Chapter Five

Injured Lion:
From Plebiscite Movement to Accord (1955-75)

After the dismissal and arrest of Shaikh Mohammad Abdullah on 9 August 1953, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was made the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. The accession of Bakshi marked the “beginning of Kashmir’s alienation” from India.¹ Since Bakshi lacked the kind of popular support which the Shaikh enjoyed, he had no alternative but to rely on India and consequently he was forced to strengthen the constitutional ties between Srinagar and New Delhi.² India too had no option but to support Bakshi fully.³ The Central Government fully cooperated with Kashmir Government and sent heavy financial aid to Bakshi, so that he could succeed in building public opinion in favour of India.

The State Government took welfare measures and the people of Kashmir witnessed the overall growth and development during this period.⁴ Even Shaikh Abdullah accepted that there was development during Bakshi’s reign.⁵ However, India did not succeed in diverting the attention of the people from its demands for “political concessions by emphasising on economic growth and welfare,”⁶ because the people in the absence of the Shaikh⁷ were not ready to cooperate with the Bakshi⁸ to whom they considered as “Delhi’s man” in Kashmir.⁹ At the same time Bakshi tried to “purchase the colleagues of Shaikh and other influential people by offering them money and positions.” It is worth to quote Sanna-ullah Bhat: “Whoever was to be purchased with money was won over, whoever was to be won over by suitable posts,

³ The arrest of Shaikh Abdullah had put a question mark over the Kashmir’s accession to India, because India had claimed that accession was final as it had the support of Shaikh Abdullah, the popular leader of Kashmir.
⁴ Education was made free up to university level, subsidy was given on rice, roads were constructed; Banihal tunnel was constructed to improve the road links between the Valley and Jammu and the rest of India; work on power projects was started etc. See Ajit Bhattaraju, ‘Kashmir The Wounded Valley’, New Delhi, 1994, p. 207. Also, Mir Qasim, My Life and Times, New Delhi, 1992, pp. 70-1.
⁸ Mir Qasim, op. cit., p. 71.
⁹ N.C. Behera, op cit., p. 114.
they were offered to them and those who rejected both money and posts were imprisoned.” The motive was to isolate Shaikh Abdullah from his political following. It was under this consideration that Mirza Afzal Beg was released in November, 1954. As is evident from the letter of Jawaharlal Nehru which he wrote to Bakshi; “I am glad that he (Afzal Beg) is no longer with Shaikh Sahib. I do not particularly like Shaikh Sahib being surrounded by some people who must have influenced him all the time in a wrong “direction”. However, Beg remained loyal to Shaikh and acted as the representative of Shaikh among the people during his absence.

Since the National Conference had come under the control of the Bakshi group, the Shaikh group thought in terms of founding a new organisation and the new organisation they founded came to be known as “Plebiscite Front”. The Plebiscite Front or Plebiscite Movement or Tahrik-i-Rai-Shumari was launched on 9 August, 1955 by Mirza Afzal Beg, the lieutenant of Shaikh, with the main objective to struggle for the attainment of the “right of self-determination to decide the future of Jammu and Kashmir.” The era of Plebiscite Front politics (1955-1975) “signalled phase of withdrawal from Indian system and the emergence of a formidable challenge to the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir with the Indian union.”

Although Shaikh Abdullah was in prison he fully supported the Plebiscite Movement. In fact from his memoir it becomes clear that the Plebiscite Front was formed after a

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13 Shaikh Abdullah, op. cit., p. 662.
14 Ibid.
15 Exactly after two years of Shaikh Abdullah’s arrest and dismissal. From here 9th August came to be observed as a black day. Ironically they demanded plebiscite and said that accession was not permanent, but observed 9th August as black day and not 27th October when the accession took place. According to B.N. Mullik, they were “frustrated with the loss of power and their main aim was to get power and raised the slogan of plebiscite to gain the support of the people.” B.N. Mullik, My Years With Nehru, New Delhi, 1971, p. 76.
17 The Plebiscite Front declared that the accession was conditional and temporary and Kashmir was a disputed territory and its future could be decided by its people through the right of self-determination. Gul Mohammad Wani, Kashmir Politics: Problems and Prospects, New Delhi, (1999), p. 66.
consultation with Shaikh. However, it remains a mystery that Shaikh never joined the Plebiscite Front. The branches of the Plebiscite Front were opened all over the Valley. Thus a good platform was provided to the followers of the Shaikh and the pro-Pakistan elements, who fully used this platform in making people conscious about the right of self-determination and created an anti-India feeling among them.

In no time the Plebiscite Movement became the mass movement and “a symbol of the people’s opposition to the Bakshi Government.” At this juncture, the State and the Central Governments reached to an understanding—Bakshi was allowed by Delhi to run “unrepresentative, unaccountable government in Srinagar in return for facilitating IJK’s (East Kashmir’s) integration with India on New Delhi’s terms.” In consequence of this a number of Indian laws were extended and made applicable to Jammu and Kashmir. The first came in the form of the President of India Proclamation Order 1954 by which besides other things, the emergency powers of the President of India and Provisions of the Constitution of India regarding Citizenship, and Fundamental Rights (with restrictions) were made applicable to Jammu and Kashmir. The others included the extension to the State of the jurisdiction of the ‘Comptroller and Auditorial General (vide Presidential Order of 1958), of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court including its power to grant special leave to appeal against the decisions of Jammu and Kashmir High Court, appointment and conditions of the judges of the State High Court and review election petitions (vide Presidential Order of 1960). In 1958 the State Legislative Assembly gave its “concurrence after due consultation with New Delhi, to the deployment of Indian staff from outside IJK (East Kashmir) in IJK’s (East Kashmir’s) administration.” Three decades later, in 1989, when the militancy started; “out of 22 senior level officers in

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18 Shaikh Abdullah, op. cit., p. 662.
19 B.N. Mullik, op. cit., p.198. The main reason behind this, says Ajit Bhattacharjea, was that it was Shaikh who had supported the accession to India in 1947. Ajit Bhattacharjea, Kashmir the Wounded Valley UBSPD, (1994), p. 208. If he headed the Front, “he would lose all support he had in India” and also he did not want that others could exploit his name. Times of India, Sep. 28, 1955.
20 For its organisational structure see Asifa Jan, op. cit., pp. 96-8.
23 M.Y. Saraf, op. cit., p. 1228.
24 Mir Qasim, op. cit., p. 90.
27 B. Puri op. cit., p. 152.
the IJK (East Kashmir) branch of India's professional civil service, only 5 were Kashmiri-speaking Muslims, and were mostly filled by Pandits, although Muslims constitute 65 per cent (70 per cent) of the population." Bakshi had no problem in bringing Kashmir more closer to India, if he could get "maximum financial assistance for the State with a (good) percentage for family." These developments suggest that Shaikh was arrested to bring Kashmir in total integration with the Indian union. "Abdullah for part," affirms Peer Giyas-ud-Din, "was always zealous of this special status so long as he continued to be at the helm of affairs in the State. As a matter of fact, it was after the dismissal that many of the privileges which the State enjoyed under the constitution were taken away." Thus, with these developments, the beginning of the end of special status of Jammu and Kashmir started in February 1954, the "Kashmir Constituent Assembly" declared the accession to India "final and legal". On November 17, 1956, the "one-party Kashmir Constituent Assembly" approved and adopted a new constitution, which declared the State of Jammu and Kashmir as an "integral part of India." Shaikh Abdullah from the prison protested against these developments. In a letter to Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, Shaikh Abdullah questioned the competence of the Constituent Assembly to finalise the State's Constitution, since after his removal from office in 1953, the Assembly had "completely forfeited the confidence of the electorate." The Constituent Assembly was "extremely dubious body and could not claim to represent the will of the people." Shaikh Abdullah considered the Constituent Assembly illegal and that the existing government had no "legal or constitutional status" after his undemocratic dismissal. Pakistan took a strong notice of these developments inside Kashmir and

29 Ajit Bhattacharjea, op. cit., p. 205.
31 A. Bhattacharjea op. cit., p. 205.
35 Shaikh Abdullah to Sadiq, 16 August, 1956, Times Of India, October 30, 1956.
36 Christopher Thomas, Faustline Kashmir, Middlesex, UK, 2000, p. 208.
requested the Security Council to convene a meeting on the Kashmir Issue. Pakistan also released a letter ‘purportedly’ written by the imprisoned Shaikh alleging repression in the disputed State. The Security Council adopted a resolution (S/3779) at its 76th meeting on January 24, 1957, and, *inter alia*, affirmed its stand by plebiscite, that the Kashmir issue would be decided by its people through “the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite, and any action by the Kashmir’s Assembly and its support by the parties would not constitute disposition of the State in keeping with that (above) principle.” However, nothing could stop India from bringing Kashmir closer with the Indian Union. And in fact it got the support of Soviet Union when in 1955 the Soviet Prime Minister, Khrushchev and another leader Bulgamin visited India and also Kashmir. At Srinagar, Khrushchev declared Kashmir an integral part of India.

In Kashmir, India fully backed up Bakshi for his undemocratic and authoritarian rule, fully supported by Nehru. Balraj Puri recalls how Nehru turned down his request for allowing him to form a pro-Indian democratic opposition in Kashmir: The politics of Kashmir,” Nehru replied, “revolved around personalities. There was no material for democracy in Kashmir.” Similarly in a reply to P.N. Bazaz, while Nehru accepted that there was no respect of political rights in Kashmir as he wrote “it is true that political liberty does not exist there in the same measure as in the rest of India” but in the same breath claimed that “there is much more of it than there used to be” (under the Dogra Rule). It was “a very poor excuse” on part of Nehru and he was “conscious of it.” Meanwhile the communists who had gained some powers under Bakshi tried to oust Bakshi from the office. Bakshi was aware of

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39 *Times of India*, January 17, 1957.
42 Bose as referred earlier p.68. No political opposition was allowed and there was like Shaikh’s reign one party’s rule. B. Puri, *Kashmir Insurgency And After*, New Delhi, 2008 Edition, p. 51
43 B. Puri, *Kashmir Insurgency*, op. cit., p. 51
46 G.M. Sadiq, Durga Prashad Dhar, Mir Qasim and Girdari Lal Dogra were its followers and the chief ideologues were Dr. Ashraf, Ali Sardar Jafri, Z.A. Ahmad and P. Ramnaril, *The Daily Martand*, 31 January, 1954. Also, *Current 5 Dec.*, 1953.
the growing activities of the communists that they were plotting against him.\textsuperscript{48} He took for himself the key positions and dismissed Sadiq, Mir Qasim, G.L. Dogra and D.P. Dhar from the Government.\textsuperscript{49} The communist group lead by G.M. Sadiq left National Conference and formed Democratic National Conference on October 20, 1957.\textsuperscript{50} To gain the support of the people, the DNC demanded the release of Shaikh Abdullah.\textsuperscript{51} In the meantime the Plebiscite Front, because of the patronage of Shaikh Abdullah, had got enormous support of the people and succeeded in creating secessionist and anti-India feelings among them\textsuperscript{52} and it became very difficult for a pro-Indian party to function and get the support of the people.\textsuperscript{53} Even the "secular elements in Kashmir became weak as their 'secularism' was disproved by the arrest of Shaikh and became secessionists by joining the Plebiscite Movement.\textsuperscript{54} The dismissal and detention of Shaikh Abdullah not only deteriorated the relations between India and Kashmir, but also between India and Pakistan\textsuperscript{55} and put a question mark over the accession of the state to the Indian union.\textsuperscript{56} In 1957, Nehru for the first time, after the arrest of Shaikh, visited Kashmir. He was in reconciliation mood and stressed on narrowing the gap between India and Shaikh Abdullah.\textsuperscript{57} In fact Nehru was "consistently apologetic about detaining Abdullah."\textsuperscript{58} He said at Srinagar that he had not come to Kashmir for the last four years because he had been pained by the arrest and detention of Shaikh Abdullah.\textsuperscript{59} Speaking at the Congress Parliamentary Party meeting at Delhi, after his return from Srinagar, Nehru said that he would be happy about the release of Shaikh.\textsuperscript{60} Nehru had realised that Kashmir issue could not be settled without the support of Shaikh Abdullah, the undisputed leader of Kashmir. In a

\textsuperscript{48} Mir Qasim, op. cit., pp. 81-2.
\textsuperscript{49} Josef Korbal, op. cit., p. 318.
\textsuperscript{50} Mir Qasim op. cit., p. 84.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid, p. 86.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid, p. 90.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid, p. 89.
\textsuperscript{54} Peer Gias-ud-Din, op. cit., p.26.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} "If Shaikh Abdullah", asks Alistair Lamb, "were a false prophet, as the coup of 8-9 august, 1953 suggested then it could well be that Nehru had seriously misinterpreted the will of the inhabitants of Jammu, Ladakh and Vale of Kashmir(in 1947)." Alistair Lamb, Kashmir A Disputed Legacy, op. cit., pp.199-200. India claimed that the accession was final because it was ratified by the popular leader, Shaikh Abdullah, who was the true leader and representative of the people of Kashmir. B.N Mulllik, op. cit., pp.177-92 and pp.197-98.
\textsuperscript{57} S.Bhatt, op. cit., p. 71.
\textsuperscript{58} Ajit Bhattacharjea, op. cit., p.211. Also, Satish Vashistha, Shaikh Abdullah Then And Now, Delhi, 1968, p. 104.
\textsuperscript{59} Times of India, Sep. 12, 1957.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid, Sep. 18, 1957.
letter to Karan Singh, Sadr-i- Riyasat, Nehru wrote: "In fact so long as Shaikh Abdullah is in prison, the dispute will not be finally closed. It is only when he has been released—that it will be possible towards a final end". India was embarrassed at the international level by the continuous detention of the Shaikh. In the same letter to Karan Singh, Sadr-i-Riyasat, he tried to persuade the latter that the Shaikh should be released. "I have no doubt that internationally speaking; the release would have powerful effect in our favour. I have a very uncomfortable feeling that our position is constantly undermined by Shaikh Abdullah's detention both internally and abroad." Pakistan time and again demanded the release of Shaikh Abdullah, who had now become "an official Pakistani public hero, and soon it would be the Indians who were calling him a Quisling." Mr. Suhrawardy, the Pakistan Prime Minister, said at Tokyo on April 24, 1957 that if Nehru wanted "to retrieve his lost reputation...he should begin by releasing Shaikh Abdullah."

The Intelligence Bureau which had a free hand in Kashmir and was duly assisted by the State Government could not "cook up to place any case before a court of law against the Shaikh in the four and a half years following his arrest in 1953." Nehru was disappointed with the detention of Shaikh without trial and pressed the State Government "either to place the Shaikh on trial or release him." As a result of this Shaikh was released on 8 January, 1958. Batraj Puri believes that Shaikh was released in 1958 by Bakshi to undermine political support of the Praja Socialist Party and Democratic National Conference, as both demanded the release of Shaikh Abdullah and end of Bakshi rule. Pakistan welcomed the release of the Shaikh. "It is a very welcome item of news that any person be released after four and a half years of

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62 Ibid.
64 Times of India, April 25, 1957.
65 The Testament of Shaikh Abdullah with a Monograph by Y.D. Gundavla, New Delhi, 1974, pp. 116-17. In 1957 an F.I.R was launched against eleven leaders of Plebiscite Front on a charge of conspiring with Pakistan to overthrow the government. But the Shaikh was not included in the eleven. According to B.N Mullik, there was no strong evidence till then against Shaikh. B.N. Mullik, op. cit., p.70.
66 B.N Mullik, op.cit. p. 77.
67 Times of India, Jan 9, 1958. Interestingly the release of Shaikh Abdullah coincided with the visit of Dr Frank Graham, the U.N representative to Indian Subcontinent. It was believed in Pakistan that in its decision to release Shaikh Abdullah, India was more "tactical than sincere". Times of India, Jan. 9, 1958.
imprisonment without trial", an official in the Foreign Affairs Ministry (Pakistan) said. Shaikh was given a rousing reception in Srinagar and was "lionised" by the masses who came out in large numbers to greet the Shaikh despite "police pressure." After his release efforts were made both at Delhi and at Srinagar to persuade the Shaikh for a dialogue and to return to power. At Srinagar, Mr. Sadiq sent Motilal Misri to Soura (residence of Shaikh) to convince him to join DNC and shun the slogan of plebiscite. From Delhi was sent Vijayalakshmi Pandit by Nehru. But the long detention and "betrayal of Nehru" which was still fresh in his mind and the gala welcome reception he was given after his release from Kud to Srinagar enhanced his popularity and his stance for self-determination. In Srinagar the Shaikh refused to recognise the State Government and criticized Nehru for betrayal and India's secular policy. His attitude towards Pakistan had changed and for the first time he said that the tribal invasion in 1947 was the reaction of the oppression of the Muslims in Jammu. The main reason behind this change in the Shaikh was the growing anti-India and pro-Pakistan feeling among the people after the 1953 event. As is evident from Bazaz's letter to Nehru, "It is no exaggeration to say that, by and large, the Kashmir Muslims are pro-Pakistan. This statement might annoy you but it would not be honest to conceal it." Speaking at Hazratbal, Shaikh declared that the accession with India was conditional and temporary and Kashmir was a disputed territory. "The accession of Kashmir", Shaikh declared, "is not to be decided by the perorations of Mr Krisna Menon or by guns and bullets. Kashmir does not belong to Krishna Menon or Nehru, Abdullah or Bakshi; it cannot be disposed of by India or Pakistan, America or Russia. The only people who can decide are the people of Kashmir -four million men, women and children, Muslims and Hindus who inhabit

69 Times of India, Jan. 9, 1958.
70 B.N. Mullik, op. cit., p. 78
71 S Bhatt, op. cit., p. 72.
73 Mir Qasim, op. cit., p. 87.
75 S. Vashisth, op. cit., p. 106.
77 S. Vashisth, op. cit., p. 106. Interestingly the same was said by Sir Zafarullah Khan, the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan in the Security Council in 1948 when Shaikh was a member of Indian delegation in the Security Council.
78 See Bazaz, Kashmir In Crucible, op. cit., pp. 193-96.
this land." Shaikh Abdullah, who had shown no enthusiasm for UN’s sponsored plebiscite when he was in power, now saw this particular form of reference to the people as essential on grounds of both justice and democracy. In a letter to Nehru, Shaikh asked Nehru to concede the demands of Kashmiris and he was determined to secure the “right of self-determination for the Kashmiri people through all means, whatever the cost.” Shaikh also declared that those countries which did not ‘support Kashmiri’s demand of self-determination were enemies of Kashmir and those which did were friends of Kashmir. It was clear indication that ‘India’ which did not support Kashmiri’s self-determination was ‘enemy’ and ‘Pakistan’ which did was ‘friend’ of Kashmiris.

Advocating the need for the immediate resolve of Kashmir issue, Shaikh made a “model declaration” with three main features:

1. The future of Kashmir had not been decided and it was because of that there was “political uncertainty’, economic distress and mental torture” for the people of Kashmir which had to be remedied.

2. The relations between India and Pakistan were a source of danger not only to Asia particularly, but for Kashmir and these unfriendly relations were a great threat to the people of Kashmir.

3. The future of Kashmir should be decided by its people through a plebiscite held under international auspices, or any other similar method mutually agreed by all parties concerned.

As already mentioned Shaikh refused to recognise the Bakshi Government as it had no “legal or constitutional status.” He also refused to recognise the new Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. He exclaimed that he was against a Constitution which was passed by the Assembly, “the majority of whose members had lost the

80 Ibid.
81 Alastair Lamb, Disputed Legacy, op. cit., p.203.
82 Shaikh to Nehru, 12th April, 1958, cited in Times of India, 14th April, 1958.
83 Friday speech at Hazratbal on January 30, 1958, cited in S. Vashisth, op. cit., p.110.
84 Ibid.
confidence of the people after August 9, 1953.” These ‘outspoken’ demands for a plebiscite and sharp criticism of the Central and State Governments were deemed by Bakshi, and his advisers B.N Mullik and D.P Dhar as ‘proof of Pakistani intrigue.’ It gave them ample ground to re-arrest Shaikh Abdullah. On April 30, 1958, Shaikh Abdullah was re-arrested on the charges of intriguing with Pakistan against India and engineering riots, to break the ties with India and to merge the State with Pakistan and receiving money (through Begam Abdullah) and bombs from Pakistan. “The charges”, writes, Ramachandra Guha “were absurd because, although he challenged the accession to India but he never advocated accession to Pakistan.” This view is substantiated by Dawn newspaper from Karachi which wrote that in his trial Abdullah had never expressed a desire for Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan, India or Independence were the only two options he had ever countenanced. According to Mir Qasim the ‘riots’ (a NC. worker was killed in the ‘riots’ on the occasion of Miiraj-un-Nabi at Hazaratbal) were engineered by Bakshi to provide justification for the re-arrest of Shaikh Abdullah. During his free air Shaikh had shown respect to Section 144 and had not violated any law, he was rearrested because the State Government considered him “as a potential threat to the State’s security.” If Mir Qasim is to be believed, Nehru who was in Hyderabad at the time of Shaikh’s re-arrest was not happy with the incident and told Mir Qasim that he (Nehru) did not ‘like any of the actions of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad.’

Shaikh Abdullah, Mirza Afzal Beg and other twenty-five accused were made to face the alleged “Kashmir conspiracy case” as it came to be known as, which lingered on for six long years. Mridula Sarabhai, a wealthy lady of Gujarat (once Secretary to Gandhi), was friend of Shaikh and well aware about the Shaikh. She

87 S. Vashisth, op. cit., p.111.
88 Alastair Lamb, Disputed Legacy, op. cit., p.203.
89 Bakshi considered free Shaikh threat to his power and Mullik was not in favour of release of Shaikh in 1958 and at the time of his (Shaikh’s) release had observed that Shaikh’s release jolted his investigation and had hoped that his release would provide them more evidence to re-arrest him, B.N Mullik, op. cit., p.86.
90 B. N. Mullik, op. cit., p.85., Also Bakshi’s statement at Delhi, Times of India, May 12, 1958. Interestingly B.N Mullik contradicts his on view. In the same book on p.52, he writes that Shaikh was not in favour of acceding to Pakistan “even though he had become hostile to India— he preferred a semi-independent status (autonomy i.e., within India.)” B.N Mullik, op. cit., p.52.
93 Mir Qasim, op. cit., p.87, see also S.Bhatt, op. cit., pp.73-74.
95 Mir Qasim, op. cit., p.88.
criticized Delhi for labelling Shaikh as pro-Pakistani and wrote innumerable letters to people far and near, on "his virtue and his statesmanship". She ran a campaign for the release of Shaikh and handing over "power to him." She also associated herself with the arrangement for the legal defence of a number of Plebiscite Front leaders who were being tried on charges of 'conspiring to overthrow the Kashmir government'. She was dubbed as anti-national, expelled from congress and arrested for her alleged 'anti-State' activities on 6 Aug., 1958.

The first complaint was filed in the court of the Special Magistrate, Jammu, on May 21, 1958 against twenty-five "conspirants", including Mirza Afzal Beg, Pir Maqbool Gilani, Pir Maqbool Vilgami and others. But Shaikh was not included in it, he, however, was featured in another complaint that was filed five months later, on October 23, 1958. Interestingly Begum Abdullah, who was charged by B.N Mullik as the main 'accused' receiving money from Pakistan, was never charged and never brought to book. In total two hundred and twenty-nine witnesses were examined and three hundred documents exhibited and the prosecution took eleven months, till on January 25, 1962 all accused were committed to the court of sessions. Shaikh did not give much importance to the prosecution because he was confident that it was based on falsehood. He made it clear that he did not believe in violence and conspiracy, but in the same breath made it clear that "getting help for freedom was not a conspiracy." He further added that he was not conspirator but was entrapped under a conspiracy hatched by Bakshi. Nothing could be proved in the Sessions Court and the case went even slower, so much so that Nehru lost patience and in April 1962, made the first move to get the case withdrawn. But Bakshi, Mullik and Krishna Menon opposed this move.

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96 M.Y. Saraf, op. cit., p. 1215.
98 Dawn, 8 August, 1958, Karachi.
99 B.N. Mullik, op. cit., p. 91.
100 Y. D. Gundevia, op.cit. P.117. Also S. Abdullah, op., cit., p. 713.
101 B.N. Mullik, op. cit., p. 85.
102 Y.D. Gundevia, op. cit., p. 117.
103 N. Koul, Shaikh Mohammad Abdullah A Political Phoenix, Delhi, 1985, pp. 80-81.
104 Shaikh Abdullah, op. cit., p. 716.
105 Shaikh's statement in the court of Special Magistrate., Ibid. p. 715.
106 Oral statement of Shaikh in the court of the Special Magistrate, Mr. N.K Hale, on 13 August,1960.,Times of India, August 14, 1960.
108 B.N. Mullik, op. cit., p. 97.
In the meanwhile the situation in Kashmir had worsened following the re-arrest of Shaikh. In the name of national interests, drastic curbs were put on fundamental liberties, press, speech and association.\textsuperscript{109} In a letter to Nehru, Bazaz informed him about this: "I can state without fear of contradiction that the Srinagar press has deteriorated since 1947."\textsuperscript{110} Even Nehru accepted this though reluctantly. In his reply to Bazaz, he admitted that political liberty did not exist there in Kashmir "in the same measure as in the rest of India."\textsuperscript{111} The people of Kashmir had grown restless\textsuperscript{112} and their long, a decade of, "pent-up resentment" finally exploded in Kashmir in late December.\textsuperscript{113} The 'spark' was provided by the theft of the Holy Relic or \textit{Moe-e-Moquddas} (a hair of Prophet SAW) on 27\textsuperscript{th} December, 1963, from the shrine of Hazratbal.\textsuperscript{114} Although the Relic was found on 3 January, 1964, but both its disappearance and appearance remained mysterious.\textsuperscript{115} The news spread like the wild fire and people from all over Kashmir moved towards Hazratbal. A spontaneous hartal was observed and violent processions taken out demanding the recovery of the Relic and punishment for the offender.\textsuperscript{116} The people held Bakshi responsible for its theft and they attacked and set ablaze a hotel and a cinema, owned by his brother.\textsuperscript{117} An "Action Committee" was formed by Maulvi Sayyid Masoodi, with Maulvi Farooq as chairman for the recovery of the Holy Relic.\textsuperscript{118} The 'Relic Movement' united the Kashmiris. To put it in the words of P. N. Bazaz: "For the first time since 1932 when the Kashmiris had unitedly challenged the Dogra Raj, the Kashmiris were united under one banner against the government and made its functioning static and also gave a message to New Delhi to see the reading on the wall."\textsuperscript{119} Bakshi had fled to Jammu and the State administration had virtually come to a standstill,\textsuperscript{120} and there was a parallel government ran by Action Committee; prices of essential commodities were fixed and enforced by the committee.\textsuperscript{121} The ministers were virtual prisoners.

\textsuperscript{109} N.C. Behera op. cit., p. 112.
\textsuperscript{111} Letter of Nehru to Bazaz, 7 August, 1962, Ibid. p. 217.
\textsuperscript{112} Josef Korbel, op. cit., p. 318.
\textsuperscript{113} S. Bose, op. cit., p. 78.
\textsuperscript{114} B.N. Mullik, op. cit., p. 120.
\textsuperscript{115} B.N. Mullik who was investigating the matter, has dedicated two chapters of his book to the Relic Issue, but fails to inform about the perpetrators. See Mullik pp.115-166.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid, p. 120.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid p. 121; Also, Ajit Bhattacharjea, \textit{Wounded Valley}, op. cit., p. 214.
\textsuperscript{118} S. Bhatt, op. cit., p. 90. All pro-plebiscite leaders were its members.
\textsuperscript{119} P.N. Bazaz, \textit{Crucible}, op. cit., pp. 74-5.
\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Times of India}, January 28, 1964.
confined to their houses with police guards protecting them.\textsuperscript{122} The Relic Movement (religious movement) turned into a political movement demanding not only the return of the relic, but also an international intervention for investigating the matter,\textsuperscript{123} the release of Shaikh Abdullah\textsuperscript{124} and holding of the plebiscite.\textsuperscript{125} Slogans in favour of Pakistan were also raised.\textsuperscript{126} However, Maulvi Masoodi dissuaded those who wanted to press for the release of Shaikh and plebiscite and hoisting of green flags.\textsuperscript{127} The Holy Relic Agitation had far-reaching consequences on the Indian subcontinent. There were riots in East Pakistan against Hindus which caused a 'chain reaction' in Calcutta of India where Muslims were victims.\textsuperscript{128} The Holy Relic Agitation on the one hand made it clear that 'the Islamic religion remained the most powerful stimulus for political activity in the valley' on the other hand, it showed that India had failed to win the hearts and minds of the people of Kashmiri\textsuperscript{129} who severely destabilized the Indian sponsored regime in IJK (East Kashmir).\textsuperscript{130} The whole episode finally convinced Nehru that they were doing wrong in Kashmir and India sponsored regimes had no \textit{locus-standi} in Kashmir, and thus he began clearing the path for Shaikh's release.\textsuperscript{131} Shamsuddin,\textsuperscript{132} the Prime Minister was replaced by G.M. Sadiq, Delhi's favourite candidate, as new Prime Minister of the State.\textsuperscript{133} Pandit Nehru called a meeting at his residence on April 5, 1964, to devise a new Kashmir policy. He was dejected by the Relic Agitation in Kashmir and exclaimed that "even after fifteen years of association, if Kashmir still remained in such an unstable state that even a simple issue like the Moe-e-Moqaddas the people could be so provoked as to rise in defiance of the Government, then, in his opinion a new approach had to be made and
a radical change in thinking about Kashmir was called for." Moreover after the failure of Bhutto–Sawaran Sing talks, Nehru thought in terms of direct talks over Kashmir with the Kashmiris. Besides this, on the international scene, India was worried about a growing isolation from African and Asian nations because of Kashmir problem. Also, the Chinese Debacle gave Nehru a fresh incentive to seek a "final resolution of the Kashmir question." Nehru knew that no political settlement could be thought without Shaikh Abdullah, who had a "strong hold on the people of Kashmir." He strongly advocated for the withdrawal of the case against Shaikh. In a meeting, recalls Y. D. Gundevia (he was also present in the meeting) "Nehru in a fighting mood,---- banged the table, and said," if a damned thing cannot be proved in four years and in six years, then there is obviously nothing to be proved." It was owing to these factors that Shaikh was released "unconditionally" on 8 April, 1964. Again Shaikh was given a rousing reception and was lionised; even his avowed enemies like Praja Parishad welcomed him. Nehru invited him to Delhi for talks to restore friendly relations with the "friend turn hostile" Shaikh Abdullah but Shaikh insisted that he would first like to see the people and know their view point.

After his release Shaikh Abdullah stressed on the friendly relations between India and Pakistan and asked them to resolve the Kashmir issue in a way that none of its parties (India, Pakistan and Kashmir should feel 'sense of defeat'. He also criticized those people who demanded accession with Pakistan and said that Pakistan could not annex Kashmir by force or in the name of religion. However, he did not give up his demand for self-determination. Speaking at Anantnag he said, "The sun rise

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135 There were six rounds of Ministerial level talks between the two countries but again to no avail. For details see Alastair Lamb, Disputed Legacy, op. cit., p. 239.
137 Rama Chandra Guha, op. cit., p. 82.
140 Ibid. p.122. Again Shaikh was released when Kashmir was due to be discussed in the Security Council. Mr Chagla stated that Abdullah's release suggested that there was normalcy and peace in Kashmir. Hindustan Times, 5 may, 1964.
141 Ibid. April 9, 1964.
143 Hindustan Times, April 9, 1964.
145 Hindustan Times, April 11, 1964.
in the west and set in the east, but I will not trade Kashmir's right for any price."\textsuperscript{146} This was the time when communalism was again hovering in the subcontinent. The Muslims of India believed that the future of Muslims of India was associated with the Kashmir issue. Mr Badru-Din Tyabji, the then Vice Chancellor of Aligarh Muslim University, in a press statement made it clear to Shaikh that “the future of millions of Muslims of India was involved in the Kashmir issue, not merely of the Kashmiris.”\textsuperscript{147} Shaikh Abdullah was convinced by this statement and in a prayer meeting at Srinagar; he said that a solution to the Kashmir dispute must take account its likely consequences for the fifty million Muslims in India and ten million Hindus in ‘East Pakistan’.\textsuperscript{148} However, it must be bear in mind that Shaikh was invited to Delhi by (only) Nehru for talks, the Indian Home Ministry and some other leaders were not happy with the release of Shaikh not to say of talks with Shaikh.\textsuperscript{149} Nehru might had been convinced by the changing circumstances that a fresh approach was needed towards Kashmir but he was no longer “Nehru of 1950's, having a supportive Parliament, now his own cabinet was against him” regarding Kashmir.\textsuperscript{150} So, when Nehru invited Shaikh to Delhi; they began to shout that the accession was final and Kashmir was an integral part of India and that the “fundamentals of the Kashmir question would not be discussed with the Shaikh.”\textsuperscript{151} Shaikh was disappointed by this rigidity on part of India and he too reiterated his demand for self-determination and reminded India their commitments. Speaking at Hazratbal, he declared that “I would remind the Indian leaders of their commitment about ascertaining the wishes of the people and try to convince them that the people had the right of self-determination.”\textsuperscript{152} He also declared that his talks with Nehru would be on the basis of self-determination for Kashmiris.\textsuperscript{153} The changing political environment of India had forced Shaikh to seek the solution of Kashmir in the life of Nehru and “there was no

\textsuperscript{146} Speech at Anantnag, on 17\textsuperscript{th} April, 1964, cited in Ab. Jabbar, op. cit., p.90, Also, S. Vashishth, op. cit., pp. 121-22.

\textsuperscript{147} Mr. Badru-Din Tyabji’s statement to press, as appeared in Hindustan Times, April 14, 1964.


\textsuperscript{149} B.N. Mullik who also opposed the release of Shaikh informs us that G.L. Nanda, A.K. Sen and others strongly protested against the release of Shaikh. B.N Mullik, op. cit., p. 172.

\textsuperscript{150} Ajit Bhattacharjea, Wounded Valley, op. cit., pp. 222-23.

\textsuperscript{151} See for example speech of G.L Nanda, Home Minister, in Loksabha, 29 April, 1964 cited in Gunjoo, op. cit., pp. 86-7.

\textsuperscript{152} Speech at Hazratbal 24 April, 1964. Ibid. p. 41.

\textsuperscript{153} Shaikh’s speech at Anantnag on 17 April, 1964, Ibid, pp. 56-7.
time to lose for Jawaharlal’s health was failing.”

It was amid this uproar that Shaikh left for Delhi to talk with Nehru on Kashmir. On 29 April, 1964, Shaikh along with Azizal Beg disembarked at Palam airport where they were received by Mrs Indira Gandhi, J.P. Narayan and others. They went to Teen Murti House, where two friends, turned hostiles (Nehru and Shaikh) met after eleven years. A special committee of three diplomats consisting of Y.D. Gundevia, G Parathrasarsthi and Badruddin Tyabji (Parsi, Hindu and Muslim respectively) was made to brief Abdullah about the previous talks between two countries (India and Pakistan) and the future proposals for the solution of Kashmir issue. The contents of talks at Teen Murti House were kept secret, the press being told only that the two had discussed “the background to the Kashmir problem” as well as the communal problem and its effects on India (subcontinent). Both the leaders (Nehru and Abdullah) therefore reached to a consensus that it was necessary to resolve Kashmir issue by making an accord with Pakistan. Nehru realised that so long as the relations between the two countries were not good, the communal tension would remain there. As he lamented; “there were again a good deal of madness and blood thirsty ideas about and the atrocities committed in India suggested an organisation behind them. One result was weakening of the governments hand in dealing with Pakistan.” In order to get the opinion regarding Kashmir from his well-wishers, Shaikh went to Wardha where he met Acharya Vinoba and Jayaprakash Narayan and then to Madras where he met Rajgopalacharya. After returning from South India, writes, Gundevia “Shaikh Abdullah forward before the Prime Minister the idea of a possible ‘confederation’- a confederation of India, Pakistan and Kashmir which it was obvious, Rajaji had

154 M. J Akbar, op. cit., p166, also S. Gopal, op. cit., p. 263.
155 Ramachandra Guha, op. cit., pp.86, also Gundevia, op. cit., p. 126.
156 Gundevia passes a witty statement in the Testament Of Shaikh Abdullah, “Yesterday’s criminal conspirator, the same Shaikh Abdullah came to Delhi and stayed in the Prime Minister’s house, as the Prime Minister’s very welcome guest.” Y.D Gundevia, op. cit., p. 123.
157 Ibid. p. 126.
158 Ram Chandra Guha, op. cit., p. 86.
159 S Gopal, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 263.
160 Letters of Nehru to J.P Jyotishi, Mrs Habibullah, Suresh Ram and S.B Ahmad, on 5 April, 7 April, 22 April and 2 May respectively. Ibid. p. 265.
161 S. Abdullah, Aatishi Chinhar, op. cit., p.775. They had opposed the dismissal of Shaikh and were in favour of the right of self-determination. For example Rajaji said that accession was conditional and revocable and was up to Kashmiris to decide their future, see Gunjoo, op. cit., pp. 124-25. J.P Narayan publicly said that accession was not final. J. P Narayan, “Our great opportunity in Kashmir,” Hindustan Times, 20 April, 1964.
Y. D Gundevia strongly opposed the plan because he was firm that Ayub Khan would never accept it, which if accepted would disintegrate Pakistan. Ironically this was the only thing for which Shaikh later on visited Pakistan to discuss with Pakistan even if India had firm belief of its failure. Nehru's real objective was to “let Shaikh talk to Ayub Khan and return disillusioned as he would not accept confederation and to give Shaikh a chance to retrace his steps.” There was a change in Shaikh’s tone after his meeting with Nehru. His emphasis shifted from self-determination to Indo-Pak reconciliation and regarded accession a minor issue. He told newsmen that accession was a minor issue and the real problem was one of creating harmonious relations between India and Pakistan.

While Shaikh was still in Delhi, he received a telegram from Ayub Khan, reminding him that Pakistan was also party to the Kashmir problem and also invited Shaikh to Pakistan. Nehru supported the idea of his visit to Pakistan. Speaking at the AICC session at Bombay on 15th may 1964, Nehru said; “if Shaikh Abdullah could help the two countries to improve their relations, he will have done a great service to both countries. We have to help him in his attempt; but in doing so we must adhere to our principles as well as to our basic attitude in regard to Kashmir.” Nehru was ready to new ideas provided “they did not compromise Indian secularism and nationalism.” A. G Noorani believes that Shaikh had no particular solution in mind but sought alternatives from India to offer to Ayub Khan and all that he got was “confederation”. Thus Shaikh Mohammad Abdullah for the first and last time visited Pakistan on 24 may, 1964. Shaikh was given a tumultuous welcome on

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162 Gundevia op. cit., p. 127. According to R.N Koul, it was the brain child of Nehru—R.N Koul, op. cit., p.92. A. G. Noorani believes that Aacharya Vinobha Bhave had suggested a confederation between India, Pakistan and Kashmir. A.G. Noorani, ‘Myths And Reality, Front Line Feb. 12, 2010. Nehru was happy with the plan but had little hope of its acceptance by Pakistan, M.J Akbar, op. cit., p. 167.
164 Ibid.,
165 Ibid.
166 Eastern Times, Cuttack, 23 April, 1965.
169 S. Abdullah, Aatishi Chinor, op. cit., p. 774, also S. Bhatt, op. cit., p. 102.
170 Saraif, op. cit., p.1244.
174 S. Bhatt, op. cit., p. 102., Karan Sing laments in his memoir; “only a few weeks earlier Shaikh Abdullah was in the dock, being accused of conspiring with a foreign power to overthrow the
arrival to Pindi that surpassed in depth and intensity given to Chinese Prime Minister, Chou-en-Lai in February,\textsuperscript{175} thanks to the propaganda created by India that Shaikh was a pro-Pakistani conspirator, after his dismissal in 1953.\textsuperscript{176} Shaikh was hopeful of success of his mission-Pakistan, as he said, that he had come with faith and there was no question of his failing because India had realised that the time had come to solve the problem.\textsuperscript{177} Shaikh had two round meetings with Ayub Khan. Ayub Khan, as expected, rejected the proposal of confederation. He plainly told Shaikh that Pakistan had nothing to do with an idea, which if pursued, would "lead to the enslavement of Pakistan."\textsuperscript{178} Further, he considered the idea very opposite to the two nation theory, "Indian nationalism is based on Hinduism and Pakistan's nationalism is based on Islam. The two philosophies are fundamentally different from each other. These two nationalisms cannot combine, but it should be possible for them to live side by side in peace and understanding."\textsuperscript{179} However, Shaikh succeeded in convincing Ayub Khan to visit Delhi to have a meeting with Nehru regarding the solution of Kashmir.\textsuperscript{180} Abdullah told a crowded news conference that "the president of Pakistan said that he would be glad to meet Mr Nehru to discuss ways and means of finding a satisfactory solution to the Kashmir problem."\textsuperscript{181} A unique opportunity of solving the Kashmir issue, "which had three statesmen –Nehru in Delhi, Ayub in Pakistan and Abdullah in Kashmir was lost with the death of Nehru on 27\textsuperscript{th} May 1964."\textsuperscript{182} The news came as a great shock to Abdullah and in a condolence meeting at Muzaffarabad he said that the death of Nehru had made his mission more difficult.\textsuperscript{183} Cutting short his visit, Abdullah left for Delhi on 28\textsuperscript{th} May 1964, to attend the funeral, along with Mr Bhutto.\textsuperscript{184} According to Stanely Wolport, Shaikh was so disillusioned with the death of Nehru that he told Mr Bhutto, "Partition below the Chenab river might be a

\textsuperscript{175} Hindustan Times, 25 May, 1964.
\textsuperscript{176} Y.D. Gundevia, op. cit., p. 129.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{180} According to Gundevia this was not discussed at Delhi when Shaikh held meeting with Nehru. He did it of his own. Y.D. Gundevia, op. cit., p. 129.
\textsuperscript{181} Hindustan Times, 27 May, 1964.
\textsuperscript{182} N.C. Behera, State Identity and Violence, op. cit., p.117.
\textsuperscript{183} R.C. Guha, op. cit., p. 90.
\textsuperscript{184} M.Y. Saraf, op. cit., p. 1247.
realistic solution. Bhutto was apparently elated by the Shaikh’s flexibility, since during his talks with Ayub Abdullah had insisted that partition was not possible.\textsuperscript{185}

The successor of Nehru showed no sincere effort to continue the peace process started by Nehru.\textsuperscript{186} Thus with the death of Nehru, the chance of peaceful solution to the Kashmir problem also died.\textsuperscript{187} The new Indian government saw integration as the only solution to the Kashmir problem.\textsuperscript{188} The Indian government could no longer accept the special status of Kashmir under the article 370. Article 370, though remained there on the “statue book, [yet] its substance was diluted consequently.”\textsuperscript{189}

Speaking in the Parliament, G.L. Nanda, the Home Minister of India, assured the Indian Parliament that the Government was in the process of full integration of the State of Jammu and Kashmir with the Indian union and article 370 was not a hindrance in that process. He added that Article 370 was a tunnel through which “a good deal of traffic has already passed and more will.”\textsuperscript{190} And the first vehicle of this new traffic came in the form of Presidential Order of 1964, issued on 21st December, 1964, making applicable Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir. Article 356 empowers the President to assume functions of the Government of a state in case of failure of constitutional machinery, and Article 357 empowers the Parliament to exercise legislative powers of such a state.\textsuperscript{191} The ‘constitutional integration’ was followed by ‘political integration’ of the State with the Indian Union.\textsuperscript{192} The National Conference (‘the name and identity of Kashmir’s historic political movement’) was dissolved and merged into Congress in January 1965.\textsuperscript{193} Mir Qasim who was the chief architect of this move says that the people had lost their faith in NC and were inclined to Shaikh’s Plebiscite Front, so they (NC leaders) joined Congress.\textsuperscript{194} After Shaikh, behind whom the masses rallied, was isolated from NC, (1953) the later lost its “distinct character and faced contestation of

\textsuperscript{185} As quoted by Victoria Schofield, ‘Kashmir In The Crossfire’, New Delhi, 1997, p. 199.
\textsuperscript{187} M.J Akbar, op. cit., p. 168.
\textsuperscript{188} P.N. Bazaz, Kashmir in Crucible, op. cit., p.83.
\textsuperscript{189} N.C. Behera, State Identity and Violence op. cit., p.112.
\textsuperscript{192} Puri, Ibid, p.156.
\textsuperscript{193} On 3rd January the Working Committee of National Conference made announcement of NC’s dissolution and was ratified by the All India Congress Working Committee on 10th January. See S. Bose, op. cit., p.82.
\textsuperscript{194} Mir Qasim, op. cit., p. 106.
its legitimacy and became increasingly vulnerable to the intrusive politics of the Centre," the result was its merger with congress. By the "Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir (sixth amendment) Act, 1965 drafted on 10th April, 1965, the State Assembly not only changed the nomenclature of the Sadar-i-Riyasat and Prime Minister to Governor and Chief Minister respectively but also provided that the Governor would be appointed by the President of India instead of being elected by the State Assembly." The change in nomenclature from Prime Minister to Chief Minister was a "semantic change" because he had not much more powers than other Chief Ministers of India. Thus by these developments the State of Jammu and Kashmir was brought into "alignment and conformity with the other states of the Indian Union." These developments were bitterly resented by the people of Kashmir, who saw them as a threat to their identity, and to save their identity they had no option but to join Shaikh 'Abdullah's demand for self-determination and an independent Kashmir. People became so curious about plebiscite that "Raishumari or Plebiscite' was whispered into the ear of a new-born after uttering Kalmia. Shaikh Abdullah who was becoming increasingly despondent about the way things were going, these developments created apprehension in his mind that India was trying to grab Kashmir and not to settle it. He further exclaimed that it was now useless to expect from India to settle this issue on the grounds of 'justice, humanity or morality.' Describing the merging of the NC into Congress a threat to the very survival of the Muslims of Kashmir, Shaikh gave a call for 'Tarqui Mawalat' or

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199 'Nor Sadiq nor his successor Mir Qasim was of the calibre 'to oppose New Delhi, whatever their objections'. Ajit Bhattacharajya, Wounded Valley, op. cit., p.216.
Complete Social Boycott of the Kashmir Congress Muslims, who were described as ‘traitors.’宣布了‘Social Boycott Movement’ at Hazaratbal on January 15, 1965, the Shaikh said that the “aim of the movement was to observe social boycott against those who opposed people’s right of self-determination.” He also asked the people to get ready to face India effectively. People responded vigorously and boycotted the marriages, religious functions and funerals of Muslim Congressmen.

The political integration had a great impact on the ‘ideology’ of Shaikh, who had now lost his faith in Indian ‘secularism’ and ‘Gandhism’ and ‘socialism’. For the first time the photos of Gandhi, Azad and Abdul Ghaffar Khan were removed and were replaced by the photos of Jinnah at Mujahid Manzil, the headquarter of Plebiscite Front, in Srinagar. The socialist slogan of ‘Naya Kashmir and socialist red banner were substituted by religious slogans and green flag.’

writes N. C. Behera, “had turned full circle. In the 1940’s the Shaikh had joined hands with Indian nationalism in order to challenge Muslim nationalism, and now he joined forces which stood for the Muslim identity in order to challenge the Indian identity.” Shaikh Abdullah’s demand for self-determination and his anti-India campaign reached also outside India when in 1965, he went to perform Hajj Pilgrimage, which proved to be a world tour to ‘pray for deliverance of suffering Kashmiris at Makah,’ and to plead Kashmir’s “case before other sympathetic nations.” Besides performing Hajj at Makah in Saudi Arabia, Shaikh also visited France, Britain, Egypt and Algeria. Speaking at Paris in an interview with ‘Le Monde’, Shaikh said that he was touring to these countries to put forward his point of

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206 S. Bhatt, op. cit., pp.104-05.
209 B. Puri, ibid, p.160.
212 Gundevia, op. cit., p. 132. It is interesting to note that Shaikh had described his nationality as ‘Kashmiri Muslim’ in the application for passport. Times of India, March 17, 1965 and 30 March 1965.
214 J.Korb, op. cit., p. 324.
view on the Kashmir problem. In Egypt, Shaikh Abdullah was treated as a state
guest and was extended the courtesies due to a state guest. This was done without
reference to the Government of India or the Indian Embassy in Cairo. He appealed
president Nasser of Egypt to help in solving the Kashmir problem. His visit to
Algeria infuriated India. He met Chinese Premier, Chou-en-Lai, who was visiting
Algeria. Both exchanged their views on Kashmir and the Chinese Premier invited
Shaikh to China. Shaikh while thanking Cho’s invitation told a press conference at
Algeria that Chinese Premier had reiterated China's support for Kashmiris right of
self-determination, for which Shaikh thanked him. Shaikh’s meeting with Cho-
en Lai created a great uproar in India. India considered China her arch enemy, after
China invaded India in 1962 and memories of India’s humiliating defeat were still
fresh and it was quite understandable that their meeting would inflame “both the
establishment and the public opinion.” Indian Prime Minister Mr. Lal Bahadur
Shastri took a “most serious view” of their meeting, which, according to him implied
that Shaikh had “condoned Chinese aggression” against India in 1962. There was
extreme pressure on the Indian Government particularly from communal elements to
punish Shaikh for his ‘anti India activities’ in abroad. Shaikh was asked to return
immediately and the validity of his passport was limited up to 30 April, 1965 and all
endorsements, except for Hajj Pilgrimage on his passport were cancelled. In India
Shaikh was dubbed as a “tool of Rawalpindi Peking conspiracy against India.” In
order to clear his position Shaikh wrote to Mr Shastri in which he complained that he
had been judged wrongly and had been misunderstood. He further added that he
had not committed any crime and he had not said anything which he had not said

ustain Times of India, April 1, 1965.
219 S Bhatt, op. cit., pp. 105-06.
221 Patriot, 2 April, 1965 Cited by B.L. Sharma, Kashmir Awakes, Delhi, 1971, p. 151.
222 P Swami, op. cit., p.87. D. Devidas feels that the uproar served Abdullah’s purpose. - “he was
playing to the gallery again showing Kashmir he could take on India, cocking a snook at integration”. D. Devdas, op. cit., p.104. J.J Sing blames Indian Government for not using Shaikh’s services which
forced him to seek foreign help to get Kashmir issue settled. J.J Sing, Shaikh Mohammad Abdullah,
224 Times of India, March, 10, 17 and 30, 1965.
225 B.L. Sharma, op. cit., p.152.
227 Hindustan Times, 24 April, 1965.
before in India. Ending the worries of India Shaikh returned on 8th May, 1965 and was arrested at New Delhi airport along with Afzal Beg and detained at Ootacamund, a hill resort in South India and his wife was served an order of no entry into the State. Again Kashmiris protested against the Shaikh’s detention. A Civil Disobedience Movement was started on June 6, 1965 by Maulvi Masoodi against Shaikh’s detention and was followed by court arrest by a large number of people. The State Government under Sadiq gave up its ‘liberalization policy’ and forcibly crushed the voice of the people. Even the leaders like G.M Kara, Maulvi Masoodi were beaten. Press was gagged and restrictions were imposed on political freedom by the State Government backed fully by the Centre. It only aggravated the situation and disappointed the people with India. It was during this situation, Pakistan for the second time tried to ‘liberate’ Kashmiris from India by a guerrilla campaign, known as ‘Operation Gibraltar’. Thus in 1965 India and Pakistan fought second war on (and for) Kashmir. The war ended in a draw with the signing of Tashkent Declaration on 10th January 1966, by which both agreed to create good neighbourly relations in accordance with the UN Charter.

After the war of 1965, because of some developments, it became important for India to ‘settle the internal crisis of Kashmir’ and for that the release of Shaikh had become imperative. Although the State Government had succeeded in enforcing law and order, for time being but the anger of the people towards India and its men in Kashmir was very high. Writing in 1966, Bazaz affirms that ‘by and large state Muslims are not very friendly towards India; an overwhelming majority of them are not happy under the present political setup, they desire to have done with it. This

228 Hindu, Madras, 26 April, 1965.
229 B. Puri, Jammu and Kashmir, op. cit., p.158. The decision of Shaikh to return has been cited by many as proof of his innocence. P. Swami, op. cit., p. 68.
232 P. Swami, op. cit., p. 188.
234 B. Puri, Kashmir Insurgency and After, op. cit., p. 34.
236 In Kashmir there emerged student movements for independence during the war. The Government closed the Hazratbal shrine and took severe measures to suppress the demonstrations. All educational institutions were closed in Srinagar. P. C Sympon, op. cit., p. 80.
237 For the war of 1965 see Alastair Lamb, Kashmir a Disputed Legacy, pp.247-271, and for Tashkent Declaration, see Sumit Ganguly, Crisis In Kashmir, pp.163-165.
238 Mushaqur Rahman, op. cit., p. 112.
239 A police state usually manages to keep law and order*, J.J Sing, op. cit., p. 6.
239 Bazaz, Crucible, op. sft., pp. 99-100.
was the time when politically conscious, "the students of universities and colleges began to take an active part in political demonstrations." They received the support of Mir Waiz Farooq and the Jama Masjid once again became one of the main centres of student agitation. They were not satisfied with the methods of moderates and believed in the violent methods rather than Shaikh’s non-violent protests, to gain the right of self-determination. There emerged new organisations like Student and Youth League and Al-Fatah and new leaders like Fazl-ul Haq Qureshi, Azam Inqilabi and Maqbool Bhatt. However the Plebiscite Front apprehended these youth organizations as a threat to its survival and started feeling jittery and conspiracies were hatched against the new emerging youth leaders. But more serious and worrying for India was that a new threat of communalism in Kashmir was now looming on the horizon. Permeshwari Handoo, a Pandit girl fell in love with a Muslim boy, embraced Islam and eloped with him. Kashmiri Pandits formed a Hindu Action Committee and started agitation against the State Government and also against the Muslims, thus ‘disturbing’ the age old communal harmony. For the first time open clashes took place between Muslims and Hindus creating tension and chaos in Kashmir. The Indian Government knew that it was only Shaikh Abdullah who possessed the stature and influence to revive political "moderation and communal harmony in the state." Because the Plebiscite Movement led by Shaikh Abdullah was non communal and a secular organization. More over the demand for Shaikh’s release to settle Kashmir issue internally was growing extremely. In a letter to Mrs Indira Gandhi, The Prime Minister of India, J.P. Narayan, inter-alia, wrote— "whatever be solution, it has to be found within the limitations of accession. It is here that Shaikh’s role may become decisive—why do I plead for Shaikh’s release? Because that may give us the only chance we have of solving the Kashmir

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242 V. Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire, op. cit., pp.208-09.
249 Indira Gandhi in a speech at Srinagar on 20 June 1971, said that India had never said that PF was a non-secular and communal organisation., Statesman, 21 June, 1971.
250 L.B. Shastri had died mysteriously after signing the Tashkent Declaration, and was succeeded by Mrs Gandhi.
problem."251 In 1967, a group of 240 members of Indian Parliament, including legislators from the ruling Congress party, signed a petition urging the Government to release him.252 Shaikh was finally released on January 2, 1968,253 by Mrs Indira Gandhi, to improve relations with her country's "most famous political prisoner."254 Pakistan welcomed the release of Shaikh Abdullah and hoped that he would continue the struggle of self-determination. The Dawn newspaper from Karachi, very well judged the situation—"the release of the lion of Kashmir presents both an opportunity and a challenge to Indian statesmanship."255

After his release it seemed that Shaikh Abdullah was not the Shaikh Abdullah of earlier 60's. "The earlier fire and zeal were missing" and he stressed the need for accommodation.256 There was the factor of age and health257 of which the better part he had spent as a political prisoner.258 He was broaching the idea of a 'special status' for Kashmir, 'more or less on the pattern of Bhutan.'259 In an interview with the 'Shabistan Urdu Digest,' Shaikh said, "I say for God's sake, give me more freedom and trust me. I will be the last man to jeopardise the honour and self-respect of India." He further added that 'the people of Kashmir did not ask for anything impossible, "they want only protection (autonomy) from their elder brother, India."'260 Before returning to Kashmir, at Delhi Shaikh had his talks with Mrs Gandhi,261 Rajgopalacharya, J. P Narayan and other leaders262 and he also began to take interest in Indian national issues, like communalism and poverty.263 After returning to Kashmir he addressed a number of public meetings. He advised the young (who

253 After a long period of incarceration of 15 years, 1953-68, with some intervals, Ajit Battacharjea, Tragic Hero, op. cit., p.227.
254 D.E Lockwood, op. cit.,
255 Cited in S.R Bakshi, Shaikh M Abdullah, p.220.
256 Ajit Battacharjea, who met him after his release found him an aged man and pensive and confused. See A. Battacharjea Kashmir the Wounded Valley, pp.228-29.
257 He was in his sixties and was suffering from diabetes and high blood pressure.
258 D.E. Devadas, op. cit., He was increasingly becoming aware of his failing health and old age. Tribune, Chandigarh, 22 Nov., 1972.
261 Shaikh asked Mrs Gandhi to complete the mission of Kashmir started by her father, but she wanted to leave Shaikh 'high and dry form some time.' Restive Kashmir, G.N. Aali, p. 28.
262 S Bhatt, op. cit., p. 130.
263 He along with J. P Narayan addressed a number of meetings in U.P. and Bihar. M. J Akbar, op. cit., p.183.
would raise slogans of "we want self-determination") that mere slogans were not sufficient, 'they should follow reason and cultivate discipline and be fully organised." Shaikh Abdullah now turned for support to parties outside Jammu and Kashmir, to discuss various prospects of Kashmir problem and to get a solution. Consequently two conventions, called; Jammu and Kashmir State People's Convention' were held in 1968 and 1970 to ascertain people's views on Kashmir. In his inaugural speech, J.P Narayan made it clear that self-determination was not the solution of Kashmir problem, because of the changing circumstances and whatever the solution might be it was to be found within the frame work of the Indian Constitution. The convention unanimously adopted a resolution, "reaffirming the principle that a solution of the problem, acceptable to the people of the State, keeping in view the interests of all regions, can alone resolve the dispute." The shift in Shaikh's thinking was 'sound strategic but historically ironic. For when the mind of Kashmiris were highly filled with the dreams of freedom-'Abdullah’s own mind was churning by the end of the 1960's with the idea of returning to power under India's aegis. Although Shaikh still reiterated the demand of self-determination but he phrased it generally: it was "an inherent right of all people (not only of Kashmiris). Moreover he could not ignore the demands of Muslims of Kashmir who were disappointed with India and demanded self-determination. There was a shift in the strategy of Plebiscite Front when in December 1970; it decided to participate in the India's Parliament elections due in 1971 and Assembly elections of Jammu and Kashmir in 1972. The decision of the Plebiscite Front alarmed both the Indian Government at Delhi and State Government, because a 'victorious Plebiscite Front from elections would talk from the position of strength.' Mir Qasim, who became Chief Minister after G. M Sadiq, accepts in his memoir that, "if elections were free

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265 P. Swami, op. cit., p.88.
267 For full speech see Manzoor Fazil, Kashmir Predilection, Srinagar, 1988, pp. 77-87.
270 A. Bhattacharjea, wounded valley, op. cit., p. 229
271 D.E.Lockwood, op. cit., p. 393.
272 S. Bose, op. cit., p. 86.
and fair the victory of the front was a foregone conclusion. To prevent the front from contesting elections, the Plebiscite Front was declared an unlawful organisation, under the prevention of the Unlawful Activities Act, and was banned for the first time since its inception in 1955. Moreover “on the morning of January 9, 1971, Shaikh Abdullah, Mirza Afzal Beg and G. M Shah, (who were in Delhi,) were debarred from entering Jammu and Kashmir and nearly 500 members of the front were arrested under the “Prevention Detention Act.” Not allowing the Plebiscite Front to contest elections exposed India at international level as it had claimed that ‘free and fair’ elections would be held.

By an unfortunate coincidence when these developments were taking place in Kashmir, India and Pakistan were engaged in another war, this time though not on Kashmir but had its repercussions on Kashmir. India emerged victorious and Pakistan got divided and a new country Bangladesh emerged on the world map. The Pakistan’s claim on Kashmir was ‘weakened’. Pakistan wanted to put Kashmir issue into cold storage for some time, because she was more “concerned with the issue of release of war prisoners and the occupied areas.” The breakdown of Pakistan in 1971 “demoralised a section of the people including the leadership of the Plebiscite Front (Shaikh, Beg) in Kashmir. They felt that Pakistan was now not in a position to help and ‘liberate Kashmir.’ Knowing that Shaikh Abdullah was disappointed with the outcome of the war, Mrs Gandhi “capitalized on India’s decisive victory to negotiate a

273 The elections held in Kashmir prior and after the new constitution were highly manipulated and fraud was done at high level. Hindustan Times, 26 Feb., 1971; and Thought Weekly, 16 January, 1971. No opposition was tolerated. A number of members would come as un-opposed. The nomination forms of opposed candidates would be rejected. And the ruling party would come as a sheer majority party. The well-known political commentator, Mr B Shiva Rao, writes about these elections, “Such massive majorities are not known in truly democratic countries.” Quoted by A.G Noorani, Kashmir Question, Bombay, 1964, p.13. For example in the first elections held in 1951, National Conference won all 75 seats. The elections of 1962 were so rigged that even Nehru wrote to Bakshi that “it would strengthen your position much more if you lost a few seats to bonafide opponents”. S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol. 3, 1956-64, Delhi, (Oxford), 1985, p. 262.
274 Mir Qasim op. cit., p.132.
278 S. Ganguly, op. cit., p. 60.
political settlement with Shaikh Abdullah.\textsuperscript{281} A significant change was seen in Shaikh and Afzal Beg when they started saying that their real dispute with India was on ‘autonomy’ and not ‘accession.’\textsuperscript{282} After the Simla Agreement,\textsuperscript{283} in which it was agreed by both India and Pakistan to settle all the issues bilaterally, India believed that ‘Kashmir issue was settled’\textsuperscript{284} and now internal problem (of Kashmir) was to be settled. But for this the support of Shaikh was necessary, because being the popular leader, he was still out of the ‘mainstream.’\textsuperscript{285} In an interview with Peter Hezlhurst, correspondent of the Times London on 10\textsuperscript{th} march 1972, Shaikh said, “Our quarrel with the Government of India is not about accession but is about the quantum of autonomy. Do not forget we brought Kashmir into India, otherwise it would never have been part of India.”\textsuperscript{286} This was a volte face in view of what Shaikh had been holding during two decades.\textsuperscript{287} He took a U-turn regarding Pakistan when he declared that Pakistan was not a party to Kashmir issue.\textsuperscript{288} Shaikh did not want to see before his eyes that “India would again proceed with incursions of Indian laws in Jammu and Kashmir State for total erosion of Article 370, whereby the Muslim majority State of Jammu and Kashmir would be submerged into the Indian sea. It was a ‘change in tactics’ in order to checkmate the erosion of article 370.”\textsuperscript{289} In an interview with Milap Shaikh said that with the emergence of Bangladesh, the political scenario of the sub-continent had changed and the Kashmiris should also change. All we want while remaining with India is political freedom in Kashmir.”\textsuperscript{290} Regarding this shift, Shaikh assured that they had only changed their strategy not the objective—“he and his colleagues do not hanker after power, but power is a means of achieving the objectives for which the people have been struggling so far.” He further added that he was trying to “secure a place of honour (izazat and abroo) for the people of Kashmir.”\textsuperscript{291} The Plebiscite Front also decided not to observe 9\textsuperscript{th} August as ‘black

\footnotesize{281} P. Swami, op. cit., p. 102.
\footnotesize{282} The Plebiscite Front realized that the “situation in Kashmir will not improve on any front whatsoever Shaikh Sahib and all his loyal followers who spent most of period from 1953 to 1975 in prison didn’t become part of the national ‘mainstream.’ Report of the State Autonomy Committee, Srinagar, July 2000, p. 63.
\footnotesize{283} For Simla Agreement see Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis In Kashmir, pp.166-68.
\footnotesize{284} M. Rahman, op. cit., p. 132.
\footnotesize{286} As quoted in Hindustan Times, 11 March, 1972.
\footnotesize{287} Bazaz, Democracy Through Intimidate and Terror, op. cit., p. 23.
\footnotesize{288} Tribune, Chandigarh, 8\textsuperscript{th} July, 1972.
\footnotesize{289} Abdul Rashid, ‘Judging Shaikh’, Greater Kashmir, Srinagar, 10\textsuperscript{th} December, 2009, Srinagar.
\footnotesize{290} Milap, 17 July, 1972.
\footnotesize{291} Speech of Shaikh at Shopiyan, 16 August, 1974, Indian Express, 18 August, 1974.
day’ from 1974.\textsuperscript{292} This move was deemed by many that Shaikh had fought for personal power.\textsuperscript{293} Mrs Gandhi welcomed the change in the thinking of Plebiscite Front leaders and showed her willingness to negotiate with them,\textsuperscript{294} because it provided an opportunity to India to ‘de-internationalize’ the Kashmir question.\textsuperscript{295}

Thus negotiations started between the ‘Plebiscite Front’ and the Centre on two fronts—one was between Afzal Beg, the representative of Shaikh and G. Parthasarathi, the representative of Indira Gandhi; the second was between Shaikh and Indira Gandhi and other leaders.\textsuperscript{296} The ‘peace talks’ formally started on June 12, 1972, when Shaikh Abdullah called on Mrs Indira Gandhi and Mr Afzal Beg started formal discussions with G Parthasarathi at Delhi\textsuperscript{297} and these talks continued for more than two years. There was a great resentment particularly in youth in Kashmir against the changing attitude of Shaikh and they started violent protests against the Indira Abdullah talks. This was for the first time since 1953 that the youth had risen against the Shaikh and took out processions and criticised him for ‘hankering after power.’\textsuperscript{298} Slogans like “azadi ya moth”-freedom or death, “we want independence”, freedom is our birth right” were painted on walls.\textsuperscript{299} Mir Waiz Faoroq blamed Shaikh for “selling out to India in general and Indira Gandhi in particular.”\textsuperscript{300} He also criticised Shaikh’s oft-changing stance on basic issues.\textsuperscript{301} The Jamait -i- Islami (of Kashmir) also questioned the wisdom of the Plebiscite Front, wasting two decades to affirm the reality of Kashmir accession. “If Mr Beg had asserted his view on accession 25 years ago, the people of the State could have been spared years of privation, bloodshed and continuous restless,” Azan the official organ of the Jamat wrote.\textsuperscript{302} There was tension in Kashmir and rift emerged in the Plebiscite Front, which led to the birth of Jammu and Kashmir People’s League on October 13, 1974, with Fazal Haq Qureshi as its

\textsuperscript{292} As it had been observing the day since 1953 when Shaikh was removed from power, Patriot, 9 August, 1974.
\textsuperscript{293} See for example Bazaz, Democracy Through Intimidation and Terror, op. cit., p. 24.
\textsuperscript{294} Mir Qasim, op. cit., p. 136.
\textsuperscript{295} On 28 February, 1972, the American President, Mr Nixon and his Chinese counterpart in a joint statement stressed the need for resolving the Kashmir issue on the basis of the UN resolutions. S Bhatt, op. cit., pp. 163-64.
\textsuperscript{296} Alastair Lamb, Disputed Legacy, op., cit., p. 306.
\textsuperscript{297} Mir Qasim, op. cit., p. 136.
\textsuperscript{298} On 23 July, 1974.
\textsuperscript{299} Current, 16 Dec., 1972.
\textsuperscript{300} Alastair Lamb, Disputed Legacy, op. cit., p. 307.
\textsuperscript{301} Indian Express, 2 Sep., 1974.
\textsuperscript{302} Quoted in Times of India, 5 Feb., 1973.
chairman.\textsuperscript{303} Inside Pakistan Shaikh Abdullah and his colleagues, who were previously referred as "great freedom fighters" came to be derided as "traitors" and "opportunist."\textsuperscript{304} Shaikh Abdullah in order to clear his stand made a whirlwind tour of Kashmir valley.\textsuperscript{305} During his valley tour Shaikh reiterated that nothing would be done behind the Kashmiris back without consulting them\textsuperscript{306} and the outcome of his talks with Mrs Gandhi would be placed before the people for their approval.\textsuperscript{307} He also assured people that he would never betray the trust-reposed the people in him and that he would continue to struggle even for a 'hundred lives to achieve a place of honour and self-respect' for his people.\textsuperscript{308} Shaikh Abdullah also convened a meeting in August 1974 of representatives of all the regions, Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh to 'pave the way for a consensus within the State and thus the stage for a settlement between the Shaikh and the Centre.'\textsuperscript{309} Shaikh Abdullah disclosed in the convention that he was facing difficulties in carrying the Muslims of the valley with him.\textsuperscript{310}

Meanwhile the talks between the Centre and the Shaikh continued. But Shaikh declared that the talks between him and the Central Government would be useless unless the India was prepared to restore the 1953 position in the State.\textsuperscript{311} In a letter to Mrs Gandhi, Shaikh declared, "I can only start from the point where I left off in August, 1953. For me to take even this position is not going to be without difficulties."\textsuperscript{312} But Mrs Gandhi made it clear to him that he (Shaikh) would not be different from any other Chief Ministers of other states of India. She replied to Shaikh, "I have already explained to you that the clock cannot be put back and we have to take note of the realities of the situation."\textsuperscript{313} Shaikh insisted on pre-1953

\textsuperscript{304} Blitz, 27 July, 1973.
\textsuperscript{305} Amrit Bazar Patrika, 9 Dec., 1973.
\textsuperscript{306} Statesman, New Delhi, 14 July, 1974.
\textsuperscript{307} Hindustan Times, 19 Oct., 1974.
\textsuperscript{308} Statesman, 5 July, 1972.
\textsuperscript{309} Times of India, 11 August, 1974.
\textsuperscript{310} National Herald, 13 Aug., 1974.
\textsuperscript{311} Hindustan Times, 19 Oct., 1974. Shaikh Abdullah stressed on the restoration of pre-1953 position when he was Prime Minister, "as a good face saving to retain his stock with the people" Tribune Chandigarh, 18th December, 1972.
\textsuperscript{312} Shaikh to Mrs Gandhi 29 December, 1974, Kashmir Accord Documents Law Department, Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir, (R.R Sec.) Deptt. Of Information Srinagar, pp.11-13. Shaikh as aware of the opposition of the people for if took over power and was unable to carry the majority with him as people would be justified in asking him why he had made them undergo so many hardships for 21 years if he wanted power. Times of India 14 Aug, 1974.
\textsuperscript{313} Mrs Gandhi to Shaikh Feb 12, 1975 Ibid. p. 16.
position so that he could sell to his people and carry them with him.\textsuperscript{314} But Delhi too had to sell it to her people.\textsuperscript{315} It was neither ‘possible nor desirable’ for Mrs Gandhi to restore the \textit{status quo ante}. For, any attempt on her part to do so would compel her to “heed a similar demand for enlarged autonomy by the DMK Government in Tamil Nadu, unleashing disruptive forces all over the country.”\textsuperscript{316} Besides, restoration of pre-1953 position would “mean a tacit admission that the administration of the State since 1953 (when Shaikh was dismissed) was illegal and that the elections held in the State were not fair, and the Assembly, was not the true ‘representative body of the people.’ Consequently, every action of the Assembly after 1953 including the ‘ratification of the accession in 1956’ was invalid.”\textsuperscript{317} And at the international level accepting these demands would, “—weaken India’s position in the United Nations and give a handle to Pakistan to raise the Kashmir issue.”\textsuperscript{318} The extreme stands taken by both Shaikh and Mrs Gandhi had cast doubts about the success of the talks.\textsuperscript{319} Behind the scene, however, there were others at work like Governor, L.K. Jha, Karan Singh, Mir Qasim and D.P Dhar\textsuperscript{320} who shook the mixture of Abdullah – Beg well, before they agreed to the minimum of Indian requirements.\textsuperscript{321} At the same time Shaikh came under tremendous pressure from the family to accept the power again.\textsuperscript{322} He liked family life which had suffered hardships during the 20 years struggle\textsuperscript{323} and his family liked the good things of life.\textsuperscript{324} Mir Qasim persuaded Shaikh to sign a statement which said, ‘he (Shaikh) would not insist on the pre-1953 position.’ And also, ‘on her part, Mrs Gandhi did not insist that the condition of the pre-1953 was out of question.’\textsuperscript{325} Consequently an agreement was signed on 13 November, 1974, between Afzal Beg (the representative of Shaikh) and G. Parthasarathi (the representative of Mrs Gandhi), which came to be known as ‘Kashmir Accord’\textsuperscript{326} by

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\textsuperscript{314} & His speech at Srinagar on 7 July 1974, \textit{Bilitz}, 31 July, 1974. & Ibd.  
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\textsuperscript{315} & \textit{Times of India}, 12 June, 1974.  
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\textsuperscript{317} & \textit{Anrit Bazar Patrika} (Calcutta), 21 Sep., 1974. As cited by Ibd, p. 36.  
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\textsuperscript{318} & Alastair Lamb, \textit{Disputed Legacy}, op. cit., p. 306.  
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\textsuperscript{319} & Ibd.  
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\textsuperscript{320} & \textit{Mother Land} (cartoon) 16 Sep., 1974.  
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\textsuperscript{321} & Ghulam Ahmad, \textit{My Years With Shaikh Abdullah}, Srinagar, 2008, p. 41.  
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\textsuperscript{322} & ‘The Lion of Kashmir Returns,’ \textit{Asian Affairs}, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Jan-Feb, 1975), pp. 193-94.  
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\textsuperscript{323} & Ajit Bhattacharjea, \textit{Wounded Valley}, op. cit., p. 236.  
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\textsuperscript{324} & Mir Qasim, op. cit., p. 138.  
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which Shaikh Abdullah resumed power and took over as the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. Thus the Accord of November 1974 was concluded between “two individuals with no constitutional or domestic legitimacy.”

The first clause of the six point Accord says this; “the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which is a constituent unit of the Union of India, shall in its relations with the Union continue to be governed by Article 370 (eroded one) of Constitution of India.” By this Shaikh accepted the finality of ‘accession’ and also the erosion of Kashmir’s autonomy, process of which had started immediately after his arrest in 1953. In fact it was made clear to Shaikh that “Article 370 could not be restored to its original form.” The Accord ratified the power of Indian Parliament to “make laws relating to the prevention of activities, directed towards disclaiming, questioning or disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or bringing about cession a part of territory of India or secession of a part of the territory of India from the union or causing insult to the Indian national flag, the Indian anthem and the constitution.”

However, the State was given right to review laws extended to the State after 1953 from concurrent list or to have its own legislation relating to the matters less important, like welfare measures, cultural matters, social security, personal law and procedural laws. But that too needed the consent of President of India. In fact a committee was established to examine the matter, but its ‘recommendations were never made public.” Even the nomenclature of Prime Minister and Sadr-i-Reyasat in place of Chief Minister and Governor were not accepted. There was a sharp reaction in Pakistan against the Accord and Mr Bhutto denounced it as a “sell-out”. He appealed to the people of Pakistan and Kashmir to observe hartal on 28th February 1975 against the Accord. Complete hartal was observed in Pakistan; and Pakistanis

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327 The Hindu, Sep. 25, 2010. Dr Mustafa Kamal son of Shaikh Abdullah in an interview with ‘Rising Kashmir’ refused to call this deal as accord, “I mean to say this accord has never taken place. Has this accord passed in the assembly? No so where from comes the term 1975 Accord?” Rising Kashmir, Srinagar, 5 December, 2009.

328 Thus he also condoned his dismissal in 1953. Greater Kashmir, Srinagar, 5 December, 2008.

329 N.C Behera, State Identity and Violence, op. cit., p.134. From 1954 to 1977 twenty eight Constitutional Orders had been issued by the President of India to integrate Kashmir with Indian Union; and also 262 laws had been made applicable to Kashmir by the Indian Parliament up to 1973, B.Puri, Jammu and Kashmir, op. cit.,p.151.

330 S Bose, op. cit., p. 88.

331 6th Clause of the Accord.

332 S Bhatt, op. cit., p. 191.
and Kashmiris in the United Kingdom and elsewhere held demonstrations.\textsuperscript{333} Pakistan also protested to United Nations, supported by China, that the Accord was against the Simla Agreement and the United Nations requirements for a Kashmir Plebiscite.\textsuperscript{334}

"This was not a settlement, writes Sumantra Bose, "Abdullah would have accepted- or even considered- twenty, ten or even five years earlier."\textsuperscript{335} Thus the twenty years of struggle for restoration of self- respect (izzat and abraoo) ended in a compromise.\textsuperscript{336} Shaikh Abdullah made a deal without taking his people into confidence and accepted the limited powers of Chief Ministerial ship.\textsuperscript{337} The Accord was "in reality humiliation of Kashmir patriots........"\textsuperscript{338} For return to power, Shaikh had to pay a proportionate loss of support among the Muslims.\textsuperscript{339} The people were disappointed with the Accord, because it was Shaikh who had taught them during long twenty years that they should accept nothing short to self- determination. His followers felt disgusted for their 'self- respect was damaged.' Abdul Qayoom Zargar, an NC veteran, who was personal secretary of Afzal Beg in 1975, told in an interview to Sumantra Bose that "its (accord75) terms were deeply unpopular among NC-PF’s activists and mass following, and swallowed as a bitter pill only because Abdullah had accepted the accord."\textsuperscript{340} However, some of his veteran comrades like (Munshi Ishaq), Mr Abdul Rashid Shah, secretary of Plebiscite Front and Sofi Mohammad Akbar could not swallow it and retired from the active politics.\textsuperscript{341}

"The protracted negotiations were carried on secretly and the Kashmiris were not taken into confidence until the deal was struck early in 1975."\textsuperscript{342} While as Shaikh was trying to persuade people that there were many things for them in the Accord, but Mrs Gandhi in her speech in the Parliament made it clear that Shaikh had proved to be a weak man on the negotiation table and had surrendered almost all his demands in lieu of Chief Ministerial ship. On February 24, Mrs Indira Gandhi made a long

\textsuperscript{333} A. Lamb, \textit{Disputed Legacy}, op. cit., p. 308.
\textsuperscript{334} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{335} S. Bose, op. cit., p. 88.
\textsuperscript{337} \textit{Greater Kashmir}, Srinagar, 5 Dec, 2008.
\textsuperscript{338} Bazaz, \textit{Democracy Through Intimidation and Terror}, op. cit., p. 25.
\textsuperscript{339} "The Lion of Kashmir Returns," \textit{Asian Affairs}, op. cit., p. 193.
\textsuperscript{340} S. Bose, op. cit., pp. 88-89.
\textsuperscript{341} \textit{Times of India}, 3 July, 1975.
\textsuperscript{342} Bazaz, \textit{Democracy Through Intimidation and Terror}, op. cit., p. 23.
statement in the Parliament on the Kashmir Accord. She said that the results had been achieved within the framework of the Indian constitution. “Shaikh Abdullah was very anxious that to start with, the constitutional relationship between the State and the Centre should be as it was in 1953 when he was in power. It was explained to him that the clock could not be put back in this matter. Mr Afzal Beg pressed for the transfer of provisions relating to Fundamental Rights to the State Constitution, the removal of the supervision and control of the Election Commission of India over elections to the State Legislature and the modification of Article 356 to require the State Government’s concurrence before imposing President’s rule to the State. It was not found possible to agree any of these demands. I must say to the credit of Shaikh Abdullah that despite his strong views on these issues, he has accepted the agreed conclusions.”

This statement created sharp reaction in Kashmir, where demonstrations were held and slogans like “Shaikh-Indira Samjota Murdabad” (Down with Shaikh Indira Agreement). Even Shaikh was taken aback by this statement. He felt the statement projected him as a man who ‘bargained everything for position’. “You have made a statement as if I have sold out Kashmir for the chair of Chief Minister,” Shaikh told Mir Qasim.

Thus Shaikh Abdullah did not succeed in achieving his ambition of resuming the power from where he had left, when he was dismissed in 1953. The position he accepted was ‘quite below his stature.’ With the signing of the Accord, the Shaikh lost his popularity, because his popularity since his dismissal in 1953 had been based on his anti-India propaganda. However, ‘it did not bother him in his life time till 1982 because of his immense tall stature and unrivalled popularity.’ And also because the people considered him more as a religious leader than seeing him in ‘political terms’.

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345 Mir Qasim op. cit., p. 143.