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CHAPTER - 4

Concept of Freedom in Jean-Paul Sartre

4.1 INTRODUCTION:

In this chapter we will elucidate and critically examine the concept of freedom in the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980). Our study of Sartre will mainly concentrate on his central treatise *L'être le néant (Being & Nothingness 1943)* and sometimes also will discuss the essays and literary works of the same period. Here our exposition will be to critically examine Sartre’s concept of ‘freedom’ and how far he is succeeded in applying this concept in day today affairs of human life. As in our introduction we have said the aim and objectives of our research analysis is not just what the philosophers claims to do rather our aim is to show what he is actually doing. In our previous chapter we have seen Sartre has talked of ‘alienation’ which is something very personal or we may say subjective. In our opinion man is not just a subjective being (as Sartre has discussed), nor a social being (as Aristotle has discussed) rather man is a socio- concrete- historical being whose consciousness develops through interaction. Being a member of society, ‘man’ for Sartre, is always trying to be escaping from the society. For this his concept of ‘man’ turns to be only a subjective being. We have in our whole thesis has taken ‘man’ not just a socio-concrete-historical being rather as Prof. Suman Gupta says,
"man as a "Bio-socio-concrete- historical being". Thus, our aim in this chapter is to discuss how Sartre has developed the concept of "man" and "freedom" in his philosophy.

We will examine how far Sartre’s notion of freedom is applicable in day today human life. And we will also discuss how far the notion of 'responsibility' is a correct application of his freedom.

Different philosophers have interpreted concept of freedom in a different manner. The concept of freedom as developed by Sartre is different from Karl Marx. We will discuss this issue in our fifth chapter.

The basic question involves in “freedom” is does freedom and causation stands apart or is freedom an appreciation of causal necessity’. The answer to the first question is in affirmative by Descartes and Kant with respect to their respective philosophies leads to dualism. And the answer to the second question in affirmative by Spinoza, Hegel and Marx with respect to their respective philosophical systems leads to dualism and implies monism’. Sartre’s notion of freedom incorporates mental side of Cartesian dualism.

Being and Nothingness of Sartre is the most troubled texts which is generally considered to be the greatest philosophical work of Sartre. Dominick LaCapra describes, “...I think also one of Sartre’s most troubled texts, a veritable textual jungle (it might even be read as a philosophical
systematization of a paranoid Schizophrenic world view)."\(^1\) The entire discussion of Sartre center's on the concept "freedom". Freedom plays a very prominent role not only in his earlier writing but also his later writings. Describing the theory of freedom, Sartre once says, "this theory is the only one that gives man dignity, the only one that does reduced him to an object."\(^2\) For Sartre, not only man is "completely free"\(^3\), free regardless of all physical and external situation. We are always free to constitute the reality in several different ways. Man is absolutely a free being in the Philosophy of Sartre. The notion of "freedom" developed by Sartre is uncommon one, which is not possible. But it fits well with his philosophy, which is based on an ontological enquiry. In our previous chapter we have discussed how Sartre's subtitles "An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology" of his book Being and Nothingness is reduced from the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger. For Sartre, there is no epistemological enquiry rather he has given importance to ontological inquiry is there. This helps him to establish 'man as a conscious being'.

Before going to analyse his concept of freedom in more detailed manner we would like to discuss his views on "consciousness" and "nothingness".

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In our next section 4.2, we will discuss the role of consciousness, as described by Sartre in his book *Being & Nothingness*.

### 4.2 THE ROLE OF CONSCIOUSNESS (BEING FOR-IFSELF)

Sartre begins his philosophical career as a phenomenologist. He is influenced by Husserl’s ‘Phenomenological Method’. In the *Transcendence of the Ego*, 1936 Sartre has accepted Husserl’s view, i.e., consciousness is always and only “consciousness of something”. He also believes that consciousness is *intentional*. Sartre Says: “Reality... is absolutely speaking, nothing at all... is only intentional, only known....”-if by “reality” is meant by “being”. In this essay he reconsiders the very idea of phenomenological reduction that leaves us with an irreducible self or ego at the basis of consciousness Sartre has eliminated the *(transcendental)* ego from phenomenology; however he does not reject the notion of consciousness. He is influenced by the philosophy of Heidegger more than Husserl. Following Heidegger, Sartre reflects Husserl’s ‘epoche’ or ‘reduction’. He believes inside the ‘consciousness’ nothing exists. Even the self doesn’t exist at the core of consciousness. For Sartre, self and consciousness are totally different from one another. The existence of self

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can be found in another world or objects but not inside the consciousness. Sartre believes, as Robert C. Solomon describes, "The Transcendence of the Ego' means that Ego is never given in consciousness (as Descartes, locke and Husserl believe) Sartre, like Merleau Ponty (1908-1961) argues that consciousness is first of all a perceiving, feeling, motile consciousness." Consciousness for Sartre is pre-reflective in nature. Here we would like to draw a distinction between pre-reflective and reflective consciousness taking into account Descartes 'Cogito' and Sartre's 'existence'. In the next section 4.2.1 we will analyse the nature of Sartre's pre-reflective consciousness. We will also see how this consciousness has developed by Sartre in his essay 'The Transcendence of the Ego' and Psychology of Imagination

4.2.1 Distinction between Pre-Reflective and Reflective Consciousness

The introduction to Being and Nothingness has put importance on the Ontological primacy of pre-reflective 'Cogito'. Sartre in his philosophy has made a distinction between being- for- itself and being- in- itself. Whereas, being for itself is the consciousness being is nothing but the reflection of pre-reflective Cogito. On the other hand being is itself which is a determined is the condition of all reflection. Being for itself is

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identified as "the being of the pre-reflective Cogito" and *Elebnis.* Consciousness, for Sartre, is pre-reflective in nature. Sartre's example of running for a street car shows my consciousness in not of myself but only of 'streetcar to be overtaken. There is no 'I' in pre-reflective consciousness and Sartre utterly rejects the need for a transcendental self to give meaning to our experiences. In a similar way Merleau Ponty argues: "In so far as I am a consciousness, that is, in so far as something has meaning for me, I am neither here nor there, neither Peter nor Paul; I am in no way distinguishable from an "other" consciousness. 'Consciousness for Sartre, is one thing and 'self' is another thing. In this connection we will discuss Sartre's rejection of Cartesian 'cogito', and in the section bad-faith we will discuss Sartre's rejection of Freudian notion of "unconsciousness".

Sartre, unlike Camu, Merleau Ponty has accepted metaphysical dualism of consciousness and the world. He has retained Cartesian dualism in his philosophy. Sartre distinguishes his 'Phenomenological Ontology into two modes of being, which he calls being-for-itself and being-in-itself. Being-for-itself which is consciousness has no determinants. It is a free being. Being-in-itself is completely determined being stands, for the things in the world. Like Descartes, for-itself and in-itself of Sartre are two

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7 Ibid., p.95.
independent realities. In this way Sartre has retained the dualism of
Descartes in his philosophy.

Sartre further differentiates between pre-reflective and reflective
consciousness. Robert Richmond Ellis describes, “Sartre’s pre-reflective
consciousness is positional consciousness of an object and non-positional
consciousness of itself. While ‘pre-reflective consciousness’ makes no
attempt to posit it self as an object, ‘reflective consciousness’ on the other
hand attempts to posit itself as an object.” 8 Describing the nature of pre-
reflective consciousness Sartre writes:

“Thus in what we shall call the world of the immediate, which delivers
itself to our unreflective consciousness, we don’t first appear to
ourselves, to be thrown subsequently into our enterprises. Our being is
immediately “in situation”; that is, it arises in enterprises and knows
itself first insofar as it is reflected in those enterprises. We discover
ourselves then in a world peopled with demands in the heart of projects
“in the course of realization.” I write, I am going to smoke. I have an
appointment this evening with Pierre. I must not forget to really to
Simon.” 9

Sartre’s notion of freedom, nothingness, are based on his theory of
pre-reflective consciousness.

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8 Ellis, Robert Richamond, The Tragic Pursuit of Being. Tuscaloosa and London; The
University of Alabama press, 1988, p.11.
9 Sartre Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness. 1943 op. cit., p.39.
Sartre believes that it is on this level of reflective consciousness we will find Cartesian "Cogito". Sartre rejects Cartesian "Cogito" by saying that instead of "I think therefore, I am" we can say "I exist therefore I am", consciousness is not reflective rather it is pre-reflective in nature. Hazel E. Barnes has described that the consciousness of Sartre is different from Descartes "Cogito". Whereas Sartre has considered consciousness as 'pre-reflective', Descartes calls it as 'reflective'. In Being and Nothingness, Hazel E. Barnes describes Sartre's rejection of Cartesian 'cogito' which is as follows:

Most important is Sartre's rejection of the primary of the Cartesian 'cogito'. He objects that in Descartes' formula- "I think; therefore I am"- the consciousness which says "I am," is not actually the consciousness which thinks, instead we are dealing with a secondary activity. Similarly, says Sartre, Descartes has confused spontaneous doubt which is a consciousness, with methodological doubt, which is an act. (P-104). When we catch a glimpse of an object, there may be doubting consciousness of the object as uncertain. But Descartes 'cogito' has posited this consciousness itself as an object; the Cartesian 'cogito' is not one with the doubting consciousness but has reflected upon it. In other words this is not Descartes doubting; it is Descartes reflecting upon the doubting. "I doubt; therefore I am" is really "I am aware that I doubt; therefore I am". The Cartesian cogito is reflective, and its object is not itself but the original
consciousness which doubted is now reflected on by the cogito but was never itself reflective; its only object is the object which it is conscious of as doubtful. These conclusions lead Sartre to establish the pre-reflective cogito as the primary consciousness, and in all of his later work he makes this his original point of departure.”

This long passage of Sartre clearly recalls his entire philosophical thought. For him, Descartes' reflective consciousness posits an object inside. Thinking, believing, knowing and willing are the attributes given to deserts cogito. Sartre has separated subject from the object. Sartre denies the self to be posited as an object. Sartre says, “The very nature of consciousness is such that for it to be and to know itself are one and the same (p.112). Consciousness of an object is consciousness of being consciousness of an object.” Thus by nature all consciousness is self-consciousness, but by this Sartre does not mean that the self is necessarily posited as an object. Sartre says, “When I am aware of a chair, I am non-reflectively conscious of my awareness. But when I deliberately think of my awareness this is a totally new act of consciousness and here only am I explicitly posting my awareness or myself as an object of reflection. The

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11 Ibid., pp.xi-xii
pre-reflective cogito is a non-positional self-consciousness." While pre-reflective consciousness makes an attempt to posit itself as an object, a "self-consciousness" (Conscience non-positionale (de) soi does exist.) Sartre on the other hand describes, "Theitic or positional self-consciousness is conscience de soi in which consciousness deliberately reflects upon its own acts. Posits itself as an object". Far Sartre, Cartesian cogito belongs to this category where self necessarily, posited as an object. Sartre says to posit consciousness as an object we require another consciousness, and to know another consciousness we require another consciousness and this process will create an infinite regress (idea, ideae etc.) which is absurd. Thus, Sartre says, "to the necessity of ontologically establishing consciousness we would add a new necessity: that of establishing it epistemologically. Are we obliged after all to introduce the law of this dyad into consciousness? Consciousness of self is not dual. If we wish to avoid an infinite regress, there must be an immediate, non-cognitive relation of the self to itself."

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12 Sartre in his book Being and Nothingness 1943, place the proposition "de" (of) between Parentheses so as not make the self as an object of consciousness or in other words to show that there is no separation positing of the self as an object of consciousness. 1992, op. cit., p.xii.
13 Ibid., p.xii.
14 Ibid., p. 12.
15 Loc. Cit.
Let us analyse Sartre’s concept of self-consciousness in a detailed manner. Sartre faces similar difficulties in describing the relation between self-consciousness and the ego. He has rejected epistemological basis in order to know the consciousness as it is. For him ontology is more important. He affirms that it is not knowledge which grounds knowledge, but being. Phyllis Berdt Kenevan describes, "Our own existence is the foundation of our self-consciousness, as the brute existence of the world is the foundation of our knowledge of the world. This awareness of existence which is the foundation for any knowledge, is itself non-cognitive awareness. Thus in the case of the self, our self-conceptual..."16

Consciousness of Sartre is purely free from cognitive ground. Sartre in our opinion made a distinction between knowledge and consciousness. He makes it clear that all consciousness is not knowledge. He says only that consciousness, which posits itself as an object, fulfils the requirement of knowledge. Sartre’s concept of knowledge is purely based on intuition. It is nothing but reflective consciousness for Cartesian cogito. My non-cognitive awareness helps me to know my existence, which is pre-reflective apprehension of myself.

This position of Sartre helps him to accept Husserlian notion i.e., "All consciousness is consciousness of something. This means there is no

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consciousness, which is not a positing of a transcendent object, or if you prefer, that consciousness has no "Content". It also helps Sartre to depart himself from Husserl's view or bracketing existence. Whereas Husserl equates the being of phenomenon with its essence or meaning Sartre argues that the being of phenomenon is own existence. That is what we mean by Sartre said, 'Existence precedes essence'. When we said consciousness is consciousness of something that means, "Consciousness is intentional and directive, pointing to transcendent object other than itself." Therefore, the pre-reflective consciousness of Sartre implies two things i.e., consciousness is intentional, or pre-reflective, consciousness is non-personal.

Sartre says that neither ego is in consciousness nor Ego is material. Sartre is also not fully discarded the existence of Ego in his philosophy. He says, "The Ego is not in consciousness, which is utterly transcendent, but in the world, and like the world, it is the object of consciousness. This is not of course, to say that Ego is material but only that it is not a subject, which is in some sense, manipulates or directs consciousness. Strictly

18 Ibid., p. xii.
19 Non-Personal in the sense that there is never Ego-Consciousness but only consciousness of the Ego.
speaking we should never say "my consciousness" but rather consciousness of me..."20

In the Transcendence of Ego as well as in Being and Nothingness Sartre presents a radical view of consciousness. He says, "This absolute consciousness when is purified of the I, no longer has anything of the subject."21 By pushing Ego on the side of the world, Sartre has successfully avoids solipsism. Describing the nature of pre-reflective consciousness, Sartre says, "Suppose I am counting the cigarettes. This property appears to my consciousness as existing in the world. It is very possible that I have no positional consciousness of counting them.... Yet at the moment when these cigarettes are revealed to me as a dozen, I have a non-theitic consciousness of my adding activity, If any one questioned me, indeed, if any one should ask, "What are you doing there"? I should reply at once "I am counting". This reply aims at not only at the instantaneous consciousness which I can achieve by reflection by at those fleeting consciousness which have passed without being reflected-on, those which are forever not reflected on in my immediate. Thus reflection has no kind of primary over the consciousness reflected on. It is not reflection, which reveals the consciousness reflected-on to itself. Quite the contrary, it is the

20 Ibid., p.xii.

non-reflective consciousness which renders the reflection possible; there is a pre-reflection possible; there is a *pre-reflective cogito* which is the condition of the Cartesian cogito".  

Sartre claims that we can describe consciousness in terms of "nothingness". It is not what it is. This means consciousness is "no thing". It is not what it is. It is not identical with what it was in the past nor yet what it will be in the future. The nature of consciousness, for Sartre, is such that it is *impersonal* in nature. We can say impersonal in two senses. *In the first sense consciousness is devoid of Ego, me, and I as subject. In the second sense, the intentional nature consciousness shows it always posits something other than itself.* As we know that Sartre as rejection of Husserl begin with his denial of the existence of a 'transcendental Ego'. Edmund Husserl as we have discussed in our previous chapter, is the founder of the phenomenological movement. The existentialists philosophy evolved out of Husserl's philosophy. Husserl believes that Transcendental Ego is an innate or subject which besides in all consciousness activity. We can not separate consciousness from its ego. The 'I' is reflecting upon the structuring of our experience.

Wilfrid Desan criticizes Sartre's repudiation of the Ego on the ground that there must be an authentic ulterior reflector, one should observe all

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22 Sartre, Jean-Paul., *Being and Nothingness*, op. cit., p.13.
happenings in consciousness. He says, Sartre's seven hundred pages of phenomenological description are a result of his own constant, permanent and inquisitive reflection.... That he has been able to expose his views and to tell us that.... there is no Ego! His Ego was present all the time?"

Sartre's radical view of consciousness in our opinion deny the possibility of any kind of structural self for Sartre Ego is something different from consciousness. He writes.

".... the Ego is an object apprehended, but also an object constituted, by reflective consciousness. The Ego is a virtual locus of unity, and consciousness constitutes it in a direction contrary to that actually taken by the production; really consciousness are first; through these are constituted states; and then through the latter the ego is constituted."23 The essential role of ego, far Sartre, is to hide from consciousness its own spontaneity. According to Phillis Berdt Kneven from the psychological point of view Ego appears to be a reality. But from the ontological point of view, Sartre speaks of Ego as an impure and unreal product of consciousness.

In our discussion, we have seen, Sartre's interpretation of 'Ego' is something different from his consciousness. Sartre is of the opinion that there is no Ego 'in' or behind consciousness; the subject is simply

consciousness itself. Sartre says that "Subject is not relative to experience, but it is this experience."\textsuperscript{24} Consciousness is no longer the object is Kant's meaning of the term, it is subjectively itself, the immense of self in self.

Describing the nature of consciousness Sartre says that "All is therefore clear and Lucid in consciousness; the object with its characteristic opacity is before consciousness, but consciousness is purely and simply consciousness of being consciousness of that object. This is the law of its existence."\textsuperscript{25}

This passage reveals Sartre's doctrine of the \textit{translucency} of consciousness. The translucency of translucence nature of consciousness is also accepted by of Mearleau Ponty. Sartre writes, a conscious state must be entirely translucent or transparent to itself; it cannot be hidden from itself and no further state can reveal it. To describe the doctrine of the translucency of consciousness as developed by Sartre is as follows.

"The type of existence of consciousness is to be conscious of itself... All is therefore clear and lucid in consciousness...it is all lightness, all translucence."\textsuperscript{26}

\begin{flushright}
24 Sartre Jean-Paul, \textit{Being and Nothingness}, op.cit., p. LXVII.
26 Ibid., pp.40-42.
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"Every conscious existence exists as consciousness of existing." 27

"In the final analysis, consciousness is defined by the possession of an object of thought or by transparence to itself." 28

"The being of consciousness consist in appearing to itself." 29

In section III of the introduction to Being and Nothingness, Sartre further elaborates his conception of consciousness. His main objective is to show that consciousness is translucent. And that translucent consciousness is itself the subject of awareness, and that consciousness does not have a further subject with determinate structure.

Sartre argues that awareness of object is possible rather than having a positional knowledge self-knowledge is a central problem for Sartre. That is why Cartesian 'cogito' is philosophical confusion for Sartre. Sartre agrees with Husserl that an account of knowledge must include what Sartre calls 'the transphenomenal being of the subject'. This means the existence of the subject depends on the itself not its being something other than itself. In this sense subject is conceived as more than a 'mere' phenomenon. And

27 Ibid., pp. 13.
28 Ibid., pp. 16.
this subject must be conscious. He believes that consciousness must be consciousness of knowing he says that:

"However, the necessary and sufficient condition for a knowing consciousness to be knowledge of its object, that is it be consciousness of itself as being that knowledge. This is a necessary condition for my consciousness were not consciousness of being consciousness of the table, it would then be consciousness of that table without consciousness of being so. In other words, it would be a consciousness ignorant of itself, unconscious-which is absurd. This is a sufficient condition, for my being conscious of being conscious of that table suffices infect for me to be conscious of it." 30

In Sartre's philosophy consciousness is related to itself but this relation is not something that is based on knowledge rather it is something which is said to be non-cognitive.

Consciousness is an immediate non-cognitive relation of the self to itself. Sartre has rejected the knowledge as the criterion of truth. Sartre has made objection to this account. Russell, Keat, Michael Hammonmd, etc. have described the objections of Sartre in three ways which is as follows. First since knowledge is always a relation between a knowing subject and

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30 Sartre Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness, p. XXVIII.
an object known, to construe consciousness of knowing as knowledge of knowing would be a split to consciousness into a knowing consciousness and a known consciousness Sartre objects to this split or 'duality' into consciousness. He also objects to the opacity, which this world introduces since the known consciousness would be an object of knowledge, and as such opaque to the knower. This objection depends on Sartre's general view that objects of knowledge are opaque.31

Sartre's objection to the account of consciousness of knowing as knowledge of knowing is that it would render an incomplete account of knowledge.

The original aim of Sartre is to give an account of the subject of knowledge and if we devide that subject into knower and know, we will get an account of the know subject The subject will lacks an account of knowing subject.

Third, Sartre argues that to require of the knowing consciousness is to accept infinite regress if all knowledge requires that one knows that one knows it, then that condition will apply also be one's knowledge that one knows and so infinitely many states if knowledge will be required for ex., in order to know that there is a table in front of one, and so one. Sartre

31 Keat, Russell, Michael Hammond and Jahe Howarth, Understanding Phenomenology. P.106.
takes this to be a reduction ad absurdum of the view that the kind of self-consciousness required by a knower is self-knowledge. All these three objections are raised in the following passage of Sartre.

“The reduction of consciousness to knowledge is in fact involves our introducing into consciousness the subject-object dualism which is typical of knowledge. (First objection). But if we accept the law of knower and known dyad, then a third term will be necessary in order for the knower to become known in turn, we will be faced with this dilemma: Either we stop at any one term of the series – the known, the knower known, the knower known by the knower, etc. In this case the totality of the phenomena fall into the unknown; that is me always bump up against a non-self-conscious reflection and a final term (2nd objection) or else we affirm the necessity of an infinite regress (idea, ideae, ideae etc.) which is absurd (3rd objection). 32

Our exposition shows that Sartre in his philosophy has rejected knowledge as the ground of consciousness. It is ontology rather than epistemology is the subject matter of Sartre’s philosophical inquiry. He has separated ontology from the epistemology appearance from essence, subject from object and possibility from actuality. Here we would like to say that our methodological approach says that we cannot separate ontology from its epistemology, subject from object. These are

32 Ibid., P.XXVIII.
interconnected are we may say intrinsically related i.e. "The basic assumption of our work is that any consistent philosophical system language, meaning ontology, epistemology and metrology are intrinsically related. This assumption also includes that any interpretation of language, meaning and truth is an outcome of a pre-conceived conception of ontology, epistemology and methodology. Thus, we can Sartre's philosophy, in our opinion has misinterpreted the knowledge which is the basis of consciousness. We cannot talk of self awareness without taking into epistemology consideration.

Sartre in his philosophy has given sole importance to pre-reflective consciousness. He says, "The first condition for all reflection is a pre-reflective cogito. This cogito to be sure does not posit an object; it remains within consciousness. But it is nonetheless homologous with the reflective cogito. Since it appears as the first necessity for the non-reflective consciousness to be seen by itself." He further says, "Pre reflective consciousness is self-consciousness."

Mearleau Ponty has described Descartes cogito is a merely verbal cogiot." Mearleau Ponty in his book Phenomenology of Perception

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33 Ibid., p.91.
34 Ibid., p. 93.
describes, "Behind the spoken (reflective) cogito, the one which is converted into discourse and into essential truth, there lies a facit cogito, myself experienced by myself... The facit Cogito, the presence of oneself to oneself, being no less than existence, is anterior to any philosophy, and knows itself only in those extreme situations in which it is under threat; for ex., in the dread of death, or of another's gaze upon me... this silent consciousness grasps itself only as generalized "I think" in the face of a confused world to be thought about... The facit Cogito is a Cogito only when it has found expression for itself." 36 Mearleau Ponty further said...

"Stop defining consciousness by knowledge of self and.... Introduce the notion of a life of consciousness, which goes beyond its explicit knowledge of itself. But something further... (Would be) necessary to describe the structures of action and knowledge in which consciousness is engaged." 37

Sartre like Mearleau Ponty has said that I abandon the primacy of knowledge". 38 Sartre has talked of every thing interms of pre-reflective consciousness. According to Robert C. Solomon says one of the greatest difficulties, in understanding the details of Sartre's theory of consciousness, however, is the enormous complexity of his description of

36 Ibid. 403-404.
37 Ibid.,410.
38 Sartre Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness, op.cit., p.LXVI.
the relation between pre reflective and reflective consciousness. In the
Transcendence of the Ego, it often sounds as if there are literally two
consciousness being described." 39 In his book The Transcendence of Ego
he describes.

"My reflecting (reflective) consciousness does not take itself for an
object when I reflect the cogitos what it affirms concerns the reflected (pre
reflective) consciousness." 40 In Being and Nothingness, it seems he is
talking of two consciousness one of which takes the other as an object.
Sartre writes.

"The reflecting (reflective) consciousness posits the consciousness
reflected on (pre-reflective) as its object. In the act of reflecting 1 pass
judgement on the consciousness reflected on; I am ashamed of it; I am
proud of it...." 41

Sartre in his entire philosophy has never discussed this term so
clearly. Robert C. Solomon has given a similar kind of opinion regarding
Sartre's consciousness. Solomon describes, in Sartre's ontology, it never
does became clear to what extent we are to think literally of two
consciousness, to what extent we are to think of two "Modes" of one

40 Sartre Jean-Paul, The Transcendence of the Ego, op.cit., p.44.
41 Sartre Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness, op.cit. P.LXII.
consciousness, and to what extent there is simply one consciousness both of self and object."42

Sartre believes that knowledge is essentially reflective in nature (only reflective consciousness constitutes knowledge). Pre-reflective consciousness simply is self-consciousness Sartre says.

"Consciousness of itself is not dual."43 Every conscious existence exists as consciousness of existing we understand now why the first consciousness of consciousness is non-positional, it is because it is and with the consciousness of which it is conscious."44 He further says, "This self-consciousness we ought to consider not as a new consciousness, but as the only mode of existence which is possible for a consciousness of something."45

From the above discussion of Sartre's consciousness we have seen Sartre has accepted the nature of consciousness as pre-reflective. It is intentional in nature. Consciousness of Sartre also involves individual self awareness. But it is something, which is different from ego. For Sartre Pour-Soi (for-itself) is a conscious being which is absolutely free. Self or ego is something that is absents in the pre-reflective conscious. If this is the

43 Sartre, J.P., Being & Nothingness. op. cit., p. Lxii
44 Ibid., pp. Lxii-Lxiv
45 Ibid., p. Lxiv
case, the question will naturally arise how can there be self-consciousness in any sense? Immediate self-awareness which Sartre believes to be the defining characteristics of consciousness. This is clear from Sartre’s example of counting the number of cigarettes.

Sartre says that there is a difference between engaging in the act of counting and reflecting on that activity. For Sartre some sort of self-consciously performing some activity, it shows that his consciousness is very much involved in his activity. It is not clear from Sartre’s discussion how non-theitic is self-consciousness. This example of Sartre reveals the fundamental nature of consciousness. Consciousness is nothing more than self-awareness. Consciousness of Sartre, is purely empty, nothing resides inside it. Sartre says that

"Consciousness has nothing substantial, it is pure ‘appearance’ in the sense to that it exists only to the degree which it appears.... It is total emptiness (since the entire world is outside of it)..."\(^{46}\)

Our finding of Sartre’s consciousness shows some of inadequacies. This is true that consciousness has a dominant role in human life but not in isolation as Sartre has talked up. The body, the other, the objects is equally as important as having the consciousness. How can we talk of consciousness without having a body. It is true that Sartre has not rejected

\(^{46}\) Ibid., p. XXXII.
the existence of body. It is also true that he has given sole importance to consciousness, which is pre-reflective. Here we can talk Marx’s view about the consciousness i.e. it is not the consciousness which determine our social existence rather our social existence which determines our consciousness. To have the consciousness is not important rather the importance lies in its application. Sartre’s man is a pure conscious being, can live in an isolated state.

Sartre’s distinction between reflective and pre-reflective consciousness is also not very much clear. The very basis of Sartre’s philosophy lies in describing the nature of pre-reflective consciousness. His views on ‘freedom’ and ‘nothingness’ are also related with pre-reflective consciousness.

Freedom exists in the pre-reflective level. It is on the basis of freedom that Sartre has made a distinction between being-in-itself and being-for-itself.

The being of consciousness is called being for itself and the being of object is the being in itself. Their former is a free being while the latter is a determined being.

We have already discussed the nature of being in itself in our third chapter. So we will not discussing it here. Consciousness or being for itself in Sartre’s philosophy is characterized, paradoxically, as not being what it
is and being. What it is not. Consciousness in Sartre’s philosophy is itself nothing. Consciousness determines itself. However it means that it cannot be characterize as objects are characterized.

“The being of consciousness does not coincide with itself in a full equivalence.”

Being-for-itself is not what it is it cannot be determined by what it is.

CONCIOUSNESS AS NOTHINGNESS

In this section we will discuss Sartre’s concept of nothingness. We will also discuss how far he is justified in claiming consciousness as nothingness. For Sartre, for itself or consciousness is nothingness. This means that consciousness is not an object. Nothingness ‘haunts’ being it lies coiled in the heart of being, like a worm.

Sartre in his Being and Nothingness says that we can reverse Spinoza’s statement by saying “every negation is determination. This means that being is prior to nothingness and establishes the ground for it. By this we must understand not only that being has a logical precedence over nothingness but also that it is from being that nothingness desires concretely its efficacy. This is what we

47 Ibid., P. 93.
48 Ibid., p.90.
49 Ibid., p.49.
50 Ibid., p.21.
mean when we say that for Sartre, inorder to conceive nothingness we do
not require being. But nothingness gets its being from being. Sartre says
that, non-being exists only on the surface of being.” 51 The concept
nihilation is closely associated with nothingness and nothing. Sartre's
nothingness is different from the ordinary use of the term nothing.
Nihilation in Sartre’s philosophy is an activity of consciousness. And it is
responsible for the existence of nothingness 'in the world'. In a similar way
consciousness is responsible for producing nothingness. Therefore
consciousness is said to be nothingness. Sartre describes the originator of
non-being as.

“The being by which nothingness arrives in the world, must nihilate
nothingness in its Being….. It must be its own nothingness.”52

In the Essays on the Imagination, of Sartre, nihilation refers to the
reflective knowledge of the unreality object. In Being and Nothingness, we
find that is prereflective consciousness which is responsible for the
ihilation of objects. Nothingness as Sartre writes, is a species of. Being
when I enter into the café to search for Pierre, there is former a synthetic
organization of all the object in the cafes, on the ground of which pierre is

51 Ibid., p.49.
52 Ibid., p.23.
given as about to appear, This organization of the café as the grown is an original nihilation.

‘Nihilation Sartre has used for human conscious activity. The nature of ‘negative factor’ is clear from Sartre’s classic example of Pierre’s absence from the café. I have entered into the café to see whether Pierre’s is there or not. It is in its own right a fullness of being, with its customer’s furniture, smoky atmosphere, and noise but Pierre is not there. In his analysis of this care Sartre relies, heavily on a distinction between ‘forme’ and ‘fond’, roughly equivalent to the English expressions ‘figure’ and ‘ground’. The café is the ground against which the figure of pierre would stand out if he were there I am not interested in the café as such, only in Pierre, by contrast with whom the café is regated as an object of interest, becomes nothingness. But as things stand Pierre is negated too; by his absence –he is also nothingness.”53 Pierre raising himself as nothingness on the ground of the nihilation of the café. Sartre writes:

So that what is offered to intuition is a flickering of nothingness it is nothingness (heart) of the ground, whose nihilation calls for demands the appearance of the figure and it is the figure, through which nothingess slips as a nothing. (rien to the surface of the ground). It serves as

53 Ibid.,
foundation for the judgement a Pierre is not here. "It is in fact the intuituve apprehension of a double nihilation."\(^{54}\)

This passage of Sartre clearly reveals Sartre view on nothingness. He believes that we are not only conscious of presence of objects in our world; we are also conscious of their absence. To analyse Sartre's example we will find the absence of Pierre may also be an object for me. If walk into a café looking for peter, I do not only see the tables, chairs, glasses and other people (but not peter), in fact that may be the defining 'object' in my environment, that object to which my attention is totally devoted. Similar is the case when I am expecting a friend to come to my house, or waiting for a phone call or a bus. Here two things arises in my mind. I am not only conscious about the presence of the door, the telephone the bus etc. but also conscious about the failure of the telephone, lack of the knock on the door, and absence of the bus etc. Nothingness, the lack or absence of something rather than the presence of something, is definitive of my situation. Sartre calls this experiences as experiences of our environment as inhabited by nothingness.

Sartre has given equal importance to consciousness, nothingness and freedom in his earlier writings. These three terms are intrinsically related or we may say inseparable from one another. These three things are logically

\(^{54}\) Ibid., p.42.
follows from one another we can not talk if nothingness without being conscious of it. So far Sartre consciousness can be interpreted as consciousness of nothingness. Ascribing the primacy of ontology Sartre writes:

"Consciousness cannot produce a negation except in the form of consciousness of negation."\textsuperscript{55}

We cannot say that "Being and Nothingness" are two kinds of being on equal ontological footing. Hegel for ex., has argued that "Being and non-being are logically contemporary. Hegel writes that (Being and nothingness are empty abstractions, and the one is as empty as the other. Heidegger in a similar way (what is metaphysics") has similarly defended an ontologically independent nothing ( das Nichts nichtet Sartre insists that.

"Non-being exists only on the surface of being."\textsuperscript{56} "Emptiness is emptiness something."\textsuperscript{57} Nothingness for Sartre is an object of experience that is produced by conscious activity of nihilation Sartre's philosophy is the application of two things. First is a radical application of the principle of intentionality, whereby consciousness is defined as consciousness of something. And also consciousness is defined as uniquely related to an object, which is formally other than consciousness.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., p. 544
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., p.33.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., p.48.
Second, is the application of consciousness as nothingness. Sartre coins the world “Nihilation” neantisation of this object term.

Sartre has discussed the intentional nature of consciousness and nothingness (nihitation) in his book The Psychology of Imagination. This book has published in the year 1940. In this book Sartre describes, the imagination is not a faculty of mind but the consciousness itself. Consciousness in intending the world as unreal, as a nothingness. Hence, we can speak of imaging consciousness not a mental substance. The basic features of imaging consciousness are negativity possibility and lack. Later on, Sartre has extend this thing to consciousness in general.

According to Thomas R. Flynn, Sartre establishes a close relationship between ‘imaging consciousness’ and ‘freedom’ in a move from phenomenological description to Kantian regressive argument, typical of his general method.58 Thomas R. Flynn, when he asks, “what must a consciousness be inorder for it to possess the power to imagine.”59 The reply to the question as Sartre writes is that consciousness must be able to posit the world in its synthetic totality” (an anticipation of what he will term” posit the world as nothingness meant in relation to the image.60 Sartre calls these action as constitution and nihilation (neantisation). He

60 Ibid., pp.239-40.
further says that it is therefore enough to be able to posit reality as a
synthetic whole in order to posit oneself as free from it; and this going
beyond de'passement is freedom itself. Since it could not happen if
consciousness were not free. Thus to posit the world as world or to nihilate
it is one and the something. Sartre says that man can imaging because he is
transcendentally free. 61 Thomas. R. Flynn describes Sartre notion of
freedom in three distinctive ways i.e. world constituting world nihilating
and world surpassing. At the most basic level therefore, man’s freedom
consists in his “nature” as world constituting world nihilating and62 in
Being and nothingness, Sartre describes consciousness and freedom as
equivalent. There is no difference he urges between the being of man and
his being free. To understand existentialist freedom we must consider these
world constituting surpassing, nihilating activities of consciousness as
developed in being and nothingness. These three equivalent and mutually
implicative terms for Sartre in the sense of world constituting.63 Sartre’s
consciousness is noetically free. That means we are free and responsible
for our action.

In this sense Sartre claims we are responsible for our world, for our
birth. This is 'condemned to be free,' which we will discuss later on world

61 Ibid., p.243.
63 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, op.cit., p.25.
surpassing activity describes consciousness is transcendentally free. It transcends depasse whatever condition facticity may consecutive its situation.

World nihilating activities constitutes of three thing i.e. interrogative consciousness, the pre-reflective cogito, and temporality.

The first denotes the ability to question our world and the freedom which such a posture implies.

The 2nd nihilation pre-reflective consciousness cogito refers to our immediate experience of the world as well as to that implicit self awareness which is a necessary condition for explicit consciousness of anything.

Sartre designates that implicit self awareness by the preposition of in parentheses. Thus explicit or thetic consciousness of anything entails implicit or non-theitic consciousness of self. The third primordial nihilation of consciousness freedom is temporality. Sartre accepts Heidegger's distinction between quantitative clocktime and the ekstatic temporality or lived time that constitutes the very existence of human reality. Man exists or literally "stands out from his self in each of three temporal dimensions: the past as facticity or no longer, the future as possibility or not yet and the present as presence to but not identity with self. and world identity with self and world.
Finally, world-nihilating activities describes, consciousness is freedom of nihilation or non-self identity. It is the expression of the fundamental fact or Sartrean ontology namely, that the for-itself is the internal negation of the in itself. Hence it is the most basic form of ontological freedom: "nihilation is precisely the being of freedom." 64

But the question arise here where does nothingness come? Sartre also says. If nothingness can be conceived neither outside of being, nor in terms of being and if one the on the other hand since it is non-being, it cannot deceive from itself the necessary force to "nihilate itself," where does nothingness come from? 65 Sartre describing the origin of nothingness says nothingness does not mean the property of nihilating itself. Nothingness does not nihilate itself. Sartre claims that, "The being by which nothingness arrives in the world is a being such that is its being the nothingness of its being is in question. The being by which nothingness comes to the world must be its own nothingness." 66 Sartre has repeatedly has given insistence on the uniqueness of nothingness as a human experience. For him "Man is the being through which nothingness comes

64 Ibid., p.443.
65 Ibid., p.56
66 Ibid., p.56-57.
Sartre believes that freedom therefore nothing exists in pre-reflective consciousness and not with freedom.

In Sartre, the anguish & Bad faith discuss Sartre’s phenomenological description of freedom fall into two groups. The first involves descriptions of reflective consciousness of freedom which Sartre claims is anguish. The 2nd group in values pre-reflective consciousness. The conduct which Sartre describes is that of flight from anguish, bad faith.

The conduct which exemplifies anguish or reflective consciousness of freedom is that of putting to one self the question. “What shall I do next” what one discovers when one asks this question is lack or gap in one self, just as questioning the world can reveal a lack or non-being in the world. The lack revealed within oneself is a lack or non-being in the world. The lack revealed within oneself is a lack of anything which determines one's actions. Nothing in one’s pact or present, no character trait, reason, decision or promise, can actually force one to act in one way rather than another. One is that is to say freed. In excellent literary example of this is the character Mathieu in Sartre’s novel the Age of Reason. Mathiews wants to act on the basis of good reasons, justification, or at least overwhelming desire: but each time he questions whether such reason or desires are

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67 Ibid., p.59.
sufficiently compelling, the very act of questioning reveals their lack of power over his future.

Whenever he asks of a possible course of action whether this is something he must do, the fact that he has asked the question reveals that questioning presupposes that alternative courses of action are also possible for him.

In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre describes two kinds of anguish. The first is anguish in the face of the future.

In establishing a certain conduct as a possibility and precisely because it is my possibility, I am aware that nothing can compel me to adopt that conduct. Yet I am indeed already there in the future; it is for the sake of that being which I will be there at the furring of the path that I now exert all my strength, and in this sense there is already being and my present being. But nothingness has slipped into the heart of the relation I am not the self which I will be.  

The second, is anguish in the face of the past it is that of the gambler who has freely and sincerely decided not to gamble any more and who when he approaches the gambling table suddenly sees all his resolutions melt away... The resolutions is still me to the extent that I realize

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68 Ibid., p.31.
constantly my identity with myself across the temporal flux, but is no longer me-due to the fact that it has become an object for my consciousness. I am not subject to it, it fails in the mission which I have given it. The resolution is there still, I am it on the made of not being." 69

Concept of Freedom:

In this section we will develop and critically examine Sartre’s notion of freedom. Freedom as we know cannot be talked without ‘ethics’. Therefore, we will be whether there is any ethics in the writings of Sartre or not. At the end of his book Being and nothingness Sartre has promised to write a book an ethics which he never did several questions has been raised by the philosophers regarding his views on ethics.

Sartre writes: “All these questions which refer us to a pure and not an accessory reflection, can find their reply only on ethical plane. We shall decote to them a future work.” 70 Most of the critics of Sartre writes that his critique of dialectical Reason is based on ethical statements And others believe Sartre has never written a book on ethics.

After the publication of his book to Being and Nothingness Sartre has devoted most of the time in politics. That may be one of the reason that he does not get any time for ethical writing. For Sartre the conditions of the

69 Ibid., pp.32-33.
70 Ibid., p.798.
world is not suited for us, where we can develop a universal ethics. This may be the 2\textsuperscript{nd} reason in an interview published in the 1960's Le Monde, he says; "First all men must be able to become men by the improvement of their conditions of existence, so that a universal morality can be created. Risieri Frondizi describes Sartre's phrase, "the improvement of the conditions of existence is very vague. No matter how much we do we shall always be confronted by conditions that could be improved. Where might we find that satisfying point at which we may rest from our labors long enough to create a universal morality.\textsuperscript{71}

In our opinion Sartre has developed subjectivist approach in his philosophy when where 'I' and my 'consciousness' only exist. It is because of his irrational attitude he has not taken ethics into consideration.

It has been frequently used by many of Sartre's critics (Heneri Lefebure, Georg, Sartre's conception of consciousness as outlined in Being and Nothingness seems to lack the required passivity to explain any social involvement..\textsuperscript{72}


\textsuperscript{72} Criticism against Sartre has developed by the philosophers like George Lukacs, Heneri Lefurc and Roger Garaudy. This has taken from Ravidra M.Singh's Article, "Is there a break in xxi, no. 4, Oct., 1994, pp. 279-280.
Risieri Frondizi writes, it seems strange that a philosopher like Sartre, who has of man, should prefers to need a particular type of situation before we can develop a universal morality.

The problem is different if what he means to say is that it is not worth while to develop one’s time to moral speculation when the situation is so bad; it is morally better to delight time and energy to changing conditions rather than to speculate about them. But such a judgement would be more appropriate to Sartre the human being than to Sartre the philosopher. For the philosopher, no matter how bad reality is, the stranger the need to develop proper models for change.”

In our opinion, the fundamental reason, for the failure, of Sartre’s ethics lies his individualistic approach in being & nothing and his involvement in politics in his later writings.

Hazel. E. Barnes in his book an existentialist ethics has described Sartre’s latter work to be ethical. He says, in the late fifties I tried to show that the connection between Sartre’s fictional examination of ethical choices and his ontology was closer than most critics more writing to admit. Contradicting his position he says, ‘Sartre himself has stated flatly

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that he no longer has any interest in writing an ethics. More than that, Sartre apparently believes that the project of working out a formal ethics is an irrelevance, an escapism, if not downright impossibility. 75

Simone de Beauvoir, in her autobiography says, Sartre arrives at this conclusion in 1950. Quoting from Sartre’s unpublished not she say that Sartre has given up the idea of formulating his own philosophical ethics” because he was convinced that “The ethical attitude appears when technological and social conditions render positive conduct impossible. Ethics is a collection of idealist devices to help you live the life which poverty of resources and lack of techniques impose upon you.” 76

For whatever reason, Sartre has not written an ethics, an ethical theory as present in his description of man in the final section of his book Being and nothingness. In the section entitle “Ethical implications,” he rightly points out that “Ontology itself cannot formulate ethical theories, and we cannot possibly derive imperatives from ontology’s indicatives.” He further adds: “It does, however allow us to catch a glimpse of what sort of ethics will assumes its responsibilities when confronted with a he man reality in situation.” 77

75 Ibid., p. 29.
76 Cf. Simone de Beauvoir, La Force des Choses, Translated by Hazel: E.Barnes.
77 Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness”, op. cit., p.795.
We will find 'consciousness' is at the beginning of his philosophy. And that consciousness which is nothingness is the middle of philosophy. And his description end with an abstract freedom which is end with an abstract freedom which is free from all sorts of objective as well as moral values. That's why his philosophy has been criticized, as Risieri Fondizi has mentioned by the traditional thinkers. Neither is it for those who believe in the existence of fixed objective values and moral principles nor far those who lacks the imagination and courage to push a head and invent on their own, daring in their inventions to discover new principles and values.'

The only thing which alive in Sartre’s philosophy is his views on freedom”. We can start Sartre’s philosophy by saying that, a philosophy whose entire query is based on the “absolute freedom”. Sartre writes, “Not only is man” completely free”, free “regardless of circumstances, regardless of time or place,” but as consequence of his freedom, man has unlimited responsibility: “I am profoundly responsible for the war as if I had myself declared it”, we says, and “I must be without remorse or regret as I am without excuse.”. To Jules Roman’s statement that “In war there are no innocent victims, Sartre adds we have the war we deserve. As if this

78 Ibid., p.641.
were not enough, Sartre continues: "Someone will say 'I did not ask to be born.' This is a naive way of throwing greater emphasis in our facticity. I am responsible for everything in fact, except for my very responsible. Everything happens as if I were completed to responsible in a certain sense I choose being born."80

Before giving our opinion regarding Sartre’s freedom we would like to analyse Dagfinn I llesdall’s view on Sartre’s concept freedom. Dagfin F llesdal claims that Sartre’s concept of freedom has nothing to with common people and their observation. Defending Sartre he says that the concept ‘choose’ used by Sartre is something psychological which people always misinterpret. He has used the concept choice in two sense. A choice may be something that implies action; to choose to do a is to do a, it is said. But a choice may also be internal psychological event. One may choose to do, but do something quite different, perhaps because one discovers that one is notable to do a. According to this interpretation Degfinn F I llesdall is says, Sartre does not mean that we are free to do whatever we might choose to do; he means only that our choice, as psychological event is free.”81

We are not agree with this position of Dogfinn F I llesdall. First thing, is that his view that Sartre’s freedom has nothing to deal with

commonplace observation? What does it mean for Sartre, freedom means of an particular individual (isolated being) what will happen to his freedom if it is not freedom of each and every individual what is the use of having such freedom? 2\textsuperscript{nd} thing is that Sartre in his philosophy does not have make any distinction between 'choice' and 'choice'. Sartre believes that to choose not to choose. This issue we will discuss latter on. Thomas R. Flynn describes, the oppressive freedom which haunts the characters in Sartre's novels, plays, and short stories of the late thirties and forties finds its theoretical justification in his phenomenological writings of the freedom. From his first significant philosophical publication, The transcendence of the Ego to the extended description of being and nothingness. Sartre proceeds to empty consciousness of whatever might resemble Cartesian substance transcendental subject, or inner it content of any kind.\textsuperscript{82} Sartre in his book being and nothingness of chapter one has described the concept of freedom. He starts with the idea of freedom as the first condition of action\textsuperscript{83}. His concept of freedom projects two things. The first is a radical application of the principle of intentionality where consciousness is defined as uniquely relational to an object which is formally other than consciousness. 2\textsuperscript{nd} is the specific action of consciousness as an activity of mihilation niantisation of the object term Sartre has illustrated there

\textsuperscript{82} Flynn, Thomas R., Marxist Existentialism. op. cit., pp.4-5.

\textsuperscript{83} Jean-Paul, Sartre, Being & Nothingness, 1992., op.cit.,559.
imagined two things in his book. The psychology of imagination published in 1940.

In his book psychology of imagination Sartre considers perception and imagination are the two greater irreducible attitudes of consciousness."

Perception refers to perceive or to observe the physical as well as external objects by allowing specific sensory contents to inhabit consciousness. Imagination does not play any role of observing something. In that case we can say imagination is quari-observational, ” that means to induce a sense of observing when the person is not observing at all.

Imagination as Sartre considers, is not a facility of mind rather it is consciousness which intends the world in a specific way indeed the act of imagining is characterized by negativity, possibility and lack features which Sartre will later extend to consciousness in general. Imagining is not merely of flippant mental posture that can be adopt gratuitously, on the contrary Sartre conceives it as “an essential and transcendental condition of consciousness.”

One cannot imagine without having consciousness and vice versa. In Sartre's opinion to begin with imagination the consciousness needs to be free or to say that imagination is the freedom. Imagining is consciousness

84 Flynn, Thomas R., Marxist Existentialism, op.cit., pp.4-5.
as of whole in so far as it realizes its freedom.\(^{86}\) As long as we are imagining a thing we are free. It has a free movement in relation to the world. It is the nihilating character of imagination which is crucial to consciousness. Sartre describe consciousness must be able to posit the world in its synthetic totality we believe it is totalization as used by Sartre in the critique of dialectical Reason and to posit the world as nothingness in relation to its image.\(^{87}\) Sartre believes when we imagine we nihilate the world. Imagination projects their object in image form (image i.e, to say, as not being. To exist in the form of an image is precisely not to be; it is lack to the theistic character of empirical reality that is perceived by objects. Therefore, for Sartre, images are characterized by a distinctive nothingness a nothingness of being heart of enter. In imagination we are immediately and pre-reflectively aware of this nothingness. Thus to posit the world as world or to nihilate. It is one and the something.\(^{88}\)

Sartre links Husserlian world constitution and Heideggerian transcendence depassement with his own nihilation to reveal the nature of imagining consciousness. Sartre claims, man can imagine because he is transcendentally free.\(^{89}\)

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\(^{86}\) Ibid., p.240.
\(^{87}\) Ibid., pp. 239-240.
\(^{88}\) Ibid., p.240.
\(^{89}\) Ibid., p.243.
In being and nothingness Sartre brings that freedom consciousness and nothingness into full equivalence. He urges, There is no difference between the being of man and his being free.\textsuperscript{90} Sartre analysis this concept by saying that: “.... An action is on principle intentional negligence caused the explosion of a powder magazine has not acted. On the other hand the worker who is engaged with a dynamiting a quarry and who obeys the given orders has acted when he has produced the expected explosion; he know what he was doing, or if you prefer he intentionally realized a conscious object.\textsuperscript{91}

It is true that human being cannot exist without action. By giving importance to action Sartre has created a new era in the philosophy which Marx has done long before by giving importance, to human activity in the form of human labour. These basic difference between Marx’s theory of action (Marx has not used the word action, but human labor and Sartre’s theory of action. Marx has talking of human activity taking into whole society into consideration. It is through human action man can able to transform the nature as well as objective material reality. Where as Sartre action is based on the action of particular individual who is having consciousness (Sartre has given importance to action with relation to its

\textsuperscript{90} Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness, op.cit., p.25.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., p.559.
consciousness). Being for itself is an active being where as being in itself is in active. In our opinion in itself is in active Separation of being for itself from being in itself is a major draw back in Sartre’s philosophy.

In our opinion Sartre has taken a wrong step by saying every action is intentional in nature and it is very difficult to find out whether an action is intention or not. If we take Sartre’s example of careless smoker we will see that the careless smoker is as much responsible the explosion of powder Magazine as the worker who is change with dynamiting quarry neither we can say smoker is intentional nor we can say it is not an act. Because in our ordinary life things are happening which is absolutely free from intention.

In Sartres terminology, the being of consciousness, the being for itself and doing are one and the something. Action and doing can never be determined by any external things. Any reflection on human action delimits its national urge. Sartre has described action interms of motive. He says, in every action some sort of motive is there. Sartre says, No factual state whatever it may be (the political and economy structure of society, the psychological state etc.) is capably by itself of motivating any act, whatsoever, For an act is a projection of the for. Itself toward what it not, and what is can no in no way determine consciousness to apprehend it as a
negotiate or as a lack. The miserable light of a worker cannot provoke him to be a rebel until he visualizes a state where present misery would be lacking. Under no circumstance, past can able to produce an action. An action to be performed we need a nihilating consciousness. In this context Sartre writes:

"In fact as soon as one attributes to consciousness this negative power with respect to the world and itself, as soon as the nihilation forms an as soon as the nihilation forms an integral part of the positing of an end we must recognize that the indispensable and fundamental condition of all action is the freedom of the acting being."

Sartre we cannot think of an action without its cause or motive. "To speak of an act without a cause Sartre thinks, is to speak of an act which would lack the intentional structure of every act."

To analyze this view of Sartre we will see that he has given emphasis on action with relation to its intention or motive or cause. To have a cause is to have the experience of cause as such. In our claim this a radical claim of Sartre about consciousness when he argues the consciousness constitutes the very motivating power of motives or in other

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92 Ibid., p.562.
93 Ibid., p.563
94 Ibid., pp.564-65.
words his claiming of consciousness as intentional. Sartre concept of freedom is centers on a particular individual who for his selfish interest can do any thing he likes. In our opinion, Hobbes concept can be fits for Sartre’s concept of freedom i.e “Man is by nature selfish, egoist and brutish. Through out his earlier writing Sartre has developed a individualistic notion of freedom who can go to. For ex. Take the fight which has been going in the Kargil sector or NATO Kasovo problem. The freedom as talked by Sartre, had it been applicable for the soldiers of their country they could have easily left the war. Does the soldiers are absolutely free. It does he action intentional or he is not acting like the careless smoker? Does he responsible for his action? If not what is the factor responsible which forced him to do war which no one likes? In what context Sartre concept of freedom is fit into its.

Sartre will say that it is the decision of the soldier that he has to joined it the army. And when he is fighting his action is also intentional.

In our opinion neither the soldier is absolutely free nor his action is intentional nor he want war to be conducted Sartre’s concept of freedom cannot be fit into the present day society where a particular section of the people using other sections for their selfish interest. Of course it is true that a particular section of the people always for their interest using others as means. Here power plays a very important role. Here we would like to
highlight some thing of Marx.. Karl Marx is the person in our opinion, who has done a great work for the workers community. Though he has given an instance of worker class we will find this class hierarchy everywhere. He is the person who influence to other people to fight for their rights. In this case we can appreciate his concept of freedom which he derive from Hegel i.e. freedom is the appreciation of basic necessities. Proceeding our discussion on Sartre we will see, that for Sartre the freedom of ‘I’ is very important. Sartre’s ontological freedom is based on the idea of ‘I’ and my consciousness exists. In the words of Sartre: “To be sure, I could not describe a freedom which could be common to both the other and myself; I could not therefore contemplate an essence of freedom. On the contrary, it is freedom which is the foundation of all essences since man reveals intramundane essences by surpassing world toward his own possibilities. But actually the question is of freedom. Similarly when I described consciousness, I could not discuss a nature common to certain individual but only my particular consciousness, which like my freedom is beyond essences, or as we have shown with considerable repetition for which to be is to have been. 95

The Sartre, the being which is what it is cannot be free. Only the being which is paradoxically defined as “being what it is not and not being

95 Ibid., p.568.
what it is\textsuperscript{96} can be free for itself without in itself is an abstraction but the far itself cannot be reduced\textsuperscript{97} to the in itself, otherwise it will not be free. The human reality, to be free, must necessarily what it is not otherwise it will not be free Sartre says, when we say we are conscious about of my causes which inspire my action that means that causes are are already transcendent objects which exists outside. Sartre writes, "I escape them by my very existence. I am condemned to exist forever beyond my essence, beyond the causes and motives of my I am condemned to be free. This means that no limits to my freedom can be found except the freedom itself, or if you prefer, that we are not free to cease being free. To the extent that the for itself wishes to hide its own nothingness from itself an toi incorporate the in itself as its true made of being, it is trying also to hide its freedom from itself.\textsuperscript{98}

To elucidate Sartre’s concept of freedom we will see that freedom is one of the most important aspects of its consciousness. Man, for Sartre, is basically a free being. Determination is not a inherent quality of human reality. Rather human reality refuses to accept their freedom Sartre says,

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., p.28.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., p.790.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., p.567.
Human reality may be defined as a being such that in its being its freedom is at stake because human reality perpetually tries to refuse to recognize its freedom.\textsuperscript{99} This shows the self-consistent being in itself cannot experience freedom. As long an man is under the survey of being in itself he cannot be free.

Sartre writes. Human reality is free because it is not enough. It is free because it is perpetually wrenched away from itself and because it has been separated by a nothingness in the form of the reflection reflecting. Man is free because he is not himself but presence to himself. The being, which is what it, is cannot be free. Freedom is precisely the nothingness which is made to be the heart of man and which forces human reality to make itself instead of to be. As we have seen., for human reality to be is to choose oneself; nothing comes to it either from outside or accept... Thus freedom is not a being. It is the being of man i.e, his nothingness of being man cannot be sometimes slave and sometimes free; he is not wholly and forever free or he is not free at all.\textsuperscript{100}

Sartre insists that the individual self has a unique and extraordinary power which he calls absolute freedom. Human consciousness, for Sartre, is to free to choose anything he likes. Man can make himself by applying

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., p.568.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., p.569.
his choice and actions. If man as Sartre conceives is condemned to be free then he can not be abide by the values and norms of the society. He has to create himself by applying his free choices.

Sartre tells us that this 'absolute freedom and creates a irreducible and unavoidable sense of responsibility for our choices. Sartre writes:

"One must be conscious in order to choose and must choose inorder to be conscious choice and consciousness are one and the same thing.\textsuperscript{101} choice in Sartre's philosophy is the nihilation of in itself. Thus to analyse Sartre's concept of freedom we will find 'consciousness' is at the centre. Man irrespective of all circumstances is free to do whatever he likes to do. Freedom is the freedom of consciousness. Choice, action, intention, responsibility are the criterion to judge absolute freedom.

We are agree with Sartre's position that 'consciousness' plays a vital role in human life. But not the consciousness which Sartre is talking. How can we talk the concept "consciousness" in abstraction. The development of consciousness requires. For ex. A human child when born, we does not know anything. At that time neither he does not have the idea of consciousness, nothingness freedom nor he knows about his action and his choices. His consciousness develops first with the help of his family

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., p.462.
members then through society when his fellow beings exists. It is not the ontology which helps to develop our consciousness rather it is the epistemology plays a vital role. And so far the concept of “freedom” is concerned neither he talk it only in terms of for itself nor absolute sense. It is true that starting from animal to human being every one needs freedom. But not an imaginary freedom or freedom of the for itself. Sartre’s concept of freedom, therefore, is only a possibility which one can only imagine Sartre says, my consciousness is sufficient enough to take any kind of decision. Let us examine few of Sartre’s relevant quotations. In being and nothingness he writes... “...nothing absolutely nothing justifies me in adopting this or that particular value, this or that particular scale of values.”

He further adds: I do not have nor can I have recourse to any value against the fact that it is I who sustains values in being. Nothing can ensure me against myself, cut off from the world and from my essence by this nothingness which I am. I have to realize the meaning of the world and of my essence; I make my decision concerning them- without justification and without excuse.”

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102 Ibid., p.76
103 Ibid., p.104.
This attitude of Sartre we can found all through out his basic works. In his lecture entitled *L Existentialisme est un humanisme* (1946) Sartre describes: Man makes himself; he is not already made; he makes himself by choosing his morality... We define man in relation to his commitments; it is therefore absurd to reproach us for irresponsibility (gratuite) of choice... Every time a man chooses his commitment and project in all sincerity and lucidity, whatever his project may be, it is impossible to prefer another to it.\(^{104}\) The feeling of unjustifiability\(^{105}\) is an aspect of the famous Nausea which Sartre's Roquentin felt in the novel by that name.

One finds the Sanki attitude is several of his literary writings also, where he each man is responsible for his own action. Each man will describe their capabilities in their own way. I have my own law which I myself can make it in

Les Mouches, Orestes Says:

"I am condemned to have no law other than my own.... For I am a man and each man has to invent his own way. "\(^{106}\)In his 4\(^{th}\) volume, La Derniere Chance which exists only in fragmentary form, Sartre has described the inevitability of freedom and the role of man. The situation

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\(^{104}\) Sartre, Jean-Paul, *Existentialism and Humanism*, Trans. by P. Mairet, London". Methuen, 1965, p.50. Here the word which is a key world in Sartre's Ontology has translated by Mairet as a purpose."

\(^{105}\) Sartre, Jean-Paul, *Being and Nothingness*, op.cit., p.480.

\(^{106}\)
Sartre describes in one which the vacuum seems total since he is dealing with a concentration camp where men are not only no longer free to move about as they wish but where they are also responsible to kind of despair about the usefulness of freedom.

It is true that they are surrounded by barbed wire, guards are always there to watch in this situation an individual can reasonable believe that he is no longer free. Since he has already prisoned by the enemy he cannot flight against him. Sartre says, in this situation a person can move freely like all other “perfect movement, it not without risks. Prisoner of the war is equality free and also can act freely. He can always tries to escape from the since one is free, his freedom lies in death also. The essential revelation of the book as mentioned by Mc Mohan Joseph H; the inevitability of freedom for good or ill, freedom is man’s constant companion, not because he has chosen it, but because he can choose nothing else. Condemned to be free man may very well wonder what he has does to merit such a condemnation; whatever answer he turns up will result only from a free thinking process about freely defined choices. Yen Chen choice mentioned choice, in Sartre’s sense, does not mean the choice of human existence itself- when capital punishment is meted out, the prisoner can not choose not to be dead- but means the choice of a human way of existing. A

prisoner facing capital punishment does not cease to make his choices just
because the date of his death is approaching, he can make choices about his
way of dying: Looking upon death as going home or looking ghastly pole,
etc., that is to say a human being will not stop choosing his attitude toward
his environment in any situation. It is his choice of his way of existing that
brings meaning and value to his external world.¹⁰⁸

Sartre's concept of freedom has nothing to do with remaking the world.
It does not help to overcome alienation and realizing a personal aim.
Freedom is considered to be a gift of perpetual decision making and the
course of never escaping from that task. Similar is the case with Mathieu
the protagonist character of the novel La Nausea.¹⁰⁹ He should define
existence as the obligation to drink himself without being thirsty" Sartre
say about Mathieu, the professor of philosophy:

There would be neither right nor wrong unless he invented the... He
was free and alone, without help, without an excuse, condemned to decide
any possible recourse, condemned for ever to be free.

¹⁰⁸ Chen, Yajun, "Conception of freedom: Hegel, Sartre and Confucianism,
Phenomenological inquiry, A review of philosophical ideas and trends, Published by The
¹⁰⁹ Sartre, Jean-Paul, La Nausea
L'age d'raison Age;\textsuperscript{110} of reason centers on Mathieu's painstaking effort to find money for the abortion of his girl friend Marcelle. Abortion, for Sartre is an indifferent act. What is concerned in motive behind the act, for they have to do with individual intentions. This 'abortion' is an intention of Mathieu's consciousness. Which makes Mathieu to act freely.

By all means he wants to remain free.

The freedom he wants is one that will protect him from all other free acts. Hoping to be free he acts in a more restrictive situation. He acts like a thief. Late night, he comes to meet Marcelle. He accepts there conditions out of sexual urge. After sometime he is also growing tied of this affair which he wants to get rid of and shift to somebody else. This story of Sartre has a bad impact on society. Two things can reveal from the story. One is the selfish Mathieu is regardless of all circumstances is free to do anything he desires. On the other hand, Sartre, has projected Marcelle as a determined State where she cannot act freely nor does she can have any choice, motive, action or intention etc. (as Sartre has used all there concepts for freedom).

The action of Mathieu in our opinion is the act of Mathieu is non-sensical antirational. The greatest flaw lies in Sartre that while he is discussing the consciousness of a particular person he is for getting the

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid, p.38.
consciousness others person. Marcelle is also having a consciousness as that of Mathieu. So before taking any decision we have to take the opinion or interest of the other. In our opinion not only Sartre in this novel but also all through out his writings projected a similar figure like Mathieu.

MC Mohan Joseph H describes that the fundamental problem we see in their relationship which we have wet in all Sartre's character; they are free subjects in their own eyes but objects as subjects leads them to want to possess the object-other in order what has been lacking in whole philosophy as well as in all Sartrean characters is interaction, reciprocity, joint. Participation etc. In the purcioit of a common which they could attain as a free subject. We are concluding the discussion Sartre's novel age reason by quoting some thing about Mathieu.

"I Find it horrible that some one should try to create a duty between me and the things I like." 111

Mathieu does no feel guilty about his action. He says: "I'm not going to kill anyone. I am going to prevent an infant from being front. 112 It is obvious that he does not want to take the responsibility of the child as well as of Marcell. In replying angrily to Sarah (she is Gomz's wife) who

111 Ibid., pp.86-7
112 Ibid., p.49.
told Matthew not to about the child Mathieu says, he is doing nothing wrong nothing worse than those who allow their children to be born no one can predict what the child will be in future. He simply wants to prevent the birth of another consciousness. The destruction of the vase was an act of vengeance on the world of thing; the abortion will be an act of revenge on the others especially on those others who look upon him and his intention with disapproval. A similar kind of opinion is developed by Sartre in his book being and nothingness where he says... the recognition that it is impossible to posses an object involves for the for-itself a violent urge to destroy it. To destroy it to reabsorb in to myself. Destruction realizes appropriation perhaps more keenly than creation does.”

Our opinion shows the philosophy of existentialism shows that this his philosophy is much closer to pose modernism of Derrida where he has taken deconstruction instead of 'destruction'. Now we are going to discuss Sartre’s views on ‘facticity:

**FREEDOM AND FACTICITY: THE SITUATION**

A free act according to Sartre is not the product of deliberation. It purely depends on person’s subjective performance as it on person’s subjective performance as it is associated with for itself. Since my consciousness of freedom is identical consciousness of freedom is identical

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113 Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being & Nothingness, op.cit., p.
with the concept of existence, the end of the formed is necessarily the end of
the formed is necessarily the end of letter. To quote Sartre... no limits to
letter. To quote Sartre... no limits to my freedom can be found except
freedom itself... or... that we are not free to cease being free.\textsuperscript{114}

Freedom is the fundamental project of man. It is that in him which
makes all possibilities possible. Ramakant Sinari describes, taken in its
simplest form, it is identical with what Sartre calls the being which has to
be 'what it was in the light of what it will be.'\textsuperscript{115} Describing the nature of
freedom Sartre says.

Freedom is conceived only as the nihilation of a given and to the
extent that it is an internal negation and a consciousness, it participates in
the necessity which prescribes consciousness be consciousness of
something. In addition freedom is the freedom of choosing but not the
freedom of not choosing to choose. The result is that the choice is the
foundation of being chosen but not the foundation of choosing.\textsuperscript{116} It is
seemingly a contradiction that human reality is free not to choose because
it is absolutely free to choose Sartre to choose not to choose is again to
choose not to choose.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., p.44.
\textsuperscript{115} Sinari Ramakant., Reason in Existentialism, Bombay : Popular Prakashan, 1966,
p.133.
\textsuperscript{116} Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being & Nothingness, op.cit. p.619.
In Sartre’s philosophy the being for itself is free. Its nature is nothing but choice and nihilation Free from being to fixed what it is, the for itself is. free to choose what not. But having chosen what is not, it makes the for itself restricted, Tennyson Samraj describes.

And if one cannot but choose, and if every choice is towards what is not with the intent to change what then one cannot but be restricted through strictly terms of temporality and practicality. That is why the onto logical impossibility of the is and the is not of consciousness to exist like the is of the in itself must be understood in the context of practical possibility again in terms of temporality of the is and is not of consciousness to be as the for itself is which is to choose what is not and be what it is not which means instead of being what one is one is conscious of it.¹¹⁷ In our opinion Pennyson Samraj description shows there is a dialectical interaction between being in itself and being for itself. We cannot talk of being for itself without taking being in itself into consideration. Samraj says, the relationship between the is and the is not of consciousness in terms of onto logical and practical freedom reveal two interlinked aspects of human reality man is free to choose but when he does choose, man is restricted by his choice... Being restricted, therefore is the result of having chosen what

is not. Man is always restricted, therefore, is the result of having chosen what is not.\textsuperscript{118}

Neither the past nor the future can prevent human reality from being present to the in itself. To be present to something is to be present to presence. I am present to this room, my fellow being, my part, environment, world etc. It is rather through the presence of so many things, being in itself enters into my consciousness. The for itself necessary connection to the in itself, hence with the world and its own past is described by Sartre as facticity. It is allows us to say that the for itself is or exists The facticity of freedom is the fact that freedom is not able not to be free.

Consciousness is always free to constitute the world in a different ways, but is not free to constitute in any away what soever. If that is the case than there would be no fantasy dream or reality Sartre says, "If conceiving were sufficient to make a real, than I have been put into a world which is like a dream, where what is merely possible is not in any way different from what is real.\textsuperscript{119} Sartre’s ontological notion of freedom is based on situation. Man is always free within his situation Sartre claims, There is freedom only in a situation and there is situation only through

\textsuperscript{118}Ibid., p.385.
\textsuperscript{119}Ibid.,p.385
This is what he calls as the freedom in Sartrean sense limited or restricted only through situation and it can be absolute only through these limitation. Sartre has described the concept of freedom in terms of its autonomy, of choice. \footnote{Sartre, J.P., \textit{Being and Nothingness}, op.cit. p629.} To be free means it has its own foundation and it is the freedom, which would decide the existence of being. Sartre says we do not choose to be free. Freedom already exists. It is the inborn quality of man. We are just thrown into it. To quote Sartre: In fact we are a freedom which chooses, but we do not choose to be free. We are condemned to freedom, as we said earlier, thrown into freedom, or as Heidegger says, “abandoned”. And we can see that this abandonment has no other origin than the very existence of freedom. If, therefore, freedom is defined as the escape from the given, from fact then there is a fact of escape from fact. This is the facticity of freedom. \footnote{Sartre, Jean-Paul, \textit{Being and Nothingness}, op.cit. p.623.}

We have already discussed the concept of 'facticity' as developed by Sartre in our previous discussion. Now we are going to deal with his famous Maxims on which his entire philosophy is based. "Man is "condemned to be free" and "existence precedes essence." First, we will discuss man is condemned to be free that means"... We are left alone without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to

\footnote{Sartre, J.P., \textit{Being and Nothingness}, op.cit. p629.} \footnote{Ibid., p.627.} \footnote{Sartre, Jean-Paul, \textit{Being and Nothingness}, op.cit. p.623.}
be free. Condemned to be free. Condemned because he did not create himself. Yet is nevertheless at liberty. And from the moment he is thrown into the world he is responsible for everything he does.\textsuperscript{123}

Sartre has used the term condemn in our opinion 'I did not ask condemn' in our opinion 'I did not ask to be born'. It is something which is given to my and which makes me realize to be free. And because of this I am responsible for my action. That means to exist is to be free. Therefore, the ontological claim of Sartre's existence

To say 'existence precedes over essence that all this is to say one and the same thing... that man is free.'\textsuperscript{124} Sartre says, man, being free 'Carries the weight of the whole world on his shoulders (He) is the one by whom it happen that there is a world.... He is also the one who makes himself. ...It is the therefore nothing foreign has decided what we are therefore, for its self is condemned to be free Man is free to create situation for himself. The situation, which I experience as mine is hence, constituted by me, it has been chosen by me. Therefore, for Sartre nothing can limit my freedom except the freedom itself.


To analyse Sartre concept of freedom we will see an epistemological break has taken place. He has described all the concepts in terms of its ontology. But he has not mentioned how to know the idea of freedom alienation and consciousness. A proper understanding of the concepts requires that under a particular situation ontology, epistemology, logic, language and reality are intrinsically related. Therefore, in our opinion he has used the concept of freedom in an abstract sense.

Proceeding our discussion on Sartre's freedom in situation we will see that Sartre has described that even in the worst situation man is free to choose. Merleau-Ponty in his book Phenomenology of Perception writes:

Our freedom does not destroy our situation, but gears itself to it. Let us examine this position of example as Sartre has given most of his writings in a different way for ex. If I will decide to join for the military service. In that case first I have to fulfil the physical requirements and eligibility conditions which they require.

In his book Being and nothingness Sartre lisped five situations to prove the absoluteness of human freedom. These are my place, my past my environment, my fellow man, and my death we will discuss this issue very briefly.

My place is a point of reference for me. Being a special man I cannot live without a place. I have not created this place. I have not chosen
the place. Rather, I giving a place where my birth has taken place Sartre says... Although this actual place can have assigned to me by my freedom, This previous place refers me to one another, this to another, and soon to the pure contingency of my place, the place which is assigned to me by my birth. But this facticity, says Sartre, cannot determine my freedom. It is I who constitute my place. By my project, I make the place an obstacle or an aid for my freedom. It is my freedom which has given.

In his later wrings, Sartre's arresting concerning freedom through not fully changed jet is quite moderate. For example, in critique of dialectical reason (1960), he writes.

Neither do I see.... Necessity on this increasing construction of action which finally reduces the possibilities to a single one... if there had been only one possible way if this way exists and if it offers itself, it it opens itself, praxis conceives of itself as if it invents this way and for a good reason, for without praxis neither the possibilities nor the means would exist as such.

Sartre wishes to show that there room for freedom even in a world where everything is physically determined. (the sense theme is central in rant).

In his later years he is changed his views. In an interview in 1969, for ex. He says:
For the idea that I have never ceased developing is that, when all is said and done, one is always responsible for what becomes of one, even if one can do nothing more than accept this responsibility for I believe man can always do something out of that which he has become. This is the only limit I will draw for freedom: the small movement which makes of a totality conditioned social being someone who does not give back completely what which his conditioning has given him.\textsuperscript{125}

In his later writing Sartre is more concerned with political freedom. In a discussion in connection with a performance of the flies in Berlin, Sartre says that Our concrete goal which is highly actual and modern is to liberate man First, metaphysical liberation: to make him conscious that he is completely free and that he must fight against everything which contributes to limiting this freedom. Secondly, artistic liberation: to further the free man’s communication with other men through art.... To place them the communicants in one and the same atmosphere of freedom. Thirdly, political and social freedom: liberation of the oppressed and other men...

Man metaphysical liberation is a necessary condition, in Sartre’s view, which gives rise to political liberation. In an interview in 1946 Sartre

Says: To but what would it mean to liberate a man whose actions were
determined? If man were not free, it would not be worth moving a finger
for him.

Although in the Critique of Dialectical Reason Sartre claims himself
to be concerned with political freedom yet in our opinion he has retained
much of his original phenomenological existentialism position. In Being
and Nothingness Sartre has developed the concept like Consciousness ego.
Being and nothingness. In critique of Dialectical Reason he has developed
the concept like "totalization", Practice-inert, collectivities et.

Sartre still hopes for a philosophy of freedom. In search for a
method he says:

"As soon as there exists for every one a Margin of real freedom
beyond the production of life Marxism will have lived out its span freedom
will take its place. But we now have no means, no intellectual instrument
no concrete experience that allows us to conceive of this freedom or this
philosophy."^{126}

^{126} Sartre, Jean-Paul, Critique of Dialectical Reason, op.cit., p.32.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS

In this section we would like to discuss draw backs lies in Sartre's theory of freedom.

We have seen that the phenomenological existentialist philosophy of freedom which Sartre propounded in being and nothingness and in some of his plays and novels of the 1940s is full of inconsistencies and difficulties.

Absolute freedom is an abstract concept as developed by Sartre in his philosophy. Rixiere Frondizi criticises Sartres concept of freedom by saying that to begin with Sartre is either begging the question or indulging in circular logic where he assumes that man has no essence because he can feely change that course of his life at any time; and that because man makes himself by his own choices he has to be free. Sartre offers no proof whatsoever of man's freedom one finds in his works only flat assertion that man is absolutely free condemned to be free and so on.127

One should always keep in mind that when Sartre discussing freedom he is not concerned with free action in the sense of the ability-to obtain the end chosen, freedom, for him is nothing but the autonomy of choice.

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Sartre introduction of any passive structure into consciousness amounted to depriving Sartre's consciousness of its translucency and freedom a theory of consciousness that allowed habitualities to reside in consciousness amounted to committing act of bad faith. This leads to consciousness of its agonizing freedom. The in itself in Being and nothingness therefore had almost no signifying force of its own.

According Marx poster, freedom for Sartre is not an essence hiding behind the manifest structure of human reality. There a paradox seems to arise between Sartre's phenomenological description of human reality as free and the unfree made in which human reality inhabited its freedom.\(^{128}\)

Take for ex. Sartre's prisoner who is not free to get out of prison or a person who is locked inside the room cannot go out of his room Sartre examines similar situations to show that our limitation or obstacles spring from our own choice or decision to do something. I am not free to get into my home only if I previously have chosen to enter it; the limitation derives from my previous choice. Sartre's illustration specifically refers to climbing a Crag. All the difficulties in climbing disappear as soon as I decide not to climb. Sartre says:

“The choice, being identical with acting supposes a common cement of realization in order that the choice may be distinguished from the dream and the wish. Thus, we shall not say that a prisoner is always free to go out of prison, which would be absurd not that he is always free to long for release, which would lie an irrelevant truism, but that he is always free to try to escape (or get himself liberated).

In our opinion Sartre’s concept of freedom is too subjective and abstract. For Sartre, a person’s freedom only means that he can freely choice is attitude towards the external world within the circle of his subjectivity. Thus, one can be free even without keeping in touch with the external world. A similar position has been developed by Emmanuel Mounier. Emanuel movier pointed out:

Sartre’s type of freedom ultimately eschews dramatic appeal, since tely eschews dramatic appeal, since in the end, it never actually comes up against any restrictions. Actually, as far as outward observation which objectives the path taken by freedom is concerned, there is restriction only to the extent to which it is observed. But freedom which is given expression never really comes up against the obstruct, because it creates the obstacle itself, and it never comes up against ultimate limits, not even death, because it has within itself no means of overstepping them. Its
limitations are not placed upon it from outside but by a start of inherent flabbiness.

In Sartre’s view, man can live in isolation from the entire world and is equally responsible for whole his action. I bear the world responsibility without being able, whatever I do, to tear myself away from this responsibility for an instant. Of course, Sartre’s point has positive meaning, but since, he exaggerates the responsibility of individuals, freedom becomes a heavy load for the human being. It becomes difficult to say that the heart of Sartre’s conception of freedom is our looking forward and pursuing.

Even of we accept that man is condemned to freed, experience readily proves that different men, in different situations, exercise their freedom on different ways and at different degrees.

Freedom for Sartre as we have already discussed is purely a subjective and mental activity, which affects nor is affected by the objective reality.

The same waiter and the same woman if they do not pretend but are aware that they are “free”, would not be in “Bad faith”. Society, instead of being the workshop where human personality, given the right objective conditions can flower, is, an obstruction in individual’s freedom. Freedom for Sartre is purely mental. According to him the mere look of another
person who can see me as an object and can never catch my subjectivity alienates me from myself- my subjectivity and freedom. The mere presence of other deprives my freedom from myself. Sartre's ontological and epistemological position makes man an isolated being who can live in the society in isolation, which is logical, impossible. Sartre's concept of freedom is similar to Kant's freedom of will. Both for Kant and Sartre 'Freedom of will' is absolute, i.e., it is not constrained by the objective conditions.

Suman Gupta describes 'Sartre's man, like Kant's being divorced from all objective and subjective determinations is absolutely free to act. His analysis of freedom obliterates the distinction between freedom and bondage. The concept of freedom looses its meaning if it cannot be distinguished from what is unfree. If freedom is inalienable from human existence, then inspite of all oppression and exploitation no one is unfree. And if such a position is accepted then there is no point in launching a struggle to achieve freedom because man's existence according to Existentialism is identical with his freedom. A Risieri Frondizei describes an absolute, unrestricted freedom destroys the very meaning of moral values and norms. I leave aside the extreme cases of very small children, mentally retarded persons and other, who obviously have he actual autonomy of choice.” At what age and in what circumstances is a person able to choose. Sartre's doctrine seems to have been worked out with the
middle class European adult in mind. It certainly does not apply to millions of children and primitive peoples. What shall we do with them? Exclude them from ontology of man because they do not fit into the picture.

At last, our analysis of Sartre's concept of freedom will effectuate some of the basic Lacunas.

In our opinion Sartre's doctrine of freedom does not take into account the true conditions of millions of people who are victim of Saturation sickness, ignorance and socio-economy oppression. Neither, he has taken into account the soldiers who are fighting for the whole country. The soldier who is fighting for the whole country has sacrificed his freedom for the whole nation. He is not free to choose an action which he wants. His freedom is restricted by social necessities. Sartre's understanding of freedom is a metaphysical speculation. His doctrine of freedom has not taken into account the poorer class into consideration. For ex. Child labour. He has not talked of in what circumstance a person is free.

In deed, it is difficult to see how even Sartre reconcile the individualistic approach to freedom expounded in being & nothingness with the Socio-political commitment advanced in his Critique of Dialectical Reason. His whole theory of freedom in our, opinion like Derrida's theory of deconstruction is based on textual analysis which has
no practical applicability in day today human life. The separation of man from his fellow beings, existence from essence, freedom from necessities, subject from object shows in Sartre’s philosophy there is no connection between ontology, epistemology, logic, language and reality.

4.5 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we discussed Sartre’s notion of freedom in detail. We found that Sartre began his philosophical career as a phenomenologist.

Sartre’s views on freedom as we observed, were related with his views on self and consciousness. In this contest we discussed, Sartre’s views on pre-reflective consciousness. Sartre claimed, we could describe consciousness in terms of nothingness.

Finally, our observation was that Sartre’s conception of freedom was abstract, because his position was that “nihilation is precisely the being of freedom”.

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