CHAPTER IV

AUSTRALIA AS AN EMERGING REGIONAL MARITIME POWER
Australia is an area of direct military interests. It constitutes about 10 percent of the earth’s surface and is to a large extent maritime in nature, an area stretching over 7000 km from the Cocos Islands to New Zealand and the islands of the Southwest Pacific and 5000 km from the archipelago and island of Chian in the north to the Southern Ocean. Australia’s marine and estuarine areas (including the continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone) exceed the country’s land mass and encompass around 7.9 million sq. km. Indeed, Australia’s main centres of industry and most of its population is concentrated in the south and southeast, naturally protected by the adjacent oceans and the inhospitable tracts of country to the north and north-west.

Australia is undeniably a maritime nation, yet it is only recently that Australia has begun building up a sound maritime strategy to defend her interests in the Indian Ocean. Australia has external territories which are under her administration. They are the group of non-self governing dependencies of Australia located on the Antarctic continent and in surrounding areas of the Southern Pacific and the Indian Oceans.

*The Defence of Australia 1987* (DOA 87) states that,

> By its very nature, the defence of Australia and its territories emphasises maritime warfare capabilities. This Australian Defence Force (ADF) must be able to conduct maritime operations to prevent adversary from substantial use of exploitation of our maritime approaches.

It is an essential element of this strategy that Australia is able to use the seas surrounding it for its own purposes while denying that use to those who are inimical to its interests. Sea-assertion and sea-denial are major facets of the ability of a nation to exercise sea control. But the concept of sea control does not solely depend on ships

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2. ibid, p.20.
3. DOA 87, n.1, p.45.
submarines and aircraft powers. In fact, it is a complex interdependency of geographical, economic, technical and human factors as well as military capabilities.  

I. HISTORICAL STRATEGIES

Australia is an island and depends on the sea for international trade and as a natural defence barrier. As a nation it never had a clear maritime defence strategy. Protected by Great Britain in the nineteenth century, Australia has not been a strong maritime or naval power. Historically, Australians have left their maritime industries in the hands of foreigners. However, Australia has started its maritime force posture and defence strategy after it obtained its independence in 1901, and subsequently began to build a strong local navy in the years between the two world wars, particularly in the 1930s. Cockburn Sound in western Australia had already been established as a naval base. Gradually, Australia came to rely on the concept of forward defence to counterbalance the communist threat in the region.  

As far as the defence of Australia itself was concerned, this encompassed the protection potentially provided by major allies, initially Britain and more recently the United States. Later, Australia adopted the concept of self-reliant defence in order to protect the maritime environment that surrounds her territories.

Australia's maritime defence strategy also appeared to be emerging in the early 1960s, prior to the Vietnam War, acquiring warships like destroyers, submarines, air-arm aircraft etc. and substantially upgraded naval bases in western, northwest and south-


east of Australia. This infrastructure development was a significant step towards self-reliance in defence. Since then, Australia has widened its maritime operations in cooperation with allied naval forces in distant oceans and even land operations in Southeast Asia and Papua New Guinea.

(a) Threats to Australia

There could be three direct threats to Australia's vital interests: the first is disruption of its coastal and overseas trade, the second is bombardment, probably with nuclear missiles, and the third is invasion and occupation. In fact, Australia has experienced each of these. For most of the past two centuries, Australians have been afraid of Asians because they pose external threats to her security. In the 1880s, there was widespread anxiety about the strategic threat posed by China. Japan became 'the yellow peril' in 1890s. Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905 came as a shock to Australia and renewed fears that the Japanese would extend their power southward and threaten Australia's security. However, after the defeat of Japan in the Second World War, Australia, again out of a sense of insecurity, started diplomatic efforts to persuade its war-time allies, the United States and the United Kingdom, to stay on the Asia-Pacific region.

However, in 1950s and 1960s Australia became preoccupied with the threat of Asian communism. Therefore, Australia signed the ANZUS Treaty in 1951 with United States and New Zealand. Again in 1954, Australia signed another treaty called South

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East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO). Both these treaty objectives was to prevent communism from expansion in the region. Indeed, Australia fought alongside its British-American allies in four wars in Asia aimed largely against communists in Korea, Malay, Borneo and Vietnam between 1950 and 1972. Australia perceived that China had replaced Japan as a possible subjugator and the threat of naval raids essentially disappeared in the light of America's naval supremacy. In addition, the US and USSR replaced Britain and Germany as the chief determinants of global strategic balance.

In 1967, Britain announced her intention to withdraw half of her forces from Malaysia, Singapore and Suez Canal by mid-1971 with the remainder to follow by the mid-70s. This announcement caused considerable concern about the future of Australia's forces in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific Ocean. This announcement also opened the door for the entry of the superpowers into the Indian Ocean and led them into a naval competition in the region. Besides this, the Chinese were beginning to build up a submarine fleet, with Russian assistance and in early seventies Chinese possessed more than thirty submarines. There is another possible threat to Australian shipping from the air. Within two or three hundred miles off the coasts of China, ships would have to be prepared for attacks from the air, either direct bombing attacks or more probably by cruise missiles launched by aircraft or surface ships, guided or moving into their targets. Therefore, defense against such attacks must come from fighter aircraft, which can shoot down the bombers or destroy the ships launching the missiles, and from the missiles in the defending ships themselves, to deal with approaching cruise missiles.

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7 The parties to the Treaty were: Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United States and the United Kingdom.

8 Ball and Kerr, n.6, p.10.

Australia began to strongly consider the fact that before the Chinese, Soviet or other threats emerged to Australian trade, she would have to build a large number of long range submarines, train crews in distant operations and set up powerful radio stations to detect enemy submarines and to protect its national interests.

The Soviets also had the capability of attacking the whole territory of Australia. The Soviet navy possessed over 20 nuclear-powered and 35 conventional missile-firing submarines in the late 60s, and the Chinese at least one conventionally powered missile-firing boat. The range of the Soviet SS-18 missile was probably between 1,500 and 2,000 miles and as all important Australian targets are on the coast, the area from which the submarines could fire would be more than six million square miles. One of the events shocking to Australia was the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, taken in conjunction with other Soviet military initiatives in Africa and the expansion of the Soviet air and naval facilities at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. The Soviet also sought to enhance its strategies posture in the West Pacific in areas which directly affected Australia's security. In fact, the advent of a class of Soviet submarine new to the Indian Ocean necessitated a re-thinking by the RAN on anti-submarine warfare and impact on defence policy. It was not only the increased Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean which gave cause for concern but also the developing naval power of India, China and Indonesia. Australia was convinced that in the long term China might establish a primary status in

13 Maritime Strategy Tutorial - Outline, RAN Staff College Study 3 Notes, RAN staff college, HMAS Penguin, p.3.
the region and that could be of substantial political and strategic consequence for Australia.\textsuperscript{14}

On the other hand, a hostile regime in Indonesia might possibly cause trouble in Australia and Papua New Guinea or if not inhibited by the ANZUS treaty could pose an invasion threat to Australia's northern coasts. In fact, Indonesia had the capability to do that because she has a very large army and already possess twelve ex-Soviet submarine fleets.\textsuperscript{15}

India had re-emerged as a major maritime power. The Indian navy is only one of five major naval powers capable of sustained long-range deployment of seaborne strike aircraft. The recent establishment of an Indian coastguard similar to that of the United States, frees most of its main naval force fleet elements (twelve submarines, two VSTOL carriers, five gas-turbine destroyers, thirty-three frigates and corvettes) for long-range open ocean force projection activities.\textsuperscript{16}

The importance of Australia attached to the Indian Ocean was highlighted in 1984 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bill Hayden, who stated that,

\begin{quote}
... Australia has important national interests in the Indian Ocean region. Together with the Pacific Ocean and the region to Australia's north, the Indian Ocean was an area of strategic significance to Australia. In particular the Government had an enduring responsibility to protect Australia's western coastline and our offshore resources interests and deep interest in the territories of Christmas and the Cocos Island....\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{14} Alan Dupot, \textit{Australia Threats Perceptions: A Search for Security}, working paper No.82, Australian National University (Canberra, 1992), p.82.
\textsuperscript{15} Blackman, n.9, p.137.
\textsuperscript{17} W.Hayden, \textit{Australian Policy on the Indian Ocean} (Perth, 1984).
\end{flushleft}
(b) Defence Policy

Australian defence policy came into form after World War II. Defence issues were the chief element of Australia's external policies from 1901 to 1945. The first defence policy adopted in 1950s was called 'forward defence', to be strengthened during this period with commitments of Australian forces to fight in distant war theatres. It was essentially unquestioned until the Vietnam era (to prevent communist movements in East Asia and Australia). The policies of forward defence and dependence upon 'great and powerful friends' was to be ended in the early 1970s. The forward defence policy was replaced by policies of greater concepts of 'self-reliance' in 1972, means defence in-depth, to focus the immediate approaches such as the sea-air gap, within a framework of collective security and alliances. In 1969, President Nixon had announced at Guam that US forces were unlikely to be committed to the Asian mainland again. Australia had to finally accept the responsibility for its regional security. The strategic basis of Australian Defence Policy 1971, adopted that, "Australia must pursue her own security interests by her own efforts more than necessary before." The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy 1973 approved by the Defence Committee and endorsed by the Whitlam Labour Government on 1 June 1973, stated that Australia must now assume the primary responsibility of its own defence against any neighbourhood or regional threats.


19 Ball and Kerr, n.6, p.11.


21 Defence Committee-1975, (Canberra, 1 June 1973), p.84.
In November 1976 another Defence White Paper was commissioned by the Whitlam government. One of the themes was to increase the defence infrastructure in the north and west of the country. This included the expansion of HMAS Stirling at Cockburn Sound, construction of patrol boat bases at Cairns and Darwin and the extension of the airfields at Amberley and Learmonth. In 1985 the Dibb Review was commissioned by the Minister for Defence and Dibb's recommendations were incorporated into the 1987 Defence White Paper. Threats to Australia were identified in terms of the possible levels of conflicts that may be encountered: 'low level', 'escalated low level,' and 'more substantial'. The 1987 White Paper also suggested that regional stability should be approached mainly through self-reliance. In pursuit of this stability the government acquired an additional six to eight major surface combatants, six new submarines, OTHR, modern sensors for the P-3Cs, the upgrade of the F-111 fleet, and the introduction into service of the FA-18 Hornets.

In the 1987 Defence White Paper, the Minister for Defence, Kim C. Beazley announced the intention to create a genuine two-ocean navy by basing half the fleet of HMAS at Stirling in Western Australia. This will enhance the navy's capability to operate throughout its area of direct military interest. If this two-ocean concept is taken into the Defence policy it could create a navy on both coasts based on the assessment of possible political, economic and military development originating in both Pacific and Indian Oceans and got many advantages in the region.


The Defending Australia, *Defence White Paper 1994* (DA94) states that, "as an island continent, the primary focus of our defence effort is on our sea and air approaches, which can be turned to our decisive advantage."25 Though the end of the Cold War has reduced global threats, but at other levels the use of military force has not diminished and indeed may become more common.26 Therefore, in order to achieve its strategy Australia intended to use sea power. DA94 advocated a strong maritime emphasis for Australia's concept of depth in-defence and adopted a predominantly maritime strategy for the defence of Australia's sea and air approaches and ultimately for the defence of Australia itself.

The aim of DA94 is pursuing a maritime strategy in order to defend Australia's national interests, and to provide the ADF with the greatest degree of flexibility in the execution of its allocated task. The current principal Australian defence locations and the Navy's infrastructure around Australia are shown in Map 4.1A and Map 4.1B.

### II. MARITIME CAPABILITIES

Australia decided on the basic shape of its navy and then participated in the general build-up of Western forces. During the Cold War, the arms race between the superpowers in the Indian Ocean brought a substantial naval capability to Australia's doorstep in 1970s and 1980s. Currently, Australia has surplus of capability over the essential requirements for maritime defence. Therefore, Australia had already laid down two stages for greater and efficient maritime operations. First, it has identified the

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AUSTRALIA'S PRINCIPAL DEFENCE LOCATIONS

MAP 4:1-A

structures of forces. And two, it has to consider what additional capability will be required for Australia to play the role of a maritime power in other parts of adjacent regions. With these objectives there has been progressive changes in the naval defence policy in the 1980s.

In the 1980s and 1990s, Australia has tremendously developed her maritime capabilities and also established a multi-layered detection system which will transform her defence strategy. Australia has developed the world's most advanced long-range radar, the Jindalee OTHR. A system of up to three new stations is being planned to allow around the clock surveillance of Australia's vast northern approaches. Long-range strike capabilities are being developed in order to respond quickly and lethally to early warnings far from Australian shores. This includes both air and naval forces. The air forces has been upgraded and eighteen of the 22 F-III bombers have been fitted with the Pave Tack system for accurately guiding Harpoon missiles and bombs on to land and sea targets. The F-III's range encompasses the Indonesian archipelago from Java eastward, including Sulawesi and Irian Jaya, as well as Papua New Guinea and New Caledonia. Australian has also acquired 75 F/A-18 fighters from the United States as replacements for the Mirage fighters. The F/A-18s are equipped to destroy aircraft and in 1992 had an enhanced capability to attack ships with Harpoon missiles. In-flight refuelling aircraft will soon be available for the F/A-18s, which will increase their effective range and payload enabling them to bomb targets on land. Even the RAAF's 20 P-3C Orions which are long-range maritime patrol aircraft, can carry Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and torpedoes for use against submarines and sea mines. The F-III's and

F/A-18s are deployed on rotation at Butterworth air base in Malaysia, and a number of P-3C Orions are also stationed there all year around under the FPDA.

Surface and submarine naval forces are undergoing the most dramatic expansion. The navy's fleet of major surface combatships are being expanded from twelve to sixteen or seventeen and the new class of warships with range and armament have been operating throughout the area of direct military interests and beyond. The army is studying innovative solutions to military challenges which these units will face in the north, including armoured fighting vehicles etc. Other forces secure key military, economic, and civilian areas with reserves playing a major role. With the combination of air, land and sea forces, Australia can secure and fight against any possible aggressor.28 These forces have been equally well equipped with long-range fighters, ships, submarines and highly mobile ground forces.

Presently Australia is acquiring a substantial number of new aircraft, warships and submarines for the ADF as shown in (see Annexure III). This arms acquisition will enhance the flexibility and speed of response for any operations in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Examination of the Indian Ocean littoral states and the possession of missiles and submarine-launched missiles such as the Harpoon can be a considerable threat to the vital assets to the Indian Ocean region. The air-to-surface missile fitted in the maritime strike aircraft of the Indian Ocean navies places Australia at considerable advantage (as shown in Table 4.1) without comparing to the People's Republic of China's airforce strength.

Table 4.1: Composition of Principal Indian Ocean Navies

A. Surface Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Aircraft carrier</th>
<th>Sub-marines</th>
<th>Destroyers</th>
<th>Frigates</th>
<th>Corvettes FAC</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% coastal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>72.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>90.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Aerial Maritime Strikes Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>ASM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>P-3C</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4000 nm/7410 km</td>
<td>ASM-89 Harpoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-18</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>575 nm/1065 km</td>
<td>ASM-89 Harpoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-IIIC</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2549 nm/7410 km</td>
<td>ASM-89 Harpoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>P-3C</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4000 nm/7410 km</td>
<td>Harpoon Exocet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4855 nm/8955 km</td>
<td>Harpoon Exocet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mirage-V</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>750 nm/1390 km</td>
<td>Harpoon Exocet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-3B</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4750 nm/8955 km</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fokker F-27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2605 nm/4800 km</td>
<td>Harpoon Exocet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Tu-16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2605 nm/4800 km</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>P-3K Orion</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4000 nm/7410 km</td>
<td>Harpoon Exocet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Jaguar</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>290 nm/537 km</td>
<td>Sea Eagle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sukhoi*</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>/3200 km</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sea Harriers</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Sea Eagle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sea Kings</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Sea Eagle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mirage 2000</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Sea Eagle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>P-3F Orion</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Times of India, 7 August 1997.

The above Table 4.1-A shows the composition of some Indian Ocean navies. Their Brown-water nature is evident from their modest size and also from the fact that
fast attack and coastal craft are considered the backbone of their maritime forces forming more than 50 percent of the respective navies. The only exception to this pattern is Pakistan which incidentally, has the smallest coastline and fewest maritime concerns of all these nations. As in the Table 4.1-B the most formidable naval air strike forces is Australia because she had the longest range capability in the region, followed by Pakistan, but Pakistan had a limited coastal area. Indeed, Australia had maintained both equal air power and sea power compared to the littoral states in the Indian Ocean.

Currently, Australia's defence policy focusses on three main themes: (i) the defence of Australia: a prime strategy for Australia is to defend the Australian continent, Australia's offshore territories and its maritime approaches (the 'sea-air gap group'). Military and strategic measures have been undertaken by the main players, the Department of Defence/ADF and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The ADF Headquarters was set up at Russell Hill in Canberra, the joint-service functional or environmental commands (Air Command, Maritime Command and Land Command), and the in-theatre Northern Command (NORCOM) in Darwin were established. The ADF force structure, from its major combatant elements to its communications and logistic support systems has been designed for defence of Australia. The ADF indeed, accepted the defence of Australia as a national responsibility.

Secondly, regional contingencies in the South Pacific, Australians foresee that the regional contingencies could involve hostilities especially in northern Australia and the immediate approaches. Therefore, to prevent such hostilities the ADF will be employed in regional contingencies in the South Pacific. The Australian government has

29 Ball and Kerr, n.6, p.56.
30 Ross Babbage, *A Coast Too Long: Defending Australia Beyond the 1990s* (Sydney, 1990), pp.32-44.
been focussing on the three possible situations in which ADF might involve in operations in this region: (1) The provision of support for a legitimate government in maintaining internal security; (ii) counter-terrorist operations; and, (iii) the protection or rescue of Australian citizens abroad in both opposed and unopposed circumstances. The ADF have been placed on high alert because Australian had witnessed in mid-1980s events such as the Fiji coup in May and September 1987, the riot in Vanuatu in May 1988, and Port Morseby disturbances in early 1989, and an early 1990 evacuation of Australian nationals from Bouganville. With the prevailing situation in the South Pacific, Australia realised some sort of capability would be required for such regional operations. As the 1994 Defence White Paper stated,

> Activities in support of our regional interest will not in themselves determine the force structure of the Australian Defence Force, but our existing capabilities will continue to provide us with the scope to undertake the full range of activities and projects necessary to support our regional objectives.

Australia had already deployed surveillance and early warning capabilities, such as the Jindalee over-the-horizon radar system, the *P-3C Orion* long-range maritime patrol (LRMP) aircraft and sophisticated signals intelligence capabilities, which cover several thousand kilometres in the region.

Thirdly, Australia’s defence cooperation with states of South East and the South Pacific, is mainly based on the regional defence policy. Security has played a vital role in making defence strategy. In fact, security relates military threats to perceived national interests and military means to deal with those threats. Paul Dibb stated in 1986 ‘Review

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33 *Defending Australia 1994*, n.26, p.86.
of Australia's Defence Capabilities' that security policy should protect the nation from armed attack and from constraints on independent national decisions imposed by the threat of such attack. This concept was endorsed by Australian Defence as a defined security.

According to the DOA-87 it gives priority to the ability of the ADF to mount operations capable of defeating enemy forces in its area of direct interests. This area of direct military interests has been defined as including South-East Asia, Indonesia, the Eastern Indian Ocean, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand and other nearby areas of the South-West Pacific (Figure 4.1). Again in the Strategic Review 1993 (SR 93) stated that the importance of the region to Australia's security and the need to 'move beyond the framework of existing relationship' are major themes. The Defence Minister Robert Ray also supported in SR 93 that there now exists an integral link between the defence of Australia and the country's increasing defence engagement with regional nations. The ADF is now more involved with ASEAN defence forces joint exercises (with 38 percent of its joint exercises being with ASEAN forces and only 29 percent with US forces in 1994-95). The ASEAN countries have moved towards Australia in respect of defence cooperation. Even in Australia there are now more ASEAN defence personal than US personal especially at the joint facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar. ASEAN countries like Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia are more engaged with Australia with respect to cooperative defence activities than with any other country.

34 The Defence of Australia 1987 n.1, p.30.
35 ibid, p.2.
36 Strategic Review 1993 (Canberra), p.32.
37 ibid, p.iii.
Modern weapons are being procured and restructured in the Royal Australian
Navy (RAN) to strengthen its ability for effective operations and to respond quickly to
low-level threats and to provide a basis for expansion in the case of higher level
threat.\textsuperscript{38} The first of the new \textit{Kockums Type 471} design \textit{Collins} Class Boats, \textit{HMAS Collins} was launched into Adelaide river on 28 August 1993.\textsuperscript{39} It is the first
development of a major warship to meet the RAN's specific needs; all other major
warships have been relatively proven designs for European or US navies with some
modification for Australian conditions. The second of Australia's state of the Art diesel
powered \textit{Collin}-class models, \textit{HMAS Farcumb} was launched in December 1995.\textsuperscript{40}
Australia plans to have at least six and possibly eight of the world's biggest and most
sophisticated non-nuclear submarines. The \textit{Oberon}-class is being phased out as the
\textit{Collins}-class is being phased in. The \textit{HMAS Onslow} underwent her third major refit at
Australian Defence Industry's (ADI) Garden Island facility. \textit{HMAS Otama} underwent
her ADI refit from August 1993 and will be ready in 1997.

The Australian navy has three \textit{Adam} Class DDGs, \textit{HMAS Perth}, \textit{HMAS Hobart}
and \textit{HMAS Brisbane}. These ships have operated for 25 years with RAN. The \textit{HMAS
Brisbane} has been re-fitted with reconfiguration of the communications system and
communications centre, and installation of \textit{Navislan} and is now playing the trial ship role
for a number of accounting systems that are being introduced fleet-wide, including
\textit{SLIMS}. The RAN received the former \textit{USN Adam} class \textit{USS Goldsworthy} in 1994 which
will be used to support the Australian destroyers, it is one of only three \textit{US Adam} class

\textsuperscript{38} Peter Lewis Young, "The Australian Army - An Updated Review", \textit{Asian Defence Journal}, March
1995, p.34.

\textsuperscript{39} ibid, May 1995, p.29.

which was modernised to RAN Mod Adams class standards. The two Australian-built FFGs are HMAS Melbourne and HMAS Newcastle. HMAS Newcastle was commissioned in late 1993 and in March 1994 off Jervis Bay. HMAS Melbourne returned to base in December 1994 after five months overseas deployment including major exercises with a US carrier group. The new ANZAC class frigates are being built at Transfield's Williamstown shipyard since 1994. It is designed by the German designers Blohm + Voss and Celsius Tech of Sweden for the command and weapons system.

The Australian Navy had also acquired two ex-USN landing ships, USS Saginaw and USS Fairfax country, now called them HMAS Manoora and HMAS Kanimbla. These two ships, ex-USN ships, had undergone modifications to meet RAN requirements. The ships, which normally operate one large helicopter, will launch four Blackhaws/Seahawks or Sea Kings after being modified. It is expected that the Manoora and Kanimbla will last 20 years in RAN Service. In fact, these two ships are the replacement of HMAS Toburk.

The minehunters based on the Gaeta design have been ordered, which is an undertaking by ADIs at Throsby Basin. The design is notable for its shock resistant hull and exceptionally low magnetic and acoustic features and work began in September 1994. The induction of this Gaeta class will strengthen the navy's minehunting capabilities. At the moment RAN's patrol boat duties are carried out by Fremantle class patrol boats. These boats are the workhorses of EEZ patrol, regularly apprehending illegal fishermen in northern waters. Landing Craft Heavy (LCH) play a 'maid of all work' role for the

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42 ibid, p.30.
navy as well as support of the army. A sole LCH, *HMAS Balikapan*, is based at Darwin and now has a permanent crew after refit. The RAN is also taking up the project on personal boats to restored regular warships. In the other equipment project during 1994-95, the RAN acquired a global position system (GPS), undertaken as a joint project with the Air Force. Kelwin Hughes Ltd took the contract to supply and install 21 KH 1020 naval GPS navigation systems abroad the RAN's priority vessels. The Defence Industries are also engaged in manufacture of the *Nulka* howering anti-missile decoy. The RAN will install *Nulka* in its *FFG* destroyers and *ANZAC* class frigates. *AWADI* will install the decoys into RAN ships in three stages, installation into a selected *FFG*, develop and build a fire control system and assist with acceptance into naval service trials, fit the system to the other five *FFGs*, and then fit the system to all *ANZAC* class frigates. The RAN Laser Airborne Depth Sounder (*LADS*) has been operating since February 1994 surveying the Greater Barrier Reef. The system was recently demonstrated in Indonesia, off Enggano Island and showed the system to be far quicker and more accurate than traditional depth sounding methods.

Joint projects have also been undertaken between RANs and RAAF's on the Australian Army's *Blackhawk* helicopter. It was found that the *Blackhawk* could operate aboard ships in support of amphibious operations. Australia Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) improved satellite Fleet Broadcast Receiver (FBR) called *Stanilite*. This system will receive everything from operational data to weather conditions. The system can receive at 1,200 bits per second (bps) which is the fleet broadcast format or at 9,600 bps which is emergency high speed format. Currently, RAN ships have access to a single channel for fleet broadcast via the US Fleet *Satellite*
subsystem. The DSTO's Aeronautical conducted study of ship seaworthiness along with Maritime Research Laboratory and Monash University. Other partners in the project are BHP Lloyds of London and IHI of Japan. It aims to set reliable physical parameters for seaworthiness and design a reliable device that can be fitted to ships to measure these parameters.

On shores facilities also have been undergoing a major reconstruction. The naval base in the west coast, HMAS Stirling, has undergone substantial expansion as more RAN units are stationed there. A notable expansion has been training facilities which operate in conjunction with the Western Australia TAFE (technical and further education) system. Most of the new Collins class submarines will be shorebased at HMAS Stirling naval base on the west coast with up to two boats detached to Fleet Base East. Protector was initially assigned to South Australian waters, but with the new submarine, began its trials and has now returned to HMAS Stirling to await HMAS Collins trials in Western Australia waters. HMAS Protector will be assigned to trials for the next 7-8 years.

The Garden Island extended into the west airfield with an eighty km expansion - a similar construction to the USN's Barking sands range off Hawaii. The US navy's Undersea Warfare Centre was lead designer and programmer. The range consists of three cables laid at around 4,000 m linked to a land-based control centre at HMAS Stirling.

The naval base HMAS Huon Tasmania, which has operated since 1913 has been decommissioned with facilities being consolidated at Anglesea Barracks. The Naval Air Station (NAS) at Nowra is scheduled for installation of an Instrument Landing System (ILS) to replace the present Precision Approach Radar (PAR) system. This will standardise Nowra with RAAF bases which acquired the system in 1994-95.
(ILS) to replace the present Precision Approach Radar (PAR) system. This will standardise Nowra with RAAF bases which acquired the system in 1994-95.

III. EMERGENCE OF MARITIME STRATEGY

The maritime strategy of Australia had been defined in the policy information paper, *Defence of Australia 1987*. A more recent and unclassified discussions of aspects of the strategy can be found in the ministerial statement on Australia’s Regional Security delivered in December 1989.44 Key features of the Australian defence strategy are:

(1) Defence self-reliance set firmly within the framework of the country’s alliances and regional association

(2) Defence in-depth meaning that priority is given to meeting credible levels of threat in Australia’s area of direct military interest and that any adversary should be faced with a comprehensive array of military capabilities having both defensive and offensive components.

(3) A high priority of maritime (naval and air) forces capable of defeating an adversary as far forward as possible in the sea-air gap.

(4) Activities including operations by the ADF, which promote regional security in concert with Australia’s neighbours and prevent threats from arising.

Today, Australia’s maritime force consists of maritime strike capabilities such as ships, submarines, RAAF aircraft (*F/A-18 Hornet, Orion P-3C* and the *F-III*), the two ocean naval basing policy and the development of HMAS Sterling and the acquisition of OTHR as the core of the nation’s maritime surveillance system. With the acquisition of these capabilities, the ADF has moved towards identifying its roles supported by operational concepts that recognise the key features of Australia’s strategic environment and contingencies that may arise there. They are:

44 *Australia's Regional Security, Ministerial Statement by Senator the Hon Gareth Evans Q.C., Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, December 1989 (Canberra, 1989).*
This is the first layer of Australia's maritime strategy of defence in-depth. Intelligence collection is usually seen as a sea assertion mission and this purpose can possibly extend beyond the area of direct military interest. The maritime forces have a vital part to play in both the collection and evolution of intelligence. The inherent mobility and geographical spread of their operations give maritime assets (ships, submarine and aircraft) ample opportunities to observe and enhance knowledge of the regional environment. In this regard strategic circumstances dictate that submarines had advantage to gather intelligence covertly and play important role in this respect at higher levels of conflict.\textsuperscript{45}

Currently maritime forces, in particular ships and aircraft are inherently mobile and possess the capacity to cover great distances such as \textit{F/A-18 Hornet}, \textit{P-36 Orion}, \textit{F-III} and \textit{Collin-class}. Their ability to observe events through Australia's area of strategic interest enhances its knowledge of the regional environment. If any instability arises in the region, surface ships and submarines have the ability to conduct sustained intelligence collection operations and the capacity to cover long distances from their bases. Submarines indeed have a further strategic advantage in capturing intelligence covertly regardless of the level of conflict. That the maritime forces have no doubt in maintaining presence in Australia's maritime approaches is a significant strategic consideration.

\textbf{(b) Maritime Surveillance}

The main priority of maritime surveillance was to detect, identify and necessarily respond to sea and air activity in Australia's sovereign sea and air space - vital to the

protection of national interests. The surveillance of Australia's northern and north-western maritime approaches is important for the early detection of an adversary's activities and timely response to them. Therefore, prominent stations have been set up. The Jindalee operations Radar network will soon be completed in 1997 and will provide for detecting and tracking potentially hostile aircraft across the sea and air gap to Australian territory and will also provide surface surveillance over the northern and north-western approaches to Australia.

Other initiative to improve Australia's maritime surveillance capabilities will include the update and upgrade of the P-3C aircraft fleet in the region. Besides this, towed acoustic array are being fitted in the Collins class submarines to provide a further capacity for detecting ships and submarines and similar arrays will be fitted later to surface ships. Maritime patrol aircraft and naval helicopters carry sonobuoy which can detect submarines within localised areas. The feasibility of fixed seabed acoustic arrays for wide area maritime surveillance will be undertaken soon. However, assets, whether radars, ships, submarines, fixed-wing aircraft or land based coastal watchers, will definitely play an important role in performing this task.

(c) Maritime Patrol and Response

The ADF maintains capabilities for patrolling in the sea and air approaches, responding quickly and decisively to any emerging threat, and protecting shipping, territories and resources in these approaches. Capabilities for maritime operations are based around a mix of aircraft, ships and submarines each fitted with appropriate sensors and weapons. The P-3C Orion, F-Ill and F/A-18 aircrafts can patrol large maritime areas.

and intercept hostile ships or submarines using a variety of sensors and precision missiles and torpedoes. The P-3C fleet will undergo a major upgrading of capacity and to extend its operational life.\footnote{Defending Australia, n.26, p.43.}

With the possession of six Collins class submarines it will be able to play a significant role for this decade as it will provide a very substantial capacity for maritime patrol and response, maritime strike and support of a number of other roles. Six Huon class minehunters will be constructed in Newcastle over the remainder of this decade to balance the planned ADF mine countermeasures force. This force will have a significant capacity to detect and neutralise mines in port approaches, confined shipping routes and focal areas.\footnote{Force Structure Review, Report of the Minister for Defence, May 1991, AGPS (Canberra, 1991), pp.1-2.} A new class of patrol boats will be acquired to replace Class Patrol Boats. The new vessels will have more capable combat systems weapons and sensor suites, allowing better integration with other maritime assets and hence a capacity for surface warfare in coastal and inshore waters.\footnote{ibid. p.43.}

Currently, larger surface ships possess a multi-role capability that allow them to conduct anti-air warfare (AAW), anti-surface warfare (ASUW), and anti-submarines warfare (ASW), if not always simultaneously then at least without having to be withdrawn from the sea of operations to re-configure weapons systems.\footnote{W.S.G. Bateman and R.J. Sherwood, "Maritime Power and Australia", Australian Defence Force Journal, no.103, November/December 1993, p.14.} Harpoon missiles, a key element in the capacity for maritime operations are deployed on a range of ADF aircraft, ships and submarines. These missiles continue to improve precision

\footnote{Defending Australia, n.26, p.43.}
\footnote{ibid. p.43.}
missile capability. In the future all major surface combat units will be equipped with helicopters to extend the effectiveness and range of the ships' combat systems like Seahawk helicopters and the Sea Kings currently operating from surface combatants very effectively. The Sea King will be modified to extend its life until about 2010.

(d) Protection of Shipping, Offshore Territories and Resources

The most crucial and demanding task for ADF is the protection of shipping, offshore territories and research and need deployment of forces over extended distances. It is true that ADF have maintained the capacity for escorting ships using its fleet of surface combatants assisted by a range of aircraft where their reach and endurance permit.

The navy also plays an important role in protection of shipping through measures such as safe routine and a combination of maritime assets to maintain sea and air control of particular focal areas for specific periods. This control is achieved by escorting high value targets through areas of potential vulnerability conducting mine countermeasures operations as appropriate or if required, by intercepting and slowing down an adversary's air surface, and sub-surface units. During such periods control can be achieved by offensive measures to neutralise hostile capabilities through strikes against the adversary's base.

Most of Australia's offshore territories and resources are away from main military bases and industrial and logistic support centres. Australia cannot isolate these offshore territories because it has advantages of air assets, although there are limited airfields in

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it. The Cocos and Christmas Islands have air fields but depend on ability to resupply with fuel.\textsuperscript{52} Australia's offshore territories and oil gas resources infrastructure are protected by a combination of maritime patrol aircraft and surface combatants, air defence using \textit{F/A-18} aircraft and ground-based missiles and deployment as necessary of land forces.

(e) \textbf{Support of Land Forces}

In northern Australia the ADF maintains a capacity to intercept and defeat hostile aircraft and missiles. While all naval units are well-equipped for the operation by transporting equipment, stores and personnel, the RAN's heavy landing ships and heavy landing craft provide a specialist capability by their ability to discharge cargo and personnel across a beach or through non-operational ports by reaching or the use of small vessels. Naval helicopters also contribute to these operations. Three squadrons of \textit{F/A-18} fighter aircraft provide primary air defence response which are based in Darwin unmanned air bases in northern Australia and by the availability of aerial refuelling aircraft.

The government will upgrade the capacity of the \textit{F/A-18} fleet alone with new sensors, electronic counter-measures and weapon system which are compatible and fully integrated with the \textit{F/A-18}'s current avionics. Weapons and sensor suite will be managed to enable the aircraft to remain fully effective until their replacement around 2015.\textsuperscript{53}


\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Defending Australia}, n.26, p.52.
The Sea Sparrow and Standard missiles are capable of countering incoming missiles and the Nulka decoy system will be installed in a number of ships.

(g) Strategic Strikes Capability

The ADF possesses 23 F-III aircraft which represent a unique force in the region. This aircraft are long-range with the ability to strike sea and land targets with substantial immunity. Four F-III aircraft are fitted to conduct all-weather and long-range reconnaissance. Since the acquisition of F-III aircraft the ADF is effectively operating in all strategic areas.\(^{54}\) The ADF's submarine force can exploit, interdict shipping and otherwise attack an adversary within range of hostile shore-based weapons and aircraft, and land special forces and conduct covert mine laying. With the coming of the Collins Class submarines which have been deployed in sensitive areas, they can strike ships using a variety of sensors to locate targets and a combination of missiles and torpedoes. Aircraft like F-III, F/A-18 or P-3C are capable of using precision-guided weapons and with precision munitions by day or night and in all weather conditions.\(^{55}\)

IV. AS A REGIONAL MARITIME POWER

The most crucial strategic areas for Australia lies in South East Asia, the South-West Pacific and the eastern Indian Ocean. In 1972 the introduction of ‘self-reliance meant defence in-depth’.\(^{56}\) The primary focus of self-reliance is for Australia to develop its capacity to mount and sustain, predominantly within the national capacities.

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54 The Defence Australia 1987, n.1, p.41.
forces capable of meeting "... any credible level of threat in Australia's area of direct military interest." Later on it was not confined to Australia and its territories but her primary strategic interest extended into the South East Asia and South West Pacific neighbours. In the defence review of 1972 it was stated that,

The best defence of Australia's interests goes beyond the defence of Australian territory alone. It calls for military capability evident to other countries, to project Australian strength beyond the continental boundaries... drawing on increasing self-reliant military strength, we continue to recognise and support the security interests which we share with those who are part of our special strategic environment.  

Again in the 1987 White Paper, the Defence Minister reaffirmed that the South Pacific, South East Asia and the East Indian Ocean are our 'area of primary strategic interests.' This definition was also used in the 1993 Strategic Review (see Map 4.2).

Subsequently, Australia upgraded her naval vessels. The airforce has in-flight refuelling, army has become more mobile and deployable. The ADF has generally acquired better surveillance and patrol capacity. Political, economic and military developments and stability limiting the potential powers or conflict in this region are of prime concern to Australia. Indeed, Australia is the major power in this region and she has capacity to deploy a significant force in any circumstance. P.Dibb, Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centres, said, "we are the biggest power in the South Pacific but in South East Asia the equation is more equal." 

57 ibid, p.23.
58 ibid, p.5.
60 Manoj Joshi, "Strategic Coordination Australia and South East Asia". Frontline. 16 July 1993, p.54.
(a) South-West Pacific

The South-West Pacific countries are strategically important to Australia because of its geographic proximity to it and Australia's major trading partners like Japan and the US run through this region. The interests of Australia has grown since the 1970s when a number of the island nations began to attain independence and the interest of external powers was stimulated. In fact, the South-West Pacific countries has strained relations with USSR (now Russia) due to the fishing agreement between Vanuatu and Kiribati, United States over fishing fees by fleet and French nuclear testing.

With increasing strategic complex situations Australia is playing a dominant power and influential role. During the Fiji Crisis in 1987 the RAN deployed a Task Force to defuse the situation. Australia and the countries of the South Pacific realised the need to strengthen regional stability and limit situations that would create tension on conflict. The White Paper stated Australia's involvement capacity in the following terms

Australia is a major power in the South-West Pacific. We have the capability now to deploy significant forces there. The current substantial capacity of Australian forces... will be further enhanced by the government's decision to increase our naval and air deployment to the region... In the event of a regional conflict, the forces we are developing for our own defence would have direct utility in the South-West Pacific.

Again, Australia's use of military force to intervene in the affairs of South Pacific nations was exercised in the following year in Vanuatu. In 1989 the Foreign Minister issued a statement on Australia's Regional Security in which "Australia was prepared to use its military forces in the South-West Pacific in pursuit of security interests not

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61 South-West Pacific countries are PNG, Fiji, Soloman Islands, Vanuata, Western Samoa, Cook Islands and Tuwalu.

62 Whitworth, n.23, p.23.

63 The Defence of Australia 1987, n.1, p.6.
immediately affecting the defence of our national territory." Then the Australian government realised a sense of responsibility in the region and need of regional security alliance for more stability in the areas. Among the South-West Pacific countries, Australia and Papua New Guinea (PNG) are committed to consult if an external armed attack threatens the sovereignty of either country and to decide what measures should be taken in response. Under the FPDA both countries have responsibilities to support in capabilities development. Within the framework of the ADF Australia will continue to consider PNG's request for assistance which will meet Australia shared interests.

Currently ADF is heavily engaged with the South-West Pacific countries especially protecting and playing a crucial role as an adviser in PNG Vanuatu, Nauru, Tonga, Solomon Islands, Fiji, Western Samoa and Kiribati (see in Map 4.2) in times of serious civil disturbances and external intervention. There has been increased deployments of P-3C Orion aircraft and the major vehicle for Australian military contacts with the region. The Defence Cooperation Programme (DCP) has increased steadily such as training, a range of project, communication engineering tasks etc. Australia will continue to give high priority to helping develop capabilities to police maritime EEZ through continuing support for maritime surveillance project and activities, and consulting with the Forum Fisheries Agency. Australian Government had offered Pacific

64 Australia's Regional Security, Ministerial Statement by Senator, the Hon. Gareth Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, December 1989.


67 The Military Balances, published by Brassey's for the IISS, p.150.

68 Australia's Relations with the South Pacific, p.156.
A U S T R A L I A N  M A R I T I M E  P O W E R

Map 4:2

Patrol Boat Programmes at a total value of $19 million which began in 1995 involving the overhaul and upgrade of systems and equipment to overcome obsolescence and ensure all vessels reach their planned fifteen year life span.69

Historically, Australia and New Zealand had strong personal, economic, cultural and shared strategic interests which result from each country's security being bound closely to the others. Both countries are a member of ANZUS Treaty along with the United States to support and consult in time of external attack. Australia defence relationship with New Zealand reflects the fact that as Asia-Pacific countries, both shared a wide range of interests in the security and stability in South East Asia and South West Pacific regions. Even in the FPDA, New Zealand contributes significantly to the stability and well-being of the South-West Pacific as a partner with Australia. Currently Australia and New Zealand increased its cooperation in defence and sustaining modern capabilities, Australia will continue its commitment to New Zealand Defence Force because it is in her strategic interests. Australia is encouraging countries of the region to fully cooperate for the promotion of economic and common interests under the banner of APEC. Australia is also committed to its alliance with US, New Zealand and the FPDA.70

(b) South East Asia

Australia committed to this region to give higher priority to strategic exchanges, sciences, industry cooperation, cooperative equipment acquisition and training cooperation. Among the South East Asian countries Australian have priority to the

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70 FPDA members are United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore.
ASEAN countries, on defence activities and had common interest. The main formation of ASEAN is to strengthen its military ability and to resist external pressure which is also strategically beneficial to Australia. Both ASEAN and Australia developed their cordial relationships in economic, military strategic in order to maintain stability in the region. They also, promoted their military strategic in the region on land and navy exercises have been established. The ASEAN-Australian economic programme promotes agriculture development especially at Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and Brunei, where Australia had contributed $57 million which is expanding at 25 percent per year.

The Australian strategy is to maintain an intense surveillance of the region stretching in an arc from the Philippines to Malaysia to counter any aggressor from foothold. In fact, Australian defence is progressing and building up on surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in the continent. This is because the end of the Cold War might lead into uncertainty and at the same time South Asia economic powerhouses are worried. They expect that US navy's personnel will decline in the region. However, Australia had established a substantial military power and to some certain extend she might provide some reassurances for the stability in the region.

Australia has an air base at Butterworth in Malaysia and this contributes for the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) which operates under the FPDA by F/A-18 Hornet tactical fighters to cover Malaysia and Singapore region, supplemented on some

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71 ASEAN members are Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippine and Brunei.
72 Joshi, n.60, p.55.
74 Joshi, n.60, p.56.
occasions by \textit{F-III} aircraft.\textsuperscript{75} Under the FPDA provision Australia deployed its array in Malaysia in 3 month rotational tours. The Air Force \textit{P-3C Orion}\textsuperscript{76} long-range maritime patrol from Butterworth to maintain surveillance over the South China Sea and North-east Indian Ocean.

Among the ASEAN countries Malaysia and Singapore are dependant on Australian military strategy assistance (see Map 4.2). Under the FPDA these three countries are committed to consult each other in times of threat or attack from outsiders. Indonesia is of strategic significance to Australia because Indonesia forms a protective barrier to Australia's norther approaches. Indonesia also depends on Australia's military assistance and recently has acquired substantial military power and have desire to maintain stability in Asia as well as in the Pacific region. On 18 December 1995, Australia and Indonesia signed an agreement on maintaining security, that is, any matter which may affect their common security. The ministers will be consulted for the benefit of their security in the region. For any adverse challenge to either party or to their common interests, both countries will take appropriate measures and to promote in accordance with the policies and priorities of each cooperatives in the security field.\textsuperscript{77}

(c) \textbf{External Territories}

The largest of Australia's external territories is the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT). It encompasses 42 percent of the Antarctic continent, an area approximately two-thirds that of the Australian mainland. The Antarctic lies some 1,300 nm south of

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Asian Strategic Review 1991-92}, IDSA (New Delhi, 1992), p.111.

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{The Military Balance 1993-94}, published by Brassey's for the IISS, p.150.

\textsuperscript{77} "What the Security Treaty Says", \textit{Age}, 19 December 1995.
Tasmania, and situated south of the 60° south latitude and lying between 160° east longitude and 45° east longitude. The Antarctic's importance to Australia in the future as a source of raw material and a primary strategic concern, is reflected in the 1987 Defence White Paper which noted that,

The national interest of Australia lies in ensuring that Antarctic remains demilitarised and free from political and strategic competition. So long as Antarctic remains demilitarised, no threat to the security of Australia itself is in prospect from or through that region... with the other Treaty consultative parties, we are working on means to preserve the Treaty.

Australian's assumptions are that the military implications are essentially two-fold. Firstly, the need for protection of current major installation from seizures by foreign power, secondly, the need to eject a foreign expedition which enters the Australian Antarctic Territory without the consent of the Australian Government. It is obligatory for Australia to defend her territories, therefore, Australian's military involve where RACT amphibious vehicles in the ship to shore logistics operations has been carried on. The role of ADF would have to be extended to the surveillance of the Southern Ocean in order to detect possible hostile vessels operating near Australia's claimed territory. Currently, the Australian Army is undergoing scant training in Antarctica due to the severe cold and trying to develop a new range of clothing suitable to operations at temperature consistently below zero degrees centigrade. Aircraft operations are also limited by physical factors. Australian Government is doing its best to preserve its territories through military operations in Antarctica but still face difficulty to mount and sustain.

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The external territories are, Macquarie, Heard and MacDonald Islands, in the Southern Ocean, could be used to support operations in that area or Antarctica. MacDonald Island already plays an important role in supporting Australia’s scientific programme in the southern continent.  

Christmas and Cocos Islands, occupy potentially important strategic position in the Indian Ocean. Norfolk and Lord Howe Islands lie off Australia’s east coast (see Map 4.2). Both the islands have capable forward operation for maritime air if the facilities are upgraded. The other offshore territories are Ashmore Cartier situated in the north west coast, and the Coral Sea Island lying to the north-east of Australia. These islands are also significant only for the extension they provide to Australian jurisdiction over the natural resources in the 200 nm exclusive economic zone.

(d) Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean play a very crucial role to Australia, especially in the eastern Indian Ocean which is considerable geopolitical, economic and strategically significant. The eastern Indian Ocean stretches to the coast of Burma, the West Coast Malaysia, the Indonesia archipelago and the western coast of Australia. This region as a commercial highway on any given day with more than US $1 billion in trade passing through this region on its way to or from East and Southeast Asia and to a lesser extent, North America. This massive trade flow travel between East and Southeast Asian on the one hand and the Middle East and Europe on the other. Indeed, the Indian Ocean is a

80 W.A.G. Dovers, Controlling Civil Maritime Activities in a Defence Contingency, SDSC, Canberra Act, 1959, p.39.

81 The Indian Ocean Challenges and Opportunities seminar, Hosted by the Navy Foundation, New Delhi, 29-30 September 1992.
major international strategic interest for Australia which she focusses through in the
north-west and the Gulf and in the north east littoral states, which is near its neighbours
in South East Asia, who are directly involved in Indian Ocean issues\textsuperscript{82} and stand a
chance of affecting Australia's strategic affairs.

During seventies and eighties Australia adopted a passive role to support the
United States and goes against the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean. Australia and US
jointly built naval base and communication on the western coast of Australia and 50
percent of its surface and fleet in it. But the end of Cold War Australia sees the
emergence of Chinese hegemony in the region where naval station in three islands in
Mynmar (Burma) and South China Sea. The ability of Indian navy and air force project
power beyond the Andaman sea. With these implications, currently Australia's increased
naval involvement in the Indian Ocean is related simply and directly to defence of
Australia interests. The shift in strategic focus to include the Indian Ocean seaboard is
not reflection of the increase in other countries activities in the Indian Ocean or of any
perceived development of threat from the Indian Ocean. Australia's main concern in the
region is to protect her interests.\textsuperscript{83}

Recently, Australia upgraded \textit{HMAS Stirling} naval base just south of Perth. As
part of its two-ocean policy, all the \textit{Collins} class submarines are operated in western
Australian base, which in itself will have implications for the extend of maritime
operations taking place in the Indian Ocean. There is also an expectation that surface
combatants will operate from northern and north-western ports, again increasing the
emphasis on Indian Ocean operations of Australia conducting extensive maritime

\textsuperscript{82} Klenthis, RAN, n.66, p.21.

surveillance operations in the region. The P-3C long-range maritime patrol, F/A-18 and F-III aircrafts has been deployed at Butterworth in Malaysia for surveillance in South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca and eastern Indian Ocean. These aircrafts are undertaking patrolling through rotational basis and no littoral states had such high technic aircrafts. Australia recognised the importance strategic significance of the Indian Ocean region and is now establishing a major fleet base at Cockburn Sound and also air bases at Tindal and Curtin to cover up the entire Indian Ocean. Furthermore, it is increasing its emphasis on using naval force to enhance regional defence cooperation. However, Australia pays more attention to the eastern Indian Ocean and is trying to upgrade both naval and air bases in it, to protect her territories and resources from adversary attack.

V. REGIONAL CO-OPERATION

After the World War II, Australia engaged actively and involved in multi-national cooperation to secure stable defence and able defence from outside attacks. The government set up the Department of External Affairs to workout the realities of a belated yet fairly distinctive three-pronged foreign policy. This policy is to preserve the most historical link with the United Kingdom and older Commonwealth members, secondly to welcome powerful trans-Pacific partner, the United States, to work for increasing close economic and diplomatic ties, and thirdly, strategic link with Australia neighbours, whether through Commonwealth of nations or United Nations memberships or by regional relationships. The first pact was between Australia and New Zealand in

1944 - the treaty called as the Australia New Zealand Army Corp (ANZAC). The main objectives of ANZAC was to maintain the regional zone of defence comprising the South-West and South Pacific areas which is stretching through the area of islands north and northeast of Australia to Western Somoa and the Cook Island.85

In 1949, Australia, New Zealand and United Kingdom had signed a treaty86 called ANZAM to protect and also for coordinating their defence planning in covering the territories of Australia, New Zealand and the former British possessions of Malaya and Borneo, together with adjacent sea areas. The ANZAM was also to prevent and to counter the communist insurgency in the South East Asia. In 1955, under the treaty Australia and New Zealand had agreed to set up a defence station in the region. Australia sent an air transport squadron and Lincoln bomber squadron and some combat troops to Malaysia to fight against the communist insurgents.87

The third security treaty was signed in 1951 with New Zealand and United States and is known as the ANZUS Treaty, and came into force on 29 April 1952.88 The main strategy of the ANZUS was for defence arrangements against a rearmed Japanese and the extension of communist power and influence in the region. The treaty was also to maintain the stability and to balance Asian power in the region, and they also agreed to consult together in defence matters. Australia considered that the ANZUS treaty was the most important instrument of her alliance with US and a great protection from external attack.

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86 The treaty party were Australia, New Zealand and United Kingdom.
87 Miller, n.5, pp.56-57.
Australia had signed another remarkable defence treaty on 8 September 1954 called South-East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO)\(^9\) or the Manila Pact. The SEATO was Australia's first defensive treaty with Asian countries. SEATO was designed to check Soviet and Communist Chinese expansion into the South/Southeast Asian region.\(^9\) Australia was playing an energetic role in all the activities of SEATO and donated impressively\(^9\) to SEATO budgets. The joint military exercises were also prominent among the SEATO countries.\(^9\)

In 1971 Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and United Kingdom established the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). The FPDA's main objective is to provide reassurance to protect Malaysia and Singapore from external threats and to consult together in the event of an attack. In 1995 the Defence Department of Australia stated that Australia's defence cooperation activities are enhancing perceptions of FPDA which is relevant and effective.\(^9\) The contributions of Australia in the FPDA is generally larger than any other participants.

Currently the RAN capability is playing a leading role in the South-West Pacific, South East Asia and in the eastern Indian Ocean. This is due to the ADF maritime capabilities and implementing the Australian policy to the issues. The RAN activities is to protect Australia's offshore interests and the promotion of Australia's image throughout the region. On the other hand, the RAN and the RAAF activity surveillance

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89 SEATO members, n.7.


92 *Current Notes*, vol.27, 1955, p.96.

93 Inspector-General's Division, Department of Defence, *Defence Cooperation* (Canberra, 1995), pp.4-6.
has been enhanced by the Jindalee OTHR network for operational in the region. The Navy's fleet *Fremantle* class patrol boats (FCPB) is actively patrolling in the northern region and RAAF such as - *P-3C*/*Orions*, surveillance extends from northern littoral seas, to the southern ocean, to the offshore territories of Norfolk, Lord Howe, Macquories, Heard, Cocos and Christmas Islands. The *P-3C*/*Orions* surveillance goes beyond Australian territories and covers up to in the South China Sea and Bay of Bengal, which are of strategic importance to Australia.

Australia, presently has a sound maritime strategy to protect sovereign claims, vital maritime interests, deny the use of maritime approaches by an adversary and actively promoting a stable strategic environment. With the maritime assets such as ships, submarines, aircraft and personnels. They provide the foundation for the nations capacity to contribute to a positive security environment through the exercise of military diplomacy or a politico-military capability.