CHAPTER III

The Bhutto Era

It is difficult to obtain an adequate academic treatment of Bhutto's public life within the limited compass of a single chapter. Bhutto's was a highly controversial personality not only at the level of his personal life but also in his role as a public figure. Bhutto had the fortune of starting his political career at a relatively very young age when he became the youngest minister in the Martial Law government of Field Marshal Ayub Khan, in charge of National Reconstruction, Broadcasting and Minorities. However, Bhutto had a natural flair for foreign affairs, buttressed by his academic attainments in Britain and the United States: Christ Church College (Oxford University) and Lincoln's Inn and the University of California (USA), respectively. Bhutto evinced keen interest in politics from his early student days. He hailed from an aristocratic feudal family whose veins carried the blood of politics. When Bhutto came to occupy the reins of power in Pakistan, he had already had sufficient political experience as a minister under the Marshal Law regime of Ayub Khan in charge of foreign affairs since 1963 with the exit of Mansur Qadir from the Pakistani foreign policy scene. This had kept him in good stead in his subsequent political life. There were suggestions to the effect that he advised Ayub Khan to mount an attack, codenamed Operation Gibraltar, against India on the issue of Kashmir in September 1965.

Bhutto quite often led Pakistan's delegations to the United Nations on different occasions. Before being inducted into the Ayub Khan government in 1958, Bhutto headed the Pakistan delegation at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the

1. A detailed description of his moral foibles in addition to his public role is contained in a volume penned by an American scholar. See Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993).
Sea. On one occasion, it so happened to him to champion the cause of Algerian liberation against French imperialism in North Africa. This was not something extraordinary for Pakistan as the Muslim League, in its pre-Partition phase, consistently extended its support to the cause of independence of North African states from the Italian, French and British tutelage. Bhutto's championing the Algerian cause was only natural and obvious: it was simply an extension of the League's pre-partition commitment to post-partition Pakistan's vociferous espousal. With Bhutto's personal imprint, it was plausible to say that the subject had received well-deserved attention from the international community. In 1959, the Political Committee of the UN General Assembly was seized of the Algerian problem. Before this Committee, Bhutto delivered a brief, but strong speech in support of the Algerian freedom fighters against the French occupation forces. It was Pakistan's first open stand on that important Pan-Islamic issue, one that was to remain near the top of Bhutto's foreign policy agenda. It is noteworthy in this connection that when he took up this issue at the General Assembly, he was not yet Pakistan's foreign minister. He took this bold initiative of supporting the Algerians with the hope that it would meet with an approval from his mentor, Ayub Khan. "Thanks to his [Bhutto's] initiative on the matter, Pakistan recognized the Provisional Government of Algeria, building the first several important Pan-Islamic bridges across North Africa that Bhutto always kept in good repair".  

The purpose of this chapter is not either to chronologically outline the political career of Z.A. Bhutto or to attempt his political biography. Instead, this chapter purports to evaluate the Islamic segment of Pakistan's foreign policy under the leadership of Z.A. Bhutto. It does not also aim at evaluating his domestic reform programme in the spheres of economy, polity and society except in so far as they

---


155
impinge upon the foreign policy pursued by Pakistan under his active leadership. Nor
do this chapter enter into a theoretical discussion of what is called domestic policy -
foreign policy symbiosis, even though there were ample indications to point towards
pragmatic endeavours to seek domestic legitimization through foreign policy. Bhutto
adroitly manoeuvred issues in this direction.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto descended on the political scene of Pakistan when the state
was passing through a trying transitional phase in its history following the loss of East
Pakistan. At such a juncture, Pakistan was in dire need of a leadership which could
lift it from this morass and instill confidence among its subjects in their future. As
Lawrence Ziring aptly depicts the psychological state that enveloped Pakistan in the
Seventies:

...a rump Pakistan [caused by the secession of East Pakistan] found itself
in a new environment and given the disarray within as well as the
prevailing national despair, the time seemed opportune not only for a
new national beginning, but for a new framework to support the nation’s
foreign policy....Steeled by the affection of the masses, armed with a
significant coalition, counselled by bright advisors, Bhutto was called to
administer to (sic) a nation that had suffered the trauma of humiliating
defeat, that had been forced to submit to dismemberment, that seemed to
have lost direction and was on the verge of rejecting its ethos. In such
dire circumstances, it was ... remarkable that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
dreamed of placing Pakistan in the forefront of the Muslim nations, or
that he aspired to be the recognized spokesman for Third World causes. 4

Besides, some hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war were under Indian
custody; their release received his utmost attention. In the midst of such
circumstances, Bhutto took the reins of power in Pakistan.

Providentially, Bhutto and Pakistan had an external environment, particularly
in the West Asian region, that was quite conducive for Pakistan to chalk out its

--------------------
4. Lawrence Ziring, 'The Foreign Policy of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto', in S.M.Burke
and Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan's Foreign Policy : An Historical Analysis,

156
future: the Arab claim of victory over Israel in the *Yaum Kippur* War of 1973 and the imposition of oil embargo against the supporters of Israel in 1973.

The lines that follow will delineate the contours of Pakistan's foreign policy under the political dispensation of Z.A. Bhutto and the latter's manoeuvres in utilizing these favourable conditions to promote Pakistan's national interests. Among the latter, in the circumstances under which Pakistan was constrained to find itself in, national survival rightfully received the topmost priority in it's foreign policy agenda.

Writing in the prestigious *Foreign Affairs* in 1973, in the aftermath of the trauma of the secession of East Pakistan, Bhutto posited the central role of "New Pakistan" (the remainder Pakistan, minus its Eastern Wing, Bangladesh) in the geopolitical milieu of Arab and non-Arab Muslim states:

"Pakistan is... a leading member of the Muslim World... Imperishable affinities born of culture, religion and historical experience bind us to other Muslim nations and underline our community of interest. Together with our neighbours, Iran and Turkey, we have established an Organisation for Regional Cooperation for Development. We have supported the just cause of the Arab world, which in turn, stood with us in our hour of trial in 1971. Their subsequent support has strengthened our position immeasurably. Not only has it demonstrated to Pakistan the friendship of her Muslim brethren, but it has displayed to the world the solidarity of the Muslim nations."

In another place, Bhutto was credited to have said:

"The severance of our eastern wing by force has significantly altered our geographical focus. This will naturally affect our geo-political perspective... At the moment, as we stand, it is within the ambit of South and West Asia. It is here that our primary concern must henceforth lie."

---


7. See Zubaida Mustafa, "Recent Trends in Pakistan's Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East", *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi), Vol. XXVIII, No. 4, 1975.
Furthermore, the 1971 dismemberment, having left its scars on the Pakistani psyche, forced it to look westwards to search for moorings. As one analyst put it succinctly that "the loss of East Pakistan necessitated a course correction in Pakistan’s foreign policy." It further impelled Pakistan to withdraw itself from the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the Commonwealth of Nations. Till its break-up, Pakistan considered itself both as a South-East Asian and a Middle Eastern power. Bhutto was also convinced that dependence on the United States could not bear fruit as it could not stall the dismemberment of Pakistan, its most allied ally. Keeping this scenario in view, Bhutto christened his foreign policy and called it 'bilateralism': a foreign policy strategy of maintaining Pakistan's bilateral relations without impinging on its relations with the third countries adversely. 'Bilateralism' was an attempt to negate the essence of Cold-war based international relations sponsored by the erstwhile Soviet Union and the United States of America. This foreign policy strategy was conspicuous by its absence during the regimes of Bhutto's predecessors who aligned themselves with the U.S.A. Bhutto's 'bilateralism' strategy was to give him an independent leverage in the pursuit of his foreign policy.

Bhutto's imprint on Pakistan's foreign policy could become possible at such a historical juncture following the emergence of Bangladesh on the one hand and the assumption of a crucial role on the part of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) on the other, both occurring in the early part of the seventies. This


coincidence paved the way for the forging of mutually advantageous cooperative ties between Pakistan and the Muslim states. It was during the period of Z.A. Bhutto that both the Muslim countries and Pakistan realized their mutual importance to one another. Since then, both have spared no effort in further strengthening their friendship. Under Bhutto, Islamic unity was converted into 'a principal instrument of foreign policy'. In order to bring the Muslim states onto the centre stage of international politics, Bhutto employed Islamic dimension in his endeavours to forge deep political, economic and strategic ties with the Muslim world in order to attain the foreign policy objectives of Pakistan. This is evident as Edward Mortimer writes:

...Pakistan in the 1970s could hope to derive material as well as psychological satisfaction from a foreign policy emphasising Islamic solidarity, as the Muslim oil-producing states of the Middle East became important markets for manpower and ...sources of economic aid...After 1971, Pakistan needed both a psychological and economic boost. Bhutto ...made great efforts to develop an "Islamic" foreign policy, eagerly responding to Saudi quest for a wider Islamic community...While Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states provided the cash, Pakistan has provided much of the manpower, and much of the zeal, for the network of supranational 'Islamic' institutions that has [sic] developed during the last decade under the umbrella of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.

While the constellation of international forces operated to the mutual advantage of Pakistan and the Middle Eastern states, such a correlation had also made an imprint on the domestic scene, as the following observation indicates:

...the Islamic resurgence in Pakistan and closer ties with the Middle East have been mutually reinforcing developments during the 1970s. Increased diplomatic and economic intercourse with Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states has strengthened the Islamic thrust at home which in

turn has led the Government of Pakistan to seek still closer relations with these same states...The willingness of the Saudis and others to underwrite aid for mosques, educational institutions, the Zakat Fund, and other features of the new Islamic order demonstrates their continuing interest in the Islamization drive [in Pakistan].

Such an alliance-like relationship between Pakistan and the Gulf states, as the foregoing indicates, enabled the latter to intervene in the domestic politics of the other Muslim states whenever possible. As the result of such a situation, the ambassador of Saudi Arabia and the Foreign Ministers United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and Libya could oblige Bhutto and his main opposition, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) - a nine-party political alliance consisting of Jamat-i-Islami, the Jamat-i-Ulama-i-Pakistan, the Jamat-ul-ulama-i-Islami, the Convention Muslim League, the Tehriq-e-Istiqlal, the Pakistan Democratic Party, the National Democratic Party, the Khaksar Tehriq, and the Muslim Conference - to settle their differences through negotiations in June 1977 in the spirit of Islamic solidarity and brotherhood. (In fact, Bhutto requested them to do all they could to settle his political problem with the opposition). Soon after the talks, Bhutto visited six Middle Eastern capitals ostensibly to brief them about the developments on the Pakistani domestic scene.

Such an interest and involvement of the Arab states in the domestic politics of Pakistan was feasible because the former had a real stake in the political stability of Pakistan and that they were united in their common cultural and religious heritage. The evincing of such an active interest by the Gulf states in the internal developments of Pakistan was not at all considered an interference in the internal set up of Pakistan by Pakistanis themselves. These Arab personalities, acting under the name of

---


15. Ibid., n. 11, p. 595.
`Islamic Solidarity Committee`, did in fact provide a face-saving device to both Bhutto and his main opposition. They also offered to provide financial assistance for the conduct of new elections.\(^{16}\) Ere the Arab mediators deal could fructify, the PNA Central Council rejected the deal that had been tentatively approved by the negotiators.

**India-Pakistan Relations and the Muslim World**

A majority of Muslim states gave continuity of support, diplomatic and material, to Pakistan in its problems with India. The issues were significant: The 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, India's `expulsion` from the Rabat Islamic Summit Conference in 1969, the 1971 East Pakistan Crisis, etc. Viewing such issues in a broader perspective, a week-long Asian-African Islamic Conference of thirty-three nations held at Bandung in the first fortnight of March 1965 had called upon the World Islamic Community to present a united front whenever a non-Muslim state committed aggression against a Muslim state and to give all possible assistance to the victims of aggression.\(^{17}\) The 1965 conflagration aroused a spontaneous and favourable response among Arab countries for Pakistan. Thus, when the War broke out between India and Pakistan in 1965, several demonstrations of solidarity with Pakistan took place in Jakarta from 1 September onwards. In one such demonstrations, the agitating public ransacked the Indian Embassy in Jakarta, burnt three cars, took away the Indian flag, and occupied the office of the Indian


At the official level, President Soekarno of Indonesia had, on 7 September 1965, declared that "the sympathy and prayer of the Indonesian people are dedicated to the people of Pakistan who were fighting fiercely to maintain the freedom and sovereignty of their country and people". He exhorted all Muslim countries to come forward to assist Pakistan. Indonesia also tried to mobilize international opinion at the Afro-Asian-Latin American Conference held in Havana in the first week of January, 1966 by emphasising Kashmir's right to self-determination. In material terms, Indonesia sent a few naval vessels to Karachi. It even offered its help to Pakistan to seize the Andaman and Nicobar Islands so as to detract India from Kashmir. The Times reported from Karachi:

A small flotilla of Russian craft from the Indonesian Navy, lying in Karachi harbour, is the most conspicuous contribution made by Pakistan's various friends to her rearmament. There are six vessels, two submarines, two missile carrying boats in size between a frigate and a large motor torpedo boat, and two similar vessels without missiles. They came on a 'goodwill visit' several weeks ago, but it is believed here that they have either been lent to the Pakistan Navy or even made over to it...It is understood that the MIGs have been offered by both Indonesia and China.

---

19. Ibid., n. 17, p. 245.
21. Ibid.
Thus, from both the public and the government, Indonesia’s support of Pakistan was vociferous as well generous. Indonesia's pro-Pakistani proclivities were preceded by a series of cordial moves initiated by the leaders of the two countries with a view to strengthening their mutual ties. In the summer of 1962, Indonesia accepted a battalion of Pakistani troops (having a total strength of 1,537) under the command of Major-General Said-ud-din Khan, to safeguard the security of the West Irian for a period of seven months, during the interim U.N. administration called United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), preparatory to the transfer of that territory from the Dutch hands to the Indonesian ones. Consequently, the UNTEA took charge of the territory (now called Irian Barat) on 1 October 1962 and seven months later, the area's control was handed over to Indonesia on 1 May 1963 through its Foreign Minister Subandrio.

It was notable that an Indian and a former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, and chef de cabinet C.V. Narasimhan, made a suggestion to the Secretary-General, U Thant, to invite Pakistan to do the peacekeeping job in the territory.

Major-General Saiduddin Khan was assisted in his duties by his aide-de-camp, Major Muzaffar Khan Malik. In addition, Pakistan appointed a liaison officer, stationed at UN headquarters in New York-Lt. Colonel Shirin Dil Khan Niaz.

In June 1963, President Soekarno of Indonesia visited Pakistan at the end of which a joint communique was issued. The communique referred to the resolve of the two leaders - Ayub and Soekarno to intensify their efforts to liberate the Afro-Asian


peoples and to secure the right of self-determination of peoples still held in bondage. They hoped that in view of the need for strengthening the Afro-Asian solidarity, an honourable and equitable settlement of the problem of Kashmir would be reached in the near future. The two leaders also called for a holding of a second Afro-Asian conference for strengthening solidarity among Asian and African countries who have to play a major role in 'a new world order' 27 In this connection, in April 1964, Foreign Minister, Bhutto paid a visit to Jakarta to participate in the preparatory meeting of the proposed conference. The occasion produced a Bhutto-Subandrio (the then Foreign Minister of Indonesia) statement concerning the question of Kashmir. Indonesia came round to the Pakistani view that the Kashmir dispute involved the question of the fundamental rights of the people of Kashmir, and joined Pakistan in calling for an early solution of this dispute in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State. 28 When Soekarno visited Pakistan in September 1964, he reiterated the same view in his joint statement with Ayub. Further, the two leaders decided to establish cooperative relations between their countries on the lines of the RCD [Regional Cooperation for Development]. 29 In an attempt to reinforce bilateral cooperation, the two countries, in March 1965, signed an agreement which stated that 'concrete decisions' had been taken to develop cultural and economic cooperation between them. However, the 'concrete decisions' were not spelt out. 30 Again, meeting in Jakarta in August 1965, the two countries signed an agreement to form Indonesia-Pakistan Economic and Cultural Cooperation (IPECC), patterned on the RCD.

Be that as it may, it seems proper to know as to how each India and Pakistan perceived the 1965 conflagration. To Pakistan, it was a war of Islam on the basis of which, it tried to evoke Islamic solidarity among Muslim countries in order to seek their support. To obtain such support, it sought the help of its two CENTO colleagues, Iran and Turkey and also from Saudi Arabia and Jordan in the Arab World. India projected its secular image and relied on the UAR for support. With this end in view, it sent Krishna Menon to Cairo who failed in his bid to obtain a forthright support from Egypt. On the contrary, he was told that his country had committed aggression (against Pakistan) by crossing the International border and that Cairo could not support India in spite of the cordiality governing their bilateral relations. The Egyptian press identified in the Kashmir issue the centrality characterising India-Pakistan relations. For instance, Al-Gamhouria, a semi-official Egyptian daily, considered it the duty of the Afro-Asian leaders to strive for the settlement of the India-Pakistan dispute by enabling Kashmiris to exercise their right of self-determination through a plebiscite.

The occasion for the Arabs to rake up the India-Pakistan dispute was provided at the Casablanca (Morocco) summit of Twelve Arab Presidents and Monarchs held during 13-17 September 1965. Egypt was a party to the communique released at the end of the Summit which, inter alia, called upon both the belligerents in the subcontinent to put an end to their conflict in accordance with the principles and resolutions of the United Nations.

34. Dawn (Karachi), 20 September 1965.
At this summit, Saudi Arabia and Jordan extended their vociferous support to Pakistan on the usual ground of Islamic solidarity. Jordan treated Pakistan’s war as her own. King Hussein asserted that his country would stand by the side of Pakistan ‘till right is restored, justice is done’. A fund was opened to collect money for Pakistan’s defence requirements.  

As Pakistan’s traditional Muslim ally, Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic, moral and, to some extent, material support to Pakistan, in its war with India, had been notable. King Faisal offered Pakistan some financial aid. A statement made by the Saudi Arabian Embassy, and issued in Karachi, asserted that India had ‘committed aggression against our Pakistani and Kashmiri brethren’. Amir Mishaal, brother of the late King Faisal (of Saudi Arabia) and Governor of Makkah, in league with other leading families of Jeddah, came forward to volunteer themselves for Pakistan in the latter’s war with India. The Amir also arranged for daily namaaz in Kaaba Shareef for Pakistan’s victory. Besides, Saudi students and school boys collected funds and the entire population acted as if Pakistan’s cause was their own. As a mark of solidarity with Pakistan, the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Pakistan did not celebrate their country’s National Day, and, instead, donated pound 1,000 to the Pakistan National Defence Fund. On the diplomatic front, the Saudi representative at the UN General Assembly, taking part in the General Debate, said in October 1965:

> The principle of self-determination was proclaimed at the Peace Conference of Versailles long before the founding of the United Nations, the same principle has been enshrined in the Charter of Our Organisation and later on elaborated and accepted as a fundamental human right by the

whole human world community. The Maharaja of Kashmir acceded his state to India without ascertaining the wishes of the people of Kashmir...It is dangerous for any state [implicitly referring to India] to take action on its own without the consent of the other party. It is no wonder that the War broke out...the people of Kashmir...cannot be muzzled for long when they became even more conscious of their rights to determine their future.\(^{39}\)

Besides Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Iran, Turkey, Kuwait, Iraq, Somalia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Mauritania, Sudan, Mali, Dahomey, Senegal, and Chad had lent support to the Pakistani case for self-determination of Kashmir. The governments of both Iran and Turkey combined their diplomatic and moral support with the supply of token military hardware.\(^{40}\) The government of Iran termed the Indian attack on Pakistan as 'aggression' and declared that the people of Iran 'shall not fail to extend every possible assistance to their Pakistani brothers and sisters'.\(^{41}\) Similarly, the Turkish Prime Minister stated that India's action in extending hostilities 'outside the area of dispute in Kashmir itself' had caused deep concern in Turkey, Pakistan's ally in CENTO.\(^{42}\) Besides, on 10 September 1965, the Prime Ministers of Iran and Turkey jointly disapproved of the Indian attack on Pakistan.\(^{43}\) For material help, Pakistan, in fact, made an appeal to Iran and Turkey for the supply of jet aircraft. With this end in view, Air Chief Marshal Asghar Khan had gone to Indonesia, Turkey and Iran to secure aircraft, ammunitions, and explosives. Besides, Pakistan's Ambassador to Ankara was told to persuade Turkey to supply aircraft spare

---

40. Ibid., n. 22.
41. Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), Vol. XVIII, No. 4, 1965.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
parts immediately. Although, Iran and Tukey did not favourably respond to the request for aircrafts, they, however, decided to 'use all national possibilities' to aid Pakistan which precluded them to transfer to a third country weapons obtained from the NATO and USA. In accordance with this decision, Iran provided Pakistan with jet fuel and gasoline and Turkey with guns and ammunition. Besides, a large number of Iranians and Turks volunteered to fight against India. Paramedical staff, the nurses from Iran and Turkey flew to Pakistan and served there. Iran offered medical supplies and a field hospital. Pakistan's Islamic solidarity appeal was quite effective in so far as even a state like Iraq, a Baath Socialist state, with its own Kurdish problem, was compelled to support Pakistan's self-determination demand for Kashmir. The Algerian Government too viewed the Kashmir problem from the plank of self-determination. Being acquainted with the latter through its liberation struggle, Algeria could not but support the application of the same principle for the settlement of the Kashmir question. Syria also expressed its belief in the sacred right of its [Kashmir's] people to decide its own future.

Afghanistan, Pakistan's western neighbour which never boasted of having amicable relations with Pakistan in the contemporary era owing to the issue of Pakhtunistan, had adopted a neutralist stance towards the war. But public feelings


46. Ibid., p. 354.

47. Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), Vol. XVIII, No. 4, 1965.

48. Ibid.
were palpably marked by empathy towards Pakistan.\textsuperscript{49} The Kabul-based correspondent of \textit{The Times} wrote: 'Quite a few people here speak of Pakistanis as fighting to hold back the wave of Indian expansionism that, unhindered, might try to roll to the Hindu Kush'.\textsuperscript{50}

Malaysia stood distinctly aloof from the rest of the Muslim World by not displaying its \textit{esprit d'corps} with Pakistan. In fact, Malaysia openly sided with India thereby creating dismay and anger in Pakistan. Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman was reported to have said that "Malaysia must regard her international ties as more important than her religious ties with other countries."\textsuperscript{51} Participating in the Security Council debate on 18 September 1965, concerning the war in the subcontinent, Malaysia's representative, R. Ramani, not only castigated Pakistan for having initiated the war but also made a suggestion to the effect that Pakistan's creation was an error. He told the Council that the question of Kashmir 'began simmering on that fateful day in August 1947 when one ancient country and one ancient people were cut into two unequal parts'.\textsuperscript{52} Further, Ramani likened the plebiscite-exhorting UN resolutions to 'ancient resolutions from the musty records of the past'. Pakistani protestations against the Ramani utterances had only led to the confirmation that they reflected the policy of the government under the Prime Ministership of Tunku Abdul Rahman. Pakistan consequently severed diplomatic ties with Malaysia. Not until September 1966 did the two countries announce their readiness to mutually exchange High Commissioners, thanks to the mediatory efforts of the late Shah of Iran. Subsequently, since 1970, an improved thaw marked the relations between Pakistan and Malaysia, when the latter's Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman became the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{49} Ibid., n. 45, p. 355.
\item \textsuperscript{50} \textit{The Times} (London), 5 October 1965.
\item \textsuperscript{51} Ibid., n. 44, p. 362.
\item \textsuperscript{52} \textit{Security Council Official Records}, 1241st Meeting of 18 September 1965.
\end{itemize}
Secretary General of the Islamic Conference at the Karachi (second) Islamic foreign ministers’ conference held in December 1970. At this conference, the first incumbent of the OIC, drew the attention of the assembled delegates to the words of the Prophet enjoining Muslims to regard one another as brothers, and described Pakistan as a country whose strength had emanated from the Islamic faith.

This changed scenario in Pakistan-Malaysia relations has been further strengthened with the political ascendance of Mahathir ibn Mohammad who has ensured Malay dominance in the political life of his country. Of late, the Malay political thinking has started veering around Islam which is reflected in the support extended to the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina including the stationing of a Malaysian military contingent as part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The pro-Bosnian posture was further reinforced by Mahathir’s decision to sever diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia in view of the latter’s support to its ethnic cousins in Bosnia. Buttressed by a buoyant economy and a political leadership increasingly self-conscious about its leadership credentials of the Third World in a post-Cold War International Order, Malaysia’s increasingly hardline and aggressive posturing in support of Bosnia had inadvertently made it to lean towards Pakistan in the politics of the Indian subcontinent, over the question of Kashmir. Thus, Tunku Abdul Rahman’s pro-Indian stance, as outlined in the foregoing, does no longer exist under the present dispensation of Mahathir whose Malay-dominated foreign office has tended to be pro-Islamic and as a logical corollary, is inclined to adopt a pro-Pakistani position on Kashmir. Such orientation was also facilitated by other contributory factors. Malaysia’s foreign policy under Mahathir has been conducted in broad conjunction with the OIC which made the Commonwealth and the Non-aligned Movement practically redundant for Malaysia.

The traditional predominance of the Malays in the social structure of Malaysia and sustained by the state's policy of affirmative action (Bhumiputras, sons of the soil) did not, however, provide them with a permanent advantage vis-a-vis the non-Malays as the latter found ways and means of achieving progress and efficiency in their walks of life. In this medley of social dynamics, the Malays have sought to further strengthen their Bhumiputras' advantage by emphasising the distinct nature of their culture and Islamic religion. The Bhumiputras, have, thus, linked their ethnicity and future to the Islamic factor. They treat their ethnicity and faith as synonymous with each other so much so that to be a Malay is to be a Muslim. Such a dialectic presents a difficult situation for a social scientist to know where the one begins and the other ends. Mahathir's strident pro-Islamic external tone is, thus, directly rooted in the whirlpool of Malaysia's domestic politics.

In an address made to the UN General Assembly titled "Self-determination and Kashmir" on 28 September 1965, Bhutto, as a quid pro quo to the moral support lent by Muslim states to Pakistan thanked "our brothers" in Iran, Turkey and the "great bloc of Arab countries...to which Pakistan is linked...not merely by ties of religion and of common culture, but by common adherence to the idea of justice and peace," and also the President, government and people of Indonesia for their "brave and unstinting support".54 Thus, from the Pakistani point of view, the most satisfying aspect of the War of 1965 was the sympathy and support they received from the Muslim World to which they had always attached significance. The support extended by the Muslim World to Pakistan in the War of 1965 impressed upon it the need for a quid pro quo which is earnestly displayed in favour of Arabs. The occasion was the six-day Arab-Israeli War of June 1967 which involved Israel on one side and the UAR, Syria, and Jordan on the other.

No sooner than the War broke out among the belligerents, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan promptly condemned Israel for its 'naked aggression' and Ayub Khan wrote to the Arab Heads of States that Pakistan would do her utmost to render them whatever 'material help' they required. In the National Assembly, the Foreign Minister asserted: 'perhaps with the exception of Kashmir', no other subject had stirred the people of Pakistan as had the Arab-Israel War. Pakistani support to the Arabs was reiterated in the UN wherein it submitted a resolution in the General Assembly which declared invalid the measure, taken by Israel to change the status of Al-Quds (Jerusalem).

The 1971 War

In the 1971 India-Pakistan War, most of the Third World states stood for Pakistan's territorial integrity as 'most-Afro-Asian countries, having recalcitrant minorities within their own borders, were sympathetic to Pakistan. The Arab states, in particular, stood in unison to protest against the dismemberment of Pakistan. They were especially concerned at the danger Pakistan faced at the hands of India. Some of them, in particular, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, came forward to assist Pakistan materially. The former lent Pakistan seventy five war planes in October 1971 and the latter sent ten during the War. However, such an Arab solidarity in favour of Pakistan could not reverse the fait accompli, the emergence of Bangladesh.

56. Ibid., p. 995.
59. Ibid., n. 57, p. 407.
However, Bhutto in January 1972, undertook the thanks giving and much publicized "Journey of Renaissance" (and also called "Journey Among Brothers") to twenty countries of the Middle East and Africa, starting first with Afghanistan, "to thank them for the support extended by them to Pakistan during the critical days of 1971." His sojourn covered a large number of Muslim states: Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Nigeria, Guinea and Mauritania. He visited the first named country on 11 January 1972 and had talks with its ruler, King Zahir Shah, and the rest were covered in the months of May-June. The tour was aimed at establishing direct, personal, and intimate contact between Bhutto and the leaders of those states. Howsoever, the tour's immediate objective was fulfilled: Pakistan's psychological rehabilitation with the wider Islamic community following the loss of Bangladesh. Bhutto himself testified to this in his "A Journey of Renaissance": "Pakistan had recovered not merely the will to survive but also grit, strength and ability to maintain a stable democratic polity and a viable economy in spite of the shock of defeat, the cost of war and amputation of one wing of the country, East Pakistan." Besides, the tour demonstrated to Pakistanis that they were not alone in their predicament. It paved the way for Pakistan to usher in creative diplomacy testing the latter to challenging tasks ahead. This creative diplomacy was discernible in his successful endeavours to obtain the Pakistani prisoners of war and its territory held by India. It could also be seen in the way he tactfully persuaded the Muslim countries that he visited to withhold recognition of Bangladesh till the pending issues of the prisoners' repatriation, etc., were resolved to the satisfaction of Pakistan. Besides the aforesaid Muslim states, some important Islamic organisations were also favourably disposed towards Pakistan.

61. Ibid., p. 7.
62. Ibid., n. 59, p. 421.
in the latter's conflict with India. In this context, a Muslim representative body, the Makkah-based Rabitah al Amali al-Islami (World Muslim League), was critical of India for its role in the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. In a resolution passed to this effect in its meeting held in Makkah in April 1974, the Rabitah expressed "its great resentment against the Indian aggressors who made use of the internal political crisis in Pakistan, dividing brothers and dismembering the state of Pakistan." It also appealed to the Muslims of Bengal to expel foreigners from their land and begin a dialogue with Western Pakistan to establish Islamic brotherhood on firm ground.63

As a prelude to the hosting of Second Islamic Summit Conference in Lahore in 1974, Pakistan skillfully played its role in championing the cause of Islamic solidarity in various international Islamic bodies which form part of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). An overview of Pakistan's diplomatic strategy in this context is quite in order. In the first place, an immediate Muslim fallout in the case of Al-Aqsa despoilation will be analysed in perspective, and second, an attempt will be made to delineate India's efforts to enter the international Islamic Community through Rabat in 1969 and Pakistan's open hostility to it.

The Masjid-ul-Al-Aqsa Episode

The desecration of the Al-Aqsa mosque on 21 August 1969 as 'triggered by a psychotic Australian Christian starting a fire' 64 in the said mosque, ignited a worldwide protest among Muslims and in sheer anger and anguish, they made calls for Jihad against Israel. In a joint communication sent to the UN Secretary-General, a total of 25 Muslim states brought to his notice the gravity of the episode, and the


revulsion it had caused among millions of Muslims all over the world. Besides, they called for an urgent meeting of the Security Council which met and passed a resolution by 11 to nil with four abstentions namely, the United States, Finland, Columbia and Paraguay.\(^{65}\) Sharing the anguish of the Muslim countries, Pakistan's President Yahya Khan, in a statement, deplored the desecration of the mosque which was the first gîbîla of the Muslims and one of their holiest shrines. Continuing the statement, he underlined the need for Muslim unity and asserted that Pakistan on its part would adopt a course of action in conjunction with the rest of the Muslim World.\(^{66}\) Thus, taking initiative on the subject, Pakistan sponsored a resolution which was adopted by the Security Council. The resolution read that "...any act of destruction or profanation of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Jerusalem or any encouragement of, or connivance at, any such act may seriously endanger international peace and security."\(^{67}\) In a rhetorical sense, the Council Resolution was, of course, strong but it could not extinguish the religious passions that had been aroused by the incident. The revulsion that engulfed and caused by the episode had led the Muslim leaders to think that in an ideologically fragmented world (with the Cold War overtones), the Muslim states must strive to set up a common body to ensure the protection of their common interests. Such a contemplation made them realize the need for a machinery through which they could endeavour to defend their common interests on the stage of world politics. It was under these circumstances of acute emotional upsurge that the leaders of 25 Muslim states decided to meet in Rabat (Morocco) on 22 September 1969, with King Hasan II consenting to host a Summit Conference. It is to be noted in this regard that there was a gap of a little more than a month between the Al-Aqṣa incident and the convening of the Summit Conference. Further, only 25 states did attend the Conference from among


\(^{66}\) *Dawn* (Karachi), 24 August 1969.

\(^{67}\) Ibid., n. 65, p. 235.
those 36 states that were in fact invited. The Summit passed resolutions pertaining to the Al-Aqsa episode, Israeli occupation of Arab lands following the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967 and the restoration of the national rights of Palestinian people. 68

India and the Rabat Summit

Besides addressing itself to the agenda items, as outlined in the aforesaid, the Conference had to grapple with a ticklish issue in the form of India's membership in the Islamic body, representing the international Islamic community. The conference Preparatory Committee had not included India in the list of 35 countries originally invited to the summit. It was a seven-nation body formed to seek its suggestions on procedural matters such as, for instance, the selection and the number of countries to be invited to participate in the proposed Conference. Pakistan, it may be noted, was one of the members of the Committee. The Committee adopted an eligibility criteria in its meeting held at the Moroccan capital in September 1969 for participation in the Summit Conference: the participant-country should have a majority of Muslim population or had adopted 'Islam as the state religion'. Following Indian protests, and remonstrations from friendly Arab countries, the Preparatory Committee's decision was reviewed after the Summit opened its plenary session, and it was decided on 23 September by acclamation to invite India on a proposal by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. A statement issued by the Pakistani delegation said: 'In recognition of the historic and abiding concern of the great Muslim community in the India-Pakistan sub-continent, the Islamic summit adopted proposal by His Majesty King Faisal of Saudi Arabia to accord representation to the Muslims of India.' 69 While this being the state of affairs, India sought to justify its case on the ground that it had a sizeable Muslim population and that that population had to be represented in the Conference.

It further claimed that it had the third largest Muslim population in the world after Indonesia and Pakistan (the then undivided, with East Pakistan still its constituent part). New Delhi stated that "the Indian Muslims are as much concerned with what is happening in Palestine as the Muslim population elsewhere." However, later, the Conference itself accepted the Indian appeal that Indian Muslims should be represented. When the Conference took this decision, the deliberations were already underway. Pending the arrival of an appropriate delegation from New Delhi, headed by its Industry Minister, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed (who later became the President of the Republic), India instructed its Ambassador in Rabat, Sardar Gurbachan Singh, to represent India in the Conference. The Ambassador had attended the plenary session of the Conference, and even made a formal speech there. However, as soon as the Indian delegation arrived in Rabat, the atmosphere underwent an unexpected change. In the words of the late Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed himself:

Soon after (after the delegation's arrival in Rabat on 23 September, 1969), the Information Minister of Morocco, on behalf of his King in his capacity as Chairman of the Conference, met us... and explained that Pakistan and two or three other countries had objected to the Government of India's participation in the Conference [emphasis added], and pleaded with me that we: (1) voluntarily withdraw from the conference, or (2) accept the status of observer, or (3) remain physically absent from the conference without withdrawing from it.

Ahmed summarily rejected these conditions, reiterating that he had come to Rabat following an unanimous invitation from the Conference for Indian participation. However, these conditions were later reiterated on behalf of the Conference by a delegation led by the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, who called on Ahmad along with the representatives of Afghanistan, Egypt and Nigeria.


They could not, however, change Ahmad's original position. Ahmed had to say afterwards:

Later...some of our delegates tried to go into the conference hall where the leaders of the delegations were meeting, but they were told that it was a closed session and India was not required to attend it. 72

On 24 September 1969, to quote Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed:

The [former] Prime Minister of Malaysia sent me a letter thanking me for the sacrifice I had made in the cause of Islam in order to save the Conference. 73

Ahmed expressed surprise at the letter of the Malaysian former Prime Minister and replied to it immediately. In an another letter sent to the Monarch of Morocco, Ahmed "informed him (the Moroccan King) of the presence of our delegation and asking when we were to be present at the Conference". Having had no response to this communication, the Indian Minister had learnt that night to the effect that:

the Conference had met without any representative of India, and adopted a final declaration which made a reference to the representatives of the Muslim Community in India being present at the Conference [emphasis added]. 74

The Minister immediately issued a Press statement refuting the mention of the Indian Muslim Community in the Conference declaration. Viewing the whole episode in perspective, the Ministry of External Affairs, in its annual report submitted to Parliament for the year 1969, remarked that "it is to be noted with regret that due

72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
mainly to Pakistan's intransigent attitude [emphasis added] the Indian delegation could not attend the final session of the conference." 75

"Pakistan's intransigent attitude", as alluded to in the aforesaid report could be identified in the reported statement of Field Marshal Yahya Khan (the then President of Pakistan) that Pakistan would cease to take part in the conference if the Indian Government was allowed to be represented by its Ambassador. He further argued that the Conference gave admittance to the Indian Muslim Community and not to the State of India. He even questioned the credentials of Gurbachan Singh - a non-Muslim-to represent the Muslim minority. 76 He further argued that "if the criterion of participation in the conference is a large Muslim minority, then why not to invite Soviet Union, China, Ghana or Albania, not to say Israel? From the way it treats our brothers, India is to Pakistan what Israel is to the Arabs." 77 The Shah of Iran even warned the Conference Chairman, King Hassan of Morocco, that he would immediately join any walkout by General Yahya Khan should India attend the session. 78 As his argument carried the day, India had to leave the session in ignominy. 79 Pakistan also protested against the communal riots then going on in Ahmedabad. In this context, it may be mentioned that Jordan, Turkey and Iran took an identical position to that of Pakistan's. As an additional snub, the conclave named mosques after every country save India. As a writer had to say later that the humiliation of Rabat was the culmination of a very frustrating experiment in

75. Ibid.

76. Dawn (Karachi), September 25, 1969.


78. Ibid.

multilateral diplomacy for India. In his closing prayer, King Hassan said, "May God help Muslims in Palestine, in India, and wherever they are being persecuted." The Rabat fallout in India had been one of pique and a general widespread frustration. Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s handling of the case was roundly criticised both within and outside Parliament. The Statesman in its critical editorial summed up the Government’s stand:

New Delhi has only itself to blame for the humiliation to which India had been subjected at the Islamic summit at Rabat in being asked to withdraw from a Conference to which it had secured a belated invitation only after persistent and, at times, pathetic importuning.... The very idea of secular India wanting to go to a conference of Islamic States was open to serious objection.  

Against this background and the on-going attempts by Pakistan to increasingly internationalize/Islamize its Kashmir dispute with India, and it’s success in getting the OIC decisions taken in its favour, it is of interest to note that some scholarly suggestions are being made to the Indian government to review its present position and "show an involved interest in the OIC activities".

The Jeddah Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference

The Jeddah Conference was inaugurated by Saudi Arabia’s Monarch, the late King Faisal on 23-25 February 1970. While doing so, King Faisal underlined the need for Islamic unity by reaffirming the Muslims’ faith in Allah. To quote him:

---------------------
80. Ibid., n. 70, p. 325.
83. Zafar Imam, 'India Must Reassess its Ties with OIC', The Times of India (New Delhi), 12 September 1994.
We must go back to God Almighty, renew our belief in Him and adhere to our faith and work sincerely to defend ourselves with all the power at our command. Luckily we are not so weak so as to be incapable of defending ourselves and doing our duty. However, we are sorely in need of the force of faith and sincerity in work and determination to execute - all of us feel the gravity of our setbacks and... the savage and unprecedented aggression to which the Moslem nation has been subjected [referring to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the 1969 Al-Aqsa mosque episode].

The Jeddah Conference was attended by foreign ministers of 22 member states in order to deliberate on the progress achieved in connection with the liberation of Palestine and to set up an Islamic Secretariat as envisaged in the 1969 Rabat Summit. Pakistan focused on the need to give an organisational shape to the aspirations of Muslim countries in order to enable them to resolve problems of cooperation. Speaking on the occasion, Nawabzada Sher Ali Khan, Pakistan's Information Minister stated:

Pakistan... strongly and enthusiastically supported the idea [Permanent Islamic Secretariat] and played a crucial role in getting it through. In its view, such a body would serve as a clearing house for collaboration amongst Muslim countries and this was necessary for the smooth working and proper servicing of all future meetings of Heads of Governments and other leaders of Muslim countries.

The Minister felt that 'the need of the hour was effective cooperation and coordination on the part of Muslim countries in political, economic, psychological and spiritual spheres.' However, Jeddah meeting was not without its controversy.

84. Record of the Arab World (Beirut), March 1970, p.1949.
85. The League of Arab States and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) participated as observers.
87. Ibid., pp. 181-182.
Four of the participating states, namely, Libya, Algeria, the UAR and Sudan, were opposed to the idea of an Islamic body for such an organisation was supposed to be in conflict with their commitment to socialism and secularism. Notwithstanding their reservations, the Pakistani proposal to setting up a Permanent Secretariat of the Islamic states was overwhelmingly endorsed by the meeting.\footnote{For details on the resolutions passed by the Jeddah meeting, see Keesing's Contemporary Archives (Bethesda), Vol.XVII, 1969-1970, p. 239219 and also Shaukat Ali, Pan-Movements in the Third World: Pan-Arabism, Pan-Africanism, Pan-Islamism (Lahore: Publishers United Ltd., 1976), pp. 238-240.} On the question of Palestine, the Conference exhorted the participating states to give political, material and moral support to the Palestine Arabs and to facilitate the representation of the PLO in their territories. It rejected any solution of the Palestine problem which did not provide for the restoration of the status of Jerusalem as it existed before June 1967. It also strongly condemned Israeli refusal to withdraw from the occupied territories and reaffirmed the right of the Palestinian people to struggle for the liberation of their homeland and restoration of their rights. However, the Conference felt shy of recommending military option to achieve this objective, as strongly demanded by some Arab "revolutionary" states. In contrast to the latter's stand, most of the non-Arab Muslim states urged that the conference's stand on the Palestine question should take note of its limitations and the realities of prevailing circumstances in the Muslim world. Pakistan shared the non-Arab Muslim stand. The significance of the Jeddah Conclave, from the Pakistani perspective, lies in the fact that it laid the organisational foundations to the collective endeavours of Islamic countries in the pursuit of their multifarious objectives in the international arena. The motives of Pakistan in emphasising the need for giving organisational shape to the needs and requirements of Islamic countries were not far to seek: to obtain regular flows of assistance for its economic development programmes from the relatively richer Arab states. Further, such an organisational infrastructure was skillfully made
use of by Pakistan in its conflict with India over Kashmir, as the contemporary scene bears ample testimony. This was further facilitated by the presence of entrenched Pakistani personnel in the OIC bureaucracy.

The Jeddah Conference was hailed as a signal victory for Pakistan which succeeded in bringing together a large number of Muslim countries some of whom were at odds with each other. From Pakistani angle, the conclave was also significant for Pakistan successfully blocked India's entry into the conference despite the latter's deliberate efforts in that direction and, thus, asserted the exclusive Muslim character of the conference.89 The conference having thus, obtained general consensus on the establishment of an international Islamic organisation, "King Faisal's Pan-Islamic movement had acquired considerable momentum of its own. 90

The Pakistani efforts towards creating an organisational framework that began at Jeddah persisted in the subsequent conclaves. At the second (Karachi) foreign ministers conference (26 - 28 December 1970), both Pakistan and Egypt played their respective roles in consolidating the idea of Islamic conferences and cooperation among Muslim countries. Pakistan, therefore, submitted proposals related to the idea of establishing either an Islamic Bank or an Islamic Federation of Banks. The conference, in its inaugural session, elected Dr. Abdul Muttalib Malik, head of the Pakistani delegation, as its Chairman. Inaugurating the Conference, the Pakistani President, General Yahya Khan, began his address with a modest and pragmatic note. He underlined that the conference was intended neither to be a substitute for the existing forms of international cooperation nor to provide a new alignment or bloc.

89. Ibid., n. 86, p. 183.

Instead, he asserted that the conference was an endeavour on the part of like-minded states to identify possible areas of meaningful cooperation among themselves. Yahya Khan's pragmatism was reflected in his assertion that "we should concentrate on what is common among us and extend gradually this common consent and areas of argument to our mutual benefit." However, with regard to Palestine question, he affirmed Pakistan's firm and unwavering support for the Arab cause and expressed his hope that the conclave "will once again demonstrate our united stand that the aggression must be vacated and the sons of the soil regain their birthright." The Karachi Conference confirmed the appointment of Tunku Abdul Rahman, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, as the first Secretary-General of the OIC with Jeddah as its Headquarters pending the liberation of Jerusalem. The Conference also took the decision to set up an International Islamic News Agency with a view to rectifying the proclivity of the Western news media to either ignore or under-play news about the Islamic gatherings and the decisions taken at the latter. The news agency in turn paved the way for the creation and reinforcement of Islamic cultural centres. The Karachi parley approved a budget of U.S. $450,000 for the Secretariat for 1971.

The third Islamic foreign ministers conference (Jeddah, February 29-March 4, 1972) included, *inter alia*, 'the situation in the India-Pakistan subcontinent' as an approved item of the long agenda. The deliberations of the conference were coloured by the India-Pakistan conflict which culminated in the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent entity in December 1971. Inaugurating the conference, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia said, keeping the Indo-Pakistan war in mind, that "it was most unfortunate for the Muslims of Pakistan to have fallen prey to the machination of the enemies of Islam." The head of the Pakistani delegation, Mairaj Khalid, made a

---

scathing remark that there was a conspiracy between India and Israel to weaken Pakistan. He further charged India that it could not support the Arab cause and urged upon the conference to put pressure on India to withdraw her troops from East Pakistan and beyond the ceasefire line in Kashmir." He further called on the participating states to extend support to the "rights of the Kashmir people to self-determination in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations."92 However, there was lack of unanimity among the member countries regarding the stand to be taken towards the Pakistani position. Libya and Saudi Arabia took a pro-Pakistani stand, whereas Malaysia, Senegal, Indonesia and Egypt took a different stand. For instance, Malaysia had already recognized the state of Bangladesh. Moreover, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Secretary-General of the OIC, considered the break-up of Pakistan as a fait-accompli and described Bangladesh as "a newly created country".

Further, the resolution that was finally approved, asked both India and Pakistan to withdraw their troops to positions behind their frontiers and the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the UN General Assembly Resolution (No.2793) of December 7, 1971 and the Security Council Resolution (No.307) of December 21, 1971. Additionally, the resolution called upon both the Governments to cease all hostilities and take necessary measures for repatriation of all the prisoners-of-war and detained civilians in conformity with the Geneva Convention. The meeting also decided to dispatch a conciliation mission - consisting of Algeria, Iran, Malaysia, Morocco, Somalia, and Tunisia - to both Islamabad and Dhaka with a view to bringing about a reconciliation between what it called the "estranged brothers". However, as the Government of Bangladesh adopted an inflexible attitude - it "would not receive a mission from states which have not recognized Bangladesh"--

92. Ibid., p. 78.
the mission could not undertake the proposed planned visit. However, in the final analysis, Pakistan had the contentment that its viewpoint was accepted by the majority of participants.\textsuperscript{93} As the tone of the resolution made it obvious:

\begin{quote}
...the Conference declares its full support for Pakistan for its territorial integrity, national sovereignty and independence, and urges all peace-loving nations which respect moral values to support the Muslim nations in maintaining peace and security of the Islamic territories and peoples, and to uphold the principles of non-interference in their internal affairs in accordance with the human values and principles of the United Nations Charter.\textsuperscript{94}
\end{quote}

The third foreign ministers conference also discussed issues of economic cooperation among Muslim countries. Pakistan supported the Egyptian proposal to set up an Islamic Development Bank. The latter was designed to provide funds for the economic development of Muslim countries. Ghulam Ishaque Khan, then Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, and who later rose to the highest public office of the President of Pakistan, was elected Secretary of the Conference. Besides, Dr. S.A. Meenai, the Deputy Governor of the Bank, was assigned the task of preparing a report concerning the overall organisational structure of the Islamic Bank. The Jeddah Conference approved the Charter of the OIC which Pakistan ratified on 8 September 1972.

The Benghazi (Libya) and the Fourth Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference (March 24, 1973) was attended by 23 states. The Conference had a long agenda before it in which the "release of Pakistani prisoners of war in India" (arising out of the 1971 India-Pakistan War) constituted a significant part. The conference, \textit{inter-alia}, expressed its increasing anxiety over the continued detention of Pakistani

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{94} Quoted in Fazul Haque Kazi, \textit{Law and Politics in Pakistan} (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1976), p. 176.

186
POWs by India and called upon the Indian Government to release them immediately.\(^{95}\) Besides, the Secretary-General of the OIC, in his report tabled before the conference, made a plea for the release of Pakistani POWs, quoting Article 118 of the Geneva Convention, which says that when peace is signed by warring states, all prisoners of war must be released. The Secretary-General expressed that for some reason or other, India was still holding them as prisoners.\(^{96}\) It is, thus, obvious that the tenor of the conference resolution and the Secretary-General’s report were decidedly in favour of Pakistan. The advantages of the conference diplomacy, as increasingly facilitated by the OIC, were skillfully manoeuvred by Pakistan in later years.

Further, the conference also demanded the Implementation of the U.N. General Assembly Resolution No.307 of 21 December 1971, which called upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to withdraw their troops to positions behind their frontiers and the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir. It reiterated the need for cessation of hostilities and necessary steps to repatriate without delay all prisoners of war and civilian internees in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Further, the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference held in May 1977 recorded its appreciation of Bhutto for his role in helping create unity among Muslim nations.

The upshot of the foregoing suggests that the initial Pakistani successes in diplomacy in getting India-centric resolutions passed in the OIC fora were to stand in good stead for it in the subsequent years. The earlier OIC responses were a kind of foundation on which the structure of ‘anti-Indian’ and ‘pro-Pakistan’ resolutions


concerning India were based. The OIC fora provided Pakistan with a psychologically conducive environment to mount diplomatic onslaughts against India since the 1965 War.

**India's Peaceful Nuclear Explosion and the Fifth Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference**

India's detonation of a peaceful nuclear device on May 18, 1974 set the diplomatic ball rolling at the initiative of Pakistan. Bhutto's Pavlovian reaction to the Indian explosion provided the framework within which it had conducted its diplomacy vis-a-vis India. Addressing a Press Conference in Lahore on May 19, 1974, he informed the international community about the ramifications of Indian nuclear explosion, and sought "insurance against India's use of nuclear threat" against Pakistan. 97 He had also brought the question of "credible and effective guarantee for non-nuclear-weapon states." Subsequently, at the 29th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Pakistan sponsored and got passed an unanimous resolution on "strengthening the security of non-nuclear states." On 7 June, 1974, Bhutto addressed the National Assembly on whose floor, he further elaborated Pakistan's anxiety and concern. "India was brandishing nuclear sword to extract political concessions from Pakistan and to establish her hegemony in the sub-continent." 98 He further declared that the Indian action 'had introduced a qualitative change in the situation prevalent in the sub-continent' and hence directed his foreign office to lobby at the United Nations for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. 99 He also sent his emissaries to Beijing, Washington and London to seek a 'nuclear umbrella' for Pakistan from the nuclear powers.


Guided by these parameters, Pakistan gave vent to its diplomatic moves at the Kuala Lumpur Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference (21-25 June 1974) under the general rubric of "nuclear non-proliferation". It tried to obtain diplomatic mileage from the Indian action by arguing that its anxiety was shaped not only by its traditional concern for national security and the perceived adverse impact on the balance of power position in the sub-continent, but also because the explosion had paved the way for further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world; hence, as Pakistan contended, the Indian move should be of grave concern to all countries.

Mindful of the complexity of the subject as appended to in the foregoing, the conference entrusted the task to the political committee to enable the latter to prepare a resolution on it. However, before the committee could make any move on the subject, it was instantly presented with a dilemma as Pakistan insisted that the resolution should, specifically, identify India by name and that it should make a reference to the Indian explosion. The delegate of Senegal, instead, argued that the proposed resolution should be couched in generic terms and not identify any country by name with a view to condemning it. The delegate further argued that if Pakistan's stand had to be endorsed (i.e., singling out India by name) by the Conference, then the latter in its resolution, should contain a reference to India's oft-asserted contention that its nuclear programme was purely for peaceful purposes. Pakistani delegate argued that there was no such thing as peaceful nuclear explosion as contended by India and that it was impossible to distinguish it from defence purposes. However, in the end, much to the contentment of Pakistan, the resolution that was adopted contained an innocuous-sounding statement: "noting that on May 18, 1974, India exploded a nuclear device, thus increasing the number of nuclear powers". Thus, 100

---

the conference had come to a round-about implicit conclusion that India joined the ranks of nuclear-weapon states.

Closely related to the aforesaid, was Pakistan's further insistence that the resolution should also persuade India to accept inspection of its nuclear installations by the United Nations and to carry out its nuclear activity under the supervision of the Global Organisation. The Committee did not, however, accept this suggestion as such an insistence was construed to be an implied interference in the internal affairs of India. Be that as it may, the Committee, in its resolution, dwelt on two aspects which were germane to the overall question of nuclear non-proliferation: "there is a growing need for the international community to devise measures to assure the security of the non-nuclear countries," 101 which, however, fell short of Pakistani expectation of the UN inspection of India's nuclear installations.

Besides this Indo-centric subject which the conference had deliberated and acted upon as outlined in the aforesaid, the Kuala Lumpur convention also focussed its attention on economic issues and the solutions sought therein. Such issues constituted an important segment of the agreed agenda of the Conference. In this regard, the ball was made rolling by Tun Abdul Razaq, the Malaysian Prime Minister, with his conference-inaugurating call for turning "our words into concrete results to make the aim of Islamic unity a reality". He laid emphasis on the implementation of concrete measures, programmes and projects involving economic and technical cooperation between Muslim countries and increased assistance to poor member-states and collaboration in making investments among themselves.102 Consequent upon his stress on the diplomacy of economic cooperation, the conference had approved six

101. For the Text of the Resolution, see ibid.

resolutions whose subject-matter had previously engaged the attention of the Eight-Member Economic Committee, set up at the Lahore Summit Conference in February 1974.\(^{103}\)

In pursuance of the Lahore Summit decision, the Committee met twice: once in Jeddah and again in Kuala Lumpur in April and June 1974 respectively and submitted its report to the conference. The Committee, in its report, made a recommendation for the easing of balance of payments situation of the Third World Muslim countries: an economic predicament emanating from the global inflation including the oil-price hike. Further, the Committee made a suggestion for the creation of an "Islamic Fund for Economic Settlements" to render assistance to the poor countries in financing their imports through bilateral or multilateral agreements, for the movement of capital among Muslim countries and exchange of experts or scientists.\(^{104}\) In addition, the Conference endorsed the basic statute of the International Islamic News Agency, for whose creation the Karachi Foreign Ministers' Conference, reference to which has already been made in the preceding pages of this Chapter, had taken an affirmative decision. Being an active member of the Economic Committee, Pakistan demonstrated its keen interest in the creative decisions of the Kuala Lumpur conference on matters of economic cooperation. As a non-oil producing developing economy, Pakistan has been consistent in stressing the need for economic cooperation among the Muslim states' as mentioned in the beginning of this Chapter.

Viewing the whole question in perspective, it may be contended that Pakistan's diplomatic success within the framework of the OIC fora vis-a-vis its troubles with

\(^{103}\) For details, see the pages of this Chapter that follow, particularly the section which deals with the Lahore Summit.

India, could become feasible for there is such an 'amorphous and yet palpable' notion called Islamic solidarity that, inter alia, guides the Muslim states. Moreover, given the circumstances under which Pakistan was placed in the early seventies with the loss of nearly half of its territory, the consequent Arab and Muslim understanding (and sympathy) of Pakistani predicament partially accounted for its relative ease with which Pakistan successfully manoeuvred its Indo-centric diplomacy within the OIC. Further, Pakistan's ceasing to be a participant in the Western sponsored military alliances, viz., SEATO and CENTO, and its withdrawal from the Commonwealth (a decision taken by Bhutto in the aftermath of the Bangladesh episode) also accounted for (to a large extent) its raison d'être to reinforce its association with the Islamic fraternity and to obtain diplomatic and other forms of support for its international objectives.

The aforesaid is intended to portray the setting wherein Pakistan had adroitly employed its diplomatic skills in the service of its foreign policy objectives not only in the specific context of its preoccupation with India but also in the wider context of forging beneficial inter-state relations with the Muslim world and achieving Islamic solidarity. The latter objective becomes all the more crucial with its hosting of the Second Islamic Conference in Lahore in 1974.

**The Lahore Islamic Summit Conference**

The convening of the Lahore Islamic Summit in 1974 was preceded by a conducive international environment, in the creation of which the Muslim World contributed its no mean mite. In the first place, international public opinion had come to understand the Arab/Muslim position vis-a-vis Israel following the desacralization of the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem in August 1969, as the incident sent shock waves throughout the Muslim World and deeply infuriated Muslim sentiments. In the second place, the myth that the Zionist entity was invincible was exploded with Arab victory

---

against Israel in the 1973 war. Thirdly, the Arabs could successfully employ oil as a
weapon against those states which were assisting Israel in many ways. Further, by
the year 1974, the Arab Cold War between Saudi Arabia and Egypt had come to an
end following reconciliation between them. By then, Gamal Abdul Nasser was no
longer at the helm of affairs in Egypt. His successor, Anwar Sadat, adopted an
accommodationist and a non-confrontationist policy towards Saudi Arabia, giving the
latter a leeway in coveting for itself a larger foreign policy goal of Pan-Islamic
solidarity among the Third World Muslim states. These conducive developments
were made feasible with the declining appeal of the Nasserite Pan-Arab nationalism
following the crushing defeat of the Arabs by Israel in the 1967 war. Last, but in no
case the least, Pakistanis as a whole required to heal their moral wounds following the
secession of their eastern wing in 1971. The Summit provided an opportunity for
morale boosting with the presence of so many Heads of States from several important
countries of the Muslim World which found some Arab States - Saudi Arabia, in
particular - awash with petrodollar funds following the imposition of oil embargo
against the partisans of Israel. Moreover, by the time the international Islamic
community could hold its second summit, an inter-governmental organisation was
already in place with an approved structural base and procedures, having already met
four times at Jeddah, Karachi, Jeddah and Banghazi at the level of foreign ministers.
The initial problems of financing their endeavours towards a Pan-Islamic solidarity
were successfully overcome in the early seventies. Against the backdrop of this serene
international situation, characterising "...a moment in world affairs which is as critical
as it can be creative" 106, Pakistan agreed to host the Second Islamic Summit
Conference in 1974 in the historic city of Lahore which "symbolises not only
Pakistan's national struggle but also its abiding solidarity with the Muslim
world".107 (In fact, when Tunku Abdul Rahman, the outgoing Secretary - General of
the OIC, took the initiative (with the Saudi support) in convening the Summit meeting,

106. A Bhutto description. See the address of Z.A. Bhutto delivered on 22 February
1974 before the Second Islamic Summit. This address is contained in Shaukat
Ali, Pan-Movements in the Third World : Pan-Arabism, Pan-Africanism,

107. Ibid., p. 370.
Pakistan promptly offered to host it). In this context, it is not out of place to view Pakistan's espousal of Islam in historical perspective. As a perceptive analyst put it:

By meeting in Pakistan, the Muslim World was also paying a tribute to this country's long association with the Pan-Islamic movement. Even before the establishment of Pakistan, the Muslims of Indo-Pakistan sub-continent had always been the great champions of every Muslim cause. Since the creation of the new state, every successive government has maintained unity among Muslim nations a cardinal principle of the country's foreign policy.¹⁰⁸

The Lahore Summit stood out as one of the most significant diplomatic initiatives undertaken by Pakistan under the political leadership of Z.A. Bhutto. In fact, Bhutto's careful orchestration played no mean a part in making the Summit as not only the largest gathering of its kind in the post-second world war, but also very successful.¹⁰⁹ Looking at in perspective, it was a milestone in the contemporary history of the Muslim World as it was marked by an euphoria preceded by a dramatic launching of an Arab armed attack against Israel and a successful imposition and execution of an oil embargo against the collaborators of Israel which severely hit the economies of Western Europe, United States and Japan.

The Lahore summit received a wider Muslim gathering than the first one convened in Rabat (Morocco) in 1969, following the desecration of the Al-Aqsa mosque in Al-Quds (Jerusalem). The latter summit was graced by only twenty-four of the thirty invitee states, whereas the former attracted thirty-eight¹¹¹ Muslim states to the

-----------------------------

¹⁰⁸. Ibid., p. 242.


¹¹¹. The break-up of the participants was as follows: 23 countries were represented by their Heads of States, 5 by their Heads of Governments, and 7 by their Foreign Ministers. Yassir Arafat, the PLO Chief, was given the status of the Head of the State. In the guest category, the following were invited: The Secretary-General of the Arab League, a delegation of Motamar-al-Alami-al-Islami (Muslim World Congress), and Secretary-General of the Rabita Al-Alam-al-Islami (Muslim World League). For details, see Mehrunnisa Ali, 'The Second Islamic Summit Conference, 1974', Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), Vol. XVIII, No.1, 1974, p.34.
Summit venue (Lahore), "thanks to Zulfi's [Z.A. Bhutto] strenuous personal efforts and singular energy...and proved to be Bhutto's greatest diplomatic triumph". Every major Muslim Head of State found it feasible to attend the Summit. Only the Shah of Iran, the late Mohammad Reza Pahalvi, was conspicuous by his absence because, as Bhutto later wrote during his incarceration, "the Shah [of Iran] had a complex towards me....He was intensely envious...His grandiose designs and fanciful ambitions of being the modern Cyrus the Great if not Greater contributed in no small measure to his ruin...He lost all touch with reality". Stanley Wolpert quoted Benazir's reflections on what he called "historic initiative", a reference to the Lahore Summit. In the words of Benazir, as quoted by Wolpert:

He [Bhutto] gave Pakistan this [Islamic] linkage to the countries of the Gulf....on defense lines, on economic lines, on foreign policy lines, he carried out this bloc of Islamic countries, uniting the countries of the Muslim world, which gave birth not only to the Islamic Conference, but also to a new found assertiveness....To have unified action...he sent soldiers abroad, he sent labour abroad.

By hosting the Second Islamic Summit Conference (22-24 February, 1974), Pakistan could find a proper niche for itself in the comity of nations, especially among Muslim states that almost all of them belong to the Third World. The Conference presented an opportunity for Pakistan to afford recognition to Bangladesh without losing its face. Moreover, as the second largest Muslim majority state in the world, Bangladesh could not be kept off the Islamic fraternity indefinitely. In fact, since the creation of Bangladesh, the Islamic Secretariat and certain Muslim states had been putting


112. Quoted in *ibid.*, p.224. Wolpert obtained the original source from Bhutto's Prison Cell Holograph, PCH, which is securely preserved in the Bhutto Family Library and Archive. The latter contains a rare collection of Bhutto's letters and papers, besides more than 10,000 titles.

113. Wolpert's interview with the then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto at Rawalpindi on 9 April 1989 and quoted in *ibid.*, p.224.
pressure on both the countries, to remove their differences and acknowledge each other's independent existence. In order to facilitate this, an OIC goodwill delegation consisting of the foreign ministers of Kuwait, Lebanon, and Somalia, the representatives of Algeria, Senegal and PLO and the Secretary-General of the Islamic Secretariat, Hasan al-Tohamy, mediated on the issue and suggested Pakistan to recognise the irreversible reality. This seven-member delegation flew to Dhaka, by using the personal plane of Algeria's former President, Boumediene, and brought the late Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to Lahore.\textsuperscript{114} To iron out the differences that did exist between Bangladesh and Pakistan in regard to according recognition to the former by the latter, the Islamic Secretariat and some Muslim states played their role in the deliberations of the Third Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in Jeddah in March 1972 which resulted in the decision to send this delegation to Dhaka, as mentioned in the preceding. This seven-member goodwill mission got assurance from Sheikh Mujibur Rahman for the release of 195 Pakistani Prisoners of War as a quid pro quo to Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh. Only such a settlement paved the way for Bangladesh's participation in the Summit. The Conference created an atmosphere of reconciliation which led to Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh and the latter's release of POW's. Bhutto could later say that he had acted in such a way in 'deference to the friendly advice of the Muslim countries in order to promote the cause of Muslim solidarity'.\textsuperscript{115} He gave primacy to this 'friendly advice' in comparison to the pressure being exerted on his regime by Great Powers. As Bhutto gave vent to his feelings in this context:

\begin{quote}
Big countries have advised us to recognize Bangladesh, but I never bow to the pressure from the super powers or from India. But at this
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., n. 111, p. 232.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., n. 110, p. 41 and also Z.A. Bhutto, \textit{The Third World: New Directions} (London: Quartet Books, 1977).
important time, when Muslim countries are meeting, we cannot say we are under pressure. It is not our opponents who advise us to take this decision, but our friends and brothers.\textsuperscript{116}

Stanley Wolpert considered that the recognition was 'Zulfi's first summit coup but would not be his only diplomatic victory during the most jubilant and spectacular week (22 February-1 March 1974) in the recent history of Lahore'\textsuperscript{117}. Further, in the words of a perceptive analyst:

\begin{quote}
The political leadership [of Pakistan] and the Foreign office actively sought an identification of the Pakistani position on the non-recognition of Bangladesh [because of the use of Indian military force and the incarceration of 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of War in India] with that of other Islamic countries.\textsuperscript{118}
\end{quote}

These diplomatic tactics on the part of Bhutto enabled Pakistan to regain its national pride and self-respect whose losses as caused by the breakup of East Pakistan were very much resented by the Pakistanis. Moreover, by drawing Bangladesh closer to the Islamic world as evidenced by its participation in the Summit Conference, Bhutto wanted to drive the beginning of a wedge between Bangladesh and India, the consequences of which might tilt the balance of diplomatic power in the sub-continent from India to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{119} The foreign policy orientation of the post-Mujib political leaderships of Bangladesh had vindicated Bhutto's line of thinking with increasing irritants characterising Indo-Bangladesh relations which reinstated, to some extent, Pakistan as a factor in Bangladeshi politics. Moreover, the increasing contacts of Bangladesh with the Middle Eastern states got further boost with the insertion of Islam

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{116}See the Text of the Bhutto Speech. \textit{Ibid.}, n. 106, p. 369.
\bibitem{117} \textit{Ibid.}, n. 111, p.232.
\bibitem{119} Vijay Saroop, 'The Islamic Summit', \textit{The World Today} (London), Vol.30, No.4, April 1974, p. 139.
\end{thebibliography}
as the state religion in the constitution of Bangladesh in April 1977 under the political dispensation of Hussein Mohammad Ershad, the former President of Bangladesh. This constitutional action brought Pakistan and Bangladesh a step closer to each other and it was suggested that the very constitutional step was taken at the behest of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Further, Bhutto's Dhaka visit in June 1974 which was accorded a warm welcome had laid the basis for reconciliation between the two countries.

What all the aforesaid points to is that Bhutto turned a normal unilateral act of recognition into a multi-lateral issue involving the Muslim states. Those who were still opposed to accepting Bangladesh as a fait accompli could not succeed 'as the atmosphere was highly charged with feelings of the universal brotherhood of Islam'. In this context, it is worth recalling that Bhutto had envisaged a "commonwealth" concept of confederation with Bangladesh but could not win over Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on the subject. Undaunted by this failure on his part, he still dreamt of resurrecting pan-Islamic ties, or restoring "fraternal sentiments" with Bangladesh that might help erase the traumatic memories of the darkest days of 1971. Howsoever, he could fulfill the latter objective in Lahore in 1974 when he, along with some Muslim leaders, succeeded in bringing Mujibur Rahman into the fold of Islamic fraternity.

---------------------


The diplomacy employed by Bhutto in relation to the question of according recognition to Bangladesh may well be a pointer to his feeling of guilt for his own role (by not allowing the late Mujibur Rahman to occupy power even though his party, Awami League, had acquired a majority seats in the United Pakistan's legislature) in the dismemberment of Pakistan.

Be that as it may, the Summit conclave witnessed rhetorical flourish on the part of participating Arab leaders who showered wholesome accolades on the conference and its host. Sheikh Zaid bin Sultan al-Nahiyan, President of the United Arab Emirates, considered the Lahore Conference as "a landmark in Islamic history and the beginning of a new era of Muslim unity and brotherhood." The mercurial Libyan leader, Colonel Qaddafi hailed Pakistan as a "citadel of Islam in Asia" and promised that Libya stood "ready to sacrifice its blood" if Pakistan were ever threatened, and asserted that "our resources are your resources."

Bhutto did not remain oblivious of the potential of Islamic solidarity movement to fight for the rights of the developing countries vis-a-vis the North. Keeping this in view, the Lahore Summit recognized the Muslim countries as part of the community of developing countries and called upon the Third World states "to beware of manoeuvres aimed at dividing the developing countries in exploitation of their resources". In order to counter such manoeuvres, the Lahore Summit decided to come to the rescue of the less fortunate brethren among them, by means of taking certain ameliorative measures; the creation of an Afro-Arab Bank, the OPEC's


199
decision to create a special fund, the formation of an economic committee by the Summit, and the like. The Summit set up within the OIC Secretariat an Islamic Solidarity Fund (with an initial capital of 26 million US dollars) to finance projects in the Muslim World. The atmosphere of euphoria created by the Summit spurred some states to act in the field of economic cooperation. Pakistan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia had agreed to establish an automobile plant for producing Volkswagons at Dammam (Saudi Arabia), and Pakistan and Saudi Arabia had a plan for the establishment of a joint bank. Further, the summit resolutions acted as bases for subsequent conferences for achieving common objectives. The post-Lahore phase did witness the proliferation of institutions catering to cooperation in economic, scientific and cultural areas within the context of the OIC. For instance, at the Fifth Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, June 1974), Pakistan mooted proposals slated to enhance economic cooperation among Muslim states and specific recommendations affecting the spheres of trade, finance and technical cooperation were adopted. Further, with Pakistani prompting, the Finance Ministers of the Islamic countries approved the Articles of Agreement of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in August, 1974. The Summit underlined the need for all member states to adopt a

126. Ibid.

127. It purports to "take all possible steps to raise the intellectual and moral levels of the Muslims in the World and to provide relief in case of emergencies such as natural disasters, etc., that may befall the Muslim Ummah". It further aims at "granting adequate material assistance to Muslim minorities and communities so as to improve their religious, social and cultural standards" and to contribute to the building of mosques, hospitals and other similar institutions. The Islamic Solidarity Fund is headed by a director appointed by the Secretary-General of the OIC and is financed mainly through contributions and donations received from member-states.


common stand on global issues in the United Nations and other world fora. The significance of this resolve can be further underlined as the Third Summit (Makkah, 25 January 1981) called upon member-states to strive for the establishment of equality, peace and prosperity for the whole mankind in concert with other nations.130

**Economic Cooperation among Muslim Countries and the Third World**

The Summit leaders did recognize the fact that the rhetoric of Islamic solidarity, in order to become effective, need to be reinforced by concrete economic measures of cooperation and assistance. In fact, the summit devoted a major part of its attention on economic issues. Pakistan has been laying a great deal of emphasis on this subject ever since the Islamic community had decided to give a concrete organisational shape to itself since the Rabat Conference. In the foregoing, a mention has been made with regard to Pakistan’s deep interest in creating some kind of Islamic bank or Islamic federation of banks. The salience of economic cooperation as a bedrock to the notion of Islamic solidarity, as recognised by Pakistan, was clearly reported in the international print media. The Economist commented upon the stakes of Pakistan in this regard:

> If Moslem [Muslim] brotherhood means anything, it should mean that the rich help the poor. This in fact is integral to the Islamic faith. President Bhutto for one, has been actively canvassing the Arab Gulf states to invest heavily in Pakistani agriculture and so enable his country to become the main supplier of cereals to the Middle East. He has also been proposing that Pakistan might help the Arab World with military equipment - and soldiers - in return for the cash it needs. Mr. Bhutto and others, believe that their richer brother-Moslems should not only devise means of lifting the burden of increased oil costs but should also invest their swollen funds in the Moslem [Muslim] world.131


The Summit after providing for broad and general guidelines on economic cooperation among member states, entrusted the specific task of identifying spheres of cooperation to an Eight-member Economic Committee, which itself was an offspring of the Summit. Pakistan was one of the members of this Committee.\(^{132}\) The Committee was told to commence its work immediately and submit its report/proposals to the next Conference of Foreign Ministers. The Summit entrusted the committee with the responsibility of achieving the following tasks:

a. eradication of poverty, disease and ignorance from the Islamic countries;
b. ending exploitation of developing countries by the developed countries;
c. regulating the terms of trade between developed countries and developing countries in the matters of supply of raw materials and important manufactured goods and know-how;
d. ensuring the sovereignty and full control of the developing countries over their natural resources;
e. mitigating current economic difficulties of the developing countries due to recent increases in prices;
f. mutual economic cooperation and solidarity among Muslim countries;
g. Creation of Islamic Science Foundation for the promotion of research and studies in the field of science and technology.\(^{133}\)

It needs to be noted in this context that in view of the Committee's recommendation to neutralize the effect of increased oil prices, non-oil producing developing countries like Pakistan had the fortune of not having to commit enormous budgetary allocations for the importation of oil in their plans. The immediate outcome of Pakistan's economic diplomacy was Libya's shipment of oil to Pakistan at the rate

\(^{132}\) The other members of this Committee were Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Egypt and Senegal.

\(^{133}\) Keesings Contemporary Archives (Bethesda), No. 26423, March 25-31, 1974.
of cost of production.\textsuperscript{134} In this way, Pakistan could save its crucial foreign exchange reserves. Besides, the Committee also made a provision for the creation of a Muslim Common Market which would generate policies leading to trade preferences, lowering of tariff rates and customs.\textsuperscript{135} At the Seventh Islamic foreign ministers conference (Istanbul, Turkey, May 29, 1976), Pakistan played a creative role in enlarging the scope of this Committee by converting the latter into a more representative Islamic Commission for Economic, Cultural and Social Affairs.

The summit made a provision in an area in which Pakistan had a vital interest: the flow of capital from one Muslim country to another. For Pakistan's industrialization, the capital investment originating from the rich Arab Oil states was warmly accepted. From its side, Pakistan was more than willing to send its available scientific, technological, military and other forms of manpower to the Arab states. This two-way economic cooperative activities proved advantageous to both the parties, in particular, the remittances sent by the Pakistani workers from the Middle East. It had a dramatic impact on the alleviation of absolute poverty in Pakistan. \textsuperscript{136}

Bhutto was quick enough to sense the opportunities threw up by the Arab imposition of oil embargo against the collaborators of Israel. He successfully turned this euphoria into a positive, beneficial movement of Muslim (and Third World) solidarity. His address to the Summit and the latter's approval of resolutions dealing with economic cooperation bear ample testimony to his espousal of Third World causes. In the words of Bhutto himself:

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{\ldots}
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushleft}


136. This was an argument held by Shahid Javed Burki. For details, see his essay, \textquote{The State and the Political Economy of Redistribution in Pakistan}, in Myron Weiner and Ali Banuazizi, eds., \textit{The Politics of Social Transformation in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan} (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994), pp. 270-329.
\end{flushleft}
The War of last October [referring to the Yaum Kippur, Arab-Israeli War of 1973] has...precipitated a chain of events and created an environment in which the developing countries can at last hope to secure the establishment of a more equitable economic order. Some far-reaching possibilities have been opened by the demonstrated ability of the oil-producing countries to concert their policies and determine the price of their resources.137

In his enthusiasm for Muslim Unity, Bhutto did not lose sight of the rest of the Third World. He visualised a possibility that there could be harmonious relationships between the Muslim and other Third World states and their potential to play an active role in international politics. It was reflected in the Summit Declaration that the Islamic countries are `part of the community' of the wider developing world, thus elevating the former from the purview of a narrow ecclesiastical context.

The Muslim countries are now so placed as to be able to play a most constructive and rewarding role for cooperation among themselves and with other countries of the Third World. Not only are they possessed of a common heritage and outlook but also their economies are such as to enable them to supplement one another's development effort. It is time that we translate the sentiments of Islamic unity into concrete measures of cooperation and mutual benefit... Let not posterity say that we were presented with an historic... opportunity to release ourselves from the injustices inflicted on us for many centuries and we proved ourselves unequal to it.138

The Summit decisions on economic cooperation served as a launching pad for further reinforcement of these cooperative ties among Muslim States during the subsequent years. For instance, the Fifth Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, June 1974) adopted, with Pakistani prodding, specific recommendations on trade, finance, and technical cooperation. Further, in August 1974, the foreign ministers of Islamic countries approved, again under Pakistani

137. Bhutto's address delivered to the Summit Leaders on 22 February 1974. This address, in full, is contained in ibid., pp. 380-381.

thrust, Articles of Agreement of the Islamic Development Bank, with a subscribed capital of two billion US dollars, the bulk of which was financed by the oil-rich states.

Bhutto's economic diplomacy helped Pakistan obtain substantial amounts of economic and financial assistance from the following Muslim states under three categories. Under the category of general purpose programmes, Pakistan received the following aid:\textsuperscript{139}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>$730.00 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>$100.00 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>$80.00 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>$10.00 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC Special Fund</td>
<td>$21.45 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under the second category, the Project Assistance, Pakistan received from:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>$130.00 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>$92.00 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>$75.00 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>$53.00 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>$45.00 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the final category, Relief grants, Pakistan obtained from:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>$16.00 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>$10.00 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>$8.00 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>$5.00 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>$1.00 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran and others</td>
<td>$2.70 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During Bhutto's rule, Pakistan realized the critical importance of its export

\textsuperscript{139} The figures are derived from Government of Pakistan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), \textit{Pakistan's Relations with the Islamic States: A Review} (Islamabad), 21 February 1977, pp. 28-9.
trade with the Middle East, hastened by the Bangladesh fiasco, even though in the
pre-Bangladesh years, such trade ties existed between the two sides. Bhutto,
therefore, took substantial steps to fulfill Pakistan's trade objectives with the Middle
Eastern states in an overall framework of economic diplomacy which was infused with
Islamic rationalizations, of an apparent secular process. During 1973-74, Pakistan's
trade with them fetched over a billion dollars.140 Further, the share of nine major
Muslim trading partners, namely, Iran, Iraq, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Kuwait, Oman,
Saudi Arabia, Libya and Indonesia, in Pakistan's total exports climbed from 6.6 per
cent in 1969-70 to 24.8 per cent in 1973-74.141 In terms of bilateral trade, Saudi
Arabia emerged as the eighth leading importer of Pakistani goods during 1973-74
from its seventeenth position in 1970-71 and that of Iran's from twenty-fifth in
1970-72 to tenth in 1973-74.142 Further, between 1972-73 and 1973-74, Pakistan's
export trade with these two countries galloped to 209 per cent and 449 per cent
respectively.143

Pakistan under Bhutto obtained direct investment from the oil exporting
countries in sectors such as manufacturing, agriculture, construction, energy, and
others. Iran and Abu Dhabi supplied a major chunk of the investments. Saudi Arabia
made investments in the cement and fertilizer production and sheep-raising, Dubai and
Kuwait in road construction and communications respectively, Abu Dhabi in oil
refining, and Libya in fertilizer, shipping and sugar industries.144 Iran's investment

p.118.
p.241.
142. Ibid., pp. 239-43.
143. Ibid.
pp. 138-139.
was primarily concentrated in the strategic border state of Baluchistan in industrial projects such as textiles, cement, fertilizer, de-salination, irrigation and ground water development.\textsuperscript{145} It is, thus, obvious that structures of economic integration were laid between Pakistan and the oil-rich Muslim countries in which the Bhutto administration played an important role. Joint ministerial commissions were set up with Iran, Libya and Saudi Arabia with a view to coordinating and overseeing the economic collaboration with these countries.\textsuperscript{146}

In the area of technical cooperation, Pakistan, during the seventies, supplied technical expertise to the Gulf states by providing them with long and short-term consultants, by training their personnel in Pakistan and by undertaking contracts for them. For instance, Saudi Arabia’s monetary agency was headed by Anwar Ali, a national of Pakistan. Besides, Saudi Arabia utilized Pakistani technical expertise in setting up two car assembly plants \textsuperscript{147} and its personnel were trained in Pakistan to operate cement factories.\textsuperscript{148} Besides Saudi Arabia, other Gulf sheikhdoms were also the recipients of technical assistance made available by Pakistan. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) obtained the services of a Pakistani, Naziruddin Mahmood, to act as the Head of its Investment Corporation.\textsuperscript{149} Abu Dhabi gave a $30 million contract for the construction of its roads and buildings to the National Construction Company of Pakistan and the Karachi Shipyard built and handed over a 13,000 TOW ship, costing $7 million, to the National Shipping Company of Abu Dhabi.\textsuperscript{150} Technical

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., p. 137.
\textsuperscript{147} Quoted in ibid.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
assistance in the arena of defence was also notable between Pakistan and the Gulf sheikhdoms. The air force of Abu Dhabi owed its existence to Pakistan, including the training of former’s personnel and leadership. In the armed forces of Oman, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Pakistan’s military personnel occupied important positions. Pakistani air force personnel provided training to their counterparts from these countries at the former’s academies.151

THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE

Like the leaders of Pakistan’s early history, notably Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Allama Mohammad Iqbal, Bhutto’s thinking was exercised a great deal by the question of Palestine. In his address to the summit gathering delivered on 22 February 1974, Bhutto quoted Jinnah and Iqbal quite extensively on the subject of Palestine. Bhutto’s address was known for its eloquence, devoting a great deal of his attention to the question of Palestine and drawing the attention of his guests towards it. He situated the question of Palestine in its contemporaneity, thus putting it in the context of European colonialism:

Fifty years ago, there was no Palestine problem, there was only a country named Palestine. Only the right arrogated to itself by Western Colonialism enabled one Western Nation to promise to a section of another people, namely the Jews, the country of a third, the Arabs...it is this fundamental injustice...that evokes the resentment of the entire Muslim world. The malady consists of a cancerous outgrowth of colonialism, the establishment of settler regimes, or the imposition of immigrant minority rule.... The outrage of its partition in 1947 and the graver injury of its occupation by Israel in 1967 have been intolerable because the territory is part of the spiritual centre of the Muslim world.152

Continuing his address further, Bhutto stated:

151. Ibid.

152. An extract of Bhutto’s address. See ibid., n. 137, p.373.

---

208
Israel has gorged and fattened on the West's sympathies, nurtured itself on violence and expanded through aggression...Situations arise in which there is no choice but war against the usurper. Such a situation was created for the Arab peoples.\(^\text{133}\)

Bhutto underlined the centrality of Al-Quds in the overall settlement of the Palestine question. He held that "except for an interval during the Crusades, it [Al-Quds] has been a Muslim city. I repeat, a Muslim city - from the Year 637 A.D." His "crowning glory" came when some extracts of his address were picked up and unanimously approved as a resolution by the Summit (more or less in verbatim). To quote the relevant resolution:

\textbf{Al-Quds} is a unique symbol of the confluence of Islam with the sacred divine religions. For more than 1,300 years Moslems [sic] have held Jerusalem as a trust for all who venerate it...[and who] believe in all the three prophetic religions rooted in Jerusalem. No agreement, protocol, or understanding which postulates the continuance of Israeli occupation of the holy city of Jerusalem or its transfer to any non-Arab sovereignty or makes it the subject of bargaining or concessions, will be acceptable to the Islamic countries. Israeli withdrawal from Jerusalem is a paramount and unchangeable prerequisite for lasting peace in the Middle East.\(^\text{154}\)

Bhutto's emphatic tone as evidenced in his address regarding the historic Muslim character of Jerusalem had (in the Sixth Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference, Jeddah, July 1975), enabled Pakistan's election to the 'Jerusalem Committee' whose task was to find ways and means of liberating "Occupied Palestine" and the "Holy City".\(^\text{155}\) Bhutto's championing the Palestine cause led some analysts to say that he emerged as the leading champion of non-Arab solidarity

\begin{flushright}
\textit{Ibid., pp. 374-375.}
\end{flushright}
\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}
\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}

209
with the Arabs in Lahore. This was reflected when he declared that "the armies of Pakistan are the armies of Islam... We shall enter Jerusalem as brothers-in-arms".

The Summit recognised Arafat-led Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as the "sole, legitimate representative of the Palestine Nation". The Summit admitted the PLO as a full member of the OIC. The Summit decisions on Palestine and Jerusalem continue to be relevant even today in view of the fact that the status of Jerusalem is yet to be settled. The Palestine National Authority has, of late, taken up the task of administering the West Bank town of Jericho and Gaza, following a series of agreements with Israel. As per these agreements, negotiations will start between the PNA and Israel regarding the future status of the city. Meanwhile, the PNA has declared Jerusalem to be its future capital.

PAKISTAN AND INTER-MUSLIM CONFLICTS

Bhutto and his successors scrupulously avoided Pakistan's entanglement in the inter-Muslim conflicts involving two or more Muslim states. This was reflected in the deliberations of the Lahore Summit wherein the raising of bilateral disputes among Muslim states was thoroughly frowned upon. At this conclave, when the Afghan delegate tried to bring to the notice of the Summit his country's problem with Pakistan, president Sadat of Egypt made a prompt intervention and suggested that such disputes among Muslim states should not be discussed in the conference. He was extended support by President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria, in this regard. This was in accord with Pakistan's stated foreign policy guideline to observe


neutrality in disputes among Muslim states and to help resolve them through the forum of OIC.\textsuperscript{158} The only exception to this guideline was the Iraq-Kuwait conflict in which Pakistan took the side of multinational coalition which finally liberated Kuwait from the occupation of Iraq in 1991. Of course, this was an exceptional case involving the naked aggression and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. And it required an exceptional response from Pakistan. However, in other cases, Pakistan stuck to the norm of either neutrality or mediation. For instance, Bhutto in February 1976, offered to mediate in the territorial dispute between Morocco and Algeria. In a dispute over Sahara in 1974 between Morocco and Spain, Bhutto backed the former. Similarly, Pakistan supported the case of Turkish Cypriot community in the latter’s conflict with the Greek Cypriots in Cyprus. Further, at the Seventh (Istanbul) foreign ministers conference in May 1976, Pakistan made and got adopted a proposal to assist the Turkish Cypriot community in their struggle against the Greek Cypriots. As a further mark of solidarity with the Turkish Cypriots, Islamabad allowed the latter to set up a representative office on the Pakistani soil. Pakistan, in this context, advocated a permanent solution to this problem through the creation of a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal structure which would safeguard the interests of both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. The conference permitted Rauf Denktash, leader of the Turkish Muslim community of Cyprus, to present his viewpoint on the question of Cyprus. The resolution that was approved in this conference recognized the equality of rights of the two communities in an independent and non-aligned Republic of Cyprus as well as the right to be heard in all international forums on the question. The conference also gave its consent to invite the Turkish Cypriot representatives to its future meetings. It was, therefore, evident that in disputes involving a Muslim and a non-Muslim state, Pakistan came to the help of its co-religionists.

\textsuperscript{158} For details, regarding these guidelines prepared by the Foreign Office, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, \textit{Pakistan’s Relations with the Islamic States : A Review} (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 21 February 1977), pp. 20-1.
Emergence of Bangladesh: Alleged Refutation of Two-Nation Theory

Immediately in the aftermath of the birth of Bangladesh, there developed a school of thought among scholars which contended that Islam, as Pakistan's existential justification, was too slender a thread to hold two disparate, distant regions and people together.\(^{159}\) Religious-minded Pakistanis dismissed such prognosis as malicious anti-Pakistani propaganda. Refuting such a contention, S.M. Burke remarked:

> It is not so much the concept of Islamic solidarity which has been proved wanting as the un-Islamic conduct of those who purport to follow the ideal. If west Pakistanis had behaved like true Muslims, they would have displayed greater brotherly love towards their eastern brothers during the last quarter of a century, and a greater willingness to share their wealth with them.\(^{160}\)

Further, S.M. Burke agrees with those who argue that with the emergence of Bangladesh, the original scheme, as implicit in the Lahore Resolution that there be two independent Muslim states in the North-West and the North-East of the sub-continent, appears in retrospect to have been vindicated.\(^{161}\) Further, two objective conditions prevalent in the seventies sowed the seeds of Pakistan's disintegration. Among the former, no less significant a factor than 'Praetorianism in Pakistan spawned Bangladesh.\(^{162}\) Moreover, Bangladeshi nationalism, either prior to independence or afterwards, did not repudiate Islam as a factor in either domestic or


\(^{161}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 400.


212
international politics. Subsequent developments in Bangladesh bear this out very clearly. Like Pakistan's, one of the principles of the Bangladeshi foreign policy is to cultivate amicable ties with Arab and Non-Arab Muslim countries. At the time of Liberation struggle and in the immediate aftermath, language and other material factors predominated over the religious factor, but at no stage, the latter was underestimated. Instead, there were scholars who have advanced a novel argument that Jinnah's two-nation theory had got further sustenance with the rise of Bangladesh.  

However, the fact of the matter is that ethnicity or identities formed on primordial loyalties have not ceased to exist in the domestic or international politics of South Asian states. Moreover, Pakistan, after the loss of its eastern wing, did not bid adieu to Islam and embrace secular ideology. On the contrary, faith in the former grew further. Writing in 1982, well after a decade's lapse following the birth of Bangladesh, a Trinidadian of Indian origin, V.S. Naipaul, could still vouchsafe for the centrality of religion in the psychic map of Pakistanis. As he captured the mood of the people: "The state withered. But faith did not. Failure only led back to the faith. If the state failed, it was not because the dream was flawed, or the faith flawed; it could only be because men had failed the faith. A purer and purer faith began to be called for."  

Buttressed by such a determination among Pakistanis, the state consciously adopted measures, both in the domestic and foreign policy arena, to strengthen the Islamic factor more vigorously. In the realm of foreign policy, Pakistan could not do otherwise as the the Islamic factor offered moral and material

163. Theodore P. Wright, Jr., 'Indian Muslims, the Bangladesh Secession and the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971', in Giri Rai Gupta, ed., Cohesion and Conflict in Modern India (New Delhi: Vikas, 1978), p. 133. Wright says: 'A more telling point raised in refutation of the argument that the two-nation theory was dead was that the Bengali secessionist movement, if it proved anything, demonstrated that there are not one or two but many nations in South Asia' (emphasis added).

rewards after 1971 to the elite that did not overcome the trauma associated with the loss of the eastern wing. In such a scenario, the elite’s embrace of Islam offered them a chance to seek out 'deeper moral obligations'.

These 'deep moral obligations' found their echo in the common basis of nationhood with respect to both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Emphasising this aspect of Pak-Saudi relations, Bhutto in his speech welcoming the visit of Saudi Arabia’s King Khalid to Pakistan in October 1976, described Islam as an "indissoluble bond of unfailing strength and indestructible solidarity" between them. Both of them supported each other’s national independence and integrity. King Khalid called for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute in accordance with relevant UN resolutions. While Bhutto demanded total Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories and the restitution of Palestinian national rights. During the visit, King Khalid gave Pakistan $30 million of which $10 million were meant for the construction of an Islamic Centre in Islamabad. Pakistan had a special reason to be very cordial to Saudi Arabia as the latter is the custodian of the Holy Places of Islam, besides the economic largesse that it doled out to Pakistan.

The Pakistan elite’s positive disposition towards Islam even after the 1971 trauma had been buttressed by a view held by a section of its intelligentsia. The dismemberment resulted in a vigorous debate about the very foundations of Pakistani nationhood. When the leading historians of Pakistan met in Islamabad in April 1973, to discuss issues connected with Pakistan’s 'Quest for Identity', one of the participants, Professor Waheed-uz-Zaman posed the dilemma, thus:

-----------------


The mind of Pakistani intellectual has often been agitated by a consideration of the question of our national identity. But since the traumatic events of 1971 this self-questioning has assumed the proportions of a compelling necessity... what are the links that bind the people of Pakistan? What is the soul and personality of Pakistan? What is our national identity and our peculiar oneness which makes us a nation apart from other nations?  

He himself answered the queries:

If we let go the ideology of Islam, we cannot hold together as a nation by any other means...If the Arabs, the Turks, the Iranians, God forbid, give up Islam, the Arabs yet remain Arabs, the Turks remain Turks, the Iranians remain Iranians. But what do we remain if we give up Islam?  

Another scholar, in a different context, commented upon the nexus between Islam and nationalism bearing on both Pakistan and Bangladesh. To quote him:

While Pakistan caused Islam to accommodate the notion of Muslim nationalism when it was conceptualized on the basis of the Two-Nation theory, the emergence of Bangladesh caused Islam to accommodate ethnic nationalism as an equally Islamically legitimate political identity.  

The said analyst further said that the loss of East Pakistan had left "an indelible mark...on the popular consciousness about the importance of Islam as a national political ideology." At the level of popular perception, it was also felt that the secession of East Pakistan was...not failure of Islam but of the un-Islamic policies...
and conduct of the rulers. The late Maulana Maududi, was one among those who attributed the break up of United Pakistan to these factors and further held that the lack of authentic Islamization gave rise to regionalism, parochialism, and linguistic chauvinism. Thus, the cumulative effect of all these perceptions was the unleashing of a powerful Islamic current which was aggressively promoted for their respective motives by both the Islamic activist groups and the regime of Z.A. Bhutto. In the latter’s case, the overarching Islamization drive was partly mirrored in the 1973 Constitution whose unanimous adoption by the national legislature stood as a stark contrast to the ones approved in 1956 and 1962.

POLITICS OF SYMBOLISM

Bhutto’s Islamization drive was not without its symbolic gestures. During the 1977 elections, he invited the Imams of the Kaaba and Medina mosques to visit Pakistan. The dignitaries visited, led prayers, and warmed the hearts of the faithful in major cities. Besides, Bhutto organised an International Seerat Conference (Karachi, 1976) on the life and works of the Prophet. He effected the conversion of Red Cross into Red Crescent (Hilaal-e-Ahmar) thus symbolically bringing the international humanitarian effort, into the purview of Islam. Bhutto encouraged the study of Arabic and Persian in schools and fostered an increasing number of religious conferences to which representatives from Muslim countries were invited and supported the national radio and television stations in the country to increase the

171. Ibid., p. 99.
number of religious programmes. He ordered that copies of the *Holy Qur'an* be placed in all the rooms of first-class hotels throughout Pakistan.¹⁷⁵ His government gave an increasing number of Pakistanis the foreign exchange needed to make the pilgrimage to Makkah; removed quota restrictions imposed on those willing to perform *Hajji*. For the first time in Pakistan's history, the central cabinet included a minister for religious affairs.¹⁷⁶ And with a view to bridging the Shia-Sunni sectarian division, Bhutto provided increased facilities for the separate Islamic instruction of Shiaism for Sunni children in all schools. In the arena of culture, Pakistan began to welcome Muslim students in large numbers to study in its colleges, and universities, as a result of which cultural cooperation agreements were signed with countries like Libya, Algeria, Sudan, Kuwait, Mauritania and Iraq and others. With Saudi Arabia, Bhutto entered into an agreement for the construction of King Faisal Mosque in Islamabad. As a mark of concession to the Sufistic convictions of the village folk of Punjab and Sindh, Bhutto ordered the ornate gilded doors from Iran to be placed at the entrances of two very popular shrines in Pakistan: one at Shahbaz Qalandar in Sewan (Sindh) and the other at Data Ganj Baksh in Lahore.¹⁷⁷ During the height of the PNA-led opposition movement against his regime, Bhutto, in order to prove his Islamic credentials vis-a-vis the former, resorted to the following Islamic measures in his press conference on 17 April 1977: the immediate prohibition of alcohol in the country, the closure of all bars and wine shops, a ban on all forms of gambling and the closure of night-clubs, and forbidding Pakistani embassies abroad from offering alcoholic drinks at receptions.¹⁷⁸ His government declared Friday a

---


¹⁷⁷. Ibid., p. 53.

¹⁷⁸. Ibid., p. 56.
national holiday instead of Sunday. Adding further to the list of symbolic gestures, Bhutto honoured the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Turkish Republic on 30 November 1973 by ordering an erection of the Kamal Ataturk Memorial in his hometown of Larkana in Sindh, thus seeking to deepen Turco-Pakistan ties. Bhutto delivered a speech on this occasion in which he said:

I make no secret of the pleasure I feel at the building of this memorial at a place where in my boyhood, I read about Ataturk and marvelled at his courage, his lucidity and his determined fight against reactionism and obscurantism.\textsuperscript{179}

Outside Al-Murtaza- the family residence of the Bhuttos - stands erected a monument to commemorate the achievements of President Soekarno of Indonesia, thus further buttressing his politics of symbolism. "In several respects", writes Stanley Wolpert, "both men - Kamal Ataturk and Sukarno - had been political role models for Bhutto: Ataturk igniting his passion for Pan-Islamic unity and Muslim modernism; Sukarno stimulating other passions, including his resolve to be free of any superpower control".\textsuperscript{180}

There exists a notion among scholars and analysts that Islam has become an instrument in the hands of cynical politicians in order to advance interests related to regime stability in the face of mounting opposition to them. (Like the general ilk of politicians, Bhutto too sought to undercut the vociferous Islamic interest groups in the country). Without refuting this general contention totally, it may be said that the objective state of Pakistan in the 1970s was such that it could only depend upon the Muslim world for the fulfilment of its psychological and material needs. This


dependence was quite understandable in view of the redundant nature of SEATO and CENTO that emerged on the world scene in the context of Cold War between the United States and the former Soviet Union.

Besides the Islamic factor, Pakistan's geostrategic location and its non-Arab character had been playing no less a critical role in the international relations of West Asian states. As S.S. Bindra elucidated:

The strategic location of Pakistan permits her to fully implement her diplomatic measures in the Muslim world as it is not involved with any of them in any territorial and other disputes. This has conferred on Pakistan the status of impartial and neutral observer of Muslim world and its foreign policy makers are fully utilizing the status by enjoying economic and other benefits which are helping in building its natural capability. 181

Moreover, Pakistan's experience with the United States had proved beyond any shred of doubt that under critical circumstances, the United States could not be relied upon for assistance as the east Pakistani episode had proved. Disillusioned with the Cold War related defence alliances, Bhutto, on 20 June 1977, called for a treaty of mutual defence for and by all Muslim states. 182 He also presented a regional non-aggression pact to the states of Persian Gulf. However, nothing concrete could come out of these endeavours.

**ISLAMIC PROVISIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION AND OTHER GUIDELINES**

Successive Pakistani constitutions contained a constitutional imperative for Islamization on the basis of which the regimes endeavoured to justify their policies


both inside and outside the country. Broadly, there exists a consensus among all shades of political and social opinion in Pakistan on the subject of Islam's place in the Pakistani society. Such an institutionalised prop to Islam in the constitution of Pakistan featured some provisions in the constitution as passed by the National Assembly of Pakistan (the lower and Popular Chamber) on 10 April 1973. The Preamble of this Constitution recognises the absolute sovereignty of the Almighty Allah over the entire universe and considers the authority to be exercisable by the People on His behalf as a sacred trust. It enjoins upon the state to fully observe the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as tempered by Islam, thus making it explicit that these values derive their origin and sustenance from the indigenous roots of Islamic ideology (in its historicity) as distinct from their hitherto-accepted roots in the Western Ideology of liberalism. The Preamble also requires the State to enable Pakistanis, both individually and collectively, to organise their lives in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam. The definition of what constitutes 'the teachings and requirements of Islam' is, however, kept in ambiguity so as to be decided by the vagaries of politics that obtains at a given time. Like the 1956 constitution, the 1973 constitution too designates Pakistan as an Islamic Republic under Article 1. Further, according to Article 2, "Islam shall be the state religion of Pakistan".

The foregoing makes it evident that the 1973 constitution did not bind the hands of the powers-that-be which the insertion of these Islamic provisions in the constitution might imply. The Constitution gives the scope and opportunities for the regimes to embark on the task of interpreting these provisions in the light of modern conditions that may also include the interests of regime stability. Hence, it may not be wrong to say that the 1973 Constitution combines both the elements of rigidity and flexibility in so far as its Islamic provisions are concerned. It may be construed as rigid in so far as it enjoins on the state to organise public life on the principles of Islam and flexible for it allows the state the leverage of interpreting these principles.

The 1973 Constitution also contains some Islamic provisions bearing upon the conduct of international relations by Pakistan. Article 38, titled 'Principles of Policy' (akin to the Indian Constitution's 'Directive Principles of State Policy'), exhorts the state to preserve and strengthen the bonds of unity among Muslim countries. In its Report titled 'Constitutional Recommendations for the Islamic system of Government', the Council of Islamic Ideology suggested that the Islamic State shall be duty bound to strengthen the brotherly ties among the Muslims of the world. It shall also work for 'the safety [sic?] of unity and solidarity of Millat-i-Islamia (Islamic Community) by eliminating all racial, linguistic and territorial feelings or other distinctions based on asabiyat-e-Jahiliya [practices of pre-Islamic system dubbed as Ignorance or Darkness]. In view of these suggestions and exhortations, it is quite natural that Article 40 (Chapter II) of the Constitution states that

The state shall endeavour to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic unity, support the common interests of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America, promote international peace and security, foster goodwill and friendly relations among all nations and encourage the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

In this regard, it is pertinent to note that the OIC Charter also requires the Organisation "to endeavour to eliminate racial segregation and discrimination..." as

184. The architects of the 1973 Constitution had the fortune of knowing the working of the earlier two constitutions (the ones made in 1956, and 1962) before them to benefit from, which they eventually did. It goes to the credit of the Bhutto regime that the present Constitution was unanimously approved by the National Assembly.


one of its objectives. In the constitutions of many Muslim states, one finds provisions exhorting their governments to promote Islamic solidarity as a foreign policy objective and to endeavour to achieve it by means of multifaceted acts of cooperation. In this context, the OIC Charter, like the UN Charter, acts as a guide to its constituents in the sphere of foreign relations.

Besides these Constitutional provisions, Pakistan's Foreign Office also prepared some guidelines/criteria to be followed by Pakistan vis-a-vis the Muslim states:

1. "Pakistan considered Arab nationalism, Iranian nationalism, and Turkish nationalism no more antithetical to Islamic solidarity than Pakistani nationalism;
2. Pakistan remained scrupulously impartial in all Inter-Arab disputes;
3. Pakistan followed the principles of 'bilateralism' in its relations with all nations, including the Islamic states. The government emphasized its intention to maintain friendly relations with one state or group of states without antagonizing others;
4. Pakistan intended to maintain relations with fraternal Islamic states irrespective of variations in political systems, international alliances or ideology;
5. Pakistan's relation with Muslim states would be expressed through the establishment of permanent international institutions;
6. Pakistan would promote the Arab cause at every opportunity and raise the issue of Palestine from a regional to an universal plane;
7. Pakistan would avoid becoming embroiled in conflicts between rival Muslim

states but it would urge bilateral settlement of disputes, or provide good offices or mediation, if called upon; and

8. Pakistan would aid Muslim minorities residing in non-Muslim states and would request the Islamic nations to join in the effort." 188

Without belittling the contribution of other Pakistani leaders, Bhutto's foreign policy thinking found its reflection in the formulation of these guidelines. For instance, the essence of the first guideline was contained in the address delivered by Bhutto to the Lahore Summit Conference. This guideline was indicative of the ground reality of Muslim nation-states within which Pakistani politics of Islamic solidarity had been operating. Further, 'bilateralism' as a foreign policy strategy was undoubtedly the brain child of Bhutto, as outlined in the foregoing in this Chapter. It was, of course, true that this foreign policy design was initially applied in the context of Pakistan's ties with the two Superpowers and China, and was later extended to the Muslim world as the constituents of the latter, notwithstanding their espousal of Islamic solidarity as an object of achievement, were not (and are not in the present times also) oblivious of their respective national interests which are, by their very nature, conflictual. Therefore, an acquiescence to the considerations of pragmatism (i.e., recognition of the respective national interests of states) was the hallmark of Bhutto's foreign policy of 'bilateralism'. With regard to the observance of impartiality and/or mediation, Bhutto offered to resort to the latter in a territorial dispute between Morocco and Algeria, whereas Zia-ul-Haq, Bhutto's successor, unsuccessfully mediated on the Iran-Iraq war during the eighties on behalf of the OIC. The fifth guideline was vindicated in Pakistan's successful efforts to strengthen the

institutional framework associated with the OIC as a forum of multilateral diplomacy. As regards other guidelines, namely the support to the cause of Palestine and the Muslim minorities question in non-Muslim states, Pakistan's diplomacy had not been found wanting.

The Bhutto Regime and the Ahmadiya Community

Notwithstanding what the preceding may signify in accordance with the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, the Bhutto government did, in one important respect, create a controversy when the National Assembly voted against the Ahmadiya Community by legislating them as a non-Muslim minority in 1974. The legislation, in effect, put the Community beyond the pale of Islam, thus making an authoritative pronouncement on a theological subject. The National Assembly legislated on such an issue which may open floodgates for similar acts on the part of future regimes. In fact, in the present times, some Sunni religio-political outfits have been demanding that Pakistan be declared a Sunni Islamic state and that the Shias be declared a non-Muslim minority, on the lines which the Bhutto government dealt with the Ahmadiyas. In 1953 Lahore disturbances too, the Ahmadiyas were at the receiving end. The Munir Commission that was set up to investigate the said disturbances, confirmed the fact that the Ahmadiyas were the major victims of violence in 1953.189 Considerations of political expediency on the part of the Bhutto government played their role in effecting such a measure in relation to the Ahmadiyas.190 Through such an action, Bhutto sought to establish his government's Islamic credentials among


ulama and other Islamic forces. Bhutto’s policies had paved the way for the rise of sectarian schisms - the Shia-Sunni conflicts, in particular -- with which all his successor regimes have been constrained to grapple with. Since the Ahmadiyas were not found a majority in any part of the Muslim world, unlike the Shias in Iran, Bahrain and Iraq, the law of 1974 did not evince any keen interest in the outside world except for a few international human rights bodies. This state of affairs may not be relevant in the case of Shias because 'Iran is not likely to quietly watch the Shias of Pakistan suffer a slow suffocation.\textsuperscript{191} Instances of Iranian interest in the Shias of Pakistan are already in evidence during the reign of the late Zia-ul-Haq when the latter was advised by the late Ayatollah Khomeini to let Shias be governed by their own fiqh, i.e., Fiqh-e-Jaafriya (Jaafriya Jurisprudence).\textsuperscript{192}

\textbf{Pakistan and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1973}

During Bhutto’s political leadership, Pakistan had consciously involved itself in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Yaum Kippur War) of 6 October 1973, in ways that did not prove costly or deleterious to its interests in the region. Instead, such an involvement did fetch some perceptional advantages to Pakistan.

It is well known to scholars as to where Pakistan’s sympathies lay in so far as the Arab-Israeli relations are concerned. As stated at the beginning of this work, the Arab cause had seriously engaged the attention of the Muslim League leaders both in


the pre-partition and post-partition years of the Pakistani nationhood. It was only to be expected from Bhutto that he pursue (which he actually did) that policy more vigorously, as demonstrated in his devoting a major part of his address on this subject to the assembled gathering in Lahore on 22 February 1974 (Second Islamic Summit Conference). As he unambiguously stated Pakistan's position on the occasion:

 Pakistan's support for the just causes of the Muslim world is organically related to its own national vocation. It has never suffered a severance between its national impulse and the urges of Muslim emancipation... (It's) approach to the problems of the Muslim world is...informed with a certain range of sympathy and awareness. This...is in accord with the great ends of Muslim brotherhood. 193

It needs to be noted in this context that the War preceded the Lahore Summit and hence Bhutto's address had the imprint of the lessons and experiences gained by the Arabs in the War. Pakistan's political and the limited military support extended to the Arabs were further reinforced by multilateral (conference) diplomacy in Lahore. Before the War broke out between the Arabs and the Israelis in October 1973, Pakistan, over the years, had already established entrenched military and strategic contacts with the countries of the region, particularly with Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan and Kuwait. Bhutto could hardly contain his delight as word reached him of the two-pronged Arab attack against Israel, launched without warning on the Jewish Day of Atonement (Yaum Kippur) and fasting, by Egyptian and Syrian forces. 194 He proceeded to Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran to find out ways and means of extending material assistance to Egypt and Syria in their conflict with Israel. Following his

return home, Bhutto summoned his chiefs of staff of the Army, Navy and Air Force. On 11 October 1973, Bhutto stated before them:

We would do whatever we can within our limited capacity to be of assistance to the just cause of the Arab people which we uphold dearly and consider [it] to be a part of our own struggle...[a] cease-fire will not do....it is essential that Arab territories held by Israel-illegally by Israel--should be vacated.\footnote{Hamid Jalal and Khalid Hasan, eds., \textit{Politics of the People: Speeches and Statements}, Vol. 7: August 14, 1973-December 13, 1973 (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1972-1975), pp. 128-129.}

As soon as the hostilities between the Arabs and Israel erupted, Bhutto called on the Pakistan-based Arab envoys on 7 October 1973, and assured them of Pakistan's sympathy and support to their cause. In his message sent to the UN Secretary General on the same day, Bhutto stressed that

the state of `no war, no peace' which has been allowed to linger on in the Middle East has failed to prevent renewal of hostilities. It has plunged the region into yet another armed conflict. The United Nations Security Council should no longer evade its grave responsibility for restoration of peace. It would not be enough to call for a cease-fire. The Security Council must take immediate measures to have the occupied Arab territories vacated without further delay. It must implement Resolution of 242 of 1967. Failure to do so is fraught with serious and far-reaching consequences for the whole world.\footnote{Fazul Haque Kazi, \textit{Law and Politics in Pakistan} (Karachi, Royal Book Company, 1976), p. 179.}

Further, to the Arab leaders, Bhutto wired messages of support and sympathy on 16 October 1973 to President Hafez al-Asad of Syria, and Hasan al-Baqr of Iraq in their struggle on behalf of the indomitable Arab nation against the Israeli aggressor. The same day he also sent messages to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and King Hussein of Jordan that "the Government and people of Pakistan have always fully supported
the cause of the Arab people and will continue to do so." 197 Further, at the United Nations, he instructed the Pakistani delegation to assist other Muslim diplomatic missions in making common cause.

Addressing a Press Conference in Karachi on 20 October 1973, Bhutto further reiterated Pakistan's principled support to the Arabs. He said that in the current Middle East Conflict "the whole of the Muslim world is on trial....Pakistan is not a non-aligned state. Pakistan is fully aligned to the principles of justice and international law and to a durable structure of international peace. Pakistan was doing "everything within our power and capacity" to help the Arab position, "and to give "tangible support" to the Arab states in their struggle. "It must be remembered that a war is being waged, every minute is precious and every action has to be taken deliberately," Bhutto announced. He said further: "It is not possible for me to make full revelation of all efforts....we know the people of Pakistan have faith in their Government and in the successful execution of this Jehad." 198

While this being the state of affairs as regards Pakistan's stand on the Arab-Israeli War, the then US Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, had stopped at Rawalpindi, on his way to Beijing, and discussed with Bhutto the Middle East problem in early November 1973. During the course of their talks, Bhutto told Kissinger:

We have a vital stake in the region [Middle East]. We have taken a position which we believe is based on principles...We shall remain in touch with our Arab friends. And whatever modest contribution Pakistan can make for a just settlement...we shall always be available." 199

197. Ibid., n. 195, p. 152.
198. Ibid., n. 195, p. 156.
199. Ibid., n. 195, pp. 175-176.
In this way, Dr. Kissinger could not have expected a clearer or a more eloquent enunciation of Pakistan's Middle Eastern Policy than the one advocated by Bhutto. While this high-pitched diplomatic (rhetorical) support to the Arabs (as outlined above) was quite understandable, the limited tangible support in military assistance was quite noticeable, with Pakistan extending its token military assistance to the Arabs, following the outbreak of hostilities. The experienced Pakistani pilots were believed to have destroyed at least one Israeli Mirage.\(^{200}\) Two battalions of troops were placed on alert for transfer from Pakistan in the event of Israel launching a land attack on Damascus.\(^{201}\) His regime was reported to have dispatched doctors and nurses to Egypt and Syria. That the fact that Pakistan was in someway involved in the War was complained by the then Israeli Defence Minister, Moshye Dayan: "Pakistan was one of the Muslim countries which were extending active military assistance to Syria in its continuing conflict with Israel."\(^{202}\) Meanwhile popular enthusiasm in support of Arabs was running high. Weinbaum reported the widespread mass support to Arabs:

Student rallies and processions took place in most major cities. Workers' meetings were called, blood donations accepted, and prayers offered in the mosques for an early Arab victory....National Awami Party spokesman demanded firmer support of the Arabs....Opposition politicians backed the idea of recruiting volunteers to fight in Jihad.\(^{203}\)

As noted in the early part of the study, this war was fought from the Arab side, in the name of Islam and it also witnessed the widespread use of Islamic symbols. The Arabs won this war in contrast to their shocking defeat by Israel in

\(^{200}\) M.G. Weinbaum and Gautam Sen, 'Pakistan Enters the Middle East', Orbis (New York), Vol. 3, No. 27, Fall 1978, p. 600.

\(^{201}\) Ibid., p. 600.


\(^{203}\) Ibid., n. 200, p. 600.
1967. Arabs fought the latter under the banner of Nasserite Nationalism which proved to be a poor match for Zionism. As an ideological force, Nasserism was caught in the conflicting attractions of nationalism, socialism and Islam. In a comparative perspective, the 1973 War could be visualised beyond the confines of an Arab-Israeli equation. It heralded and reinforced the forces of Islamic resurgence in the Muslim world.

Evaluation

Bhutto rose to Pakistan's political horizon at such a critical juncture when there was skepticism all around about Pakistan's identity and ideology following a comprehensive defeat of its armed forces at the hands of Indian Army in East Pakistan. He re-energized Pakistani nationalism which had been seared in the events of 1971. Through deft diplomatic negotiations, Bhutto could successfully secure the release of Pakistani prisoners of war held by India and Bangladesh and also the vacation of Pakistan's territory captured by India in the western sector. He rekindled the faith of Pakistanis in Islam and ventured to infuse state and nation building with it. His efforts were further solidified by his successors (including his arch-foe, the late General Zia-ul-Haq, whom he had elevated to the position of the Chief of Army upstaging some senior most officers). In his student days at the University of Southern California, Bhutto in a different context, spoke on "Islamic Heritage" on April 1, 1948, very eloquently:

...any accomplishment of the Islamic people [is] a personal feat [for him], just as I consider a failure of the Muslim world as a personal failure. There is something binding about the Muslim world in spite of the fact that it is torn by dissension...I am not a devout Muslim...My interest is soaked in the political, economic and cultural heritage of Islam...Imperialism has sapped our vitality and drained our blood in every part of the globe...The younger generation of Muslims, who will be the leaders of a new force, of an order based on justice, wants the end of exploitation...Destiny demands an Islamic Association; political
reality justifies it; posterity awaits it. Courage is in our blood, we are the children of a rich heritage, we shall succeed.\textsuperscript{204}

Bhutto himself made a reference to this University speech in his address to the Lahore Islamic gathering:

There have been periods in my life when...I have been assailed by doubts whether this vision of mine [that is, to put them in brief, the end of exploitation from the Muslim lands, the establishment of justice in those lands, and the need for an Islamic Association to achieve them etc.], would be fulfilled. Today, despite all difficulties in our path, I bow my head in gratitude to Allah for making me witness to a scene which should dispel those doubts.\textsuperscript{205}

However, it is unclear as to what Bhutto had in mind when he stressed the need for an 'Islamic Association' in his Student speech: a revival of Caliphate? (which ceased to exist from 1924) or an international Muslim organisation consisting of the sovereign Muslim nation-states akin to the present OIC? It is to be noted in this context that when Bhutto made the said speech, Pakistan had barely completed a year of its independent existence. The circumstances under which he made these two speeches (as paraphrased above) were qualitatively distinct from each other: In 1948, few Muslim states existed on the world’s political map, but by 1974, not only a sizable Muslim nations existed but also were poised to play an active role in international politics. A careful study of these two Bhutto speeches would indicate his disposition towards the latter: a Muslim organisation composed of the sovereign Muslim nation-states.

In this context, Bhutto, in his Lahore address, made a reference to "a certain ambivalence and... some uncertainty...in...Muslim minds about the role of natio-\textsuperscript{204}

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid. n. 193, pp. 387-388.

\textsuperscript{205} Ibid., p. 388.
nalism in Islam and its compatibility with the establishment of an Islamic community". Stating his position vis-à-vis this 'ambivalence', Bhutto asserted:

Nationalism as the motive force of a people's liberation,... as an agent of a people's consolidation,... as a propeller of social and economic progress is a powerful force which we will do nothing to weaken. Patriotism [in other words, nationalism] and loyalty to Islam can... be fused into a transcendent harmony. As Muslims, we can rise higher than our nationalism, without damaging or destroying it.

It is evident by the foregoing that Bhutto understood and, therefore, supported that kind of nationalism which was positive/creative in nature and also that which did not limit humanity's mental horizon. This positive nationalism is comparable to patriotism which is not only not an evil, but a desirable good enjoined by Islam. It is both a religious and ethical duty, to love and serve, to defend one's people and land and against aggression and injustice. It would, therefore, not be wrong to say that Bhutto did comprehend the notion of an 'Islamic Association' to be composed of the creative nationalisms of the Muslim nation-states. It was also evident that he was not the champion of an unbridled chauvinistic nationalism which was akin to ethnocentrism. Islam abhors ethnocentrism as the latter regards ethnic entity as the ultimate criterion of good and evil; the claim it makes is the claim of ultimate reality. Viewed from a historical perspective, Bhutto's understanding of Islam-nationalism compatibility was comparable to the one held by Allama Mohammad Iqbal who, after the abolition of Caliphate by Turkey's Ataturk, Mustafa Kamal Pasha in 1924, laid great emphasis on strengthening the individual sovereign Muslim nation-states in order to attain the true spirit of Umma. It is to be seen whether the evolving challenge

206 Ibid., p. 385.
207 Ibid., p. 385
being posed by the forces of resurgent Islam to the system of nation-states (as historically evolved in the European clime) can accommodate the notion of Islam-nationalism conformity held by both Iqbal and Bhutto. It is pertinent to recall what the former had said in December 1930, while addressing the Annual session of the All-India Muslim League in Allahabad: “At critical moments in their history, it is Islam that has saved Muslims and not vice versa”. Though made in the pre-partition subcontinental context, this Iqbalian statement was no less applicable in the case of Bhutto’s “New Pakistan” of the 1970s.

Closely akin to this “Islam-Nationalism ambivalence” is the Quranic notion of “midmost nation” or “People of the Middle” (Ummatan Wasatan) to which Bhutto made reference in his Lahore address. As he quoted the Holy Book to this effect:

Say: To Allah belong both East and West. He guideth whom He will to a straight path, thus We have appointed you a midmost nation that you might be witnesses over the nations and the Apostle a Witness over yourself.

Viewing this notion in perspective, Bhutto himself, in his address, outlined the stupendous tasks associated with it: “the mission of mediating conflicts, spurning the doctrines of bigotry and hate, trampling under-foot the myths of racial or cultural superiority and translating into social terms the concepts of mercy and beneficence” as constituting the core of Islam.

---


209 The Holy Quran, 2:142, 143.

210 Ibid., n. 193, p. 384.
...it is inherent in our purpose that we promote, rather than subvert, the solidarity of the Third World. This solidarity is based on human and not on ethnic factors. The distinctions of race are anathema to Islam but a kinship of suffering and struggle appeals to a religion which has always battled against oppression and sought to establish justice.  

The essence of obligations assumed by the 'mid-most nation' is beautifully captured in a Quranic verse which says that "You are the best ummah created for mankind. You command good and you forbid evil (amrbi'l maroof wa nahy analmunkar) and you believe in Allah."  

Z.A. Bhutto's contribution in the arena of foreign affairs rested on his success in enhancing the faith among Muslim nations that they could face the world confidently, be proud of their Islamic heritage and could be in a position to adopt Islamic activism as a viable foreign policy choice in the governance of their multifaceted relations between and among themselves and also with the rest of the international community. 'In Foreign policy, he received high marks as an innovator and perspicacious Third World Leader'.  

"...in the cause of the Third World, and in humanity's struggle towards a balanced world order...Muslims are being called upon to play a central role".  

The enthusiasm aroused among the Muslim states in the Lahore Summit manifested itself in the creation of a plethora of international Islamic institutions (for instance, the OIC), in order to fulfil the increasing aspirations of the umma, so that

211. Ibid.
212. The Holy Qur'an, 3:110.
the latter might find a rightful place for itself in the world order. The OIC's institutional set up enabled Islamabad to play a more dynamic role in Islamic affairs than warranted by virtue of its size and economic resources. Bhutto's contribution in the institutionalization of Pakistan's role as a key Muslim state was no less significant than was commonly attributed to him.