CHAPTER TWO

NATURE OF THE WHOLE — THE SĀNKHYA CRITIQUE OF THE NYĀYA VIEW.

The problem that will now occupy us is the ontological problem regarding the nature of the whole. Is the whole a mere aggregate of parts and therefore nothing different from them? Or is it something more than its parts — an emergent, novel unit? Or again, is it both different and non-different from the parts? These are the questions we shall deal with in the present chapter and the next two.

We have seen, the Nyāya regards the avayavin as something more than its avayavas. It is an additional entity arising out of combination of its parts and is wholly different (ātyantika bhāda) from them. The Sāṅkhya and the Bauddha, however vehemently oppose it and contend that 'avayavin' is just a myth, a figment of imagination (upakalpita) of the Naiyāyika. They maintain that the so-called avayavin is simply the avayavas summed up — it is but parts in a given arrangement. The only point is that for the Sāṅkhya the three gunas are really the constituents or avayavas,¹ while for the Buddhist atoms are the avayavas. Both of them therefore agree that

¹ Vide Chap. I., p. 23.
'avayavin' is not to be had anywhere in the world and advance a formidable array of arguments to demolish the Nyāya view. We shall devote this (present) chapter to an account of the Sankhya critique and the next to the Buddhist. Thereafter we shall go over to the Nyaya and see how it defends itself.

II

The Sāṅkhya, as we have seen in the last chapter, recognises no distinct avayavin. Its view regarding avayava and avayavin can be summarised as follows:

(1) At a given time an avayavin (i.e., so-called avayavin) is just its avayavas summed up. A thing is not a unity but a plurality held in order, an aggregate of its parts. A book is nothing but its pages, including the covers, taken together; a tree but a collection of leaves, twigs etc. and a cloth but warp and woof. In this aspect the distinction between avayava and (the so-called) avayavin is one of mere nomenclature.

(2) These avayavas are sometimes called the material cause of the (so-called) avayavin, i.e., the parts of a thing are said to be its upādāna kāraṇa or material cause, e.g., threads are called the upādāna kāraṇa of the avayavin 'cloth'. This is, however, not correct. Threads of an earlier state may be said to be the material cause of the threads of the later state as found in the cloth viz.,
warp and woof (atāna-vitāna-vantahtantavah). This difference of form or of earlier and later states is often ignored for two reasons: (i) according to the Sāṅkhya form, state, condition, or phase is the property of a thing; change of property does not affect the nature of the substance. Therefore, threads, inspite of the change of state, remain the same. (ii) Such change of form involves only a minor disturbance of the existing arrangement, not a rude shake-up; with the result that the thing does not lose its identity or old 'look' and continues to be called by the same name and to be treated as such. But as we have noted earlier, this is not fair or sound logic.

(3) Disappearance of one form or state and re-appearance of another means dispersion of the elements of the thing concerned in new directions and positions. Termination of the chaotic state of threads or of their lying in a disorderly mass means a new dispensation of the parts of threads and not of threads themselves (tantvavayavah na tu tantavah). Thus, when threads change from the earlier state into the later one (of warp and woof), it is the tantva vayavas which are really in action and should therefore be called upādāna karana. In reality, we cannot stop even at the stage of parts of threads in our quest for upādāna kāraṇa, for the above logic drives us to search for further constituents; till we come in the end to the threefold as the ultimate upādāna kāraṇa and avayava of

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all things. In this aspect, avayava and upādāna kāraṇa are identical, i.e., parts are the material cause of a thing. But this is true only of the three gunas — of course, on a rigorous interpretation of the Sāńkhya view. A lack of clear cut stand as regards the relation between avayava and avayavin, and even a measure of ambiguity that we find in the Sāńkhya is, as we shall see later, due to the fact that the Sāńkhya itself vacillates on the question of status of form and its relation to matter. As a result of this vacillation the Sāńkhya writers are not themselves always careful about these distinctions. For example they have taken threads to be the material cause of cloth and proceeded in their discussion accordingly. Naturally, we shall have to adopt their language in setting forth their arguments; but we must bear the above facts in mind.

One thing must be clear by now. The Sāńkhya view regarding avayava and avayavin is based on, and logically follows from, its doctrine about upādāna kāraṇa and its effect. The Sāńkhya takes its stand squarely on this doctrine in order to combat the Nyāya view of a distinct avayavin (avayavatīriktā avayavin) and defend its own position.

This doctrine to which we are referring must not, however, be taken to mean the Satkārya vada of the Sāńkhya — but to mean

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3 Vide infra, p. 253.
4 Vide infra, p. 31.
another doctrine which may be styled ‘kārya-kāraṇā/bheda-vāda’ or the Doctrine of Non-Difference (or Identity) of Cause and Effect. These two doctrines must be clearly distinguished as the Sāṅkhya kārikā itself has done. In Kārikā 9 the grounds of satkārya-vāda are set out.5 The tail-end of the Kārikā reads: 'kāraṇa-bhāvācca satkāryam' which means that the effect is pre-existent in the upādāna kāraṇa because it is of the nature of that cause. Vacaspati explains the term 'kāraṇabhāva' as 'karaṇatmakatva' i.e., the effect is identical with the cause. Thus, the authors of the Sāṅkhya Kārikā and Vacaspati are agreed that 'kārya/kāraṇā/bheda' is the hetu or probans and satkāryatva is the sādhya, and therefore the two are not identical. The doctrine of kārya/karaṇā/bheda is thus the basis of, and logically prior to, the doctrine of satkārya. The two must therefore be never confused - one being the hetu and the other, sādhya.

We may cite another fact to support our case. The grounds of satkāryavāda are all given in verse 9 of the Sāṅkhya Kārikā. But Vacaspati enumerates a different set of grounds to prove identity of cause and effect. Why did he do it? If satkārya vāda and kārya/karaṇā/bheda vāda were identical, their grounds also would have been the same and there would have been no necessity whatsoever of different lists of grounds.

5 Asadakaranad upadana grahanat sarya sambhavabhavat saktasya sakyakaranat karaṇa bhavacca satkaryam.
On all these considerations we are led to conclude that the doctrine of identity of cause and effect is the real basis of satkārya vāda and is therefore distinct from it. And it is this doctrine which also forms the bedrock of the Sāṅkhya view of ava-yavin and the spring board for attacking the Nyāya. We therefore propose to consider it now.

III

In the Tattvakaumūḍī Vācāṣṭapaṭi has adduced four arguments to prove identity of cause and effect (kāryasya kāraṇābheda śādhanāni pramanāni) and therefore of parts and whole. But all these and many more are found in the Nyāya-vārtika, set forth in great detail as purvapakṣa and refuted with great care and skill. We shall have to deal with them when discussing the Nyāya view and we therefore propose to briefly touch Vācāṣṭapaṭi's arguments here. One more thing we may notice here. All these arguments are based on vyatireka vyāpti, i.e., concomitance by absence. Identity of cause and effect is proved, as it cannot be done otherwise, by showing that the effect is not different from the cause — identity can be proved not by 'vīta' argument, i.e., argument based on anvaya vyāpti but by 'avīta', i.e., argument based on vyatireka vyāpti.

6 S.T.K. Kār.3p
* Vide infra. p. 81.
7 Vācāṣṭapaṭi expressly says 'etānābhedaśādhanānyā vītāni', i.e., these proofs of identity between cause and effect are all indirect i.e., based on vyatireka vyāpti / S.T.K. (f. 5.p); p. 246.
The arguments are as follows:

1) The effect is a property (dharma) of the cause and therefore non-different from it. Cloth is not different from threads because it is a dharma of threads. Sārabodhini points out that 'dharma' means the specific state or condition; the effect is thus a specific condition of the cause. Cloth is just threads in a particular condition - in the state of warp and woof (ataca vitana). What is different from a thing cannot be its property. A cow is different from a horse and cannot therefore be a property thereof. This argument adumbrates the famous Sankhya doctrine that dharma is not different from dharmin, character from the characterised.

2) The effect and the cause are not different from each other because of 'upādāna upādeya bhāva' i.e., the relation of material cause and effect. A thing different from another cannot be its material cause or its effect e.g., jar and cloth. Threads and cloth, being cause and effect, are not different from each other (upādānopādeyabhāvāca nārthāntaratvam tantuṇaṭayoh).

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8 Na patastantubhyo bhidyate taddharmatvāt / Ibid., p. 244.
9 Dharmatvāt = tadavasthā visēṣētmakatvāt / Ibid., The other meaning 'tatsattānīyatatasattākatvāt' given by Sārabodhini is not correct; on this point vide Pūrṇimā tīkā (by Mahāmahopādhiyāya Paścānan Tarkaratna); pp. 76-77.
10 Yad yato bhidyate tat tasya dharma na bhavati yatha gauravasya / Ibid., p. 244.
12 Yayorarthāntaratvam na tayorupādānopādeyabhāvo yathā ghaṭa-putaṭayoh / Ibid., p. 244.
13 Ibid., p.
(3) Again, the effect is not different from the cause because (a) there is no relation of conjunction between them and (b) there is no relation of disjunction between them. Conjunction is possible only between different things (arthāntarātve hi saṃyogakṛṣṭo) e.g., berry and the bowl (kuṇḍa vadarayoḥ); similarly about disjunction, e.g., the Himalayas and the Vindhya (himavad vindhyaoḥ). As between the cause and the effect there is neither conjunction nor disjunction; therefore they are non-different.\(^\text{14}\)

(4) The effect is not different from its cause also because of the fact that it does not weigh any differently from the cause (gurutvāntarakārya-grahaṇāt). Since this point receives considerable attention later on, it needs no labouring here.\(^\text{15}\)

IV

These are the 'abheda sādhana' proofs, - proofs for identity of cause and effect. The opponents, i.e., the Naiyāyikas, however, feel unimpressed and point to a number of considerations which are 'bheda sādhaka', which, in other words, argue difference of parts from the whole. These are rolled up, so to speak, in one omnibus expression by Vācaspāti - "kriyā nirodha buddhi vyapadesārthakriyā vyavasthā bhedāḥ\(^\text{17}\) i.e., (1) kriyābheda - difference due to origination; origination means origination of something out of something

\(^{14}\) Ibid., p. 245; \(^{15}\) Vide infra, p. 71 and Ch. \(\text{\textsection}\).

\(^{16}\) 'etānyabhedasādhanāni' / S.T.K. p. 246.

\(^{17}\) S.T.K., p. 247.
else - of jar out of clay or cloth out of threads; thereby a distinction between the cause and the effect is implied; (ii) nirodha bheda - difference due to destruction. Destruction is not absolute (nirāñaya), it is not evaporation or annihilation, it is just resolution into the elements of which it is made. Destruction of cloth means retention of threads, and of jar, retention of clay. Thus, destruction or nirodha also points to difference of cause and effect.

(iii) Buddhi bheda - Difference of knowledge. In case of threads we have the knowledge that these are threads and of cloth that this is a cloth. These two cognitions are different by any standard; therefore cloth and threads which are the respective subjects must also be different. (iv) Vyapadesa bheda$^{18}$ - Difference of usage or linguistic representation. The language we use for causal relation brings home their relation of adhara adheya - container and contained. The cause is denoted by a word in the seventh case-ending and the effect by a word in the nominative case, e.g., cloth is in the threads (tантусу पाताह).$^{19}$

(v) Arthakriya bheda$^{20}$ Difference due to satisfaction of distinct wants or needs. Things which are different serve different purposes and cater to different needs. Threads provide us with materials for cloth and cloth fulfills the need of clothing our

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$^{18}$ Kriya = उत्पत्ति (origination; nirodha = vināsah (destruction); vyapadesa = अधारा अधेया bhāva yyayahāraḥ. We have followed here the interpretation of Sarabodhinī Tīkā. But another interpretation is possible, cf. Pūrṇimā Tīkā, p. 78.

$^{19}$ Reference here, it may be noted, is to Sanskrit language which was the universally accepted language for philosophical discussion in ancient India.

$^{20}$ Arthakriya = asādhāraṇapravojanasādhakatvam / Pūrṇimā, p. 78.
person; and there can be no reversing their functions. There is
a uniformity found in connection with satisfaction of particular
wants by particular things (artha kriyā vyavasthā). The cause
answers a need that cannot be done by the effect and vice versa.
The strict uniformity with which things behave in this regard and
the absence of their chaotic or erratic behaviour are a clear poin­
ter to difference of cause and effect.

These arguments are mentioned by the Tattvakaumudīkāra as
the grounds on which the opponents maintain that cause and effect,
are radically different substances. The Sāṅkhya probanses, accord­
ing to them, are guilty of being 'satpratipakṣa', i.e., counter­
balanced marks and do not prove the desired probandum, viz., non­
difference (abheda) of parts and whole.

V

The Sāṅkhya, however, points out that the above arguments
of the dualists (bhedavādins) are not of equal and opposite weight
(tulyavala) to their own. They do not point to substantial dif­
ference. Difference of functions and properties does not signify
difference of things. The very same thing may have different func­
tions and properties under different conditions. As Vācaśpati puts
it, 'naikāntikaṁ bhedaṁ sādhayitumārhaṁ', i.e., the above arguments
cannot prove absolute difference. They can all be explained on the Sánkhyā hypothesis of appearance and disappearance of certain specific conditions or properties in one and the same thing. Origination does not mean creation or production, an absolute beginning - it only means manifestation, the being explicit of what was implicit, the becoming patent of the latent. Utpatti is thus abhivyakti or pariṇāma. Similarly, destruction does not mean consequential non-existence; it is just dissolution into the causal substance, a lapsing back into the component elements (nāsāḥ kāraṇalayah). What is destroyed is not the thing, the substance but only the form, the present form; and even this is to be understood not in the sense of the Nyāya, in the sense that there is an objective non-existence of the form, but in the sense that another form is present. This is because the Sánkhyā does not recognise non-existence as an objective entity but takes it as equivalent to bare substratum (adhikaraṇa kaivalyam). Similarly, distinction of apprehension is no proof of difference. The same thing may be apprehended differently according to its different

21 aikāntikam = vāstavam, ātyantikam / S. D. (Pūrṇimā); p. 78; also 'vāstavam, pāramārthikamīti yāvat / S. K., p. 248.
22 Ekaśminnāpi tattadyiseśāvirbhāva tirobhāvabhāyam eteṣām arirodhāt / S.K., p. 248; 'visēga' here means 'pariṇāma bheda', i.e., change of condition (cf. Pūrṇimā; p. 78).
23 . . . pariṇāma guṇāntara prādurbhāvāt / N. S., 3.2.15.
24 Sāṅkhyā pravacana Śūtra, 1.121.
states or conditions. Threads, when unwoven, are cognised in the form 'these are threads'; when knit together they are known as cloth.

Difference of usage again can be similarly accounted for. Expressions like 'iha tantuṣu pataḥ', 'cloth is made of threads' (lit., cloth is in the threads), signifying the relation of substrate and content between parts and whole need not point to their irretrievable difference. Such usage is not rare, indeed quite common, even where there is substantial identity between two things, e.g., 'there are tilaka trees in the forest' 25 - where the forest consists wholly of tilaka (or sesamum) trees. The same kind of language is often used to denote both ādhyā-tādhyā bhāva (substrate-content relation) and tādātmya or abheda. 27 A number of threads can be designated by means of singular number, e.g., 'this is cloth! When we consider them from the view point of necessity of covering our person (ekapraṇānālaṁañā prayoyanāvacchedat). Similarly, judging from the view point of being situated in one place and at a time (ekadesākālāvacchinna) a number of trees can be taken as a whole and can be expressed as 'This is a forest'. Difference of kārya kāritva, i.e., modes of serviceability also does not tell against identity of things. The same thing may perform diverse functions.

25 'Iha tantuṣu pataḥ' iti vyapadesōpi yathā iha vane tilaka ityupapānaṁañā / S. K., p. 250.
27 . . . yathā ādhārādhyeyā vyavahārastathā tantupatayorabhedaśe pi ādhārādhyeyāvyavahāropadhyatā vyapadesā bhedasya bhedāśādhyākatvādityarthaḥ / Sārabodhini Tikā, p. 250. Ādhārādhyeyā bhāva-pratayo hi samaśti vyaśti viseṣādārena kathanticābhedā vyaksāyā bhavati na tu tadānyatvamātībhāvaḥ / Pūrṇimā Tikā, p. 79.
Fire serves the purposes of cooking, burning and illuminating ('vahānīr-dhāhakah pācakah prakāśakasca). Therefore, the vyapti, 'wherever there is serviceability for different purposes, there is difference of objects', is not tenable. Regular behaviour of things to such ends (arthakriyā vyavasthā) also does not fare any differently in the above context.

Since the arguments of the dualists can all be explained on the Sāṃkhya hypothesis, they do not pose a genuine situation of satpratipakṣa (counter-balanced probans), for they cease to be of equal strength to those of the Sāṃkhya. The rule is: the situation involving a counter-balanced probans arises only when the pros and cons of an issue are equal and opposite, and not when one is of lesser strength. Hence the Sāṃkhya concludes that there is only aupādhika bheda (adjectival difference) and not atyantika bheda (absolute difference) between cause and effect, parts and whole.

In the Tattvakāumudi Vācaspāti brings home this point with the help of the analogy of the tortoise and its limbs. When the tortoise withdraws its limbs into its shell, the limbs disappear but are not destroyed; and when the tortoise comes out of the shell, its limbs reappear and cannot be said to be created anew. Similarly, production is really manifestation or evolution (vikāsa), and des-

23 S. K., p. 255.
29 "Tulyavalayoreva satpratipaksatvam nātulavalayoh iti niyamat / Ibid., p. 248."
traction, dissolution or involution (saṅkoca or laya). Just as the tortoise is not different from expanding or contracting limbs of its own, even so the jar and the crown do not differ respectively from clay and gold. The non-est cannot be est nor the est be non-est. Vācaspāti cites in support the famous lines of the Gītā:

There is/coming into being of non-being and no passing into non-being of being.

VI

The Saṅkhya pravadana sūtra also says that the effect has the same nature as cause (kāraṇabhāvacca). Aniruddha in his Vṛtti comments: The effect pre-exists in the cause because cause and effect are one and the same (kāryakāraṇayorekatvāt). Even though modified into the form of the water-pot the lump of clay does not cease to have the nature of earth. On the other hand, there can be no identity between the existent and the non-existent (na ca saṃsāraḥ kṛtasya vaśeṣasya nissarantō tirobhavanto vinasyantītyuccante; na punarasatam utpādah na nirodhaḥ).

30 Yathā hi kūraṃyaṅgāni kūraṃsa-rīre nīvīṣāmāṇāni tirobhavanti nissarantī cāvirbhavanti na tu kūraṃstātaṅgāni utpadyante prajñhaṃsante va evamakasya mṛdhā suvarpasaya va āvāṃsatādāyayo vīseṣā nissarantā āvirbhavanta ityuccante pursamanasāca tirobbhavanto vinasyantītyuccante; na punarasatām utpādah satām va nirodḥah / Ibid., p. 248.

31 Yathā kūrmaḥ svavayevaḥ bhūḥ samācavikāśībhvah na bhinnah evam āvāṃ saṅkocātādayopī mṛṣuvarṇānādiḥbhvah na bhinnahah / Ibid., p. 248.

32 Nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate satāḥ / (2.16); Op. Cit., p. 249.

33 1.118.

34 Aniruddha Vṛtti.
sadasatorekatvam). If the cause and the effect are identical, it may be said, why cannot water be carried by means of a lump of earth as is done in a pitcher? Aniruddha replies, this is because there is no absolute identity between the two (bhavedeva yadi atyantabhedaḥ syat).

Vijñānabhikṣu in commenting upon the above Sutra points out that even the Vedas declare non-difference of cause and effect prior to production, e.g., "That the same as this was then unmodified (Tadhedamtarhyavyākṛtamasit)," "That the world, O peaceful one, was verily existent at the beginning (sadeva saumyedamagra asit)" etc. All these go to prove identity of cause and effect; and eternal existence of the effect. If this is not admitted and asat-karyavada is recognised, then the Vedic pronouncements have to be declared false. Therefore Vijñānabhikṣu affirms kārya-kāraṇā-bheda vada and rejects the contrary view of the Nyāya.

On the strength of these arguments the Sankhya holds that upādāna kāraṇa and kārya are substantively identical and formally different. Therefore, according to the Sāṅkhya the avayavin which is an effect is also substantively identical with its avayavas (both in the strict sense and the loose one, referred to above).

36 Ibid., p.
38 Ch. Up. VI. 11.1.
39 Vide Sūtra, p.23.
with only a difference of form. But as form has no existence apart from the relative substance, and difference of form does not signify difference of things, the avayavin is declared non-different from the avayavas. The Nyāya thesis of a distinct avayavin is thus rejected - a view which is strikingly similar to that of Buddhism which we take up in the next chapter.