CHAPTER - III

Concept of Alienation and Individual Authenticity
In Jean-Paul Sartre

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CHAPTER - III

Concept of Alienation and Individual Authenticity in Jean-Paul Sartre

3.1 INTRODUCTION:

In this chapter we will analyse and critically examine the concept of “alienation” developed in the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980). Our study will mainly concentrate on Sartre’s most famous treatise Being and Nothingness, 1943 and also some of his other earlier writings. In our fifth chapter we have discussed the basic principles of existentialism and their methodology. We have also discussed how the philosophy of Sartre is different form that of Karl Marx in our Introductory as well as Comparative chapter.

Here we would like to say that the concepts like “Alienation,” “Freedom” “Consciousness” and “Nothingness,” all are intrinsically related in the philosophy of Sartre.

The word “Existentialism” is inextricably coupled with a group of French as well as German philosophers. The philosophical intimacy of these philosophers is the result of the social-political war, which has taken place in Europe in 1940s.


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Jasper (1883-1969) Unamuno (1864-1936), Heidegger (1889-1976) are some of the leading exponents of existentialist movement.

An irrational trend has been developed by all these philosophers. The concepts like, 'freedom', 'responsibility', 'anguish', 'death', 'consciousness', 'quietism', 'despair' have been developed by all most all the existentialist philosophers. The most fundamental maxim of existentialism is 'Existence Precedes Essence'. They have defined the concept 'existence' by separating from its 'essence'. Here we will discuss this issues on our discussion on Sartre.

In this chapter our discussion centers on five sections. In the section 3.2 we will discuss the Phenomenological Pursuit of Being, and in the section 3.3 we will discuss the Distinction between Being for-itself and Being-in-itself. We have also discussed Sartre's concept of Existence Precedes Essence, Concept of Bad-faith (self-alienation) in the section 3.3 & 3.4. In the section 3.5 we will discuss the problem of Others, where Sartre has developed his concept of alienation. In this section we will also discuss the concept of Look, The Body etc.

Before going to analyse these concepts one by one we would like to say that every philosophical system requires a proper understanding of its epistemological as well as ontological issues. As we have discussed in our introductory chapter under methodology section, in every consistent philosophical system Ontology, Epistemology, Logic Language and Reality, are intrinsically related. Let us examine how far Sartre is able to justifying this claim in his theory of alienation and Individual authenticity.

'Alienation' is a central issue in Sartre's philosophy so far as his theory of 'consciousness', 'freedom' and 'nothingness' is concerned. The central figure of French Existentialism is Jean-Paul Sartre. Here we would
like to discuss some biographical perspective of Jean-Paul Sartre, which has a great impact in the development of his philosophical thought. The birth of Jean-Paul Sartre has taken place on 21\textsuperscript{st} June, 1905. In Paris. In 1906, his father died. He had taken to live in the home of maternal grandparents, Charles Schweitzer (uncle of Dr. Albert Schweitzer of Lambaréné) and Louise Guillemin. His mother remarries to a naval officer. He is raised in the home of his widowed mother. Sartre is exposed to the Lutheranism of his German grandfather and the Catholicism of his French grandmother. However, the two grandparents are indifferent to religion. This helps Sartre to become an atheist.

Though Sartre is never a disciple of Bergson yet he is influenced by Bergson’s theory of consciousness. He is also influenced by the philosophers like Descartes, Husserl, Heidegger and Nietzsche. In the mid-1930 he has produced his first philosophical essay, \textit{The Transcendence of the Ego} where he has challenged certain premises of Husserl’s phenomenology. After that Sartre defines himself as a phenomenologist.

In 1939, Sartre joined the French Army at Nancy and from there he was transferred to Alsace. He was soon captured by Nazis and imprisoned. Though he escaped next year, the experience left a profound experience on him. It is in this crucial experience that the origin of his theory of human relations is to be found. He has developed the concept man where he can exist apart from other human beings. At the end of his life he has addicted the positive reciprocity between man.

During 1940s, Sartre was involved in political activities. But his great philosophical treatise of the period \textit{Being and Nothingness} described the human condition from an individual perspective. In \textit{Etre et le Néant} Sartre has accepted ‘being-for-itself’ (etre-en-soi) i.e., consciousness is an independent being. Being-for-itself has no connection with being-in-itself.
which stands for object. Replying to Natonson question: “Does the for-itself has a plural gender or a gender?” Sartre replies, “No obviously not. There is always and only the for-itself. Yours, mine that does not make ‘for-itself’ several ‘for-themselves’.”2 After 1950s he has placed his existential philosophy within a social frame work. In the Critique of Dialectical Reason he has accepted Marxism as the true philosophy of our age. In his final work, The Family Idiot, Sartre has synthesized both the individual perspective of Being and Nothingness and the social theory of Critique.

Philip Thody in his book on Sartre describes, “the most significant event in Sartre’s early life is of course, the death of his father. Had Jean-Baptist survived the fever he had brought back from Cochin China, his son would not have grown up in the Schweitzer household....... Jean-Paul would not have been a lonely child, with neither brother, nor sister and friends who spent most of his time in the imaginary world provided for him by books.”3 In the year 1944 he has written two plays: Huis Clos (1944) where three people are shut up together in a very in-christina version of Hell; and in the play Les Sequestre’s d’Altone (1959), he describes, the hero deliberately spends thirteen years in a garret in order not to see what is happening outside the world. Philip Thody writes, when one reads Les Mots, with its protrait of a child virtually held prisoner in the top-floor flat of a building in the Latin quarter of Paris, allowed out only in the afternoons for a walk with his mother in the Luxembourg gardens, it is

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easy to see where the original inspiration for this theme might lie. In Saint Genet, Comedien et Martyr Sartre deeply admires the choice which Genet made to become a thief and defy society 'at an age when we were playing the survive buffon.' Like other existentialist philosophers Sartre regards anguish as an emotion which reveals the true nature of man's relationship with the world and with himself. Sartre unlike Jasper believes that the human condition reveals itself more clearly in the boundary situations of fear, terror, torture and loneliness, than in nonal experience helps Sartre's childhood experience him to enter consciousness theory or world ideas. "I found more reality in the idea," he states" than in the thing because it was given to me first and because it was given as a thing.

In the year 1933 Sartre goes to the French institute of Berlin to study philosophy. There he is influence by the work of Husserl and Heidegger Jean -Paul Sartre was not only an exponent of atheistic existentialist philosophy but also a play writer, a novelist, and an activist who participates in the anti-Fascist movement of French Resistance. He has opposed the French Resistance. He is also opposed the French government's attempt to retain control on Algeria. He is opposed with the idea of United States intervention in Vietnam. He supports the students prising in May 1969. In 1964, he refuses to take the Nobel Prize. Sartre is one of those philosophers who opposed colonialism and aggressive wars by advocating democratic humanism.

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4 Ibid., p.10.
5 Sartre, Jean-Paul, Saint Genet, Comedien at Matyr; Situations, I, II, III, etc, Gallimard, 1952,p.55.
6 This quotation has taken from Philip Thody books on Sartre : A Biographical Introduction, London : Studio Vista, 1971, p.11.
Inspite of an activist his ideas are very much influenced by his childhood days. His ideas are nothing to do with the society. In this connection Prof. Suman Gupta writes, ‘In spite of being an activist in the context of concrete social reality, in his philosophy, Sartre tries to deny the objective reality, social development and interpreted man as an important being who can only feel anguished at his helplessness.... a helpless state which Sartre designated as “freedom”.

Almost all the existentialist thinker has described the concept man without talking much about the society and human relationship. Because of this reason their philosophy is completely metaphysical in nature. The same is true in case of Sartre also.

The structure of Sartre’s philosophy one can say undeniably Cartesian. Sartre begins his treatise *Being and Nothingness* by reflecting Cartesian ‘cogito’, yet the structure of his philosophy remains unlike Descartes. Sartre’s philosophy owes particularly to the philosophies of George Bishop Berkeley (1685-1753), David Hume (1711-1776), and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Philosopher like G.W.G. Hegel (1770-1831), Karl Marx (1818-1883), Husserl (1859-1938), Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, helped Sartre, in formulating his central ideas. Our finding shows, while the philosophers like Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger and Nietzsche have influenced Sartre in his earlier writings, his later writings on the hand are influenced by the philosophy of Karl Marx.

In this chapter we will give emphasis on his book *Being and Nothingness*. In between our discussion we will also deal with some of his earlier writings as well as his later writings.

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In our next section we will discuss 'The Tragic Pursuit of Being'. In that section we will discuss how Sartre's Phenomenological Ontology is developed from the philosophy of Husserl and Heidegger. And we will also discuss how Sartre's position is similar to the philosophers like Kant, Hume and Nietzsche.


Sartre's philosophy in his early essays centers on the concept of "consciousness". In other words we can say consciousness is the basis from which Sartre starts his philosophy. Nothingness,” “Freedom”, “alienation” all are follows from his 'consciousness.” ‘The Transcendence of the Ego’, Sartre has accepted Husserl's theory of consciousness, i.e., “Consciousness is consciousness of something.”

In the Psychology of Imagination that would lead to an understanding of 'nothingness of consciousness' and its ultimate freedom Sartre argues an “imagining” consciousness is always differs from a “realizing” consciousness. In “imagining” consciousness there should not be the involvement of any object inside it. It cannot posit an object. But in case of realizing consciousness there is a possibility of positing an object inside it. Sartre has accepted imaging consciousness as the basis of man. To make this explanation clear we are giving Sartre's own explanation of it.

Sartre, Jean-Paul in his book 'Being and Nothingness, 1943 defines 'consciousness' as 'Pre-reflective'. In the Transcendence of Ego he has described it as 'Unreflective' and in the 'Psychology of Imagination' Sartre describes, consciousness in terms of 'imagining consciousness'.
“We can affirm fearlessly that it consciousness is a succession of determined psychical facts, it is entirely impossible for it ever to produce anything but the real. For a consciousness to be able to imagine it must be able by its own efforts to must be able by its own efforts to withdraw from the world. In a word it must be free.”

Robert Richmond Ellis describes, “It is as a negation of the real that Sartre approaches the problem of art. The real, he states is completely contingent and for this reason never beautiful.” And Sartre quotes; “Beauty is a value applicable only to the imaginary and which means the negation of the world in its essential structure.”

This passage reveals that Sartre wants to live his artist in an imaginary world where he can realize his nothingness. Here our analysis is different from that of Sartre. How can we imagine something without having knowledge of it whether it exists or not? Even if we imagine something what is its use? For ex: Flying horse or Unicorn exists. Some one in imagination can conceive 'flying horse' or 'unicorn exist.' As long as we are imagining the things this is true. But when we come to the realizing things it turns out to be false. We feel as if we are dreaming something. In our view Sartre has committed a mistake by making consciousness as imaginary, which have no connection with objective material reality.

In Being and Nothingness Sartre has discussed the theory of consciousness in a more detailed way. Sartre brings with a discussion of

the relationship between consciousness and the being of which it is conscious. And in our account he fails to establish the relationship. Sartre has accepted the dualism of Descartes in his philosophy fails to establish a dialectical interaction between subject and object, appearance and essence, possibility and actuality etc.

The Introduction of Being and Nothingness begins with a statement, "Modern thought has realized considerable progress by reducing the existent to the series of appearances which manifest it. It aim was to overcome a certain number of dualism which have embarrassed philosophy and to replace them by the monism of the phenomenon."12

This phenomenological movement of Sartre has rejected the dualism between phenomenon and noumenon, (as made by Kant), appearance and essence, He says, "...we can equally well reject the dualism of appearance and essence. The appearance does not hide the essence, it reveals it; it is the essence."13

Sartre has identified appearance with essence. In our opinion from the appearance of a thing or objects we cannot judge its essence. Though it is true that Sartre has not taken into account essence of thing into account for him, only appearance in there and that is his consciousness. Let us discuss what do we mean by essence? Suman Gupta describes and we agree with the views that, "essence, as a philosophical category, means the sum total of ties, relations and internal laws determining the transformation of an objective system. Essence implies the underlying causal connections in a clears phenomena. Appearances on the other hand, are the external aspects of reality. They are the individual phenomena, properties or

12 Sartre, Jean-Paul Being and Nothingness, op.cit. p. 3.
13 Ibid., p.5
processes expressing outward aspects of reality. 'The category of essence and appearance forms of unity.'

Thus we cannot separate essence from its appearance and vice-versa. It can be applicable for an object or thing, for an individual being, etc. The unity of essence and appearance establishes a scientific worldview. Marx in this context said: "...All science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided." Here we can apply the dialectical laws of Marx how quantitative leads to qualitative changes. Man for Marx, through his knowledge can bale to transform the objective reality. And this knowledge will be possible when there is an interaction between subject and object. Continuing our discussion on Sartre we will see, reality consists only appearance. Sartre writes "The appearances which manifest the existent are neither interior nor exterior; they are equal they all refer to other appearance, and none of them is privileged."

Sartre's ontological status is based on only appearance. In this context Sartre has also rejected Kant's thing-in-itself or noumena. For Sartre thing-in-itself is unknown and unknowable.

Consciousness, for Sartre, is always intentional in nature, which always directed towards its object. Similarly the object also presuppose, consciousness. But it does not presuppose anything like the thing in itself of Kant. Sartre says, "But if we once get away from what Nietzsche called "the illusion of worlds behind the scene", and if we no longer believe in the being behind the appearance, then the appearance becomes full positivity; its essence is in 'appearing' which is no longer opposed to being

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16 Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness. 1992. op.cit., p.3.
but on the contrary is the measure of it. For the being of an exsitent is exactly what it appear. Thus, we arrive at the idea of the phenomenon such as we can find for example, in the 'phenomenology' of Husserl or of Heidegger- the phenomenon of the relative to the absolute. Relative the phenomenon remains, for 'to appear' supposes in essence somebody to when to appear. But it does not have the double relativity of Kant's erscheingung. It does not point over its shoulder to a true being which would be, for it, absolute. What it is, it is absolutely, for it reveals itself as it is. The phenomenon can be studied and described as such, for it is indicative of itself.\footnote{Ibid., p.4.}

Sartre has rejected Kant's thing- in- itself as the cause of the appearances. In our opinion Sartre held a similar position with Hume in describing his theory of "appearance". In other words we can relate Sartre's appearance with Hume "impression". Here we would like to give a brief account of Hume's theory of "impression". Hume describes impressions, "....as those perceptions which enter into out consciousness, 'with most force and violence,' and adds that he comprehends under the name all our 'sensation, passion and emotions' as they make their first appearances in the soul." He further says, "by the term impression is 'all our more lively perception when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire or will.'\footnote{Hume, David., \textit{Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding} and concerning the principles of Morals ed. By L.A.Sel by Bigge, revised by P.H.Nidditch, Oxford : Oxford University press, 1975, p.18.}"

Hume observes that every perception is either an 'impression' or an 'ideas'. In the words of Hume:
"All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two
distinct kinds, which I shall call 'impression' and 'ideas'."\(^{19}\)

What Locke calls it 'idea' Hume calls perception and in a similar
way what Locke says about idea Hume argues about perception that the
mind have never anything present to it but perceptions.

But whereas Locke's position is that the ideas are caused by the
external objects, Hume points out that (Mind) cannot possibly reach any
experiences of their context on with objects. The supposition of such a
connection is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.

Describing the nature of 'Impression' and 'Ideas' Hume writes:

"The difference between there (impressions and ideas) consists in the
degree of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind and
make their way into our thought and consciousness. Those perceptions,
with enter with most force and violence, we may call impressions; and
under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions,
as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas, mean the faint
images of there in thinking and reasoning; such as for instance, are all the
perceptions excited by the present discourse..."\(^{20}\)

In the above passage Hume introduces the fundamental entities of
his theory of perception. In our opinion Hume's theory of 'impression,' is
very much similar to Sartre's 'appearances'.

Husserls phenomenology helps us to draw a similarity between
Sartre's appearance and Hume's impression Sartre is influenced by the

\(^{19}\) Hume, David, \textit{A Treatise of Human Nature}, Mossner, E.C., (Intro. &ed.),

phenomenological method of Husserl. Sartre in his philosophy is much influenced by Husserl’s Phenomenological method.

In the introduction of his book *Being and nothingness* Sartre’s project is identified as Phenomenological Ontology. He distinguishes his approach from Husserl, in which pure phenomenology presumably leads to subjective idealism. And from Heidegger, he distinguishes, his approach, in which pure ontology presumably leads to a captive objectivism oblivious of the problem of subjectivity and consciousness.

Before going to discuss these issues in a detailed manner we would like to draw a distinction between ‘Phenomenology’ and ‘phenomenalism’, Phenomenology is a theory, that has been used in different sense in modern philosophy. Phenomenology is the science in which we come to know mind as it is in itself through the study of the ways in which it appears to us.

John Heinrich Lambert, a German philosopher contemporary with Kant first speaks of a discipline which is known as Phenomenology in his Noves organon Leipzig, 1974. He defines phenomenon to refer to the illusory features of human experiences. Thus, he describes phenomenology as the theory of illusion. Kant has also used phenomenology in his philosophy. Kant has made a distinction between the things or events as they appear to us and things or event as they are in themselves. The former he called “phenomena and the latter he calls as “noumena”. Hegel has also used this term in his book *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) where he traces the development of spirit (or mind) through various stage in which mind apprehends itself as phenomenon.

In the middle of 19th century, the philosophers’ uses this concept fact or whatever observed to be the case. They have used the concept
interms of descriptive study of mind. American philosopher C.S. Peirce has used the term phenomenology not only a descriptive study of all that is observed to be real but what ever is before the mind, since Husserl employed the term in the early 1990's it has become the name of a way of doing philosophy by using phenomenological method. Phenomenology is supposed to begin from a suoopulous inspection of one own conscious, particularly intellectual process.

In this inspection all assumptions about the wider and external causes and consequences of there internal process have to be excluded (bracketed). Although this sound like a programme for psychology of introspection, Husserl insisted that it is an apriori investigation of the essences or meanings common the thought of different mind.

One should not be confused phenomenology with phenomenalism a difference lies in using both the terms. Phenomenalism is an analysis of physical object propositions it rejects the notion that there are forever inaccessibly objects shrounder behind the veil of appearance, by reducing all talk of things perceived and perceivable to talk about actual or possible perceptual experience. Phenomanlists perceptual experience. Phenomenalist reduce material objects to sense Hume’s empiricism has been attacked for its phenomenalism, that is, for its view the physical objects, as well as human beings, are no more than collections of their observable properties.

Hume held that all concepts are either divided directly from sensory experience or are complex collections of such concepts. He regarded it as consequences of this view that tall concepts ever either to sensory qualities like shape, color or sound or to complex collection of three.
Linguistic phenomenalism uses this term by saying that, material objects are logical construction of sense.

We are not going to deal with these two concepts in a more detailed way. Our main concern is Sartre’s acceptance as well as rejection of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s philosophy.

We here will trace the development of Sartre’s existentialism from the philosophy of Husserl and Heidegger. Husserl’s phenomenology has a great influence on the philosophy of Sartre.

It is the philosophy of Husserl and Heidegger which helps Sartre to establish a phenomenology of consciousness we will discuss the philosophy of Husserl and Heidegger separately.

Husserl, Edmund Gustav Albert (1859-1938) is a German philosopher. Husserl establishes the doctrine of phenomenology into a pure non-empirical science. He has also developed the notion of ‘Transcendental Ego’. Husserl presents a programme for the systematic investigation of consciousness as the fundamental undeniable existent and its objects.

Husserl says, to describe pure phenomenology the philosopher is to proceed like the natural scientists. Husserl says, the phenomenologist aims to aims to describe how the whole world, no longer assumed to exist, appears to consciousness.

“In the one case we have data belonging to the world, which is presupposed as existing that is to say, data taken as psychic components of man. In the other case the paralleled data, with their like contents, are not taken in this manner, because the whole world, when one is in the
phenomenological attitude, is not accepted as actuality, but only as an actuality of phenomenon."21

Husserl’s phenomenology is ‘absolutely subjective’ in nature. Husserl in the opening sections of the second Meditation, has accepted the nature of consciousness as intentional. He writes.

“Consciousness processes are also called intentional; but then the word intentionally signifies nothing else than this universal fundamental property of consciousness to be consciousness of something.”22

Robert D. Cuming describes, Sartre takes over from Husserl’s phenomenology two methodological procedures, “intentional analysis” and eidetic analysis. Intentional analysis is a procedure for analysing consciousness with respects to its “Meaning endowing” acts, by which identify something as being what it is. Thus, I am conscious of it as ‘a triangle’ as “a table,” as anger. Phenomenological anaysis is intentional in the etymological sense that it follows out the identifying reference of the “act” to the object “aimed at” as the target of the reference.”23

Sartre has characterized his major work, L’ Etre et le n éant (Being and Nothingness) as an eidetic analysis of self-deception. Sartre has rejected Husserl’s transcendental ego.

Husserl defines, phenomenological investigation must begin by ‘bracketting’ the world and the real objects exists inside the world.

22 Ibid., p.33.
Husserl's main focus is on the phenomenon of the world and its object as they appear to us. Heidegger as well as Sartre has rejected the Husserl's notion of 'bracketing' Sartre has rejected two central tenets of Husserl's transcendental idealism. Sartre rejects the transcendental Ego (the standpoint, out side the natural world) Secondly, it rejects Husserl's account of the objective world as a world of sense.

Michael Hammond, Jane Howard and Russell Keat have given certain points, where Sartre agrees with Husserl. Firstly Sartre begins by applauding what he sees as Husserl's attempt to steer a course between realism and idealism:

"Against all 'psychologism' Husserl persistently affirmed that one cannot dissolve things into consciousness." In our opinion Sartre and Husserl has interpreted in a similar way. But whereas Husserl has accepted the transcendental nature of Ego, Sartre rejects it.

Husserl says, "to know is to eat..... we have all believed that the spidery mind trapped things in its web, convert them with a white spit and slowly swallowed them reducing them its own substance. What is a table, a rock, a house? A certain assemblage of contents of consciousness, a class of such contents. O digestive philosophy'!

26 Ibid. p. 4.
He further says, "the tree escapes me and repulses me, and I can no more lose myself in the free than it can dissolve itself in me. I'm beyond it; it's beyond me."  

Hugh J. Silverman describes:

"For Husserl the problem of intersubjectivity hermeneutical one: How do I come to interpret something within the perview of my experience as an other self, or alter ego? His task is to locate a type of experience called "empathy" (Einfühlung) namely any experience I have it into constituents."  

Husserl in his philosophy has accepted intentional analysis of consciousness for him first intentional analysis of consciousness is descriptive. He viewed we cannot deny the role of ego inside the consciousness. He has accepted the existence of Others inside his consciousness. He says that:

"In changeable harmonious multiplicity of experience I experience Other as actually existing and on the one hand as world objects not as were physical things belonging to Nature (though indeed in one respect as that too). They are in effect experienced also as always governing psychically in their respective governing psychically in their respective natural organisms... on the other hand I experience them at the same time as subjects for this world as experience me too, even as, experience the world and others in it."  

27 Ibid. p. 4.  
‘Others’, for Husserl, are there. They are actually existing in the physical world and controlling their bodies. And I as a conscious being is the part of that world. Sartre has explicitly rejected this view of Husserl. He says that there is no ‘ego present inside the consciousness. In his Essay *The Transcendence of the Ego*, Sartre criticizes Husserl’s conception of the subject of consciousness as transcendental Ego. According to Sartre such an Ego is neither necessary to explain experience nor a fact of experience.

Though ‘rationality’ is a part of Husserlian science which he has applied into logic, yet like Sartre, Husserl rejects any claim that the relation between self and other is an inferential or rational relation. Sartre, like Husserl to rejects any appeal to comparision and inferences. He has used it in the sense of the existence of Others. Sartre says:

“Shame is by nature recognition. I recognize that I am as the other sees me. There is however no question of a comparision between what I am for myself and what am for the other....”

He further says:

...the meaning of “the Other” cannot come... from a reasoning by analogy effected on the occasion of the experience; on the contrary, it is in the light of the concept of the other that the experience is interpreted.”

Thus, Sartre has rejected the existence of others so far as “my consciousness” is concerned. Sartre says, “When I am at the other in my daily experience, it is by no means a noumenal reality that I am aiming

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30 Sartre, Jean-Paul., *Being and Nothingness*, op.cit., p.222.
31 Ibid., P.234.
at." 32 He further says, "the other is a phenomena which refers to other phenomena." 33

Coming back to Heidegger we will see that Sartre is closer to Heidegger than Husserl. He has accepted Heidegger's notion of "being-in-the midst of the world."

For Heidegger, "The essence of Dasein lies in its existence." 34

Sartre in his book Existentialism is a Humanism, has used the sentence as existence precedes essence." Silverman describes, for Heidegger there is not "the slightest point in common" between there two sentences in particular, Sartre has not understand that if the word essence is written in italics, this is meant to indicate that there is no question of a what, but only of a how." 35

Sartre Writes:

"Heidegger has completely avoided any appeal to consciousness in his description of Dasein." 36

Sartre has rejected the contradictory notion of Dasein in his philosophy. Sartre feels that his consciousness or being for itself has one

32 Ibid., p.225
33 Ibid., p.225
35 Silverman, Hague & Eliston Frederick, Jean-Paul Sartre, op.cit., p.169.
36 Sartre, Being and Nothingness. op.cit., p.85.
thing common with Heidggerian analysis of Dasein, i.e., it is always mine", always individual."

The point of departure from Sartre to Heidegger is based on their concept of 'nothingness.' For Sartre "Consciousness" is nothing but its "Nothingness."

The apprehension of nothingness implies its consciousness. Sartre says, "anxiety is the apprehension of nothingness." 38

So far as, Sartre's theory of 'the existence of other's is concerned his view differs from Heidegger. Sartre viewed that even the look of Others denies me as the subject that I am for myself. He says.... there is no place for death in being which is for-itself." 39

Differing from both Husserl and Heidegger and accepting their concept of Phenomenological method and the concept of 'being in the midst of the world, Sartre establishes his own theory i.e., Consciousness is consciousness of something. Consciousness is free from 'ego', object and it is purely empty Nothingness is the basic feature of its consciousness.

In his book being and nothingness he has made a distinction between being-for-itself (Etre-pour-soi) and being-in-itself (Etre-en-soi). In our next section 3.3 we will discuss these issue.

Sartre has accepted all these views of Husserl. He also aggress with Husserl that the nature consciousness is intentional.

37 Silver & Elliston, Jean-Paul Sartre, op.cit., 170.
39 Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness, op.cit., p.540.
3.3 Distinction Between Being-In-Itself & Being-for-Itself

Sartre started his philosophy by establishing pre-reflective consciousness. He rejected any idea of a noumenal world behind the and explains his own idea of "transphenomenality of Being." \(^{40}\)

For Sartre, there are two modes of reality being in itself and being for itself.

He said being-in-itself in unconscious being and being-for-itself is conscious being. \(^{41}\) Being for itself is nothing. Absolute freedom and pure consciousness are distinguishing characteristics of being-for-itself. On the other hand being-in-itself is completely determined. Possibility, immobility, lack of consciousness which characterizes being-in-itself: For itself Sartre describes is nothing but the nihilation of in itself. It is not a general nothingness but a particular privation, an individual non-being. \(^{42}\)

Sartre is not very much clear about the idea whether a dualism of mind & body is there or there is only one disintegrated Being. For this he has established a metaphysical hypothesis. In other passage of his book he made...it clear that, being-in-itself is logically prior to being-for-itself, that the latter is dependent in being-in-itself, both in its origin and in its continued history. In the original nihilation the for-itself is made to be by the in-itself. Nothing external to Being caused the rupture in the self-identity of being-in-itself. It occurred some how in Being. Thus the for-
itself would be a mere abstraction without Being, it is not an autonomous substance. It is *unselbständig*.

"But as a nihilation it is, and it is in a priori unity with the in-itself."

This passage clearly reveals that Sartre has accepted being-in-itself is logically prior to being. And being for-itself, which is consciousness is nothing but the nihilation of being-in-itself. The question here arises what do we mean by consciousness and what is its nature? Sartre described, "consciousness is a being whose existence posits its essence, and inversely it is consciousness of a being whose essence implies its existence; that is in which appearance lays claim to being. Being is every where Heidegger reserves for *dasein* and say that it is a being such that in its being, its being in question... consciousness is a being such that in its being. Its being is in question in Sartre as this being implies a being other than itself.

So for Sartre, human consciousness is determined by its existence. Sartre accepts Heidegger's view regarding consciousness. For him consciousness or being-for itself is as being what it is not and not being what it is.

Thus, it is clear from the above discussion of Sartre that being-in-itself and being-for-itself are two distinct radical beings. These two being cannot be united. Describing the nature of being-in-itself, Sartre says that neither can *Being-in-itself* is derived from a possibility. The possible is a structure of the *for itself*; that is, it belongs to other regions of being. Being-in-itself is never either possible or impossible. For Sartre,

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43 Ibid., pp. xxv-xxvi.
44 Ibid., p. xxv-xxvi.

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consciousness absolutely cannot derive being from anything, either from another being, or freedom a possibility or from a necessary law. 46

Of consciousness does not coincide with itself in a full equivalence. Such equivalence, which is that of, the in itself, is expressed by this simple formula: being what it is. In the in-itself there is not a particle of being which is not wholly within itself without distance. When being is thus conceived there is not the slightest suspicion of duality in it; this is what we mean when we say that the density of being of the in-itself is infinite. It is fullness. The principle of identity can be said to be synthetic not only because it limits its scope to a region of definite being, but in particular because it masses within it the infinity of density. "A is A" means that A exists in an infinite density. Identity is the limiting concept of unification: it is not true, that the in itself has any need of a synthetic unification of its being; at its own extreme limit, unity disappear and passes into identity. Identity is the ideal of "one", and "one" comes into the world by human reality. The in-itself full of itself and no more total plentitude can be imagined, no more perfect equivalence of content to container. There is not the slightest emptiness in being, not the tiniest crack through which nothingness might slip in. 47

This long passage of Sartre in his book being and Nothingness clearly reveals the nature of being in itself and its relation to for itself. In itself in Sartre’s philosophy is a completely determined being. He has described this concept in terms body the existence of others etc. The nature of in itself is positive and its is what it is. Nothing can enter inside the in-itself. The existence of in-itself is the necessary condition because of which

46 Ibid., p.28.
47 Ibid., p. 120-21.
alienation takes place it is the alienation of the self. We will discuss this
issue later on.

The distinguishing characteristic of being-for-itself or consciousness
on the other hand is that it is decompression of being.\textsuperscript{48}

Man for Sartre is a subjective being who can live without society.
Here we would like to go back to Sartre's literacy works La Nausea
(Nausea, 1937). This novel of Sartre is richest in philosophical content.
Until the publication of being and nothingness Sartre's discussion on men's
and happiness and unhappiness, his ethical problems were depicted in his
literary works. The most important novel of Sartre is Nausea. The key to
Nausea is to be found in the title of the novel. In \textit{Being and Nothingness}
Sartre defines Nausea in Ontological terms as the non-thetic apprehension
of consciousness of its own contingency as an existent. It is through
Nausea that consciousness discovers its facticity: "A dull and inescapable
nausea perpetually reveals my body to my consciousness."\textsuperscript{49}

In this novel, "the first realization on the part of the hero, Roquentin,
that Being in general and he himself in particular are de trop; that is
existence itself is gratuitous and unjustifiable."\textsuperscript{50} Being is there and outside
of it is nothing. Roquentin struggling with the idea that thing over flow all
the relationships and designations which he can attach to them, a view
which Sartre developed later in the form of a theory of the
transphenomenality of being.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p.121.
\textsuperscript{49} Sartre-Jean-Paul, \textit{Being and Nothingness}, p.338.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., p.xix.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., p.xix.
Roquentin realizes that since he is an existent being, he cannot overcome this original contingency and this obscene superfluity.

Roquentin’s view regarding the object exist around him as follows:

“We were a heap of living creatures, irritated, embarrassed at ourselves we hadn’t the slightest reason to be there, none of us; each one confused, vaguely alarmed, felt de trop in relation to the Others. De trop: it was the only relationship I could establish between these trees these gates, these stones. In vain I tried to count the chestnut trees to locate them by there relationship to the velleda, to compare their height with the height of the plane trees: each of them escaped the relationship in which I tried to enclose it, isolated itself and overflowed... And I soft, weak, obscene, digesting, juggling with dismal thoughts- I, too, was de trop Even my death would have been de trop. De trop, my corpse, my blood on these stones, between these plants at the back of the smiling garden. And the decomposed flesh would have been de trop in the earth which would receive my bones, at last; cleaned, stripped, peeled, proper and clean as teeth, it would have been de trop: I was de trop for eternity.”

Roquentin the hero of the novel feels alienated from the whole society. His alienation is experienced in Nausea. He dislikes the people.

Till now, we have seen Sartre in his philosophy has given primary importance to consciousness, nothingness and freedom. These three are inseparable concepts for Sartre. We will discuss these issues in our next chapter. We have seen Sartre has taken being in itself as a completely determined being without which being for itself can exist.

The existence of others, which create a problem in Sartre's life. The other is there because of that which my subjectivity is no longer the same subjectivity. There is always a constant threat to my life. It is the others who create all sorts of negativity in my life. Others are responsible for my 'alienation'. In our opinion all the existentialist thinkers develop an individualistic philosophy but Sartre has gone to extreme extent where he and his consciousness only exists.

The "Oppressive freedom" which haunts the characters in Sartre's novel, plays and short stories of the late.

The existence of others is a problem, which arises in Sartre's earlier as well as his latter writings. Sartre says that all problems arise because others who are constantly looking at me. It's because of them my subjectivity is no longer there. So all the problems are vested with the other's. It is because of others' existence, "alienation" takes place. In our next section we will discuss the existence of others and its impact on Sartre's being for itself.

3.4 SARTRE'S CONCEPT OF ALIENATION

3.4.1. Bad-faith

In the Being and Nothingness Sartre has developed a concept i.e. Bad faith. He said, bad-faith is a matter of lying to oneself. In his book Being and Nothingness, Sartre has given general examples of individuals, who are in bad-faith; the waiter in the café, the homosexual the women and her would be lover etc. These individuals are acting in bad-faith by denying their situation-birth, education, class etc. Sartre said when a person is acting in bad-faith he or she is very much aware of the truth that he is hiding. Those who are in bad faith they are attempting to hide themselves their transcendence, their freedom, their ability to negate, to separate
themselves from, to change, alter, or at least reinterpret their situation. In bad faith, an individual may reject the ambiguous existence of those who realize that they are both being for others and being for themselves, that they are both being in the midst of the world and being in the world. That they may accept on perspective on themselves as true while rejecting the other as appearance or they may deny that they are both things many other things as well as beings with futures of possibilities towards which they project themselves. Sartre said in confronting with the natural world, the for itself (individual man as consciousness) necessarily negates the in-itself, reject the other.

3.4.2. The Problem of Others

Sartre said the others are there to tell me about my existence. I cannot entertain others to interfere in my way of life.

Sartre said, it is the for-itself, which discovers the existence of others, when it is made an object of other's look. The look of other makes me an object. I am no longer remains as a subject. “Shame” is fundamentally the for itself's recognition of its objectivity. Sartre calls “Shame” as a fundamental attitude through which the existence of other is revealed. To quote Sartre,

“I am ashamed of that I am Shame therefore realizes an in intimate relation of myself to myself. Through shame I have discovered an aspect of my being...... I have just made an awkward or vulgar gesture. This gesture clings me; I neither judge if nor blame it. I simply live it. I realize it in the mode of for itself. But now suddenly I raise my head. Somebody was there and has seen me suddenly I realize the vulgarity of my gesture, and I am

ashamed. It is certain that my shame is not reflective, for the presence of another in my consciousness, even as a catalyst is incompatible with the reflective attitude; in the field of my reflection I can never meet with anything but the consciousness which is mine. But the other is the indispensable mediator between myself and me. I am ashamed of myself as I appear to the other.”

This passage clearly reveals the opinion of Sartre towards others. He is saying, it is because of the appearance of other I lost My subjectivity. Even the look of other is threatened for my subjectivity.

I can no longer be a subject, my subjectivity, freedom, all are determined by others. The underlying presupposition of Sartre’s philosophy is that man is a subjective conscious being, where he can live in isolation from others. It is the for itself which can alone exists. He further says: “By the mere appearance of the other, I am put in the position of passing judgement on myself as an object, for it is as an object that I appear to the other..... I could feel irritation, or anger before it as before a bad or trait of myself which gives to my expression an ugliness or baseness which I do not have, but I could not be touched to the quick. Shame is by nature recognition. I recognise that I am as the others see me. There is however no question of a comparison between what I am for myself and what I am for the other as if I found in myself, in the mode of being of the for itself, an equivalent of what I am for the other.”

Thus, for Sartre, the appearance of others makes me realize as what others sees me. There is no difference between others looking towards myself and my being looked at others.

54 Ibid., p.79.
55 Ibid., p.302
In the most primitive encounter, I discover the other in function of what he tells about me, about my own existence. Though he is a man, and in that sense mirrors something of what I am, he is another man; because of that difference I have the certainty that he cannot altogether like me. Others have a value for me. But the value can become negative or threatening because others forces me to escape from what Sartre calls “the reef of solipsism.” In seeing other I feel that I am not I for him. For him, I am an another being. I am an object for me. I am no longer exclusively the object I have been for myself, the object I call my and in whose interests I, as a subject, separate in the world. I am additionally the object I represent for him as he is the object he represents for me- an object which, beyond my description of it, is also a me being protected and defended by an I.

In our next section we will discuss the reef of solipsism as developed by Sartre in his book Being and Nothingness. Sartre has devoted almost thirty six pages in the Being and Nothingness to describe his concept self. Different philosophers have interpreted Sartre as a “Solipsist”.

Sartre always tries to avoid their concept. And he said he succeeded in doing this in the concluding section of the article “The transcendence of the Ego”. If in the conclusion of the Transcendence of the Ego, it had been explicitly eliminate, the question arises why in Being and Nothingness that problem is discussed again. The central theme of the article “The

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57 Sartre discusses this concept in Being and Nothingness, see p.303-339.
transcendence of the Ego is as follows: The ego is not located within, but outside of consciousness. It is, neither in the formal nor in the material sense, immanent to consciousness. The Ego is transcendent to consciousness. The ego does not in habit consciousness; its adobe is outside consciousness. In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre states that even if outside of the empirical ego three is nothing other than the consciousness of that Ego that is, a transcendental field without a subject the fact remains that my affirmation of the other demands and requires the existence beyond the world of a similar transcendental field. Sartre explicitly dissociates himself from the position he had taken in his early article. He sticks to the view that ego is transcendence to consciousness He adds: "Yet we need not conclude that the for itself is a pure and simple (impersonal contemplation). But the Ego is far from being the personalizing pole of a consciousness which without it would remain in the impersonal stage; on the contrary, it is consciousness in its fundamental selfness which under certain conditions allows the appearance of the ego as the transcendent phenomenon of that selfness."

From both the quotations it follows that personification of transcendental consciousness is indeed carried out in being and nothingness. This is the reason why problem of solipsism once again

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62 Ibid., p. 103.
appears in that work. Sartre's theory of \textit{look} also involves a kind of solipsism.

3.4.3 The Reef of Solipsism

Sartre said, the problem of others has neither disturbed the realists or the idealists. They have accepted as the existence of other out of the self. The other is a thinking substance of the same essence as I am, a substance which will not disappear into primary and secondary qualities, and whose essential structure I find in myself.\textsuperscript{63} Husserl, Heidegger and Hegel have taken epistemology in order to prove the existence of other. But for Sartre, there is no epistemology. Rather it is the ontology of 'being' which is the ground for our relationship to others. Therefore for Sartre's ontology is the appropriate level of discourse not the epistemology. The prime example, for Sartre, a philosopher caught up in the trammels of solipsism is Husserl. Husserl in his philosophy always tried to overcome the idea of solipsism. Sartre writes:

"When Husserl in his Cartesian Meditations and in Formal and Transcendental logic attempts to refuse solipsism, he believes that he can succeed by showing that a referral to the other is the indispensable condition for the constitution of a world... For Husserl the world as it is revealed to consciousness is inter monadic. The other is present in it not only a particular concrete and empirical appearance but as a permanent condition of its unity and of its richness. Whether I consider this table or this tree or this bare wall in solitude or with companions, the other is always there as a layer of constitutive meanings, which belong to the very object, which I consider; in short he is the, veritable guarantee of the

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., p.569.
objects objectivity. And since our psycho-physical self is contemporary with the world, forms a part of the world, and falls with the world under the impact of the phenomenological reduction, the other appears as necessary to the very constitution of this self.64

Sartre said Husserl's position in describing the concept of others is very much similar to Kantian subject. Husserl in his philosophy has retained the to transcendental subject which is distinct from Ego which against has a resemblance with Kantian subject Husserl writes.

"In any case, then within myself, within the limits of my transcendentally reduced pure conscious life, I experience the world (including other) and me according to its experiential sense, not as I so to speak my private synthetic formation but as other than mine alone..., as an inter subjective world, actually there for everyone, accessible in respect of its objects to everyone."65

It is also true, as Sartre points out, that "the other is always there as a layer of constitutive meaning which belong to the very object which I consider but the constitutive source for those meanings is the intentional activity which generates the world of the essential materials of my world.66

The existence of other is unavoidable, phenomenological reduction, for Husserl discloses the constitution of authentic solitude.

Husserl tells us

64 Ibid., p.316.
"If I" abstract in the usual sense from other, I a lone remain. But such abstraction is not radical; such aloneness in no respect alters the natural world sense, experienceable by every one, which attaches to the naturally understood ego and would not be lost even if a universal plague had left only me. Taken however in the transcendental attitude and at the same time with the constitutional abstraction that we have just characterized. My ego in his transcendental owners is not the usual I, this man, reduced to a mere correlate phenomenon and having his status within the total world phenomenon. What concerns us is, on the contrary, an essential structure, which is part of the all-embracing constitution in which the transcendental ego, as constituting an objective world, lives his life. 67

Sartre said, Husserl has eliminated the very possibility of understanding what can be meant by the extra mundane being of the other since he defines being as the simple indication of an infinite series of operations to be effected. 68 For Husserl, being can be measured only through knowledge. Through knowledge the existence of others can be revealed. This position of Husserl is rejected by Sartre. Husserl replies to the solipsist that the existence of others is as true as that of the world. He said, "the existence of the world is measured, he will add, by the knowledge which I have of it; the case will not be otherwise for the existence of the other." 69

So far Husserl it is epistemology rather than ontology of Sartre which helps us in building the existence of world as well as the other.

67 Husserl, Edmund, Lartesian Meditations; An Introduction to phenomenology, op. cit., p.93.
68 Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness, p.317.
69 Ibid., p.318.
Sartre's rejection of Husserl's philosophy, is not based on the meaning of object as described by Husserl rather it is based on the refutation of transcendental ego. This is clear from this statement as declared by Sartre. To quote:

"Formerly I believed that I could escape solipsism by refuting Husserl's concept of the existence of the Transcendental Ego. At that time I thought that since I had emptied my consciousness its subject, nothing remained there which was privileged as compared to other. But actually, although I am still persuaded that the hypothesis of a transcendental subject is useless and disastrous, abandoning it does not help one but to solve the question of the existence of other. Even if outside the empirical Ego there is nothing other than the consciousness of that Ego that is, a transcendental field without a subject the fact remains that my affirmation of the other demands and requires the existence beyond the world of a similar transcendental field. Consequently the only way to escape solipsism would be there again to prove that my transcendental conscious is, in its very being, affected by the extramundane existence of other consciousness of the same type. Because Husserl has reduced being to a series of meanings, the only connection which has been able to establish between my being and that of the other is a connection of knowledge. Therefore, Husserl cannot escape solipsism any more than Kant could."\(^70\)

Sartre argues that Husserl's phenomenological conception of radical intentionality renders a transcendental ego. Consciousness for Sartre is not only consciousness of transcendent object; it is also simultaneously self-consciousness and as such absolute inwardness. It is for this reason Sartre says it is not the I that makes possible the unity and individuality of

\(^70\) Ibid., p. 318.
consciousness, but rather the reverse is true. Sartre’s repudiation of Husserl’s theory of others beings out the fundamental philosophical in sight of ‘Being and Nothingness’ that we can not prove the existence of other through epistemology. Sartre has given importance to ontology because of which his philosophical view does not establish as interaction between man and man on the one hand and man and nature on the other.

Proceeding from Husserl to Hegel Sartre said, Hegel has done a significant progress. Sartre said, Hegel in his book Phenomenology of Mind has discussed about the other. He said:

"the appearance of the other is indispensable not to the constitution of the world and of my empirical Ego but o the very existence of my consciousness as self-consciousness."\(^\text{71}\) Hegel said the other serves to confirm the operation by which I have discovered myself. He said, nothing can separates my consciousness from other. It is by the very fact of being me that I exclude the other. The other is the one who excludes me by being himself, the one whom I exclude by being myself. Consciousness are direct by supported by one another in a reciprocal imprecation of their being.\(^\text{72}\)

Sartre has not accepted this view of Hegel. Because he has always a legative feelings to needs the existence of other. Sartre claims in discovering the other I have no justification what so ever for presupposing that I know that he things of me, what he knows of me, and most alarmingly what he want from me.\(^\text{73}\)

Sartre has accepted Heideggers notion, that with the other I share a field of being which it is our common task to plough and cultivate. That

\(^{71}\) Ibid., p. 319.  
\(^{72}\) Ibid., p. 319.  
\(^{73}\) Ibid., p. 325.
field which Heidegger calls the Mitsein is only a category which describes the presence of many man in the earth. Sartre said the other are there but we do not know anything about the other nor does he knows about me. Neither I know his quality nor I have something common with him. Since I do not know what other wants from me it is always better to keep myself away from others. By confronting with other Sartre says, I introduce the same negation which I have encountered with the natural world. I recognize that he is neither I nor me, nor am I he or him. We confront each other in a union of nihilating reciprocity, seeing each other as obstacles to be met and eventually to be overturne. Sartre said: by Proceeding from Husserl to Hegel we have realized an immense progress: first, the negation which constitutes the other is direct internal, and reciprocal; 2nd it calls each consciousness to account and prices it to the deepest part of its being; the problem is posited on the level of inner being, of the universal and transcendental 'I'. Finally, in my essential being of the other, and instead of holding that my being for myself is opposed to my being for others, I find that being for others appears as a necessary condition for my being for myself. Sartre asked how can the I dealist reply to the question how can the other be an object for me. Hegel being an Idealist will reply if there is in truth a me for whom the other is an object, this is because there is an other for whom the we is object. Sartre said knowledge here is still the measure of being...

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74 Ibid., p. 322.
75 Ibid., p.321-22.
76 Ibid., p. 322.
77 Ibid., p. 322.
Sartre is of the opinion that Hegel like Husserl has accepted knowledge in the back door. Husserl measures being by knowledge while Hegel identities knowledge with being.

The problems remains problematic. He does not want to proof the existence of other. He has give a better refutation of solipsism is to be rejected not because its absurdity or impossibility can be demonstrated, but because the other has his own grounding in his own being, an independent cogito. It is no use neither actually producing the other as object. 'In my own in most depths I must find not reason for believing that the other exists but the other himself as not being me.' The for others is one of the modes in which the for-itself appears; all the others, for each for itself, form a totality, but Sartre calls it a `detotalized totality.'

Sartre said, "The other is not a for itself as he appears to me; I do not appear to myself as I am for the other. I am incapable of apprehending for myself the self which I am for the other, just as I am incapable of apprehending on the basis of the other as object which appear to me what the other is for himself." Sartre said others will transform me into an object of his creation when the others will interfere in my activity which I want to perform myself, I myself loose mastery over my work. In confronting with the
“Shame is the feeling of an Original fall, not because of the fact that I may have committed this or that particular fault but simply that I have fallen into the world in the midst of the things and that I need the meditation of the other in order to be what am.”

The problem before Sartre is the existence of others. Our studies of Sartre shows that in order to avoid solipsistic position Sartre has accepted the existence of others. His opinion towards others shows his position is similar to mechanical materialist position. He said, other looks at me to make me feel that I am not only a being for my self (being for itself) but also being for. Others. Sartre feels other always decides to treat me as I have treat being in itself others looking at me is clear exploitation towards my subject. Other makes me fall and I discover it through the other. Sartre has given importance “the look of the other.” In this section the look of the other, he has discussed how the concept of Alienation takes place so in our next section we will discuss the look for which Sartre has devoted almost 58 pages p.340 to 398) in his book being and nothingness.

3.4.4 The Look

Sartre in the previous section described the far others as a fall toward objectivity but that if this objectivity were ever reached, conscious would cease to be consciousness. Consciousness for Sartre, never “Knows” itself as an object. Sartre said, “My being for others is a fall through absolute emptiness towards objectivity... Thus my self as object is neither knowledge nor a unity of knowledge but an uneariners, a lived wrenching away from the ecstatic unity of the for itself, a limit which I cannot reach and which yet I am.” To describe the concept of other Sartre has taken the

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81 Ibid., p. 242.
82 Ibid., pp. 274-75.
look as a medium. He believes in the look of the other, there is genuine threat of my existence as an individual being. My being seen by the other as Sartre describes.

This relation which I call being seen by another," far from being merely one of the relations signified by the ward man represents an irreducible fact which can be deduced either from the essence of the other as object or from my being as subject. On the contrary, if the concept of the other as object is to have any meaning, this can be only as the result of the conversion and the degradation of that original relation. In a word, my apprehension of the other in the world as probably being a man refers to my permanent possibility of being seen by him; that is, to the permanent possibility that a subject who sees may be substituted for the object seen by me. Being seen by the other is the truth of seeing the other. Thus the notion of the other cannot under any circumstances aim at a solitary extram undone consciousness which I cannot even think. The man is defined by his relation to the world and by his relation to myself. He is that object in the world which determines an internal flow of this universe, an internal hemorrhage. He is the subject who is revealed to me in that flight of myself toward objectivation. But the original relation of myself to the other is not only an absent truth aimed at across the concrete presence of an object in my universe; it is also a concrete, daily relation which at each instant I experience. At each instant the other is looking at me.83

The look of the other may however, pose a threat in a different way. The other conceived the individual as only his or her facticity, only what the other sees, only a peculiar kind of thing among other things. In intimacy one Sartre's story we will see Lulu (One character of intimacy)

83 Ibid., p. 257.
feels uncomfortable with his her flesh and that of others. The touch or look of another from behind is an uncomfortable reminder that one has a back and a behind, a fact lulu finds especially mortifying.\textsuperscript{84}

In coming to recognize other as master who looks toward me, Sartre said I lost my subjectivity. My freedom is overthrown by interference. Sartre writes I grasp the other's look at the very centre of my act as the solidification and alienation of my own possibilities. In fear or in anxious or prudent anticipation in anxious or prudent anticipation I perceive that these possibilities which I am and which are the condition of my transcendence are given also to another, given as about to be transcended in turn by his own possibilities. The other as a look is only that my transcendence transcended.\textsuperscript{85}

When I experience the other's look. Sartre's class example is the person who driven by jealousy curiosity or vice have given my ear to the door and looked through a key whole. I am alone and on the level of non-theitic self-consciousness. This means first of all that there is no self to inhabit my consciousness, nothing therefore which I can refer my acts in order to qualify them... The door, the keyhole are at once both instrument and obstacles; they are presented as to be handled with care; the key whole is given as to be looked through close by and a little to do one side, etc. Hence from this moment I do what I have to do. No transcending view comes to confer upon my acts the character of a given on which a judgement can brought to bear. My consciousness sticks to my acts, it is my acts, and my acts are commanded only by the ends to be attained and


\textsuperscript{85} Sartre, Jean-Paul, \textit{Being and Nothingness}, op. cit., p.263.
by the instruments to be employed. Sartre said so for the object is not there my consciousness and myself are free to do anything. He says.

The end justifies the means; the means do not exits for themselves and outside the end… There is constraint here since my freedom eats into my possibilities and since correlatively the potentialities of the world indicate and offer only themselves. Moreover I cannot truly define myself as being in a situation first I am not a positional consciousness of myself second because I am my own nothingness. Sartre said as long as others are not there in the room at that time in doing certain activity, I am enjoying my freedom thinking since at that time only my consciousness exist.

Suddenly, a change occurs in my situation. I hear footsteps in the hall. I realize that I am seen by another. My being suddenly affected by the looks of the other, my consciousness is no longer the same consciousness. Sartre says, the other reveals himself as in the case of Husserl and Heidegger through the objects in the world: It is one table, on the wall that the other is revealed to me.

The other as subject is not only the one capable if perceiving the same objects as me, he is first and foremost the one capable of making me the object of a look My fundamental connection with the other as subject must able be ably to be refereed back to my permanent possibility of being seen by the other Sartre say the physical presence of an other is not a prerequisite condition of the look. A slight movement of a curtain or the

86 Ibid., pp. 347-348.
87 Ibid., p.348.
88 Ibid., p. 233.
89 Ibid., p. 256.
creaking of a branch or removing a chair may create a situation, for me because of which I feel I am the object of a look. Sartre said my attitude... is... a pure mode of loosing myself in the world, of causing myself to be drunk in by things as ink is by a blotter.\textsuperscript{90} Sartre while I am peeping through the keyhole, I am fully by my spying activities.

That moment I am only a consciousness annihilating my being in itself. And this consciousness of mine is totally devoid of an I.\textsuperscript{91} My suddenly the footstep. Of another person change the situation. I feel that I can no longer remain as the same person by the interference of another 'I'. However this consciousness... Does not apprehend the person directly or as its object the person is presented to consciousness in so far as the person is an object for the other. This means that all of a sudden I am conscious of myself as escaping myself not in that I am the foundation of my own nothingness but in that I have my foundation outside myself. I am for myself only as I am a pure reference to the other.\textsuperscript{92} It is in the sense that I experience that I am an object for the other. The concept of shame we have discussed before. I am ashamed of my being as a subject with the sudden interference of others. I cost my freedom other is judging me. Sartre says shame of self; it is the recognition of the fact that I am indeed that object which the other is looking at and judging.\textsuperscript{93} Sartre has never denied the concept of shame. He says I do not for an instant think of denying it; my shame is a confession later on he changed it into bad faith.

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., p.348.
\textsuperscript{91} Howells, Christina., The Cambridge Companion Sartrem Cambridge University press, 1942, p. 86.
\textsuperscript{92} Sartre, Jean-Paul. \textit{Being and Nothingness}. P.349.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., p. 350.
Bad faith like shame is a confession for Sartre\(^94\) shame reveals me in the made of being in itself. Sartre views towards the existence of others shows that he still retains the solipsistic position in his philosophy. Though he claims that he is not a solipsist, yet actually speaking 'Solipsism' is the true hallmark of Sartre's philosophy. He says one cannot deny the experience of shame. And this sentence presupposes according to Sartre, the existence of other is a necessary condition, for my experience of shame.

My original fall says Sartre, is the existence of the other, shame like pride is the apprehension of myself as a nature\(^95\).

"The look" of others alienates me from myself. Alienation of myself, Sartre says, which is the act of being looked that involves the alienation of the world, which I organize.\(^96\) My relation towards other can be judged by other's look Sartre says, the other is the hidden death of my possibilities ...\(^97\) Sartre says I can no longer seriously entertain the hypothesis that the other is nothing more than an object he says: Thus in the shock which seizes me when I apprehend the other's look, this happens that suddenly experience a subtle alienation of all my possibilities, which are now associated with objects of the world far from midst of the world.\(^98\)

The other in Sartre's view who is looking at me sees only my determinate characteristics while other's observing in this way, appear as an object

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\(^{94}\) Ibid., p.350.

\(^{95}\) Ibid., pp. 350-51.

\(^{96}\) Ibid., pp.352-53.

\(^{97}\) Ibid., p.354.

\(^{98}\) Ibid., p. 354.
inside the world rather than a free subject. Of course, I am still my possibilities…. But at the same time the look alienates them from me. 99

Others see my objective outside only. And because of others I feel myself as having a dimension of objectivity. It is under their circumstances that my awareness of my objectivity emerges. 100 Sartre has described other's look on the level of cogito. He says, we have only made explicit the meaning of those subjective reactions to other's look which are fear (the feeling of being in danger before the other's freedom pride, or shame the feeling of being finally what I am but else where, over there for the other, the recognition of my slavery the feeling of the alienation of all my possibilities.

Describing the nature of others Sartre says other is one towards whom I do not turn my attention. He is the one who always looks at me, creates fear and shame inside me and whom I don't even give a look. He is the one who always gives direction, to my activities. In Sartre’s words ….. never as the object of my direction he is the concrete pole though out of reach of my flight, of the alienation of my possible yet lacks all communication with it. 102

From the above discussion of our concerned topic alienation, we have seen that Sartre has established a philosophy, a society where man live without interacting with his fellow being Others are there because of which alienation arise. Even the look of the other is not accepted by Sartre. In Sartre's philosophy there is no epistemology only ontology is there.

99 Ibid., p.263.
100 Schacht, Richar, Alienation, London: George Aller Cunwin Ltd. 1971, p.221.
101 Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness. op. cit., p.358.
102 Ibid., p.360.
Sartre says insofar as I experience myself as looked at, there is realized for me a trans-mendane presence of the other. The other looks at me not as he is in the midst of my world but as he comes toward the world and toward me from all his transcendence; when he looks at me, he is separated from me by no distance, by no object of the world- whether real arises by no body in the world, but by the sole fact of his nature as other. Thus, the appearance of the other’s look is not an appearance in the world neither in “Mine” nor in the other’s and the relation which unites me to the other cannot be a relation of exteriority inside the world. By the other’s look I effect the concrete proof that there is a beyond world. The other is present to me without any inter mediary as a transcendence which is not mine. But this presence is not mine. But this presence is not reciprocal…. As I am plunged by this look into the heart of a world complete with its distances and its instruments such is the other’s look when first I experience it as a look. 103

This passage clearly reveals that the existence of other presupposes things exists beyond the world. And it is the other which makes me recognise myself as an object. And it is through other I am able to know others subjectivity. To quote Sartre in experiencing the look, in experiencing myself as an unrevealed objectness I experience the in apprehensible subjectivity of the other directly and with my being. 104 Sartre say My freedom is restricted by the appearance of other. And it is again a freedom far others. Let us discuss this point how other fully realized their freedom making me has in a state of bondage. It is clear from Sartre’s example as discussed in being and nothingness. He says we will take two situations into consideration. One is, to remain at home because it is

103 Ibid., pp.361-362.
104 Ibid., pp. 361-362.
raining and another one is to remain at home because he is restricted to go out. For Sartre this two are not the samething. In the first case I determine myself to stay inside. Here I make myself an instrument of it. In the 2nd case my freedom is totally restricted by others which I dislike by restricting my freedom others are realizing their full freedom. To quote Sartre, Thus through the look I experience the other concretely as a free; conscious subject who causes there to be a world by temporizing himself toward his own possibilities. Sartre in his earlier writings has projected man who can live in isolation without having interaction with others.

Nauséa, 1936 (La Nusee) one of the most significant Novel of Sartre. The key to Nausea is to be found in the tile of the novel itself. The Latin word refers to sickness, to an indisposition provoked by movement and to the resulting discomfort, which lasted long as long as the movement continued.

The feeling of 'nausea does not means actual vomiting it is something which arises out of disgustedness. So many factors are responsible for developing this type feeling. Once something induced within us by an outside force, it gives us a disquieting experience. The experience of nausea also creates fear inside us. In Being and Nothingness Sartre writes: “The perpetual apprehension on the part of my for itself of an insipid taste which I cannot place, which accompanies me even in my efforts to get away from it, and which is my taste this is what

105 Ibid., p.362.
106 Ibid., p. 362.
108 Ibid., pp.36-37.
we have described elsewhere under the name of Nausea. A dull and inescapable nausea perpetually reveals my body to my consciousness.”

Roquentin in Nausea is a marginal figure which lives in a provincial French city called Bouville (Mud vill). Roquentin is writing a biography on Marquis de Rollbon. He lives alone in a rented room near a train station and has no friends except a former lower, Anny. He regards himself alienated from the society as well from his own past. His alienation is experience in nausea, and as he gradually withdraws from his surrounding and his former self the nausea becomes increasingly intense.” He described nausea as the normal state of his behaviour.

Roquentin feels nausea is something that comes to him from outside and slowly insinuates itself into him. It is a quality he first espies experience in thing. And this creates a subtle alienation. Roquentin feels that it is impossible to avoid things, which exists inside the world. The things around me restrict my freedom. Nausea Ships away from the things in order to stick to him: That sickly sweet disgust came from the pebble, I’m sure of that, it came into my hands from the pebble. Yes, that’s it, that’s certainly it: a kind of nausea in the hands.

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111 Ibid., p. 56.
112 Cf. B.N. “The thing, before all comparison, before all construction is that which is present to consciousness. (p.174) “It is in fact in terms of the being which is not that a being can make known to itself what it is not p.176… The upsurge of the for itself is not only the absolute event for the for itself. It is also something which happens to the in itself. (316).
Sartre's concept of others in *Being and Nothingness* is quite similar to Roquentin explanation of there. Roquentin feels others are their because of which it there on the wall, on my braces, every where around me. It is all of where around me. It is all of piece with the café; I'm in it.\(^{114}\)

Roquentin I cars that Nausea is nothing other than his discovery of the contingency of his existence when measured against the immobility of the physical morl's being. For him the physical world is fixed and undisturbed; he exists, undefined and dismayed... I under stood the Nausea. I possessed it ... contingency is what is essential what I mean is that, by definition, existence is not necessity. To exist is simply to be there.\(^{115}\)

In *enfane d un chef* (1939) Sartre gives a full portrait of consciousness which clearly sees the world in which it is going to live before it chooses to live in that world Lucian Feurier, the young protagonist of the story. He discovers that at each step others are there in one form or other.

Coming back to Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* we will see Other's look make an object. He says, "The Other's look the necessary condition of my objectivity is the destruction of all objectivity for me."\(^{116}\) It is the Other looks, which makes me alienated from myself. My natural tendency according to Sartre is to be repulsed by this alien me and to try to tear myself away from the relation to the other which reveals it to me, in an attempt to avoid acknowledging it. But as I choose myself as a tearing away from the other, I assume and recognize that as mine this alienated

\(^{114}\) Ibid., p. 34.

\(^{115}\) Ibid., p. 166.

me. Sartre said that if someone looks at me, I am conscious of being an object. But this consciousness can be produced only in and through the existence of the other. In this respect Hegel was right. However that other consciousness and that other freedom are never given to me; if they are they would he known and would therefore be an object, which would cause me to cease being an object.

A look of other makes me an object. And my consciousness is no longer there. It is produced by the existence of the other. My being for others is a fall through absolute emptiness towards objectivity. And this fall is alienation. Sartre writes being for others is constant fact if my human reality and I grasp it with its factual necessity in every thought, however slight, which I form concerning myself. The present to me every where as the one through whom become an object Hence I can indeed be mistaken concerning the empirical presence of an other as object whom I happen to encounter on my path.

Thus it is clear that the look gives us the idea of others existence. Let us examine the fundamental relation of me the other as described by Sartre said being for other is not an ontological structure of being for itself. We cannot define being for other from a being-for-itself. In Sartre’s own

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117 Ibid., p. 285.
118 Ibid., p. 412.
120 Ibid, p.363.
word. This is the fact that being far others is not an ontological structure of the for itself we cannot think of deriving being for others from a being for itself as one would derive in consequence from a principle, nor conversely can we think of deriving being for itself from being for others... Other's existence creates a fear inside me other's are looking at me, is a threatened to my existence because of which fear arise. Sartre therefore said fear is the discovery of my being as object on the occasion of the appearance of another object in my percept time field. Sartre's character has developed a similar kind of fear because of the existence of others. In his movement towards maturity, Lucien discovers the world of things: the tree kicked does not cry out in pain; the objects insulted do not insult back their silence is perhaps the worst insult. The things like the class in which he lives really don't exist. In another step he has discovered two modes of the other. One is his family and another inside the school factory etc. Others in two different situation. He says. There is the other as seen in his father's employees the other neutralized, held in control, dependent for his existence an the work which Lucien's father supplies; he is the other who greet you with respect and thus helps you to appreciate the security of your position. But Lucien said there exists another others which make my life problematic. And this type of other lucien meets of school and about whom he does not have the information. The students are the other as unpredictable mystery; they make Lucien uncomfortable because, among other things, they stare at him from behind and makes him aware of his body which was always existing on all sides at the same

I exist for myself, as a body known by the other is the third ontological dimension of my body.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., p. 373.}\]
3.4 Conclusion

In this chapter we discussed 'Sartre's concept of Alienation and his notion of Individual' in detail.

Here we observed that Sartre's philosophy is undeniably Cartesian. In a separate section on The Phenomenological Pursuit of Being, we discussed how Sartre was influenced both by the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger.

But finally our observation was that Sartre's notion of alienation is not an outcome of a particular social set up or due to exploitation, rather he argued alienation arises because of 'other's Look'.