CHAPTER IV

The Zia Era

The preceding chapter endeavoured to evaluate Bhutto’s contribution to the evolution of Pakistan’s foreign policy in the context of the state’s growing links with Muslim countries. It also tried to show how Bhutto attempted to give a new geopolitical and Islamic identity to a "New Pakistan" following the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent political entity in December 1971. The present chapter is an attempt to evaluate how (1) Zia-ul-Haq could scarcely fundamentally deviate from his predecessor in so far as Pakistan’s external orientation towards Muslim countries was concerned, (2) how Zia-ul-Haq, presented with the foreign policy opportunities (with attendant risks) in his neighbourhood following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 28 December, 1979, gave an "Islamic" orientation to the war that ensued, and (3) how Zia-ul-Haq’s internal Islamic reforms impinged on foreign policy and vice versa, during his tenure (1977-1988) which turned out to be the longest innings, to use a cricket metaphor, in the political history of Pakistan. Zia’s assumption of power in July 1977 as a ‘soldier of Islam’ and his death in an aircrash in August 1988 were equally epochal events of far-reaching repurcussions.

During his political career, Zia-ul-Haq was guided by a worldview that was increasingly informed by Islam and militarism. Of the latter two, Islam shaped both his personal behaviour and public domain. This was clearly discernible in his internal Islamization campaign and in Pakistan’s external relations during his stewardship of Pakistan’s turbulent Eighties. Further, his understanding of the rationale of Pakistan’s creation veered round Islam: it was not just to be a ’Muslim Homeland’ but to be an authentic ’Islamic State’. Delivering an address to the nation on radio and television on July 5, 1977 immediately after assuming the reins of power following the bloodless overthrow of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, General Zia declared that Pakistan was 'created in
the name of Islam' and that it would 'survive only if it sticks to Islam'.\textsuperscript{1} The introduction of a variety of Islamization measures at home in the realms of law, polity, economy and social relations were unmistakably geared towards solidifying Pakistan as an 'Islamic State'. In fact, these measures were meant to strengthen his preconceived notion of politics in the Pakistani milieu. State institutions whose creation was owed to his predecessors were revived and strengthened with a view to advising him in the sphere of policy-planning. For instance, the Islamic Ideology Council, created in 1973, was given the task of formulating guiding principles for the implementation of \textit{Nizam-i-Islam} (Islamic Order/System), and of suggesting ways and means of bringing the existing laws into conformity with the \textit{Holy Quran} and \textit{Hadith}. By 1979, the Council began to function as a major policy-planning organ in the sphere of Islamic reformation of the country. The revitalized Council was predominated in its membership by eight maulanas/muftis out of the total of thirteen, one of whom was a Pir, thus relegating to the backseat the syncretistic (Sufistic) Islam in the overall scheme of Islamization ushered in by Zia.

General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq who had occupied the reins of power in Pakistan for well over a decade, had done so by means dubbed as questionable by observers. However, he had left behind a formidable (and contestable) legacy in both the Internal and external politics of Pakistan. In the sphere of domestic activity, as outlined in the aforesaid, his imprint was very much discernible in Pakistan's polity, economy, law and society. In the international realm, the environment contiguous to Pakistan and beyond had created both opportunities and risks for his regime. Notwithstanding this, it would not be erroneous to say that no other regime in Pakistan in its history suffered from a legitimacy crisis as much as Zia's. Apart from this, the regime's longevity was explained in terms of his manoeuvring abilities, lack of consensus among the political forces, the American connection and the healthy

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} \textit{Pakistan Times} (Rawalpindi), 7 July 1977.
\end{itemize}

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economy sustained by Gulf remittances.\(^2\) To add further to these factors, the successful piloting of the First Islamic Revolution in Iran by the late Ayatollah Khomeini reinforced the forces of Islamic assertion in Pakistan with whose cause Zia-ul-Haq had himself identified instantly, and, as later events had conclusively proved, they became his steadfast allies for the cause of Islamization in Pakistan. And, no less important than these was his masterly handling of the Afghan crisis culminating in the withdrawal of the Soviet Army in 1989. As viewed by Rodney Jones in perspective:

Zia's consolidation of power and longevity probably can be attributed partly to the broadening of military influences in society and the economy and to the expanding base of civilian participation in the economic infrastructure associated with routine military life, support, and logistics. These may be indicators of the evolution of a distinctive system of governance in Pakistan, a hybrid that merges bureaucratic and parliamentary traditions from the colonial experience with Islamic juridical and representational forms, and that adapts to indigenous social forces embedded in the national mosaic. Indigenous social forces seem to be undergoing an inexorable process of modernization (i.e. participatory expansion and value redefinition), but one that happens to be quite distinct from the Western idiom. In many respects, the future of security policy objectives and capabilities of Pakistan may hinge on the outcomes of this process. Major political reactions to military rule...may also be shaped by the same underlying process.\(^3\)

The evaluation of Zia's role on the Pakistani scene had evoked both denunciation and eulogy among analysts. In order to assess his contribution to Pakistan, it is necessary to appreciate the strategic environment prevalent at that time.


\(^3\) Ibid., p.66.
The Islamic Bomb

The 'Islamic Bomb' controversy, raised in 1979-80, had received a sort of fillip due to certain developments in the Muslim world. First, the rise of the forces of Islamic assertion in 1978-79, particularly the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Second, during this period, Pakistan's relations with the United States reached their low point due to the nuclear issue. Third, Pakistan's hectic nuclear shopping in many countries and the Libyan government's attempts to buy a nuclear reactor from China and the Soviet Union, close military and economic links between Pakistan and Libya built by both Colonel Qaddafi and Z.A. Bhutto. Fourth, Pakistan's refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In this context, one should note that during 5-9 February, 1979, an International Conference on the "Defence of the Muslim World" was held in London in which the following proposals were made: the setting up of an Islamic Institute of Defence Technology; the establishment of a data bank of Muslim experts in the development of defence organisations; industrial projects to sustain deterrent defence systems; Islamic bank for strategic minerals; defence institutions of each country to familiarize themselves with Islamic concepts of warfare, and a committee of military experts fully qualified in the field of Islamic studies, were mooted and planned in future.4

Besides the aforementioned developments, Bhutto's last testimony before his execution had lent credence to the suspicion. Bhutto asserted:

We know that Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capability. The Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilizations have the capability. The Communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilization was without it, but that position was about to change.5

Sheikh Ali believes that the 'Islamic Bomb' controversy serves Pakistani leadership in many plausible ways: Pakistan wants to capture the leadership of the Muslim world and wants to undercut India's economic and political influence in the Arab Middle East; by associating Islam with nuclear efforts, Pakistan hopes to get not only petro-dollars from the Arab countries but also enlist greater support for its economic and military programmes; to garner Muslim support against strong Indian criticism against its acquisition of nuclear weapons; by calling it an "Islamic Bomb", Pakistan can promote the anti-Zionist aspect of the enterprise.  

Further, it is also designed to obtain strong bargaining power with the U.S. and West European states. It may be noted here that with the possession of nuclear weapons by Kazakhstan, a former Soviet Central Asian republic, the so-called "Islamic dimension" of the nuclear weapons was further extended and the US has been strenuously trying hard to halt the possession of nuclear weapons by non-European states. These U.S. efforts are further redoubled following the demise of the Soviet Union from the international political scene.

Pakistan and the Afghan Crisis

The invasion of Afghanistan by the erstwhile Soviet Union in the last days of 1979 - 'one of the costliest blunders in Soviet foreign policy since the Second World War', in the words of Myron Weiner and retrospectively called 'bleeding wound' by Mikhail Gorbachev in February 1986 - had dramatically upset the security environment of the states of the region, in particular Pakistan, as perceived by it.

Pakistan under General Zia-ul-Haq, denounced the Soviet invasion, called upon the World Community not to rest until all troops were withdrawn, and asked for assistance in dealing with the many refugees who were flooding northwest Pakistan from Afghanistan. Similarly Iran, reacting on 28 December 1979 to the Soviet onslaught, strongly condemned the Soviet moves as anti-Islamic and argued that these actions showed that the USSR, like the USA, was intent on carving up the world. Fortunately, Pakistan had some options available to it at that historic movement: the U.S. connection, the Non-aligned Movement, the United Nations System and not the least, the Islamic state system. It would be worth recalling that the entire international community, barring a few exceptions like India and the socialist states, condemned the Soviet invasion in no uncertain terms. The U.N. General Assembly on 14 January 1980, acting upon the Pakistani initiative, condemned, in a resolution, the Soviet invasion by 104 votes, 18 against, 18 abstained and 12 absent. The resolution, inter alia, expressed "profound concern over the recent military intervention in Afghanistan which violates the sovereignty, territorial integrity and the political independence of that country." It further called upon all states "to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Afghanistan and its position as one of the non-aligned countries, and to refrain from interfering in its internal affairs." Most significantly, the resolution, in one of its operative paragraphs, called for "the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, in order to give the people of Afghanistan an opportunity to determine for themselves the form of government they wish and to choose their own economic, political and social system, without any foreign interference." Prior to this General Assembly vote, the Soviet Union vetoed a Security Council resolution tabled by Bangladesh, Philippines, 

7. The members which opposed the resolution and exercised their negative votes were: the USSR, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Hungary, Laos, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. India abstained from voting.
Jamaica, Niger, Zambia and Tunisia on 7 January 1980. Thirteen Security Council Members approved a resolution which "denounced the armed intervention in Afghanistan and called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from that country". In subsequent years, the overwhelming endorsement of Pakistani stand by the UN General Assembly persisted. In 1983, Pakistan spearheaded a resolution sponsored by 44 countries which had obtained the support of 116 States in favour of an immediate withdrawal of foreign troops. In 1985, the number of countries voting in support went up to 122 and did not decline through the decade. Thus, Pakistan was highly successful in building and holding together through the 80s an international consensus against the Soviet invasion. For the purposes of this Chapter, the response of the Islamic Community as reflected in the Islamic Conference Organisation to the crisis will be taken up for analysis in so far as it lent material and political support to Pakistan as a member that was adversely affected by the invasion. The analysis will also focus upon the endeavours which Pakistan made to mobilize the Muslim opinion vis-a-vis the invasion.

In successfully doing so, Pakistan's historically forged multi-faceted links with the Muslim world, no less contributed by Zia's immediate predecessor, Z.A. Bhutto, came in handy to the former, who moved closer to the pro-U.S. conservative Arab regimes. The Gulf region had a vested interest in a stable Pakistan in order to ensure the former's stability of the monarchical regimes which started perceiving insecurity and threat primarily because of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. The U.S. and the Arab Gulf states had thus felt a vital stake in Pakistan's stability for their own national interests. Moreover, by the time the Afghan crisis erupted, Pakistan had already strengthened its military, economic, political and ideological relations with the states of the Gulf region and the rest of the Muslim and Arab world.
It will not be wrong to say that in Muslim states, the Afghan problem was perceived as an Islamic issue on the basis of which the state responses were crystallised. These responses found their echo in organised and institutional framework symbolised by the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). Ever since the Soviet troops marched into the Afghan territory on 27 December 1979, the OIC had come to play a prominent and vocal though not a very effective role in the Afghan crisis. In doing so, the OIC got an added fillip from the General Assembly which condemned the Soviet invasion in a comprehensive way. Not simply contented with the General Assembly condemnation, General Zia, as a follow-up to the latter, skillfully made use of the diplomatic front provided by the OIC and stressed that the OIC was duty-bound to see to it that the problem resulted in a successful conclusion.

As a response to the Soviet aggression of Afghanistan, the OIC held its extraordinary session of its foreign ministers in January 1980 in Islamabad. Bangladesh took the initiative in proposing an extraordinary session of the OIC’s foreign ministers to be held on 26 January. However, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), Syria, Algeria, Libya and Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Yemen objected to the session taking place on that day because they felt that it would coincide with the proposed setting up of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel on the same day. They called for a change of date. Hence, these five members pointed out that the proposed foreign ministers meeting would divert the attention of Islamic public opinion from this serious development. However, Pakistan rejected the contention of this group and argued, instead, that by meeting on the same day, the Conference could focus attention on this issue as well. In order to accommodate their feelings with the rest of the OIC members, Pakistan, on the request of Iran, and in its capacity as the host, postponed the opening of the session by a day. With the change of the date to 27 January 1980.

9. Ibid., p.28.
January 1980, Algeria and Libya agreed to send delegations to the conference, but Syria and South Yemen decided to keep away, while the PLO declared that it was attending as an observer.\(^{11}\) Thus, it was clear that there were differences among the OIC members vis-a-vis the Afghan crisis which later impacted upon the effectiveness of the OIC's response to the crisis and the strategy to be adopted against the Soviet Union regarding the said crisis.

In this context, it is pertinent to note that these five members were traditionally pro-Soviet in their external orientation. Though it was true that the OIC had unambiguously stated its position vis-a-vis the Afghan crisis, in terms of realpolitik, it was Pakistan that might have faced the brunt of Soviet wrath, had the latter decided to punish Pakistan for playing an active, supportive role in favour of the mujahideen. Zia could not envisage the possibility of directly involving Pakistan in a military brinkmanship with the Soviets, as his country could not afford it, given the military asymmetry obtaining between them, notwithstanding Pakistan's steadfast support to the mujahideen. Thus, championing the resistance cause and resorting to diplomatic track with a view to negotiating a settlement with the Soviets were simultaneously pursued by him. In other words, geopolitical considerations were not altogether conspicuous by their absence in the case of Afghan crisis, notwithstanding the obvious involvement of the Islamic element as perceived both by the mujahideen and the wider international Islamic community. Hence, Pakistan's rationale for assuming a crucial role for itself vis-a-vis the Afghan crisis. As testified by the subsequent developments, it was Pakistan which bore the brunt of the refugees, and it was Pakistan whose national security was threatened by border skirmishes and occasional bombings by Afghan forces.

The OIC position with regard to Afghanistan was contingent upon Pakistan's posture towards the crisis. In fact, the other OIC member-states had little knowledge

\(^{11}\) Ibid., n. 8, p. 28.
of Afghanistan and its complex social mosaic. From 27 April, 1978, when the 'great' Saur revolution brought the People's Democratic Party into power in Kabul till 27 December, 1979, when the Soviet Army entered into Afghanistan, the Islamic Conference did not formulate any response to the situation because Pakistan maintained a low profile on the unfolding Afghan situation. What, in fact, brought about the qualitative change in Pakistan's posture was the prompt and firm American response. In fact, the condemnation of the Soviet invasion was led by the United States followed by Pakistan. It laid an initial basis for an eventual crystallization of a response from the international community including, of course, from the OIC. The U.S. Defence Secretary, Harold Brown, even accused the Russians of helping to suppress "nationalistic Islamic feelings" and called upon the international community to join in condemning the Soviet action. This typical Western response to the crisis as orchestrated by the United States was a function of the Cold war. However, it was altogether a different matter that this Cold war perspective coincided with the response of the Islamic community as represented in the OIC. The West's enthusiasm and support for Afghanistan had started waning with the exit of Soviet troops in 1989 from Afghanistan and with the increasing rhetoric of Islamic solidarity as mounted by both the Afghan resistance movement and the Muslim world represented in the OIC. As it was rightly pointed out by a scholar that the Afghan War against the Soviet invasion got only rather grudging sympathy in the West. Further, the West was prone to under-estimate the will and capacity of the resistance movement to sustain itself particularly in a scenario following the Soviet retreat. With the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, the balance of war started tilting in favour of the mujahideen. As the rhetoric of Islam by the mujahideen mounted, the U.S. began dissociating itself from the resistance movement. By this time, the U.S. and the Soviets had already arrived at an understanding to stall the mujahideen victory. Besides, with the Soviet retreat, the Kabul regime found itself with the vast arsenal left behind by the former at

the latter's disposal, while the Americans stopped arms supplies to the mujahideen, thus ensuring a halt to the mujahideen victory in 1989. Such an U.S. volte face was acknowledged by other analysts also. They discerned the gradual divergence in the American and Pakistani interests in Afghanistan as the withdrawal process unfolded. The American concern, at this stage, pertained only to the Soviet withdrawal; Zia-ul-Haq, on the contrary, desired an Islamic Afghanistan. As he earned the wrath of the U.S. by sticking to his mission, Zia-ul-Haq had to pay the price with his life.14

Pakistan's Response

As the days went by in the immediate post-Soviet invasion, the Pakistani official response assumed a rigid position, with the U.S. having already exhibited a posture of stridency. A statement issued by the Pakistan Government on 29 December 1979, expressed "grave concern" at the development in Afghanistan and described the "induction of foreign troops as a violation of the norms of peaceful coexistence and the sacrosanct principles of state sovereignty. The statement also emphasised the Islamic character of Afghanistan and the fact that it was a member of the OIC.15 Behind this background of the Pakistani position on the crisis, the response of the Islamic Conference gradually evolved over the years. The response rested on four fundamental principles which purported to guide the OIC in relation to the Afghan crisis. They were: first, the total and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; second, respect for its political independence, sovereignty and non-aligned status; third, recognition of the national rights of the Afghan population to determine their own government and the economic and political system

15. Ibid., n. 8, p. 31.
of the country; and fourth, the creation of conditions favourable for the return of
refugees to their homeland in safety and honour. The OIC adopted them as its
organising principles through the 1980s.

Guided by these principles, the OIC considered the Afghan question on three
separate occasions: the extraordinary session of the foreign ministers convened in
Islamabad on January 27, 1980, the eleventh foreign ministers conference held in
Islamabad in May 1980, and the Islamic Summit Conference convened in Taif, Saudi
Arabia, in January 1981. Even though the OIC deliberated the Afghan problem on
these three occasions, the tone of its resolutions passed on separate occasions differed
from each other quite substantially. As, for instance, at the extraordinary session, it
was affirmed that the "Soviet occupation of Afghanistan constitutes a violation of its
independence, and aggression against the liberty of its people and a flagrant violation
of all international covenants and norms, as well as a "serious threat to the peace and
security of the region". Further, the resolution unequivocally "condemned Soviet
armed intervention against Afghanistan, a Muslim and Non-aligned country and called
for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the Soviet Union from
Afghanistan". Thus, the resolution was strongly worded and that it covered all
aspects of the situation in Afghanistan. In the operative paragraphs, the session
exhorted the member states to "withhold recognition to the illegal regime in
Afghanistan and sever diplomatic relations with that country until the complete
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan". It decided "to suspend the
membership of Afghanistan in [sic] the Organisation of the Islamic Conference."It
further urged "all States and people throughout the world to support the Afghan
people and provide assistance to the refugees." The Declaration expressed its
solidarity with them in their Jihad "to safeguard their faith, the independence of their
country and its territorial integrity and the recovery of their right to determine their
destiny and their future". It also expressed its "complete solidarity with the countries
neighbouring Afghanistan as against any threat to their security and well-being and
called upon member states to resolutely support and extend all possible cooperation to

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these countries." In this Session, Pakistan was successful in blocking the Kabul regime from occupying the Afghanistan seat. Juxtaposed to this, the resolution adopted at the eleventh session of the foreign ministers convened in May 1980 was considerably moderate. In the resolution passed at this session, there was no condemnation of the Soviet aggression but only expression of "deep concern" at the "continued Soviet military presence" in the beleaguered country. Further, the same session authorized Pakistan, Iran and the Secretary-General of the OIC to explore possibilities of a political solution leading to a Soviet withdrawal without, however, committing the rest of the Muslim World to talks. At the Taif Summit in January 1981, the resolution expressed "deep concern over the situation created by the foreign military intervention in Afghanistan" 16 without mentioning Soviet Union explicitly. Besides, the Makkah Declaration was notable on another count too: It did not call for a military solution to the crisis. Instead, it re-affirmed its continued support for the struggle of the Afghan people and its determination "to seek a political solution of this crisis, on the basis of an immediate and complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, respect for political independence and territorial integrity, as well as the non-aligned nature of Afghanistan and respect for the inalienable rights of the heroic Afghan people to self-determination without any foreign intervention or presence." 17 Thus, the tone of moderation is discernible in the OIC resolutions adopted particularly at the May 1980 session and the Summit meeting in January 1981. The reasons for this state of affairs were not far to seek. The pro-Soviet lobby, the PLO, Syria, Libya, Algeria and the then South Yemen - the "Arab Steadfastness Front" - played their part in pressing for the adoption of moderate resolutions. As, for instance, the Syrian President, Hafiz al-Asad, regarded the Afghan crisis simply as a "refugee


17. Ibid., p. 259.
problem" and warned that "denunciation and condemnation cannot force the withdrawal of foreign forces, but might achieve its complete opposite." 18 As far as the PLO was concerned, its spokesman contended that the Soviet Union was "a friend of the Islamic World" and that the Afghan "crisis can only be solved through a dialogue between Afghanistan, its neighbours and the Soviet Union". 19 Further, the spokesman of this Front pointed out that as the Soviet Union was a traditional supporter of the Arabs in their cause against Israel, any denunciatory response from the Muslim World should be tempered by this reality 20 All these factors impacted on Pakistan to modify its response to the situation. 21 Notwithstanding these subtle nuances, the objectives of the OIC in relation to the crisis were made unambiguous in its various resolutions as the foregoing had amply indicated. Further, General Zia-ul-Haq, in his address to the Makkah Islamic Summit in January 1981, urged upon the Islamic World to continue to persist in its endeavours to exert maximum moral and political pressure for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan, which he considered it as a pre-requisite for the return of normalcy in Afghanistan. It is noteworthy in this context that General Zia also relied upon the UN track with a view to arriving at a negotiated political settlement with the Soviets. 22

Zubeida Mustafa considered that the OIC stand had affected Pakistan in two ways: In the first place, it strengthened and lent support to Pakistan in its call for a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the restoration of the independence

19. Ibid., p. 131.
21. Ibid., n. 8, p. 33.
and non-aligned status of Afghanistan. On the other hand, the Organisation's rigid position had tied down Pakistan's hands. Given its close involvement in the Islamic Conference, Islamabad had found it difficult to adopt a more flexible approach without breaking away from the OIC. However, Pakistan's unceasing harping on the Islamic character of Afghanistan and the resistance movement saw to it that the Islamic dimension of the crisis was never lost sight of.

Pakistan had to bear the major brunt of the crisis with the influx of refugees inundating Pakistani territories bordering Afghanistan. Between April 1978, when the "Infamous" Communist-led Saur Revolution was heralded and December 1979, when Afghanistan was occupied by the Soviet Army, Pakistan had already become a host to 300,000 Afghan refugees. The influx was further facilitated by the porous nature of its international frontiers with Afghanistan. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran, little material assistance was forthcoming from the rest of the Islamic Community. Saudi Arabia, in particular, among the rest of the Muslim world was, by the time of invasion, already extending financial assistance to those refugees and Islamic groups who had already found refuge in Pakistan. In the rest of the Muslim world, there was little knowledge of the Afghans and the empathy they had shown towards the Afghans was less than that required given the gravity of the crisis faced by the Afghans. Mindful of these constraints, Pakistan had ventured to assume what Marvin Weinbaum had referred to as "the role of ideological bastion" and begun to project its foreign policy towards the Afghan crisis in subsequent years.

Pakistani politicians consistently stressed the non-aligned and Islamic character of Afghanistan, besides it being a neighbour of Pakistan. Speaking at the

23. Ibid., n. 21, p. 40.

inaugural session of the extraordinary meeting of the foreign ministers of Islamic countries in January 1980, Zia-ul-Haq stressed that "the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan was the latest tragedy to befall the Muslim world. This intervention, in which the Soviet forces participated in very large numbers, was entirely contrary to the established and fundamental norms of international relations." He underlined further that "this is the first instance since World War II when a superpower has made a sovereign and independent Muslim country the target of its attack." In the same speech, he also drew the attention of the delegates to the questions of Palestine and Kashmir in the context of Muslims' sufferings. He also stressed the importance of the collective defence of the ummah. It is pertinent to note in this context that Zia-ul-Haq proposed (as referred to in the foregoing) in February 1979 in an Islamic defence conference that there should be increased defence cooperation among Muslim countries to achieve self-sufficiency in the field of defence. Zia firmly believed that the future of the Islamic World was inextricably interwoven with the collective defence of the Islamic ummah, unlike the emphasis on the defence of individual members. As he affirmed:

History bears witness that only by collective and concerted action can nations withstand the challenges that are posed to them. One of the fundamental principles of our religion is the establishment of the Muslim ummah and the basic philosophy of this principle is that so long as all members of this ummah share each other's travails, they cannot be harmed.

26. Ibid., p.274.
Zia-ul-Haq was gratified to note that the overwhelming majority of the international community, as represented in the UN General Assembly, endorsed by 104 votes to 18 with 30 abstentions, the stand of the Islamic Community on the crisis in January 1980. He stressed that the crisis was not the concern of Pakistan alone but also of the Islamic Community and the rest of the world thus emphasising the need for a collective response. On this point, there existed a near consensus among policymakers, shared by a wider public. In his inaugural address to the extraordinary session, as referred to above, Zia said that Pakistan's response to the Afghan crisis was shaped by the principles of Islamic brotherhood and humanitarianism with the people of Afghanistan.

**Collective Defence of Ummah**

In the foregoing, a reference was made to the need, as felt by Pakistan, for the collective defence of ummah. He contextualised its contemporaneity by underlining the fact that the peoples of the Muslim World believe in one God, One Prophet and One Book, thus constituting the Muslim Ummah which is straddled in regions having a special significance for international peace and the well-being of the nations of the world. Thus, the rationale for collective defence was that individual parts of the ummah were unable to defend themselves in the context of great power/super power aggression against them. Hence, it was adopted as part of the Final Declaration of Extraordinary Session of January 1980. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a fait accompli, the need for such a collective defence of the ummah was all the more relevant in view of the remaining super power's endeavours to hegemonise international politics characterized by what is often labelled as "unipolar world". Regarding the notion of ummah's collective defence, Zia hastened to add that it need

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not frighten the international community as the idea connotes that the dangers facing the security of the Muslim countries should be viewed in the context of one ummah, one millat and one entity. Zia further elaborated the theme. In his own words:

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\text{When I make the proposal (collective security of the Ummah), it was not my intention that the Armed Forces of all the Muslim countries should be put under the command of a Supreme Commander, nor was it my intention that we (Muslim countries) should unite our forces to commit aggression against any country. My objective was simply that we should view the dangers facing the security of the Muslim countries in the context of one ummah, one Millat and one entity (emphasis added). We should develop a common outlook. We should use our manpower, mineral, agricultural, industrial and other resources for collective benefit and collective progress. }^{30}
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Such proposals need to be contextualized: the situation in Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war. Zia-ul-Haq had these and other crisis situations in mind when he laid down such notions in Muslim multilateral gatherings. Reiterating his notion of Ummah's collective defence, Zia-ul-Haq, in the context of his address to the Third Islamic Summit (Makkah) in January 1981, contended that the OIC, as an international organisation of Muslim nation-states, should have a certain creative role (to play) in it. As he affirmed:

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\ldots\text{ the [Organisation of] Islamic Conference has a great responsibility, and indeed an unprecedented opportunity to explore ways and means of promoting the collective security of the Ummah so that the trials and tribulations of an earlier generation of Muslims are never visited upon us again. Any pooling of skills and resources that we contemplate in this context would not be directed against any other country or group of countries. Our devout wish is for a manner of cooperation amongst our countries that would maximise the utilisation of our collective manpower and material resources to strengthen the security of the Ummah. }^{31}
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The view that the notion of collective defence of the Islamic world did not then, and does not even now, have the military teeth behind it is buttressed by analysts also. Representative of such viewpoints was the one held by Naveed Ahmad. To quote him at length:

The authors of the idea of the collective security of the *ummah* rightly do not have in mind a gigantic military alliance providing a security cover to the numerous political entities comprised in the Islamic World. It is too idealistic to talk of forging such a military alliance. To aim as high as that carries risks of serious disillusionment. The ideas that have been actually propounded at the Conference (Eleventh IFMC, Islamabad, 17-22 May 1980) are both ambitious and realistic - ambitious because the Islamic World has never before dared to conceive of the possibility of collective self-reliance in the matter of security and realistic because the Islamic World having learned to speak in a single political voice on matters of common concern and having realized the compulsion to close ranks in the face of threats and pressures, is now capable, given the will, to concert its measures for the eventual realization of the goal of collective security. Commitment to the idea is the first step towards its realization. 32

Further, on the concluding day of the Eleventh Session, Agha Shahi, President Zia's Advisor on Foreign Affairs, in his Press Conference in Islamabad on May 22, 1980, stated, thus:

The Pakistani proposal regarding collective Security of Islamic countries is not for a military alliance. The proposal ...does not stipulate a military grouping. However, aggression against one Islamic state will be a matter of concern for other Muslim states. A beginning has been made and it is too early now to say how it will develop in the future. 33

Answering a question on the subject at an Islamabad Press Conference on 18 January 1981, Zia-ul-Haq said that there was no proposal either from Pakistan or from any other Muslim state for a joint defence arrangement among the Islamic states.

However, he tempered it by further saying that Muslim countries should concentrate on what he called "instruments of defence" and on achieving self-sufficiency in the production of arms if a defence alliance was to have any teeth. As no Muslim state has achieved this objective so far, the proposed defence alliance belongs to the realm of future plausibility. However, in the context of Pakistan's perceived security threat from the Soviet Union, Zia-ul-Haq, in an interview, given to a Saudi daily, Al-Bilad, on 5 February 1981, called for pooling of resources and "creating an "Islamic Power" to maintain balance between Super Powers and protect the Islamic Ummah from encircling dangers." 

Notwithstanding all that preceded so far on the subject, the ambiguity surrounding the notion of collective security still persists. It may be quite possible to assert that the proposers of the idea want, in some future date, to assume the advantages of such an ambiguity that currently prevails.

Islamic Solidarity and the Need for a Muslim Approach

Speaking at the inaugural session of the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in January 1980, Mr. Agha Shahi, Presidential Advisor on Foreign Affairs to Zia-ul-Haq, stated that the reassertion of Islamic identity on the part of the Muslim communities the world over was a reaction to the hegemonic politics being played by the Great Powers vis-a-vis the Islamic world. He felt that the contemporary Islamization was activated by the principles of Islam which impel its followers to work for an order free of injustice, domination, oppression and exploitation. He asserted that the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan, affecting adversely the sovereignty and independence of the latter, was a vivid illustration of the challenges

and dangers being posed to the Muslim world in the contemporary era. Hence, he underlined the need for understanding the nature of these challenges with a view to evolving an effective collective response from the Muslim body politic. The crystallisation of such a collective response in favour of Islamic solidarity was reflected in the institutional framework provided by the OIC. He envisaged the resolution of the challenges posed to the Muslim countries through the instrumentality of the OIC. Articulated thus, it is not surprising to note that the response to the tragedy of Afghanistan is couched in the language of Islamic solidarity as a function of Islamic reassertion or resurgence. As a perceptive analyst put it:

The present resurgence of Islam presents a historic opportunity to recapture the temporal glory of Islam by emphasising interdependence in a large number of areas of common interest and by moving towards the actualization of the idea of collective security of the Islamic World. 36

Agha Shahi's utterances - particularly his emphasis on the need for collective response to the challenges faced by the Ummah and the inculcation of Islamic solidarity to deter those challenges - were found expression in the Final Declaration adopted by the Extraordinary Session of January 1980. 37 The rationale behind Pakistan's emphasis on the collective defence of the Ummah is not difficult to imagine; to muster Islamic community's support in any eventuality of it's becoming a victim of aggression as manifested in an operative paragraph of the approved resolution which declared the Conference's "complete solidarity with the Islamic countries neighbouring Afghanistan against any threat to their security and well-being" and further exhorted the OIC members "to resolutely support and extend all possible cooperation to these countries in their efforts to fully safeguard their sovereignty, national independence and territorial

36. Ibid., n. 32, p. 58.
37. For details, see Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), Vol.XXXIII, Nos. 1 & 2, 1980, pp. 252-256.
General Zia-ul-Haq too aired such views which, inter alia, underlined the need for strengthening the collective strength of the Islamic world as represented in the OIC. Addressing the Makkah Summit on 26 January 1981, he stressed upon the Summit's responsibility to give a clear direction to the OIC, and to invest the latter with what he called "an enhanced sense of purpose" for it provides the Muslim world with "a unique forum for developing a collective and authentic approach to world problems as well as to issues affecting Muslim peoples themselves". He, thus, called upon the OIC "to create an awareness of the immense potential of the Islamic countries to act as a distinct entity on the world stage". Elaborating the same theme in his Makkah Address, Zia-ul-Haq, further visualized an active, creative role for the OIC in the overall context of superpower rivalries over their respective spheres of influence. To quote him at length:

the...member states of the [organisation of] Islamic Conference, acting in concert, must establish an identity of their own, which is clearly distinct from the power blocs of the East and West, and which possess an invisible geographical and ideological perimeter, totally immune to outside encroachments and interferences. They can make a positive contribution towards the consolidation of the international order by becoming an independent point of reference, distinguished by their courage to uphold the fundamental principles on which alone an edifice of durable peace and security can be built. The Islamic Conference should become the instrument of bringing the collective will of the Islamic people to bear on all international issues in the light of the eternal principles of justice and equality laid down by our Great Faith for the resolution of inter-state relations.40

General Zia-ul-Haq posited such ideas in the context of resurgent Islam. He felt that with the dawn of the Fifteenth Century Hijra, the Muslim World experienced "a new awakening, a new awareness, a new mood, and a new vision" and affirmed that Islam

40. Ibid., p.175.
has "inherent capacity to renew and reinvigorate itself" and that the world was conscious of it. The international community, he asserted, had come to realize that the Muslim world was capable of exerting "decisive influence on important issues affecting the future of mankind". Should this capability be translated into a reality, as felt by him, the Ummah was required to "act in unison on all vital issues affecting its rights and interests", and Ijma as a device to come to a consensual opinion on contentious issues, needs to be revitalized within the institutional framework provided by the OIC.41

The constituent members of the Islamic Organisation (OIC) were very much conscious of the possible collusion between the two Super powers in regard to their interests in the Third World. Lest this collusion should result in an American acquiescence to the permanent Soviet control in Afghanistan, the delegates assembled at the Eleventh IFMC in Islamabad in 1980 had succeeded in projecting a united stand of the Islamic Community on various problems facing the Muslim world, including the Afghanistan crisis. The statements, particularly of Agha Shahi and Zia-ul-Haq clearly lent support to such a contention. Before the Conference was convened, Agha Shahi cautioned Muslim countries about the possibility of another Yalta-like conference of the two Super Powers for dividing Muslim countries into two spheres of influence between themselves. He also called upon the leaders of the Muslim world to be mindful of the risk of war between the two Super Powers in the Gulf region. He was able to bring home the point that collusion among Super Powers against the Islamic World was as full of danger as contention leading to war.42 Further, Zia-ul-Haq, in an interview given to a CBS correspondent, Mr. Walter Crowcrite on 16 May 1980, stated:

41. Ibid., pp.176-77.
42. Ibid, n. 32, p. 62.
We have come to the conclusion that it is far better to remain equidistant in a superpower rivalry and help the Afghan refugees on humanitarian grounds, rather than plunging into the risks of a much greater or more dangerous role that may be envisaged. 43

Keeping such a feasibility of great-power collusion in view, both General Zia and Agha Shahi made pointed references to the need for a genuine detente between the Super Powers. General Zia's Speech delivered at the UN General Assembly made a reference to such a need for detente and clarified the position of the Muslim World towards detente. To quote him at length:

The World of Islam does not believe that there can be genuine international security so long as it is predicated on an unstable balance of terror, and a continuous escalation of the arms race...Muslim countries favour a genuine detente, but not a detente based on a division of the world into spheres of influence by the two super powers, because such an arrangement would be at the expense of the Islamic and non-aligned world. We cannot subscribe to a detente which is designed to keep certain areas of the globe tension-free, while exposing others to subversion and aggression in any shape or form. We want peace...with dignity...with respect [and]....with honour. We firmly believe that peace is indivisible, and must encompass all parts of the globe. It cannot be selective in its scope or application. 44

The cumulative effect of all these perceptive statements strengthened the need for an Islamic perspective on international issues, in particular on Afghanistan.

**The Eleventh Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference**

The Conference in its Final Communique (approved on 22 May 1980) adopted President Zia's address as an official document of the Conference "in view of its

43. **Dawn** (Karachi), 10 May 1980.

importance and the useful guidelines and constructive proposals it contained". Most of the characteristic features of his address and the requests which he wanted the conference to give effect to, were incorporated in the Communique issued at the end of the Session on 29 May 1980. The Conference, on its part, was more than willing to coalesce its viewpoint with that of Pakistan's as warranted by the dynamics of the situation. On the question of Afghanistan, the Communique voiced its "deep concern at the continued Soviet military presence in Afghanistan". The Conference reiterated its demand for the immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. It reaffirmed respect for the inalienable right of the people of Afghanistan to determine their own form of government and choose their socio-economic and political systems free from outside interference or coercion and called upon all states to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned status of Afghanistan and its Islamic identity. The conference strongly urged the creation of right conditions for the early return of the Afghan refugees to their land in security and honour, and reiterated its appeal to all states and peoples to provide assistance in order to alleviate the sufferings of the Afghan refugees. The Conference set up a Political Committee-consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan, Iran and the Secretary-General of the OIC - which was entrusted with the task of finding out ways and means of resolving the conflict. With the formation of this political mechanism, this conference recognized the need for settling the problem through negotiations unlike the extraordinary session which employed unambiguous and terse terminology in the condemnation of Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan which was quite understandable because the Muslim states' anger was still rampant when the extraordinary session met in January 1980. Further, there was hardly a month's gap between the two incidents: the Soviet armed intervention on 27 December 1979 and the convening of the Islamic Conference on 22 January 1980. Reflective of

45. Ibid., n. 33, p. 23.
46. Ibid., p. 35.
these and other circumstances, the extraordinary session urged "all countries and peoples to secure the Soviet withdrawal through all possible means" which implied the use of military means also. In comparison to this, the Eleventh Session was notable for its use of moderate language and its recognition of the need for a negotiated settlement of the problem. With the setting up of an aforesaid political committee, Pakistan obtained something of a diplomatic manoeuvrability, without committing itself to the recognition of the Babrak Kamal regime. The conference decision to open a diplomatic track with a view to ending the Afghan impasse was one of the notable features of the decisions arrived at by the session. Pakistan's President himself, in his Inaugural Address, exhorted the foreign ministers conference to "devote their full energies to finding a speedy and peaceful solution of the tragedy of Afghanistan."

Besides Afghanistan, the Conference also focused its attention on issues pertaining to South Asia. Even though no resolution was passed by the Conference on the Kashmir Question, the Communique did make a reference to the subject. It is significant to note in this context that the said reference to Kashmir was a verbatim extract from Zia-ul-Haq's Inaugural Address to the Conference on the subject. The following is what the Communique stated:

The President [of Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq] stated that another vital issue was the long standing and unresolved problem of the state of Jammu and Kashmir whose people had yet to exercise their right of self-determination. A settlement of this issue would greatly contribute to the betterment of Indo-Pakistan relations which is indispensable for the peace and stability of the region. Pakistan was committed to the resolution of this issue in the spirit of the Simla Agreement and in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations.47

47. For the Text of Zia-ul-Haq's address to the Eleventh IFMC (Islamabad, May 17-22, 1980), see Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), Vol.XXXIII, Nos. 1 & 2, 1980, pp.257-261, and for the Final Communique of the Conference, see ibid., n. 33, p. 22.
Besides Kashmir, the Conference also dwelt upon another issue of interest to South Asia: the establishment of nuclear weapon free zone in the region. In a resolution adopted on this subject, the conference favoured the establishment of such a zone in South Asia and also resolved to strengthen the security of non-nuclear weapon states against use or threat to use nuclear weapons.48

The Conference discussed at length the question of the security of Muslim states in the context of growing risks/challenges faced by them. It, therefore, resolved that the security of each Muslim state was the concern of all the Islamic countries and affirmed to strengthen it through cooperation and solidarity in accordance with the principles and objectives of the OIC Charter and those of non-alignment. This resolution drew its origin to a proposal made by President Zia-ul-Haq in his Inaugural Address to the Conference. For this purpose, it also set up an Inter-Governmental Expert Group whose task was to recommend concrete measures on the subject.49

In the economic sphere, the conference approved the Pakistani proposal to hold high level Round Table Consultations on Industrial Cooperation at Lahore in the first half of 1981. In the sphere of culture, the conference decided to establish a centre for the teaching of the Arabic language in Pakistan, besides setting up such centres elsewhere in the Muslim World. On the question of legal reforms, the Communiqué referred to the decision of the Conference to set up an International Islamic Law Commission. The task of the Commission would be to conduct research on Shariah and "make special efforts on the premises of Ijitehad to bring about application of Islamic concepts to the existing institutions". Of special significance to Pakistan, the Conference also decided to follow up the recommendations of the seminar on the application of Shariah held in Islamabad in October 1979.50

48. Ibid., n. 33, p. 37.
49. Ibid., n. 33, p. 36.
50. Ibid., n. 33, p. 42.
President Zia's UN General Assembly Address

The fact that President Zia-ul-Haq delivered an address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on behalf of the Muslim world on 1 October 1980 owed its origin to an unanimous decision taken by the Eleventh IFMC in its regular session held in Islamabad during 17-22 May 1980. The proposal to this effect came from the foreign minister of Upper Volta with the support of the Republic of Senegal as the approved resolution "requests the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, as the Head of the host country to address the 35th General Assembly of the United Nations at New York on behalf of the OIC." On this decision of the Conference, President Zia-ul-Haq himself had reacted that "it (the Conference) has placed a great responsibility on Pakistan which must now ensure that its representation of the viewpoint of the Muslim world is a true reflection of the aspiration of the Muslims throughout the world."51

Further in his own words:

This is for the first time that the entire Muslim World has bestowed such an honour upon any country. To represent 90 crore Muslims of the World is such a great honour for Pakistan which is rightfully a matter of pride for the citizens of this country. I express my deep thanks to the Islamic World for this honour to Pakistan. I have full realization that this is not only a great honour but a great responsibility as well.52

Further, in the words of a perceptive analyst:

It (conferring of an honour upon Zia-ul-Haq to represent the OIC at UN General Assembly) amply showed the trust that the Islamic world feels for Pakistan, as a promoter of Islamic solidarity and a defender of the cause of Islam. Pakistan has always played a vigorous role inside the Islamic Conference and had taken part in arranging top level conferences of Muslim leaders. For Pakistan, it was a unique honour that its President should be chosen to present the case of the Islamic World, as a collective entity, at the UN General Assembly Session.53

53. Ibid., n. 32, p. 75.
Viewing this momentous decision of the foreign ministers in perspective, Pakistani newspapers variously commented upon it. As for instance, The Pakistan Times, in an Editorial headlined, "A Unique Honour", reacted very positively:

In this resolution is implied the trust that the Islamic world reposes in Pakistan as an activist in the cause of Islam. It honours the person of President Zia-ul-Haq as a perceptive statesman who has guided his country through political crises, to a realistic ideological status within the comity of Muslim nations...Pakistan has always played a vigorous role inside the Islamic Conference (and has arranged top level conferences of Muslim leaders under its aegis) but never has there been such a spontaneous recognition of its services as a promoter of Muslim Unity as expressed at the 11th Session of the IFMC at Islamabad...It makes credible the image of Pakistan as a country that is sincere in its determination to assert its Islamic identity in foreign affairs and carry with it the consensus of its brother countries in the solution of problems that confront them...The offer of presenting the OIC point of view at the 35th session of the UN General Assembly, therefore, is a tribute paid to the statesmanship of President Zia-ul-Haq and to the sincere stewardship of Islamic solidarity conducted by Pakistan.  

In the course of his address to the General Assembly, (which was known for its extensive quotations from the Holy Book), President Zia-ul-Haq characterized the OIC as constituting a 'concrete manifestation of the urge of the Muslim ummah to re-establish its historic role as a factor for peace and progress, and to reassert the overriding unity of the Muslim peoples scattered over the globe,' even though the ummah is straddled along a wide geographical belt composed of diverse climes, customs, political systems, languages and dialects.

Zia-ul-Haq held a firm view that Islam had a role to play in the contemporary world.

...we perceive the role of Islam as that of helping to overcome the problems besetting the present-day world. It can assist in building an

54. The Pakistan Times (Rawalpindi), May 23, 1980.
55. Extract from the Speech. For full text of address, see Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), Vol.XXXIII, No.4, 1980, p.7.
enduring structure for international amity, based on universal brotherhood, and on respect for the principles of peaceful co-existence. Islam is not a religion in the conventional sense but a many splendoured mansion - it is a unique and comprehensive system of law; it is a distinctive culture; a fascinating civilization; it is a supreme metaphysical doctrine for the relief and redemption of man.\(^{56}\)

Referring to the dawn of the 15th century Hijra on November 9, 1980, and the future of Muslims in the ensuing period, Zia-ul-Haq said:

As they enter the 15th century Hijra, the Islamic peoples, who have rediscovered their pride in their religion, their great culture and their unique social and economic institutions, are confident that the advent of this century would mark the beginning of a new epoch, when their high ideals of peace, justice, equality of man, and their unique understanding of the universe, would once again enable them to make a worthy contribution to the betterment of mankind.\(^{57}\)

Further, in his address to the nation marking the dawn of the new Hijra century, he set four priorities before his government for accomplishment: (1) acceleration of Islamization process, (2) Jihad against ignorance, (3) Jihad against poverty, and (4) provision of inexpensive and speedy justice.\(^{58}\)

In the foregoing, a reference was made to Zia's championing of the notion of collective defence of Muslim countries. He reiterated the proposal at the General Assembly session. It is pertinent to quote him at length on the subject:

...It's (Islamic world's) chief source of strength, today, is its urge for unity of thought and action. Its member states...are generally in agreement on the need for a united and collective response to issues affecting them, and the world at large. This has led to the emergence of the concept of strengthening their security by pooling their natural resources, their abundant manpower, and their available skills. The close collaboration so achieved, will undoubtedly promote self-reliance, and reduce dependence on the uncertain and often uncomfortable

\(^{56}\) Ibid., p. 18.  
\(^{57}\) Ibid., p. 20.  
external factors. This concept of security of the Islamic countries does not involve alignment with any of the power groups; nor does it envisage multilateral defence pacts. It aims essentially at advancing the individual and collective capability of the Islamic countries to achieve the goals, set by consensus, in the larger interests of the Muslim Ummah. Zia-ul-Haq's General Assembly speech symbolised a bold attempt of the Islamic community to present its viewpoint to the World Organisation regarding the state of contemporary international relations and the increasingly active role which Muslim countries came to play therein in the present context of what is called "Resurgent Islam". In his address, General Zia contrasted the worldviews represented by Islam and the ones reflected in what he called "narrow nationalism, parochialism and racial elitism". He felt that in the course of its history, Islamic civilization paved the way for inter-communal peace and harmony which stood in sharp contrast to evils like racial arrogance, discrimination and persecution characterising the contemporary international scene. The address touched upon a wide variety of issues confronting the world community and an Islamic perspective on them and possible solutions thereto: the Palestine problem, the Afghanistan tragedy, New International Economic Order, Detente, Apartheid in South Africa, the state of Muslim minorities, disarmament, and others. Reflective of the traditional penchant of Pakistani politicians, President Zia-ul-Haq while making a reference to the question of Jammu and Kashmir, felt that the position of Pakistan was based on "universally recognized principles". He, however, left the latter unspeIt but the invocation was unmistakably towards the right to self-determination. On the question of Palestine, he reiterated the traditional common stand of the Muslim world which wholeheartedly supports the just struggle of the people of Palestine under the leadership of their legitimate, and sole representative, the Palestine Liberation Organisation, for the liberation of their sacred territory from Zionist rule and occupation. Further, the Muslim world considers that the issue of Palestine is at the core of the Middle East Question.

59. Ibid., n. 55, pp. 17-18.


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During the course of his address, President Zia-ul-Haq laid a great stress on the need for the Muslim world to strengthen the United Nations, notwithstanding the latter's shortcomings in fulfilling the Charter Obligations. He also spoke of the great esteem in which the UN was held by the Islamic World and the latter's role in furthering the objectives of the former. He held that the message of Islam - the message of peace, human brotherhood, rule of law and pre-eminence of justice - and the ideals of the United Nations were very much similar and hence the Muslim countries were favourably disposed towards the latter. Underneath these utterances of President Zia-ul-Haq, there was an implicit urge to the international community to view the Islamic world and the contemporary Islamic resurgence in favourable, friendly and harmonious terms. Be that as it may, the Afghan tragedy received a major part of President Zia's address to the United Nations. He underlined the historical tradition of Islamic brotherhood as a factor binding Pakistan to the Afghan resistance movement. He reiterated the earlier stand taken by the Islamic foreign ministers in their Islamabad meetings held in January and May 1980. Zia emphasised that Pakistan's hospitality towards the Afghan refugees was guided by Islamic consideration of brotherhood and as such it should not be construed as Pakistan's interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. During the course of his speech, General Zia made a mention of 'orchestrated propaganda campaign' insinuated against Pakistan and dispelled it by affirming that the Afghan resistance movement was 'a manifestation of a patriotic upsurge of a proud people', who had never succumbed to alien domination. The Islamic element of the Afghanistan situation was further buttressed by Pakistan's Foreign Affairs Adviser, Agha Shahi, in his address to the General Assembly in November, 1980:

It is natural that the international concern over the armed intervention in Afghanistan should have been felt most intensely by the member-states of the Islamic Conference which are bound to Afghanistan by lasting ties of common faith, culture and history.61

61. Mr. Agha Shahi's address at the UN General Assembly on the question of Afghanistan on November 17, 1980. Reproduced in ibid., n. 55, p. 143.
Pakistani diplomacy in regard to the Afghanistan crisis laid emphasis on the latter's wider ramifications and thus successfully brought the entire Islamic world into accepting such a perspective. At one end, it stressed the Islamic dimension of the crisis, thus enjoining upon the ummah the obligation to come to the rescue of its constituent member. On the other, as regards Pakistan, Zia said that his country was performing its obligations on the cherished ideals of humanitarianism and Islamic brotherhood. Writers on the Afghan crisis considered this aspect as having guided Pakistan's approach towards the crisis. As stated by an analyst:

...a reservoir of good feeling [towards the Afghan refugees] remained through the [Soviet invasion] years, a sympathy for Muslims fighting for their freedom in a "holy war" against communists. Few in the broad public in Pakistan argued for the authorities in Islamabad to expel the Afghans to a war zone .... The hospitality or at least toleration shown by Pakistan towards the Afghans was...quite extraordinary...In general most Pakistanis took pride in having borne the political and economic burdens in the true spirit of Islamic brotherhood. 62

'The establishment of Islamic ummah is ordained by God and negating this would be to go against the word of God. Going against the word of God brings retribution' 63

Thus, Pakistan, during the regime of Zia-ul-Haq, through its individual endeavours, energized the OIC as the voice of the Muslim World having a particular interest in the Afghan crisis and also a vehicle of Islamic resurgence in international politics.

Pakistani decision-makers viewed the Afghan tragedy in the context of resurgent Islam and had endeavoured to mobilise the response of the Islamic world within that framework. It was true that this coincided with the U.S. response and also with the


63. Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference, Islamabad, January 1980. For details, see ibid. n. 33, p. 249.
response of the international community as represented in the UN General Assembly when the latter voted to condemn the Soviet intervention. Underlying this point in his speech at the inaugural session of the extraordinary conference of the Islamic Foreign Ministers on January 27, 1980, Agha Shahi said:

The violation of the sovereignty and independence of brotherly Afghanistan vividly illustrates the challenges and dangers confronting the Muslim countries in the contemporary era. It is imperative to understand the nature of these challenges and to formulate an effective response which would fully reflect the collective will of the Islamic ummah.64

Agha Shahi further held the view that the renaissance of Muslim countries should find its organisational expression in forums like the OIC and that there was an urgent need to solidify the latter. As he asserted:

Islamic solidarity has found a concrete expression in the institution of the Islamic Conference which enshrines the common aspirations of the Muslim peoples. It is in this forum that the Islamic countries must express their resolve to meet the historic challenges of our time. It is here that we must demonstrate to the world that the tragedy of Afghanistan is a target for the entire Islamic world.65

Agha Shahi echoed the similar theme at the Eleventh Islamic Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Islamabad on May 17, 1980:

…The Islamic Conference represents the political totality of the Islamic world and it is our solemn obligation to nurture it in our common interest. This means that we must not only see the conference as an instrument for the harmonization of our actions, but more importantly as

64. Agha Shahi’s full speech is reproduced in ibid., n. 32, p. 250.
65. Ibid., p. 251.
an embodiment of our collective will to harness the limitless resources and talent of the Islamic world to build the structure of world peace on the everlasting foundation of justice and equality in conformity with the eternal precepts of Quran-ul-Hakim.\footnote{For Agha Shahi's speech delivered at the Eleventh Foreign Ministers' Conference, Islamabad, 17 May 1980, see ibid., n. 32, p.266.}

**Pakistani Military and the Afghan War**

Pakistan's foreign policy in regard to the Afghan crisis was characterised, in a remarkable degree, by consistency. This was feasible because Pakistan's foreign policy under the Zia regime was moulded by the Army, particularly the famous Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). This state of affairs still continues to exist till date. This Army outfit, the ISI, backed the Afghan mujahideen based in Peshawar, particularly Hizb-I-Islami (Party of Islam) headed by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. In this context, it deserves to be noted that Hikmatyar (and also Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani of Afghan Jamaat-i-Islami) were sheltered in Pakistan by the late Z.A. Bhutto to act as a counter to the Pushtunistan demand voiced by successive Afghan regimes (including King Zahir Shah, who is now in exile in Rome, Italy) prior to the Soviet invasion. Sardar Muhammad Daud, who succeeded the King through a bloodless Coup d'état in July 1973, followed the Soviet line in both domestic and foreign policy spheres. He was nicknamed as "the red prince" and was reputed to be hostile to Islam. Hikmatyar found it difficult to pursue unhindered his brand of Islamic doctrine under such uncongenial circumstances.

local military commander of Panjshir during and after the Soviet occupation years, was also one among those who fled to Pakistan following the Daudian overthrow of the Zahir Shah monarchy. During his stay in Pakistan till 1975, Masoud joined the Muslim Youth movement headed by Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani. The then Army General, Nasirullah Babur (and formerly the Interior Minister in the second time Prime Ministership of Ms. Benazir Bhutto) was said to have created an organised Afghan resistance. Anti-Kabul Propaganda Centre was also set up in Pakistan with a view to destabilising the Daud regime.

During the mid-1970's, Hikmatyar and his cohorts were ready to offer their services, first to Z.A. Bhutto, and after the latter's demise, to the successive Pakistani regimes, in order to counterbalance the irredentist policies pursued by Muhammad Daud, Afghan Prime Minister (1953-1963), towards "Pushtunistan". Like Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq, Hikmatyar was opposed to the idea of "Pushtunistan" as he considered the latter 'as having been fabricated by social forces hostile to Islam' both within and outside Afghanistan and that the differences, as they existed between the pre-1979 Kabul and Islamabad regimes over "Pakhtunistan", 'did not serve the interests of Islam but its enemies'.

Pakistan's national interests as does any other state's, demanded that its territorial integrity was maintained at all costs. In the Western sector, this meant that the Pushtunistan demand did not impinge upon the territorial integrity of Pakistan. In

68. Ibid., p. 5.
69. Quoted in Weinbaum, ibid., n. 67, p. 5.
70. Ibid., n. 67, pp. 4-5.
72. Ibid., p. 10.
order to achieve this objective, successive Pakistani regimes, beginning from Z.A. Bhutto, and in more pronounced tones during the Zia regime, had admirably utilized the Afghan crisis. As a noted Paris-based scholar on Islam put:

For the Pakistani military, and specifically for General Zia, the Soviet invasion was a good opportunity first to resolve the pushtunistan issue definitively and then to try to establish a Muslim belt south of the Soviet Union under Pakistani influence. Pakistan has since secured strong control over the Pushtun tribes on the Western side of the Durand Line (the disputed Afghan-Pakistan border) by dealing directly with the local Mujahiddin commanders. The war accelerated the process by the integration of the NWFP into the state of Pakistan.73

The logic of the politics of Islamic discourse employed by the Peshawar-based Afghan mujahideen and supported by Pakistani policy-makers and Islamic groups did not allow the re-emergence of ethnic, nationalistic, and secularistic tendencies among Pushtuns during the course of war. In the course of their camp life in the host country, Pakistan, the Afghan refugees of different nationality backgrounds were guided less by considerations of ethnicity, tribalism and held together more by overarching and unifying potential of Islamic solidarity which further served as a check against the rise of Pushtunistan question. Pakistani policy-makers will like this trend to continue in the foreseeable future. Further, in the early years of his reign and at the height of his diplomatic and military offensive against the Soviet-backed Kabul regime, Zia even entertained the idea of a federation with Afghanistan as part of a strategic Islamic consensus for the region. Even though this grandiose design was inchoate in its form, the perceived need for forestalling irredentist movements against Pakistan in future was quite discernible.

Moreover, the intensity with which President Zia pursued his Afghan policy made it seem that he was 'driven by a mission to extend the struggle across the Oxus

to Soviet Central Asian republics". Besides, the Islamic theme of the Afghan war convinced the Pakistani public opinion that the extension of Pakistan's ideological frontiers to Afghanistan would serve the permanent interests of Islam and their country. The 'Ideological Expansionism' which Daniela Breedi has referred to in the context of Saudi Arabia's growing ideological influence in Pakistani society, as made possible with the Instrumentality of Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami, may be useful in understanding Pakistan's contemporary attempts to influence minds and events in Afghanistan.

The India Factor

Pakistan's relations with India from the very outset of partition have been far from friendly. In the strategic scenario of the Pakistani defence - and foreign - policy formulating elites, India loomed large in their horizon. Constant search for security from the perceived threat from India formed a backdrop of their strategic thinking. Entrenched ties with the Muslim world, particularly in the area of defence, purported to achieve its objectives vis-a-vis India. Furthermore, a friendly Afghanistan, bereft of the Pushtunistan demand, would, as the Pakistani defence strategists projected, provide a strategic depth in the pursuit of security against perceived Indian threat. Besides, General Zia and his military planners had also conceived of an Islamic regime in power in Kabul to achieve this objective. They also expected such a regime to forge close economic, political and strategic ties with conservative Arab states. As


76. For details, see Daniela Breedi , 'Notes on Saudi Arabia's Economic and Ideological Expansionism: The Case of Pakistan', in Wolfgang Peter Zingel and Stephanie Zingel Ave Lallemante, eds., Pakistan in the 80s : Law and Constitution (Lahore: Vanguard, 1985), pp.537-547.
a matter of fact, the support extended by Pakistan to the **mujahideen** was expected to work on these lines. This sort of futuristic scenario, projected by the Pakistani defence strategists, got further fillip with the emergence of sovereign political entities in the erstwhile Soviet Muslim Central Asia. And hence, the rationale behind Pakistan's quick response in according recognition to these Muslim states much before the demise of the Soviet Union became a **fait accompli**. Whatever foreign policy ambitions Pakistan entertains to accomplish in the newly emergent Central Asian states, it can fulfill them only when Afghanistan achieves stability and pursues a policy of friendly relations with Pakistan. Hence, a friendly and stable Afghanistan, with secure boundaries and ethnic peace, is a **sine qua non** for a Pakistani thrust into Central Asia. As Olivier Roy says:

> Pakistan's generals...nurtured a more ambitious project, to establish, through a federation between Pakistan and Afghanistan, a sunni Muslim belt that would have given Pakistan the strategic depth it lacks in front of India.  

To quote him further:

> The Pakistani Army...nurtured the dream of creating and leading a Sunni Muslim belt between India, the USSR and Iran by means of an Afghan-Pakistani confederation. To this end, it used the radical fundamentalists of the Pushtun ethnic groups settled on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border as its tools, having greater influence over these than the northern ethnic groups.  

The question is whether these objectives cherished by Pakistan during the course of **Mujahideen** resistance will be attained in a situation where the Taliban and the non-Pushtun coalition are locked in a struggle for control over Afghanistan. Only time will resolve this dilemma. However, at present, the **Taliban**, with the alleged support of Pakistan, is in control of the two-thirds of the Afghan territory.

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77. Ibid., n. 73, p. 40.
78. Ibid., p. 4.
Afghan Resistance and Islamic Ideology

The Peshawar-based Afghan Mujahideen, besides being sufficiently armed by Pakistan, were also ideologically indoctrinated by the religio-political parties of Pakistan, particularly the Jamaat-i-Islami. The refugee administration under the overall supervision of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had seen to it that the Afghan refugees would not have any opportunity to entertain Passhtun nationalist feelings which had bedeviled Afghan-Pakistan ties since 1947. In order to accomplish this objective, the ISI and the refugee administration extended ideological and material assistance to Hikmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami. Further, Pakistan’s Jamaat-i-Islami was allowed free access to refugee camps, the opportunity which it adroitly utilized in promoting Islamic indoctrination among refugees. The educational activities in the refugee camps were given a strong Islamic coloration which intended to discourage the rise of ethnic nationalism among Afghans. Thus the Jamaat-i-Islami, Hizb-i-Islami and the ISI caused school curriculum to be ideologized in terms of Islam. Besides, the Hizb-i-Islami’s offices and printing presses in Peshawar worked in close unison with the Jamaat. The Pakistani ulama, acting as deputies to the mujahideen leadership in the refugee camps, were allowed to propagate the unifying message of Islam. They utilized this opportunity in inspiring and consoling refugees and mujahideen. In this context, it needs to be noted that it was the Jamaat that gave its wholehearted support to President Zia’s internal Islamization mission. During the 1960s, the Jamaat, under the leadership of the late Abul Ala Mawdudi, tried to create its counterpart in Kabul. In those years, some sections of Afghan intellectuals came under the intellectual influence of resurgent Islam symbolised by Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen (Muslim Brethren) of Egypt and Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia, while some Afghan Shias had gone to Najaf and Karbala to study under the Ayatollahs, namely, Khu’y, Shariat Madari, Khomeini and Baqr Sadr. In this way, the mujahideen were at the core of the ideological battle of resurgent Islam. 79

79. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
Further, Pakistan’s Islamic drive, initially in the form of Islamic theology and currently through multi-dimensional endeavours to forge political, economic, strategic ties with Central Asia (much before the latter attained the sovereign status), was made possible through the medium of Afghan mujahideen and Islamists. It was the Afghan conflict that brought face to face the Central Asian states with Pakistan. It was the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan that had raised the issue of mutual relations between Central Asian states and Pakistan. The penetration of the Afghan mujahideen into Central Asia was again the consequence (or an unintended by-product) of Soviet adventurism into Afghanistan. Further, in the initial years of the invasion, the bulk of the Soviet armed personnel were drawn from Central Asian republics. They were reported to be unreliable in the struggle against their Afghan brethren and were eventually replaced by Slavic troops. Their "unreliability" was caused by their ethnic and religious affiliation with the Afghan mujahideen. Given this congenial atmosphere, it was only natural that the Mawdudian writings on Islamic theology and politics became familiar to the Central Asian Muslims. Moreover, the resistance leaders, who took pride in humbling the mighty Soviet army, had never denied their efforts to influence Central Asia’s Muslims. At least some of these plans were laid in Pakistan, often with the approval and support of the ISI. Guided by generals like Akhtar Rahman and Hamid Gul, the ISI had envisioned using the mujahideen as a catalyst for Islamic movements in the Soviet Union. Thus, the Pakistani strategic thinkers perceived the potential of the Afghan crisis as a

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means to a greater end of penetration into the Central Asian region. Soviet Union
was very much conscious of this Pakistani game plan as evidenced by the subsequent
infiltration of the mujahideen and the Central Asia's Muslims into each other's
territories. The Afghan mujahideen injected into Central Asia an unhindered and
uncensored Islamist rhetoric by means of cassette tapes and tracts. Such a relatively
free movement of information and populations between Afghanistan and Soviet
Central Asia was further reinforced by Gorbachev's Glasnost (openness) policy.
Thus, the Muslims under the Soviet rule, especially since 1980, had relatively free
access to outside news which rendered redundant Iron Curtain pursued till then.

This being the case, it is very interesting to note that Soviet invasion did result in
the rise of Afghan nationalism which was in turn coopted by Islamism of basically two
hues: Shi'ite Islamism of northern Tajik Afghan mujahideen propped up by Iran and
the Sunni Islamism buttressed by both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The latter variety
is predominated by Pushtun mujahideen who inhabit the southern parts of
Afghanistan. To the extent that the Afghan mujahideen perceived the Soviet
adventure as an attack on their traditional Islamic society, such a perception brought
them together under the fold of Islam which succeeded, during the course of Soviet
occupation, in disregarding their ethnic differences. Thus, Islam provided an
overarching ideology in mobilizing the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet
occupation and also legitimacy to the universality of the struggle in the name of Jihad.
Islam played the crucial role of uniting a country that was historically divided by
ethnic, tribal, linguistic and regional differences. This was a major reason why the
mujahideen were able to take the leading role in resisting the Soviet occupation.
Thus, the Jihad, preceded by the invasion, ignited a mass-scale politicization of
Afghan Society. Thus the Soviet occupation provided an ideological veneer to the

84. The view that Islamic dimension superceded the ethnic nationalist perspective is
held by Olivier Roy. For an incisive analysis/explanation on the nature of the
resistance movement, see ibid., n. 73, p. 77.
resistance movement of the mujahideen. Fortified by an ideological justification, the resistance movement assumed jihadic proportions. The resistance movement's Islamic dimension got an increasing feedback from the OIC under its various fora: the extraordinary session of the IFMC held in January 1980 in Islamabad, the regular IFMC session held in May 1980 in Islamabad, and the Makkah/Taif (Saudi Arabia) Third Islamic Summit meeting (January 1981) did all condemn the Soviet adventure as an unacceptable attack on the sovereign, Non-aligned and Islamic nature of Afghanistan. As if this were not enough, the Makkah/Taif Conference of Kings and Heads of State and Government which is, by virtue of Article IV of the Charter of the Islamic Conference, 'the Supreme authority in the organisation...', unanimously decided to suspend the membership of Afghanistan, thereby manifesting its political solidarity towards the mujahideen. The act of suspension was in accord with the objective set down in Article II(A)6 of the Charter which seeks "to strengthen the struggle of all the Moslem peoples with a view to safeguarding their dignity, independence, and national rights." 85

Moreover, the Makkah Declaration unanimously approved by the Summit Conference at Taif on 27 January, 1981, declared its "full solidarity with the people of Afghanistan, who are engaged in a Jihad to attain their freedom and independence." 86 Further, the Declaration, in a paragraph dealing with the OIC, referred, inter-alia, to the latter's "growing status in international forums as a symbol of the unity of Muslims and a framework of understanding and rapprochement among them", to the member states' commitment "to support and develop our organisation [the OIC]...so that it may discharge the noble tasks assigned to it" [including


Afghanistan, and finally, appealed to the peoples of the Muslim world "to unify their forces so as to face the challenges that confront them and to support one another in improving their conditions and achieving strength, dignity and prosperity". 87

In this context, it may not be wrong to assert that the Afghan nation as symbolised by the resistance movement and the international Islamic community as represented by the OIC came to a synchronised perception that the Soviet move was an attack on the Islamic character of Afghanistan. Thus, 'the Soviet/Afghan war...encompassed the direct confrontation between Islam and Communism', asserted Olivier Roy. 88 This antagonism was sought to be converted into a success for the cause of Islam through the instrumentality of Islamic solidarity. As for instance, the Manifesto of the Afghan Students' Islamic Federation (ASIF) which was released in Peshawar in 1985, proclaims:

The fundamental aim of the Federation is to expand solidarity and conception (of) unity among the Muslim Youths of Afghanistan and to stabilize against the atrocious enemy and the bloodshed communism....[the ASIF] attributes itself to those who are fighting under the flag of monotheism (and) against communism....demands the termination of conflicts and differences amongst the Islamic nations, rooting out all plots of the world colonialists between Muslims...and considers all the Islamic World as one united and brotherly nation...demands complete and world-wide solidarity among the Muslims throughout the World and complete support for the problems of the Islamic countries, [and] the liberation of all Islamic nations under the domination of the world superpowers and restoration of self-determination for them... 89

87. Ibid., p. 262.
88. Ibid., n. 84, p. 3.
Further, the Muslim Youth Organization of Afghanistan (1969) also played a pivotal role towards Islamic indoctrination which came in handy for the mujahideen during the eighties. In this respect, Hikmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami had also contributed no less a significant role beginning from the late sixties, by means of pamphleteering.90

The Afghan resistance movement led by the mujahideen can be considered as part of a wider Islamic resurgent movement prevalent, in one form or the other, in all Muslim countries. The Afghan mujahideen have not been immune from the pervasive influence of the international Islamic resurgence. Hence, contemporary Islamic resurgence, as manifested in a variety of forms in different Islamic societies, also finds its expression in multi-faceted forms in Afghanistan. However, one of the most significant forms is a politicised Islam which expressed itself in an increasing assertion by the mujahideen. It is true that traditional Islam, relying as it does on the religious preacher of the mosque, also played its part in stirring the masses against the Soviet-installed Afghan regimes. Be that as it may, it was the mujahideen, bereft of the traditional segment, who took pivotal position in the Afghan resistance movement. Their political vision is based on the fusion of state and society. To them, Islam is an ideology and a political system. To this extent, Islam, as understood by them, is a revolutionary doctrine. They are a product of secular educational institutions, while traditionalists are the products of madrasahs (religious seminaries).

It is not an exaggeration to assert that the resistance movement would not have succeeded as it did, both in effecting Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and mujahideen's assumption of reins of power in Afghanistan in the post-withdrawal Afghanistan, without the diplomatic and material support extended by Pakistan for more than a decade. On the diplomatic front, Pakistan, using the OIC platform and the UN fora, mounted a continuous offensive against the Soviets which had a salutory effect on the latter. On the other hand, this offensive highlighted the mujahideen cause, thus

drawing the attention of the international community. It took an active, albeit a pivotal, role in negotiations leading to the withdrawal of Soviet forces, thus making itself indispensable for the negotiations conducted under the auspices of the United Nations named as 'proximity talks' through the medium of Diego Cardovez, a special envoy of the UN Secretary-General.

Reference has been made in the preceding to Pakistan's jamaat-i-Islami which played a role in the Islamic indoctrination of its Afghan counterpart. The Pakistani Jamaat's role in this context, was made feasible because of its close links with the Zia regime which derived its ideological sustenance for internal Islamization process from the Jamaat. As Pakistan's Afghan policy is in the effective hands of the Army's ISI, the Jamaat was allowed to intervene, shape and direct the internal dynamics of Afghan Islamist groups. Furthermore, the latter, and particularly Hizb-i-Islami's Gulbuddin Hikmatyar himself championed the cause of an Islamic Order in Afghanistan that would replace the traditional ethnic-based political system. Hikmatyar's party has developed what Pakistani columnist Mushahid Hussain referred to as "relations of trust and confidence with the military".91 Further, the ideological worldview and the strategic vision of the ISI and that of Hikmatyar cemented their closeness to each other. As the Hizb-i-Islami was reported to have made the following statement in the late April 1980: "Our aim is great and long-term. Our struggle is for creating concrete defense positions in Afghanistan for the advancement of Islam to Central Asia and Europe" (European Parts of the USSR).92

The cohesiveness as displayed by the Islamic community in regard to the Afghan crisis within the OIC fora has, however, not prevented some members, especially Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, from advancing their own national interests vis-a-vis the crisis. This form of nation-state approach to the problem further strengthened the already existing religious sectarianism. Iran started harbouring the Shia resistance

91. Ibid., n. 74, pp. 71-86.
groups within its territory while Pakistan and Saudi Arabia espoused the cause of Sunni Islamic groups. This Pak-Saudi entente is not looked upon favourably by Iran and vice-versa. It needs to be noted in this context that the Shia resistance groups happen to be non-Pushtun ethnic minorities of Afghanistan while the sunni ones are the Pushtun ethnic majority group. The latter are the traditional power wielders in the Afghan political system. While Iran is not made to pay any price, within its domestic context, for this sectarian vision, Pakistan is not comfortably placed in this regard. Within the context of Pakistan’s internal politics, it resulted (and continues to exist) in an increasing Sunni-Shia schism, further confounding the already volatile ethnic situation in the country. Taking into account this nebulous sunni-shia duality, there has come to fore what might be designated as the 'Shia Factor' in the Pakistani politics, both in its internal and external dimensions. In so far as the external dimension of this factor is concerned, Pakistan does not have any conceivable control over it. For instance, with the success of the late Ayatollah Khomeini-led Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the Shias of Pakistan, as elsewhere, have shown favourable disposition towards it.93 Moreover, President Zia’s special ties with the "Great Satan", culminated with the "conferring" of a Frontline State status on Pakistan following the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, did not find favour with Tehran’s Islamic Revolutionaries, in particular the late Ayatollah Khomeini. The latter were always at guard against the imminent danger of Pakistan being used by the "Great Satan" to undo the fait accompli, i.e., the Islamic Revolution.

With the usurpation of power by Zia-ul-Haq on July 5, 1977, following the overthrow of the Z.A. Bhutto government by what observers refer to as "peaceful coup d'etat", Pakistan has witnessed fundamental transformation in all its walks of life. Immediately after assuming the reins of power, General Zia told the nation that his mission would be to introduce Nizam-e-Mustapha (The Prophetic System) in

Pakistan.\textsuperscript{94} As part of this Islamization process, a \textit{Zakat} and \textit{Ushr} ordinance was passed which contained a mandate to collect the \textit{Zakat} (Islamic Welfare tax) from the savings account holders in the commercial banks. Shias protested against the compulsory collection of the tax by the state arguing that the ordinance violated their \textit{Jafariya fiqh} (jurisprudence) by which they are traditionally governed. With the intervention of the late Ayatollah Khomeini in the matter, Zia-ul-Haq exempted them from paying this tax.\textsuperscript{95} The former sent a message to Zia in which he advised the latter to treat Shia compatriots on equal terms with the Sunnis. Zia agreed to abide by the Ayatollah's advice to the effect that the Shias would be governed by their own fiqh (school of jurisprudence).\textsuperscript{96} However, they are required as per the ordinance, to take the oath that they are not Sunnis in order to be able to benefit from the exemption. The exemption was followed only after some 15,000 Shia marchers demonstrated in Rawalpindi against the measure in July 1980, causing violence and bloodshed; a Shia alim (scholar), resigned from the Council of Islamic Ideology.\textsuperscript{97} These developments forced the government to announce a series of concessions to the Shias: (1) that there would be no interference in the religious belief of individuals; (2) that no one dogma would be imposed on any Muslim sect; (3) that the Shia community would be allowed to formulate its own procedures and establish its own organisation to collect, administer, and distribute the voluntary part of \textit{Zakat}.\textsuperscript{98} Besides, in 1981, even the

\textsuperscript{94} It is beyond the scope of this study to make a detailed account of those Islamic reforms which do not impinge on the external/foreign policy behaviour of Pakistan. However, recourse will be taken to them in so far as they contain implications far beyond Pakistan's frontiers. For particulars about Zia's Islamization process, see Charles H. Kennedy, 'Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan: 1979-1989', \textit{Pacific Affairs} (Vancouver), Vol.63, No.1, Spring 1990, pp. 62-77.

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., n. 93, p. 281.

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., p. 281.


compulsory part of Zakat for Shias was withdrawn.\textsuperscript{99} Thus, the orchestrated pressure tactics mounted by the Shia community saw to it that they would not be made to adhere to the majority Sunnis' Hanafi code. In this context, it is very interesting to note that Zia's internal Islamic measures, particularly the introduction of Zakat in 1980, has received an international endorsement, when the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia have each granted substantial amounts to the Zakat Fund. With much fanfare, Zia declared that such a welfare measure would usher in an egalitarian society in Pakistan in which 'hunger and beggary would be eliminated' and no 'citizen would go to bed hungry'.\textsuperscript{100} This being the case, the Committee on Islamization, set up by the government in 1980 observed, in its report (as the pages that follow would show), that the introduction of Zakat and Ushr were not crucial to the establishment of a just and kind society: an essential objective of an Islamic economic system. Be that as it may, so far as these Arab states were concerned, they were very much appreciative of the Shariat measures introduced by Zia.\textsuperscript{101} The Saudi regime has even underwritten its political support to Zia's internal Islamization programme as evidenced when King Khalid sent his Syrian-born advisor, Dr. Maruf Dwalib, to Islamabad to oversee the programme.\textsuperscript{102} It is of interest to note that Mr. Agha Shahi, General Zia's Foreign Affairs Advisor, in his speech to the Tenth Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference (Fez, Morocco, May 1979) referred to Pakistan's commitment to usher in a system of Islamic economics particularly in relation to Zakat, Ushr and Riba.\textsuperscript{103}

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\textsuperscript{100} Mumtaz Ahmad, 'Islamic Revival in Pakistan', in Cyriac K. Pullapillay, ed., Islam in the Contemporary World (Notre Dame: Indiana Crossroads Books, 1990), p. 58.


\textsuperscript{103} See the Text or the Speech by Mr. Agha Shahi at the Plenary Session of the Tenth IFMC (Fez, Morocco, May 10, 1979), Foreign Affairs Pakistan (Islamabad), Vol. VI, No. 5, May 1979, pp. 1-7.
\end{flushleft}
Within the confines of a state wherein the Sunnis happen to be numerically strong, the Shia's wish to maintain their customs, rites and a separate madhhab. They have a particular political party to look after their particularistic interests: Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-i-Jafariya (Movement for the Implementation of the Jafariya Legal Code). They are well aware of the fate that has befallen on the Ahmadiyas in 1974 when the latter were legislated away as a non-Muslim minority during the regime of Z.A. Bhutto.\textsuperscript{104} In this context, it is necessary to view these two different actions in perspective: enactment/decree regarding the religious identity of the Ahmadis and the state's kneeling down before the Shia stubbornness to be guided solely by their legal code with particular reference to Zakat.

Bhutto's enactment on the Ahmadis was taken to its logical extension by Zia-ul-Haq in 1984. Responding to the heavy lobbying by the Khatim-i-Nabuwat (Finality of Prophethood) organisations throughout Pakistan (similar to the pressure exerted by the religio-political parties on Bhutto), Zia had no choice but to issue a series of decrees which had the effect of totally erasing the remnants of their religious identity. The decrees forbade the Ahmadis from (a) calling themselves Muslims, (b) proselytizing to Muslims, (c) calling their place of worship a masjid (mosque), or (d) utilizing Islamic religious practices as the Azan (invitation to prayer).\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{104.} For details on the Ahmadiya question (also known as Qadianis, so called, as they were inhabited in Qadian of pre-partitioned Punjab), see Charles H. Kennedy, 'Towards The Definition of a Muslim in an Islamic State: The Case of the Ahmadiya in Pakistan', in Dhirendra Vajpeyi and Yogendra K. Malik, eds., Religious and Ethnic Minority Politics in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1989), pp. 71-108.

The reason(s) as to why the state in Pakistan responded in quite contrasting ways to two different situations need to be viewed beyond their contemporary setting. The roots of Shiaism are traceable to the early Islamic history. This doctrine has been grudgingly tolerated by the mainstream Sunni Muslims as a schism developed over the question of political leadership of the religio-political community after the Prophet. With particular reference to Zakat, the Shias had a well-developed tradition of collecting it through their ulama which for most part of Islamic history, zealously guarded its independence vis-a-vis the state. This is particularly true in the case of Iran which was drawn into the predicament of Pakistani Shias regarding the payment of Zakat. This being the case, the Ahmadiya controversy was on a different plane. Ahmadism, a modern phenomenon, is considered a heretical doctrine which cuts through the Muslim consensus and the fundamental belief in the notion of the 'Seal of Prophecy'. The personage of the poet-philosopher of Pakistan, Allama Mohammad Iqbal, is also attached to the Muslim consensual opinion on Ahmadism. Viewing the whole scenario in context, a scholar of note has appropriately analysed the state of Pakistani Shias, vis-a-vis the numerically strong Sunnis, thus:

This Shii's struggle in Pakistan has been directed not at transforming the country into an Iranian-style Islamic republic, but at guaranteeing Shii's freedom from Sunni coercion. In Pakistan, the Shii question is a minority question, setting obvious limits to forms of Shii protest. Shii fundamentalists well know that the model of Iran is not one which they can emulate without forging an alliance with those same Sunni fundamentalists who now excoriate them. Enthusiasm for Iran's revolution was initially widespread in some Sunni circles; leaders of the Jamaat-i-Islami, the foremost fundamentalist party, as well as other Sunni groups, trekked to Tehran to meet the revolutionaries and catch a glimpse of Khomeini. Since then, a disillusionment has set in, the result of Iran's implicitly Shii' bias in dealing with other Muslim peoples...Far from engendering Muslim unity, Iran's Revolution...has served to underline those differences which have long divided Shii's and Sunnis on the sub-continent.

106. For an authoritative exposition of his viewpoint on the subject, see Muhammad Iqbal, Islam and Ahmadism (Lahore: Anjuman-i-Khuddam-Ud-din, 1936), pp. 47.

107. Ibid., n. 93, p. 285.
To further buttress what is said and quoted in the foregoing, Pakistan witnessed recurring sectarian violence during the last years of Zia's regime. In the early part of 1988, sectarian violence took heavy toll in the Northern Area of Gilgit. A few weeks before Zia's death in an aircrash on August 17, 1988, the main Shia leader of Pakistan, Shaikh Arif Hussein Al-Husseini, was murdered in Peshawar. He had emerged as a major symbol of Shia response to Sunni fundamentalism being imposed by the state. 108

Further, an incident impinging on Pakistan's external relations with Iran, took place in Lahore in December, 1990, in which a junior Iranian diplomat, Mr. Aqai Ganji, was gunned down allegedly by a militant Sunni outfit, Anjuman-e-Sipahe-e-Sahaba (Society of the Prophet's Companions) on January 10, 1991. Maulana Isarul Haq Qasmi, Vice-President of the Anjuman and Member of the National Assembly was gunned down by unidentified persons. 109 The increasing incidence of such intra-Muslim sectarian clashes had led some columnists/observers to designate the phenomenon as the Lebanonization of Pakistan.

Military and Economic Relations with the Muslim World

As shown in the early part of this study, Pakistan's external behaviour was, from the initial stages of it's history, given an Islamic thrust in favour of building beneficial economic, political, military, ideological and other facets of relations with the Muslim world. It was also shown that with the secession of the eastern wing of Pakistan in 1971, a renewed emphasis on Persian Gulf, Arab Middle East and the Maghreb (North Africa) became imperative not only in ideological (i.e. Islamic) terms but justified also on geostrategic considerations. 110 The 1971 India-Pakistan War,


fought on Bangladesh issue, played the role of a catalytic agent: it "hijacked" "New Pakistan" from its South Asian Regional identity to anchor it on South-West Asian/West Asian moorings. Zia-ul-Haq had carried forward this process to its logical conclusion that was earnestly initiated by Z.A. Bhutto. Even though, Pakistan has been a member of the SAARC, it evinced very negligible interest in the latter. Moreover, the Principal members of the SAARC, i.e., India and Pakistan have been locked in their bilateral disputes, principally over Kashmir, thus preventing the SAARC from being effective. With the emergence of Central Asia as an independent entity from the ashes of the erstwhile Soviet Union, Pakistan, besides Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran among Muslim countries, has displayed extraordinary enthusiasm in befriending these entities by forging multifaceted ties on the basis of common historical, cultural and religious heritage. In view of all these efforts of Pakistan, it appears that its westerly geopolitical bias seem to be on sound grounds.

Domestic Islamization Process in the International Context

With the assumption of power by General Zia-ul-Haq under extraordinary circumstances on July 5, 1977, the first problem that he faced was that of legitimacy of his rule. In the domestic arena, he tried to resolve this "crisis" by a comprehensive Islamization drive - Nizam-Mustapha (The prophet's system) - in all walks of the Pakistani lives: social, political, judicial, economic, educational, etc. Shariat (Islamic canonical law) was made the basic law of the land. In the social sector, Namaaz (prayer) was made obligatory during office hours; women were made to wear hijab/chadar 111 (veil); in the political field, Majlis-e-Shura 112 (Consultative Council, a nominated body) was introduced in 1982, besides other measures; in judiciary, Islamic reforms were very comprehensive in nature 113; in education, the

112. Ibid.
113. Ibid., n. 94, pp. 62-77.
entire body of knowledge was made to conform to the principles of Islam;\textsuperscript{114} in Islamabad, an international Islamic University was set up, and the like. Existing state structures, those which were redesigned to advise the functionaries on how to bring existing laws to conform to Shariat - are strengthened and revived; new structures were created to perform new tasks, viz., Council of Islamic Ideology, set up in 1972, to cite only one.\textsuperscript{115} By an amendment to the Constitution,(1973), the principles and provisions enshrined in the Objectives Resolution (1949) were made an integral part of the Constitution and also justiciable in the courts of law. To all these changes, \textbf{Jamaat-i-Islami} had, in the initial period of Zia's dispensation, lent wholehearted support. As an Islamic movement, it had a specific blueprint of an Islamic Order to be ushered in Pakistan. And in Zia it found a willing hand to give effect to this vision, thereby meeting its requirements. It will not be an exaggeration to assert that the \textbf{Jamaat} provided an ideological legitimacy to the regime. On the question of how the Zia regime had attempted to resolve the legitimacy crisis, a scholar of note says:

The relative success of General Zia in establishing his Islamic legitimacy can be explained in part by his strategy of seeking certification for his Islamic authenticity from both the "professional" religious establishment as represented by the Ulama and the Mashaikh (sufi leaders), and the popular, lay Islamic forces as represented by the Jamaat-i-Islami.\textsuperscript{116}

Besides, the \textbf{Jamaat} is known for its strong political organisation with a committed cadre which could be made available to the regime under contingencies. Moreover, it has entrenched itself in the Army and educational institutions, particularly in the students bodies. During the formative reign of General Zia, the \textbf{Jamaat}, was given

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{114} For details, see Parvez Amirali Hoodbhoy and Abdul Hameed Nayyar, 'Rewriting the History of Pakistan', in Mohammad Asghar Khan, ed., \textit{The Pakistan Experience: State and Religion} (Lahore: Vanguard Press, 1984), pp. 164-185.
\end{itemize}
clearance to keep its cadres in strategic positions within the coercive, administrative, and ideological arms of the state. It's founder, the late Mawlana Mawdudi was, primarily through his writings, known to the entire Muslim world. Most of his writings were translated into a number of Asian and European languages. In 1960, he was a Consultant to Madina University when the Syllabus for the latter was drawn up. In 1962, he was elected a founder member of the Makkah based Muslim World League [Rabita al-alam al-Islam], a Saudi-funded organisation originally intended to counter Nasser's Pan-Arab socialism. His life-long commitment to Islam has earned him the "King Faisal International Award for Distinguished Services to the Cause of Islam" in 1979. Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen) of Egypt promoted his image in the Arab world and beyond to that of the "Reformer of the 20th century "(Mujaddid), in analogy to Jamal-al-din-al Afghani".  

The top echelons of the Jamaat hierarchy, besides Maududi, also contributed to its credibility in the Arab World. As, for instance, Masud Ali Nadvi, a prominent member of the Jamaat, acquainted Egyptian and other Arab Islamists with the Pakistani movement through his writings in Arabic. Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood during the sixties structured its programmes and activities on the lines provided by the Jamaat. Ali Nadvi's articles written in Arabic were published in al-Muslimeen, an organ of the Brotherhood, before the 1952 Officers' Revolution spearheaded by Gamal Abdel Nasser. Dar al-Uruba (House of Arabism), an Egyptian publishing house, shouldered the responsibility of translating and publishing most of Mawdudi's early monographs on society, religion, and politics penned by him during the fifties. The translations were reproduced in Cairo, Damascus and other Arab capitaits, and appear to have acquired an instant popularity among Islamic activist groups. In Cairo, in particular, Lajnat al-Shabab

al-Muslim (Muslim Youth Committee) took special care to publish Maududi's works, where most of the translated material ran into several editions. Among those Egyptian Islamists who remained most affected by the Maududian interpretations was Sayyid Qutb of Muslim Brotherhood, especially on the political aspects of Islam.118

The significance of these Islamization measures as initiated in Pakistan has to be seen in perspective not only in the domestic context of the historical progress of individual Islamic states but also in an unfolding international scenario of 'Resurgent Islam' in our contemporary times. If the transformative endeavours on the lines of the Shariat within the individual Muslim states can be considered as microcosm, then the internationalist Islamic reassertion can be designated as macrocosm. Both subsist on the other; both sustain each other. In the backdrop of this outline, an attempt is made here to evaluate Pakistan's increasing endeavours to integrate itself with the rest of the Muslim world in the areas of economic and military relations.

Defence

Before the nitty-gritty of Pakistan's defence entrenchment with the Muslim world is attempted, a brief discussion as to how Pakistan's Army defines itself and how the Zia regime helped strengthen such a definition, is in order.

Zia's Islamization policy was intended to inform to all institutions of national life. By the time Zia assumed the reins of power in Pakistan, the character of the Army has changed qualitatively: its social base is made up of those whose ethos are steeped in indigenously constructed religious mores unlike the situation that prevailed...

in the Ayub Khan era. In the latter's case, the ethos of the army were drawn from the mixture of both the British and American patterns. Since the late Sixties, the majority of recruits to the officer corps were drawn from lower-middle-class families. The crop of Army Officers, with the onset of the Zia dispensation, have become the strong votaries of the union of religion and public life. Ethos of secularism, separation of religion and public life - no longer hold sway over them now. The ethos of military strategy have even undergone a great change from the "alien" British and American models to the homegrown Islamic ones. In order to promote such a change in favour of the latter by strategic thinkers, Zia-ul-Haq had even written a "Foreword" to a book written by a Pakistani Brigadier.119 Besides, the infiltration of Jamaat-i-Islami, either through recruitment of its cadre/sympathisers or ideologisation in barrack mosques, has successfully ensured the retention of Islamic values in the army. As an Army Chief of Staff, he lectured and exhorted the Pakistani Jawans (foot soldiers) on the necessity of religiously observing salaat (namaz, i.e. prayers) and Saum (roza, i.e. fasting during the lunar month of Ramadhaan). He is also said to have invited key Jamaat-i-Islami functionaries to deliver lectures on Islam in the military barracks. Observers of the Pakistani scene recognize the fact that the ideology and sociology of the armed forces are, inter-alia, shaped by the influence exerted by the Jamaat in the ranks of the Army.120 

Doctrines of warfare, gleaned from the long course of Islamic history and the Holy Quran, are sought to be integrated into and informed on all army personnel. Thus, Pakistani Army prides itself on being called an Islamic soldiery: soldiers of Islam.121 General Zia-ul-Haq's conception of Pakistani Army had transcended its customary role of safeguarding Pakistan's International frontiers. To it, he envisioned


a custodial role of the protector of ideological frontiers of Pakistan, i.e., the guardian of Islamic Ideology. Such a role-perception accorded well with "soldiers of Islam" which had been further accentuated with the induction of Pakistani military personnel in the Middle Eastern states; a practice having a history of more than three decades.

The preceding chapters of this study have attempted to show how Zia’s predecessors, in particular Z.A. Bhutto, could entrench Pakistan into significant military contacts with the rest of the Muslim world. Bhutto’s emotional empathy put him in the company of the Arab Steadfastness Front, in particular with Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, even though he could balance it by maintaining cooperative ties with the Arab conservative regimes also. In the case of Zia, the reverse was the truth. To him, Saudi Arabia had a very important place in his heart and mind: his social upbringing and his personal piety consistently drew him nearer to Saudi Arabia; besides, as shown in the early part of this Chapter, his worldview paralled with that of the Jamaat-i-Islami; the latter’s Amir, Mian Tufail Ahmed, was filially related to him. The Saudis never suspected his personal Islamic credentials, in comparison to Bhutto’s.

Pakistan’s connections with the Muslim world are multidimensional encompassing political, economic, military, ideological and intellectual spheres. On balance, the contacts did fruitfully serve Pakistan’s international objectives. Hither and thither, some misunderstandings, ferments took place in view of the heterogeneity of the Muslim world, nature of ruling elites in the Muslim world, big power Western intervention, pro-Western proclivities of some Muslim states, and the like. The impact

of these factors on Pakistan’s foreign policy with regard to the Muslim world, could not be underrated.

It should not be a surprise for any person to know that Saudi Arabia holds a unique place to Pakistanis as the former is the custodian of the holy places of Islam: Makkah and Medina. Under certain contingencies such as the 1990 Gulf War (following the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait), Saudi-Pakistan understanding made it feasible for Pakistan to deploy some armed personnel in the Holy cities for their protection. As and when the Pakistani armed personnel are called upon to perform this duty, they consider it a great honour as ‘Soldiers of Islam’. The ideological dimension of the Saudi-Pakistan connection has, of late, come to the fore. The contributory factors to this scenario are: the Soviet intrusion in Afghanistan in December 1979, the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the Jamaat-i-Islami factor, and the 'fortuitous' (according to the Saudi ruling monarchy) rise of Zia-ul-Haq on the Pakistani political scene, to name the most significant ones. With regard to the Soviet Invasion, without being repetitive, Pakistani and Saudi perceptions had remarkably coalesced as was evident in many ways: both played a vanguard role in condemning the Soviet invasion; both came forward in assisting the mujahideen-led resistance movement, and both were instrumental in drawing international attention to the mujahideen cause. Saudi Arabia had contributed in cash and ammunition to both the Afghan refugees stationed in Pakistan and to resistance parties. Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia played their respective roles in the sustenance of Sunni Islamist groups of resistance movement. In a triangular fashion, Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi Islamic worldview, Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami’s Islamic vision, and no less important, Zia-ul-Haq’s political craftsmanship and ideological commitments have all functioned in a symbiotic manner. The political, economic and ideological dimensions of Saudi-Pakistan interaction is referred to as Saudi Arabia’s 'ideological expansionism' in Pakistan, increasingly
becoming feasible with the willful extension of cooperation by Jamaat-i-Islami. 123 Underlying such deep-seated and multi-faceted Saudi-Pakistan interaction, the then Saudi Crown Prince Fahd, during his three-day state visit to Pakistan in December 1980, had asserted that "any interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan or injury that came to Pakistan would be considered interference and injury to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia." 124 Commenting on the significance of the visit, the Dawn, in its issue of December 12, 1980 editorially remarked that it constituted a "historic landmark" in Pakistan’s ties with Saudi Arabia and that it was a reassuring reminder to Pakistan that the latter enjoyed a firm support from its good friends (including Saudi Arabia). The visit highlighted the ideological, cultural, political, strategic and economic bonds that cemented the ties between the two countries. 125 By 1980, in terms of economic ties between the two countries, Saudi Arabia gave far more aid to Pakistan than any other Muslim country. Further, Saudi Arabia was the third largest market for Pakistani goods and the biggest employer of Pakistani expatriate manpower. On other occasions too, such close Saudi-Pakistan entente was further buttressed by Zia-ul-Haq. While addressing a Press conference on 18 January 1981 at Islamabad, Zia-ul-Haq exhorted Muslims to make their spiritual Kiblah, the Holy Kaaba, their "political Kiblah" as well, and to consider the servant of the holy places as both the spiritual and political leader of the Islamic world. 126 Underlying Pakistan’s special relationship with the Saudi state, General Zia, in the same Press Conference, referred to Pakistanis readiness to shed their blood for the sake of Saudi Arabia and said that "if Saudi Arabia’s security was threatened and help was sought from Pakistan, he could personally lead Pakistani

123. Ibid., n. 76, pp. 537-547.
125. Quoted in ibid., pp. 2241-42.
forces in the defence of Saudi Arabia. Such close ties partly explain why both the countries are not positively disposed towards the Shia Mujahideen groups based in Iran. This Shia factor, thus, acts as a potential irritant between Iran and Pakistan. As shown in the earlier sections of this Chapter, Zia's Islamization policy with regard to Zakat and Ushr boomeranged on the Shias and they could successfully exempt themselves from it. In such situations, Islamic Republic of Iran will not hesitate to pose as the protector of the interests of Pakistani Shias and the latter looking upon it as their guardian. Hence, Pakistan will be forced to make a tightrope walk between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the foreseeable future.

As mentioned in the preceding, Zia-ul-Haq had a penchant for Gulf states which are geographically contiguous to Pakistan. It is to be noted here that all of these Gulf states, sans Islamic Iran, are conservative, pro-West monarchical regimes. In his own words;

...while we want to have close relationship with all the Muslim countries, as an important pillar of our (Pakistan’s) foreign policy, we specially want strong friendly ties with those Muslim countries which are geographically placed close to us. About them, I often say: “we are the backyard to the Gulf”. Thus, alongwith the Islamic relations, we have closer geographical links with them. We are a source of strength to each other.\(^{128}\)

Zia-ul-Haq’s positive disposition towards the monarchical states had led to such unusual levels of his own active participation in the expulsion of Jordan-based PLO forces under the orders of King Hussein.\(^{129}\) This was quite astonishing, given Pakistan’s

\(^{127}\) Ibid., p. 134.

\(^{128}\) POT (New Delhi), Vol. XII, No. 143, July 20, 1984, p. 2255.

history of steadfast support to the cause of Palestine and also its policy of strict neutrality towards inter-Islamic controversies. Since the time of independence, Pakistan has, under normal circumstances, scrupulously avoided partisanship towards any controversy besetting the Muslim states. In this connection, the Foreign Office had formulated a set of guidelines on the basis of which the state was required to adhere to them in its policy towards Muslim nations. One of them requires the state to be impartial or neutral in all inter-Arab disputes and the other obligates the state not to get involved in conflicts between rival Muslim states and instead urges it to encourage bilateral settlement of disputes between the belligerents or to provide mediation to the disputants.\footnote{For details, see Government of Pakistan, \textit{Pakistan's Relations with the Islamic States: A Review} (Islamabad), 21 February 1977, pp. 20-21.} The only exception was the Gulf War in 1991 in which Pakistan took the side of Kuwait. However, this was an extraordinary case, the like of which may not be repeated in future.

Pakistan's military personnel are entrenched themselves, in huge numbers, in almost all Middle Eastern states. It was reported that Pakistan had military contingents or missions, large and small in 22 countries, with most in seven states - Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, Syria and Libya.\footnote{Anthony Hyman, 'Pakistan: Towards a Modern Muslim State?', \textit{Conflict Studies} (London), No. 227, January 1990, p. 19.} Oman, for instance, had traditionally recruited troops from Baluchistan and Pakistani army officers for the middle and junior ranks. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait employed Pakistani personnel in their navies and air forces, and Pakistani pilots flew F-10s and Mirage jets for many Gulf states.\footnote{Rashid Jamal, 'Pakistan as the Central Command', \textit{Middle East Report} (Washington, D.C.), July-August 1986, p.31.} In Saudi Arabia alone, an approximate 13,000 military personnel from Pakistan were reported to have been stationed \footnote{Ibid., p. 43.} The function of

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\footnote{For details, see Government of Pakistan, \textit{Pakistan's Relations with the Islamic States: A Review} (Islamabad), 21 February 1977, pp. 20-21.}

\footnote{Anthony Hyman, 'Pakistan: Towards a Modern Muslim State?', \textit{Conflict Studies} (London), No. 227, January 1990, p. 19.}

\footnote{Rashid Jamal, 'Pakistan as the Central Command', \textit{Middle East Report} (Washington, D.C.), July-August 1986, p.31.}

\footnote{Ibid., p. 43.}
these Pakistani army contingents varied in each host state. In Saudi Arabia and Arab Gulf states, the duties even encompassed internal defence. In other states, the defence ties envisaged training of military technicians and pilots in the host countries:

It was in the Gulf region where Pakistan's military expertise was most in demand, not in carrying on wars but in training and internal defence. Military technicians of the Army, Air force and Navy were being provided by Pakistan in many Gulf states, to help operate sophisticated equipment. Pakistani armour and artillery experts, engineers and pilots on contract were particularly numerous in the Gulf states. In 1983, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed two security cooperation agreements, with the emphasis on internal defence for the Kingdom.\(^{134}\)

The defence contacts operate on a two-way track. The Gulf states provided finance to Pakistan to purchase military equipment and Pakistan, in turn, supplied them with defence manpower for training and other purposes. It was reported that by 1981 Pakistan earned $2.128 billion from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Sheikhdoms by way of remittances sent home by Pakistani work force. In terms of military relations, Pakistan by 1981, deployed 20,000 soldiers in Saudi Arabia and another 10,000 to the area Sheikhdoms where they supplemented the local units.\(^ {135}\) Through the late 1980s, by one estimate, 50,000 military personnel from Pakistan had served in the Gulf region.\(^ {136}\) This kind of mutuality of interests operated in the areas of banking and insurance business also. In Islamic financial institutions such as Islamic Development Bank, Islamic Solidarity Fund, and a host of other institutional apparatuses, Pakistani personnel besides Egyptians, man them, while capital is provided principally by the Saudis. In effecting the birth of such financial institutions, Pakistan played a very significant role, besides Egypt, at the second Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference held in Karachi in December 1970. In light of this internationalised role played by

\(^{134}\) Ibid., n. 131, p. 19.


Pakistan, the domestic islamization process initiated by Zia in the areas of finance and banking has to be viewed. Having supported the interest-free Islamic banking at the international level, Pakistan could not absolve itself from effecting the same initiatives at the domestic level and hence their introduction. Any deviation from this avowed objective brings into picture the intervention of Federal Shariat court as it did in recent past when it declared that interest/usury is unIslamic and hence illegal.\textsuperscript{137} Further, by emphasising the setting up of financial institutions on Islamic lines, Pakistan hoped to procure loans and grants from the oil-rich states of Gulf which contribute a large amount of capital to such financial institutions. Such a system as envisaged by Pakistan could work to its advantage as Pakistan could not be a lender but only a borrower in any financial venture involving the rich Arab states.\textsuperscript{138} Its hopes and desires were, in this regard, fulfilled to a very large extent.

Besides, cooperation between Pakistan and West Asian states was further facilitated by other factors. First, Pakistan is a non-Arab and non-Persian Islamic state. To Arabs, perennially suspicious of the political activities of their co-ethnic, co-religionists, the entry of Pakistanis into their countries is a welcome change. The host Arab countries are very much familiar with the political involvement of Palestinians, Egyptians and even Lebanese on their soil. The latest example of such an involvement pertained to the alleged support extended by the Kuwait-based Palestinians and Jordanians to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. This being the case, till date, there are no reports of Pakistani expatriates' involvement in the host country politics. Further, unlike Iranians, Pakistanis are not suspected of spreading Khomeini-type message of Islamic Revolution in predominantly Sunni-Arab states. In order to ensure that no problem will be encountered between Pakistan and its Arab friends in foreseeable future, there have appeared reports in the media (their

\textsuperscript{137} For details, see \textit{The Economist} (London), January 18, 1992, p. 23.

authenticity is yet to be proved) that key army posts are earmarked for Sunni Pakistanis in conservative Sunni Arab states.

Second, Pakistanis working in the Gulf and other Arab countries send home substantial amounts of remittances in foreign exchange. There are reports that the volume of these remittances estimated to be over $2 billion, are the largest single source of foreign exchange earnings of Pakistan\(^\text{139}\) acting as cushion under situations of economic stress within the country. The volume of remittances was estimated to have equalled eight percent of Gross National Produce (GNP), and approximately 10 million Pakistanis were said to have directly benefited from the Middle Eastern economic connection.\(^\text{140}\) Besides, the Arab-Pakistan transactions enabled those Pakistani workers to alleviate their standard of living in their country. Had this not been the case, those workers would have added themselves to the already mounting unemployed ranks back home. To the extent of their absorption in the Gulf economies, the potentiality of their creating socio-political unrest in Pakistan was obviated.

The Zia regime had also evolved a system of circulation of Pakistan’s West Asia based military personnel wherein those who had the opportunity of being posted abroad in the first instance would be replaced (after completing their stipulated years of contract) by those who did not get that benefit in the initial stage. Besides the in-service military officers, the retired ones were also given lucrative assignments in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states on a rotating basis. This system ensured the spread of financial benefits of posting to as many defence personnel as possible. The concentration of such benefits in a few hands might have created ferment in the army circles. Zia-ul-Haq had, thus, created this constituency which could be relied upon in

\(^{139}\) Howard W. Wriggins, ‘Pakistan’s Search for a Foreign Policy After the Invasion of Afghanistan’, *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver), Vol. 57, No. 2, Summer 1984, p. 293.

\(^{140}\) Ibid., n. 108, p. 45.
times of exigency, besides ensuring the avoidance of internal dissent in Army ranks.\footnote{For details, see Ayesha Jalal, 'The State and Political Privilege in Pakistan', in Myron Weiner and Ali Banuazizi, eds., The Politics of Social Transformation in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994), p. 178.}

Notwithstanding these concrete benefits accruing to Pakistan, these advantages were tempered by some costs. Pakistan had to forego its own need to retain the scientific and technological manpower for its domestic economic requirements. Besides, its defence personnel, in some advanced areas of defence technology, are themselves dependent on the West. However, taking into account the overall advantages of Pakistan’s West Asian connection, these constraints were worth affording.

During the regime of Zia-ul-Haq, active Islamic activity, at the level of non-governmental organisations, kept pace with its counterparts at the official level. Zia-ul-Haq patronized them and made it a point to personally grace such conferences with his presence. During 6 - 8 July 1978, Karachi was the host to the First Asian Islamic Conference which was sponsored by the Makkah-based Rabita al-Alam al-Islam. The Conference was attended by about 200 delegates from 27 countries. Inaugurating the Conference, Zia-ul-Haq, in his address, referred, inter-alia, to the persisting problems of Palestine and Kashmir. On Palestine, Zia reiterated Pakistan’s stand that Israel had to vacate all occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem. On Kashmir, he advocated the implementation of the UN resolutions. This Conference adopted a host of resolutions on a variety of subjects concerning the world of Islam: Propagation, Shariah, Mosques, Haj, Memorization of the Quran, the spreading of Arabic language, mass media, culture, education, Youth problems, Jerusalem and Palestine, Zionism, Ahmedism, Bahaiism, Christian Missionaries, Secularism, Communism and Muslim Minorities, and so on.\footnote{For details, see Government of Pakistan, First Asian Islamic Conference: Karachi, July 6-8, 1978 (Islamabad), pp. v - 147.}
Legacy

Zia-ul-Haq left behind a legacy on the Pakistani scene. His legacy is discernible in polity, foreign policy and Islamisation process. In polity, power is shared among three state structures: Army, civilian authority (the Prime Minister) and the President. Observers have designated this as a 'Troika'. In the area of foreign Policy, particularly with regard to Afghanistan Policy, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is the final arbiter. The civilian authority is not in a position to touch matters such as budgetary allocations for defence and Army's(i.e. I.S.I.'s) free hand in dealing with the Afghanistan issue. In the domestic politics, the phenomenal rise of Mohajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM) was attributed to his politics of manipulation: he allowed the MQM to rise in order to checkmate the advance of Benazir-led Pakistan's Peoples' Party (PPP). However, such tactics brought only short-term gains to his regime during his life time. If we, now look at the rise of ethnic politics in Pakistan, part of the rise owes it to Zia-ul-Haq. In 1983, the Sindhis revolted against his regime, christened as "Movement for the Restoration of Democracy", he could, however, suppress it ruthlessly. In the recent past, the deployment of Army to flush out terrorists and dacoits from the rural Sindh has, instead, unearthed the "terrorism" of the MQM in the urban Sindh. Media reports suggested that the MQM created a "state-within-state" situation where it maintained "torture cells" to try and punish its "enemies". The upshot of all this is to suggest that Zia-ul-Haq and the Army cannot be absolved of their responsibilities in this regard.

Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization agenda addressed primarily to reforms in the realm of judiciary; an attempt on his part to bring about an Islamic penal code, in relation to theft, adultery (Zina), fornication (Qazf), consumption of liquor, etc. In the realm of Qanoon-e-Shahadat (Law of Evidence), one male person's testimony in courts is equated to that of two females: Nisab-e-Shahadat (Quantum of Evidence). As regards social welfare norms, the Islamisation measures pertained to the introduction of Zakat and an imposition of a tithe on agricultural produce (Ushr). In the realm of industry, it
effected banking business, replacing interest-centric (Riba) contemporary banking by 
an Islamic 'sharing of profit and loss system' (Mudaraba). The judicial 
pronouncement of the Federal Shariat Court, enjoining upon the Nawaz Sharif 
government to do away with the practice of riba (interest) and also declaring it as 
un-Islamic in financial transactions was a case in point. The court declared Islam to 
be the supreme law of Pakistan. Since riba was un-Islamic, it was, therefore, illegal. 
The introduction of the Federal Court system owed it to Zia-ul-Haq.

Critics portrayed these reforms as cosmetic and retrogressive. They dubbed the 
latter as representing "punitiv e or negative Islam" which distorts the comprehensive 
perspective enunciated by the Qur'an. Similar charges may be levelled against the 
former also. However, given the nature of his regime (in particular, the legitimacy 
crisis), Zia could not be expected to go beyond what he attempted to do. Some 
significant sections of the Pakistani society began to look upon these reforms as a 
unique Third World style of indigenising their social, political, economic and legal 
institutions (a movement towards endogeneity). The impetus, as could be seen in the 
case of Pakistan, to replace the colonial legal structures by the evolving indigenous 
ones in all Third World Muslim states was provided by a plethora of international 
Islamic forums through their decisions. As, for instance, the Third OIC summit took 
the decision to set up an Islamic Court of Justice and an Islamic Fiqh (Jurisprudence) 
Academy headquartered in Kuwait. The point to be noted here is that unless the 
members of the OIC are made to bring their judicial systems in line with the Quran 
and the Hadith, such decisions will not go beyond the stage of rhetorics and 
symbolism.

In the Pakistani case, the domestic judicial reforms might be conjectured to have 
been kept in touch with the decisions of international forums on the subject because of 
the coincidence of timing: Zia's judicial reforms began in the early 80's and the

143. Ibid., n. 137, p. 23.

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Makkah Summit meeting took place in January 1981. In viewing the Zia regime in context, this perspective should not be lost sight of. Further, even the critics had to counter Zia's reforms only by taking recourse to historical Islam (including the Traditions (Hadith) established by the Prophet) and to relevant Aayats and Surahs of the Holy Quran. Thus, the framework for a critique of his regime was set by the context characterised by Islamic discourse. This entailed that the critics had to establish their own Islamic credentials among the populace. The ideological/philosophical underpinnings of this discourse are informed by "Islamism" and not "secularism".

Those who advocate the cause of secularism in the context of Pakistani milieu, in the sense of divorcing public and private domains, have few takers among the masses. They even were required to sprinkle the language of secularism with the colour of Islam by emphasising, notably, the Quranic notion that there is no compulsion in religion, and 'unto you your religion, unto me mine'.

If the unfolding post-Zia scenario of Pakistan is kept in view, Zia's Islamisation measures, far from calming the volatile political situation in the country, brought to the fore fresh contradictions. In the arena of legal reform, the existing blasphemy laws are alleged to have been misused against the minorities. In political economy, income redistribution was not among the priorities of the government. A lesson that emerges from this state of affairs is that a thorough introspection should be gone through by the powers-that-be before introducing major policies in the society, by keeping in view the Quranic paradigm in its totality, the absence of which may reduce Islamization to a mere exercise in window-dressing. It is very instructive in this context to note that such a possibility was very much underlined by a Committee of economists set up by the government in 1980 to detail an agenda for Islamic reform. The Committee

144. The Holy Quran, 2:256.
(officially, the Committee on Islamization), in its Report "opted for a very gradual and deliberate process of introducing the Islamic (economic) system in Pakistan."\(^{146}\) The Committee in its report, was guided by the Quran-informed totalistic perspective in which the State acts as the manager of economy. Parts of the Committee’s Report do throw considerable light on the subject, as the following makes it evident:

Social welfare [as implied partially in the Quranic concept of Zakat made obligatory on the believers] requires not only a transfer of financial resources from the rich to the poor, but a diversion of real resources to the production of basic necessities of life...The matter is too important to be left to the "invisible hand" of the market forces.

[The Committee rejected] a strategy [which] was based on an explicit acceptance of income and wealth differentials, which were allowed to grow even further as a means of achieving rapid growth rates....Islam...would not...use widening income differentials as a policy instrument to promote capital formulation [sic] and economic growth by virtue of its commitment to [Justice and Kindness]. It was the responsibility of the State to prevent the occurrence of a situation in which the initial cost of promoting growth was borne by the underprivileged segments of society.\(^{147}\)

These observations of the Committee do accord well with the spirit of the Quranic injunctions. However, as turned out subsequently, Zia’s Islamization in the arena of economy touched only the fringes and was in no way pointed towards its restructuring. Of a number of recommendations made by the Committee, Zia picked up only a few and the convenient ones. Of the former, the most significant ones pertained to ceiling on farm land held by families (in contrast to individual persons) and the introduction of inheritance tax to the tune of 30 per cent of the deceased’s wealth, with a view to preventing what it called "inter-generational snowballing of wealth".\(^{148}\) None of these two recommendations was, however, acceptable to the government.

\(^{146}\) Ibid., p. 50.

\(^{147}\) Ibid., pp. 51-52. The passage is collated from these pages.

Thus, the Committee was primarily concerned with the ways and means of establishing a society in which justice and kindness become the organizing principles of an economic system. In order to achieve such a just and kind society, the Committee did not consider it crucial to introduce Zakat and Ushr. Instead, the Committee laid a great emphasis on universal education, an improved quality of life through easy access to basic consumer goods, a higher employment level.\textsuperscript{149} Such measures of substance may be expected to emanate from a popularly mandated government.

To hazard a comparison, Zia-ul-Haq's 'Islamic' Pakistan differed \textit{inter alia} from Khomeini's Islamic Iran, at least in one significant respect: Zia's Islamization was an exercise "exerted" from above, whereas Khomeini's Islamization stemmed from a popular revolution, albeit a revolution from below. Thus, Ziaism (if it could be called as such) and Khomeinism differed from each other in terms of their historical and social roots. The Iranian Ulama was independent of the State which extended its support to Khomeini. Zia, however, did not possess such a natural constituency. He had to cultivate the Pakistani Ulama which lent a conditional support to his Islamization drive. The Ulama, in the later years of his rule, developed cold feet about extending further support to his regime. Besides, Khomeini, before ushering in the revolution, had already developed a fairly coherent Islamic worldview to inform all sections of society. In the case of Zia, public records do not throw any light on his worldview before he stepped into the scene of Pakistani politics. Whatever Islamic \textit{Weltanschauung} he entertained, it came to the fore only when he catapulted himself into the portals of power. What was certain was his personal religiosity which was beyond reproach. Moreover, Zia-ul-Haq assumed the reins of power in Pakistan under extraordinary circumstances, whereas the locus of power in Iran had undergone a qualitative transformation, from the traditional Pahlavi dynasty to Islamic Revolutionaries. To this extent, the comparison was heavily loaded against the Pakistani case in so far as the nature of Islamization was concerned. As one analyst stated:

\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Ibid.}, n. 145, pp. 50-51.
There has [under Zia-ul-Haq] never been any possibility of a Pakistani theocracy on the Iranian model, not even a theocracy under military protection. Individual mullahs approved individual measures, such as the introduction of Islamic punishments and the establishment of shariat courts, but Zia’s attempts to draw them, as a class, into a working relationship with the army and the bureaucracy never had much chance of success. The ulema knew that there had been no real conversion at the top, and they declined to endorse an autocracy they could never control. The general mosque-going public have similar reservations.\textsuperscript{150}

However, one caveat needs to be underlined in regard to the afore cited appraisal. Islam does not permit an organised clergy to be endowed with political power on the lines of the organised papacy during the medieval Christian era. An ideal Islamic state is not theocratic, but Nomocratic,\textsuperscript{151} as it is governed by the principles of Islamic law (Sharia) and the Holy Book. A ruling authority/class of an Islamic state is bound by the latter two as the primary sources of its legitimacy and governance.

Moreover, Zia-ul-Haq, with all his Islamization drive, had to heavily depend on the United States for his Afghanistan policy. Iran had no such a constraint. However, Zia held Pakistan as the bridgehead against atheist communism’s advance into the Islamic World.\textsuperscript{152} Internationally, Zia may be remembered as the man who stood up to the Soviets after the latter invaded Afghanistan. It dominated Pakistan’s foreign policy agenda during the entire tenure of Zia. The Soviet invasion and the withdrawal of its armed forces from Afghanistan, roughly paralleled Zia’s rise to Pakistan’s political scene and his mysterious death in an air crash in August 1988 which further deepened the enigma surrounding his personality. Commenting upon the complex nature of Zia’s impact upon Pakistan’s political scene, a Western author observed in 1990:


\textsuperscript{151} To borrow the phrase of Maududi. For details, see Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, \textit{Islamic Law and Constitution} (Karachi: Jamaati Islami Publications, 1955).

A balanced picture of Zia's rule may never be possible, but the record shows the soldier-President served Pakistan at a time of renewed crisis. A less disciplined, more politically inspired leader might have reacted differently to events, but it is doubtful he or she would have been more effective in the office. 153

Further, the Afghan imbroglio was a true indicator of how a regime, beset with a legitimacy crisis from the day it usurped the reins of power, could largely overcome it with the skillful manoeuvring of both internal and external forces in its favour: from an international pariah for its 'judicial hanging' of a democratically elected civilian government of Z.A. Bhutto to a 'Spokesman of the Entire Muslim World' at the UN General Assembly Session in October 1980. As one perceptive analyst rightly observed:

The tragedy of Afghanistan is a crucial reminder of how external factors can often come to the rescue of a state's foreign policy and even how it can sustain a particular political regime. 154

A qualitative transformation of such a genre (as outlined above) is, under normal circumstances, highly unlikely.

In contrast to his predecessors, Zia-ul-Haq's upbringing and his social mores were indigenously nurtured and blossomed. In this sense, he may be called a true 'son of the soil'. His personal piety as reflected in his scrupulous observation of religious duties, and (no less than this) the lack of legitimacy for his regime were some of the factors that contributed to his Islamization drive both internally and externally. However, it would be difficult to conjecture whether a democratically


elected civilian leader would have followed a foreign policy course other than the one pursued by Zia-ul-Haq, given the critical geostrategic environment that confounded Pakistan's security dilemma during the eighties.

In retrospect, Zia's Islamization programme was notable for its emphasis on, and the promotion of, the scripturalist (literalist) Islam as interpreted by the Ulama, in contradistinction to the popular, syncretistic and sufistic (Tasawwuf) Islam observable in the Pakistan's countryside and in the rest of the subcontinent. By stressing the former, Zia-ul-Haq caused Islamic revival in Pakistan in a way which found its consonance with the activist Islam elsewhere in the Muslim world. His steadfast championing of the Mujahideen cause and Pakistan's active role in the international Islamic bodies saw to it that Pakistan received an international limelight unwarranted by its size and resources. Further, Zia's Islamization in its external dimensions had affected Pakistan's identity in the comity of nations. During his stewardship, Pakistan consciously devalued its South Asian cultural roots and drew itself closer to South-West Asia/West Asia: a process facilitated by the already entrenched economic, strategic and political ties fostered with the latter. Such a process was, of course, initiated by Z.A. Bhutto during the seventies, as noted in the preceding Chapter. Zia took it to its logical conclusion.