CHAPTER THREE

NATURE OF THE WHOLE - THE BUDHIST CRITIQUE
OF THE NYÄYA VIEW.

The Buddhist agrees with the Sankhya that there is no such thing as avayavin. The so-called avayavin is avayava samūha mātra 1 the whole is just an aggregate of its constituents; the constituents again are not wholes but constellations of smaller components till in the end we come to the atoms which are particles and further indivisible. 2 A thing is therefore a mass of atoms, paramattā saucayā. Not an odd jumble however, not a mix-up of the parts in a chaotic or tosyy-turvy manner, but an arrangement of them in a specific order (prāptāvasthā visēga). 3 The Buddhist, therefore, is known as avayava-samūha-vadīn and paramattā-saucayā-vadīn and the Naiyāyika as avayavātiriktāvayavīvadīn.

Vatsyayana refers to two possible variants 4 of avayavasamūha vada:

---

1 It seems to us that there is a slight difference in accent between the Buddhist and the Sankhya. In the Buddhist works we find the words 'avayavasamudaya', 'avayava samūha' but not 'avayava vyoha' such as we find in the Sankhya. From this we feel tempted to surmise that the Sankhya regards a thing as a compact whole with its elements held in a close and rigid system. The Buddhist lays more emphasis on the collective character of a thing than on its system or pattern. Of course, this does not matter much. Since both of them are agreed that a thing is an aggregate with a form.

2 This view of the whole is also shared by the Māmamsakas. Not all of them however adopt the atomic view. Vide Sloka Vartika, Ch. on Inference, Verse 183.


4 Samudayaseṣatva va samudāyo vrksah syāt tat prāptvi va /
Vātsyayana on N. S., 2.1.32.
(i) Samudăyi-asēṣatāvāda - The whole is an aggregate, an exhaustive collection (asēṣatā) of the parts (samudăyi) which stand quite close to one another but not joined with one another. There is no conjunction (samyoga) but only the nearest juxtaposition, e.g., the tree is just a collective enumeration of the root, the stem, flowers, leaves taken severally.5

(ii) Samudăyi-prāpti-vāda - This is the view that the whole consists of parts connected and conjoined with one another. The parts not merely stand alongside of one another in the closest possible order but are actually in contact (prāpti) with one another.

It is however difficult to say which school vatsyayana has in mind in respect of the second variety. It cannot be Buddhism or Sāṅkhya, for neither admits samyoga or prāpti. The reference may be to the Mīmāṁsaka of the Prabhākara or the Bhāṭṭa school, for both these schools regard conjunction as a quality. There is however no clear and decisive indication of this view in the mīmāṁsa works as we find them. We shall therefore concern ourselves here only with the first variety, as this is the view found in Buddhistic works.

5 Kṛṣṇamīti vai khalva sēṣatāyāṁ satyaṁ bhavati. . . .
Mālaskandhasākāśa pālāśādīnamaśeṣatā vā samudāyo vrksa iti syāt prāptirvā samudāyaśeṣatā. / Ibid.,
II

The principal arguments of Buddhism against recognition of avayavin can be set forth under the following heads:

(1) Criticism of the Nyāya view that the avayavin can be known by inference.

(2) Criticism of the Nyāya view that the avayavin can be known by perception.

(3) Criticism of the Nyāya view as to the relation between parts and whole.

(4) Criticism of the Nyāya concept of samavaya.

(5) Criticism of the Nyāya view of citra-rupa or variegated colour.

(6) Criticism of the Nyāya view on the grounds that
   (a) the whole does not weigh more than its parts taken together.
   (b) the whole does not occupy space different from that of its avayavas.

(7) Antinomies based on the law of contradiction.

We shall discuss these points in the given order.

III

(1) Criticism of the Nyāya view that the avayavin can be known by inference:
This criticism we find in Sāntarakṣita and his commentator, Kamalasīla. Before opening his attack Sāntarakṣita sets forth in brief the Nyāya argument.

The Nyāya argument runs thus: All things that have different makers and different potencies (bibhinna kartrśaktyādeḥ) must be regarded as different; threads and cloth have different makers and different potencies; hence they are different. Kamalasīla clarifies the term 'ādi' occurring in 'bibhinna kartrśaktyādeḥ' as meaning 'kārya-kāla-parimāṇa', so that the whole expression means 'different makers, different effects, different periods and different sizes'.

Difference in these respects is antagonistic to identity. Wherever we find these features, we have to conclude that the things are different (ye bhinna-kartr-kārya-kāla-parimāṇāste-bibhinnāḥ).

In reply to the query why these differences are irreconcilable with identity and unity, it is said that these lead to possession of contradictory qualities and contradictories assuredly cannot have the same locus (viruddha dharmādyasomātra nibandhano hi bhāvānāṁ paras-parasparato bhedaḥ). The maker of threads is the spinning woman and that of the cloth the weaver (tantūnāṁ yośit kartrī paṭāsyā kuvindāḥ); the cloth can give us protection against cold, the threads

6 T. S. p. 264. 7 Ibid., (Kamalasīla's commentary);
8 Ibid., It may be noted however that this argument is not found in Uddyotakara, although Sāntarakṣita says that he is here setting forth the views of Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta. It may therefore be presumed to have been given by Bhāvivikta of whom we do not hear at all in the Nyāya works. He flourished before Uddyotakara and seems to have been completely overshadowed by the latter.
9 T. S., Ibid., 8.
cannot; the threads are prior to cloth in time since they are seen before the cloth is manufactured; the length and the breadth of cloth are different from those of each of the yarns (paṭṣyaṭṭama vistarābhyāṃ yāvat pramāṇam na tāvat pratyekam tantūnāmasti). On these grounds which, the Naiyāyika asserts, are not inconclusive (nānaīkāntikata hetunām), he holds that the avayavin is distinct from the avayavas.

Sāntaraksita rejects the Nyāya contention. He urges several objections:

a) The first is from the view point of the Sautrantika who is an avowed kṣanabhaṅgavādin. For him things are all momentary, and paṭapāk-kālīna-tantu and paṭasamāna-kālīna-tantu, threads just before the manufacture of cloth and those co-existing with cloth are different. If the Naiyāyika means to say that avayavin is different from the avayavas just preceding its emergence, his argument is futile (sādhana vaiphalyam), for it seeks to prove the proven to establish what is already established (siddhasādhanā dōṣa). Such difference is openly admitted and unreservedly accepted by the Buddhist.

---

10 T. S. p. 241., Verse 578.
11 "yadi prathamāvaṣṭhaḥbhābibhyo samadhigatapaṭṭakhyāntu, bhayastantubhyah patasya bhedaḥ sādhyate, tāda siddhasādhyate / K’s Commentary thereon.
12 i.e., kṣanabhaṅga-vādī Buddhist. As to how the Vaibhāṣīka treats it, Vide Supra, p. 7-9.
(b) If the Naiyāyika, on the other hand, is out to prove
difference of avayavin from the avayavas constituting it and co-
existing with it, his argument, Sāntaraksita asserts, is fallacious,
the grounds adduced being asiddha (or unestablished). We shall
first refer to the version of Kamalaśīla who has endeavoured to put
the best face on Sāntaraksita's contention, and then mention another
version that is found in Nyāya Sutra and Vātsyāyana's commentary
thereon. Whatever the version, the burden of the Buddhist conten-
tion is that the avayavin cannot be inferred and all arguments by
means of which it is sought to be inferred are defective.

Kamalaśīla states the Buddhist objection thus: "If the
cloth were a recognised entity (prasiddha) as something different
from the yarns existing alongside, then it might be proved to have
different makers, potencies etc. in relation to and in contrast to
the yarns. As it stands, the cloth, however, is not recognised as
such and the other party (i.e., the Naiyāyika) has still to prove
its difference from the yarns". What Kamalaśīla means to say
and what he has not perhaps clearly spelt out in this. Somewhat

13 Atha patasamānakālabhāvino ye tantavastebhyah patasya anyatva
prasādhyate, tadā hetūnām asiddhātā / Ibid., p. 242.
(Here, ‘ananyatvā’ after ‘patasya’ is an obvious misprint; it
makes no sense especially in view of what follows in the
commentary. It would clearly be ‘anyatva’).

14 Yadi tadānīm tantu vyatīrīktastatsamānakālabhāvī
patāh prasiddho bhavet, tada tasya tantuvyapeksayā
vibhinna kartṛtvādayo dharmāh siddheyuh, . . . . . sa evāyam
tantuvyatireki pato do siddhah -
tadbhāsasyaiva prasādhyātum prastutatvat / Ibid., p. 242.
sketchy observation is this: for the Naiyåyika the probandum is the 'tuntubheda', the hetu is in turn 'bibhinnakartå karya' etc., and the pakṣa is 'the cloth' (the form of the pratijñā being 'paṭah tantubhinnah bibhinnah kartåtyādhah' i.e., the cloth is different from threads because of difference of makers etc.). But the pakṣa here is asiddha - it is not yet proved, and in such an unestablished locus or dharmi, the hetu dharma cannot reside. Hence there is the fallacy of asiddha hetu, this particular type being known as āśrayāsiddha doṣa.

Gotama in his Sūtra No. 2.1.33 refers to a pūrvapakṣa which rejects avayavin on the ground that it is not recognised by all but has to be proved, and in so far as it is the probandum, it is a dubious entity (sadhyatvāt avayavini sandehah). The purport of this pūrvapakṣa (which is attributed to Buddhism) is that the probandum in every inference must always be a siddha padārtha, a prasiddha vastu, something already established. A thing which is not recognised, which is asiddha, cannot have even the semblance of a probandum. Nobody cares about proving the existence of hare's horn which is a non-entity. Similarly, the avayavin is also a non-entity, an alīke padārtha and cannot be the subject of proof.

It must be admitted that we do not find any such argument in the Buddhist works and neither Vātsyāyana nor Uddyotakara nor Vacaspati has referred to any Buddhist work while dealing with this
The argument, as it stands, does not hold water. The probandum need not be recognised by all the parties, recognition by one is enough. If universal recognition were made a condition of a thing being proved then nothing over which there was controversy could be proved. No argument could in that case be advanced to prove the existence of God, atoms etc. which are all matters of controversy and dispute, vivada or vipratipatti is admitted by none, not even by the Buddhist, to be a badhaka of anumana. Hence, Gotam's Sutra does not appear to do full justice to the Buddhist purvapaksins. Bhaṣyakāra is alive to this aspect and hence comments, "evānca sati vipratipattimātram bhavati, vipratipattesā avayavim samsayah", i.e., sadhyatva is not the immediate cause of doubt, it leads only to vipratipatti, i.e., conflicting opinions about the probandum and thus gives rise to doubt. Thus, the sadhya, qua sadhya, is not the father of doubt but only as vipratipatti prayoyaka.

It may be said that Gotama is not open to the above criticism, for does not Kamalasila himself say that avayavins as distinct from the avayavas cannot be proved since it is not a recognised entity? If so, why should Gotama be censured? Moreover, how does Gotama's version differ from Kamalasila's, seeing that both argue impossibility of proving avayavin on the ground that it is not a prasiddha vastu? The answer is that the two versions are not the same but differ in an important respect. In Kamalasila, the 'avayavin'

15 Bhāṣya on N. S. 2.1.33. Also vide Tarkavāgīsa's Comments thereon.
(i.e., the cloth) forms the paksa and 'avayabheda' the sadhya.
While in Gotama's version, 'avayavin' constitutes the sadhya.
Anyway, whatever the merit of 'Santaraksita's contention, his point is that avayavin cannot be proved by means of any valid argument, - that it is not inferable at all. This is, we should note, is not a criticism of any inference in particular whereby the avayavin is sought to be proved but a general and broad criticism of the very inferability of the avayavin. Later on, we shall see, the Buddhist will refute many specific arguments of the Nyaya in support of independent existence of the avayavin.

IV

(2) Criticism of the Nyāya view that the avayavin can be known by perception:

The Naiyayika urges that apart from inference, perception also points to the existence of avayavin#. Most of the objects we are familiar with, tables and chairs and trees and mountains, we know by perception. √If they were all just aggregates of atoms (paramāṇu saṅcaya), they would have remained invisible. An atom being atindriya, a bundle of them would also be so. Hence, nothing would left over for perception if the avayavin were not admitted. 16

16 yadi hyavayavi na syat, sarvagrahanāprasaṅgāḥ, paramāṇūnāmatiindriyatāt / K's Commentary on Verse 561. This refers to N.S. 2.1.34 : 'Sarvagrahanam avayavasiddheh'.
The Buddhist rejects this contention on the ground that if the avayavin were an object of perception, there would have been no controversy about it, for we would have only to see it to recognise it. The very fact that there is more than one opinion about it irretrievably indicates its non-perceptual character. Not that we do not perceive anything but that we do not perceive anything as an avayavin distinct from the avayavas. In fact we have only the multitude of atoms left over and it is this we perceive. Though atoms are individually invisible, collectively they are not so. It is therefore an unwarranted proposition that atoms are ever imperceptible. This may be true for the Naiyayika who holds to eternity of atoms; but for the Buddhist atoms are ever changing and when they attain a specific condition, they can well be objects of perception.

(3) Criticism of the Nyāya view about the relation between parts and whole:

The Buddhist also opens broadside on the Nyāya view that the avayavin, though one, still permeates the avayavas or the components. The relation of the avayavin to the avayavas (and not vice versa)
is known technically in the Nyāya as samavāya or inherence - the avayavas being samavayin or the ādhāra or anuyogin (substrate or subjunct) and the avayavin being samaveta or the ādhārya (adjunct). The Naiyāyikas regard samavāya as 'vyāpya vr̥tti' and samyoga as 'avayāpya vr̥tti'. Consequently, the whole is supposed to pervade its parts through and through. The Buddhist subjects the concepts of samavāya and ādhāra-ādhārya-bhāva to vigorous scrutiny and challenges the 'viability' of the concept of, 'one residing in many'. We shall here begin with the latter and come to ādhāra-ādhārya-bhāva in course of our discussion while leaving samavāya for separate treatment.

Sāntarakṣita simply says that things like yarns, hands and other limbs cannot be imbued with any single 'composite' (ekāvaya vyamugata naiva tantukarādayah) because they are many (anekatvat); and further, that the substance in question (i.e., the avayavin) cannot subsist in many because it is one like atom (nānekavyavāsvat ekatvadānuvat). Kamalaśīla expands and reformulates the arguments thus:

(a) That which is diverse cannot be permiated by a single substance (yadaneke na tadekadravyamugatam) e.g., straw, hut and jar (kata kūtya kūtādayah). These objects are many and diverse in character and admittedly not imbued with any single substance.

The components in question viz., yarns, hands etc. are also many and diverse. Experience nowhere provides us with an instance of plurality being steeped in unity, of many being shot through with one (The instances under consideration viz., the components being subjudice cannot be cited against the Buddhist. Their precise character has to be determined on the analogy of other instances). Experience rather tells us of unredeemed pluralism, of many free from the least vestige of community. Hence, there is vyāpaka viruddhopalabdhi, i.e., knowledge of the contrary of the vyāpaka of the opponent; and so the opponent's thesis is untenable.

(b) Again, what is one must subsist in a single substance e.g. a single atom (yadem tadekadravyāsvitam, yathāikāḥ paramānūḥ). The 'avayavin' is one; therefore it cannot subsist in many. So, there is again vyāpaka-viruddhopalabdhi.

Santaraksita now argues that if inspite of the above arguments the opponent sticks to his position, then he can be challenged on the ground that such subsistence of one in many is not warranted by any pramāṇa (vṛttterayuktirvādhi pramāṇa). It is impossible for two reasons: (i) It militates against the nature (svabhāva), form and character (ṛūpa) of an avayavin to subsist simultaneously in many parts; and (ii) an avayavin cannot exist in any of its components, either wholly or in part.

---
23 The opponent's thesis is: What is diverse is pervaded by a unitary substance (yadenekam tade-kadravyānugatam). Here vyāpaya is 'anekatva', vyāpaka is 'skadravyānugatatva'. In experience we find its very opposite; therefore there is 'vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi'. This is a pet expression of Vacaspati and its use shows how great was his influence on later writers even of the rival schools.
24 The opponent's thesis is: What is diverse is pervaded by a unitary substance (yadenekam tade-kadravyānugatam). Here vyāpaya is 'anekatva', vyāpaka is 'skadravyānugatatva'. In experience we find its very opposite; therefore there is 'vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi'. This is a pet expression of Vacaspati and its use shows how great was his influence on later writers even of the rival schools.
25 T.S.P. Verse 604; Ibid., p. 25.
(i) To take up the first one. Does the avayavin subsist in a part in the same form and character in which it subsists in another? Or does it do so in some other form? The former alternative is unacceptable; if the whole subsisted in one part with its form and distinctive nature intact, it could not be subsisting in others at the same time in the same way. If the whole pertaining to one component subsisted in some other component which occupies a different space, in the same form and manner, it would mean that the two components were not distinguishable from each other. The second alternative is equally forbidding. If the avayavin subsisted in the other part in another form and feature, it would no more be one, for difference of form and distinctive character nullifies unity of the object. Indeed on this view we should have to postulate as many avayavins as there are parts, for the avayavin has to subsist in each of them in a different form and character. But this is obviously absurd. Hence, neither of the alternatives is tenable.

(ii) We have just now shown how the concept of subsistence of a thing in many is repugnant to the very nature of the thing. We shall now show how every possible mode of subsistence is equally contradictory to the nature of a single avayavin. A thing can subsist in another only in two ways — either partially or wholly. 

26 Tadekam dravyamekāvayava krodikrtam yattasya rupam tenaiva vyavāntareṣu vartate, yadvā ānyēṇa - iti pakṣa dvayam /T.S.,p.250.
27 Na ca kṛtanaikadesābhyyām prakāṛāntaramasti /N.V.T.T., p. 381.
The avayavin therefore can subsist in each of its parts wholly without any remainder (e.g., vocal excellence of the cuckoo (kalavīka kantha gunā); or it can subsist only in part (e.g., a single thread running in and through the flowers (yatha svākṣūtram kusumesu). Now, if the avayavin subsisted wholly in one part and were exhausted in it, there would remain nothing over to be in other parts; so they would be useless and superfluous (sesāvyava vaiyarthyam). If it is still maintained that the whole somehow subsists in entirely in each and all of the components, then it follows that there would be as many avayavins as there are parts, each avayavin having a different locus of its own, like water lilies blooming in different tanks. But this is surely repugnant to the Naiyāyika. For this means the avayavin would cease to be one and be reduced to the status of avayavas. A unitary reality embracing the parts such as the avayavin is supposed to do is blown sky-high.

The matter does not end here; there are other difficulties. If the avayavin existed wholly in a part and were constituted of it, it would be 'ekadravya' and be incapable of being perceived. The

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{23 Ibid. \footnote{29 M. V. \footnote{30 Tatasā sarvātmanā vṛtterjugapadaneka kundādiya vastheta kubalādivat anekatvamavayavinah prāpnoti / T. S. P. on Verse 612.}}}
\end{footnotes}
conditions of perceptibility recognised in the Nyāya Vaisēśika are gross dimension and composition by many substances (mahadanēkadravya vattvasyopalabdhi kāraṇattvāt).\footnote{N.V., p. 214; it may be noted that this differs from the old Nyāya Vaisēśika view according to which manifest colour is a necessary condition. Cf. VS. 4.1.6.} Since the avayavin in the present case consists only of one part, it obviously cannot be perceived. And this again goes against the Nyaya contention that it is perceptible. In fact, such an avayavin would be atomic in magnitude, for an atom alone is ekadravya. Moreover, on such a view, the avayavin would be indestructible. A thing that is composed of many can be destroyed, for destruction is only decomposition, a resolution into smaller components. Where there is only one component there is no meaning in saying it can be destroyed.

We cannot also maintain the other alternative viz., the avayavin exists part by part in its components. For this would mean that the whole existed in its components through the medium of a set of intrinsic, non-constituent parts. There would be thus two sets of parts – constituent and non-constituent. But this is not warranted by experience nor accepted by the Naiyayika. Experience does not tell us of any such two-fold part of a thing. What is more, we cannot stop here, for the question arises: How is the whole related to its non-constituents parts? As before, it cannot exist in entirely in any of its parts; if however it is to exist partially, there would be a third set of parts and so on ad infinitum.
Moreover, if the whole were to exist piecemeal, we would have an instance of many being in many and not of one being in many. The whole would lose its self-identity and unity and would just be a conglomeration of parts (evam hi sati ekovavi na syat avayavapracayamatarupatvattasya). But this is precisely the Buddhist view and the Naiyayika cannot certainly accept it!

Sántaraksita goes further and challenges in this connection the very concept of 'vyrtti' or subsistence of the whole in the parts on another ground. If each of the composites present in each of the components together occupied the same space, then and only then could they be said to subsist in a component; since, however, that is not possible, i.e., the many composites subsisting in the many components cannot all occupy the same locus, we cannot speak of subsistence of the whole in the parts. Vācagpati also states this Buddhist contention as purvapaksa with considerably greater trenchancy. If the whole exists, part for part, in the avayavas, then ultimately we have to come to atoms and instead of saying 'a garland running through flowers', should say 'an atom of the garland is in an atom of a

33 Atha ekadesena iti paksah, tadā mavavasthā syādekadesānām / T.S.P. on Verse 612.
34 Tathā ca sati naikamanekatvaikadesena vartate kim tu anekamanekatya iti / NVTT., p. 382.
flower (kusumaparamānabhasmin sutra paramānureko vartate). But subsistence of one atom on (or in) the other is absurd. Hence, it is not meaningful talk to say that the avayavin subsists in the avayavas (avayavesu avayavi-vṛttah).

Sankaraswaṣṭya sought to combat the Buddhist's argument by putting him between the horns of a dilemma. The ground of Buddhist rejection of avayavin is 'impossibility of subsistence either in, part or in entirety'. Now, is this ground or probans something perceived by the Buddhist? or is it something unperceived? In the latter event it is open to the change of being 'asiddha' (unproven). As a matter of fact, the Buddhist has nowhere perceived such subsistence, hence the ground is asiddha; consequently, his conclusion that the avayavin is non-existent is untenable. If, on the other hand, such vṛttti or subsistence has been perceived by him (i.e., if he so claims for argument's sake) it would be the same everywhere including the case of the 'avayava-avayavin'. In that case it is not open to the Buddhist to deny 'avayavin'. Again, if vṛttti or subsistence as such is not admitted by him, then the question whether the subsistence is partial or complete does not arise at all and should not be entertained at all. Instead of hair splitting as to the mode of subsistence the Buddhist in the very beginning should denounce it.

33 N.V.T.T., p. 382.
39 A Nyāya scholar who lived, like Bhāvavikta, before Uddyotakara and like the latter has been completely lost in oblivion because of Uddyotakara's fame. Only in the Tattva Samgraha do we come to know of them.
Sānkarasvāmy finally winds up by saying that in any event the oppo-
ponent cannot deny avayavin, for it is vouched for by our perception
which takes the form 'It subsists herein', 'the cloth subsists in
the yarns' etc.\textsuperscript{40}

Vacaspati, it is interesting to note, follows, at least, a
part of this line of attack. He also says that if, as the Bud-
hist argues, there is no subsistence, then all talk of whether subsis-
tence is by part or as a whole is so much empty verbiage (vyṛttera
bhāvāt ekadesāna vā kartānyena vā vartata iti riktam vacah)\textsuperscript{41}.

The Buddhist says in reply firstly that so far as subsis-
tence or vyṛtta as such is concerned, it has been shown to be a myth.
The second question relates to the mode of subsistence and the
validity of such expressions as 'partial or complete subsistence'.
These are used and intended to be taken only analogically. By the
term 'in entirety' is meant whether the 'avayavi substance' subsists
as an impartible whole - in the way in which the 'Śrī-phala', i.e.,
the Bilva fruit lies in a dish? or does it subsist in some other
way as a certain person, Chaitra, does when lying down our several
seats? This latter sense is sought to be brought out by the term
'subsistence in part'. Hence, there is nothing wrong in using
expressions to which Sāṅkarasvāmy has taken exception. Lastly, as
as regards the perceptual character of subsistence of the whole in

\textsuperscript{40} T. S. Verses 613-617; Also, Vide T.S.P. thereon.
\textsuperscript{41} N.V.T.T., loc. Cit., p.
\textsuperscript{41\textsuperscript{A}} T.S. \textnumero \textsuperscript{620}.
parts, it is flatly denied by the Buddhist. There is no cognition of the form 'the cloth is in the yarns', or 'the pot is in the kapalas' etc. Since this involves examination of 'samavāya' we shall not discuss it here but reserve our discussion under the next heading.

VI

(4) Criticism of Samavāya:

We have seen that one of the Nyāya contentions is that the whole is apprehended by us as subsisting in parts. We have cognitions of the form 'the cloth is in the yarns' or 'the pot is in the polshards'; and this clearly shows that there is subsistence of the whole in the parts. Since experience and knowledge attest such subsistence, this has to be admitted as a brute datum, as an indispensable objective fact. Possible difficulties regarding mode of subsistence cannot be allowed to supersede or negative this fact; rather they are to be explained or sorted out on the basis of and in the light of such subsistence. The Naiyāyika designates such subsistence by the term 'samavāya' or inherence.

Although 'samavāya' or inherence later on came to be supposed to obtain in various cases, e.g., as between a substance and its qualities and motion, an eternal substance and its ultimate differ-
ential etc., still in the beginning it seems to have been introduced in the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika literature only to explain the peculiar relation between kāraṇa and kārya dravya. Kanada, e.g., does not speak of qualities, movements, universals to be residing in their substances by the relation of samavāya. He defines 'samavāya' as "that which produces in respect of the material cause and the effect, the notion 'this subsists in that'". The relation of samavāya therefore makes it possible for the material cause and the effect to be the container and contained (ādhāra and ṛdeya) respectively. It seems that originally samavāya was meant to explain only this relation of subsistence; subsequently, it was extended so as to cover other cases.

The Buddhists, however, reject the relation of samavāya. As for the contention that samavāya is vouchsafed by relevant cognitions such as 'the cloth is in the threads' or 'the pot is in the potsherds', they flatly deny it. They deny that we have any such cognitions. Indeed, Dharmakīrti asserts, apart from the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika literature we nowhere come across such linguistic expressions. They are not also found in the language of the ordinary people. The Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas deliberately coin such expressions with a view to defending their theory of samavāya; expressions are not dictated by the nature of things.

42 ihedam iti yataḥ kārya kāraṇayoh sa samavāyah / VS., vii.2.26.
43 'yadi naśti samavāyah, tadā iha tantusu pataḥ ityādaḥ buddayah na syuh ? . . . 'ihā tantusu pataḥ ityādiśabdah imeśvayam samayāmulocanaḥ kṛtaḥ no vastuparadhinah / Pramāṇa Vārtika, Verse 149. (Manorathananandin's commentary).
Santaraksita also urges that the notion of 'subsisting in this' (etadiha vijñānam) exists for the opponents only (paresameva vartate); it is due entirely to their infatuation with their own doctrine (svasiddhāntānurāgena); and is never met with in common experience (na drṣṭam lamkam tu tat)\(^44\).

The Naiyāyika's rejoinder is that expressions of the form 'A is in B' (iha khalu vartate atra khalu vartate) with some words in the locative case and some in the nominative case, indicating presence of one thing in another, are not peculiar to him or to his philosophy. They are used by common people and even by the Buddhists themselves. Do they not, for example, say\(^45\) 'the horn belongs to the cow' (srngam gavi tiṣṭhāti - lit. is the horn in the cow) and do they not claim validity for the same? Here certainly some sort of subsistence obtains and is so accepted by the Buddhist!

The Buddhist points out that he is not opposed to such expressions or their use. Those expressions and the cognitions embodied therein, which are established by some pramāṇa (pramāṇa prasiddhyorāṇurodhat),\(^46\) are accepted by him; but any and every expression cannot claim this privilege, there must be the certificate of a pramāṇa. Now, regarding expressions recognised by the Nyaya as indicating samavāya of the whole in the parts, e.g., the

\(^{44}\) T. S., 326; T.S.P. thereon;
\(^{45}\) Pramāṇavārtika, Verse 150 (Manorathanandin's commentary thereon).
\(^{46}\) Ibid., y.
cow is in the horns (śrīnga gauh), such usage is unknown to the common man; it sounds outrageous to him. Not only does he never have such knowledge but he has rather knowledge of the reverse e.g., the horns belong to the cow. 47

As Dharmakīrti points out, the latter is certified by pratyaksa and is universally accepted as is borne out by language of all unsophisticated people; the former however is specially maintained by the Naiyāyika. It is 'upakalpiita', i.e., imagined by the Naiyāyika and 'alakṣīka' i.e., not found in the world, because it falls beyond the realm of what is established by pramāṇa (pramāṇa siddhīrbaḥīrbaḥāvāt). 48 Santarakṣīta drives home this point by saying that the notion that appears in our ordinary experience is 'the branches are in the tree' and not 'the tree is in the branches', 'the stones are in the hill, and not 'the hill is in the stones'. 49 Thus, we should say following universal experience down the ages that parts make up the whole and belong to it and not vice versa, as the Naiyāyika believes, to wit, the whole belongs to and is in the parts.

The Naiyāyika now seeks to turn the tables on the opponent. He argues that even the expression approved of by the Buddhist e.g., 'the horn belongs to the cow' suggests that what is called 'the cow' is different from its parts and thus goes to prove that avayāvā is

---

47 Na kevalamiha tantasu potah ityādikā dhiyo loke na siddhāḥ kintu tadviparitāh eva prāsiddhāḥ / T. S. P. on Verse 330.
48 Pramāṇavartīka, ibid., (vide Manorāthanandin's vṛtti thereon).
49 Vṛksaḥ sakhaḥ śītāṣeṣa ityāsa lamkikī mātēḥ / T. S. Verse 830. Na 'tusakhayam vṛksah, śītāṣu parvata iti / T. S. P.
distinct from the avayavas! If the whole were not distinct from parts, the cow from its avayavas, we could not even speak of horns being in the cow.\(^{50}\) The Buddhist points out in reply that the above expression simply means that the horns are never found apart from the remaining parts which together with them (i.e. the horns) are known as the cow (gavākhyā pariśistāṅga vicchedanupalamabhavāt)\(^{51}\), it does not signify the existence of an additional avayavin called 'cow' (na tu avayavatiriktagosadbhavāt)\(^{52}\). Sāntarakṣita explains in this connection that according to the Buddhist sentences containing a word in the nominative and another in the locative signify two things close proximity (nairantaryā) or identity (tādātmyā)\(^{53}\). It signifies close proximity when the two words stand for two portions of an aggregate (avayavasaṇcaya) as in the above example, or for portions of two different aggregates, e.g., the bilva fruit is in the bowl (kundādau śrīphalam). 'The branches are in the tree' or stones belong to the hill mean that branches and stones are found to be in close contact with portions other than themselves, viz., trunk of the tree and base of the hill respectively (vivaksita sākhācilā vyatirik-tanyadhovavasthitani skandhadinyāgām).\(^{54}\)

But in cases where we speak of colour, sound, taste, smell, action etc. as residing in a substance, identity is meant identity

---

50 Yadyavayavebhyo na gaurbhinnah tadā gavi śrūgam ityapi na syat ?\(^{50}\) Pramāṇavārtika / Kā. 150
51 Ibid. (Manorathanandin's commentary) 53 T.Ś. Ka. 831.
52 Ibid. (T.Ś.P).
between the substance and colour, taste etc. as the case may be. 'Colour is in the jar' means 'colour is of the nature of the jar,' and not that 'colour' and 'jar' are two different things and one inheres in the other. Kamalaśīla here points out that the word 'tadatmya' used by Śāntaraksīta is not to be taken as 'sameness' or 'equation', otherwise 'colour' and 'jar' would be identical; wherever any patch of colour is found, it would be termed 'jar' and vice versa. What is however intended here to convey is that though colour is found in many places, colour associated with certain other sense-data which together forms a jar is different from character-complexes found elsewhere. This distinction from other things i.e., sense-data (atadvyāvṛtti) is sought to be pointed out by the expression 'colour in the jar.' Hence it means not that the 'colour is the same as jar but that it is of the nature of jar' (ghate rūpam = ghatasvabhāvam rūpaṁ, na ghatadyātmakamityarthah).  

Śāntaraksīta therefore concludes that only when two things are known to be different from each other and one is contained in the other, do we have the notion that 'this subsists in that.' Cloth and yarns however are never perceived as distinct from each other, so there cannot arise in our mind the notion that one subsists in the other.

55 For the Buddhist, we may remember, there is no distinction between substance and quality.

56 T.S.P. on Ka 831. The interested reader may read through Kamalaśīla's commentary on this Kārika for further discussion on this point.

57 Nañatvalaksane hi syādādharadheyabhūtāyoh Idamatvati vijñānam kundādau śrīphalādivat / T. S. Ka. 827 (also vide T.S.P. thereon).
Dharmakirti also says in this context that cloth and threads cannot subsist one in the other by inherence, for the inherence would suppose the two things are different and exist simultaneously. But this is obviously absurd. For threads are the cause and cloth is the effect - cause and effect are related as antecedent and consequent and not as synchronous entities (naika-kālam kathācana)\(^5^8\). A cloth is but the subsequent state of yarns brought into existence through the instrumentality of loom, weaver and other machinery (tantu saṃskārasambhūtam kāryam)\(^5^9\) - threads are the antecedent condition of the cloth.

VII

Criticism of Nyāya Vaisesika hypothesis of variegated colour (citra-rūpa):

A further Buddhist objection to the doctrine of a distinct avayavin (prthagbhūta avayavī) relates to Nyāya Vaisesika hypothesis of variegated colour.

The Buddhist argues that if the avayavin is a distinct entity, it should have a colour of its own, apart from that of the avayavas. But even the closest observation of a cloth does not

\(^{58}\) P. V. Kā. 151.
\(^{59}\) Ibid., p.
disclose in it any colour other than that of its parts. When the colour of the whole is supposed to be perceived, we really perceive the colour of the parts. The whole therefore cannot be conceded a distinctive status. In this contention the Buddhist is supported both by the Mīmāṃsaka and the Sāṅkhya. 60

The Naiyāyika observes in reply that the avayavin must have some colour, for there can be no substance without colour. And the colour of the whole follows the colour of the parts - if the parts are red, so is the whole. This is in accordance with the maxim - kāraṇaṁ gūnāṁ kāryaṁ gūnārādhante, i.e., attributes of the cause produce in the effect attributes of the same kind (this is true when the attributes are of a specific nature, not general, i.e., viśeṣa gūnāḥ and not sāmānya gūnāḥ). 61 We fail to distinguish the distinctive colour of the whole from that of the parts because of the sameness of kind (sajātiyatva). Both the colours being of the same nature, the one overshadows the other and makes it impossible for us to discriminate between the two, but it does not mean that the other is not there. Even though it is not perceived in its distinctive states and form, it must be regarded as being present and even perceived on grounds of logic, for we cannot otherwise explain perception of the whole. If the whole had no colour of its own, it could not be perceived. Non-discrimination of the colour of the whole does not prove non-existence of the whole.

60 S.D., p. 107.
61 Nyāya Paricaya - Mahāmahopādhyāya Phalibhūṣana Tarkavāgīśa, p. 83; also Vs., 2.1.24.
The Buddhist rejects this contention and says that while it may go well when the parts are all a uniform, unvaried colour, it breaks down when they are different colours. What colour would the whole be if the parts were some red, some blue and some yellow? Similarly what will be the nature of a cloth if it is made of different kinds of fabrics viz., cotton, silk and wool?

To take the instance of colour, the avayavin cannot obviously possess one of the colours in preference to another, for in that event the whole would have a colour different from that of some of the parts, and this would go against the above Nyāya maxim. The avayavin cannot also possess all these colours simultaneously for they are mutually contradictory (paraspara viruddhasvabhāva). It cannot also be partly one colour and partly another, for then the colours would really belong to the parts and not to the whole. If a thing is partially red and partially green, it only means that some parts of it are red and some parts green. If it is insisted that these qualify the whole, the avayavin, then certain insuperable difficulties arise. In the first place it would involve a patent contradiction. The same thing has at once to be both red and green, i.e., red and not-red, which is a plain absurdity. Buddhists refer to a number of antinomies which emerge if we assume a distinct avayavin. We shall dwell on these in connection with antinomies. Meanwhile, it is clear that contradictory colours cannot simultaneously be predicated of the whole. Secondly, according to the

\[2. \text{Vide infra, p.76.}\]
Naiyāyika some qualities are avyāpya-vṛtti or non-pervasive and some are vyāpya-vṛtti, conjunction, e.g., is non-pervasive, it resides only in a particular portion of its substrata, but colour is of a different kind, it pervades its ādāra all over. Naturally, a thing according to the Naiyāyika can have only one colour. The hypothesis of two or more colours residing in a substance is anathema to him. On the other hand, the Nyāya cannot say in view of these difficulties that the avayavin is a virupa dravya, an uncoloured substance, for no such thing is admitted by it. Similarly, when the fabrics of a textile are a variety of cotton, silk and wool, the textile cannot be said to be of the nature of any one of them only; then what it would be like? The Buddhist holds that all these difficulties crop up only because the Nyāya assumes the extra entity of avayavin. If this hypothesis is discarded and a thing is put down to an aggregate of its parts, the problem is at once solved.

The Nyāya however sets its face against this conclusion and holds that what happens in the above cases is that a new property emerges in the avayavin. In the case of parts having dissimilar colours, the avayavin comes to acquire a distinctive colour called 'citra rūpa' or variegated colour. Variegated colour is not a variety of colours but are single species of colour like red, green or yellow. The variety of colours inhæring in the avayavas begets the variegated colour in the avayavin. The same solution holds for a variety of fabrics.
The Buddhists reject outright the plea of 'citra rūpa'. They deny that there is any such kind of colour. We do not find in it anything more and anything other than the various colours blue, green etc. (-nilādipratibhāsaścitrapratibhāsaḥ).

Dharma-kirti says that a 'citra pañāga', i.e., an insect of variegated colour (e.g., a butterfly) does not appear to us to have one colour but a good many. Experience, therefore, unambiguously points to the manifold nature and content of 'citra rūpa'. Just as the effulgence of a string of jewels is nothing but a mixture of their glorious tints, even so the citra rūpa of a piece of cloth is but the colours of its parts taken together. It cannot be said that the analogy is an unhappy one, that there is dissimilarity (vaisā-drśya) between 'drśanta' and 'darśantika', the illustration and the illustrated viz., in the one case there is no one avayavī while in the other there is. Therefore, the two cases are not on a par. With regard to the insect, our cognition of the 'citra rūpa' is basic and literally true because the insect is an avayavī, but a cluster of stones is not an avyavī and our description of its colour as 'citra rūpa' cannot obviously be literally true. It can be used only figuratively (upacarita).

---

63. P. V./Ka 201 (Manorathanandin’s commentary).
64. Naikām citra pataṅgādī rūpam vā drśyate katham / P. V. Ka. 200.
65. Yathaiva samsthāna viṣegena sannivisthanām vañahunām maninām rūpaṁ taccitramanekam nāikamavayavi dravyam / M. V. Ka. 201.
66. Citrabuddhi rekatvānmukhyā pataṅge, manirūpadisu upadeśīviteti/ M. V., Ibid.
The Buddhist dissents and argues that the relevant facts in both the cases are the same, viz., presence of variegated colour and its resolution into a variety. If we can show that in the case a variety of colours appears as 'citra rūpa', in the other it can be extended with equal logical force. Presence or absence of the avayavin cannot tell upon these facts. In fact, concept of avayavin is subjudice and will have to be a recognised if 'citra rūpa' is proved to be a more than a mixture of colours. Therefore, in the discussion of citra rūpa, consideration of avayavin should not be introduced to pre-judge the issue.

Dharmakīrti says that in the case of cloth, the diverse colours of the parts shine forth as the variegated colour of the cloth, not that an emergent avayavi comes to have such a colour of its own. He rests his polemic against avayavivada on the famous Buddhist maxim which he himself formulates, viz., vijatiyanam dravyanaram bhat i.e., things of a species cannot beget things of another species. Threads cannot make a cloth if cloth is supposed to fall into a class apart. Cloth is in reality nothing more than threads in warp and woof, nothing other than them. Absolutely disparate things cannot be related as cause and effect, for that would be repugnant to cosmic continuum, the santanapravaha. Hence, Manorathanandin says that as with a piece of cloth, so with an insect, multi-colour is not

---

67 Tatāvayavāraṇām cet kevalām drṣyate tathā / P.V. Ka 202.
68 also, citrapaṭādīṣu kevalāmaṇāvaya rūpaṁ citratayādvaṣyate nāvayavi / M.V. Ibid.,
69 c. 205; also : vijātānāṁ bhinnajātānāṁ rāgaḍravyaṁ kāryadravyaṁ nārambhat.
due to the emergence of an avayavin but to the many colours of the avayavas.\textsuperscript{70}

On these grounds the Buddhist concludes that variegated colour is not 'ekasvabhava' i.e., a unitary colour (naikam svabhāvam citram)\textsuperscript{71} and even ridicules the Naiyāyika: "What can be more queer (citra) than to declare variegated colour (citra rūpa) to be one colour!"\textsuperscript{72}

VIII

(a) Criticism on the ground of weight:

The Buddhists argue that if an additional avayavin is produced when the parts are combined, there should be an increase of weight. When the yarns are woven into cloth, we have on the Nyāya view, not merely the avayavas, the yarns, but also the emergent avayavi, the cloth. And since the avayavin subsists in its avayavas and is not found apart from them, weighing the cloth really means weighing the yarns and the cloth, the avayavas and the avayavin. Consequently, we should have double the weight of the yarns. But we never find that it is so. The weight of a body is never found to exceed that of its parts. Rather our experience is that the whole weighs equally as its parts. This conclusively shows, says the Buddhist, that the additional avayavin is a myth and a thing is no-

\textsuperscript{70} M. V. Ka. 202. \textsuperscript{71} P. V. Ka. 201. \textsuperscript{72} Ka. 200. The line quoted by Vācaspati in his N.V.T.T. is slightly different. For the last word 'tatah' he has 'mahat'-citram tadekamiti cedidam citra-taram mahat' The sense however is the same. For the Nyāya reply vide infra. pp. 129-131.
thing but its parts taken together.73

It may be noted that the Śāmkhyas also advance this argument against the Nyāya theory of avayavin and reject it like the Buddhists.74

(b) Another argument advanced by the Buddhist is - two things entirely different cannot occupy the same space, e.g., jar and cloth.75 They are always found to occupy different portions of space. So, if the avayavin and the avayava were different substances, they should be found in experience to do the same, i.e., occupy different portions of space. But the fact is otherwise. The avayavin and the avayavas, whole and parts, occupy one and the same space (samanadesavṛtti). Therefore, they should be adjudged to be one and the same (abhinnā).

IX

Criticism of the Nyāya view on the strength of antinomies based on the Law of Contradiction:

Of all the objections by the Buddhists perhaps the best known is the objection based on the law of contradiction. This is found in the Tattvasamgraha rather in a sketchy manner but is very ably treated by Pandit Aśoka (10th Century Buddhist Scholar) in a

73 Gurutvadhāgato syātām yadyasya syāt tulānatiḥ / P.V. Verse 154. / 74 Also nānyo/vayavyavyayavayevbhastulānati viṇesāgraḥanāditi / M.V. thereon.
75 Itasca paṭastantubhyo'na vidyate gurutvāntāva-kāryaṃgraḥanāt / S.T.K. p. 245.
76 Yo hi yasmādvayatiriktah sa tadāṅkhiṣhtadesā vyatirikta desadhīśthaṃ upalabhyaṃ ghatādīvapato, na'calvamavavayavābhāyaṃ prthagdeśo dṛṣyate / N. M., p. 114.
famous essay called 'Avayavinirakaran'. Curiously enough, we do not find any elaborate discussion of this point in other major Buddhist works like Pramanavartika, Ratnakirti nivandhava or Jñanāsri nivandhava. This is perhaps because the first mentioned work is concerned mainly with epistemological questions esp. with sources of knowledge and pramana vyavastha, while the last two are pre-occupied with more fundamental questions like Ksanabhāngavada. The problem of avayavin has not received any special attention. In the Nyāya, however, we find discussion in almost all the major works. In view of the fact that considerable attention has been paid to the problem by the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas and subtle arguments have been advanced by them to meet the Buddhist objections, we propose to confine ourselves in this chapter to a brief sketch of the Buddhist viewpoint and shall deal with the arguments and counter-arguments in the chapter on the Nyāya view.

* * * *

Pandit Asoka says it is obvious that contradictories cannot co-exist in the same locus. And if two qualities are really contradictory, they must subsist not in one locus but in two (yo viruddha dharmaḥ dhyāsāvanāsāvekah)\(^{76}\). The concept of avayavin involves contradictions and has therefore to be rejected, what are these contradictions? Udayanācārya has summed them up in the Atmatattva

\(^{76}\) Avayavinirakaran / S.B.N.T. 
\(^{78}\) S.B.N.T., p. 78
viveka. The Buddhists, he says, refer to five-fold antinomy (pancavidha virodha): (a) grahanagrahana virodha (or upalambha-mupalambha virodha) (b) āvaraṇānāvaraṇa virodha (c) kampā-kampa virodha (or calācala virodha) (d) raktārakta virodha and (e) taddesatvā-taddesatva virodha. All these antinomies stem from a single source viz., the Nyāya view that the avayavin is a unitary substance, numerically different from the avayavas, though related to them by samavaya. The Buddhists argue that this involves the avayavin into the above contradictions and thereby renders it nugatory. The antinomies arise as follows:

(a) Antinomy of being perceived and unperceived simultaneously:

According to the Nyāya the avayavin, though distinct from the avayavas, can never be known apart from or independent of them. The avayavin is ādheya while the avayavas are the ādhāra; and it is impossible to know the ādheya without knowing the adhāra first.

When we know some avayavas, we also know the avayavin in and through them. Vātsyāyana expressly says that there can be no perception of the parts only (na ca kadesopalabdhimātram). A part is known along with the whole that subsists in it (ekadesopalabdhistatsahacaritāvayavyupalabdhiśca). Given the conditions of perception, it is not possible that the avayavin should remain unperceived when its

77 Astu tarhi sthūlāgātī viruddha dharmādhyasograhaṇagrahanādih pañcavidhāḥ / A. T. V., p. 258.
78 N. B. H., on 3u^32.*<. , 7t, 9^-
79 Tasyāvayavasthānasiyopalabdhiścakāraṇapraṇātasyaikadesopalabdha vanupalabdhiramupanneti / Ibid., Also, "ekāvayavasahita-syopalambhe nyāvayavasahitasyampalambha iti cet" / A. T. V. p. 253.
substratum, the parts, are being perceived. This means that
the whole as subsisting in perceived parts is perceived and as
subsisting in unperceived parts remains unperceived. But it is
one and the same whole that subsists in both these parts, and not
two wholes or even two parts of a whole, one subsisting in parts
perceived and the other in the remaining parts, for as we have
already seen, the whole has no parts other than those in which it
inheres. Hence we have to say that the self same avayavin can be
both perceived and unperceived by the same person at the same time
and in the same place. But this is plainly self-contradictory and
tells against distinctive existence of the avayavin.

(b) Antinomy of being covered and not covered at the same
time (avayavekaṇa virodha).

When a part of a thing is covered and another part exposed,
what would happen to the whole? Would it be covered? or would it
be exposed? or would it be partly covered and partly exposed? The
Buddhist urges that the avayavin, so far as is contained in the covered
parts, must be admitted to be covered. If it were not so, a covered
part would mean that the whole subsisting in it was exposed, and
consequently, if all the parts were covered, the whole would still
remain uncovered and visible! Moreover, there would then be no
circumstances under which the whole could be declared covered and hidden from the eye. But this is clearly absurd, says the Buddhist. Therefore, the sensible conclusion would be that a part being covered means the whole in it is also covered, and by the same token - a part remaining exposed means that the whole is also exposed. But then, argues the Buddhist, the whole as one 'single', partless (niramsa) substance cannot be both covered and not covered at the same time. It will be no answer to the present dilemma to say that the avayavin is partly covered and partly not covered; for as we have seen, the parts are not in the whole but according to the Nyaya they are distinct from the avayavin. Therefore there can be no question of the whole being partly anything.

(c) Antimony of being coloured and not coloured simultaneously (raktarakta virodha):

This objection is in the same vein as the previous two. If a part is red, for example, while the other is not, how is the whole to be characterised? In keeping with its stand, Buddhist argues that the whole as inhering in the red part must be red and as inhering in the other part which is not-red, must be not red. But then the difficulty arises as before; how can the whole be red and not-red at the same time? For reasons already stated it is also not possible for the whole to be partly red and partly not-red. Once more the dilemma cuts at the root of the avayavin and negates its existence.

---

31 AVT, p. 257; SBN'T, p. 85
32 AVT, p. 257; SBN'T
It may be noted that this antimony relates to presence and absence of a particular colour, and not of colour in general. It can never be the case according to both the Buddhist and the Naiyāyika, that one part is coloured and the other wholly uncoloured, for arūpī dravya is recognised by neither.

It cannot also be said as a way out of the impasse that the avayava alone has the colour and not the avayavin; for in that case we should perceive the whole to be of a different colour than the parts. But this is not the case. Moreover, it would go against the Nyāya dictum that the colour of the avayavin must be of the same kind as that of the avayava.

(d) Antimony of being in motion and yet not being so simultaneously (kampākampa virodha): -

The Buddhist points to a further difficulty that arises in connection with motion. It is a matter of common experience that when one part is in motion, the other often remains unmoved. The hand may move but neither the legs nor the trunk does. The leaves and twigs may dance with the breeze but the stem of the tree remains static. Now, the tree as a whole, the avayavin, must therefore be said to be both moving and unmoving. But this is again self-contradictory. Sakampatva and niskampatva are avowed contradictions - one is found uniformly and invariably to exclude the other. Hence they cannot go together in the same locus. Consequently, we must
hold that the avayavin is non-est and only the avayasancaya is paramārthasat.  

(e) Antinomy pertaining to presence of the self same thing in many places (taddesātvata taddesātvā virodha):-

This objection means two things: - (i) A single, undivided entity cannot occupy many parts of space; (ii) A single, undivided entity such as the avayavin is cannot be in many avayavas. The second obviously follows from the first; hence Pandit Asoka lays more stress on the first. Sāntarakṣita does not specifically refer to it, though it is implied in his discussion of the second. He discusses it as a part of the problem we discussed before viz., relation between parts and whole.

Pandit Asoka begins by saying that any two portions of space are mutually exclusive - uniformly and invariably, and we find no exception to it. This exclusion cannot be denied, for in so far as a part of space is what it is, it cannot be any other part. It has a specificity, a definiteness of its own which distinguishes it from the rest. This being so, the different parts stand opposed, and to that extent, contradictory to one another. As a result, the contents of these different parts are also mutually exclusive. A thing cannot therefore be in more than one locus. Subsistence in

83 A.T.V., p. 260 ; 84 Vide Supra, p. 50.
85 Taddesayoscā parasparabhavavyabhicara nimātto virodhah / S.B.N.T., p. 90
86 . . . tenadhavabhutena desena yadvyaptam rupam tadāpi desantarā samsargadvicchinnam bhavati / Ibid.;
one locus automatically negates/subsistence in another, exclusive of and opposed to the former. Since the parts of a thing occupy different parts of space, the avayavin cannot subsist either in the different avayavas or in the different parts of space. If a thing is in one locus, we can know by the law of contradiction, that it cannot be in another. We need not appeal to experience, our knowledge is immediate and a priori. In fact, the Buddhist rejects 'anupalabdhi' or non-perception as a source of knowing abhava.

Suppose the locus is not possible of perception, say, e.g., the top of the Everest. How to know whether a thing is absent there? In such cases surely non-perception is impossible. The Buddhist says that there is no necessity of perceiving the locus. There mere presence of the thing in front of us is proof that it is nowhere else. This knowledge is based on the notion that different parts of space are contradictory and a thing cannot be in more than one locus. To sum up in the words of Stcherbatsky, "One real thing cannot exist in many places. If that were the case, it would run against the law of contradiction. If a thing is present in one place, it cannot at the same time be present in another place. Thus to reside in many places means to be and at the same time not to be present in a given place."^87 Therefore, the avayavin cannot pervade any portion of space nor can it pervade its parts that occupy different parts of space.

---

^87 Buddhist Logic, Vol. I., p. 86.
The foregoing is an account of the main grounds on which Buddhism reject the Nyaya concept of avayavin and uphold the collective nature of things. One cannot help being amazed at the verve and vigour of Buddhist logic, and if any system is to be given credit for holding the Nyaya at bay, it is undoubtedly the Buddhist philosophy. It is not for nothing that Buddhism has exerted a potent influence on the development of the Nyāya.\textsuperscript{33} We now pass on to the Nyaya, once again to gasp in wonder and excitement, at the virile and robust logic of the system. If Buddhism has thrown mighty challenge, the Nyāya has been strong enough to take it up and answer it with gusto.

\textsuperscript{33} Cf. Critique of Indian Realism - a study of the conflict between the Nyaya Vaisesika and the Buddhist Dignaga School. The entire book is a masterly study of the Nyaya in relation to Buddhism though some misinterpretation of the Nyaya are contained here and there, the book is a laudable attempt in a region hitherto unexplored.