PART - I
SOME THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES

By following Husserl on the one hand and Doob on the other, we define and use the term attitude in the sense of mental act rather than in the sense of 'predisposition' or 'tendency'.

Therefore, the acts such as wishing, willing, intending, hoping, anger, reasoning, doubting etc., are referred to by 'attitude'.

We shall use the phrase 'speech act' in the customary sense. We follow Austin who said about the usage of the phrase 'speech act'.

'The more we consider a statement not as a sentence (or proposition) but as act of speech (out of which the others are logical constructions) the more we are studying the whole thing as an act' (quot in Lenigan, 41).

Despite the controversies with regard to the meaning of perlocutionary act, we use it to refer to the speech act which is labelled after the effect on the hearer it produces. E.g., a threat, an urge.

We use the word 'structure' in a loose sense to refer to the whole 'context' of the attitude which is formed out of various independent acts. And therefore, we do not belong to the 'structuralist' tradition. (See Hawkes for a lucid description of structuralisation).
In a similar vein, we use 'reasons' to refer to a particular type of attitude (see Davidson and Anscomb). We do not go into the discussions of over the questions such as 'whether dispositions are causes or not'? What is a mental state how it is different from mental act? And finally, the ontological status of attitudes.
THE NATURE OF GRASPING AND STRUCTURE

The above mentioned problem, that is, 'the speaker's attitude reflected in poetry', contains another problem, namely, how a reader can grasp the attitude of the speaker. Here 'to grasp' is roughly equivalent to 'to know', 'to understand' etc. In this section, we will try to clarify some theoretical questions concerning the above mentioned two problems. In doing this, we will give an account of Nasthene's concept of intelligibility that he presents in his thesis entitled, "How language makes us know: some views about the nature of intelligibility."

The following account, as we have said, tries to clarify our problems by way of exploring the nature of them with the help of Nasthene's thesis. Therefore, we propose to give a brief account of 'what is known' 'what is that to know anything', and finally, 'what makes us know anything'. Consequently we will try to correlate these theoretical perspectives with our problems of 'speaker's attitude reflected in poetry' and 'how a reader can grasp the attitude of the post-speaker'. Because, the latter problem, that is, how a reader can grasp (understand, know etc.) the attitude of the speaker should come under a general problem of knowing, i.e., how anyone can know anything.
To know anything is a result of an enquiry into things. Firstly, let us clarify, 'what is known?' That is, what all knowing aims at. Mesthene gives an account of nature of an enquiry in the following manner: "All enquiry seems to aim at the discovery of structure". (Page 87) Some peculiarities apart, which exist in case of various types of knowing, (as the presupposition is a sort of knowing) this is a general account of knowing. Therefore, we show at the first place the structure of attitude which a reader aims at discovering. In the following passage Mesthene clearly says: "The object of all knowledge seems to be structure of some sort, when we say, if we know something, we mean, I think, that we know its structure, the relationsh of its elements. When we are still engaged in the process of knowing, it is the relations or patterns of our subject matter that we seek. The reason things can be known, in other words, is that they are characterized by, or have, or exhibit structure. Discovery of the nature of intelligibility would thus seem to require analysis of structure". (Page 87)

Therefore, while dealing with the problem 'what is known', we are partly dealing with the solution of a problem of 'what is that to know'. Therefore, when we take
up the problem, that 'the speaker's attitude reflected in poetry', saying that it includes a basic component i.e., how a reader can grasp it, we have to solve the problem by showing the structure of attitude(s), which is a reason for the reader's knowing.

Now the problem follows is that 'what is then a structure?' Before answering the question that, how do we know the things, let us see clearly what we know. The structure of the things is of two types, namely formal and functional. Let us see the definitions offered by Nasthene of these terms.

"I term 'formal' the structure of the limits of things; that is, the pattern or order that defines a thing. Take anything at all and it is possible to say of it that, given the proper circumstances, it can exhibit certain kinds of behavior while ways of acting other than these certain kinds are not open to it no matter what the circumstances. The thing possesses certain limits of possible action beyond which it cannot pass so long as it remains that thing. These limits constitute its formal structure. Wood, for example, can be burned or built into a table, but it cannot be digested."
Formal structure is static. It marks the "properties" of things, and its discovery leads to knowledge of their "essence". By contrast, "functional" structure is dynamic. The term names the determinable ways of acting that things exhibit in their interactions with other things. At any one time, any thing behaves according to only one or a few of the total number of possibilities implied by its formal structure. The same piece of wood cannot at the same time enter into both the process of combustion and that of table building. (Page 97)

The term 'formal' is synonymous with potentialities, powers etc. The term functional is synonymous with operations, realizations etc. (Page 97)

Let us now clarify the relevance of the above mentioned concepts to our problem which function as a guide-line for the understanding of our analysis. We have defined an attitude as an act of mind. Through the above discussion we came to know that a reader grasps an attitude means 'a reader knows the structure of an attitude'. And a reader knows the structure of an attitude because the attitudes have structures. We try to show the structure of various attitudes through which we partly answer the question "how a reader can grasp the attitude of the speaker".
The formal structure of the attitudes is non-behavioral analysis of them. The functional structure of the attitudes is the speech acts and behavioral patterns which are, therefore, the realizations of attitudes. As Mesthene also observes that the scientific knowledge is the formal structure of the things (Page 97).

Therefore, we concentrate on the formal structure of attitudes which we call as the analysis of attitudes per se. To drag the precision to a bit further, an attitude has potential to be realized in 'n' number of ways. Through one or more than one realization of an attitude we reach to its formal structure. Therefore, through its one or more actualizations we can know contextually non-variant static structure or power. And hence, we proceed from speech act, and take the context that which modifies the manner of expression of attitudes i.e., realisation of attitudes, and finally, reach at the basic formal structure of attitudes.

Let us now take-up the question that how we know. Mesthene explicitly says that "In order to discover what things can do, i.e. in order to enquire into potentialities or powers, we must formulate meanings, we must institute hypothesis, draw up plans of action."
We know by entertaining ideas. Formulating meanings is not different from knowing or enquiry into things. Let us see what he says about this distinction while supporting Dewey. "His (Dewey's) point, I believe, is that the activity of formulating, "languaging", is an integral part of the enquiry itself. That is getting knowledge is equivalent to putting it into language" (Page 59).

"Those are one process not two" (Page 59). Therefore, a reader grasps the attitude of the poet by putting the elements (structure) of the attitudes into linguistic forms. That is exactly what we are going to do in the following pages. We take up a certain speech act and hypothesize that, there is certain attitude involved therein and then proceed to put, the element of the structure of attitudes, into language.

In this way by imitating the reader, we analyse his understanding of the attitudes. That is how we propose to show how he grasps the attitudes. The role of language, in the process of the enquiry into enquiry, is clear in our author's final remarks of his thesis.

"What has made us know - to answer Aristotle's question in his own terms - is language used as an instrument to convert powers into operations, ideas used
to actualize potentialities. Language is a condition of intelligibility by virtue of its function as agent in the process of inquiry." (Page 107)

Therefore, there are somethings like attitudes having a discernible structure. And the knowing of them is the knowing of their structure. A reader knows the attitudes in terms of language. The attitudinal formal-structure is known (or put into language) by taking into account the realizations and the conditions for its manner of realizations (so to say speech acts and context) as a formal criteria along with the language. This is an account of our basic problems as they fit into a general framework of philosophical problem of intelligibility. A more particular theoretical perspective will be elucidated under the head of 'presupposition, reflection and objectivity'. Here, let us make explicit the difference between realization and the conditions for realization. The attitudes are potential enough to have a realization, as we have said, in 'n' number of ways.

In case of the literature, the behavioural (gestural) and speech are the two types of realizations of the attitudes. An attitude of, say, love, can be realized (expressed) in form of an information, i.e., I love you, in certain behavior, (as it has been evident
through the exampleIX), or in form of enquiring about the person, etc. There are various ways of expressing one and the same attitude of love. In this way every attitude has potential to be expressed in many ways. I hypothesize that it is possible to show that certain attitudes cannot be expressed by certain speech acts. And further, certain set of speech acts only can express certain attitudes but not the others. We do not and cannot exhaust all the possible analyses. But the suggestions given here are intended to function as the guide-lines for further research in the field.

The variation in the nature of responses is due to mainly two causes. One is, according to the intensity of the attitude, (see example VIII) the responses differ. Secondly, the external condition function as the reasons for a certain manner of the expression of attitude. The intensity of attitudes belongs to the feeling component of attitudes. An example for the response variation of one and the same attitude of the same person is Sakuntala's two responses i.e., the one that is revealed in the example (VIII) and the one that is found in the third act of Sakuntala. In the first instance, Sakuntala falls in love with King and expresses her love through the behaviour
of speech. In the second instance, she becomes sick and is in need of pain removing devices. In a similar way, the external conditions function as the reasons for certain type a realization of the attitude of intention in our example (XII).

Therefore, while pointing out that 'how the attitudinal structures are understood', we will take into account the manner of realization and the conditions for realizations of the attitudes. The classification of contextual elements (see page) is the classification of the conditions under which a knowing of attitudes occurs.
PRESUPPOSITION

The presuppositions we considered as the disclosures if attitudes are, in theory, different from the principle of presupposition the linguists and logicians talk about. Let us see what David E. Cooper, in his book entitled 'presuppositions', says as the salient features of 'presuppositions'.

i. "If S presupposes S' then it is odd or inappropriate to assert S unless one believes S' to be true". (Cooper, 15).

This is enumerated as the salient feature (i) by Cooper. Before going further, we should remind our reader regarding the task of modern logic. The presupposition is one of the principles which come under the truth functional transactions in propositional logic. An example where the above mentioned salient feature of presupposition is applicable is, X says that 'The king of France is bald'. This proposition presupposes that 'There is a King of France'. And if one asserts the former, then usually it means that one believes that the latter is true. If one does not believe so, the, it is not proper to assert the former one. Not only that, Cooper's salient feature iv will be as follows:

iv. "If S presupposes S' then S lacks truth value where S' is false". (This seems to be the most salient features of all, since it has been used to justify speaking
of presupposition in contrast to entailment (and, of course, assertion). (Cooper, 15)

This means that, if the latter proposition is false, ('There is a king of France') then the former one cannot be a subject for the truth function analysis. That is, it is neither true nor false.

Let us now try to come out of these congested theory of presupposition. Basically the modern logicians are concerned with the truthfulness of the propositions being unaware of the fact that there is no world of proposition but only the world with people who utter propositions exists.

Let us at first see how the above mentioned two features are non-applicable to the presuppositions in case of the poetry. Let us at first take typical example where our theory of presupposition is applied. In the example (II) when Anasuya says to Sakuntala that 'you stay there for a while, being accompanied with you the Kesari tree looks as if it is being accompanied by creeper'. This utterance of Anasuya, as we have said, presupposes an aesthetic enjoyment on the part of the speaker. Let us now try to apply the first feature of presupposition mentioned by Cooper. Before going further, we should remind the reader of the universality of logical principles. That is, wherever there is an S presupposes an S', then it is odd or inappropriate to assert S unless one believes S'
to be true. This universality is obviously out of question in case of the poetic presuppositions. In case of the above-mentioned example Anāśūyā might know the truth value of her aesthetic enjoyment! (1), but in some other context it is just possible that the same utterance presupposes a ridicule. Therefore, the contextual variations of presuppositions do not allow us to take up the existing concept of presupposition. Secondly, if we follow Cooper’s third feature, then, in case of our example, or in similar examples, the very existence of various attitudinal interpretations itself proves the invalidity of the poetic utterances to become the subjects for truth functional analysis. Therefore, since the possibility of their becoming the subjects for the truth functional analysis is ruled out, the poetic texts will not have the concept of presupposition as a logical principle. And therefore, we need a separate theory of presupposition which can cover the poetic texts.
In the present thesis the word presupposition is used to refer to a particular functional property of a given linguistic unit of the text. Unlike many other functions, it is dependent upon the epistemological conditions of the speaker and the hearer or the reader. At large, the concept of presupposition is a causal principle of the textual criticism. There are four features which are to be accounted for within the concept of presupposition. Those are: (1) presupposing linguistic unit, (2) the presupposed psychological phenomenon, (3) the beholder of the psychological phenomenon, and (4) presupposing hearer or reader. It is evident that our above mentioned definition of presupposition based upon the first feature. The nature of the function of presupposition is to explore and bring forth the mediatly presented self, the second feature. The third feature refer to the speaker or actor in totality. The fourth feature is the reader or hearer who presupposes the feature (2).

Here is a small terminological muddle which has its roots in the conceptual ambiguity, that is regarding the verb 'presupposes'. It refers to the inherent quality of the linguistic unit to be explained in a particular way, and to a capacity of the outsider's namely, the inference. Therefore, if we say that a given textual
linguistic unit presupposes a certain psychological phenomenon, then, we are using the term in the first sense. But, since obviously it is not an objective feature of the language, as the phonological, grammatical and semantic features are, to perform the function of presupposition in a systematized way, the concept in question may be wrongly conceived as a purely psychological concept. This confusion is due to the so-called scientific rigidity and unrealistic conservatism. If linguistics is the study of language as it is a rule-governing behaviour and the psychologist's boundary is the behaviour of organisms in a vague sense, then, the socially relevant and spiritually significant interactions of individuals demand for an independent study. Philosopher, in-between, endeavouring to keep up his face value, remains as all knowingly ignorant partly out of the fear of committing himself to the blemish of redherring and partly out of the struggle for the Leviathan of scientific precision. These structures are not intended to devaluate the respective sciences, but to turn their attention to an all important and highly germane study. The existing concepts of presupposition are cognitively oriented logical postulations. The extension of the concept to cover every part of the human life is an urgent requirement. From within the
Proposed project the following schemata seem to emerge:

1. The socially relevant and spiritually significant study of the human interactions, especially verbal interaction, with reference to the mental states of the participants has to be considered as an epistemological problem.

2. The nature of the thing understood, through which it is understood, and finally how it is understood are the three dimensions of the epistemology under discussion. Here the second and the third dimensions are closely connected but are separate phenomena. The former is the verbal or behavioural pattern that is given and the latter is the process of encoding it.

3. The presupposition is an epistemological function involving the linguistic and psychological aspects together. The process under discussion has a linguistic aspect in the sense that in a given text the varieties of speech acts are presented through which a reader grasps the attitude of the speaker. It has got a psychological aspect in the sense that, an inference is the process of mind that is involved on the part of the reader or hearer and the understood attitudes are, by nature, psychological ones. Here we find the solution for the confusion regarding the usage of the verb 'presupposes'. When a particular linguistic unit in a text is presented, it has no meaning unless someone is there to pick-up the text and start reading it. At the time of the static existence of the text in a book-shelf, the
words within that, do not, as it were, go on presupposing anything. The reader is the resurrector and the recreator of the text. The reader is a resurrector in the sense that, he gives life, through the reading activity, to the past-lived experiences, by allowing them to become the parts of his consciousness in which the poet’s mind is reactivated. He is also a recreator in the sense that, he reconstructs the experiences those are presented in the text by the manner of interpreting the text. The more objectively it is interpreted, the more liveness a text will have in its existence. In a similar manner, unless there is something in the presented text itself, the reader can not understand what attitude is presented.

4. An attitude is presupposed means; there is an actor performed certain action in certain socio-cultural context which is an expression of his own mental state and that mental state has become the object of the consciousness of another as part of the understanding of the performed action. This definition clearly means that the understanding of the others’ actions includes the understanding of the mental state of the actor. And therefore, a particular process of understanding of the actions of others only is called as presupposition. Only others because, one generally does not need to try to understand his own conscious actions. The self-evidence
is such a powerful force that it does not even implicitly require the argumentation of one’s own conscious activities. This is to say that, for example, I am always certain that, without any inside or outside evidences, I am angry when really I am. This knowledge of course, is not a psychological knowledge but the matter here is that independent of the psychological jargon one knows and is always absolutely certain of the things happening with him in the conscious stage.

5. The socio-cultural context is the place where the actor performs action as the means for the revelation of his own self. While acting, he, as a conscious free being, is completely responsible for his actions and is aware of the meanings of the actions he performs. And he intends the action he performs to mean to others in similar way how he is intended by the others to understand their similar action. The co-existence and the structural identity among humans presuppose an experimental similarity among them. What a common man understands of his co-beings is sometimes more precise than a sceptic philosopher’s understanding of the same. The process of social interactions itself is an evidence for the sharability of the experiences and the objectivity of the mental activities.

6. To conclude, the process of presupposition
of the attitudes is neither psychological nor linguistics. Rather it is an epistemological problem involving equally both the psychological and linguistic dimensions as well as the socio-cultural factors. In case of a literary text, presuppositions of attitudes of a speaker are part of understanding of the process of creation. The process of presupposition involves, therefore, right from the anticipation of the content and the form of the text by the reader, up to the finishing part of reading activity. This is to say that, if presupposition is part of the understanding of the text, then it has to include the expectations a reader makes while reading the text. Where he presupposes in the sense, he anticipates the revelation of some attitudes according to his knowledge of the world and of literature and of that particular text. Whatever is given in a text is understood along-with the presupposed attitudes at once.

7. The phrase 'at once' need not be mistaken for any obscure phenomenon, for, it refers to synthesised form of inference involved within the understanding. The analyst's business is to explore the implicit content understood and the synthesised form in which it is understood. This is, the attitudes of the speaker and hearer. This position evidently implies that, the speaker's attitudes reflected in poetry can not be studied for
themselves. This may sound as a paradoxical statement, but the intention is that, independent of the reader's or hearer's attitudes, the speaker's attitude can not be completely studied because, the speaker's orientation towards the hearer dominates his way of expression, since he wants to be understood. And secondly, since the analyst happens to be a reader for himself, his so called introspection compels his manner of the explorations of the text.

3. Here there can be a doubt that, if the analyst is also a reader then, what sort of objectivity can he claim of his analysis. In other words, if an analyst talks of the things from his point of view, pretending as if he is exploring the common reader's understanding, then how can such a work have the universal validity? Such a doubt is, of course, of significance. But the analyst is a special type of reader because of three reasons. Firstly, the common reader's object of understanding is the text itself where analyst's object of understanding is the understanding of the common reader as well as the text. Secondly, the analyst, properly called, is well equipped with the terminology of the different branches of knowledge those are needed in the study of a text, which implies more than random jargon usage: a systematised manner of handling the things. Thirdly, the common reader's understanding of
the text is a synthetic one in the sense, the attitudes of the speaker and the process of understanding them are implicitly realized. The analyst's business on the other hand is to make the implicit phenomena explicit.

9. Here we inevitably come across the concept of reflection. The attitudes of the speaker are reflected in a given text in the sense, that, the speaker's speech is a part of the state of mind he was in at the time of the utterance and that speech gives clues to what was going on in speaker's mind. Here by reflection it follows that the deficiency on the part of the nature of the attitudes to become the objects of sensual perception, and hence, the ambiguity of attitudes and their objective fusion with the linguistic forms. As Bhattacharya observes, this objective fusion corresponds to subjective confusion.

"We are using the word 'fused' very deliberately, distinguishing it from what is ordinarily called confused. Confusion is only an epistemic situation, and what we intend by 'fusion' is a conceivable objective situation that would exactly correspond to subjective confusion. Normally in cases of confusion the items that I confuse with one another are objectively quite distinct: it is I alone who stand responsible for all that is unclear. By 'fusion' however, we mean a situation where even
objectively the items stand mixed up with one another undistinguishedly" (Bhattacharya, 14).

To develop this idea, the objective fusion, namely, the mixing-up of the attitudes and linguistic unit, not only corresponds to, but also coincides with, the subjective confusion. Here Bhattacharya fails to grasp a point that, there is an inevitable causal connection between fusion and confusion. For example, in his sense of confusion, one gets confused in case of a snake for a rope. Here the objective as well as subjective ambiguity exists. Since it is a dark night and since the rope resembles the snake, one gets confused one for the other. Because there is no possibility of us getting confused of a rope, for a loin, or a building, say, for a snake. Therefore, what we would like to conclude is that, every attitude is fused with linguistic fratures and potentially a confusion creating device.

10. This ambiguous appearance of the attitudes itself is called the reflection of them. The presupposition becomes an illusion in case of a wrongly conceived attitude. Objectivity is the avoidance of illusions by making the things as apparent as possible. Every presupposition is made apparent in the sense that, the major premise is the society itself. Another basic premise, as we have mentioned elsewhere, is the concept of intersubjectivity.
The potentiality to confuse exists along-with the potentiality to be understood correctly. By the methodology that is supplied in the present thesis, a reader is supposed to arrive at the true nature of the attitudes than to be misguided by the ambiguities. This actualizable potentiality of the attitudinal experiences itself, is, not only for us but for the scientific enquiry as a whole, a guiding principle.
INTRODUCTION

The present thesis is a study in the field of literary criticism. The thesis is divided into three parts. The part I contains a brief introduction to the theoretical perspectives and some definitions and explanations of the basic concepts that are involved in the present study. In the second part, there is analysis of some selected portions from Sanskrit literature on the basis of which an attempt is made to arrive at a specific method through which one can understand the attitude of the speaker. In the later chapter of the second part, the views of the poeticians of Sanskrit Poetry regarding the attitude and its understanding are presented. The final part consists of two sections. Section I presents some theoretical principles and Section II draws overall conclusions and presents a logical diagram.

The ancient Sanskrit literature can be analysed, in the strictest sense of the analysis, from five different but closely connected stand points. These are the five levels hierarchically placed. The principle of the ranking is; the following levels presuppose the preceding level(s). The five levels are, grammatical analysis, semantic analysis, speech act analysis, attitudinal analysis and psychoanalysis and cosmological analysis. These approaches may not be in practice as far as the Sanskrit literature is concerned. But the possibility of such a variety of studies may cause one to postulate them and discriminate them clearly. At first we propose to give a brief introduction to these approaches and point out where we stand.
Firstly, a typical Fānīnian analysis of various language elements of the text is referred to by the grammatical analysis. This includes studies of the texts from the point of view of the development of language or the evolution of grammar and finally, grammatical rule-finding studies. Within the grammatical analysis we would like to include the stylistic approaches to literature. For the paradigm, one may refer to the anthology Ed., by Flower. The grammatical analysis should be counted as a purely formal analyses of the texts so far as they do not take into account the semantic aspects of the texts. A typical grammatical analysis starts with the phonetics and ends with the syntactic regularities. (Flower, 77). Finally, within this level fall the textual-grammatical and textual-logical concepts such as cohesion and progression etc. Because these concepts belong to the field of the study which aims at the analysis of the structure of the text and is based upon the generative grammar.

Flower Says:

"It seems to follow that the structure of a language as the reader experiences it that is, the text's overt or surface structure is a fundamental study for the analyst of text structure" (Flower, 77). Therefore, this type of textual analysis aims at exploring the competence of the reader, which, of course, involves unlike other
pure grammatical analyses, the psycholinguistic concepts. The textual analysis from this point of view, therefore, includes the logical method. Hence, Dijk says in his article: 'In this paper I sometimes use the term 'text logic' which is not (yet) meant to refer to a specific logic, strictly speaking, but first of all to the intended base component of a text grammer' (Dijk, 13). This has to be the starting point because as Flower puts it, for the process of realization of the meanings of the text, certain linguistic knowledge is essential; i.e., what the linguistic features are that link various elements together and so on. Thus Flower says, 'This process of realization must be strictly controlled by the linguistic structure of texts' (Flower, 71). Therefore, this type of the grammatical analysis is to be considered as the one which formulates purely textual grammatical rules by basing itself on the generative grammar.

In the second level of the textual analysis comes the semantic analysis. The semantic analysis aims at finding the semantic regularities [non-syntactic semantic regularities as Ziff calls them (Ziff, 10)]. Through this analysis one can make out the possible utterances of a natural language. And the second task of the semantic analysis, according to Ziff, is to make meta-linguistic statements. (A meta-linguistic statement is roughly a synonymous paraphrasing of a given statement).
Let us see what Katz has to say about the task of the semantics. According to Katz the basic questions semantics is supposed to answer is 'what is meaning?'. And this question includes the following sub-questions:

1.1 What are synonymy and paraphrase?
1.2 What are semantic similarity and semantic difference?
1.3 What is antonymy?
1.4 What is superordination?
1.5 What are meaningfulness and semantic anomaly?
1.6 What is semantic ambiguity?
1.7 What is semantic redundancy?
1.8 What is semantic truth (analyticity, metalinguistic truth, etc.)?
1.9 What is semantic falsehood (contradiction, metalinguistic falsehood, etc.)?
1.10 What is semantically undermined truth or falsehood (e.g., syntheticity)?
1.11 What is inconsistency?
1.12 What is entailment?
1.13 What is presupposition?
1.14 What is a possible answer to a question?
1.15 What is a self-answered question?

These questions pin down the domain of a semantic theory."  
(Katz, 54-5).
Furthermore, a semantic approach to Sanskrit poetic text deals with the concept not in the sense of the cognitive elements but as they refer to the abstract entities which are not individuated in persons, i.e., as the objective content of the thought process. (Katz, 30). The limitations of semantic theory can be summarized as follows: Ziff's model is, according to the author himself, applicable only to the natural languages. And a most important factor is that semantic theory is not concerned with the contextual meaning. Therefore, we have assumed that a theory of linguistic communication involves principles of contextual interpretation that go well beyond the scope of semantic theory but that these principles require antecedently specified semantic representations of the sentences of the language (Katz, 443). Finally, the principle of presupposition, as we have discussed elsewhere, is a cognitively oriented logical principle rather than an active component of the social interactions.

The theory of speech acts is different from the semantic theory on account of its basic postulations, such as the speech acts are the basic units of communication and the theory of speech acts has to deal with the culturally variant and contextually determined meanings. Let us see what Wunderlinch has to say about the theory of speech acts.
The universal part of speech act theory deals with the following topics:

1. The general structure of speech acts;
2. The general structure of speech act sequences;
3. The general institutional impacts on speech acts and speech act sequences;
4. The general classification of speech acts on the basis of 1-3;
5. The general rules for inferring non-literal from literal meaning."

(Wunderlich, 290)

The final topic in the above mentioned list partly covers the attitudinal analysis. That is why Searle recently observes in the manner mentioned below, after examining mainly the meaning of the word 'cut' as it occurs in various contexts in various meanings. He questions "Why not can we get rid of the contextual dependency of meanings"? "The answer is that the features we have cited are not just of semantic contents but of representations generally, in particular they are features of intentional states and since meaning is always a derived form of intentionality, contextual dependency is ineliminable".

(Searle (2), 231)
These features which are mysteries for the speech act analysts are the object of study for the attitudinal analysis. The term attitudinal analysis, in the sense it is employed in the thesis, is coined for the present study. The founder of the theory of attitudes is Edmund Husserl. (There is, of course, Brentano who initiated this school of thought but Husserl is to be counted as the first and last in systematizing the thought). Logical Investigations of Husserl is mainly concerned with the attitudes in the sense of the mental acts. (See Husserl, 619) that the attitudes are used synonymously with mental acts. In the following few pages we shall give a brief introduction to the theory of attitudes that is presented in Logical Investigations.

The peculiar characteristic of the attitudes is intentionality, i.e., a directedness towards a real or imaginary object. Within Logical Investigation a theory of parts-and-wholes has been formulated. And the basic features of attitudes and the concepts that are inevitably connected with the attitudes have been elaborately discussed by Husserl. According to our author all thinking takes place in acts (Husserl, 598). But the mental acts are not activities as the speech acts are and they are the experiences. Thus Husserl says: 'But we must remind ourselves that the concept of act was not defined by us in terms of activity, but that we meant to use the word merely
to abbreviate the locution 'intentional experience' (Husserl, 617).

Every act has an experiencable content. And the concept of content is the basic one for the theory of the attitudes. The content of an act can be a simple or a complex one and it can be a dependent or an independent one. The first distinction has been defined on the basis of an act's having parts or not having parts. 'Complexity, as the word's etymology suggests, points to a plurality of disjoined parts in the whole.' (Husserl, 439). The second distinction, i.e., between the dependent and independent contents has been defined in the following manner: 'We have independent contents wherever the elements of a presentational complex (complex of contents) by their very nature permit their separated presentation; we have dependent contents wherever this is not the case.' (Husserl, 439). The part is interpreted as 'anything a 'part' that can be distinguished 'in' an object or, objectively phrased, that is 'present' in it.' (Husserl, 437). (here, the object is synonymous (almost) with the content).

The complex contents are the contents of complex acts and according to the above mentioned definitions, a complex act must be split into simple acts in its description. And the criterion for such a split is that a simple act must be capable of becoming a complete act by itself. There are two most important aspects of the content of the acts,
namely, the quality and the matter. An analogy which is repeatedly used in the Husserlian framework for these concepts is that of the colour and shape. Thus he says of the matter; the matter of an act is 'a component of the concrete act-experience, which it may share with the acts of quite different quality.' (Husserl, 596).

For example, one and the same matter that 'he has gone' can be a matter of the act whose quality is a wishing or a believing or a joy etc. Therefore, the quality of an act is the determining aspect of the content which determines of which act the matter is a matter, e.g., that it is a matter of a wishing, a matter of believing etc. Moreover, a matter does not only present the objects for themselves to experience but, 'also as what it grasps it, the properties, relations, categorial forms, that it itself attributed to it'. (Husserl, 589). The quality of an act, or act-quality is like a colour of a thing. Thus Husserl says; 'act-quality is undoubtedly an abstract aspect of acts, unthinkable apart from all matter. Could we hold an experience possible which was a judging without a subject matter?' (L.I. 589). In dealing with the complex mental acts, Husserl says that the presentation is a fundamental act. A content can be said to be a founded content when its existence is depended upon other content. (See, Husserl, 475). While interpreting the definition of intentional phenomenon of Brentano, that is, 'each intentional experience is either a presentation or based
upon underlying presentation' he says; 'an intentional experience only gains objective reference by incorporating an experienced act of presentation in itself, through which the object is presented to it. The object would be nothing to consciousness if consciousness did not set it before itself as an object and if it did not further permit the object to become an object of feeling, or desiring etc.'

(Heusserl, 598).

Therefore, any act should have a presentation i.e., an idea or an image of an object upon which its manner of directedness towards that object is built-up. Hence, an object of a judgement is the state of affairs judged, in an act of joy the object is toward which is the joy, in an act of desiring the object is what is desired etc. It follows from this that the presentation or the idea of object covers all the matter of the act. (See, Heusserl, 623). and 'each complex act is  

equal

qualitatively complex; it has as many qualities, whether of differing or identical sort, as it has distinguishable acts in itself.'

(Heusserl, 623). Therefore a complex act as we have already said, is constituted of various act-qualities and act-matters. But, 'Its total quality is no mere sum of the qualities of part-acts, but a single quality, with a unity resting on those constitutive qualities, just as the unity of the total 'matter' is no mere sum of the matters of the part-acts, but is founded, to the extent that this
'matter' is really divided among these part-acts, in the partial 'matters' (Husserl, 649).

To elucidate, as we shall see in the analysis, if a complex act, e.g., fear, is constituted of, say, three acts such as, a presentation, an evaluation and a wish, then, these three acts would have their own matter and quality and apart from that there is a quality of the act in which they are the parts is also present in the complex act, namely, the quality of fear. And this presence of the quality of the complex act unites the constituents together. The same is true in case of the matter also.

Almost all the acts can be expressed in the sense that as soon as an act is presented in consciousness there is a meaning given to it and that is spelt-out. This process is what is meant by the expression of an act. 'We have good reason to say; the statement expresses the percept, i.e. brings out what is perceptually 'given', ' (Husserl, 681). The between percept and sound of words another act (or pattern of acts) is intercalated.... This mediating act must be the true giver of meaning' (Husserl, 682).

Hence, when in the consciousness an act is presented then it is perceived and the meaning given to it is expressed through a meaning giving act. Or the expression is the meaning of the act in question. Out of the meaning, therefore, we have to arrive at its contents. And the contents are either simple of complex because, they are
the contents of the simple or complex acts. The content is an independent part of another content if it can become a content of an act for itself. Furthermore, there is a foundation for every act which refers to that type of perceptual or ideational act where the object is the matter of the act. Finally, in a given complex act over and above the independent or dependent qualities and matters of the part-acts, there is the quality and matter of the complex act which unites the part-act contents together.

According to Husserl, in case of the emotional attitudes, there is a sensation attached to the content. 'Joy, e.g., concerning some happy event, is certainly an act' (Husserl, 574). And such acts are the complex experiences because, a sensation of pleasure attaches to the idea, a sensation at once seen and located as an emotional excitement in the psycho-physical feeling-subject, and also as an objective property—the event seems as if bathed in a rosy gleam. The event thus pleasingly painted now served for the foundation for the joyful approach, the liking for, the being charmed or however one's state may be described. (Husserl, 574).

Therefore, in case of the object of an emotional act, the object is already apprehended either in this or that manner, i.e., a biased apprehension. And this is the
foundation for the further acts that constitute a complex act of emotion. Finally, therefore, in case of an emotional act there is a sensation or feeling-tone attached to the whole act inseparably.

After presenting the Husserlian thesis of attitudes, we may now describe the final possible analysis of Sanskrit poetic texts. This level includes, the approaches of psychoanalytic model, Freudian or otherwise. And analysis on the basis of the theory of archetypes of Jung and Eleade. The poetic language, like the dream language, is, a symbolic one and therefore, for Freud, an unconscious manifestation. To interpret this language, in the dream analysis, the method of free association, i.e., making the subject (Dreamer) talk about the dream freely in the sense, whatever occurs to him in connection with the parts of the content of the dream, has been applied by Freud. Let us see what Freud has to say in this connection in his Interpretation of Dreams. 'If, however, I put the dream before him cut into pieces, he will give me a series of associations to each piece, which might be described as the 'background thought' of that particular part of the Dream' (Freud (1), 178). This associative method is in the central to the analysis of Dreams because as he says, without this one is not in a position to interpret a given Dream (Freud (1), 338).
In case of the poetry of yore, one cannot discuss with the poet and therefore, Burke suggests a counter modified version of this method. He suggests that the critic should adopt a variant of the above mentioned method in the following manner: 'But what he (the critic) can do is to note the context of imaginary and ideas in which an image takes place' (Burke, 77). Whatever the method one applies the present analysis aims at reaching at 'revealing the function i.e., the unconscious purposes fulfilment' (Burke, 90). (Brackets mine). Therefore, a Freudian approach to literature would be either a typical dream interpretation model where almost all the content is reduced crudely to the libidinal infantile sexual phenomena or repressed sexual complexes of adolescence, or a Burkian model which aims at reaching the unconscious content of the poet, with a little different theoretical orientation, i.e., the poem is conceived to be a communication through which an unconscious content is revealed.

An attractive approach, which seems to be essential to Sanskrit poetry is from the point of view of the theory of archetypes of Dr. Jung. Jung in his analytic career came across a peculiar kind of thinking which involves some typical images and ideas which he calls as symbols, irrelevant of the social and cultural background of the subjects. On the basis of this experience he coined the word 'archetypes' to refer to the symbols of the above
mentioned type. A symbol means, for him, 'an idea or an image whose nature is unknown or not completely known'. Since the origin of these symbols cannot be traced back to the history of the individuals, these are the aspects of the historical psyche. That is why the corresponding unconscious is called as a collective one; collective unconscious. In his work, 'Symbols of Transformations', Dr. Jung explores the historical significance of these symbols. We have hypothesised that the basic symbols that are analysed by Jung in his works, e.g., mandala, serpent, golden flower, sun etc., do have their counterparts in the poetry of Sanskrit language the knowledge of which would be helpful in developing the theory of archetypes. Interested reader may refer to Dr. Jung’s series of lectures delivered at the Institute of Medical Psychology, London, in 1935. In these lectures he puts forth the basic presuppositions of the above mentioned analysis in a way to synthesize his earlier major works. (Jung (1)).

Mercea Eleade, a French phenomenologist and philosopher of religion uses the word 'archetypes' in a novel sense but to refer to a similar type of phenomena. In general, the Jungian and Eleadian approaches can be said to be, respectively, explanatory and descriptive. This does not mean that Eleade has no theory. His theory can be summarized as follows; There are certain beliefs and
images found to exist among the world mythologies which reflect the peoples' cosmological view (a world view as well as extra-world view) or views towards the universe, its origin, end, the peoples' place in the whole of the universe, etc. For example, a deluge myth or the myth of eternal return. (And there is a typical belief found to exist in many mythologies that a certain mountain of that region is considered to be the centre of the earth. (Eleade, (1)). A counter part of this belief is found in the first verse of Kalidāsa's Kumārasambhava). Eleade's basic thesis that is presented in his oft-quoted works, 'Cosmos and History' and 'Sacred and Profane: the historicism and or historilessness of the ancient religious beliefs.

He shows how the preceding years are reactivated so as to return at a certain stage of the year. This is found to be done through the rituals, enchantments etc., and how round this and the belief that there is a return to the eternity, many other beliefs are built. (See also Eleade (2). The approach to the literature of ancient India, we hope, in these lines, is a necessary one and the methodology can be the same which we have mentioned in connection with the Jungian approach.

With this brief introduction to the possible analysis of Sanskrit poetry we are in a position to locate the attitudinal analysis and its limitations. Among all these
levels, the attitudinal analysis is the central one for the understanding of poetry. As Parry, a psychologist of communication puts it, 'an aesthetic experience must be defined in terms of attitude rather than mechanism' (Parry, 65). We do not have to argue for the preference of analysis of attitudes to the grammatical analysis in case of poetic communication the reasons being obvious. However, the logico-grammatical aspect of this analysis is very much useful for attitudinal analysis. For example, a division between the adjectives and substantives, which is not a purely grammatical one in case of Sanskrit language, is possible on the logical grounds (Joshi, 19). In a similar manner, the concepts such as, cohesion and progression of the textual grammar are immensely valuable for the attitudinal analysis.

So far as the semantic analysis is concerned, since the textual meanings have no significance outside of the context of the text and since the semanticists restrict themselves to the non-contextual meanings, that approach is insufficient in dealings with a given Sanskrit poetic text. However, the Indian semanticists do analyse meanings with context of all kinds and hence such an approach will prove to be fruitful for such an analysis.

The speech act theorists claim that the speech acts are the basic units of language communication. (Searle, (1, 2, & 3)). Speech act analysis is concerned, as our account of it implies, with the linguistic structures, conceiving the language communication as an activity performed in a social context (See Bierwisch, in Searle (2) Pp 1 ff).
for the socio-cultural consideration of the speech act theory, speaker's intention and the understanding of the speaker's intention. But the last topic in the list which Wunderlich enumerates to be one of the topics with which the speech act theory deals is 'general rules for inferring non-literal from literal meaning'. This topic for itself, in fact, covers a vast domain and for the theorists of speech acts, is a confusing exercise if they do not come out from the rigid theory of speech acts itself. For example, according to Searle, for every speech act, there is a corresponding sincerity condition which refers to the intentional state of the speaker. But such a one-to-one correspondence between the intentionality and the speech acts does not exist at all. In the practical analysis we come across a complex of attitudes resulting into a speech act and the vice versa. Therefore, excepting the above mentioned topic, the other topics are the components of the speech act analysis per se. And the inference of the meanings partly constitute the attitudinal analysis.

There is a historical distinction between the analysis of Diction and that of Thought. Thus said Aristotle: 'Under Thought is included every effect which has to be produced by speech, the subdivisions being proof and refutation, the excitation of feelings, such as pity, anger, and the like; the suggestion of importance or its opposite' (Aristotle, 70). 'Next as regards to Diction... But this province of knowledge belongs to the art of the
delivery and to the masters of that science. It includes
for instance what is a command, a prayer, a statement,
a threat, a question an answer and so forth." (Aristotle, 71).
According to Aristotle, the later is not a very important
aspect of poetics. But the former one, i.e., thought is
an essential aspect. Hence he says: "while the effects
aimed at in speech should be produced by the speaker,
and as a result of the speech. For what were the business
of a speaker, if the thought were revealed quite apart
from what he says?" (Aristotle, 71).

Let us now try to establish a connection between
the speech acts and attitudes because, the meaning of
meaning for speech act theory is an answer to the question
that 'what a speaker does'. But the sense in which
attitudes are meanings is quite different from this. 'A
work of art, says Bosequet, is a definite thing or action'.
(Bosenquet, 4) and it is an action of a normal human
being. A famous poet Wordsworth says; 'The poet thinks and
feels in the spirit of human passion.' (Wordsworth, 39).
Any action of human beings is an object of study. And
the approach to the understanding of the actions of
human beings should be in terms of their peculiar
characteristic, i.e., meaningfulness. Let us see what
Rickman says in his essay entitled 'Understanding and Human
studies' about this meaningfulness, 'Behind the actions of
a historical figure, the ritual dances of preimitive tribe,
the practices of trade unionists, or the twitches of
a neurotic, lie ideas, beliefs and feelings which make
behaviour meaningful' (Rickman, xv). Thus the meaningfulness of the work of art as a definite action lies in the presentation of the mental acts.

It is often assumed with reference to the poetry as well the social actions that the empathy or a sympathetic attitude towards the poet or socio-cultural individuals itself is the criterion for the understanding. And therefore, since it is intersubjective in the above mentioned sense, one does not have to make an objective enquiry in order to understand the meanings of the actions of the individual. In this connection we coincide with prof. Nagel who says, about the scientist who studies the individuals and society; 'His ability to enter into relations of empathy with the human actors in some social process may indeed be heuristically important in his efforts to invent suitable hypotheses which will explain the process.

Nevertheless, his empathic identification with these individuals does not by itself, constitute knowledge. The fact that he achieves such identification does not annul the need for objective evidence, assessed in accordance with logical principles that are common to all controlled enquiries to support his imputations of subjective states of these human agents'. (Nagel, 484). Therefore, we propose to study the meanings of the creative action of poetic \textit{ex tempore} creation. The speech acts are the given for which the meanings are to be found-out. In this process
as much as possible we make an objective enquiry into the subject matter, i.e., we proposed to follow standard logical principles.

One more possible objection to the present study could be on the basis of the emotionality of poetry in particular, e.g., how can one apply the logical principles to the emotions which are by nature illogical? The presupposition of this question itself intenable. Because as a famous psychologist observed that there is no action that does not involve emotion. Britan concludes after examining the theory of emotions: 'A conclusion impressed upon us throughout our discussion is the unity of function of knowledge and of feeling. They are true supplements of each other, so that they are useless each without the other. Every one of the cognitive processes has its effective component' (Britan, 41). And the central problem of emotions, namely anxiety, is supposed to be an essential quality of human nature as such. Rollo May concludes after an extensive study of this phenomenon; 'the positive aspects of selfhood developing as the individual confronts, moves through, and overcomes anxiety creating experiences' (May, 333). These problems can be dissolved if we once again remind ourselves what Aristotle has said and this is our presupposition in carrying over the present study; 'For what were the business of a speaker, if the thought were
revealed quite apart from what he says? Therefore, there must be a link between the thought which takes place in acts and the speech.

There might arise a further problem with regard to the conclusions one can arrive at about the meanings of the creative action. We can never be absolutely certain as to what the speaker who belongs to the history had intended his language to be understood. An objective researcher whose experience is conditioned by the cultural, social and historical factors cannot come out of it and therefore, the knowledge of a historical figure is impossible. This is a sensible question. But what really happens when one reads? This problem is closely connected with the type of meanings we propose to understand through the poetry. We do not mean that the poetic meanings are identical in all respects with the meanings of other social actions. In case of the poetic texts of ancient India, there lie implicitly criticisms and justifications of various social norms of the time of the poet. In such a situation, Iser makes a remarkable observation in his 'Act of Reading', as to what really happens in the act of reading. 'If these norms have now faded into past history and the reader is no longer entangled in the system from which they arose, he will be able not only to reconstruct, from their remodification, the historical situation that provided the frame work for the text but
also to experience for himself the specific deficiencies brought about by those historical norms and to recognize the answers implicit in the text' (Isen, 74-5). For the further theoretical remarks in connection with these objections one may see our section 'On presupposition, reflection and objectivity'.

We shall end up our introduction by providing the historical significance of the methodology employed in the thesis. The concept of attitude is not unknown to the psychology. In Freudian terms we are concerned with the restricted area of unconscious. The preconscious is explained by Freud in the following manner; 'Some processes become conscious easily; they may then cease to be conscious, but can become conscious once more without any trouble: as people say they can be reproduced or remembered' (Freud (2), (16). In the therapy Freud used this concept in order to know very similar processes as we would be dealing with. Therefore, the preconscious is that part of unconscious content which can become conscious when required. In the history of general psychology gradually these concepts are placed by the terms such as drives, responses etc. Within this framework, we may quote a certain analysis of emotions by Lazarus which appears in his article entitled 'Emotion and cognition; with special reference to anxiety'. The central concept of the analysis is appraisal. 'We have chosen the term appraisal to designate the cognitive processes mediating between the environmental situation and the emotional reaction' (Lazarus, 141).
He then enumerates three formal kinds of appraisals namely, primary appraisal, secondary appraisal and reappraisal. This does not follow from this that these processes are noticed. Thus he says, that these may be realized unconsciously. (Preconsciously, in Freudian terminology). (See Lazarus, 144-5).

As Prof. Doob has defined the attitude, these mediatory responses are nothing but attitudes (See Doob). Therefore, we are majorly concerned with the speaker's, in the sense of the poet or a character of poet's creation, attitudes in the sense of mental acts. We in general try to answer the question that how they are understood? Dr. Jung once said that the existence of the mental phenomena is proved by the presupposition and implication the speech reflects. (Jung, 2).

While practicing the literary criticism, we are not subjects for the redherring, if we deal with the attitudes. It is an overlooked aspect of the critical field as such. Hence said Richards in his Principles; 'This aspect of experiences as filled with incipient promptings, lightly stimulated tendencies to acts of one kind or another, faint preliminary preparations for doing this or that has been constantly over-looked in criticism' (Richards, 85).