CHAPTER II: PHASE II - ARJARAN (1659-1700)
Sambhaji was executed. For a period of one week before his death he suffered utmost torture and punishment. Humiliation, insult and injury, were mounting every moment that he passed in the Mughal camp. Once a king and a leader of a great race, he was now helpless. No doubt he was helpless, but he never begged for mercy. It is very difficult to recapitulate the thoughts in his mind, when he was subjected to most inhuman torture. No records are available to show his reaction to his enemy. But the way he withstood the onslaught one feels that his mind was occupied by his country and he might have said to himself "I shall never surrender or beg for mercy, I am determined to sustain myself as long as possible and die like a soldier who never forgets what is due to his own honour and that of his country.... Death."

And thus he faced a martyr's death, for the love of his country and for the liberty of his compatriots.

In punishing Sambhaji in a most cruel way, Aurangzeb had manifold intentions. The first and foremost was to create 'reign of terror' in Maharashtra and establish his supremacy over them. This he expected
could effectively work against the unity of people and they could thus be coerced to join the Mughal service. And to a certain extent, Aurangzeb was successful in creating these chaotic conditions in the country. Some opportunists like and Pathans did desert the Maratha king. With bended knees and folded hands, these Maratha sardars went to Aurangzeb and thus accepted the 'royal mansab', a mark of humiliation and slavery from the Maratha point of view. According to his belief, there was neither intelligence nor virtue among the people sufficient to enable them to govern themselves. They could be subdued and humbled by physical force alone. In the death of Sambhaji, he had wishful thinking that he had vanquished the stubborn Marathas and for sometime at least he could repose as a victor. How sadly he was mistaken, the events proved it beyond doubt.

The conditions in Maharashtra after the death of Sambhaji were really explosive. The marks left behind by his death, were not to be obliterated so soon. The injuries were deep. The feelings of the people were like a volcano, likely to erupt any time. There appeared to be no longer a government. Danger pressed. Disaster thickened. The atmosphere was surcharged with vengeance. Vendetta was writ large on the faces of the people. They were to fight for Swarajya and the Maharashtra
Patriotism overshadowed all other feelings and emotions of the people. Their sentiments were roused. And it is said that, "it is the sentiment which is the political salvation of free states", if ever it was to be true, the events of this period, give abundant evidence of the same.

The capture and execution of Sambhaji did not discourage the Maratha leaders in any way. Neither of the sources Persian or Marathi, have made any mention of miserable plight of the Marathas, after this debacle. What little we gather from the events is that the execution of the Maratha king kindled the fire of the Maratha opposition, it set forth a real revolution. The Maharashtra became active like a live volcano. After almost nine years of war the people now well realized that the only way they can have peace was to drive away their enemy with all their might. It was beyond doubt clear to them, that the task required nothing short of herculean strength. And the origin and source of that strength lay in the masses. The only way was united they stand.

For the last nine years what was the state of Maharashtra? The great mass of the people were exhausted with suffering and longed for repose. The Mughal pestilence had almost destroyed them. The land was filled with the powerful enemy agents. The execution of Sambhaji
created a big vacuum in kingship and leadership of Maharashtra. There was no one man of sufficient prominence to carry with him the nation. Rājārām, the king apparent was only twenty years of age. Sambhaji’s son, was considered not more than a child. The other prominent persons from the royal retinue and ministerial post, were hardly thought of. The storm of the capture and execution of Sambhaji hurled its new problems on the bewildered people of Maharashtra. But soon they were re-inspired under Rājārām, their new king.

At this time Rājārām was in prison at Raigadh. He was released from the prison by Chāngoji Patkar, the quilledār of Raigadh and Vithlīji Kank. This happened on 19th February, 1669. The other Sarkarkuns who were under arrest, including Gānēji More, were all released. They were reappointed to their original posts. Rājārām had been unknown to fame and fortune was enthroned at Raigadh on 12th February, 1669. Almost in a matter of three days the Marathas had found their new king and a leader. He was resolved to subdue anarchy at home and aggression from abroad. The country was already disgraced and the humiliation had struck him deep.

Within a period of month and half of Rājārām’s taking over the Government Aurangzeb sent ultiqār Khan on 25th March 1669 to capture Raigadh. He promptly laid siege to the fort. The siege was being pressed hard.
From the existing conditions it appeared that they would not be able to defend the fort for a long time. Inside were stranded, the widow of Sambhaji, Yesubai, her son Sahu, Rajaram and many other ministers. The safety of Rajaram and Yesubai were the matters of paramount importance.

That we gather from some of the chronicles is that, Yesubai, realizing the plight of all the persons, advised that in the fitness of the events it was Rajaram's safety which was more important. He should immediately abandon the fort to a place of greater safety. Hopes and fears of the people were centred on him. He was to guide their destiny. About her personal safety she was least bothered. Thus bravely she uttered to the ministers "fear not". Rallied by these daring words the ministers recovered their lost courage. Yesubai and the other ministers who had assembled there, their minds were occupied with the thought of Maharashtra and the millions of Marathas, whose destiny was hanging on fire.

All of them unanimously agreed to a certain plan of action. All the ministers, quildars and leaders who had gathered at Raigadh regarded Rajaram as their master and thus their unequivocal support to him. And in turn, Rajaram contemplated them not as equals and confiding friends but as efficient and valuable instruments for the accomplishment of the cause of Swarajya.
B. COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Rājārām’s problem was to sustain the Maratha kingdom against heavy Mughal onslaught. The magnitude of the problem appeared to be greater when the Marathas were to hold it with the bare skeleton of an almost weaponless army, supported by little more than ‘Sticks and Stones’ of the inhabitants. Defence was vital and was to be pursued with all speed and every ingenuity and artifice and efficiency.

To tide over these problems, he had to select and appoint his ministers to execute the job. With consummate tact he selected the ablest men to occupy the most important departments and govern the provinces. And these able persons in their turn assured the enormous care of administering the new government for four million people. Those who were selected by him were, Rāmachandra Pant, Shankarajī Sachiv and Pralhad Miraji, as administrators and Khandoji Naik Fansaambal as the Chief of the army.

Rāmachandrapant and Shankarājīpant, the two loyal servants of the kingdom were brilliant in wit and speech, relentless and stubborn, gauged with skill and insight, the strength and subtleties of their opponents mind. Their point of interest was survival of Maharashtra against such an upheaval.
Khandoji Naik Fansaembal was a brave soldier and a great warrior. In the past he had fought many battles and proved to be the master of war strategy. In addition to that there were other brave soldiers, like Santāji Chorpade, two Chorpade brothers, Thanāji Jādhav, Neemāji Shinde and Vithoji Chavān.

Santāji was to Rājārām a body of ten thousand horsemen, ever ready for a resistless charge. Thanāji was a phalanx of infantry and cavalry, bristling with their swords and spears, which neither artillery nor cavalry could batter down or break. Neemāji was an armed column of invincible troops, black, dense, sassy, impetuous, resistless moving with gigantic tread wherever the finger of the Chatrapati pointed. These were but the few names of Rājārām's army leaders. They were like limbs obedient to the mighty soul which swayed them.

The foremost problem before the Council of Ministers was that the Mughal armies were chasing Rājārām and he was to be saved from the Mughal captivity. There was no real place of safety for him in his own country. The possibility of fighting through the forts, was not to last long. Though at that time the Marathas possessed some important forts, but how long would they have been able to sustain against the might of Aurangzeb. Therefore, it was thought that a place away from Maharashtra would
appropriately serve this purpose. Keeping this in view, a new plan and a new strategy was to be devised. And thus the idea of opening a "Second Front" at Jinji came into existence. The fort of Jinji was considered, in view of military strategy a less accessible fort to the enemy. And the chances of stronger and durable defence, with less manpower were considered to be very bright.

Secondly by making Jinji as Rājarām's abode, the Marathas expected, the Mughal armies to follow him there. Thus they would attain their objective of diverting the Mughal armed forces far away from Maharashtra, who were the cause of great destruction both, to men and crops. This would offer the Marathas a better opportunity, to meet this divided force more effectively. In addition to this we authentically learn that "His (Rājarām's) aim was to divert the Mughal army from his kingdom of Poona and join with several Nāyaks and raise a considerable army to retake Golkonda and Bijāpur kingdoms."

Though the Marathas were mainly having good army, yet, in the foreseeable future, they could have scarcely hoped to be in a position to throw as many divisions compared with their enemy. Therefore, the war strategy had to be based on keeping the enemy constantly harried and unsettled, of grasping every opportunity to inflict a wound, anywhere until at last the sword might be driven home.
Thus Rājārām's able 'Council of Ministers' began to see that the Karnātak would open the way to victory and might be the only means of bringing about, finally the conditions which would make "Second Front" in Karnātak a military possibility. The other enemies in that territory were to be reconciled. The small satellites of Beshāmkhs and Lesāis of various pargānas in the Mysore plateau and the Mādrās Karnātak were to be made allies, they were to be induced to join hands with the Marathas, if necessary by use of force. Thus a road opened to march the Maratha armies in the southern most part of the country. Jinji was to become a centre of the Maratha enterprise in the south (East coast). This was a soldiers' view of warfare as the 'art of the possible'. And it was finally pursued and maintained.

But the 'Second Front' would become possible only if the Marathas could gain ready support from the Rājā of Tānjore Shahāji II, a cousin of Rājārām and the other Māyaks, the leaders of the Bedars in the Karnātak territory. It was not an impossible task. The people in that territory were also hopelessly watching fall of their Hindu Rājā and they were willing to support the persons who would carry on fight against the alien Muslim invaders. Their own existence was in danger. Keenav Pandit expressed the same view about the contemporary rulers, from which it is clear that these men who
mattered in Karnātak shared the same belief in the 'Common Cause' of uniting the people in the hour of national calamity.

The siege of Rāigadādh was being pressed hard day by day. The 'Council of Ministers' realised the gravity of the situation. They knew that not an instant was to be lost. Life and death were trembling on the balance. The dawn of the day was to conduct them to a new scene of herculean toil in organising the state and removal of their new king to a place of greater safety. There was no time for repose. It was decided that Kājārām was to be escorted to Jinji by Pralhād Mirāji, many other loyal sardārs and a large number of trusted lieutenants.

C. JOURNEY TO JINJI

On 5th April, 1689, Kājārām left Rāigadādh for Pratāppadādh. And from now onwards, the Maratha king was moving from place to place and in a matter of six months till he finally left for Vellore, he was moving from one fort to another fort escaping the every chasing Mughal army. On 5th August, 1689 the Mughals after having taken Rāigadādh, Rohidā and Tornā, marched against Pratāppadādh. The Mughal army was led by Kānhoji and Nāgoji the two Marathas in the Mughal service under Zulfiqār Khan. They attacked the wadi at the foot of the fort. Rambhāji, the Maratha commander arrived at Pratāppadādh and gave a
battle. Many men were killed. Then he closed the gates of the fort. The Mughals besieged it. Rājārām quickly left for Panhālā. It appeared from the record that he stayed there up to the middle of September. Meanwhile Pratāpgadh also fell to the Mughals.

Finally the Council of Ministers having viewed the grave situation decided that Rājārām should secretly leave Panhālā. He was accompanied by Khandoji Nāyak Pānsambal, Pralhād Mirājī, Milkanth Moreshwar, Banīro Moreshwar, Krishnājī Anant Sabhāsad, Bāji and Khandoji Kadam, Mānājī More, Runājī Bhosale, Santājī Jagtāp, Khando Pallāl, Vithal Trimbak and his three brothers, Bāhirāj and Malōjī Ghorpade joined them on the way.

Dressed like Gosāvis (people who have abandoned the material world) Rājārām and his escorts left Panhālā on 26th September, 1689. From Panhālā, they reached Rānganā.

From Panhālgadh to Vellore, the distance is about 500 miles. The hazards of journey were quite great. But the quiet and understanding self-confidence with which Rājārām entered upon this enterprise is one of the most remarkable events in the whole of short but extraordinary career. He took with him no armies. Relying upon the energies of his own mind and upon the strength of his few followers and upon the sympathies of the great mass
of the people, he started on this perilous journey but with a few companions. Never did he encounter more fearful peril. The Mushals had drawn arms against the Marathas and had thronged in arms the entire Deccan. How could he hope to escape? The sword which killed Sambhaji was still shimmering with red blood. Everyone who had dared to oppose Aurangzeb was put to silence by the powerful Mughal sword. How could Räjärama venture with such a tiny band of the Marathas to beard this terrible lion in his den? The Mushals were quite active and fast in their work.

As early as 25th April, 1684, the orders were issued by Bahadur Khan to the Resai of Hukeri that, Räjärama had left Mäigad. "He intends to run away. You should kill him or imprison him. His activities should be traced in that territory....You should send messengers and get information about him and intimate us over night so that we will be able to capture him. If through slackness, the enemy passes through your territory....you will be considered as culprit with dire consequences. Show no slackness in this respect." Promptly, the Resai of Hukeri gave the information of Räjärama's presence at Pratäppagad. On 25th May, the Resai was again ordered to keep Bahadur Khan informed about the activities of Räjärama. And on 14th June, Asad Khan wrote to Lawrence Pit, the Dutch Governor of Mägapattan to keep
watch on Hājīrām 'whose fall is imminent'. Pit was to capture and present him to Aurangzeb. The French and others were also asked to help Pit.

Thus all the passage of Hājīrām's march to Vellore was blocked and guarded closely by the Mughals. Abdullāh Khan Bārha, who was in the Bijapur territory was ordered to capture Hājīrām. According to Sīr-i-’Alamgīrī, Hājīrām had three hundred followers of the rank of Chiefs, passed through the territory of Kānī of Bednūr. The Khan sent his eldest son Hasan ʿĀli, in that direction and also reached himself by forced marches. 13

Hājīrām had taken refuge at the banks of Tunga-bhadrā. A fight took place and more than a hundred men including Hindūrān, Vyankoji, Banirji and Māloji Chorpade were taken prisoners. 14 Hājīrām very cleverly escaped. Immediately the Kānī of Bednūr was suspected for concealing Hājīrām. Santāji reached the scene of battle and Khan Waliat Khan and Charzah Khan resisted him. The Kānī was forced to pay some fine. and within a few days the Maratha leaders, who were imprisoned escaped from the captivity. The rest of the prisoners were put to death. 15

From Bednur, Hājīrām arrived at Ambur. Here he stayed in a temple and was well looked after by a Maratha sardār Bāji Fākade. On 29th October, 1669 Hājīrām arrived at Vellore. From there he marched towards
Jinji, a place fifty miles South East of Vellore and arrived at Jinji on 1st-2nd November.

Thus Harjaram in his hazardous enterprise braved every peril. The most imminent and the most to be dreaded of all was captivity at the hands of the Mughal soldiers. For thirty two days they marched a distance of 500 miles, with utmost toil. None of his companions showed any signs of exhaustion and weakness. If ever they thought about anything, it was the safety of their king alone. And they guarded him at the peril of their lives. Rarely one comes across such an example of matchless devotion and unquestioned loyalty of followers to their leader and leader in his turn to the cause of 'Liberty'.

Harjaram's safe arrival in Karnatak, convinces us beyond doubt that though for 32 days he had been confronted by his enemies and the hostile men in the Mughal service, yet he had eluded their vigilance. This shows that there were men who staunchly supported him, though secretly against the Mughals. This was the greatest and the most triumphant moment in the Maratha War of Independence. Thus, first phase of the plan, that is of opening the 'Second Front', commenced successfully.
A month before Rājārām left for Jinji, i.e. on 19th August, 1689, Hārji Mahādik, the Maratha ruler of Jinji territory had released Heso Fatt, the envoy sent by Sambhaji to that territory. And within almost forty days of Heso Fatt's release Hārji Mahādik passed away. The widow of Hārji Mahādik took upon herself the task of governing the territory.

On 2nd November, 1689, Rājārām with his followers entered Jinji, almost unceremoniously. The arrival of Rājārām was followed by a peaceful take over of the Government by Rājārām from Hārji's widow. The councillors, though reluctantly, yet, submitted to the new rule and paid three lakh hones as a present. Rājārām sent summons to all in any considerable employment in the Government to make their appearance before him. The foremost task lay ahead of Rājārām was the formation of his cabinet and appointment of ministers. The following names were to form 'ashtapradhāṇa' or Council of 8 Ministers:

1. Nilo Moreshwar Feshwa or Prime Minister.
2. Janārdhan Fatt Hananante Amatya or Finance Minister.
3. Shankarāji Malhar Sachiv or Accountant General.
4. Ramchandra Triṃbaki Pande Mantri or Minister of Interior.
(5) Mahādeva Jī Gāḍādhāra Kumānt or Foreign Minister.
(6) Bālājī Sunder Chief Justice.
(7) Khandeji Māyak Pānsāmbal Chief of Army and
(8) Khande Ballal Chitnis.

In addition to the appointment of ministers, a few
more worthy people were honoured by Rājārān. Rāmchandra Pant, who remained in Maharashtra was given the title of Hukumat Panhā and Shaṅkarājī Nārāyan was made Sachiv.

A separate post of Pratinicchī was created for
Prahlād Mirājī, who virtually shouldered the burden of
Government of Jīnji. Parsoji Bhosale was considered in
high esteem and was honoured by the title 'Senā Sāheb Subhā' and was sent to the territory of Condvan and
Varādh (the present Vidarbha territory). Similarly
Sidhoji Nimbālkar who had established Maratha rule along
Godāvari territory was honoured with the title of 'Sur
Lashkar'. Khanderao Pāthāde was sent to Gujarāt and
Pāgāna territory with the title of 'Senā Dhurandhar'.

Simultaneously, Tīmājī, son of Pesho Trimbak
Bingale and Sunder Bālājī were appointed sūtāhādar of
Jīnji and Kununedu respectively.

After the establishment of Government, the admini-
stration faced financial crises. The ministers looked
around to raise money from the European settlement on the
East Coast. Three hundred hons were demanded from the English factors as an advance and a like amount from the French and the Dutch. Rich traders were urged to lend 5000 or even 1000 hons each. At the end of the year, 5000 hons more were demanded as a fine for buildings and fortifications of each European company. The Government raised money even by selling the fort of Tevenāpatam. Similar efforts were made to procure 100 barrels of gun powder and 2500 weight of small shot, to carry on their war against the Mughals. But the English very cleverly avoided this demand.

The functioning of new government at Jinji, brought a sense of great relief to the Marathas. The general despair about the cause of Swarājya started disappearing from the people's mind, and the feeling that the Maharashtra Rājya, was doomed, slowly got away. Towards the new government, peoples looked upon with greater hope. They appeared to be re-inspired. and the able ministers in the Government were active enough to achieve the cause of freedom.

On 20th December, Ramesh Nilo Pant received his first diplomatic success. Muhammad Sadiq, Yāchappā Nayak, Ismail Khan Dakh and other 4 thousand people who were in the Mughal employment after the fall of Golconda, deserted the Mughal service. 22 They made an alliance
with Rājārāṇi and joined the Marathas at Chenāpattan (Madras). They began to usurp the country and collect the revenue. The Mughal representatives were hopelessly outnumbered and were forced to take to their heels to Kunimedu.

Similarly, Laxmi Nāyak, who was in Aurangzeb's service, deserted. He came to Rājārāṇi at Jinji. He publicly told the people to fight against Aurangzeb for their own country and religion.23

In January of the following year, he came to Rājārāṇi with his 3000 cavalry and 6000 foot soldiers. But Rājārāṇi did not permit him to join straight away as he suspected some mischief. Laxmi Nāyak encamped outside Jinji. He pleaded openly that "we belong to the same religion. We must fight the common enemy." Finally, by February-March he joined the Maratha king. According to Martin's information he had about 12 to 15 thousand cavalry and many musketeers.

Laxmi Nāyak started his march to the Karnātaka. The Mughals deserted their posts and some took shelter at Madras. But then his campaign was not very successful. In the month of May he was defeated by the Mughals.25 And by September the Mughals recovered all the posts captured by Laxmi Nāyak.26
E. ARRIVAL OF ZULFIQAR KHAN AT JINJI

Aurangzeb having received the intelligence of Ismail Khan Mukh and Yachapra Nayak joining the Marathas and their becoming very strong in that area, rushed to send one of his greatest generals, I'tiqad Khan who had recently received the title of 'Zulfiqar Khan Bahadur'.

He had been detached from the imperial court at Koregaon at the end of November, 1689, he marched by way of Râichur, Karnul Nandiyâl, Hadanâ, and Caramkondâ, and then descended into the Karnatak plain (about June 1690), fighting and capturing many forts on the way and reaching Conjeeveram in August and the environs of Jinji at the beginning of September."

From Jedhe Chronology, it appears that Zulfiqâr Khan arrived at Jinji on 27th August and laid siege to the fort. Râjârâma having realized his insecurity in the fort, left further down south of Karnatak. He had sent his troops along with Tanjore Trimbak Rao and Yachapra Nayak, north westwards into the Karnatak plateau to prevent the Mughal generals descent into the eastern plains.

The Mughal military strength increased in this area. The Marathas were driven back and in October Zulfiqâr wrote to the French to prevent Râjârâma's escape by the sea in an English ship.
On his arrival, Zulfiquar Khan, was ordered to lay siege to the fort of Jinji. But he had no heavy guns nor enough ammunition for a bombardment. He asked for 200 maunds of powder and 500 gun shots, 500 soldiers and 30 gunners from Madras.

English supplied him with 200 maunds of powder and 300 iron shots.

Meanwhile on 23rd November, 1690, Nemaji Shinde, Sanchoji Pundhare, Nagoji Mane and other 2 thousand deserted the Mughal service and joined Nassaram at Jinji. They took charge of defence work at Chakrapuri in the lower fort. In February Nassaram returned to Jinji. In his operations against the Mughals he received tremendous support from the Raja of Tanjore both in manpower and supplies.

The Mughal army before Jinji under Zulfiquar Khan was composed of 12 to 15 thousand best cavalry and 12 to 15 thousand Rajput musketeers. At this time, 2000 army of Raja of Tanjore joined the Marathas. The battle commenced and from both the sides bombardment was being made.

In April 1691, the Mughal army before Jinji had become so large and well provisioned that the country around expected a speedy fall of the fort. But in reality the siege had made little progress in all these months.
The complete blockade was beyond the power of the Mughals. By now the Marathas recovering from their first consternation began to harass them incessantly."

"The military superiority of the Mughals was rapidly lost after April, while the activity of the Maratha bands roving around stopped the supply of grain to Zulfiquar’s camp. Many Deccani mansabdars who had accompanied him now deserted to the enemy." In May, 1500 cavalry and 2000 Rajputs joined Zulfiquar Khan.

Letters of spies informed Aurangzeb that Zulfiquar Khan abandoned the trenches of Jinji. The retreat was partly because the Marathas stopped the supplies to the Mughal army and also he was cut down from getting any reinforcement. Meanwhile Sayid Lashkar Khan brought the supplies to Zulfiquar Khan’s army.

Aurangzeb got quite alarmed with the precarious condition his general was put to by his enemy. Immediately he ordered Asad Khan, who was at that time at Nandiyal to hasten to his son’s aid. Similar orders were issued to prince Kambakhsh to proceed to Jinji. At this time Kambakhsh was busy with the siege of Wadiar. He reached Kadarā on 3th October to join Asad Khan for onward march to Jinji.

While at Jinji, in June, both the armies clashed
two three times and there was considerable loss of life. 
Zulfiquar Khan abandoned his attack on Jinji and marched 
into South Karnatak. This was mainly to collect revenue 
from the Zamindars in that territory. At the end of 
August he passed by way of Suddalore towards Tanjore. 
At the end of this year he captured Trinomali (23 miles 
west of Jinji).

On 16th December 1691 Kambakhsh accompanied by 
Asad Khan reached Jinji. On 6th January 1692 they were 
enjoined at Jinji by Zulfiquar Khan, Sarfaraz Khan and 
Sayyid Lashkar Khan.

F. JINJI - ITS DEFENCE

Asad Khan with his army having reached Jinji, the 
strength of Zulfiquar Khan's army was considerably increased. 
Ismail Khan Makh rejoined the Moghal service but Yashappa 
Nayak continued with the Marathas. Kukkar Khan, who 
had accompanied Kambakhsh was made faujdar of Jinji. 
Zulfiquar Khan renewed the siege of Jinji with great vigour 
and took the post opposite the eastern gate near a 
hillock called Ali Madad across one of the branches of 
Jinji river. Asad Khan and prince Kambakhsh encamped 
three miles away from him, beyond the northern gate, on 
the road leading from Krishnariri to Singhavaram hill.
Ismail Khan at north west of the fort in the direction
of 'Varnatak-garh'. Each Mughal camp was walled round for safety. The gate of Shaitândari could not be blocked and the Maratha garrison freely came in and went out by it, brought in provisions whenever they liked. An out-post under Kakkar Khan watched the path through the Vetávalam wood by which supplies reached the fort, but the task was ineffectively done.

Rājā of Ranjore sent large amount of money to Rājārām which enabled him to protect Jinji. The Marathas continuously attacked the Mughals and Kambakhsh’s camp in particular. "One night a Maratha force 5,000 strong sailed out of the north gate, but were defeated by the combined exertions of the entire Mughal army."

Zulfiqār Khan who saw the danger to the safety of Kambakhsh removed his tent from there and appointed Lashkar Khan to the north gate. He aimed at capture of Chandrāyandurg and thus directed his guns towards it as well as Pondicherry gate.

Though Zulfiqār Khan made very strenuous efforts to take Jinji, yet the condition of besieging Mughal army was quite pitiable. In the words of Bhimsen "The rain fell with excessive severity. Grain was dear. The soldiers, having to spend days and nights together in the trenches, suffered great hardships. In the rainy season the entire tract looked like one lake."
While on the Maratha side, in January 1692, they captured Vellore which was in the possession of the Mughals, by a Maratha Sardar Krishnaji Antaji. During March the Maratha force clashed with the Mughals near Pondicherry. And if we have to believe the account furnished by Martin, it appears that though there was a regular fighting between the Marathas and the Mughals, yet there was also a secret understanding between Fajrāzm and Sulfiqār Khan. Thus supplies continued to go inside the fort, unhindered.

Thus the fighting continued during May, June and July 1692. The siege was not very effective. On 19th July Lāsim Khan faujdar of Karnatak left for Jinji. The Marathas got their supplies from the western side of the fort through the jungles. After July another attack was launched by the Mughals, which resulted in the repetition of previous attacks. Their many people were injured and they had to retreat.

During September, the Marathas attacked the besieging army and were quite successful. They also captured one Mughal sardar (3000 Sawai) and a lot of equipment. But in October, the Mughals became fairly brave and reached the walls of the fort. The Marathas fought bravely. On 21st November at night a Maratha force arrived near the siege line of Ḥamid Khan. It challenged the Mughals.
Immediately Jamsheed Khan and others were sent for rescue. Later on Zulfiqar Khan himself arrived there. At the same time Asad Khan ordered Jatah-ullah Khan to replace Ismail Khan towards Bajgadh (Jinji). But he flatly refused. Though the Marhals were attacking continuously the news of a large Maratha army marching towards Jinji, brought a great relief to Bajrangi’s force who were inside the fort. And therefore, the suspicion grew stronger than ever, about the secret understanding between Bajrangi and Zulfiqar Khan.

On 13th December, Shankarajinath sent Bhanaji to Jinji. On 14th December, Sancharanrapant, having had the intelligence of the siege of Jinji, raised a large force over 15,000 horse and sent Santaji to Jinji. To quote Khafi Khan they had 15 to 20 thousand ready horse and many prominent Maratha sardars were in their employment. These two sardars had mercilessly attacked the imperial army. Santaji was the leader of them. He was well known in ravaging the prosperous cities and attacking the famous generals. And all those who had an occasion to meet him on the battle field, had to face one of the three consequences, firstly he is killed, secondly, he is wounded and captured and lastly he is defeated with his army.

The Mughals were terror struck with the very name of Santaji and Bhanaji. The bravest of the Mughal generals
used to tremble whenever they used to hear about the presence of these great Marathas generals in their territory. And hardly any reputed Mughal general dared oppose Santāji.

The new army composed of such heroic generals, burst on the Kanchi district. The news of arrival of this army caused a great terror among the European people and they ran to Madras for refuge. Ali Mardān Khan, who was the faujdar went out to encounter Santāji near Pāveripak. A pitched battle took place. Ali Mardān Khan was wounded and captured along with many men. The Marathas recovered 1500 horses and six elephants. Later on he was released after paying a ransom of Rupees 60 two lakhs. Many other Mughal sardārs also secured their release in the similar way.

Thus the Marathas in their very first encounter with the Mughals got an overwhelming success and a lot of war equipment as well as cash.

The Maratha cavalry reached the outskirts of Jinji. Sulṭān Khan having noticed the superior number of the Marathas resolved to retreat. Sayyid Lashkar Khan and Jakkar Khan joined him. But Ismāil Khan was on the west gate, and was rather delayed in retreating. Thanāji Jadhav fell upon him with the lightening speed and with 7 to 8 thousand horse. Ismāil Khan gave a fight, but
finally he was wounded and captured. The Marathas got 500 horses and 2 elephants.

With lightning speed the Marathas secured their successive second victory against a well established Mughal army. According to Martin, who has analysed the success of the Maratha army says, "Their weapons of attack are spears and swords. There are some archers, but these are very few in number. In this respect the Mughals are superior to the Marathas. The aiming of the Mughals is better than the Marathas and they have a larger number of archers. Therefore the Marathas dare not go before the Mughals. The Marathas feel that the Mughals are superior in fighting. One thousand Mughals will not retreat in the face of 3 to 4 thousand Marathas. But Marathas are superior in ‘surprise attacks’. They are superior and successful in manual labour more than the Mughals. They overlook personal comfort. Their equipment is light and they are contented with little.

The victorious Marathas immediately proclaimed their authority over Maidaarabadi Karnatak, the Denjeeveram and Hadapā territories. Peshav Rāmanā was appointed by the Marathas as suzāhārī with 1000 horses and 4000 foot. This happened in January 1693.

The Marathas having achieved these spectacular
victories curtailed all free activity of the Mughals in the Karnatak and Madras. Their communication was stopped and line of supply broken. Thus the Mughal army besieging outside Djinji got besieged in turn by the overwhelming force under Hanaji.

In the Mughal camp, there were dissensions between prince Hambaksh, and Asad Khan and his son Zulfiqar Khan. Hambaksh was suspected of secretly negotiating with the Marathas. Asad Khan having duly considered the division within and a large number of enemy force outside, decided to abandon the trenches and thus the siege work of past two years, was hopelessly given up. But withdrawal was not very quiet. Zulfiqar Khan, destroyed his big guns which were posted there and ordered his men to carry the equipment back as much as they could. The Marathas did not let go the retreating army without giving blows. When the Mughals were almost four miles away from their base camp, the Marathas caught them unaware. In the words of Hair-i-‘Alamgiri the condition of the Mughals was that "the audacity of the infidels passed all bounds, and death stared the Muslims in the face." Zulfiqar Khan was forced to give a fight in order to save the life. Thus the Marathas were forced to go inside the fort and shut the door. Their loss in life and animal was quite heavy.
Prince Miabakhan was put under arrest by Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan, for having opened a secret correspondence with the Marathas. Meanwhile Santaji, with his singular victory over Ali Hardan Khan, also arrived at Jinji. This brought great encouragement to the Marathas. According to Phuleen, Santaji's great army exceeded 20,000 men and fell upon Zulfiqar Khan's army with great intensity. Thus the siege was abandoned by the Mughals on 16th December, 1662.

With the abandonment of the siege and the arrival of additional Maratha force, the condition of the Mughal army worsened. Above all, there was acute shortage of grain and famine appeared to take greater toll of the Mughals than their enemy. Thus within a month's time, that is, by 22nd January 1663, "Zulfiqar Khan marched out with his own division to bring in grain from Mandiwalla." 6

Santaji having had the intelligence of Zulfiqar Khan's movement, made a rapid march in that direction and blocked his road at Besur, 67 ten miles southwards and completely encircled Zulfiqar Khan's army. After two days the Mughals were attacked. They fired so many muskets that the soldiers and banjaras of our force were overpowered. Bullets were specially aimed at the elephants ridden by the imperial commanders. Bai Balpat and his bundeladas boldly charged to clear a way ahead.
The transport animals and guns stuck in the mud of the rice fields, artillery ammunition ran short, no power or shot was left with any musketeer. Jalpat Rāj Bundelā however fought well and saved the Aughal division.

How long the Aghals were to survive on the scanty food grains brought by Sulīqār Khan. After a very short period, the army had to face the problem of acute shortage of food. The saratha activity in that area was intensified and they kept closer watch on the Aghal soldiers. "Every day from dawn to sunset the sarathas assembled round our camp and made demonstrations. No aid came from any source except the gracious to the lowly, neither money nor food stuff arrived. All the army, high and low alike, were distracted and depressed." In short, such was the condition of the Aghal army.

Gravely viewing the situation Sulīqār Khan and Asad Khan sent their ambassadors to Ḫājirān with a request to let them go uncrossed. Ḫājirān did not take any decision as Santāji, was away opposing a reinforcement that was coming to help the Aghals. According to Bhīmsen, "the saratha generals and ministers pressed their king to continue the war, crush the Aghal army which was half dead and thus establish his rule over that country before a new army could be sent by Emperor (Nurangzab)."

There are no records to show, why Ḫājirān did not
accept this advice of strategic move. If only he had followed it, the chapter of Maratha War of Independence would have come to a close at an earlier period.

A partial explanation of Rājārām's attitude towards the Mughal sardārs and his subsequent action, in not pressing on fighting against Zulfiqār Khan is available. Rājārām called Santāji and explained his that he had reached an agreement with Zulfiqār Khan, as Aurangzeb was not likely to survive for a long after his death he expected Zulfiqār Khan to occupy the territory of Golconda and the territory of Bijapur would be allowed to be retained by Rājārām.

In addition to this secret agreement, according to Martin, Zulfiqār Khan paid one lakh of rupees and ornaments worth sixty thousand rupees to Hajiraai so that he could be allowed to go unopposed.

On the other hand, Zulfiqār Khan was urged by Rāi Jafap to not withdraw; this was merely to save the face and future disgrace. But then Zulfiqār Khan's soldiers by now had become more impatient, particularly the artillery men. On one fine morning the artillerymen wound up their guns. The others also followed their suit. And thus the hunger prevailed above all. The Mughal generals were left with no other alternative but to retreat.
abandonment of siege, he ordered a recovery of rupees three lakhs from Asad Khan and rupees one lakh fifty thousand from Zulficâr Khan.

Shimsen has given a very graphic description of the Mughal camp at the time of abandonment of siege of Dinji. He writes: "Due to long continued starvation, most of the horses, camels and other transport animals, of the army had perished. Those who had a few left loaded just enough goods for these. Most men set fire to their belongings. Many in perplexity and helplessness at the terrible confusion and danger then raging... took their own way forgetful of their friends and relatives. Many stores of the Emperor and nobles were left behind there... Then the army marched out of the camp, about a thousand warthas horse came after them like a rear-guard and plundered the men of the army of their property." 73

This retreat of Zulficâr Khan took place on 22nd January 1693 and at the same time Asad Khan and Fâmbakhsh left for the imperial court.

The Mughals retreated to Vândiwâsh. It took three days for Zulficâr Khan to reach the place. Ten days later Câsim Khan who was newly appointed Faujdar of Conjeeveram brought the food grains from Padasâ. On the way, Santâji attacked him between Lâverinâk and Conjeeveram. But with the timely help of Zulficâr Khan, he was saved. And
the Mughals were successful in carrying the grain to their camp at Tándiwaśh.

Thus by February, Marathas had sufficient cause to be jubilant, as they forced Sulfiqär Khan Bahādur the victor of Sāisad, the terror of Marathas, a sardār who never knew defeat in his career, to retreat to Tándiwaśh. He encamped there for four months (February-May, 1693). He was now helpless. He had neither money nor material resources to continue the war.

The results of three years continuous efforts on the part of the Marathas showed that the Second Front at Jinnī, proved a success much beyond their expectations. The sudden blows administered by Santāji and Dhanāji to the generals of Mughal army, almost paralysed them. The Marathas took the advantage of it quickly. They proclaimed their rule over Golconda Karnātaka. And in March an expedition to capture Trichnopolli was launched. Rājārāṁ was personally present during the campaign. Santāji laid siege to Trichnopolli. Afterwards Rājārāṁ went to Tānjore to see Chahāji II.

But unfortunately all was not well with the Maratha leadership. There were misunderstandings between the king and his trusted lieutenants like Santāji and Bahirji Ghorpade.

In the beginning of the year 1693, Yāchappā Nāyak,
who had remained loyal to the Marathas all these years, deserted Sājīrām. In February-March he recovered Ātāpadh. By now SantāJI's differences with Sājīrām became too sharp to be reconciled. In April-May he returned to Maharashtra. In his place BhāniJI was appointed to command the troops. During May-June, Ṣāchappā Nāyak and BhāniJI commanded were at Vellore and a quarrel broke out between them and Sājīrām.

Sulṭīqār Khan who was quiet till May, at Ṣāndīvāsh, began his activities. His ultimate goal was capture of Jinji. In the earlier occasion, he besieged Jinji without clearing off the surrounding territory of loyal followers of Sājīrām. They constantly helped Sājīrām and the Maratha army through these Ṣāmātakī sārdārs, attacked and harassed Sulṭīqār Khan's army. It went to such an extent that the very existence of the Maratha army was in jeopardy. The Maratha general now decided to make good his mistakes of the past.

In November-December, Ṣāchappā Nāyak, after deserting Sājīrām was moving independently, met Sulṭīqār Khan and accepted the Mughal service.

During February 1694, the fort of Peru-ṣukkal was stormed by the army of Ṣāi Malikat's Bundela soldiers. Then he marched towards Ṣānjore. Ṣāchappā Nāyak
paved all the help to him. Between January and February he attacked Tanjore. Shahaji II, the Raja of Tanjore was sitting on the horns of dilemma. His immediate neighbour, Nayak of Trichinopoly joined the Mughals. Meanwhile the Marathas under Bahlirji Gharpade rushed towards Tanjore for its defence. But it did not yield any results. The Raja had to yield. He sought peace by paying a tribute of 40 lakhs (Chakrams). On 22nd May, he signed a formal letter of submission and promised not to extend any help to Raja. The terms of peace were quite heavy for Shahaji II. He was asked to pay a tribute of Rs. 30 lakhs annually, and cede the forts of Palamkot, Sittanur (?), and Tonnur, and the territory of Kulasanargudi, Shri-mushnam, Tittagudi, Trinnaur (?), Blavanasore, Nala Kurchi, Pandalum, which had been mortgaged to him by Raja.

Raja after knowing about these terms of Shahaji II, sent his army to Palamkot to defend it, as this was mortgaged to Vyankoji. In June Sulfiqar Khan's army invested along with Talpat Raja arrived there and the village. They captured it on 23rd June, 1694.

The Mughal army thus consolidated their positions in the surrounding territory of Jinji. Till September, that is the end of the rainy season Sulfiqar Khan concentrated on reorganising his army and supplies. On 10th
September, he took over all the territory close to Jinji, i.e. Vetāvalan forest through which provisions used to enter the fort and thus started the blockade of Jinji.

In October 1694 Zulfiqār Khan renewed the siege of Jinji in right earnest. He marched out of Vāndīwān and encamped north of Chamanon fort and pass (42 m.b. of Jinji). The Garathas forced themselves in his camp and carried away horses. At this time he was suspected by Tauq Khan Panni, Kishore Singh Bādā and Balpat Rāi Bundelh, of having been in league with Rājārām. But this view does not appear to be correct. Rājārām during this period wrote to Mudhoji Naik Natālkar about the Mughals being powerful in Karnātak and Vetāval having been taken over by them. The fear is expressed that within a short period Jinji might also fall. But Hindu Nān Chorpade's excellent service towards him proved of great help. But it has been urged by him that the enemy should be defeated. Santāji and Chanāji were also asked to return. "The present situation is precarious. If you could come within a month the state would remain secure. But afterwards the state would be lost."

This leaves us no doubt in our minds that Rājārām was definitely passing through the most critical phase. The siege appeared to be a real danger. And hence it can
be argued that there was no secret understanding between Rājārām and Zulfiqār Khan as presumed by Martin and others, or at least by now it was terminated.

Shankarāji Panḍya brought about reconciliation between Santāji and Rājārām. He gave an army with him and sent him to Jinnī with orders to raise the siege. Along with him was sent Yeshāji Malhār Mutalik. The total number sent was 25 thousand cavalry along with Hanumant Rāo Ninēlākar and many other captains of fame and note.

During October–November, Zulfiqār Khan laid siege to Vellore. Within a very short time the news of Maratha army marching into Eastern Karnātaka under the two generals, Thanāji and Santāji reached the Mughal camp. This caused a great alarm and fright among the people. And many started sending their families to Madras.

With Thanāji’s arrival near Vellore at the end of December 1695 Zulfiqār Khan was forced to raise the siege. Then Thanāji encircled the Mughal faujdar in Peruvadi, but Zulfiqār Khan came promptly to his help and relieved him from any further distress. From there Zulfiqār Khan marched towards Arcot. By March 1696 Santāji arrived at Jinnī and paid his obeisance to Rājārām. Thus with the arrival of Santāji, the Maratha force became very powerful and it was almost beyond the capacity of the
Mushals to meet them anywhere and everywhere. Tulliqār Khan was particularly stranded for both money and reinforcement.

In April 1696, a skirmish took place between him and Santāji near Arni and Santāji was repulsed. Tulliqār Khan confined himself in the fort of Arcot in a solely defensive way.

Thus once again the Marathas humbled the great Mughal general Tulliqār Khan. He was forced to be on his defensive and thus was left without any initiative. A similar situation was forced upon him three years back, i.e. in February 1693, when he was compelled to retreat from Jinji. Once again the Marathas established their superiority over the vast Mughal forces and left the Mughal general without any money or reinforcement. If only for a little more time the Maratha generals should have remained united and fought the enemy, with vigour, perhaps, they would have been able to defeat and crush the Mughal army.

But the destiny has its own way and it is certainly not the way to be guessed. The difference between Rājārām and Santāji were carried too far, to the extent that the latter was unwilling to serve at Jinji. Similarly, the relationship between Santāji and Shanāji was also strained and it had almost broken. Consequently
in May 1696 Santaji left Jinji for Maharashtra.

Thus the internal feuds weakened the unity of the Marathas and ultimately the cause of Swarajya suffered to some extent. There might have been many reasons for it, but it is not possible, owing to the paucity of material for a historian to go into the details of it, but effect of it was that it helped the history of the Marathas to change its course to some extent.

After the disappearance of the two powerful Maratha generals from the war theatre of Jinji, Zulfiquar Khan pressed hard the siege. By August, the scales of war had turned and the Marathas were quite in miserable condition, particularly financially. On 2nd August, Hajar Rami sent his natural son along with Shankaraji Mahanar to Zulfiquar Khan to seek peace. Zulfiquar Khan in turn sent Trimbakrao from his army to Hajar Rami stating that Hajar Rami should go and meet him.

But from some factory records it appeared that the move to negotiate peace was first initiated by Zulfiquar Khan. On 29th July, Zulfiquar Khan sent Ram Singh and Mondasby with another chief man, with five or six hundred horse to Jinji. Ram Singh who negotiated the talks, gave a present of Rs. 15,000 to Hajar Rami and Hajar Rami in turn was to send Karnah with him to Zulfiquar Khan. Consequently, Hajar Rama was expected to receive Rs. 35,000 more. Hajar
Karna was to stay with Zulficâr Khan for two months, at the end of which, he was to receive another sum of Rs. 50,000 and the wife of Râjârâm to be delivered back. Thus Râjârâm was to receive a total amount of Rs. one lakh, in turn, he was expected to hand over the fort of Jinji to Zulficâr Khan. In case the conditions were not complied with Karna was to return to his father. According to Sarkar, it was Râjârâm, who was in need of money and therefore had initiated the move. From the above letter, the circumstances and the conditions imposed in negotiating the talks, becomes quite clear.

But from the subsequent events it appears that these talks failed Karna came back to his father in the middle of October. And Zulficâr Khan renewed the siege of Jinji once again. It commenced on 8th November 1697.

C. END OF SECOND FRONT AND

TRIUMPH OF MARATHA DIPLOMACY

From October 1689 till October 1697, that is for a period of eight years the Marathas maintained their 'Second Front' at Jinji in a most successful way. Their main purpose was to keep away the Mughal forces, which were concentrating in Maharashtra. Secondly, Jinji proved to be the best place of shelter, safety and security for their king. In the period of eight years both these
objectives were achieved effectively. The Marathas
needed time to recover since the tragic end of Sambhaji
and thus use that period for military preparedness as
well as awakening of the people against the Muslim
invasion.

The two worthy ministers, Ramchandra Pant and Shankaraji Pant spared no energies in achieving the
objectives. In 1697, they were confident enough to give
the fight to the Mughals in Maharashtra itself. The
necessity of continuing the Second Front at Jinji had
ceased. They were not only sure of protecting the
king, but also were equally sure of defeating the in­
vaders.

Therefore we find that gradually, the entire policy
of fighting at Jinji had undergone change. Instead of
fighting in open battlefields Maratha statesmen now chose
to fight out the siege diplomatically.

After the return of Karad from Sulfiqar Khan's
camp, it became quite evident to the Maratha, that the
enemy was quite keen on taking over Jinji. Their own
strength was reduced to the minimum. Continuous fight­
ing would have brought them nothing but disastrous results.
Their best generals were away in Maharashtra. In the
death of Sambhaji the Marathas received a great set back.
But all hopes were not given away. Rājārām reached a secret understanding with Zulfīqār Khan. It was a great diplomatic triumph for the ministers of Rājārām. They could well read the mind of the old Mughal general, who expected Aurangzeb, his master, to die soon. And thus after the death of his master, he wanted to carve a principality for himself in Karnātaka. He was well aware of the growing strength of the Marathas and equally well he was aware of the struggle for the succession amongst Aurangzeb’s sons. Having perused the existing situation, he chose his course of action and the course to suit his ambition. Therefore he chose to remain neutral and many a time passed the secret intelligence of attack to the Marathas, so that they could take timely measure to save themselves.

Thus the episode of Jinji took an entirely different turn, contrary to the expectations of Aurangzeb and to the greater advantage of the Marathas.

Zulfīqār Khan who had informed Aurangzeb about the peace negotiations with Rājārām, was ordered to abandon them. He received strict orders to capture Jinji. Thus early in November, 1697, the siege of Jinji was renewed with great earnest.

Zulfīqār Khan divided the various positions to be occupied, among his captains. He, with his contingent,
occupied the northern gate towards the Singhāvarām hill; Nām Singh Rāda, behind the fort, the western gate and Tāud Khan Panni at the foot of the hill, before Chikkali-
durg. Though Tāud Khan's division lacked artillery and siege material, he captured Chikkali-durg in one day and one night through reckless attack.

According to Ehimsen, "If Zulfiqār Khan had wished it, he could have taken the entire fort the next day. But his secret policy was to prolong the siege in order to keep his army together, enjoy his emoluments and escape the hardships of active duty on some new expedition." Therefore, he let know the Marathas that his attacks were for show. And he gave Bājārām enough time to escape before the fall of the fort. The siege prolonged for two more months.

Wilkes has more fantastic story to tell about the collusiveness of Zulfiqār Khan with the Marathas. He says, "To preserve appearances, it was necessary to report (to the Emperor) frequent attacks and repulses. On the other hand, Tāud Khan, second in command of the Mughal army, drank largely of the best European liquors, and when full of the grog would perpetually volunteer the extirpation of the infidels Zulfiqār necessarily assented to these enterprises, but always gave secret intelligence to the enemy of the time and place of attack, and the
troops of Raud Khan were as often repulsed with slaughter.

Kajaram, noticing the fall of Chikkali-durg and the Mughals having occupied Chandrayan-durg, decided to quite the fort. He left for Vellore on 26th December in the company of chief Maratha officers. But he left his family behind.

"Then Tufiqar Khan gave the orders for assault. While Raud Khan with a large force was noisily exploring a track for scaling Chandrayan-durg from the south and had drawn the defenders to that side, Dalpat Rao scaled the northern walls of Krishnagiri and captured the outerfort, after a severe struggle. The garrison retreated to an inner fort called Kalakot, which Dalpat's Bundela's entered pell-mell with them and occupied. The surviving Marathas took refuge in Rajgarh or the highest fort.

Raud Khan entered Chandrayan-durg. From there he advanced towards Krishnapiri. Seeing no further escape the men begged for capitulation. The Mughals secured a lot of horses, camels and equipment.

The family of Kajaram was at Rajgadh. Tufiqar Khan had captured the entrance to Rajgadh, meanwhile Nam Singh Sadha reached Rajgadh by crossing the chasm at its foot by means of a wooden gangway. The royal family begged for safety and Tufiqar Khan granted it. Nearly 4,000 men, women and children were found in the fort but
very few combatants.

H. THE DAWN OF LIBERATION: EARLY REVERSALS
(FEBRUARY 1689 - DECEMBER 1692)

While adopting the policy of forming a Second Front at Jinji under his leadership, Rājarām entrusted the burden of administration of Maharashtra in his absence to the two most able statesmen, Rāmachandra Pant and Shankarāji Narāyan. Rājarām after reaching Jinji conferred upon them the titles of Anātya and Sachiv respectively. Rāmachandra Pant and Shankarāji Pant the two loyal servants of the kingdom were brilliant in wit and speech, relentless in their work, their point of interest being the survival of Maharashtra against the barbaric invasion of the Mughals and the preservation of Hindu religion in the broadest sense termed newly as Maharashtra dharma against the Islamic aggression.

Within a short period after reaching Jinji, Rājarām by an order made two divisions of Maharashtra. The southern part beginning from Karnāḍ, Talkonkan and Gokarna under Rāmachandra Pant and northern part of Varṣhāṭ beginning from Karnāḍ and northern part of Konkan under Shankarāji Pant. Later on the territory of Gālwa was also added to the latter's part. Similarly, army was also divided under two generals, one under Santāji
Choraode and the other under Thana ji Jadhav. They were to function under Nâmchandra Pant and Shankârâji Pant respectively.

Thus another nucleus of Maratha Government was formed in Maharashtra. This resembled something like "war council" of the modern days.

"Where to start and what to do" became almost overwhelming problems of the War Council. They were vigilant no doubt. They went round the country. The conditions of the people were alarming. Almost every face they saw wore a look of despair, almost every mile they travelled was littered with the wreckage left by the invading army. Burning and looting of the villages had assumed undue proportions. What appeared in the place of habitation, was only dogs and desolation. Farms were without cultivation or tools, ploughs and seeds. Men were in desolate condition. The treasury was bankrupt. It was to be replenished. The army was in a desperate state. It was to be organised and equipped. The forts, only a few of them/under their possessions, were to be adequately provisioned.

Politically speaking, the entire boonta was under the possession of Sâthbar Khan, the Mughal sardâr. He was an unrivalled master almost over fifty forts in that territory. A little earlier than the death of Sambhaji,
he was tremendously active in that territory. Except for the capture of Dālīgadh, the Mughals had their claim over all other forts in the Konkan.

On the other side, the Mughals in the rest of the country were carrying out ravages on a very large scale. The Mughal armies were marching in all parts of Maha-
rashtra, almost unhindered. All this was to be stopped.

Such was the magnitude of the problems, when the War Council was appointed. But they worked hard. They were dressed in whirlwind of urgency. Their unquestioned goal was to drive out the invaders. For the accomplishment of that purpose they were ready to make any conceivable sacrifice. In that accomplishment was to consist all their glory. No fascination of an 'īnām landa' or a 'royal mansab' in the Mughal army could divorce them from their singular aim. They appeared to be possessing bodies incapable of fatigue, and minds, whose energies were never exhausted. They worked in unanimity with others. They consecrated themselves to this great enterprise by day and by night and with an untrunk energy which bewildered their contemporaries in the enemy camp.

Their problems were manifold. One first and fore-
most was 'how to stop widely spreading Mughal army?'. They certainly knew that even if they attack the Mughal
army openly, even then the Mogul army at no stage could have been crippled with gigantic losses in men and materials. The Moghuls were still capable of coming within a hair's breadth of imposing the will of their dictator on the final day of decision.

Therefore, it was essential for the 'War Council' to work out a war strategy. The principle of this strategy was to give maximum blows with minimum force, to recapture the forts one by one from the enemy mostly by surprise and night attacks. In other words, they were to follow an offensive warfare though not in open battlefields. The forts were to form the nucleus of warfare. Therefore, the whole galaxy of assault and capture of the forts were considered the ultimate key to victory, and the only means whereby the Marathas might hope to challenge the Moghal power firmly rooted in the Deccan.

From the activities of the next few years, it is evident, that 'war council' worked tremendously hard. The country gradually recovered from its defensive role to an offensive warfare. From the events of this period we see that the 'war council' feared nothing and would stop at nothing.

The Marathas had to face their strongest enemy Aurangzeb, who had the backing of tremendous experience, personal knowledge of the Deccan plateau and immense
resources of wealth as well as armed forces. He himself built up the Mughal war strategy of the Deccan. He always conceived that the strength of Marathas lay in their forts. If all the forts in the Deccan were captured, according to him, the Marathas would be automatically forced to surrender. And thus he could establish the Mughal rule in the entire Deccan. In order to achieve this aim, he spared no pains, made use of all conceivable means, including strategies, diplomacy, cunning and bribery. His approach to the problem was simple and had three conceivable stages. Firstly he would make use of force to capture a particular fort, then coercion of people and if both these means failed, then resort to bribe quilledār.

Thus it is seen that, he captured, in the extreme north, fort of Sālher (21st February 1687), Trimbak (8th January, 1689) in the centre of Sinhgadh (November, 1684) and Bādgadh (May, 1689), in the north Konkan, Sātbar Khan had captured over fifty forts in that area. Vishālgadh, Sāṭūrā and Panhālā were the only three important forts under Marathas.

On 2nd April 1689, Aurangzeb who was at Koregāon, intended to visit the fort of Islāmābād. An incident took place at this time, which well deserves the mention. While Aurangzeb had encamped at Koregāon,
the three Ghorpade brothers, Santāji, Bahirji and Maloji who were matchless in their courage and dare devil activities, along with Vithoji Chavān attacked Aurangzeb’s camp. They carried away the gold pinacles of Aurangzeb’s tents and brought before Rājārām who was then at Vishālādāth. This created a great stir and bewilderment in Aurangzeb’s camp.

The bald fact that within a period of two and half months of humiliation of Sambhaji, the Maratha army had been able to strike back, even on so small a scale gave courage and hope to not a few. The cheers which greeted the Ghorpade brothers echoed round the mountains and valleys of Sahyādri. The morale of Maratha people which was at its lowest was, was recovering fast. Rājārām rightly honoured them by giving the titles of Samlakat-madar, Amir-ul-Ma Rao and Hindu Rāo, to Santāji, Maloji and Bahirji respectively. Vithoji Chavan was given the title of Himat Bahādur.

In June 1667, we are informed through the Armenian records that Aurangzeb had intended to go back to the North during February-March 1667. The officers at Shāhajahānābād were ordered to keep the palaces and gardens clean. 1000 camels were ordered from Ahmad-ābād and Purhānpur. But from subsequent events we find that Aurangzeb changed his mind, but the reasons are not known.
On 10th July Shujullah Khan was sent to capture the fort of Râichur.  

By 12th July, the Alâdâ Begâl of Sukeri was asked to hand over Vallahangadh vacated by its Cîledâr to Shaikh Abdul Ali the Mughal representative and keep his armed contingent there. During the same period in Tâlkâthân, about 1900 men of Abdur Razâk, the Mughal thânedâr of Tâlkâthân deserted him.  

A Maratha force appeared in the vicinity of Kholapur Munawar Khan, son of khân-i-zamân Fatih Jang went to chastise them. On 17th July the fort of Prabul was captured by Mâtabar Khan.  

Similarly Mâbuli was taken by giving bribes.  

On 27th July Muhammed ‘Ali was appointed saujdar of Hindorí. By the end of July prince Muhammed Bidâr Bakhat attacked gâdhî of Sânsâni. The surrounding territory was ravaged and burnt. A tower of the gâdhî which was blown up by mines fell on the prince’s army. About 400 men died. We do not known with what results this siege and attack ended.  

On 1st August Aurangzeb received gold key of Masâlgadhi near Bâbîri. On 7th August Hâtim Khan was appointed Cîledâr of Chandangadh.  

On September 22, Bân Sâwant and Bânp Sâwant were ordered to stop all the foodgrains being taken away by the Marathas from that territory. They were also given
the task of destroying the Thanas of Marathas and capture their forts. On 27th October, I'tgād Khan captured Mālgad. Royal personages of the Marathas who were at that place were arrested. The Khan was rewarded with the title of Zulficār Khan Sahādur. 112

In November, Bahrāmand Khan attacked the fortress of Ashta under Maratha possession. A battle took place. Many Marathas were killed. Bāhār-ud-dīn Khān Bakhshī of Bahrāmand Khan's army and many others from the Mughal side were also killed. The Mughals got the fortress. 113

About December, 1669, Marathas lost Panhāla to the Mughals. After Sambhaji's death, this was under Maratha possession. Bājārām left Mālgad and chose to go to Panhāla; from this it appears that this fort had strong garrison. Pānjūlākar Sirāj Chātge was the quillādār since Shivaji's time. Immediately, on the arrival of Bājārām Shaikh Nizām was ordered to invest the fort. But soon he found that the task was beyond his capacity. Santāji and Panhāji were ordered by Ramchandrapant to harass the Mughal commander and they indeed made his life miserable. Thus the task of taking the fort was prolonged. Aurangzeb sent Mūhullā Khān to Panhāla to see if the same could be secured through bribes. But the quillādār firmly refused the offer and requested for additional help from Santāji. But Santāji was not able
to send the timely help and in the meantime, Iliçād Khan captured Rāīgadh, seeing this the Karatha qilledār sold the fort to Aurangzeb. Thus the Mughals obtained a most valuable fort of the Karathas, as it had a lot of strategic importance.

During May-June, the Mughals had laid siege to Prachandpād. Early June Moropant, went to break the siege. He was accompanied by Dāji Burjārao Jedhe Leshamukh who was earlier made a captive by the Mughals. They raised the siege and thus defeated the enemy.

In the month of June, Abūl Khaît Khan son of Abdul Azīz Khan was appointed Subāndār of Rāīgadh and Muḥārākullāh son of İrādat Khan was appointed Banjdar of Islāmābād (Chākan). By the end of June the Šāh of Sāvantvādī and the Šāh of Ṣadāl, became disloyal to the Karathas. Moropant informed Aurangzeb that he would help Mughal armies in that territory by way of food grains and establishing thānās. He also promised to open the road to Goa. On 27th November Ruhullāh Khan captured the fort of Rāīchur and named it as Pirusnagar. On 18th December, Aurangzeb left Koregaon for Bijapur and arrived there on 11th January of the following year. On 12th March 1693, Rāāt Jang Khan informed Aurangzeb that Shivaji’s forts situated in the sea could be captured by blocking the supplies,
which reached the forts through the European traders.
and also the guards of the forts could be persuaded to
give up the resistance.

In February, a Maratha force under Şhanaji and
Hardya (?) was going to Bālāghāt by way of Mārenda.
Lutfullāh Khan gave fight to them near Vāngi. Many
men were killed on either side. Iftkār Khan came for
the rescue of Lutfullāh Khan.

These in short were the various activities of the
Mughal army in Māhrashtra as well as outside. The Mughal
infestation was so strong, during April 1689, till March
1690 that the Marathas were hardly left with any breathing
place.

The Marathas were busy preparing and uniting people.
On 23rd March, 1690, Bajirao wrote to Bābāji Darjā Rao
Jeejhe Jeshuukh that "This is Māhrashtra Aja. You are
striving very hard for the existence of the Kingdom."
Şhanaji and Santāji were being sent from Jinni to Mahā-
rastra, on their arrival, they were expected to start
recovering the lost territory.

Jeejhe Jeshuukh has been asked to remain alert with
his armed contingent. The letter is more interesting
as we see the undaunted courage of Ajjārā when he writes
"hat is the strength of the enemy, when once you people
have resolved. Enemy will be nowhere. You people are striving hard for the kingdom, then you should not care for aurangzeb. It convinces us beyond doubt that; it was a people’s war and people were expected to join it, unite themselves and fight the aggression fearlessly.

The sarathas recovered the forts of Nāi, Pratāpghad, Tornā and Rohidā through the exertions of Rāmchandrajipant and Shunkārjipant. Rāmchandra Vilkanth, immediately informed the Peshmukhs of Gunjamsāval Nāhe Peshmukh to remain alert, to raise new troops, to destroy the enemy posts and thus to help the war effort.

Abul Fadl Khan was the maula Muilōdār of Ṣājgadh. Having seen the large sarāthā force in the vicinity of Ṣājgadh, he lost his heart and begged to let his go un molested. He vacated the fort, but on the way, the sarathas had free loot of his bag and baggage. Thus in a most embarrassing condition he reached the camp of Sirūz Jang.

In a similar way, Sāji Sarīārāō Jēdhe Peshmukh, recovered the Vichitrāghadh from the Mughals about the same date. The sarathas were firm in regaining their lost territory. Then came the turn of fort of Sītārā. Shāzī Khan, a former Pījapuri general, who had subsequently joined the maula service, was given the title of Bustum Khan, and was ordered by aurangzeb to lay siege
to Štārā fort. On 29th May, 1597, Sachchandraman, Thakurajjirat, Thaujē and Santējī along with their army surprised Šhārā Khan. Šhārā Khan sent his son Chalīk to cross, with the advance party. But soon he was defeated. Karnātāki foot-musketiers on the Sarathā side charged the Mughals with deadly accuracy, their elephants were wounded, and they started trampling their own men. Šhārā Khan, seeing the miserable plight of his son, rushed for his help. He fought bravely and recollected the runaway men and started chasing the Sarathā generals Santējī and Dhanējī. These two, following the usual Sarathā tactics, pretended to give way and the Khan pressed impetuously on, driving his own elephant onwards accompanied by a few troopers. Just then the skirt of his dress was set ablaze by the enemy’s fire. The Seraj Musketiers took advantage of the confusion by falling upon the imperialists’ baggage and rear guard and plundering them. The Mughal troops were distracted and they dispersed abandoning the fight.  

Durangāzāb on receiving the intelligence of Šhārā Khan’s miserable plight sent reinforcement under Pirūz Jānē. Tīdī Abūl Guādir, while on his way to join the Mughal force was attacked by Bhōjā Gānāle. He was injured, fifty men lost their lives and he lost his complete equipment.
Before 23rd July, Hānhoji Tūzāṯrān, the Dośhrāns of Tūzāṯrān, more captured Ṭrachandrādh and defeated a large section of the Mughals. Ṭrachandramant, appreciating the success, entrusted him with the task of the capture of Ṭājpādh and Sinhpādh.।

Arangṣen by now was much worried about North Sātur, particularly, the defeat of Sharzā Khan, meant the loss of Mughal control over Sātur territory. So, he ordered Lutfullān Khan to leave for Phāṭāu on 30th May.।

He was also instructed to establish the Mughal posts in that territory. He reached Phāṭāu on 6th July. As he was setting down, his men were busy pitching the tents and had thought of taking some rest, Santāji along with ten thousand men fell upon them. The rain was incessant. The Mughals were taken by total surprise. Lutfullāh’s son hastened to encounter the enemy and saved the camp from plunder. Shortly he was reinforced by his father’s troops. Santāji moved towards Tarchangadh. There were heavy losses on both the sides. The Sarathas lost 530 in slain, besides losing 300 mares, 400 spears, 200 muskets and kettle-drums. Comparatively the Mughal losses were less. They lost 67 in killed and 170 were wounded.

According to Inshāḥi Aḥḥerān as quoted by J. Sarkar "But the Sarathas were only baffled and not crushed. They
rallied their forces and reappeared in the east Sātārā region in force. Ṭuṭṭufullāh, urged by the emperor, hastened to the scene. He halted at night in the village by Tilīv (22 m.e. of Thasvad, and 15 m.s. of Akluj). Next morning a Sārathā army reputed to be 20,000 cavalry and unnumbered infantry, led by Cantā, Thana, Taile, Sore and other generals, enveloped the small imperial detachment on its march. Ṭuṭṭufullāh placing his baggage in the centre, faced on all sides and engaged the enemy. Taile had 10,000 Karnātakī foot musketeers, whose fire severely galled the Sūfnals. The battle raged from dawn to sunset, the imperialists beating back repeated attacks of the enemy. Finally, Canta and Thana at the head of 5,000 picked horsemen, charged the division of Ṭuṭṭufullāh himself, but were repulsed. At sunset the Sārathas withdrew, leaving a thousand dead on the field, besides many wounded. The Sūfnals lost 200 killed and above 300 wounded. 130

Though the Sārathas were thus defeated, within a short period, Shankarājī made it known to the Feshāūkhna Reshmande of Khatā that he was appointed to that territory by Gañjārām and the revenue should be handed over to him. 131 From this it appears that the Sārathas were not at all unrooted from Sātārā territory.

On 24th September 1697, Cantājī dashed near a
village Mándaj, in Ahmednagar and attacked the village, accompanied by three thousand cavalry and two thousand infantry. The actual fight was not given. But he was defeated. A certain Cōpāl Cūnāstā of the village acted as an informant. The villagers paid chauth amounting to Rs. 5500 and he carried away all the camels from the fort. 132

In the first week of September Ałoji and about one thousand cavalry of the Marathas alighted in Ğā nid-dīn Bāshā or Ğān Bāshā’s parpanā (rānī). They ravaged the territory. Sayyid Hūsain Aļī Bāshā was ordered to chastise them. 133 Another force appeared near in the vicinity of Ḥabādurghān (Pepān) and Ahmednagar. Yāhūţāz Bāshā was ordered by Rahrung Bāshā to remain alert in the vicinity of Ahmednagar. 134

From September till February next year there were very few movements of Marathas in Māhāraṇātra, fewer still were those of Safafal troops. By about the middle of September 1671 Bāshānan, sons of Ḥaphojo from prince Muḥammad Aļmān’s army who were left behind at Ḥatav were attacked by the Marathas. A battle took place. 135 In the third week of September a Maratha force appeared near Peresān. Ḥabb-al-Tūbh Bāshā, the Safafal commander gave a fight to it. Many men were killed and wounded. 136 At the same time another Maratha force arrived in the vicinity of Ṣāḥb-durgh (Ṣāb-durgh – Ṣambahā). They
killed the Mughal officer there. Chhatrasāl's son who was there could not even resist them. 137

On 5th October prince Muhammad Razał marched towards Daulādār in order to chastise the Marathas. Later on he received the intelligence of Santājī's being in Sātārā then he dashed towards Sātārā. 138 At the same time Marathas were active near Calhale. Tahāur Khan was ordered to chastise them. 139

A Maratha force arrived at Chokhandi and besieged the fortress by about 12th October. The Mughal thānedār Sayyid Muḥammad fought with it. But the Marathas outnumbered the Mughal troops took him captive and kept in the fortress. 140 At the same time, a Maratha force besieged Farasāgad. The Mughal thānedār Afrāsiyāb gave a battle but he was defeated and taken away as captive. 141 Another Maratha force under Thānak Rāj campaign arrived near Curtiānāpar. Hīdāu-Allāh the Mughal faujdar sent his son Shujā' Allāh to fight with him. 142

The Marathas were active near Curtiānā. Abīu'llāh Khan from the army of Abīu'llāh Khan was appointed to chastise them. 143 By middle of October a Maratha force under the command of Fesc (Lukhott) arrived near Sārendā. Manīd-ud-dīn Khan gave the battle. 144 But it seems his condition became precarious, as Farāwar Khan was ordered to go for his help.
In November-December Barjirao Jedhe deserted
Marathas and joined the Mughals. He was granted the
Roshukhi of Phor in Maval territory. 145

On 16th December, 3,000 Marathas attacked Manaszad
Than and Sadd Khan’s men. From there they launched an
attack on Ruhullah Khan’s army. A battle took place.
Many men were killed on either side. Marathas lost
Krishnaji and Islam-ud-din. 146 At the same time Marathas
were active near Chatua and Islam-ud-din Khan was sent
from Barenda to Chatua. 147

Sometime after February 1692, Rama Chandranant by
sending men with Rarsuramant, recaptured Manhal fort
from the Mughals. 148 This brought a great relief to the
Marathas and gave equally big set back to the Mughals. At
that time Aurangzeb’s camp was at Salfal. 149 In May
he sent Muizz-ud-din towards Ukluj and on 4th May, he
appointed Abdur Rahim Khan Lari as faujdar of Nahiri and
Bosvan. He was also made a 4 hazari pardar. 149

During May, Abaji Sondev, along with Jaulkar,
Bheshkar, Navale, Rasundar and other men were ordered
by Patel Sai to capture Salfad. 150

The Mughals received one more set back in the death
of Ruhullah Khan who passed away on 6th July. 151

Thus Marathas made a successful start. They harried
the Mughals everywhere. In fact their infestation was growing stronger and stronger. And indeed the problem of Marathas became a nightmare for the Mughal Emperor. A contemporary report has well described his condition. It says "Aurangzeb was worried day and night about the enemy (Marathas) in the Deccan. Much of the territory has been brought under the imperial rule. But the army has become so weak that now there was no more strength left in it. The services and tasks which mansabdars of 7500 (faujān) could have performed, in their places the Emperor had to send princes as faujārs. They are making wild chase and their task is not nearing completion. The Emperor is receiving the news of battles (with Marathas) from everywhere. He is not finding proper remedy for it." 152

J. UNIFYING THE FORCES

In spite of the Maratha forces being driven back at Satara, and in spite of having lost many a fort under their possession, Bahadur Shah and Chhatrapati Sambaji devoted more time in uniting the men, who had their backing, and who were either in the Mughal service or else were operating independently. Their's was an uphill task. They had no attractive terms to offer, yet they could appeal, emphatically to their sense of patriotism. But then this alone however well-meant it might have been it could not create the desired effect. Therefore it was thought,
appropriate to appeal to the people to join the Maratha
force and promise them new land or new territory as a
reward. But the territory promised to them was the one
that they were expected to recover from the usurping clutches,
restore it to normalcy, raise new troops and be ready for
new assignments, then and then alone they were entitled
to claim that 'inām', so called, because it was essen-
tially a free gift (the revenue of it) to them. Thus
Rāgām, the king and his councillors, ensured two fold
objective, firstly, an oath of loyalty to the cause of
warājya and the kingdom and secondly fresh troops, under
their own arrangements and an ever readiness to take up
new task or fight against the enemy.

This in turn had its own effect. The people in
general and the local leaders in particular took up initia-
tive in the matter. This brought a great deal of
confidence among them. The leadership was completely
decentralised. Yet they were always expected to obey the
commands of Gomachandravant and Shankārāji, Nārāyan who
were at the helm of the Maratha affairs. People became
more alert and active and enlisted their support to the
Maratha king and the government.

This had one more unique advantage. The merit
and the loyalty became distinctly recognised, which was
a dire necessity of the period. The task was lying open
in front of the people and it became in the Napoleonic term
‘a career open for talent’.

There were very many influential Maratha sardārs, serving under the Mughals. It was essential to bring them back under Maratha banner. From September, 1675 to the end of 1691, both Rāmchandraji and Shankarāji-samant on the advice of Rājarāṇī devoted vigorously to this task. This was the task the importance and magnitude of which could by no means be underestimated.

During 1691, Vāgoji Satāji Dāne who was serving under the Mughals deserted them and went to Rājarāṇī at Jangi. Here he expressed his loyalty to the Maratha king. On 12th April Rājarāṇī gave him an assurance saying, ‘The kingdom of the Chatrānat is the kingdom of God....The Maharashtra Dharma should last long.’ Vāgoji in turn, agreed to fight for the king. He was given Kusbe Nashadv and 12 hamlets as ‘Vatan of Girdas Muhammad’.153

During May–June 1692 Vāgoji Dāne represented to Rājarāṇī about Bhanantārā and Krishnāji Cherrade, who were then in the Mughal service. On 4th June Rājarāṇī wrote to Bhanantārā Cherrade saying that ‘your intentions and heartfelt desire of protecting Maharashtra Dharma’ have become quite clear. Knowing the capabilities of these two persons Rājarāṇī allotted them an amount of six lakh muns, new cavalry, half of the booty, which they might in the course of their actions acquire from the enemy, including
horses, elephants, cash and the standards, provided they did the following:

Hammamrāc Chorpade was entitled to

- 62,500 hon’s after the capture of Rāigadh.
- 62,500 hon’s after the capture of Bijāpur.
- 62,500 hon’s after the capture of Bhāgānagar.
- 62,500 hon’s after the capture of Auranfābūd.
- 250,000 hon’s after the capture of Delhi.

Similarly Krishnāji Chorpade was entitled to

- 125,000 hon’s after the conquest of Rāigadh territory.
- 125,000 hon’s after the conquest of Bijāpur.
- 125,000 hon’s after the conquest of Bhāgānagar.
- 125,000 hon’s after the conquest of Auranfābūd.
- 500,000 hon’s after the conquest of Delhi.

A student of history gets wonderstruck and amazed when he reads about this ambitious plan of the Maratha king, when his own survival was completely endangered, but one need not get either wonderstruck or amazed at it. It only shows the undaunted courage that the Maratha king and the Chorpades possessed. In the hour of defeat the mind of the Maratha king soothed with schemes for victory and the conquest not only of his own forts and territory, but the citadel of the Mughal emperor, the capital of the empire, the city of Delhi, which in the past
had changed the very course of history. This mighty and ambitious scheme, showed to the world, that with methods of offence and the means, whereby this small and battered David of a country might hurl its stone against the fabulous Goliath of Aurangabad military might.

In August, Rājārām granted a Sunad, on the advice of Sarjārāc Jedhe Deshmukh, to the Deshmukhs and Desh-kulkarnis of Wathekhore, as well as to the Deshkulkarni, Cāckulkarni and Chaupule of taluqa Gunjansāwal for their loyalty and integrity to the King. They have been told to obey the orders of Rāna Chandrapant and Shankarāji-pant and thus help the cause of the Chatrapati (King). 155

During September, Rājārām entrusted the task of recovering the territory in Sāwal, Parandhar and Junnar area to Sarjārāc Jedhe Deshmukh of Rohidkhore. Santāji was asked to give his adequate help for accomplishment of that task. 156

Prior to September 1691, Haibatrāc Siliskar and Prayāji, Binkarrāc Manolikar, two influential Maratha Sardars became disloyal. Shankarāji-pant promptly imprisoned them and imposed a fine of Rs. 40,000 on the latter. But Jedhe Deshmukh negotiated about them and thus secured their release. These men, later on were asked to serve the kingdom loyally. Thus Rājārām, with his immense insight in human nature, won over the people, who had
f) Only be considered disloyal to him. Slowly and gradually he started having a large following in Maharashtra.

Similarly, Rājārām won over the Berad and Koli tribes in Maharashtra. He granted them the necessary protection and thus entrusted them with the task of capture of the fort Purandhar. During November, the Deshmukh of Nicholi was induced to join the Marathas, by granting him the vatan of that territory, for remaining loyal, while his two brothers had deserted the Marathas and joined the Mughals.

In 1692, Antāji Udhav, an influential Maratha leader was won over by Rājārām. He was given assurance of protection and was asked to join Rāmchandra Pant, with his armed contingent.

Similar efforts were made to reconcile, the son of Nāgoji Pāne. There was some misunderstanding between Santāji and Nāgoji’s son, Subhānji. Rājārām who rightly estimated the value of winning over people to his side, wrote to Rāmchandra Pant that ‘Subhānji Pāne is a well-known man and has got large following’. The Maratha general Santāji was reprimanded for his behaviour with Subhānji.

K. CAPTURE OF PASHALIGAH

A GUARDIAN KNOT FOR THE MUGHALS

Sometimes, after February 1692, the Marathas raised
their banner high over the fort of Panhālā. For a period of six months, i.e., till October, the Mughals silently watched it. During October, Prince Muizz-ud-din, who was away at ʿIlūj, was ordered to lay siege on Panhālā and capture the fort. Prince Muizz-ud-din arrived in the vicinity of Panhālā by the end of October and laid siege to the two gates of the fort, with the help of Iftikhār Khan. He blockaded the supply of food grain going into the fort. Luṭfullāḥ Khan and Asālāt Khan who were ordered to go to Ahmadnagar on 24th October, were recalled and sent to the help of Muizz-ud-din. By the middle of October they joined the prince and worked with him like second-in-command and supervised the siege work.

Meanwhile Muizz-ud-din established firm communication between Panhālā, Miraj and Calgālā, where Aurangzeb had encamped. "Gradually the investment was tightened. Mines were taken to the walls, Mughal outposts were set up around them and in January 1693 four large pieces of artillery were sent to the prince by the Emperor."

"But for a year the fort held out, and in October, 1693, the scene entirely changed. A vast Maratha army, (ten thousand horse and foot according to Akhtarat dt. 27 Oct.) under Thanā Jāḥav, Gāschandra and Shankārāji arrived for its relief and encircled the small siege force. The battle began on 24th and there were daily encounters.
for some days. While this contest kept the besiegers engaged, the Marathas outside easily threw fresh troops and provisions into the fort, and in concert with the garrison raided the Mughal trenches with great success. Some guns and wheeled field-pieces (rahkala) were carried off from Saf Thikan Khan's position into the fort. Some imperial officers were slain, several others wounded, and one taken prisoner by the enemy."

"Meantime, the Emperor had issued urgent orders to hurry up two heavy reinforcements to the prince under the command of Rirum Jang and Khansar Khan. Khan Khurram was ordered to keep back from helping the Marathas. The Maratha relieving force heard of their coming (at the end of October) and dispersed from the neighbourhood of Tanbala. Thana made his way north towards Patara; but before reaching that fort he was sighted by Rirum Jang's army on its southward march to the prince's side. The Khan sent his vanguard under his son Ghulam Khan and Rustam Khan, who overtook the Marathas near Harac. A severe battle was fought. The Marathas were defeated and dispersed with heavy slaughter, leaving 30 prisoners and 600 horses in the hands of the victors. The Mughals too lost many men."

"But Thana Jadhav had effectively spoiled the work done by Muizz-ud-din in a year outside Tanbala. The fort
had been reprovisioned, the siege work had been destroyed and heavy losses inflicted on the Mughal army. Thereafter, though the prince continued there for four months longer, he could do nothing."

"The siege was practically abandoned; the prince carried on his operations languidly, merely to deceive the emperor, and opened negotiations with the garrison to secure the fort for a price. When four months had been thus wasted, Aurangzeb on 7th March, 1694, ordered a force of 6,000 men to strengthen the prince, as the siege had now come to a stop. At the same time Ruqay-yd-din was authorised to use his discretion if the fort was surrendered peacefully he could grant terms, if not he must renew entrenching and lay siege to it a second time."

"But it was of no use. Already, about 6th March, the prince availing himself of the emperor's permission, had begun to march away from Hanālā, while Luqīfullāh Khan and many other officers, who had positive orders to stay below the fort, joined him in the retreat. The emperor on hearing of this (13th March) sent an officer to turn the prince back from Vadraon (14 m.e. of Hanālā) and take him back to that fort to make a decision about it on the spot by either securing it for a price or renewing siege operations against it. Four days later the emperor changed his mind and wrote to the prince to come to court, while his officers were to be forced to go back
to Panhala under Luṭfūllāh’s command, to continue the siege. Muizz-ud-din was received in audience by his grand father on the 29th of the month. His cousin Bidar Bakht had been selected to undertake the task from which he had returned unsuccessful. Bidar Bakht, with a nominal muster-roll of 25,000 men and artillery, was given formal leave on 27th March and began his journey from the Court at Galgala on 5th April. The officers who had come with Muizz to court without orders, were now driven by force back to Panhala.”

On 26th April a Maratha force arrived near Panhala and was engaged in carrying grain and bulls. Prince Muizz-ud-din ordered Muḥammad āskari, the Bahšshī of his army and ‘Ali Murād along with their men to punish the Marathas. They marched about 14 miles from Panhala and faced the Marathas. A battle took place and they recovered all the bulls. In the meantime 3000 cavalry of the Marathas arrived from Janādev hills. Again a battle took place. Muḥammad āskari, ‘Ali Murād and others from the Mughal side deserted the battle field. About 500 Mughal soldiers were killed.

On 27th April Saf Shikān Khan an officer of the Mughal artillery destroyed by bombardment one tower of the fort.

On 1st May, a Maratha force brought food grains to
to the besieged of Panñhâlã. Prince Muzz-ud-din appointed one thousand men to chastise them. At this time, Hamid-ud-din Khan who was beyond the Krishna river was ordered to join the prince. On 7th May, Hamid-ud-din Khan arrived at Kolhâpur. On his way Mir Bâqi, his bakhshî was attacked and looted by the Marathas.

Thus the siege of Panñhâlã was hopelessly dragging on. The Marathas were attacking and plundering the siege camp. To all this was added arrival of Santâji with a big army from Jînji. Aurangzeb got alarmed at it and reinforced prince Muzz-ud-din's army. He ordered Khanûzâd Khan son of Ruqullâh Khan, Gâzi-ud-din Khan, Gâsî Khan and Khan-i-Jâhan Bahâdûr to proceed to Panñhâlã.

On 30th July 1693 Anwar Khan the Mughal chânedâr of Kolhpur ran away from his post as he heard about approaching Maratha force. In the first week of August the Marathas attacked the Mughals and carried away Hidâyat-ullâh, Muhammed Tâhir and Muhammed Komîn. They demanded twenty thousand rupees for their release.

Earlier Aurangzeb had ordered Bidâr Bakht to take charge of the siege at Panñhâlã. But it seems that he reached there only in April 1695. His first acts were marked by vigour. Opening his approaches and planning his artillery, he siezed the village at the foot of the hill and demolished one bastion of the fort.
11 May 1695. But the promise of these opening operations was not fulfilled. A desultory siege was continued by him till the end of January, 1696, when the disasters to Asaf Khan and Jumat Khan further south induced the Emperor to send prince to Basavpatan, and to entrust the siege of Panhālā to Ferus Jang, who, too, could effect nothing. In fact the capture of Panhālā was quite beyond the power of any divisional army, as Aurangzeb was to realize during his own siege of it in 1701.”

L. YEARS 1693 AND 1694

By 1693 Marathas had recovered beyond expectations of Aurangzeb. In 1689, they were considered to be crushed but by 1693, they had gradually but firmly raised their head in Maharashtra. The singular success the Maratha army, under Santāji and Shanāji achieved at Jinji, had revived the spirit of Marathas in Maharashtra. The terror these two generals created in the rank and file of the Mughal army, had greater impact at home. The morale of the Marathas had been elevated considerably high. They regained the lost faith in the existence of their state and thus got greater confidence in their activities.

The Marathas, by now decided to use more effectively their war tactics of harrying the Mughal army with small
bands or parties. The leadership was decentralised. People took every opportunity of helping these roving Maratha armies and wherever they were helpless, the people showed gratitude and sympathy.

Marathas were moving in small forces. They were well acquainted with the intricate paths of Konkan, the western ghats and the dense jungles. On the various forts situated in the Konkan and on the ghats they organised their armies and swiftly marched and made surprise attacks on the Mughal columns. It was a most irritating task for the Mughal soldiers to chase them.

Rajarām made arrangements to capture the territory of Aurangābād, Ṣânded unto Berar and Ḍhāndesh. He sent orders to Āmarchandrapant that NaGaōji Māne, who had suffered great hardships for the defence of Maharashatra and the King, and defeated the Mughals many a time, was ordered by him to conquer the territory of Ṣânded and from Aurangābad to Berar. "He is a man of great ability if he is given independent mission he will achieve great success and will arrange the affairs (of the state) properly" wrote Rajarām on 9th and 25th March 1693 to Āmarchandrapant. NaGaōji Māne was expected to conquer that territory, raise new army, exact tributes and make the necessary appointments so as to run the administration of that territory smoothly. Āmarchandrapant and Shankarājipant were asked to accord the necessary help.
For the achievement of this mission Rājūrām gave
him 12 villages an išān and the rights of Sardeshmukhi.
In addition to this on May 22, 1693, he was rewarded by
Rājūrām, with the Sardeshmukhi of Parandā, in recognition
of his excellent work at Jinji. 173

Now let us see the activities of the Marathās dur­
ing 1693. In the third week of March 1693, a Maratha
force arrived near Mandurp in Khelapur district. They
played havoc. Fābrāzand Khan’s son Hasān ‘Ali with a
strong force was ordered to quell the Marathas. 174 They
were frequently moving near about Deogadh. The Mughal
Ciledār complained to prince Auzz-ud-dīn about his small
force. But nothing seems to have been done. 175 By
middle of April the Marathas had gathered near Sahādev
hill for worshipping. The Mughals at Panhāla feared
an attack from the Marathas. The Mughal commander Marhmat
Khan from prince Auzz-ud-dīn’s army asked for 7 thousand
cavalrymen. Hamid-ud-dīn Khan was ordered to proceed and son of
Subāhdār of Nanded was asked to despatch his army along with
Hamid-ud-dīn Khan. 176 But the Mughal’s fears proved to
be baseless as the Maratha force consisting of nearly
one thousand cavalry and foot soldiers reached in the
vicinity of Bīr from Sahādev hills. Itīsh Khan, the
Mughal faujdar of the place was ordered to drive it away. 177
At the same time Hamid-ud-dīn Khan was asked to chastise
the Marathas near Miraj. 178
By about 27th April the Marathas carried away cattles and bulls from the Mughal army at Talangi. 179

Shankarāji Nārāyan made preparations to capture a number of forts such as Sinhgadh, Purandhar and Lohgadh. These forts were of great importance. Kākāji Nārāyan of Sāval territory was asked to wrest some of these forts in Varghāt, from the Mughals. At this time, Lohgadh, which was captured by Fulficār Khan, long ago was still under the Mughals. It had great strategic importance. Triabakrānt Muṭālīq along with Viṭhoji Karke and the army was ordered to capture Lohgadh. Shortly they reached the Rājmāchi of the fort.

Similarly Viṭoji Balkavade was exhorted to capture Sinhgadh. This was a more dangerous and delicate task at this time, as an attempt in the previous year had failed and the Mughals had become quite alert. But Viṭoji bravely accepted the task. He marched with his men, descended down and reached near Sinhgadh. Having selected his comrades in arms, Viṭoji tried to scale the fort, leading his team. The Mughals on the fort were quite alert. No time was available to put the ladders. At early dawn Viṭoji managed to place the ladders near the steps of the fort. Viṭoji, with all his bravery, courage and determination climbed up the ladders. A fierce fighting took place. The garrison was defeated and thus
the fort was captured on 1st July 1693.

In August-September Khān-i-Jahān Bahādur's son Himmat Khan was sent to Bhāilwani. From there he was asked to go to Vāserāon, Aluj, etc. and remain alert. In the first week of September, Rāmāji and other Marathas were active near Kalār in Pargana Nevasā. The Mughal Qilīdār and faujdar 'Abdul shafur gave a fight. A battle of arrows and musket shots took place. Rāmāji was wounded and another sardār Narsingrao was taken captive. But in October, Marathas lost Sinhagadh (27 m.s.e. of Mahul) to the Mughal general Mātabar Khan. Though Mātabar Khan tried to take the fort by giving imperial assurance to the quilledār, yet, his attempts did not succeed. Finally on 27th October, with the help of Māval people, the fort was gained by escalade. Two Maratha sardārs, Khandoji Kadas and Pāndāji Nārāyan came from Rājmāchi, yet it was of no avail. They blockaded the quilledār in Sinhagadh. But soon Mātabar Khan sent reinforcements under Rākaji and Rawat Mal Jhālā, who attacked the village and defeated Marathas after a fight.

Next six months passed without much activity either in the Mughal camp or that of the Marathas. In March Shankāraji Nārāyan sent men from Rājmāchi to the Pen territory. Ruji Adhataroc was earlier a Mughal representative in that territory. Later on Mātabar Khan, appointed
Shivaji Telanka in his place. He had about 400 soldiers and strengthened garrison very well. But Shankaraji Narayan's contingent drove away the Mughal representative and thus added Pen to his territory, on 29th March, 1694. 185

In August 1694, Mhajaram ordered Mudhoji Nimbalkar to join Thanaji and Santaji in Satara and Thalban territory as the Mughals had become immensely strong there. He along with his armed contingent was specially ordered to work under Thanaji Jadhav. Amrit Rao Nimbalkar was also asked to join them. 186 On 2nd August 1694, Thanaji and Santaji with their armies arrived near Varugadh (25 m.e. of Satara). From there they laid siege to Mahipatsadh (10 m.e. of Varugadh) and carried out the blockade.

In September the Mughals made a successful attempt in gaining the fort of Keri. Trimbakpant Mutalik, Yadav Sagarji and Mahadaji Baji were on the fort. Rayaji Bahunkar, who was the quilledar, was approached by the Mughals. 187 He accepted large amount of bribe and agreed to hand over the fort. The Mughal contingent sometime after 15th September arrived there, with the use of ropeladders scaled the fort. The Maratha garrison which was not at all aware of the quilledar Rayaji Bahunkar's doings, defended the fort.
A gallant Maratha, Nāvāji Balkavade with his comrades in arms hovered over the fort. He did not allow the enemy to carry any ammunition towards the fort.

Mansūr Khan's son was bringing reinforcement from Junnar, he had supplies, cavalry and guns with him but, Balkavade attacked him near Sāud, defeated him and captured his horses. He showed great bravery and courage.

On the Maratha side, Abājipant Sabnis, Cirjaji Nimbālkar, Pinkarrāc and many other soldiers were killed. Trimbakpant and Acro Nārāyān were captured by the Mughals. But Yādav Sāmrāj and Mahādāji Rāji, with their families escaped through the western ghats towards Bhor. Thus the Mughals occupied Korīgadh.

But the Marathas were not prepared to let go the traitor, Rāyāji Sūlkurākar lightly. During October-November Shankarāji sent the news of the capture of Korīgadh while he was at Rājgadh. Immediately, he sent Pantaji Sirdev, Chāpji (Chānāji?) Khādam of Bhor, Lāmāji Nārāyan and many other soldiers to besiege Korīgadh. They besieged the fort and blockaded it. The Mughals were harrassed. Nāvāji Balkavade attacked the Sīdis force at Khudu Ghat who had come to Korīgadh, and stopped any reinforcement going to the fort. Finally an assurance was given to loye, the representative of the Mughals, to let him go free. Immediately his men vacated the fort without any hindrance.
Immediately the Marathas occupied the fort. Trimbakpant and Moropant were released. On hearing the news of the success, Shankarāji himself went to Korgad. Rāyāji Bāhulkar was beaten as punishment for the treachery and was put in prison at Rājgadh. Thus Marathas, immediately made good their loss and inspired great confidence in the people.

By December 1694, the Marathas had one more victory to their credit. Sambhaji Naibatrāo Lennauk of Ashra-Dhārane, captured Suchāgadh from the Mughals.

Thus gradually the scales of war were turning against the Mughals. The Maratha activities were widespread. This must have certainly disturbed Aurangzeb. A contemporary report has well described his condition when it says "An Emperor was losing his temper as he was receiving the news of fights of the Marathas from all directions. He even did not attend to the court matters. After the court was adjourned he bowed before God and thanked him saying "the day has passed well." The imperial provinces from where food grains, treasury and other equipment used to come has reached worse state. All the qilādārs are writing about the troubles of the Marathas. They were neither getting the supplies nor the help in time. The superior officers are not aware about it. The qilādār (therefore) surrenders the fort.
If he is caught alive, the Marathas torture him.

FARNATAK - A NEW THEATRE OF WAR

After the death of Sambhaji, while Häjäräm was still at Bhiçadh, it was agreed upon and more wisely so by his councillors, that he should go and stay at Jinji, a place more than 700 miles away from Maharashtra. The chief aim of this operation was to keep the Mughal army divided, harry them, surprise them and thus reduce their effective strength and opposition. Secondly this would possibly enable the Marathas from keeping the theatre of war away from home-land. Thus the idea of opening second front at Jinji came into existence in October-November 1689.

Though the Marathas were, to a large extent, successful in opening the Second Front at Jinji and carrying out the operations against the Mughals, yet it did not prove to be very effective. The Mughal line of supply was not broken. The Mughals during that period were still the master of the territory through which the supplies and communication passed to Jinji. And that territory was Sarnataka, the territory of Bijaipur Farnataka and Golkonda Karnataka, as those provinces were then called, came into the possession after the fall of Bijapur and Golconda sultans. Aurangzeb appointed his own officers to Bijapuri Karnataka, but there were not many changes in Golconda Karnataka. The desails, Nādgaudās, Sarnādgaudās
had not declared openly their allegiance either to the Mughals or to the Marathas since fall of their respective former rulers. The Marathas and the Mughals, each in their own way presumed their loyalty conveniently to their respective sides.

Marathas did not remain under this illusion for a long time. By 1691, they had realised the real situation. Their foremost problem was to have money, and as they knew well that these territories have not been managed well by the Mughal officers they could exploit them. In addition to this, they considered it a matter of great advantage, in order to divide the Mughal forces further and keep the war away as far as possible from Maharashtra. This would have brought the resultant effect of breaking the Mughal line of supply and communication. Thus in 1691 they foresaw the necessity of opening a new theatre of war and Karnâtaka readily provided the ground.

Before we go into the political history of this region, it is quite essential to understand the terrain and the geographical position of the various parts in that territory. Golconda Karnâtaka and Bijaruri Karnâtaka were sub-divided into uplands and plains. The upland of the Golconda Karnâtaka began south of Vandiyal (a frontier fort of Bijapur territory) and included Sidhout, Gandhikota, Guti, Garamkonda and Kadapa (presently in Andhra State). Bijapur Karnakshat lay west of Golconda Karnâtaka
and included Sera and Bangalore districts (Belgaum, Sannio, and Tībāg Mukeri of present Mysore State).

The first note of Maratha-activities in this region was taken by Aurangzeb in November 1690. Aurangzeb's encampment was at Calphā (on the South bank of Kṛishṇā river) during this period. In 12th November, Undat-ul-Mulk Asad Khan set out by command to punish the enemy moving on the further side of the river Kṛishṇā. In fact, he went to lay siege to Bhudargarh under Maratha possession.

Bhudargarh stands on a bluff rock, 36 miles south of Kölhāpur. It is situated on one of the six great ridges of the Sahyādri, which stretches east and north east across the Kölhāpur plateau. To the Maratha general Asad Khan himself was despatched to besiege the fort, its strategic importance during Mughal-Maratha war must have been very great.

After laying siege and waiting for some time, it must have become clear to him that it was not possible to take the fort. The Pesāls, Peshaukhs and Nāḍḍādās of Ajrā sub-division took great pains and underwent a lot of hardships in sending constant supplies to the besieged. As it was not possible for Asad Khan to break this line of supply and thus cause complete blockade of the fort, it appears that the Mughals lifted the siege on March 1691.
In April, the Redars in Garh became very strong. They joined hands with the Marathas and started ravaging the Karnātaka territory under the Mughals. Their chief was Bīdāyī Nāyak, well known for his organization and fighting capacity. Aurangzeb had to send armies under his best generals to subdue him. Thus, this affected a further division of the Mughal army in Maharashtra. The Marathas swiftly took the advantage of the situation and invaded Hukerī territory, the western region of the northern Karnātaka. In October, the Marathas captured Chikodi and took away horses and property. Alapna of Hukerī received a threatening letter from Aurangzeb's officer for his treacherous act. However, he was persuaded to accept the Mughal service. The Mughals immediately sent a detachment to that region. The Marathas on their part persuaded the Dīsāī to see Rāmschandra Ragavānt, who was expected to visit Rudharagad shortly. It appears that by January, 1692, the Marathas were able to win over the Dīsāīs of Hukerī. In a letter to the Dīsāīs Yādevrāo and Bhāṅgārā, a Maratha officer at Kolhapur says: ‘Nāpāji Nukdev is sent to you. You must convey your resolve. We are proud of you.’

As the situation was going beyond control of the Mughal officer Inṣāyat ʿAlī, he wrote accordingly to Abūl-Mukarrim, the Ḥawān of Bijāpur. Immediately i.e. by May-
June, a strong force under Jānsīr Khan was sent to that territory to punish the Sarathas.

In January 1622 a Saratha force appeared near Gulbarga. Māmur Khan from Aurangabad, Hāmi Khan faujdār of Ter and Khwāja Sāfar 'Alī of Bhīmānā were asked to co-operate with each others and chastise the Sarathas. In addition to this Siyādat Khan was also asked to go to Gulbarga.

By now, Santāji, with his mobile force alighted in Karnātaka. Jān Nisār Khan and Bahaūr Khan the two sons of Sulābat Khan, were ordered to defend the Karnātaka territory. These two brave generals clashed with Santāji in Karnātaka. A severe battle took place. Many people on either side were killed and wounded. Jān Nisār Khan and Bahaūr Khan both were wounded in the field. With great difficulty they managed to escape. Many other reputed Mughal Sardārs were put to flight. The Sarathas got large share of booty and many Mughal soldiers were made captives. The Saratha Sardār Santāji was well rewarded for the same. He received the rights of Yeeshmukhi of Siraj and other 22 villages. He was handsomely praised and got an extraordinary tribute for the extraordinary courage he showed during this period in defeating the very brave Mughal generals like Shaikh Nizām, Shāma Khan, Rangast Khan and Jān Nisār Khan.
till the rainy season was over there was no noticeable activities in this part. But soon Aurangzeb received reports that Dhanaji and Santaji with an army of 7,000 men seized some forts in Thārwār Belāgam region and invested the city of Belāgam. They caused a lot of damage to the crop. By 27th October, the Maratha leaders left for Thārwār and from there they retired to Nargund, and a small detachment of Marathas were ravaging the territory between Abhuj-Indi. Though Lutfullah Khan, a well-known Mughal general was despatched to that part he did not gain any commendable success.

Aurangzeb was quite disturbed about the news of Karnataka. He ordered Hamid-ud-din Khan to proceed to Belāgam and Matlab Khan to Thārwār. As Hamid-ud-din Khan was proceeding to Thārwār on his way near Athni, Yalbarsh Khan the Mughal thānedār of Athni went to see him. In the meantime the Marathas attacked his post. Seven men from the Mughal side were killed and one was injured. Qasim Khan was reinforced and was ordered to guard Bunkāpur in addition to his existing duties. By middle of November he reached Salhāt. Santaji and Dhanaji were in Poppulpadhn. Qasim Khan reached 20 miles away from them. But it appears that no fight took place. 

A little later Matlab Khan defeated the enemy near Thārwār. By the end of the year 1692, Dhanaji, the Cumbastā of Marsingrao, Jāśirdar of Nulvi, joined the Marathas
and captured the fort of Hubli. But Levaji Managraz
Vesāl of Hubli defeated him with great effort. 209 In
the third week of November Firuz Jang captured Kunjargadh.

In the beginning of January, 1693, Marathas appointed
Veshav Karnā as subahdār of Culkondā-karnātaka with 1000
211 horse and 4000 foot.

Santāji, who had come back triumphant after raising
the siege of Jinji, became active in October, 1693 in
Vijāpur territory. "Hīmsat Ḵān went out in pursuit of
212 Santā and over-tock him about 22nd October. The
Maratha general, at the head of a vastly superior force,
turned at bay at Mandraon (or mandvagaon) and attacked
Hīmsat, whose small column took refuge at the foot of the
village, "the enemy occupying three sides and the Khan
one." Evidently at this stage reinforcements under Ḵamīd-
ud-dīn and Ḵhwāja Ḵān joined Hīmsat, and the Mughals
resumed the chase of the raiders. They gained a signal
victory over Santa and his Berad allies (about 14th November)
at the village of Vikramhali. Two hundred of the Berads
and 300 of Santa's own men were slain, and 300 sarees and
some flags and kettledrums captured by the Mughals, though
they too suffered heavy casualties (akh. 19 Nov.). Then
the Mughal generals quarrelled. Ḵamīd-ud-dīn and Ḵhwāja
Ḵān, taking offence, left Hīmsat Ḵān, gave up the
pursuit and returned towards Bulbarga. Hīmsat alone
followed the enemy. Santa now safely divided his force, detaching 4,000 troopers under Anrit Rao to raid Berar, while he himself marched with 6,000 horsemen towards Walkhed, sending in advance threatening letters to the 'eshmukh of that place to this effect, "for long time past you have not raid the chaush. Send me immediately 7,000 hun." The couriers who brought these letters were arrested by the Mughals and put to death.

Foiled in his object, Santa turned aside to the hills of Torgul (17) in the Berad country, while Himmat Khan halted at Walkhed, not daring to venture into that wild and broken region. In a day or two the elusive Maratha leader was out again and reported to be marching upon Haidrabud. Himmat Khan, now joined by Sayyid Abdullah, was immediately on his track and drove him into the small fort of Alar (14 m.s.w. of Walkhed). This happened about 21st November, 1693."

The next few months, till June, 1694, Karnataka was comparatively quiet. In June, Khān-i-Zamān Bāth Jang from Hidar Bakht's army laid siege to Margund (30 m.N.B. of Thārwār). Bāth Jang tried to take the fort by assault. But the attempt failed; later on he abandoned the siege and in its place Pājān Uwāt Singh of Ursāna was asked to laysiege. The Mughals captured it in November and changed its name to Bahādur-nāsr.
Thus for a period of 4 years, the Maratha forces occupied the Mysore, tied down with all their resources in Karnataka. Though there were no convincingly major battles fought during these years, yet, Aurangzeb himself had to encamp in that territory and detach a few of his best generals to meet the impending attack of the Marathas.

The next year from November, 1694, till October, 1695 was quite peaceful. The Maratha general Santaji had left Maharashtra for Jinji in order to relieve Rājārāma's forces at Jinji.

In October-November, 1695, Santaji came back from Jinji, ravaged the country of Karnataka and was being chased by Himmat Khan, who was entrusted by Aurangzeb to defend the territory of Bijapur.

At this time Aurangzeb, who had encamped at Islamnur, learnt that Santaji after robbing the imperial dominions was hastening with heavy loads to northwest Mysore. Immediately he appointed Safshikhan Khan, Muhammad Murad Khan (the pay master of Prince Rām Baksh's army), Khanāzād Khan (later Ruhullāh Khan II), Sayyid Sālat Khan, Sirza Hasān, the cousin brother of Wāhīdīyār Khan, many Deccani Turārs along with the army of Mubakhs. Though on paper army consisted of 25,000 men, actually about 5,000 men were present. The army composed of such high officers, was assigned the mission of defeating and
destroying Santāji, who had created havoc in the region of Kōdarī. The army was ordered to operate in union with Āsim Khan, who himself also had good standing army and artillery. They joined Āsim Khan about 12 miles from the expected track of the Marathas.

Āsim Khan wished to entertain Khānūzād Khan and other imperial guests he brought out of the fort of Ādori, showy articles like Ṣarmātaki tents not yet used, gold, silver, copper and chinaware of all kind and sent them next day with his own advance tents and those of other amirs at a distance of 6 miles in advance. But then all was not well. Santāji who had close intelligence of the movement of the Surāhal troops, planned his strategy well in advance. He showed the highest tactical power in planning the operation and keeping his divisions in mobile and ready condition, in order to meet any eventuality. He divided his army in three divisions, ensured their timings, and co-operation of the moves in order to achieve the most effective results with minimum use of man power.

The first division went to plunder the advance-camp, the second was ordered to encounter the Surāhal army and the third division was kept in reserve, to meet any emergency. Bhumānpyāyak, the Jasindar of Chitāldurg, who was humbled by Āsim Khan, also joined Santāji with his men.
A little after mid-night the first Maratha division fell upon the advance tents, slew and wounded many and carried off everything. Heavy tents and equipment was set on fire. As soon as the news reached Čāsim Khan, who without waking up Khānāzād Khan from his sleep hastened to the battle. He had not crossed even 4 miles distance, when the second Maratha division fell upon the camp. Khānāzād Khan, who were up with this surprise, left the camp, baggage and porters and advanced quickly to help Čāsim Khan. The Marathas who were estimated to be between 3 to 10 thousand in each division blockaded the passage of Khānāzād Khan, thus he could not reach Čāsim Khan’s help. Čāsim Khan having learnt of this intelligence became desperate. The Marathas had an overwhelming number, black musketeers, known as best marksmen; in addition to it they had also mobile light cavalry. A fierce battle was fought for the whole day. Khānāzād Khan and Čāmade Khan showed tremendous courage while fighting against the Marathas. The whole Mughal army was terror-struck. The Maratha sword was so effective, that at night the Mughal sardārs did not alight their elephants, nor did they allow their horses to take rest, in anticipation of a fresh Maratha attack.

But it was only next morning that the reserve division of the Marathas fell upon the Mughals and looted the baggage. A pitched battle took place. Many were slain.
on both sides. Despite the steadiness of the Mughals and the destruction done by them, the Marathas did not yield one foot of ground or showed the least wavering.

For quite some time, the Mughal soldiers did not have food to eat nor the animals had any fodder. On the other hand, they were being constantly harried by the Marathas. The Mughal garrison shut the door at the fortress to the new force. ²¹⁷ Khānāzād Khan and Āśīna Khan, shared the food they had brought with them and the common soldier had nothing to eat except the water of the tank, not to speak of grass and grains for horses and elephants. As the night closed, the Marathas surrounded the Mughals, who stood ready to fight. But for three days the Marathas only appeared in sight without giving a fight.

On the fourth day after looking for a suitable opportunity, Surānmā Vāya's army attacked the Mughals. Ḍīrūzā Ḥassān and many other sardārs were killed. The Mughals could not even find time to recover their dead bodies due to the constant fear of the Marathas. Ḍūṣyāḥ Khān's son Ḍulādād was wounded. Āśīna Khan and Khānāzād Khan were completely shaken. They held consultation and resolved to go to Lōdērī, where there was a small fort and a tank. ²¹⁸

But it was not an easy task. The Mughal army was completely enveloped by the Marathas. They had to fight
for their way. Only in the evening they were able to
do so and reach in the vicinity of the fort as the
Marathas left changing and retired.

The fort was a small one and its stock of food
grains was also limited. To aggravate the evil the
Muskeeteers fell upon. The Mughal artillery and ammunition
had been already plundered, and what little was
carried with the soldiers was exhausted. In the words of
Cāsir-i-‘Alamgirī, "The troops sat down in helplessness
after running about, after screaming and sighting for some
hours."

The survivors, seeing the gates of the fort closed,
forced their way into it. But the garrison attacked them;
one third of the Mughal soldiers were slain. On the day
after entering the fort, all the soldiers, high and low
alike were given bread of Jowār out of the provisions of
the place and straw to the cattle. On the second day
neither was bread left for the men nor straw for horses.
Men were dying of hunger. The condition of animals was
worse. They chewed each others tails, mistaking them
for straw and the remaining oxen 'lean like the donkey's tail'
were all slaughtered and eaten away by the Mughals. Thus
there was complete starvation. To worsen the situation
the Marathas besieged the fort. Cāsir Khan died shortly
(after 3 days). Cāsir Khan's death depressed the Mughals
still more. Of the common soldiers, many left the fort
and joined the Marathas. The Marathas stripped them off whatever money and gold they had carried. Santāji’s men carried out a roving business and sold the goods to the besieged at fantastically high prices.

Very shortly the food supply was exhausted. The Marathas adopted quite stringent methods in tightening the blockade. The living condition of the Mughals became unwholesome. Then Khānāzād Khan, sent his diwan and a Veccani Sardār to beg for terms of capitulation. Santāji demanded a lakh honzs, besides the elephants, horses, cash and other baggage. A Veccani Sardār instigated Santāji and said, “What are you asking? Raise your terms. Khānāzād Khan alone can pay this amount as his ransom.” At last the ransom was fixed at 20 lakhs rupees.

Santāji’s men collected all the baggage and the animals from the Mughals. The Mughal Sardārs signed the bonds for surety and kept their relations as hostages. The Mughals did not abide by their terms but Santāji strictly adhered to them.

For two days he allowed the Mughal soldiers to come out of the fort, fed them and breathed in them a new life. On the third day Khānāzād Khan started towards Islāmpuri with a Maratha escort.

Thus came to an end the most glorious battle in the
Maratha War of Independence and equally ignominous in the history of Mughal warfare. This battle alone could prove that the Marathas were matchless in planning the battle strategy and conducting it in a most successful manner.

No wonder then the Mughal Sardârs trembled with the mention of the very name of Santâji. But what was more conspicuous about this battle was the magnanimous behaviour of the Maratha general Santâji. By his actions he proved that he was fighting the war against the Mughal aggression, the Muslim invader Aurangzeb and not against the people whom he had hired out because it was possible for him to be cruel, yet he pardoned them and treated them in the hour of their peril, as human beings. Rarely one comes across, a parallel example in the history of the world. And above all what delights one, is that, the whole account of this battle has been recorded by the Muslim biographer of Aurangzeb, Fâqi Mustâd Khan and thus unknowingly he has praised the Maratha general.

Aurangzeb was grieved to learn the miserable fate of his selected army and chosen sardârs. He even did not allow them to come back to see him. Immediately, he ordered Himmât Khan with one thousand cavalry Basavnâtan to proceed to rescue the Mughal army and punish the Marathas.

After the battle of Lodderi, Santâji divided his
army into two divisions. Himmat Khan crossed the distance of about 32 miles and fell upon one of the divisions led by Santāji himself. "On 20th January, 1696, he (Santāji) appeared before Himmat Khan's position at the head of ten thousand cavalry and nearly the same number of infantry. His Karnatakki foot musketeers — the best marksmen in the Deccan, took post on a hill. Himmat Khan, with a very small force advanced to the attack and dislodged them from it, slaying 500 of them. Then he drove his elephant towards the place where Santā was standing, when suddenly he was shot by a bullet in the forehead and fell down unconscious into the hawda. His driver wanted to turn the elephant back, but the captain of his contingent (Jasdar) Ali Bāqi, told the driver "The Khan is alive. Urge the elephant onwards. I shall drive the enemy back." But, he too was wounded, thrown down to the ground and carried off by the enemy. Then his son fell fighting. Santā received two arrow wounds. The leaderless imperialists fell back to their trenches. After some days the Marathas went away with the captured baggage.

The news reached Aurangzeb about Himmat Khan's miserable plight. On 22nd January, 1696, Hamid-ud-din Khan was ordered to join Himmat Khan and relieve him at Basavpatan. But by 26th January, Aurangzeb received the news of Himmat Khan's casualty. Basavpatan which was besieged by Santāji's troops was being defended by Sayyid
Hamātullāh and Muḥammad Izz. On first February Hamīd-ud-dīn Khān started from Adoni, with 12,000 men. After about 20 miles march he was attacked by Santaji’s troops. This happened on 26th February. But the Marathas were driven away. The Maratha camp was looted.

On 6th March 1696 Santaji attacked him again. But the Marathas were repulsed. Many Marathas were killed and wounded.

In the meantime, Aurangzeb ordered Prince Bīdār Bākht, “to proceed to the relief of Basavpatan, who was then busy at Āmnālī. But by the time Bīdār Bākht reached Chitaldurg and Basavpatan, the Maratha General had already left that territory to meet Sulīfīār Khān at Jinji. He ordered Hamīd-ud-dīn Khān to go on the pursuit of Santaji. Later on he was asked to remain at Bālāghat.

Thus virtually after March, 1696, the Marathas did not come back to that territory and hence Karnatak ceased to be any more a theatre of war for the Marathas. It had served its purpose as originally intended by the ‘War Council’ of the Marathas. Though in June Marathas again appeared near Tanjorein. In July, the Marathas threatened Sadāshiv Naik, the ‘esāi of Sondhe, for payment of revenue to the Mughals. He was urged to pay the revenue to the Marathas, as the Mughals would be destroyed at any time.
The sinking of year 1697 and the dawn of new year struck a great blow to the cause of Swarajya. Raja Ram at Jinji had to bow before the increased Mughal power and the intensive siege of Jinji fort. He well knew that the mission at Jinji was over and any overstay there would result in his destruction and ultimately of the Maratha kingdom also. In a hurry he had to leave that place for Maharashtra. And he acted upon it faster than his opponents could think about his moves. He was well ahead of them and reached safely at Vishalgadh in February 1698.

Though the king arrived safely back to the land of Maharashtra, yet Marathas lost the precious fort of Jinji to the Mughals. In a way the established government over there was thrown away and for a while people were again startled at the fate of the king and his kingdom. But then they only had to wait for some more time and the events that followed, were to prove how unfounded was their fear.

On the other hand the Mughal army at Jinji had an occasion to celebrate the victory of Jinji. As they were rejoicing, the news of fall of Jinji reached Aurangzeb at Islampuri. He no doubt rewarded his generals and army men lavishly, yet he was not happy over it. How could he have been? For past seven years he had sent his best generals, large army, a great amount of wealth and had
diverted all the resources to fight against Marathas, to capture their fountain-head, the king Bājārām. But in disgust he learnt that much before his generals could lay hand on the fort of Jinji, the Maratha king had escaped to the heights of safety. He hopelessly learnt that it was much beyond the capacity of Mughals hands to arrest him. So also it was beyond the power of Mughal sword to kill. Thus his dream of putting this very powerful source of Maratha energy, the nearest of infidels, on the anvil of salvation remained unfulfilled. What added insult to the injury was that the Maratha king had come back to Maharashtra in order to give fight to him more openly than ever. He had mustered greater courage in showing such daacity to the Emperor of Hindustan, a descendant of Taimur, the greatest warrior, Emperor Aurangzeb. Though worn out with the signs of age and decay, yet he was not willing to accept this humiliating situation. At heart he was still young. Accepting the realities of the situation would have defeated the very mission of his life.

Therefore, much against the wish of many of his generals, sardārs and followers he decided to continue the war with greater enthusiasm than ever. Now in spite of the old age, he took upon himself to lead his armies once again into the battle fields.

On the other hand though the Marathas did suffer the
loss of Jinji yet, they wisely followed the events. By now the Maratha leadership well knew the incapacity of any major retaliation by the Mughal forces. The Mughal army had become weary and sick of wars in Maharashtra. During the last 17 years they hardly had any time to repose. The dissensions and personal rivalries among the Mughal generals were even on increase. The commands given by Aurangzeb very hardly obeyed to its fullest extent. By now a huge number of men had lost their lives in these battles. Much of the resources of the Mughal Empire had exhausted. The villages had become desolate and local inhabitants hardly owed their loyalty to the invading army. Those Maratha sardars who had joined the Mughals had the sole intention of personal benefits and prosperity. As long as it suited them, they sided with the Mughals. When Mughal orders ran counter to their self-interest, they, without any hesitation, deserted the Mughal service. By now the Mughal army, exhausted and exasperated, had grown quite thin. A large number of well known generals were slain in these battles. And yet the menace of Marathas had not reduced a bit. Their sole purpose of this sacrifice was being defeated.

And the Marathas were quick enough to grasp this situation. They looked back upon their past. They were convinced that they effectively withstood such an onslaught. Though their losses both in manpower and material were by
no means less. Yet the determination to fight the
aggression had not withered away. They did not become
weary and sick of war. They mustered more courage in
order to fight more vehimently. By now they had gained
sufficient confidence that no single large army of the
Mughals could wipe them out. They were capable of facing
the guns with all the confidence of a soldier. This
brought a total change in their outlook towards the pre­
sent war. This gave them a new vision and vigour. They
were more inspired and thus their morale was boosted very
high. From now onwards their role was changed. From
defensive role they chose offensive one and planned a new
strategy of war, a strategy which finally humbled the
great Mughal armies and forced them to retreat, even though
they feigned to be victorious.

C. AURANGZEB'S FIERCE DETERMINATION

It was in the 43rd reignal year (1698-99) of Aurang­
zeb's reign that the Maratha armed contingents started
raiding the territory under Mughal faujdars. By now
Aurangzeb was well over 80 years of age, yet the years
did not wear out his fierce determination of destroying
the Marathas. The news of Marathas becoming powerful and
raiding the country under his possession gave a great blow
to his prestige. For a little while he might have thought
that the mission of his life had failed. The Marathas
rightly took the advantage of the situation. The generals of Aurangzeb had started paying lip-service to Aurangzeb and before executing the commands issued by Aurangzeb, within a short time they would turn away. They were more after repose than making any fierce battle. By now a stage had reached when the line of loyal obedient and brave generals had become quite thin; as a result, the old age of Aurangzeb and his policy of continued warfare greatly weighed upon their minds. No doubt Aurangzeb himself was aware of the phenomenal consequences of his policy, yet nothing under the Sun could turn him away from his objective. When he saw his generals were not obedient enough and were not commanding the armies in the battlefield properly and when they were being repeatedly defeated by the Marathas, many a time at the hands of small forces, then he took upon himself to command them to victory. In the words of Khāli Khan, we can read his mind in a very clear way when he says, "The shelter of this mean community was the forts. Those should be captured and thus the community was to be uprooted."

Thus at the age of eighty, when most of the men at that age think of grave and God, Aurangzeb, with the enthusiasm of an energetic young man, planned a new strategy of war, i.e. capturing all the hill forts from the Marathas under his own command. He organized his army once again.

For last four years i.e., since 21st May 1695,
Aurangzeb had encamped at Islāmpuri. Most of his generals and army men had settled down well. They had built the houses and were enjoying most of the amenities of life. A wall was built round the camp in order to give added protection to the men. For long the Mughal soldiers were under the impression that Aurangzeb would launch a new campaign and at far away places. But alas, they received a jolt when Aurangzeb announced his intention of marching through the hilly tracks of Tāhādri range and capturing the forts under Maratha possession. The first fort Aurangzeb thought of capturing was Vasanṭgadh. The Mughal army blew its trumpet of march from Islāmpuri on 19th October 1699.

Meanwhile, immediately after the fall of Jinji, Aurangzeb recalled Sulṭān Qā/INFO Khan. He left that territory via Arcot for Islāmpuri. On 22nd February 1699, Bājahān, with his long marches and successful escape arrived at Khelnā. On 2nd April, 1699, Bīdār Pakht was sent to Panhālū to punish the Marathas.

From March-April till November there do not seem to have taken place any major events. At least the records are silent. In November-December, Bīdār Pakht was chasing the Maratha army under Bhanājī at Khelnā.

Early in 1699 Bājahān set out on a tour of inspection in Konkan, visiting all his forts, returned to Sāṭārā, at
the end of June, whence he went to Vasanthapura about 20th July.\textsuperscript{232} Here \textbf{Hujjaram} and his followers seem to have planned future course of action. But then it is difficult to know what exactly was this plan. The inference that is drawn from the events which took place about this time, it seems that \textbf{Hujjaram}, planned to march into the territory of \textbf{Berar}, then cross the Narasara river and attack the Mughal territory in the North India. At the same time, the king of Tejgadh, who had embraced Islam deserted the Mughal shelter for repeated atrocities committed by the Mughals in his territory. He extended an invitation to \textbf{Hujjaram} to join hands with him in order to defeat the Mughals, their common enemy. \textbf{Hujjaram} readily accepted the offer and appeared with his army in that territory. \textbf{Narayanibab} immediately ordered Prince \textbf{Dajur Pakht} to proceed to that territory.\textsuperscript{233} Even \textbf{Kiran Jang}, who was engaged in fight with Hedars, was asked to make peace with them and was hastened to go to Tejgadh to punish the joint forces of \textbf{Dajur} of Tejgadh and the \textbf{Marathas}.\textsuperscript{234} \textbf{Hujjaram} ravaged the territory of \textbf{Berar} and got a lot of equipment and cash.

While the famous \textbf{Maratha} \textbf{Sardar} \textbf{Jasoji Shinde} and \textbf{Tanaji Jadhav}, with a large army arrived at Berhapur and besieged that city. For three days \textbf{Najibat Khan} and other Mughal officers were fighting the \textbf{Marathas}. Later on the \textbf{Maratha} army left for \textbf{Hijagadh}. Their intention
was to cross the Sambadé river at Habbapur and thus in-
vade Malwá. But Firuz Jang who was present in that
region did not permit them. He chastised the Marathas.
The Marathas with eight thousand army turned to Mandurbar
Targana. They ravaged that country. Hussain 'Ali Khan
was the Thásadár of Thúlner. He bravely fought the Marathas,
but he was hopelessly outnumbered. A pitched battle took
place. Three hundred of Hussain 'Ali Khan’s men lay dead,
his himself was wounded. He jumped down from the elephant
and was captured by the Marathas.

Maratha army got a lot of equipment, horses and ele-
phants and war material. A sum of Rs. two lakhs was
demanded as ransom from Hussain 'Ali Khan and was paid by
him.235 victoriously, thus Marathas returned.

By now Bajrás who was at Sátárá received the secret
intelligence of Aurangzéb's campaign of capturing the
hill-forts. He quietly removed his family from Sátárá
to Balsám. Bajrás planned a march towards Condavana.
But he did not embark on it. On 26th October, he left
Sátárá for Chandan Vandan in order to lead the northern
campaign. In his new undertaking he was accompanied by
veteran Maratha commanders like, Bajnáji Chinde, Khanderào
Thábde, Barúji Shire and Saiyábráo Sáibékar. Bajnáji, Sáichandrapant, Vádo Válmír and other generals with seven
thousand strong force accompanied him up to Chandan Vandan.
While Bajnáji Ghorpade was left behind to guard the territory
of Sátárá, with a brave force of 4 thousand men. At Chandan
Vandhan he halted for three days. Another contingent of 12,000 troops joined him. After Basora on 31st October, Mājārām rode the horse, towards Surat, which later on was to prove as the last campaign of his life. Unlike the days of Shivaji, the news of his intended campaign did not remain a secret. The country which was infested with the Mughal spies speedly brought the news at Aurangzeb’s camp.

Aurangzeb immediately issued urgent orders to Prince Bīdār Bakht, who was at that time 25 miles west of Dīrāj to go in pursuit of the Maratha force. Tullīqār Khān, who was in Karnātaka region was also asked to rush with his army and join Prince Bīdār Bakht. Tullīqār Khān left his baggage at Sholāpur and joined the Prince Bīdār Bakht at Chārthāna, and also Shīn Qulī Khān was ordered to proceed. He was in Aurangābād at that time.

Bīdār Bakht’s army fell upon the Marathas near Nārānpur. Mājārām, who had encamped 6 miles away from the main force, detached Tānājī with his force to stop the march of Bīdār Bakht’s army. A fierce battle took place, the losses in dead and injured were quite heavy on both the sides. Finally the Maratha army was defeated. The Marathas then marched towards Aḥmadnagar. According to Bhimsen, Tānājī with his men raided the imperial camp at Islāmānur unsuccessfully. Meanwhile, Tullīqār Khān, who returned to Islāmānur, successfully drove away the Marathas.
Chin Gulich Khan joined Sidir Bakht at Farsi (near Farsana). By 22/23 November, they reached Ausa in pursuit of the Maratha army. and returned to Aurangzeb after a month. Rājārā, with his troops arrived near Sātārā, with the intention of proceeding to Visnālgad. Thus came to an end Rājārā's last campaign, without any results. But it was of great consequence to the Marathas war on the whole, as it gave impetus to the other Maratha chieftains to fight the Mughals, wherever it was possible for them. By now the Marathas divided their army into small divisions under various sardars and spread into various parts of Maharashtra, with the result that it became difficult for the Mughals to oppose them every now and then and run after them without any tangible results or measurable gains.

Soonji Cherapade harried the Mughals at Sārārācād (Parād) and Sānpol. Here Soonji's strong men joined him. Hamid-ud-din Khan, who was detached from Sātārā by Aurangzeb, arrived there with a large army. A great battle ensued. The Marathas outnumbered him. Many soldiers were slain and finally, seeing his doom close, the shan was fast on his heels and retreated ignominously at Nasur. This happened on 20-21st December.

To the good fortune of Hamid-ud-din Khan, Tulfiqār Khan, with his army rushed to his rescue. He arrived at Nasur near about 27/10 January 1700. A fierce battle took
place between the Maratha forces under the leadership of Thanaji, Manoji and Manvantarao on the one hand and Zulficar Khan's army on the other. Marathas lost 900 in killed. The Marathas retreated from there. Later on Thanaji attacked the Mughal post at Thanapur and carried away Avji Adhal, the Mughal officer. Though Zulficar Khan arrived there, but it was too late for him to do anything.

On 26th January he met Thanaji near Undirpahan (19 m. s. of Darenda). Marathas lost about 100 men and left that territory.

Shimson in his account relates that Zulficar Khan with his army moved into the territory of Thanapur, Malud, and Gomjotri chasing the Marathas. From there he proceeded to Hyderabad, viz. Endhri, Anglapithan, Hirkali, Ahti, Darende, Nanded, Ausa and Undhir on his way. He fought many a pitched battles with the Marathas, who were led by Thanaaji.

At this time Manoji Ghorpade and Thanaaji had decided to meet at Almele for reconciliation. Zulficar Khan, who received the intelligence of the Maratha movements rushed to Almele. Thanaaji bravely attempted to stop the Mughal army, which was on his pursuit. At Beedabad, a place on the bank of Shima, Thanaaji joined Manoji, it is estimated that Manoji was in command of 35 thousand Maratha troops, where the Mughal troops under Zulficar Khan were
estimated to be only 300. (Phimseh's exaggeration looks
to be limitless). He continues and describes that the
Marathas attacked the right flank of the Mughal division.
But the attack was successfully repulsed. And the Marathas
were put to flight. A large number of Marathas were
killed and innumerable were wounded. At this time the
Salapat joined the rear division of the Mughals.

Similarly, Phimsee recorded another incident in which
Marathas were put to flight by Sultang Khan across the
Shima river and conceited the imperial camp. From there
the Marathas left for the territory of Faginera.

Aurangzeb who had left Isapuri on 14th October
1699 for the campaign of Vasantra, reached Miraj in
twenty days. Prince Muhammed Shah who was summoned from
Begun joined him there. At the same time Kuglun Khan
and Masud-ud-din Khan were ordered to ravage the
territory of Jangala and Atara.

By rapid marches the Mughal army reached Farah.
After a brief halt over there, Aurangzeb arrived at Basur,
6 miles away from Vasantra. The Mughal army encamped
there.

Immediately the orders were issued to Sardiyat Khan,
the Chief of Artillery to dig the trenches and he was put
in charge of the siege work. He carried the artillery
equipment under the gate of the fort and placed guns opposite it in order to destroy the Marathas. The Marathas faced the attack bravely. They did not care for the Mughal cannonade, nor the showering fire of their guns. They in turn counter-attacked the besieging army by their guns and muskets. With their bravery and courageous counter-attack, the conquest of the fort looked to be a remote possibility.

Aurangzeb, having learnt the miserable plight of his soldiers, ordered his tent to be pitched within two miles from the fort and thus gave a hope and courage to the army who had already lost their heart. In spite of the infirmity of the old age, the determination displayed by Aurangzeb on this occasion is really commendable. Here in once again, and beyond doubt, by his own utterance that the mission of his life was to exterminate the infidels (i.e. Hindus), convinces us that he was a fanatic of an extreme order. He was not prepared to spare his life, leaving apart the others, in order to put in practice his fanaticism. No wonder mankind has always paid dearly for such extreme acts of religious fanatics. No also on this occasion, many innocent people, without knowing the real purpose sacrificed their lives.

After great bloodshed, the terms of capitulations were offered. The Maratha Cuiidâr, who having seen that, it was beyond his capacity to retain the fort in the face
of large army, agreed to hand over the fort after receiving a large sum. His men, womenfolk on the fort, and the equipment was allowed to go out of the fort unmolested.

Thus Aurangzeb captured Vasantgadh on 25th November 1699. The fort was renamed as Hilid-i-fath, the key of the victory. But it was an irony of the fate that now onwards started the real tragedy of the Mughal invasion of the Deccan. In fact, the conquest could rightly be described more appropriately as the key of destruction, rather than the victory. It was a success disillusioned, and subsequent events bear enough evidence to this.

* TRAGEDY OF VASTRA - A TRAGEDY*

After the capture of Vasantgadh, Aurangzeb with his army left for Satara on 7th December 1699. He crossed the Krishna river and reached Parnaj and on 24th December, the Mughals pitched their tents with a regular wall and a compound.

The fort of Satara is 11 hundred yards in length and in width six hundred yards, in height it is about 900 feet from the surrounding region and tapers in a triangular form at its top. It has got two main gates, one on the northern side and the other on the southern side, northeast of the fort is Vankali Gate. It is situated on 93' steep rocks and over it was built a stone wall of 18 feet high in order to give adequate protection from the guns of the invaders.
Nurangzeb knowing the topography of the fort, ordered Tarbiyat Khan to dig the trenches and carry the guns to the suitable elevations, from where they could be effectively operated. It was indeed a difficult task as the land was completely rocky, yet with the help of Mirāchand and Fulā, he accomplished the task of digging the trenches and raising the rafts and platforms. In a short time the monstrous guns were carried to these selected places.

As this was being done Nurangzeb posted Prince Azam and Phudabandā Khan to be in the western side of the fort, Tarbiyat Khan was positioned before Ranaulāi Gate, Yunim Khan was asked to be on his right, Sahulīn Khan was made in charge of the southern gate assisted by Munsur Khan, who was in charge of Jeccani artillery. Thus the most important generals under the command of large army were ordered to surround the fort and keep watch on the Varathnas. Strict orders were issued to enforce blockade of the fort from all sides.

The Varatha Guiledār on the fort was Subhānji. He was fully aware of the danger to which the fort and his men were exposed. Also were the order Varathna leaders like Ramchandrarant and Parsurām Trībāk, aware of the siege of the fort and expecting attack. They were preparing themselves with a resolve to fight. On 22nd December, Parsurām Sant wrote to Vithoji Fābar Bāshmukh of Jaryāt
The news that Shāhjāhān was at Sīnnāpur and was organizing a large army in order to march against Aurangzēb. The fear of this news spread among the enemy camp. The grace of God is being defeated. The enemy is not to be feared for. Vitnūji was asked to recruit more men in order to continue the fight. Similar orders were issued to Uro Vitthal the vālvād of Pānmālī to attack Aurangzēb's troops.

Shānaḍjīrāōk, Yāvājīrāōk and Vānājīrāōk Pundēthār have already gone to Yātārā. Submānīji Pundēthār with his men were posted at Ambavālā that in order to guard the passage.

Shānājīrāōk Jādav, Yalānār rāo, Vemājī Chīnīde, Yarsājī Shōnālī and many other prominent generals, who were carrying on the operations, across the hillā, were recalled to break the siege. In order to blow up the concentration of the vēsāl forces near Yātārā, Barathas, deployed 15,000 strong men under the generalship of Vānājī Gorōnadā and Jādav rāo in the territory of Chandan Vandal.

The qilīadar had managed to keep a few guns in readiness and also the storage of necessary supplies, which would be required if the siege was prolonged. In the words of 'Āgāh Mustāfa, "there were brave people on the fort. To their sacrifice of their lives was a most trifling thing. They were capable of charging rockets, small rifles and many other firearms like Hakkā, Chāddar and Satwaal."
Such was the preparation of the Maratha forces besieged by Aurangzeb. The Dughal army was innumerable and at any time it was capable of outnumbering the besieged Maratha force. They were in possession of superior arms, better equipment, plenty of ammunition and above all big guns which were capable of blowing up the mountains and cause devastating effects. The Dughal forces had gathered around Sathara to vanquish the Marathas.

In this way the siege commenced. The Dughal tightened up siege effort on all sides and would thus exhaust the Marathas. The Maratha parrison would open fire from the fort on the besieging Dughal army. The retaliation by the Dughal soldiers was massive. They would fire the guns. But due to lack of accurate aim, it amounted to only the wastage of ammunition rather than creating any deterring effects on the Maratha parrison. On 17th December, Aurangzeb under his personal supervision launched an attack but with little success.

On the other hand field forces of the Marathas under Bhagaji and Shankaraji made frequent attacks on the besieging army. Creeping parties had to have strong escorts as Marathas would frequently attack them. They ravaged the country surrounding Dughal camp and would not permit grain to reach the Dughals nor forage for their animals. They attacked the outposts of the Dughals and
captured Ghori Khan, the faujdar of Bararbad, though rescued by Hamid-ud-din Khan later. On 27th December Ikhlas Khan was encircled by Chorpadar (Chorpade) in the vicinity of the Signal camp. He and his son were killed to death. So also many other soldiers were killed. The Marathas appeared in small batches on all sides of the besieging Mughal army. They used to fall upon them with lightning speed, and equally fast they used to disappear from the range of the Mughal guns. Thus throughout the siege the Marathas could frequently go inside the fort and come out with equal ease. And this was more true, when the contemporary records suspect Prince Azam's connivance from the fort gate, the territory which he was supposed to guard.

On 11th December, at night, the Marathas came out of the fort and attacked the division under Munim Khan. A pitched battle took place. The Mughals successfully turned away the Marathas with huge losses of manpower. A similar attack was launched by the Marathas on the night of 16th December. Two prominent Mughal sardars faced the attack. Munim Khan and Satvaji Laphale's son Bajirao showed great valour. Munim Khan was injured and the Marathas were repulsed.

These activities of Marathas created devastating effects on the Mughals. Firstly all the supplies of food
grains and the forage from outside was stopped. The food prices in the Mughal camp shot up very high and thus they were forced to starve. Similar was the condition of their animals. This greatly demoralised the fighting Mughals. And there was an echo of all this, that they should abandon the siege. The resultant situation was that they themselves were besieged.

On 10th January, 1700, three most prominent sardars, Tufiqr Khan, Bahadurband Khan and Hasid-ud-din Khan, were sent to meet Maratha army under Thanaji, Panjamantrao and Ranoji, beyond Sagimathpur. The Marathas had 15,000 strong force. According to the Mughal estimates (Akburarat) five hundred Marathas fell in the battlefield. The Maratha losses are not known. But it can be fairly estimated that the casualties on their part must have been equally heavy.

On 27th January, Thanaji captured the Mughal faujdar of Behapur and thus made their position secure in Chandan Mandan and stopped the Mughal communication to the North.

Thus in early months of siege, Marathas gave a determined fight and indeed caused fright in the rank and file of the Mughal army. Some Mughal sardars seeing the precarious condition raised a cry of abandoning the siege. But Aurangzeb was a matchless military leader. These attacks of the Marathas did not make any impression on him. He looked to be more determined than ever before. He gave
up his plan of spending month at Tholapur and took upon himself to guide the operations.

He ordered Ith-ullah Khan and Mahbullah Khan to take their batteries up to the main gate of the fort. trenches were dug near the fort. Aukhalis Khan and Mustaq-ud-din Khan with a few thousand foot soldiers and Karnatak musketeers were ordered to be at the foot of the fort. 253

The chief of Mughal artillery, Farbiiyat Khan raised his gun platform 24 yards high, to the level of the bastion of the fort gate. In procuring materials for it, not a tree was left standing within thirty or forty kia of Satara. Eight thousand sacks were taken from the grain market and filled with sand to form a bulwark round it. Three hundred oxen were set to transport timber for the battery. But the stones showered by the enemy made further progress impossible. Creers were then issued to fill the empty chests of the public treasury and of the money changers with stone and sand and line the battery with them. 150 water carriers being posted there to put out fires promptly. 254

The Mughal army generals were taking tremendous efforts to secure the fort. But they had little success. The Maratha opposition within the fort under its veteran dileran Subhanji was more than formidable. Whenever the
harrison had an opportunity to retaliate, it never wasted it.

This brought a great despair in the Mughal camp. The chief of artillery, Tarbiyat Khan, dug a mine, with great effort. It was 24 yards long and reached under the fort wall. The Mughal plan was to breach the fort wall and carry on assault. But under the circumstances it was considered impracticable and thus given up. Immediately, a surprise attack, by 200 Havle, who were known for their skill in hill climbing in the Mughal army, was carried. These Havle were paid three years pay in advance, as an incentive for successful accomplishment of the task. But the Marathas, who had spread their spying in the Mughal camp, received the intelligence much before the actual hour of operations. They were all waiting in readiness. The attack was launched a little before the dawn on 23rd January. It was met with equal firmness by the Marathas and thus both the element of surprise and the attack failed.

During this period, Maratha troops in small divisions were carrying out their surprise attacks on the Mughal lines of siege. On the night of 1st April, a division of Maratha army, marched from Farali. It was effectively checked by the Mughal generals Mughulshan and Pathullah Khan. The next day 300 men from the garrison of
the fort gallied forth. They attacked the besieging Mughal troops and spoiled all the siege work. They lost five in killed and were repulsed. Fath-ullah Khan was wounded in the clash.

As Aurangzeb came to know about the failure of surprise attack by Havlas, he immediately ordered Fath-ullah Khan and Rajghar Khan to run another trench from the side of the gate of the fort. On 15th March, they carried it under the revani and within about a month completed the work. It was the night of 12th April, 1700, dark and cool, the Mughal army, including cavalry, infantry, artillery, Phaschauki, Afghan and Chakhkar men, Pratapgarh troops and the brave generals like Hamid-ud-din Khan and Jukhles Khan took their positions for a desperate battle the next morning. The sky was clear and the cool wind was blowing. Opposite Mangalai gate, the Mughal troops formed in a battle array. A potentially destructive mine 24 yards in length was laid under the fort wall, by the chief of Mughal artillery to hurl destruction into the bosom of their foes. The midnight storm wailed its mournful requiem over the sleeping host. The hostile host were at but a cannon shot from each other. Indomitable determination inflamed the souls of Maratha officers and soldiers. It was an awful night, the harbinger of a still more awful day. The dark morning of 13th April, had not yet dawned when the fuse of first mine was lit. We can well imagine
what havoc it must have created. It was terrific. The very earth shook beneath the tremendous detonation. It created an un-interrupted roar of the most deafening and appalling thunder. The Marathas who were in the region of explosion presented themselves unprotected to the flying missiles of stones from the exploded wall. The air was soon so filled with smoke that the day was as dark as the night. Under this black and sulphurous canopy the infuriated Mughal soldiers rushed in. Horsemen plunged to the charge. Prayagji Rathi, the havildar of the fort was buried alive under the debris of the wall.

A few minutes passed, as both the sides were plunged into utter confusion, the second mine was blown up by the skilled Mughal artillery men. Like the previous one it made enormous sound and blew up a large portion of the wall. But unlike the previous one, this time the hills of clay and stones were showered on thousands of Mughals, who were already in forward march. Two thousand were buried instantly under the ground. The bodies of wounded and the dead covered the plain. Many of the torn and bleeding victims were trampled by the rush of frenzied charges. The piercing shrieks rose above the roar of explosion. Prominent among the dead were Sakhi Khan, Sayyid Shamasud-din Khan, Shaeed Khan Lodhi, Asad-ud-din Ahmad and Muhammad Basir.
The explosion caused a 70-yard breach in the fort wall. With a disastrous second explosion there was none from the Mughal army to assault the Marathas who were defenceless. It was so sudden that it stunned the Mughal soldiers so much that they were paralysed of any action. Prayāgji's body was removed from the debris and surprisingly he was still alive uninjured. The loss of the Marathas was comparatively less. They recovered from the shock speedily and charged the Mughals. Meanwhile they started speedily repairing the walls. Thus the plan was upset. All the Mughal efforts were undone in a twinkling. Speedily the news was carried to Aurangzeb. He rushed to the scene and condoled the crying and ailing army men. He issued orders to Sar-afraz Khan to take the men and make fresh efforts to attack. Next day Banliā infantry men, who lost many of their relatives, on seeing that it was impossible to extract their dead bodies, secretly set fire to the whole wooden work. And it is reported that the fire continued for seven days, the flames consuming Hindus and Muslims alike. The whole siege work was in flames, so also the surrounding area was ablaze. An eye-witness has described it that nearly two thousand men awfully torn by explosion were prostrate upon bloodstained earth. A wall of anguish rose, which froze the heart of the beholder with terror. Fragments of projectiles, guns, swords, horses dead or cruelly mangled, neighing, plunging, shrieking in their agony presented
a scene of unparalleled horror. and still the battle continued.

After the disastrous explosion and a big breach in the fort wall, the condition of the Maratha Qiladar became quite precarious. The Qiladar Subhānji was fighting the fort more on moral courage than on any material supply of the things. During the siege since December till April, the stocks of food grains which were stored were consumed, there was not much of external supply, though Shankarajji Pant, once replenished the stocks from Parali. Secondly, the frequent attacks of the Mughals had adversely affected the manpower on the fort. The breach in the fort wall was irreparable. Day by day the Marathas were being exposed to the guns of their enemies. Considering the situation and possible defeat, the Qiladar decided to surrender the fort. He sent a word to Rāmchandra Pant and Shankarajji Pant about it. Rāmchandra Pant and Shankarajji Pant through Bājji Pandit and Abājji Pandit respectively sent for the terms of capitulations to Prince Hazar. The Prince in turn, got the sanction for the same from Aurangzeb. On 31st April, 1700, the Marathas vacated the fort. The Marathas were permitted to go out un molested. The Mughals secured seven guns, five rehkalas, nine gandumak guns 14 mounds of gun powder and 71 rockets. The Qiladar Subhānji, also joined the Mughal service. As the fort was secured through the negotiations of the Prince Hazar it was named as Naujantārā.
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<td>13</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>The last name Rāniā Ghorpare identified by J. Sarkar appears to be incorrect. Rāniā, it is suggested can be read as Bālyā, which may originally be Nāloji, as it is common practice with the Persian writers to write the names like that for example, they have written, Santyā for Santāji, Koyatyā for Mohite, etc.</td>
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</table>
HGR, p. 265 suggests name of Shamji Rao Bunde as Matri, Mirāji Rāmāji as chief justice, Santāji Chorpade as commander-in-chief and also includes Srikarāchārva Kalgaonkar as Pandit Rao, the last one was certainly not a ministerial post.

SCP, p. 35.

Martin's Diary. As quoted in HS, p. 237.

Martin's Diary. As quoted in HS, p. 238.

Martin's Diary. As quoted in HS, p. 239.


SCP, pp. 35-36.
37 HA, p. 352.
38 HA, pp. 354-55.
40 HA, p. 316.
41 Appendix A No. 165.
42 HA, Vol. V, p. 76.
43 HA, p. 350.
46 HS, p. 242.
50 Martin’s Diary. As quoted in HS, p. 242.
51 Martin’s Diary. As quoted in HS, p. 243.
52 Martin’s Diary. As quoted in HS, p. 243.
53 Appendix A No. 166.
54 Martin’s Diary. As quoted in HS, pp. 243-44.
55 Martin’s Diary. As quoted in HS, p. 244.
56 Appendix A No. 167.
57 SCP, p. 36.
58 KK, p. 115.
59 KK, p. 416.
60 SCP, p. 36 and Appendix A No. 169.
61 Appendix A No. 168 and 170.

HA, p. 357 maintains it was Santaji who captured Ismail Khan Makh. SCP, Vol. V, No. 778, p. 23 and
J.S. p. 36 states it was chanji who captured Ismail Khan. Evidently the name has been mistaken in Persian sources.

62 Martin’s Diary. As quoted in HS, p. 246.
63 HA, p. 357.
65 SCP, p. 36.
71 Martin’s Diary. As quoted in HS, pp. 246-49.
72 Martin’s Diary. As quoted in HS, p. 248.
73 Appendix A No. 171 and MM p. 119.
75 SCP, p. 36.
76 SCP, p. 37. The date given is 23rd April 1693.
77 SCP, p. 36.
78 SCP, p. 37.
79 SCP, p. 37.
80 SCP, p. 37.
81 This fort is 18 miles north of Pondicherry and 6 miles east of Tidivanan.
NOTE ON THE DATE OF CAPTURE OF JINJI BY THE MUGHALS

(1) According to S.I., p. 391, Jinji was captured by the Mughals on 16th Shābān, 1109 (16th February, 1698).

I do not know from where Sarkar has borrowed the date 6th Shābān, which according to him is 7th February.
Apparently it seems that Sarkar, incorrectly read 6 for 16th Shaban (H. of A. Vol. V. p. 108). Therefore, Sardesai and Pagadi, both have repeated the same mistake, i.e., fall of Jinji on 7th February (6th Shaban).

(2) According to Gadadhari Praihad Shakavali (S.C.P. p. 66) it was taken by Zulfiqar Khan on Paush (Ed) 12, 9.1619 (the day of Sankranti- 30th December, 1697). Thus, there is a radical difference between the dates of the above two sources. According to Bhimsen, an eye witness (Bilkash 130a) the fort fell on Sankranti, which according to Sarkar would correspond to 2nd or 31st January. There is one more source, Madras Diary of 2nd January, 1698, which says, "A letter from Amir Jahan from the Mughal camp received today advises that the Nawab has taken the Jinji fort all but one which also offers to capitulate" (H. of A. Vol. V, p. 108 - Foot Note). Another source, Letters to Fort St. George, p. 6 as quoted in HGR pp. 346-47, says "that Zulfikar Khan had taken Cingee and became absolute master of the country and also warned the fort St. David authorities to be very careful and be prepared for an attack". This letter was written on 5th January.

(3) From the above sources, it appears that, Madras Diary, Fort St. George and Bhimsen are very close to exactness in giving the date as mentioned in C. I. Shakavali. Therefore, I am inclined to believe the date of this
incident i.e. the date of the fall of Jija is 30th December 1697.

102 MA, p. 326.
103 KIS, No. 3, p. 5.
104 Appendix A No. 157.
105 MA, p. 331.
106 SCS, Vol. XII, No. 83, p. 25.
107 Appendix A, No. 158.
108 Appendix A No. 159.
110 Appendix A No. 160.
111 Appendix A No. 161.
112 MA, p. 331, SCP, p. 35, gives the date as 4th November.
113 Appendix A No. 162.
114 MA, Vol. V, p. 32. Sarkar has supported it by Bhismen's Dilkashā.
115 SCS, Vol. VI No. 112, p. 76.
117 Appendix A2 No. 12.
118 MA, p. 332.
119 SJA, No. 780, p. vii.
120 Appendix A No. 163.
122 SCP, p. 36.
According to Sarkar, the date of attack is 25th May.
J.S. p. 36 gives 20th May (S.162 Vaish. B.12). Sarkar also mentions that this is the first signal victory of the Marathas. There are two Marathi letters written by Ramchandra Milkanth to Mārne Deshmukh of Kuthakhore and Haibatrāo Siliskar Deshmukh Tal. Gunjan Māwal dt. 6 May, 1690 (S. 1612 Vaish. A.8). It states that the fort of Sāi, Pratāpgadh and other forts have been taken by the Marathas, though J.S. mentions this incident after 25th May. Therefore, it creates doubt in our minds, if taking of Sāi, Pratāpgadh and other forts was not the first major victory of the Marathas. However, considering J.S. more authentic, I have arranged the events accordingly.

Ramchandrapant to Mārne Deshmukh CCS, Vol. VI, No. 113 and Ramchandrapant to Silamkar Deshmukh, Rajwade/xvii/No.20, p. 37.

Was it taken back by the Marathas?
Apparently there is some mistake as Rājgadh was captured earlier.
130. HA, Vol. V, pp. 39-40 (Insha-i-Madhuram) Sarkar in the footnote says that 'the first Maratha attempt at revival was temporarily checked and Dhana and Santa were driven into hiding and comparative inactivity for six months. (Oct. 1690-April 1961). It does not appear to be correct. Santaji was active in Ahmadnagar during September-October.


132. Rajwade, Vol. XV.

133. Appendix A No. 180

134. Appendix A No. 181

135. Appendix A No. 183

136. Appendix A No. 184

137. Appendix A No. 185

138. Appendix A No. 186

139. Appendix A No. 187

140. Appendix A No. 188 Chokhandi(?)

141. Appendix A No. 189

142. Appendix A No. 189 (Murtida Nagar (?)

143. Appendix A No. 190

144. Appendix A No. 191

145. SCP p. 36.

146. Appendix A No. 192

147. Appendix A No. 193

148. SCP p. 36
149 H A, p. 347
150 Rajwade, Vol. VIII, No. 43, p. 46
151 H A, p. 347
152 Appendix A No. 194
153 CL, pp. 166-67
155 SC 3 Vol. II, No. 225, pp. 222-23 and SC 3 Vol. VI,
No. 116, p. 79.
157 SC 3, Vol. VI, No. 117, pp. 79-80 and Rajwade, Vol.XV,
No. 354, pp. 384-85.
161 H A, Vol. V, pp. 34-35, SCP, p. 37 does not give the date
of attack. The Marathas arrived at Panhala during
Oct-Nov. (Saka 1615, Kartik). They helped besieged
as a result of which the siege was lifted.
166 Appendix A, No. 195
167 Appendix A No. 196
168 Appendix A No. 197
169 Appendix A No. 198
170 Appendix A No. 199
I have extensively quoted from Vol. V, pp. 34-38 by J. Sarkar. In the words of Sarkar: "The entire narrative from Dhana's attack on Muis to this point has been reconstructed from Akhbarat or daily newsletters of Aurangzeb's camp preserved in MS in London." There is no other source material available so far either to corroborate or contradict the same.

The date of the capture of the fort is given (S 1615 Ashadh (s) 8), 1st July 1693. In recognition of the services of Navaji Balkavade, he was given the village of Savargaon with all the rights.
A certainogue from the Mughals approached Sayadi.

In appreciation of his services Balkavde was given Mulkhed in 'inām'.

After 15 September 1694

As a reward of this gallant act he was given the village of Daravli in 'inām'.

After October-November 1694

As a reward of this gallant act he was given the village of Daravli in 'inām'.

This is an unrecorded campaign of the Mughals. The information is based on a document, which is an original order given by a divisional officer of Rajaram dt. 7th November, 1691. It refers to a grant made to the Desais Desh Kulkarnis, Nadgaudas of the Ajra subdivision. Document does not mention the date of siege, but the date of grant which was not long after the siege.


Appendix A No. 209

MA, p. 338

PIHRC, Vol. XXII, p. 84.
Place of overtaking appears to be near Bupal gadh, 65 m. n.w. of Bijapur.

Torgal (Torgul), it is a fort in the Bijapur territory.

Akhbarat dated 22 Oct 1693 (Appendix A No. 215) gives no more detailed information about Santaji's movements. It states "Hami-ud-din Khan and Khwaja Khan who were with Himmat Khan went towards Gulbarga in pursuit of Santaji. Santa sent Amrit Rao with 4000 cavalry towards Berar. He has got 6000 men. From Bidar he went towards Malkhed. Aurangzeb ordered Hamid-ud-din Khan and Khwaja Khan to go in pursuit of Amrit Rao. Asad Khan along with Lasnkar Khan accompanied by his men was ordered to help Himmat Khan and chase Santa."

Santaji left for Jinji during October-November 1694. Sarkar in HA, pp. 47-49 gives the
encounters between Santaji and Himmat Khan and Hamid-
un-din Khan during this period. If J.S. is considered
as an authentic source, then Sarkar's information
becomes superfluous. It is not known on which source
material Sarkar has based his narrative.

217 *KK* p. 431 gives more vivid and interesting account
about how Mughal Sardars secretly planned to go in­
side the fort and did not care for others.

218 According to *KK*, p. 430, the battle continued for 4
days. This seems to be most unlikely, the Mughals
would have completely perished if they had stayed
any more.

219 According to *MA*, he was an opium-eater. His life
depended on it and lack of it caused the death, but
many suspected of suicide for the possible disgrace
in near future, at the hands of Aurangzeb.

220 *KK*, p. 433, gives the amount as 7 lakhs. *SCP*, p. 38
indicates one lakh only.

The entire narrative is based on these sources.

**The data of the Battle of Deodderi**

According to *MA*, p. 375 Khan'azad Khan and Qasim Khan
united their forces before sighting the enemy on 23rd Jamadi
II, 1107 (19 Jan 1696). According to Sarkar this date is
wrong by two months. In his opinion *Akbarat*, which is a
more trustworthy source, shows that 'on that day the mace
bearers sent by the Emperor returned to him at Brahmapur after delivering his gifts to the vanquished officers, who had then reached Adoni. Āsim Khan had died more than a month before 19 Jan. The Madras Diary records on 5th December, 1695, the report of Āsim Khan having been already defeated (say, about 20th November) (HA, Vol. V, p. 119 footnote).

According to SCP, p. 38 (Jedhe Shakavali) “after Peush (S) 11, S.1617 (after 5 January, 1696) Santāji Chorpade imprisoned Āsim Khan and Khanazad Khan. Āsim Khan died, Khanazad Khan paid ransom of one lakh rupees.”

Therefore, from the above sources it appears that, Doddari was not besieged before 5th January by the Marathas. In other words Āsim Khan died some time after 5th January and not on 20th November as Sarkar maintains.

If we accept J.S. as authentic source, then both M.A. and Sarkar have apparently made the mistake in calculating the date.

222 MA, p. 379.
223 HA, Vol. V, pp. 120-121. Sarkar’s information is based on Akbārat, hence it has been extensively reproduced. MA, p. 379, SCP, p. 38, it gives the date of killing Himmat Khan as Dec. 1695-Jan. 1696.
225 Appendix A No. 216
226 Appendix A No. 217
Appendix A No. 218

SCS Vol. III, No. 479, pp. 85-86

KK, p. 459

SCP, p. 66

HA, p. 393.


Rajaram arrived at Ahmednagar in Feb-March (SCP, p.66).

KK, p. 461

SCP, p. 66

KK, pp. 456-58.

No other Persian source has given this information.

According to Bhamsen, Krishna Sawant a Maratha sardar crossed the Narmada with 15,000 men. He ravaged the territory surrounding Dhamuni. From there, he retreated. Since the days of Muslim sultans till date the Marathas had never crossed the Narmada. As/Chimsen has not given the date of the incident. But it is quite likely that the event might have taken place at the same time as, Hemaji Shinde and others crossed the Narmada, as mentioned by Khafi Khan.

HA, Vol. V, p. 132

HA, Vol. V, p. 133. The date of incident given by Sarkar is 13/14 Nov.


HA, Vol. V, p. 134. We are not aware of the losses of men of the Mughals, as the records are not available. Surely, there must have been some losses on their side too.
As no dates are indicated it is difficult to place the incidents in exact chronology of the events. However, from 1756 Sanvant Vikram, it appears that, the happenings took place same time at the end of 1899.

Wasantgadh is a hilly fort. It is situated in Karad, a taluk of Sātārā district (25 M.S.W. of Sātārā). The fort was in Maratha possession and was known for its strength.

The narrative of this campaign is based on MA, pp.408-11 and KK, p. 462.


Sh, Ch. V, No. 27, p. 180. Ambvalā ghat?


MA, p. 414.

MA, p. 414.


KK, p. 465.


MA, p. 419.