.
Thus finally Aurangzeb cleared off the obstacle in the conquest of the Deccan and derived the satisfaction and happiness of punishing a suspect, who secretly helped the defenders against the law of Islam and reached a step closer in realizing his dream of bringing the entire Deccan under the Mughal banner.
1. In 1603 Shivaji and Ṭādil Shāh had entered into a treaty. In 1679 Marathas sent precious help in order to defeat Bāler Khan. Thus in Sambhaji, both Ṭādil Shāh and his advisers knew that their only reliable friend in the hour of need.


3. BUS, p. 520.

4. BUS, p. 521.


10. HA, p. 256.


15. HA, p. 279.


23. SCP, p. 34.
24. MA, p. 290.