India and Pakistan are geographically one and jointly form the Indian sub-continent which is isolated from the rest of Asia by the great Himalayan ramparts. India shares 1800 miles long frontier with east and west Pakistan (excluding 560 miles of Kashmir frontier). What is more, Pakistan has a peculiar feature of being composed of two territories, separated by more than a thousand miles of Indian territory. The Indo-Pakistan frontiers are not intercepted by any natural barriers and have been drawn on the principle of self-determination. India and Pakistan might come together and jointly decide to maintain a defensive ring around the Indian sub-continent. Their relations may be hostile and this might lead one or both to seek help from outside against the other and deploy most of their forces for the safeguards of their extensive frontiers. Each would regard outside help to the other as a matter of direct concern to it.

The hostility between India and Pakistan has produced a number of striking diplomatic shifts. In the early 1949 Indo-American relations were at low ebb, while the Indo-Chinese and Pakistan-American connection flourished. At that time, India was not half as close to the Soviet Union as she was to the United States. She tried her best to be on good terms with Washington. Despite India's policy of non-alignment, she leaned towards the West. But the difference in the psychology of
the two nations, the complex of each other's past experience and above all, the assessment of the need of their national security prevented them from getting closer. The United States naturally moved closer to those countries which appreciated its values, motives and policies and assumed that in the fight against communism, Pakistan would be a more faithful friend than India. Problem of international communism and difference over policies towards Pakistan had brought misunderstanding and irritation into Indo-American relations. Indian attitudes towards Pakistan seemed somewhat comparable to the American attitudes towards Soviet Union. India looked Pakistan as the main threat to its security like American view to Soviet leadership as the greatest threat of its security. It is true that American response to Indo-Pakistan friction had, at times, been reminiscent of Indian response to the Soviet-American friction. When it came to India and Pakistan, it was the United States which sought friendly relation with both countries and explored way of bringing them closer, while itself trying not to take any sides in their disputes.

Having no reason for being unfriendly with either country the United States had repeatedly expressed its desire, wherever possible, to help each country to develop and strengthen itself. Both India and Pakistan received economic help from the United States. American help and political alliance had gone to Pakistan only and not to India solely because India had declined such help and association for the maintainance of principle of non-alignment. The United States had to
take positions inside or outside the United Nations on Indo-Pakistan disagreements as was in the case of Kashmir. It had according to its own lights, made every effort to judge the issue on their merit, in an attempt to help the two countries to remove the differences between them.

The divergent Indian and American perspectives had found their way into policies because of their immediate security interests and caused intense reactions in Kashmir and American military aid programme to Pakistan. The question was whether without taking any violent measure India and the United States, for the safeguard of respective interest, may make a closer adjustment of their respective policies. Although American security is involved to the degree that Pakistan is a part of the ring of deterrence, the United States was neither afraid of Pakistan nor regarded Pakistan as likely to commit any aggression. Its interest in the Kashmir dispute derives from its general desire apparently to strengthen peace and justice and to safeguard its strategic interest in this territory. For India, on the other hand, Pakistan is an immediate neighbour that commands the major and traditional invasion-route into India from the north-west and was considered as an aggressor in Kashmir. This estimate of danger to vital interest of India had resulted in a pronounced emotional straits amounting to a burden on the Indian national budget, and continuing bad relation with Pakistan in other aspects of their relations as well. Within this context, the question of Kashmir dispute not to examine the details of India's disagreement with Pakistan but to isolate those factors in the case that had in the past exacerbated Indo-American relation was to be judged.
Position of India was rather shaky during that period because of the reason that the United States had consistently misinterpreted the Kashmir situation specially from the time it was placed before the Security Council in January, 1948. India had often felt bitterly that Americans ignored the cruelty and terror, arson and murder committed by the tribal and other invaders in Kashmir with Pakistan's assent if not with its active help. India had complained that the United States, which moved quickly when Greece and other cold war areas were threatened and was eager to condemn communist China for its aggression in Korea, but in the case of Pak aggression they did not response so quickly. The United States had been lending its support to the Pakistan on the ground that there had been Indian aggression in Kashmir for the purpose of securing Kashmir's accession by fraud and violence. General view in India was that the United States should, instead, extend support to the Indian charge of Pak aggression. In addition, American policy on Kashmir dispute had been widely interpreted in India as a reaction to India's refusal to align herself with the United States in the cold war. This trend in Indian thinking became stronger since 1954 when Arms Aid Agreement was signed both by America and Pakistan. In the United States the essential points at issue in the Kashmir case had generally been appraised quite differently. American opinion recognized the great strategic and

psychological value of Kashmir to India and Pakistan, as well as its potential economic importance to both. Kashmir's northern frontier, which lies close to the Soviet Union and borders of China, has importance as marking the upper limit of the Indian and Pakistan sub-continent. The national prestige and purposes of India and Pakistan are equally and fully committed to the possession of Kashmir. The widely held American view that the Kashmir dispute could not be settled by a straightforward acceptance of India's original complaint evolved from several considerations. The first of all the widespread reaction of shock to the outbreaks that spread across West Pakistan and Upper India from August, 1947. The violence in Kashmir seemed to be a part of a longer pattern of violence. This suggested to America as well as others that complaint of India had not come before the Security Council with clean hand. The prevailing American reaction, therefore, was that it would be unreal to try to solve the Kashmir dispute by adjudication of legal points. In the course of protracted negotiation from 1948 onwards, the impression gained currency in the United States that India, more than Pakistan, was resisting proposals for demilitarization and for plebiscite conditions that seemed reasonable to impartial outsiders. This very point was emphasised by Sir Owen Dixon in reporting the failure of his mediatory efforts. Finally he said, "I became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarization in any such form or to provisions governing the period of the plebiscite of any such character as would, in my opinion, permit the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence
and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperilled. 2

America could not take easy the assertions of leading spokesmen of the Government of India. Adverse role played by the United States and Security Council in connection with the Kashmir issue was the result of hostilities towards India rather than the result of honest differences with India's policies. Thus opinion of America had been critical of India's attitude in the Kashmir issue. They were of the opinion that there was no question of showing favour to one party or the other, but only the question of each party's willingness to carry out basic agreements as to follow the recognized international standard in resolving a dispute which they had brought to the attention of the United Nation. It is on this point that American sympathy towards India had been most strained. There were serious objections in holding a plebiscite so long after the Kashmir dispute began, so the question arose whether any alternative measure of settlement could be adopted. Any cause on which India and Pakistan could agree would probably be regarded with favour by the United States of America. Suggestions for having a plebiscite in the valley of Kashmir alone, coupled with the partitioning of the remaining areas, had at times caught American attention as a possible solution. Such a suggestion was, however, still far from the official view of India; she rather stressed to make

Pakistan guilty of aggressions and wanted to clear Pakistan forces from the soil of Kashmir. When Kashmir issue came up first in the Security Council, the American delegate, Mr. Warren Austin did not put any objection to the legality of the presence of Indian troops in Kashmir but he refrained from conceding India's contention that Pakistan had committed aggression. Pakistan was perplexed by this approach and was quick to express support for a subsequent suggestion by President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee that the dispute should be resolved through arbitration. India opposed this suggestion.

The move of Sheikh Abdullah in holding election to form a Constituent Assembly in Kashmir and in proceeding to conclude an agreement with the Government of India in July, 1952 on the constitutional position of the State, was viewed with profound concern by Pakistan. The United States again indicated its sympathy for Pakistan Earnest Gross, the American delegate in the Security Council made it clear that his country would not regard the elections in Kashmir as equivalent to a plebiscite as envisaged in the resolutions of the United Nations. Mr. Gross waged the Security Council to call upon India and Pakistan Governments to seek a solution by all manner of peaceful means including arbitration. The United States took the lead along with Great Britain in sponsoring a move that led to the appointment of Frank Graham, President of the University of North

---

3 Security Council Official Records: 6th year, 240th meeting, pp. 370-76. (Statement by the Secretary of States, Mr. Dean Acheson on Truman-Attlee letters in the Department of States Bulletin, Vol. 21, p. 399).

Carolina as the representative of the United Nations in India and Pakistan. This development was welcomed by Pakistan, but Nehru characterized it as "extremely unfriendly, illogical and (one that) betrayed a great deal of ignorance of the basic issue". The efforts of Graham during the next two years did not lead to any significant progress towards the narrowing of the difference between the two States.

A new factor entered into the situation when, on January 17, 1952, Jacob Malik, Soviet Delegate in the Security Council, took a positive stand on the Kashmir issue. He charged that the Anglo-American emphasis on assistance through the United Nations was a mere pretext for an annexation of imperialistic design to convert Kashmir into an Anglo-American colony and a military and strategic base. The American delegates refuted the allegation and American Newspapers made some adverse comments on Malik's opinion. One wonders whether they realized the implications for the future of the Soviet delegation's intervention. It revealed the Soviet Union's determination to be in closer relations with India in the event of Pakistan becoming too cooperative with the United States. Though the United States leaned considerably towards Pakistan, it carefully avoided any action that might imply endorsement of Pakistan's claims in Kashmir. American policy, it was claimed by United States representatives, continued to be what the Secretary of States had laid down in an address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 23, 1948. It was a policy of encouraging the continuation of mediation and negotiation between the great nations.

---

India and Pakistan for a peaceful settlement which may bring out a conclusion to an issue charged with great dangers. The prospects for these negotiations were never brightened before April 17, 1963, the date on which Mohammed Ali took up the charge as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Soon after assuming office Mohammed Ali sent a message to Nehru declaring that it would be his earnest endeavour to promote friendly relations between our two countries. The Indian Prime Minister reciprocated warmly, stating, "We should settle all our problems in a spirit of friendship and cooperation." Shortly thereafter, preliminary discussions were held between the two Prime Ministers when they were in London for the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth. Talks were resumed when Nehru paid his first visit to Karachi on July 25, 1963. A communique issued at the end of the talks stated that the Kashmir problem was discussed in all aspects and that the ground had been prepared for further talks. This new cordiality passed through a severe test due to dramatic ouster and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah on August 8, 1963. The news created considerable amount of hostile comments in Pakistan but it did not disrupt the negotiations over Kashmir. Seeking an immediate meeting in view of what he described as the distressing development in Kashmir, the Pakistan Prime Minister cabled Nehru, "We must succeed because there is no such a state that we must fail."

---

6 GAOR, Session I: Pan meetings, p. 41.
7 The initiative had been taken by his predecessor, Nazimuddin when he wrote to Nehru suggesting a meeting at Karachi to discuss outstanding issues, (Summit meeting), New Delhi, April 23, 1963 and New York Times, 7th, 11th and 16th April, 1963.
8 The Hindu, April 22, 1963.
9 Telegram from Pakistan High Commission, August 13, 1963.
The Statesman.
President Truman had said that though Pakistan was one of the youngest nations, she was progressive and powerful. He added that its friendship for the West may become an important factor in giving stability to the Near East. At the same time Pakistan is a valuable ally in South Asia because of its strategic location and its control of land bases in Central Asia. When Eisenhower became the President, Truman's thesis was translated into action. In October, 1953, Washington invited Mohammed Ali, the Prime Minister of Pakistan and Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army, to the United States. In a Press Conference Mohammed Ali stressed on the purpose of achieving increased strength and higher and stronger degree of economic stability designed to foster international peace and security within the framework of United Nation's Charter. Before making his formal request, Pakistan informed of her requirement of United States' Mutual Security Legislation and bound herself in agreement with them. Pakistan desired to make it clear that the assistance which she asked for, will be utilized for the purpose of maintaining and promoting stability and providing her own legitimate defence and putting her in a position enabling her to participate in United States' system of collective security. In that way, Pakistan could strengthen the United States' defence in Asia. Ghulam Mohammed the Governor General of Pakistan, came to Washington and negotiated a close United States-Pakistan alliance. The New York Times reported that the United States had sought military base in Pakistan in exchange of arms. Eisenhower sent Vice President Nixon and Dulles, Secretary of State to Pakistan and India in December, 1953.
At the end of his visit to India and Pakistan, Dulles had nothing to say about India. But he publicly stated that he found warm friendship in Pakistan and that the strong spiritual faith and martial spirit of the Pakistan people may stand as a defendable bulwark against communism. Nixon tended to favour military aid to Pakistan and the pact between them as a counter-force to continued neutrality of Jawaharlal Nehru's India. He also said that the policy of the United States should be based not on any fear of enraging Nehru and this had worsened the situation. The United States' Ambassador in Delhi (Mr. George Allen) had delivered a personal letter from President Eisenhower to Nehru on February 24, 1954. This letter which gave an assurance that the United States Government's decision to aid Pakistan was not directed against India and offered similar assistance to the Government of India. But on March 1, 1954 Nehru declined President Eisenhower's offer and in a statement in the House of People on March 1, 1954 he strongly criticized the United States' military aid to Pakistan as a form of intervention in Indo-Pakistan relations. In an interview on December 26, 1953 Mr. Mohammed Ali expressed that a strong Pakistan would be in a position to defend the border of India and would, therefore, be the asset to India.

On January 23, 1954, Prime Minister Nehru in his Presidential Address to the 59th Session of National Congress of India stated: "Peace is not, that we have viewed, the absence of war. It is this context that we have viewed the proposals for United States Military aid to Pakistan. It is not merely a question of rich and a powerful
country aiding an under-developed country but something which goes
to the root of the problem of peace as well as of many countries". He also said "... this is a matter which constitutionally or otherwise is not our concern what kind of pact Pakistan and the United States have, but practically it is a matter of most intense concern to us and something which will have very far-reaching consequences on the whole structure of things in South Asia and specially on India and Pakistan." 10

India’s objections to United States-Pakistan Military Aid Agreement signed on February 25, 1954 were outlined by Nehru in his Presidential Address at the Kalyani Session of the Indian National Congress in January, 1954. He pointed out that "(i) this would bring the cold war to India’s border and disturb the 'area of peace'. (ii) India has been anxious to build in cooperation with other Asian Nations. This move would upset the balance existing between India and Pakistan which is dangerous to India’s Security. (iii) It would introduce Western and foreign domination into Asia in a new guise." 11 India, however, appreciated the assurances given by President Eisenhower that if United States’ Military aid to Pakistan is misused, immediate appropriate action must be taken by the United Nations. But India was not questioning American motives in aiding Pakistan which was unfriendly towards

10 Presidential Address by Nehru at the 69th Session of Indian National Congress on January 23, 1954.
11 Times of India, December, 1955.
India; she was concerned only with the consequences of such aid to Pakistan vis-à-vis India.  

India was constrained to view it as an intervention by United States in favour of Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute. Nehru remarked in the course of his speech in the Lok Sabha on March 16, 1964:

"A situation has arisen whereby any officer of the United States' Army cannot be considered neutral in the dispute in Kashmir."

On March 2, 1964 in the Chamber of United States Senate the Senator, William J. Fulbright Arkansan condemned the decision of the United States to furnish military assistance to Pakistan. Arkansan, the Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, declared: "I think the decision to supply military aid to Pakistan is an unfortunate mistake. I have the greatest respect for the people of Pakistan, as I do for the people of India... Their mutual difficulties have threatened war; so we are not unaware of the tension between them and therefore should have been extremely careful in our relations with them."

The Eisenhower administration ignored Fulbright's warning, proceeded to supply military assistance to Pakistan and erected a system of military alliances in Asia with Pakistan as one of the most important members. The American move was a significant landmark in the relation of the United States with Pakistan. It also had a profound impact on the relations of the United States with India. In May, 1964 the United States and Pakistan signed a mutual aid and Security Agreement.

12 The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, December 6, 1966.
14 Congressional Record, 1964, Vol. 100.
In an obvious effort to conciliate Indian opinion, Eisenhower stated that under the mutual Security Legislation the recipient country was specifically directed to use the equipments received solely for his internal security and legitimate self-defence or to participate in the defence of the area of which it is a part. "Any recipient country also must undertake that it will not engage in any act of aggression against any other nation. I can say that if our aid to any country including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in aggression, I will undertake immediately, in accordance with any Constitutional Authorities, appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression. I would also consult with Congress on further step." 15

In an interview with the United States News and World Report, the Pakistan Prime Minister stated "Of course he nothing to prevent us from asking a friendly power including America to use those bases to help defend this region." 16 In July, 1954, Brigadier General William T. Senton, Chief of Staff of the United States Sixth Army in San Francisco and a veteran of campaigns in Italy, France, Germany during the Second World War arrived in Pakistan as Head of the United States Military Assistance. Advisory Group and Pakistan signed the South East Asian Defence Treaty in Manila on September 8, 1954 and thus became "Member of a full-fledged military alliance. Already, in April, 1954, Pakistan had signed an agreement with Turkey, which, less than a year and a half later, grew into the Bagdad Pact. By these treaties

Pakistan became, as some of its leaders proudly claimed, the most allied of all the Asian allies of the United States.

The American Military commitments to Pakistan were qualified in two significant ways. Unlike its obligation to its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation partners, the United States did not bind itself to regard automatically any attack on Pakistan as an attack on itself. It only agreed "to meet the common danger in accordance with the constitutional process". 17 Importance to the label and stipulated that its commitments would "Apply only to Communist aggression".

President Eisenhower's letter to Nehru (February 24, 1964) expressing his readiness to give the most sympathetic consideration to any request for military aid from India were unmistakable indications to Pakistani leaders of importance that the United States attached to placating India and removing its misgiving concerning American motives. 18 Apparently, Pakistan leaders hoped that in course of time they would be able to persuade the Americans to modify their stand. Would the alliance with mighty American eventually enable Pakistan to get Kashmir from Bharat? To many Pakistani that was the test of its utility and they were not pessimistic about the outcome. American policy in regard to the Kashmir issue had, from the beginning, appeared to Indian opinion somewhat sympathetic to the Pakistan. To the Pakistanis, however, it appeared as though the United States was unable or unwilling to give forthright support to their cause.

18 Text of Eisenhower's letter to the Prime Minister Nehru in the Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 30., p. 400.
Taken as a whole the prospects of adjustments in India's policies that might open the way to a wider area of agreement between India and the United States on the solution of the Kashmir issue appeared to be adversely affected by the new factor of American arms aid to Pakistan, which began in 1954. Prime Minister Nehru referred the matter of military aid to Pakistan in a Press Conference on 15th November and next day, the Indian Ambassador called on to the Secretary of States to seek information about the proposed pact between America and Pakistan. On February 24, 1954 President Eisenhower announced that the United States was gravely concerned over the weakness of defensive capabilities in the Middle East and was complying with the request by Pakistan for military aid. He said that we would be guided by the stated purposes and requirements of the mutual security. Those included specifically the provision that equipment, materials or services provided would be used solely to maintain the recipient country's internal security and for its legitimate self-defence, or services, or to permit it to participate in the defence of area of which it was a part. Any recipient country also must undertake that it would not engage in any act of aggression against any other nation. These undertakings afforded adequate assurance to all nations, regardless of this political orientation and whatever their international policies might be, that the arms the United States provided for the defence of the free world would in no way threaten their own security.

The United States President had not been misinformed about probable reactions in India. Prime Minister Nehru dismissed the American offer of military aid as gratuitous, since it was public know-
ledge that India would not accept military assistance from any foreign power. The Prime Minister declared that the provision of American military aid to Pakistan had destroyed the roots and foundations of the proposed plebiscite in Kashmir and had completely altered the political and military character. Indians feared that the effect of the military aid programme would be to make Pakistan more intractable. It could now count on United States support in case of trouble and its capacity to intimidate the Kashmir issue or to launch an attack on India would be increased. The conclusion was widely accepted in India that the United States had ceased to be neutral in the Kashmir issue. Since United States was an ally of Pakistan Prime Minister Nehru charged that India was being encircled by Pakistan's military arrangements and that large bases had been built not only in Pakistan but so far as it was known, military bases had been set up in Pakistan occupied territories of Kashmir. Nehru's views were developed and expanded in the Indian Press and on political platforms on the point that the United States came to be regarded in many quarters as the principal cause of India's insecurity in its relations with Pakistan. While the Pakistan Pact was being negotiated, there was considerable opposition in the United States and that was taken to be a departure from the traditional American foreign policy. However, since then the opposition had died and congressional and general opinion had apparently come to accept the military assistance programme of the present.

---

19 Poplar, S. L. & Talbot, P.: India and America, New Delhi, p. 88.
Assisting Pakistan to improve the stock of military equipments, mobility, training and organization of its troops would, it was thought, help to resist Soviet attempt to overrun or subvert the country. Finally it should be recalled that military aid was only a part of the assistance that the United States rendered to Pakistan. A large volume of economic aid also being pledged to it on the ground that the healthy development of Pakistan was the best assurance of its peace and stability against any internal or external threats. It was the American view, in general, that the interests of the free world would best be served by actions strengthening both India and Pakistan and these ends could best be met if both countries moved forward in peace towards stability and economic development. It was also an American assumption that military aid to Pakistan would constitute no threat to Indian security.

This assessment was based partly on the relative size and strength of India and Pakistan, with India having nearly four times the area of Pakistan, four times the population, probably ten times the industrial base, and superior strength in most other measurable dimension. It was also based on the assurances of the Pakistan Government that the military aid would be used for the designated common purposes of defence against Soviet attack. Presumably American authorities assessed that even if Pakistan, despite its relative weakness and its official pledges, were to determine on a seemingly hopeless aggression against India, American influence would be adequate to resist the action or at the worst to bring it to a prompt end. American did feel that India would place more confidence on American assurance.
It was believed in India that acceptance of American military aid had been made palatable to public opinion in Pakistan not because there was any real danger but because it was represented as being advantageous in local rivalries. This had tended to harden the local conflicts instead of soothing them. Pakistan was a politically unstable entity and to hold public support its leaders were consciously indulging irritations between India and itself, and that Pakistan was making conditions increasingly intolerable to its Hindu citizens. Pakistan believed that if their power to govern be critically weakened, the leaders of Pakistan would seek to restore their domestic authority by launching disguised aggression against India.

Indian resentment against American arms aid to Pakistan could be explained in a large part by the fact that by allying itself with the United States Pakistan had aligned itself with one side in the cold war. This ran counter to basic Indian concepts of foreign policy. To the Indian way of thinking alignment endangered India's security by bringing the clashing interest of the major powers on the borders of India by joining the Baghdad Pact and South East Asian Treaty Organization. Pakistan had also presumably sought to strengthen its own general influence in international affairs. An influence which India suspected, through which Pakistan had also taken a position different from that of India in Western Asia while India felt that its security and other interests would best be served by encouraging neutralism and by cultivating extremely friendly relations with Egypt and Arab.
As a result India viewed Pakistan as an immediate and continuing threat to its security; its policies towards its neighbour had been very similar to policies which had commonly been adopted by the larger military powers under similar feelings of danger. United States had respect for India for her protective measures. There was, however, a feeling in the United States that India, which had taken a leading role in urging other countries along peaceful paths, did not help to ease international tensions in regard to general problem by its policy towards Pakistan. Similarly, many Indians were interested to know why the United States should criticize Indian policy towards Pakistan when in the eyes of the Indian it was parallel to the American policy towards the Soviet Union. After all the disputes over Kashmir and arms aid to Pakistan are the two among a great many difficulties between India and Pakistan. But in the meantime, for the common interest of both the parties, a good number of conflicts had already been solved by compromise and negotiations while still more were under peaceful discussion between the two countries. Representatives of India and Pakistan had frequently expressed their hopes for improved mutual relations, and this must also be the hope of those who are concerned over these difficulties. Real hope for improved Indo-American adjustments in the field of their relations with Pakistan arose from the prospect that India and Pakistan could gradually, or perhaps, at a stroke solve their troubles.

A new pattern of relationship seemed to emerge from 1965. Pakistan had never suppressed its anti-Indian motivation for joining South East Asian Treaty Organization and the United States, which viewed South
East Asian Treaty Organization as a means of controlling Peking, had not originally included Pakistan in the alignment. Pakistan hoped to isolate neutral India, dependent on Western and Soviet military support, by bringing the other Colombo Powers into South East Asian Treaty Organization. Though the attempt at aligning its Colombo partners failed, Pakistan succeeded in breaking the group unity. But the different objectives of Karachi and Washington meant that even at the start, Pakistan's dramatic abandonment of non-alignment was far from clear-cut.

Meanwhile Karachi had been closer to the pro-Western states of Turkey and Iran, in a move that culminated in the Baghdad Pact of 1955 (with Britain and Iraq as the other full members). In fact, Washington had first discerned Pakistan's strong interest in a security link while canvassing for a stronger diplomatic posture in the Middle East. But when in November, 1963 the United States informed India of its intention to offer Pakistan substantial military assistance, India withdrew an offer made to Karachi to consider a plebiscite for Kashmir and adopted a position of complete rigidity on this issue.

Mutual Defence Assistance of May, 1964 between the United States and Pakistan put the neighbour of Pakistan to a major military threat and necessitated Indian reassessment and placed Pakistan in the service of American interest. India's resentment even led it to demand the removal of American citizen from the United States Peace Observation Mission in Kashmir.

The agreement of 1954 stipulated that Pakistan would use the aid only for internal security, self-defence, participation in the defence of the area, or in United Nations' collective security measures.
Further, Pakistan affirmed that it would not commit aggression. Nonetheless, India remained unmodified and took the same aggrieved stand on the ground that these conditions did not protect its security interest.

Under the American-Pakistan Accord of March 5, 1969, United States recognized Pakistan's independence and integrity which was vital to its own interests and in the case of aggression against Pakistan the Government of United States of America, in accordance with the constitution, will take such appropriate action, including the use of arms force, as may be mutually agreed upon. At this time President Mohammed Ayub Khan offered to form a common defence policy with India if New Delhi would settle Kashmir dispute. But Prime Minister Nehru on May 7, 1969 rejected this offer, terming it almost some kind of military alliance. American leaders, despite occasional lapses, remained aware of the fact that the policy of military pacts and specially the agreement with Pakistan, had been evolved to meet a set of specific circumstances with further modifications as and when needed.

Developments in the field of ballistic missiles, polaris and nuclear submarines provided considerable impetus to a reappraisal of American policies. As the period of initial tension and anxiety over Russian intentions were off in 1958, American leaders began to have a more balanced evaluation of India's role. They had skillfully sought to counteract the adverse impact on Indian opinion regarding United States military aid to Pakistan by continuing economic assistance to India. And, while the process continued, American policy-makers watched
with close attention the course of Sino-Indian relations. The vigorous Indian reaction to the suppression of the Tibetan uprising and subsequent reports concerning the Chinese threat to India's own frontiers indicated that a drastic reorientation of Indian policies towards China was inevitable. It was a development of such far-reaching importance in the world politics that the United States felt impelled to reconsider its policy in South Asia and especially the discord in the Indian sub-continent caused due to American military aid to Pakistan. The United States thus became deeply interested in exploring ways of bringing about a modification of its policies in order to promote a rapprochement between Pakistan and India.

Politicians of Pakistan watched these developments with grave anxiety and their nervousness was reflected by a threat to look elsewhere for protection. Prime Minister Feroz Khan told the Pakistan Parliament in March, 1969, "I hear rumblings . . . . . that from 1969 they (the Americans) probably want to stop our military aid. I am sure if they do that it will be under pressure from India. I can tell the world that if our people find their freedom threatened by India they will break all pacts to save freedom and will shake hands with those whom we have made our enemies for the sake of others." 20 Feroz Khan and his associates failed to realize that threats of this kind only served to give rise to doubts concerning the real intentions of Pakistan in becoming a military ally of the United States. The Prime Minister

was not destined to carry out his grim warning; only after six months of his discourse in Parliament, Pakistan itself had come under military rule.

Perhaps no other person but General Ayub Khan, the new ruler of the country had been so closely and continuously associated with the evolution and implementation of Pakistan's military relationship with the United States. American leaders viewed him as a competent and dependable man who might succeed in providing some stability to his hard-pressed country. The United States sought to reassure the new regime concerning its intentions by signing a bilateral agreement on March 5, 1959 which proclaimed that "the Government of the United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan". A statement issued by the State Department asserted that the United States would view "with the utmost gravity any threat to the territorial integrity and political independence of Pakistan". Armed with this guarantee and possibly with some encouragement from the United States, Ayub Khan took a significant new step. On April 24, 1969, Ayub Khan suggested that "in the event of an external threat both India and Pakistan should defend the sub-continent in cooperation with each other." Mr. K. Balaram, the correspondent of The Hindu, reported

from New York that Pakistan representatives in America had begun to play a new tune, and that the show had been initiated by Aziz Ahmed, the Ambassador of Pakistan in a speech on April 30, 1959. The Ambassador said:

"The Indian sub-continent can be defended territorially and ideologically only by the joint efforts of India and Pakistan. Acting separately or against each other as at present, neither can defend it. Pakistan, for its part, is keenly conscious of the grim facts... Pakistan would be willing to participate with India in a scheme of joint defence of the sub-continent if the impediments to such joint action are first eliminated. If our great neighbour were to view the facts of life in their correct perspective and were to desire it, Pakistan could well become its defence shield, lying as it does across the historic invasion routes to India in the North-West and approaches to that country from South-East.*

Two of the principal impediments that the Ambassador had referred to were Kashmir and the dispute over the waters of the Indus. If the Pakistani proposal were to be conditional on complete surrender by India on these two issues, it would have been unacceptable to India. However, there was not much discussion on the implications of the proposal in India since Prime Minister Nehru speedily and summarily rejected it. "I don't understand when people say: 'Let us have a common defence policy. Against whom?'", Nehru asked. In November, 24

23 The Hindu, May 3, 1959. The New York Times (May 1, 1959) quoted the Ambassador as stating that a "special responsibility" rested on the United States in resolving the disputes between India and Pakistan.

24 The Hindu, May 6, 1959.
1959, Ayub Khan again spoke of the usefulness of an agreement for joint defence of the sub-continent and the Indian Prime Minister again rejected it in decisive fashion. 25

These developments were watched with keen interest in the United States. American policy-makers were undoubtedly disappointed over Nehru's attitude, though were unwilling to give up hope. Mr. A. Harriman told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that Nehru's rejection of Ayub Khan's offer might not be the final word. He expressed his agreement with the view that the United States "ought to pursue it quietly, however, not with publicity . . . We ought to use our influence towards gerring both countries to direct their military efforts more toward common defence of the sub-continent and less against each other. I think it is of vital importance to both of them that they work together, and perhaps they can work together without a pact". 26 Harriman was at that time a private citizen, but his views apparently reflected the general sentiment of the Eisenhower administration. Mr. McElroy, the Defence Secretary indicated that his thoughts too ran on similar lines when he voiced his hope "for a focussing of the attention of both those countries (India and Pakistan) on their problems in the North". 27

27 Ibid., pp. 182, 205-6. McElroy added that events in Tibet were a clear demonstration of where the true enemy of both India and Pakistan lay. He hoped that a realization of this fact might promote a reduction of the tension between India and Pakistan.
American policy-makers were of the view that progress towards such an objective might be promoted if a satisfactory solution could be found, if not for the Kashmir issue, at least for the dispute over the Indus. Pakistani propaganda had all along contended that India's real intention was to turn the whole of West Pakistan into a desert by improperly diverting the waters of the Indus for its own purposes. There was little support for the contention in the United States where official opinion seemed to favour Nehru's view that the problem called for technical and engineering solutions. In 1952, following a meeting in New York between the representatives of the countries and of the World Bank, a tripartite working group was set up and it began the task of collecting basic data and preparing technical plans. A Special Study Mission of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that visited the sub-continent in 1953, expressed the hope that work of the tripartite Committee would lead to a sensible solution. But, as in the case of negotiations over Kashmir, progress on the Indus water issue was stymied by the complications caused by the American military alliance with Pakistan.

The United States Government, for reasons described earlier, was anxious and determined to make an end of this stalemate. It was not purely by chance that Mr. Black, the President of the World Bank paid a visit to the sub-continent in May, 1959. After discussion with Indian and Pakistani leaders, Black made a dramatic announcement that he had succeeded in establishing general principles acceptable to both the Governments that afforded a basis for negotiation for a
final settlement. The nature of the American Government's interest in the matter can be seen in the testimony of William H. Draper, Jr., Chairman of High Powered Committee appointed by President Eisenhower to study the military assistance programme. Draper told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that his group had held several discussions with the President of the World Bank and had become fully conversant with the plan for settlement of the Indus water dispute. Draper continued: "We believe that this may offer an opportunity, an opening for which you and your committee are looking for, which is some composition of the problem between India and Pakistan. That is more important to the future of the free world and the United States than whatever money is involved here many times." ②3

When President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Nehru signed the Indus Water Treaty in Karachi in 1960, it was hailed in the United States as a development of immense significance not only for Indo-Pakistan relation but for the relations of both the countries with the United States. At that time a Presidential campaign was under way in the United States. In a remarkable demonstration of unity of purpose and objectives relating to the sub-continent, the two presidential candidates, John Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon, along with many other prominent Americans, appended their signature to the following statement that appeared in a full page advertisement in the New York Times:

on the day the Treaty was signed. "We salute President Mohammed Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India for their far-sighted statesmanship signing on this day in the common interest of their people an agreement on their control and division of the waters of the Indus river and for thus demonstrating to the World the possibility of reaching by patient negotiation agreement on international problem on matter how complex or difficult". 29

Even though the signing of the treaty was a milestone in the history of Indo-Pakistan relations, it did not lead further relaxation of tensions between the two sides. Pakistan grew increasingly suspicious of implication of the American desire to promote an accommodation with India. It was fearful that India might begin to receive much more favourable attention from the United States than in the past. The old anxieties and fear again began to play in the minds of the leaders of Pakistan.

Therefore, it can be said that Indo-American relations received a big dent from United State's involvement in Pakistani military pact. India was literally upset by this American policy or measure. Eisenhower Vs. Nehru debate on the policy of the American administration was openly repudiated by a good number of well-known American.

Indo-Pakistan Water Treaty sponsored by the World Bank restored the confidence partly. However, the suspicion on Indian side persisted.

The dispute over Kashmir question remained as before. Rather it became stiffer. No amount of American assurance was helpful in restoration of Indian confidence.

India could not appreciate the American crusade against communism as United States of America could not realise the importance of non-alignment. This was the true source of colossal misunderstanding between these two nations though both are democracies.

However, it is rather difficult to expect normalcy of their relations even at the present stage. Perhaps only time and earnestness to establish international peace for the sake of common people of the world may create a smooth relations between them. At any rate, these historical differences and issues and experiences gained through these must be taken into account for any further approach for the improvement of Indo-American relations in future.