CHAPTER FOUR

NATURE OF THE WHOLE - THE NYAYA REJOINDER TO THE SANKHYA.

The Nyāya rejoinder to the Sankhya and the Buddhist criticisms constitutes a glowing chapter of Indian philosophy. The subtlety of thought, the depth of insight and the unswerving loyalty to experience which pre-eminently characterise it cannot fail to impress the true seeker after truth. And it will be a pleasure and a delight to us to follow the Naiyayika as he threads his way through the phalanx of the opponents' criticisms.

The Nyāya has dealt with all the criticisms of the Sānkhya and the Buddhist. We shall treat of them separately for the sake of our convenience. This chapter will be taken up with Nyaya reply to the Sankhya.

II

The Sānkhya critique as already observed, is based exclusively on the doctrine that the material cause and the effect are identical. The arguments advanced in support of this view by Vacaspati in the Tattvakaumudi are all found in the Nyaya vartika where Uddyotakara has set forth almost all the possible arguments of the Sānkhya as purvapaksa and has subjected them to a penetrating scrutiny.
The Sāṅkhya argues that two things entirely distinct cannot be related as part and whole. A cow is different from a horse and therefore neither is a part of the other. Hence, whatever is a part of anything is not distinct from that thing. The yarns, therefore, being parts of cloth, are not different from it.¹

The argument according to the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika cannot stand as it involves the fallacy of 'viruddha hetu' or contradictory propositions.² 'Being a part' is here used as the hetu for establishing a thing's non-difference from the whole of which it is a part. But it rather proves the opposite, viz., difference of a part from the whole. A part means and implies a whole distinct from it, part and whole being necessary correlates.³ To be a part is to be the part 'of' a whole which is therefore not identical with but different from it. The 'of' here is not appositional but differential. A thing is not ipso facto a part, it becomes a part only when it enters into the composition of a thing which is its whole. Yarns, for example, are not, as such, parts of a cloth; as Vacaspati says, yarns put in the casket of a widow are not parts of cloth; only when they are woven into the texture of cloth do they become parts of cloth.⁴ Hence, the hetu here disproves the very proposition sought to be proved with its help.

¹ N. V. 2.1.33., p. 217.
² Narthantaram patattantavah tadavayavatvaditi na, vyaghatat / Ibid.
³ Avayavyapeksatvat, avyavyapekso vayavah / Ibid.
⁴ pátmapiékso hi tantavo vayavah bhavanti, no khalu randakaranda vasthitastantavo vayavaucyant iti / N. V. T. T., p. 388.
The Nyāya Vaisēśika further points out that the term 'avayava' (part or component) is always used in Sanskrit in reference to something different from it and never in reference to something non-different from (identical with) it e.g., "component yarns are different from the jar" (tantavāvayana ghatādarthāntaramiti)⁵. The opponent replies that this argument is untenable, as whenever the term 'avayava' is used in the context of its own composite, the latter is referred to by a word with the genitive case ending, e.g., we say 'patasya avayavah' (components of cloth)⁶. Such an expression is never used in connection with such things as the jar and the like which are altogether different from the said components. This difference of linguistic usage, asserts the opponent, clearly points, on the one hand, to the difference of jars etc. from 'component yarns' (tantavāvayavah) and on the other, to non-difference of cloth from the same.

The Naiyāyika protests, "If the two were identical, we could not use either the term 'avayava' (component or part) or the genitive case ending". There is no sense in saying that 'threads are components of threads', because a thing cannot be part of itself, nor can we construe the genitive here in the sense of a qualifying character as 'tāntava avayava' we or 'thread components', because of patent contradiction (vyāghata)⁷. Hence, yarns and cloth, part and whole, must be regarded as different.

⁵ N. V., Ibid.,
⁶ Sasthi visesanat aprasanga iti cet? / Ibid,
⁷ N. V., Ibid.,
The Naiyāyika has rested the above contention mainly, as we have seen, on the ground of correlativity, 'avayava' and 'avayavin' being relative to each other. The opponent viz., the Sānkhya who is a believer in pre-existence of effect in the cause now gives another argument. The yarns are the material cause of cloth and are therefore identical with it. The Naiyāyika first argues that even as cause the yarns should be deemed to be different from the effect, viz., the cloth, for if there were no distinct object to be produced in the shape of the 'composite', of what the components would be the cause? Certainly the cause cannot produce itself! And yet, this is precisely what it would come to, if the composite were the same as components.

The opponent boldly accepts this conclusion and points out that according to him there is nothing to be produced. What happens when a cloth is made is that the same yarns (which in a certain order were known as yarns) are arranged in a different fashion and come to be known as cloth. No new substance is produced; the same old yarns only undergo a change of form and of verbal designation.

---

8 Purvam karanamavaksitva avayavasabdatya parapara sabdavat sambandhisabdhatamatram grhityoktam, samprati karanatvam vivaksitvocoyate / N. V. T. T., p. 389.
9 Vide Supra., p. 31
12 tantayah samsthana visesavasthitah patakhyam labhante iti apatakhyastantawah palasabdenabhidiyante / N. V., p. 218.
The Naiyāyika impugns this position on the grounds firstly that yarns as such cannot be the sole basis of the designation 'cloth'; and secondly that the specific mode of arrangement (samsthāna visēsa) of which the opponent has spoken is left undefined and vague. Knowledge of cloth is not derived exclusively from and does not rest solely on yarns; if it did, yarns locked up in a widow's spinning basket or rolled up in 'ball like' fashion could be known as cloth (na hi paṭākaraṇapratyayah tantumātrālambano rāṇākarāṇāvasthi te śratantusū prasangāt). Nor can the concept of cloth apply to the mere quantity of yarns (na ca tantu parimānabhedralambanah), since ex hypothesi this should be in existence even before the name 'cloth' come to be applied. So, in any case the yarns cannot be the same as cloth. In these circumstances conception of yarns as cloth would be but a misconception. But, then, misconception thrives only on similarity. Where there is no similarity, there can be no misconception. Here also there is no similarity between cloth and yarns which are 'not-cloth' (apaṭaḥ). How can yarns then be mistaken for cloth?

The second argument of the Naiyāyika is: what precisely is the nature and status of 'samsthānaviśeṣa' or specific disposition of yarns? Is it something different from the yarns or not? If

13 N. V. T. T., Ibid.,
14 tasyapurvamapi sattvat / Ibid.,
15 N. V. T. T., Ibid.,
16 Na hi tantunamapatanam patena kīmcitsamanyamasti, na casati samanye mithyaprtyasya vijamasti / N. V., p. 213.
different, what is its character? For the Naiyāyika himself there is no difficulty in answering it; it is a case of saṃyoga or conjunction. Conjunction of the yarns brings about the cloth and is the a-samavāyi karana.

The purvapaksa vigorously dissents. He contends that conjunction cannot in the first instance be called a substance or rather 'a substantive'. A thing different from another cannot be called its conjunction (anyadanyasya saṃyogo no bhavati) e.g., the cow is not the conjunction of a horse (gaurasvāsya no saṃyogah). He may choose to put his argument in the form - 'conjunction is not a different thing, because it is conjunction'. The probans here viz., 'being conjunction' is too specific (asadharana), as it is absent from all different and non-different instances and present only in conjunction. Hence the probans is defective and the argument inadmissible.

Conjunction cannot be regarded as guna or attribute either. The Nyāya view is that it is an attribute of the things conjoined. When, e.g., one is asked to bring up two conjoined things, he brings up those two things which he finds together and which, because of their togetherness, are marked off from the rest. The opponent in rejecting this view pleads that the above situation can be explained even without taking recourse to the concept of conjunction as guna.

17 Ibid.,
When two things come into close proximity so that they end in striking each other, it would be a case of conjunction; conjunction thus is not anything different, but only that impact (pratighata) of two things which results from their gradually coming into closer and closer proximity.\(^{19}\)

The Nyāya rejoinder is that the opponent should precisely define the concepts of 'proximity' and 'impact'. As a matter of fact, proximity is only the gradual shortening of distance between two things. Before the hand comes into contact with the table there is a large number of space-points intervening between the two, and as the hand gradually comes nearer, the number of these points and their conjunctions become less and less until they are nil, when the hand actually touches the table. And impact is coming into contact of two limited material things that produces sound.\(^{20}\) Thus both proximity and impact (abhīghata) involve conjunction. How then, can the purvapakṣa get away with denial of conjunction and substitution of it by proximity and impact?

Another argument is advanced in support of the view that the composite is non-different from the components. This argument is a slight variation of the first argument.\(^{21}\) The basic point here is that a thing is different from another because it is not a part

---

\(^{19}\) Pratyasattan pratighatavasanayam samyoga vyavaharah / N. V., p. 219.

\(^{20}\) karmajopi dvīdhaiva parikirtilatah / Abhīghato nudanca sabdaheturihadimah // B.P.Karima 118

\(^{21}\) Vide Supra., p., 82.
From this it follows that two things are non-different because they are related to each other as component and composite (avayava-avayabhāvāt).

The Nyaya answer, as before, is that this cannot be accepted. A composite and its components are relative to each other; and if one is rejected, the other cannot stand by itself. The opponent repudiates this and contends that the terms 'part' and 'whole', though relative, are often used in connection with things that are not different from each other e.g., we meet with such expressions as 'part of ākāsā' (ākāsasya pradesā). What is spoken of as the part is not different from ākāsā itself.

The Nyaya points out in reply that the above contention is not tenable. 'Avayava' and 'pradesā', component and part (or portion) are not synonymous. 'Avayava' is the name of a particular kind of cause, viz., the constituent cause (karanavīsesa bhidhanam avayavah), pradesā is the name of 'adhara', container or substrate (ādharabhidhanam pradesāḥ); it is where the whole is indicated as contained (pradisyate asminniti), it is the receptance of the

---

22 Arthantaranaavayavatvat / N.V., p. 225; formerly only 'avayavah' or 'components' was made the probans, now in this argument, the probans is 'avayava avayavinam' (components and composite). Cf: Purvamavayavacatayetavammatvam hetu krtam, samprati tvavayavaya vinavityaspamaruktyam / N.V. T.T., p. 390.

23 N.V., Ibid.,

24 Drstonarthantararepi pradesa-pradesi-vyavaharo yatha ākāsasya pradesa iti / Ibid.,

25 N.V., p. 225; Although we have in general rendered 'avayava' into English as 'part' here and in some other places we had had to translate it as 'component' and pradesa as part in order to distinguish them from each other.

25A N.V., Ibid.
As such, we can speak of 'a part of ākāśa' ākāśasya pradesā) but not of a component of akasa (ākāśasya avayavah). Consequently, such expressions do not nullify the Nyāya view that avavaya and avayavin are distinct substances. The opponent however drives home his contention and quashes the rejoinder of the Nyāya. In case of ākāśa, he asserts, neither of the above two senses is tenable. Ākāśa is never indicated as contained in anything; nor has ākāśa any kind of cause. We have no adhāra-ādheya pratīti with regard to ether and anything else, nor is it a janya-dravya, being eternal and all-pervasive. In the circumstances the Nyāya holds that use of the term 'pradesā' or 'part' with regard to ether is to be taken not literally in the sense that 'ether has parts' but that it is similar to things that have parts. The point of similarity is that conjunction, here in the case of ākāśa as elsewhere in the case of those things, is non-pervasive.

In view of the Nyāya attitude and contention that while avayava is different from avayavin, not so is pradesā from pradesin, the pūrvapaksin turns the tables on the NaIyāyika and presents his argument in a new makeup. He makes the point that yarns can be proved to be non-different from the cloth on the ground that they are often called its pradesā. His argument, fully stated, is:

26 Here it is used to mean not an avayavi born of conjunction of components (avayavasamyogajayavavi) but a pradesā of which we can locate different portions.

27 Soyamakasi pradesa sabdah pradesavaddravyasamavyat drastavyah / N. V., p. 225.
Assertion (Pratijna) - The yarns are of the nature of cloth (patatmanastantavah)

Reason (hetu) - Because they are spoken of as parts (pradesā) of cloth.

Illustration (udaharana) - Those that are called parts of a thing are of the nature of that thing, e.g., parts of ākāśa.

Application (Upanaya) - So is here (tatha cāyam). 23

Conclusion (nigamana) - The yarns are therefore of the nature of cloth.

The Nyāya urges the following objections. Firstly, the hetu here is asadharana, found neither in things different (arthan-tara) nor in things non-different (anarthantara). If things are wholly identical, one cannot be called part of the other. 29 Secondly, if the term 'pradesā' or 'part' is synonymous with cause, the probans becomes contradictory (pradesāsābdasya kārana-parīyāyatvad viruddah. 29A. If the yarns are called pradesā of cloth in the sense of its constituent cause, then obviously, as argued above, they would be different from cloth. Thirdly, the probans is an unestablished one (asiddha).

The form of the inference is: 'Tantavah patat na arthantaram tat pradesā-vyapadesā-visayatvat', i.e., the yarns are not different from

28 This is how the upanaya is usually conched Cf: T.S. (Chowkhamba), p. 53.
29 N. V., p. 226.
29A Ibid.
cloth because they are spoken of as parts (pradesā) of yarns.

The pronoun 'tat' in the last clause must refer to the 'tantavah' (i.e., yarns) of the preceding clause, that being the principal noun here. Since yarns cannot apparently be called tantupradesā or parts of themselves, the hetu is defective. Fourthly, the instance cited is also viruddha. The proposition 'part of ākāśā' (akasasya pradesa) only means that the conjunction of akāśa is non-pervading in its character; and certainly the non-pervading character of its conjunction does not constitute the essence of ākāśa. So, the instance also turns out to be an impossible one.

The purvapaksin adduces another reason. The composite cannot be different from components, because no substance can be produced out of a totally different substance (dravyāntārebhyo dravyānatarāniṣparināyayo vayavyanayavabhyaḥ). In experience we never come across a substance being produced out of another different from it. A man is not produced out of the cow, the elephant or the horse. The cloth, however, is produced out of yarns. Therefore, the cloth is not different from yarns.

The Naiyāyika objects as before to the probans as defective. He brings up all the objections he advanced against the previous

---

30 Tantavo hi paksikrtah pradhanam iti taditi sarvanamna heteratena paramastavyah. Tatha ca tantu pradesasya vyapadesva visayatvam na tantunam ityasiddho heterityarthah / N. V. T. T., p. 390.
31 N. V., p. 226.
32 Na ca gauhastyaśvebhyaḥ purusa utpadyate / Ibid.,
argument viz., the probans is asādharāna or 'too specific', viruddha or contradictory, and asiddha. Since all these have been explained above, we need not explain them here again. The main contention of the Naiyāyika is that non-difference of the composite from the components as formulated above cannot be established by any reasoning.

The pūrvavāksin offers another argument. Components of a whole, he says, are admitted on all hands to be different from another whole. In other words, components which are different from a whole are themselves components of a different whole. Wheels, for example, are components of the chariot and are patently different from a cloth (which is something other than chariot). Similarly, if yarns were different from cloth, they should be components of something other than cloth; as a matter of fact, however, they are not found to be the components of anything other than cloth; therefore, the yarns are not different from cloth (na ca te tadvyatirekaṇa vayavyantarāvayavāstasmānārthāntaramiti).

The Naiyāyika opens his broadside by pointing out that in the first instance the argument rests on a false assumption. It assumes as a logical ground for proving identity, a condition which is not necessary for the same and which as a matter of fact is found

33 Nānyo vayavyavayavebhyo vayavyantaravayavanam avayavyantararthantarabhavat / Ibid.,
34 Iha ye avayavānarthantarabhavanti te vayavyantaravayavabhavanti / Ibid.,
35 N. V., p. 227.
to be absent even where the identity is beyond dispute. It is not essential to the identity of A with B that A should be the part of anything other than B. For A is admittedly identical with itself, although we cannot say of it that it is not the part of anything but itself. Since it is impossible for a thing to be part of itself.

The Sāṅkhya may reply that the relation of identity or tadatmya as understood by the Naiyāyika is not recognised by him. In common with the Mūmāmsaka and the Vedāntin he construes 'tadatmya' only in the sense of identity-in-difference; bare identity is for him a barren concept, a pseudo-concept, not adequate to logical discourse and therefore of little logical import. Hence, the plea of a thing being identical with itself is no refutation of the principle that non-difference of A from B means that A is not the part of anything other than B.

To this the Nyāya reply is that in such an event the opponent's argument involves, as before, the fallacy of being 'too specific'. What specifically is the probans here? The argument is - yarns are non-different from cloth, because they are not components of anything other than cloth (tattavāh patāmnar thantaram tadvyatirekena anyānāvavatvāt). The probans is - yarns not being components of anything other than cloth. But this

36 N. V., p. 227.
is something which is obviously present only in the **paksa**, viz.,
the yarns and nowhere else; in consequence, the fallacy of
'**asadharana hetu**' becomes irrefragable.

Secondly, the **Naiyāyika** says, it is admitted even by the
opponent that yarns cannot be their own components. That being
so, a cloth cannot be said to be identical with yarns, since yarns
are as a matter of fact components of cloth. Hence the **hetu** is
really **contradictory** of the conclusion (**viruddha hetu**) proposed
by the opponent.

Thirdly, since the opponent disavows the 'avayavin' as an
entity, he cannot consistently hold, as he does, that 'the compo­
nent is the composite'. The underlying meaning seems to be that
if the composite is a non-entity, then what is it that the compo­
nent would be identical with?  

Fourthly, the self-contradictory character of the argument
can be proved in another way, - by analysing and ascertaining the
meaning of the illustration given viz., wheels of a chariot are
different from cloth. The self-contradiction occurs in two ways :-
(a) when the opponent says 'the wheels are the components of the
chariot', he has to admit that the wheels are in fact different from
the chariot, and thereby to concede whether he likes it or no that
the composite and the components are different.

(b) If the opponent does not admit this difference, then 'what is the meaning of the sentence, "the wheels are the components of the chariot?" asks the Naiyāyika. Common sense interprets it as signifying a difference between the two, the wheels and the chariot; but the pūrvapakṣin holds to the equation between them viz., the wheels are declared identical with, or non-different from, the composite. On such a reading there remains nothing called 'components'; the wheels cease to be components at all, whether of the chariot or of anything else. As a result, the above sentence becomes a meaningless jargon and the opponent's thesis falls to the ground. Whether he admits the difference between the composite and the components, or does not, his argument proves self-contradictory.

The Sāṅkhya offers yet another argument. Two things admittedly different cannot occupy the same space at the time of origin - are not produced on an identical site (yadubhaya sampratipannamarthāntaratvena tat tasmadbhinnadesamutpadyamanam drṣṭam). Difference of things - of course numerical difference - is conditioned by difference of spatial position at the time of production (dravyāntaro pāttidesvayo avacchada). A cow and a horse are different because a cow is produced where a horse is not and vice versa.

---

38 Ibid.,
40 Ibid.,
A cloth comes into origin at a place different from where a pot is produced. But in the case of yarns and cloth the situation is different. The cloth is produced in the very same place where yarns exist. They are not separated by any space interval. Hence they are identical.

The Naiyāyika deals with this argument as follows: The argument speaks of the whole being produced where its parts exist. But what is this production (ka utpattisabdasyarthah)? The components do not certainly produce themselves, for they are already there, nor do they produce a whole different from themselves, for the Sankhya recognises no such entity. Then how would the Sankhya interpret production? For the Naiyāyika himself there is no difficulty. For him production is origination (utpatti), emergence of the avayavidravya with its distinctive characteristics. The cloth that comes out of the yarns is something that formerly was not and has come to be for the first time. Even by the opponent's reckoning the form of the whole, its manifestation etc. were non-existent before production.

The Sankhya hurls a further argument. A composite, he says, is not different from its components. What is actually found

---

41 Ibid., Sa ca nirupyamano vyaktadi dharmabhedena apurvam
janmaheti viruddhah / Ibid.,
Adigrahanenabirbhava samasthanadaya vyante te ca karana vyaparat
purvam nasanniti janmapi tesamapurvam iti / N.V.T.T., p.39C.

42 Ibid.,
Sa ca nirupyamano vyaktadi dharmabhedena apurvam
janmaheti viruddhah / Ibid.,
Adigrahanenabirbhava samasthanadaya vyante te ca karana vyaparat
purvam nasanniti janmapi tesamapurvam iti / N.V.T.T., p.39C.
to be different from them is another thing which is composed of a different set of components (avayavāntaravayavino vayavānta rārthān tarabhavat). For example, wheels etc. are different from the jar, because the jar is composed of components wholly different from wheels etc. (which are themselves components of the chariot). The cloth, on the other hand, is not composed of components other than yarns; hence it is not different from the yarns.

The Naiyāyika hits back saying that if the language is any clue to one's attitude, then the opponent must be deemed to have acknowledged the distinctive entity of the composite; for what else is meant by speaking of 'a thing which is composed of different constituents' (avayavāntarānāmavayaviti)?

The Sāṅkhya does not relent in his pressure and puts forward another argument. That the composite is non-different from the components can be proved, he says by the following consideration: A thing is different from another if it produces, during the existence of the latter, a thing different from the latter. It is found, for example, that while the mat is in existence, yarns bring into effect the cloth which is different from the mat. Therefore, the yarns are different from the mat. But not so in the case of

43 N. V., p. 223.
44 cakradibhyo iti rathavayavebhya ityarthah/ N.V.T.T., p. 391.
45 N. V., p. 223.
46 Iha ye yasmin satyanyat kuryanti te tasmad arthantaram bhavanti yatha katat tantavah / Ibid.,
cloth. While the cloth is there, the yarns produce nothing further; their productive capacity is exhausted in the making of the cloth in question and they produce nothing else so long as this particular cloth remains intact.\(^47\) For this reason yarns and cloth should be regarded as non-different from each other.

The Nyāya disposes of this argument as follows: It involves the fallacy of asādhārana hetu or extra-ordinary probans. The probans here is 'satya nyākaranāt'\(^48\) i.e., one thing remaining intact or being present, another cannot be produced. 'The paksā or the whole here is 'avayavā', the sādhya is 'avayavānarthāntaravā' i.e., 'non-difference from the components'. The hetu is something which is present only in the paksā and in nothing else. The argument is thus fallacious and fails to prove the opponent's thesis.

Moreover, the argument contradicts itself and thereby defeats its own purpose; for how can the opponent declare in the same breath that 'while the mat is in existence, yarns produce the cloth', and yet that cloth is not different from the yarns? If cloth were non-different from the yarns, then there would be nothing to be produced!

Nothing daunted by these criticisms of the Nyāya, the Sānkhyā returns to the attack. A thing is different from those others:

\(^47\) na punah sati pote tantavo dravyantaram kurvanti tasmat te nārthāntaramī / Ibid.,
\(^48\) Asyapi hetvarthāḥ satyanyakaranat asyapi asadharana ta ca purvavat / Ibid.,
when it is produced not in consequence of their conjunction but in consequence of other causal factors. An avayāvī, however, is the result of combination of its own avayavas and therefore non-different from them. A mat is produced independent of conjunction of yarns and therefore is different from them. But a cloth is dependent for its making on the conjunction of yarns and hence is non-different from them.

The Nyāya criticism is in the same vein as before. The probans viz., 'tantusamyogebhyastadutpatteh', i.e., 'because of production from conjunction of yarns', is, as before, too specific or tadharana on the same ground as mentioned above. Again, to speak of cloth as being produced from conjunction of yarns is to concede, albeit indirectly, that the whole is different from the parts.

III

The Sānkhya now switches on to a new line of attack. A composite, says he, is not different from the components, because, if it were so, it would be devoid of qualities. Qualities of a

49 Nanyo vayavyavayavebhyyah svatmasamyogavyetireka bhavyavavyavyayatvat iha ye yasmadarthantaram bhavanti te atmasamyoga vyatirekena bhavanti / N. V., p. 229.
50 Ibid.,
substance cannot produce the qualities of a different substance. In experience we never find that where two substances are different, the qualities of one generate those of the other. For example, qualities of the horse are never produced from those of the cow (gogune bhyo svagunam). But in the case of cloth, however, the reverse is the case. Its qualities are actually found to be produced from those of the yarns. If the avayavin were different from the avayavas, how would it have any qualities? The qualities of the components could not be said to have fathered them, for the avayavin and the avayava being different ex hypothesi, such operation is impossible; nor could they be said to have been self-caused, for self-causation is accepted by neither party. Therefore, urges the Sánkhya, either the whole should be adjudged to have no quality or to be identical with the avayava. The first alternative being contrary to facts of experience, the second should be accepted.

The Nyāya points out that as thus formulated, the argument is not free from self-contradiction. Firstly, it says in so many words that the qualities of cloth are produced by the qualities of yarns and yet seeks to prove in the same breath that cloth is non-different from yarns. Is it not plain contradiction? Secondly,

51 nanyo vayavyayavayavabhya dravyantaragunanam dravyantaragunanatve agunatvaprasangat/ Ibid.,
52 Tantuguneyah patagunanamutpathim pratipadyase na carthantaram pata iti / Ibid.,
the contradiction shows up from another point of view. The reason adduced here viz., "qualities of cloth are produced from the qualities of yarns" really comes to mean (in view of the Sāṅkhya identity between cause and effect) that qualities of yarns are produced from the qualities of yarns themselves—a surely a fantastic proposition! So, the argument involves the fallacy of viruddha hetu (contradictory mark).

The Sāṅkhya advances still another argument. The composite must be non-different from the components, since, if it were not so, it would be imperceptible. A distinct composite must somehow be in the parts, but at a given moment only some parts are perceived, the parts in front, while others remain beyond the pale of perception. In the circumstances the whole would be imperceptible, as its locus remain in part unperceived. The Sāṅkhya cites the analogy of conjunction between mother and her womb. While the mother is perceived, the womb is not; consequently, conjunction between the two, which subsists in each and both, is imperceptible (garbhamātr samyogaḥ pratyaksāpratyaksavṛttirna pratyakṣaḥ). This shows, says the Sāṅkhya, that if a thing subsists in many entities (or items) some of which are imperceptible, the thing itself would be imperceptible. Similarly the whole, if distinct, would subsist in the parts some of which, viz., the central and the hind-parts

53 Nanyo vayavyavayavebhyo pratyaksatvaprasangat / Ibid.,
54 Ibid.,
would in a given case be ever unperceived; as such, the whole would remain imperceptible. But as a matter of fact the opposite is the case, the whole is perceived. It cannot therefore be different from the components (pratyaksastvavayavi tasmannasan tebyo' rthantram). 55

The Nyāya subjects it to a gruelling examination. In the first place the probans is once more distinctly contradictory or viruddha, it proves the very reverse of the opponent’s thesis. 56 The fact of the whole being actually perceived (pratyakṣatva), on which rests the argument rather proves the difference of the composite from the components than their non-difference; for in the latter event the composite would not be perceptible at all, being identical with components which as atoms enjoy the privilege of being imperceptible.

Secondly, the opponent must make clear the nature of imperceptibility he has in mind. Does imperceptibility of a thing follow from its origin (utpatti) out of a thing imperceptible or from its subsistence in an imperceptible? 57 Neither alternative is tenable, says the Nyāya, for neither is substantiated by facts. To take up the first one, the snow-ball that we find on the peak of the Himalayas and that is formed as a result of contact between snow-

55 Ibid.,
56 Pratyaksatvadeva narthantaramiti viruddho hetuh / Ibid.,
particles (hima\textit{vatparam\textit{anukam}) and the peak should have been imperceptible, because, as between the two things, the mountain-top and the smaller snow-particles from which it is produced, only one is perceptible while the other is not. As a matter of fact, however, the snow-ball is very much perceptible. To take up the second alternative, bhava or being would have to be adjudged imperceptible, because it subsists both in perceptible and imperceptible things. A paramanu and the ākāśa both of which are imperceptible are bhava padarthas like the tables and the chairs which are however visible. If subsistence in an imperceptible were the cause of imperceptibility of the subsistent, bhāva or rather bhavatva, the character of being, should have been imperceptible. But it is not so. Hence, the alternatives fall to the ground.

The pūrvapaksin may argue that what he means is something different. Awareness of conjunction presupposes awareness of the conjuncts (sāmyogah sāmyogidvayanirūpaṇādhiṇānirūpaṇāḥ) and if one of the conjuncts is imperceptible, so will be the conjunction. Similarly, the avayavin will be imperceptible if some of the components are imperceptible.

\begin{itemize}
\item[58] N.V., p. 230. Vacaspati points out that the term 'paramanu' here is not to be taken literally as 'atom'; for an atom, because of its anutva, is productive only of a 'dyad' which is also of atomic size and is imperceptible, and not of any gross object. Hence, the term should be taken in the sense of small particles of snow (himavindu). Cf: paramanugrahanam aiksmadrayopalaksanartham. na punah paramanordryanukadanya tvarambhhasam bhavah / N.V.T.T., p. 391.
\item[59] Bhavopratyaksah prapnoti sa hi pratyaksapratyaksavṛttiriti/ N. V. T. T. / Ibid., p. 390.
\item[60] N. V. T. T. / Ibid.,}

\end{itemize}
The Nyaya answer is categorically in the negative. Imperceptibility of some components does not affect the perceptibility of the whole. Perception of all components is not the condition of perception of the avayavin. (We shall not labour this point here as we shall have to discuss it later at some length). Moreover, if anybody were to hold that the composite would be imperceptible if its components were so, he should then have to reconcile himself with all things being imperceptible, since the inner and the back portions of a thing are always inaccessible to us. The view would thus lead to the absurd position that nothing would be an object of perception!

The purvapaksin joins issue with the Naiyayika and contends that perceptibility of the whole does not argue its numerical difference from the parts. To be non-different (abhinna) from the parts does not mean that the whole has to be imperceptible. This is a mistake of the Naiyayika and rests on the view that atoms are supersensible. But this again is a dogma. Atoms are endowed with colour and we nowhere find in experience that a thing with colour is ever a thing beyond experience. 61 We can, says the opponent, form the vyapti on the basis of uncontradicted experience that all coloured substances like the jar and the chair are perceptible. Why should then atoms, in defiance of this uniform law, be deemed to be supersensible?


* vide īśva, pp. 139-141.
The Nyāya asks for clarification. What exactly is the meaning of the expression, 'atoms are within the reach of the sense-organs' (aṅdriyakah paramāṇavah iti kośrthaḥ)? Does it mean (a) that atoms are perceptible through the instrumentality of the sense-organs or (b) that they are related to the sense-organs (kintavat-aṅdriyakaranapratyaksāt uta āṅdriyasambaddha). The first interpretation is untenable, for certainly the purvapakṣin does not mean that while the atoms are imperceptible to the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas, they are perceived by him and men of his ilk. Sense-organs function uniformly and are no respector of one's intellectual views. The second interpretation, on the other hand, is quite irrefragable for it states a plain truth. Atoms are undoubtedly related to the sense-organs; but the fact is that though related, they cannot still be perceived on account of absence of grossness (mahattvabhāva). Sense-object contact and colour, though each a necessary condition, are not together the sufficient condition of perception, gross magnitude is a 'must' for perception. The Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas claim to base this proposition on anvaya vyatireka of the vyāpya and the vyāpaka - there is perception when there are gross magnitude and colour; and there is no perception when the colour or magnitude or both are absent.  

---

62 Ibid.,
63 Bhavabhavayostadvattat - yasmat sati mahattverupe ca upalabdhīr bhavati asati ca na bhavati / N. V., p. 231.
Uddyotakara now posits a purvapaksin who sticks out for perceptibility of atoms, challenges this vyapti between gross magnitude and manifest colour on the one hand and perceptibility on the other, and urges that tangibility should be regarded on like grounds as a necessary condition of perception. Uddyotakara in keeping with the old Nyāya Vaisesika tradition rejects this contention and trots out a number of arguments against it. These are not of any consequence to our problem and hence are not discussed here.  

IV

The Sāṅkhya now urges another point which we have had occasion to notice earlier when dealing with his kārya karana bheda vāda. The argument is that the avayavin is non-different from the avayavas because of two reasons - (a) absence of conjunction and (b) absence of aprapti. When two things are different, there is as a matter of fact the relation of (occasional) conjunction as also of non-proximity, e.g., the cow and the horse may come into conjunction given the necessary con-
ditions; and of course, at other times they remain apart, out of
contact with each other. In the case of the yarns and the cloth,
however, we find that there is no conjunction between them, nor is
there non-proximity. Therefore the cloth cannot be different from
the yarns.

The Nyāya does not accept it and fires a volley of objec-
tions. The first objection is that the hetu does not reside in
the pakṣa. The pakṣa here is 'avayavin' and the hetu is 'samyoga-
bhava' or 'vibhāgabhave', as the case may be. But, says Uddyota-
kara, these hetus pertain respectively to conjunction and proximity
of which they are the corresponding abhāva, and not to the subject. 63
Hence, the argument involves the fallacy of what is known technically
as svarūpaśiddha, i.e., being unestablished in respect of its own
being in the subject. 70

The pūrvapakṣin may amend his argument in this light by
bringing in a different hetu viz., asamyogitva or avibhāgitva and
contend that the composite is non-different from the components
because of asamyogita (i.e., the character of being not conjoined)
or because of avibhāgitva (i.e., the character of being not disjoined). 71

68 In fact there are two hetus here and therefore there is not
one but two arguments adduced by the Sankhya, Vide Supra, p.

69 Avayavinah paksikarane samyoga vibhagabhavasya samyoga
vibhaga visayatvat asambaddham / N. V. , p. 233.

70 Uddyotakara does not give the name of the fallacy, but this is
the technical name, Cf; Tarkasamgraha (Chowkhamba) p, 60.

71 T.B. (Poona) p. 81.

N. V. Ibid.
Both asamyogita and avibhagita must be admitted to pertain to the subject, the avayavin, says the opponent. To this, however, the Naiyayika demurs. His objection is that even these hetus are fallacious, as they suffer from the same defect of 'svarupa siddha'. The avayavin is certainly conjoined and/or disjoined with other things; hence neither of the suggested hetus is true of the paksa. The purvapaksin thereupon proceeds to modify his argument further and hold that the hetu is not 'asamyogita' or 'avibhagita' as such but 'svayavayenasamyogita' or 'svayavayena vibhagita', i.e., the character of being not conjoined or disjoined with one's own components. The composite cannot enter into the relation of conjunction or disjunction with its components and therefore are non-different from them, because feasibility of either of these relations is the condition of difference. The Naiyayika once again enters his objection and points out that even this modification does not save the argument. The probans is again defective because it is inconclusive (anupasamhāri) and affords no possibility of having an example of co-presence or co-absence (anvaya-vyatireka-drṣṭānta-rahita). Uddyotakara does not explain it but let us work it out and see the intricacies involved.

72 N. V. / Ibid.
73 N. V. / Ibid.,
74 T. S., p. 58.
Anvaya drṣṭānta presupposes the existence of sapakṣa and sapakṣa sattva hetu; and vyatireka drṣṭānta, that of vipakṣa and vipakṣasattva hetu. Here neither sapakṣa nor vipakṣa is possible. The probandum here is 'avayavabheda' or 'avayava-bhinnatva' and the probans is 'svāvayavāsāmyogitva' or svāvayava-vibhāgatva77 as the case may be. Both these are however found only in the pakṣa, the 'avayavi' and there is nothing else where the probandum resides, everything being subsumed under the pakṣa. Hence there is no sapakṣa. Likewise there is no vipakṣa, since we can get nothing where there is 'avayava bheda' which is the sādhyabhāva here - everything being but 'avayava' (even the so-called avayavi is on this view just a collection of avayavas). It may however be urged that this objection of anupasamhāritva is wrong, for while there is no vipakṣa available, sapakṣa is.

The subject of the inference is 'avayavi' and the probandum is avayava bheda; the probandum resides not merely in the subject but also in something else, viz., avayava. The relation of identity with parts exists both in the whole and in the parts. How then does the charge of 'anupasamhāritva' lie?

75 Niscita sadhyavan.sapaksah; niscitasadhyabhavaban vipaksah / T. S., p. 59.
76 V. S., 3.1.15.
77 It may be noted that 'or' is used here in what is known in symbolic logic as 'the weaker' or the 'inclusive' sense as distinguished from the 'stronger' or the exclusive sense. Cf: Symbolic Logic (Copi) (Seventh Printing, 1962), p. 13.
As we have already noted, Uddyotakara does not at all mention these complications; it seems he was not even alive for the defect just pointed out. He has rested content merely with bringing the objection of *anupasamharitva*. Vacaspati with his eagle eye is, however, conscious of it and without saying in so many words quietly introduces the sapaksa and brings on a new approach. In his hands the argument wears a new look and the charge of *anupasamharitva* gives way to that of *sādharanatva*. For reasons which will be clear later on Vacaspati takes up the original probans *samyogabhāva* and *aprāptyabhāva*, ignoring the two subsequent modifications by Uddyotakara (viz., *samyogitva-vibhagitva* and svāvayavāsamyogitva-vibhagitva), and argues to the effect that this probans can be used to prove not merely non-difference of A with B (where they are avayavāvayavi) but also identity of A with A. *Samyogabhāva*, or for that matter *aprāptyabhāva*, holds not merely between the avayava and the avayavi, but also in respect of one's own self (*tadatmya*). A thing cannot have any *samyoga* or *aprāpti* with itself. *Samyoga* or *vibhaga* is possible with a different thing. Therefore *samyogabhāva* or *aprāptyabhāva* cannot be said to hold between two different things (*bhinnat abhāvo vyavṛttah*). Similarly, these two abhavas like their prati-

78 The reasons are glowing testimony to excellence and astuteness of Vacaspati's philosophic acumen.

79 *Yatha bhinnat samyogaprāptyabhāvo vyavṛttā evamabhinna dapi, na hi sa eva tantuspaiva tantuna prapyata ityarthah / N. V. T. T., p. 392.*
yogis, samyoga and vibhaga, cannot obtain as between a thing and itself (abhinnat ca vyavrttah). Hence, the above probans leads to sadharana savyabhicara hetvabhasa. Not that the Sāńkhya is without answer to Vacaspati's contention - we shall have occasion to draw a parallel in a later extract of the Nyāya view. 

Let us proceed with Uddyotakara's presentation.

The Sāńkhya in answer to the Nyāya charge of 'anupasaṃbhāricity' may point out that it is not correct, as there can be found an instance of co-presence (anvaya drṣṭānta) of hetu and sadhya viz., serpent coil (sarpakundaśalaka). The coil of the serpent is not in conjunction with the serpent and at the same time not different from it (svākaraṇenāsaṃyogi na cārthinātaram). This will provide us with the necessary sapakṣa in refuting the charge of inconclusiveness and enable us to draw the vyāpti that where there is absence of conjunction (or of disjunction), there is non-difference. The Naiyāyika of course sets his face against this argument and makes mince-meat of it. He points out firstly that the coil of a serpent is definitely different from the serpent and it is wrong to suppose that they are non-different. The difference lies in the fact that the serpent is a substance and its coil a quality. Secondly, the coil is undoubtedly not in conjunction (asāmyogi) with the serpent; but the point is, is it asāmyogi as a guna or as something non-different from the snake? Assuming that it is non-different. The Nyāya view is that it is different.

Kim gunatvat svakaraṇenasāmyogyathartharthāntaramītī / N.V.,p.233.
According to the Nyāya, asamyogitva is due to gunatva and not to the other alternative. For the Nyāya says, what after all is a coil (kundalaka)? It is nothing but a peculiar conjunction (or combination) of the serpent's limbs. But conjunction is a quality. Therefore, the coil, as quality, cannot have any conjunction, for a quality cannot have a quality, only a substance has. Thirdly, and now the Nyāya hits the nail on the head, even in the Sankhya absence of conjunction and/or disjunction is found in the case of different objects. Sattva, Rajas and Tamas are regarded in the Sankhya as distinct and yet there is neither conjunction nor disjunction among them. Similarly, as between Puruṣa and Prakṛti there is absence both of conjunction and of disjunction, and yet, they are different, even opposed realities. Thus, the probans is concomitant both with difference and non-difference and is therefore sadhārāna vyabhicāri, i.e., common irregular mark.

Therefore, the Nyāya concludes that absence of conjunction and/or disjunction is no proof of difference of things.

The other argument of the Sankhya on the score of same weight of a thing and of its parts we shall deal with in an independent chapter. Uddyotakara does not here put forward arguments.

---

82 Uddyotakara declares on these grounds that the hetu is viruddha. This is rather strange. A contradictory probans is universally concomitant with absence of sadhya. It is present only in vipaksa and not in sapaksa. Here however the probans samyogabhava is found both in different (which is a contrary instance, being where sadhyaabhava is) and non-different things (sapaksa) Cf: B.P., pp. 246-7; T.S., p. 57-59.
which purport to show that differences of functions, usage etc. indicate differences of things. Presumably he thinks that even if the Sāṁkhya refutes them on the ground that they prove only aupadhika bheda and not ātyantika bheda, the aforementioned arguments are strong enough to establish difference of parts and whole.

The Nyāya therefore holds that Sāṁkhya criticism of its view about avayavin on the basis of kāryakāraṇābhedavāda does not stand to reason and should therefore be rejected.

§3 vide supra, pp. 35, 37