CHAPTER ONE

SURVEY OF THE SCHOOLS OF
BUDDHISM, NYAYA AND SANKHYA.

In this chapter we propose to undertake a broad survey of the three systems - Buddhism, the Nyāya and the Sāṅkhya. Both the Sāṅkhya and the Buddhist have urged various objections to the Nyāya view of avayavin and we should be unable to appreciate them with sympathy and understanding if we did not acquaint ourselves with their distinctive disciplines. It is not possible nor desirable to discuss here all the main points of these systems but it is necessary to have acquaintance with the general background, at least some important features of it, so that we can put the problem of parts and whole in the right place and judge it in the proper perspective.

It seems to us that we should open with Buddhism, because in the first place it is perhaps the most neglected of the three systems. Its culture and ideas are not a part of our common knowledge such as those of the Nyāya and the Sāṅkhya are, and those who do know these are not many in number. Secondly, Buddhism has, if we may say so, a strange weltanschauung. Its metaphysical concepts and schemata are radically different from those of other systems. There is nothing like the doctrines of womem-

1 Dr. Dharmendra N. Sastri: Critique of Indian Realism - Preface - XI.
tariness and no-soul in our orthodox systems. That is why we propose to devote more attention to it and discuss it in greater detail.

II
BUDDHISM

The very first thing we must remember here is that, strictly speaking, there is no one Buddhist metaphysic, just as there is no one Brahmanical metaphysic. The metaphysical view of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika is not the same as that of Saṅkhya-Yoga or Māmaṁśa Vedānta. Similarly, the ontic commitments of the Vaibhāṣika, e.g., are not identical with those of the Sautrāntika, the Yogācāra or the Mādhyamika, not to speak of their various sub-schools. As Hrīṇyānna nicely puts it, "All the different shades of philosophic theory realistic and idealistic - are found within Buddhism itself; and we have, so to speak, philosophy repeated twice over in India - once in the several Hindu systems, and again in the different schools of Buddhism".  

Of the above four schools only the Vaibhāṣika will engage our attention because it believes in the external world and has

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2 Outlines of Indian Philosophy - (17th Impression), p. 198.
worked out an elaborate theory about it that has a direct bearing on our problem. The Sautrāntika accepts it mutatis mutandis, while the other two schools, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika, are interested mainly in repudiating the world and are therefore not of much concern to us.

(B) The Vaibhāṣika system is remarkable even from the Buddhist point of view. Buddhism is generally associated with the belief that nothing abides in the world and everything perishes, indeed is momentary. The Vaibhāṣika, however, repudiates this view and strangely enough believes both in eternal and non-eternal things, and interprets the doctrine of momentariness in a way that takes our breath away. We shall, therefore, discuss the Vaibhāṣika view under the following heads: (i) Constituents of the Universe and (ii) Structure and distinctive features of the constituents.

(i) Constituents of the Universe: Things of the world are divided into two kinds, eternal and non-eternal.\(^3\) Eternal things are known as asamśkrta dharma, i.e., those which are "uncaused and unconditioned, hence eternal and unchanging, transcendental and inactive, and which do not combine to produce anything".\(^4\) There are three asamśkrta dharmas, viz., ākāśa, prati-

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4 Mahāmahopādhyāya Umesā Misra (Tirabhukti Publications, 1937)-History of Indian Philosophy, p. 400.
samkhya nirodha and apratisamkhya nirodha, and these are all separate and discrete. 5

Non-eternal things are known as samskrta dharma. They come into existence in the presence of a specific set of causes and conditions. 6 They are all composite, being invariably produced out of an aggregate of causal conditions and never by a single cause. 7

The samskrta dharmas again are of four kinds - Rūpa (matter), Citta (mind or consciousness), Caitta (mental proprieties) and Citta viprayukta (non-mental elements) e.g., prāpti, aprāpti. 8 According to the Sarvāstivādins, there are eleven rūpa dharmas, one citta dharma, fortysix caitta dharmas, fourteen citta viprayukta dharmas, thus totalling seventytwo and taking three asamskrta dharmas we get seventyfive dharmas in all. 9 This division is based on objective classification (vānya vibhāga). There is another classification known as subjective classification (āntara vibhāga). Since these dharmas never exist singly but always in a cluster, as an aggregate (skandha), these dharmas are divided into five skandhas (rūpa, vijñāna, vedanā, saṃjñā and

5 . . . Ākāśam dvau nirodhah ca . . . / A. K. I. 5.
6 Hetu pratyaya janīta rūpācyah samskṛtāh. - Ibid. I.4.

8 A. K. II. 35.
samskāra), twelve āyatanas and eighteen dhātus. This classification is āntara vibhāga. Rūpa dharmas form the component parts of rūpa skandha and the citta dharmas of citta skandha; caitta dharmas, however, include the component parts of vedanā skandha and samjñā skandha along with some of those of samskāra skandha. The citta viprayukta dharmas are subsumed by the Vaibhāṣīka under the saṃskāra skandha.

(ii) Structure and distinctive features of these reals:

Buddhists recognise two principles here - (a) Nairatmya-vāda and (b) Kaśyapabhaṅga-vāda. So far as the first doctrine is concerned, the Vaibhāṣīkas admit it along with other Buddhists, but as regards the second, they give it a slant all their own. We shall first give the general interpretation of these principles and then note the Vaibhāṣīka view with regard to the second.

(a) Nairatmyavāda or Doctrine of No-Soul: Though negative in name, it has both a negative and a positive side. Negatively the doctrine means denial of soul substance and positively it is saṅghatavāda. 'Ātmā' here really means substantial core and the doctrine holds that there is no substance whatsoever, either spiritual or material.

There is no spiritual substance, changeless and identical; there is only stream of consciousness. As Mrs. Rhys Davids pic-
turesquely puts it, "There is no king-ego holding a levee of presentations". This is known as pudgalasūnyatā. The so-called personality thus consists of a congeries of ever-changing elements without any perduring element in them. At any moment it is just an aggregate of fourfold skandha or skandhatatvā: vijñāna-skandha, vedanā-skandha, saññā skandha and saṃskāra skandha. The fundamental psychical elements are the citta and the caitasika dharmas, otherwise known as citta mahābhūmika dharmas.

Similarly, on the objective side there is no material substance, no underlying entity for the qualities to belong to. A thing is just a complex of attributes like sound, smell, touch etc. What appears is what really is. The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika concept of dravya as gunāśraya has no place in the Buddhist philosophy. Of course, the so-called attributes like colour, shape etc. are not regarded as attributes as in the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika but are conceived rather as 'sense-data' or 'character-complexes' and hence are self-subsistent.

(b) Kṣanabhaṅgavāda or Doctrine of Momentariness: So far we have looked at things ignoring the element of time. If we now introduce it and see things in time, we find, says Buddhism, that these aggregates do not remain the same even for two consecutive moments but are ever changing. Both the self and the not-self,

10 Buddhist Psychology, p. 93.
the mental and the material worlds are each a flux (santāna), each a series (vīthī), a succession of similar things or happenings and the notion of fixity we have of them is wholly fictitious. To quote Hiriyanna's inimitable language, "since there is incessant production but no new things are brought into being, the world becomes the world-process, a continual coming-to-be and passing away. Neither the world as a whole, nor any object in it can be described as subject to the process. The process is the thing". 11

(C) Such in short is the common interpretation of the above principles and this is supposed to have been the view of early Buddhism. Stcherbatsky e.g. observes, "This is the first main feature of early Buddhism, its soul denial. The no-soul theory is another name for Buddhism". 12 He further observes, "This (i.e. theory of momentariness) constitutes the second characteristic feature of early Buddhism; no matter, no substance, only separate elements, momentary flashes of efficient energy without any substance in them, perpetual becoming, a flow of existential moments". 13

These somewhat lengthy quotations from Stcherbatsky clearly show how early Buddhism, i.e., sarvāstivāda of which Vaibhāṣika is a school, is generally interpreted. This, however, is not the

11 Outlines of Indian Philosophy - (7th Impression); p. 198.
13 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
true view of the Vaibhāṣika. It is not possible to give full
details on this point but we shall sketch them as far as is nece­
sary for our purpose here.

The Vaibhāṣikas do not believe in universal momentariness.
As should be clear from the preceding account, asamskṛta dharmas
are immune to it, they are eternal and suffer no mutation. Even
as to the samskṛta dharmas they assert, quite contrary to common
belief, that these too are essentially perduring entities. Changes
occur to them only as regards their state or condition, the mode of
their being. They as such, as substrata underlying the phenomenal
changes, are undying, uncreate and unwrought. Sogen, the famous
author of Systems of Buddhistic Thought, brings this out clearly.
He says, "Sarvāstivāda means the doctrine that the substance of
all things has a permanent existence throughout the three divisions
of time, past, present and future. By substance in this connection
is meant what is called in Latin 'substantia', or the abiding subs­
trata of things". Sogen elsewhere speaks in the same vein :
"Sarvāstivadins believe that the substratum of everything is perma­
nent, though its phases are constantly changing. Thus, the aque­
onous substratum, if I may be permitted to use the expression, in­
heres permanently through the phases of water, ice and steam".

It may be asked, 'how then do the samskṛta dharmas differ
from the asamskṛta dharmas if both are eternal ?' The answer is :

the latter are eternal (trikalasat or trikālāstityavān) in the sense of being beyond all change and temporal succession, the former are eternal in the sense of persisting in the midst of change and succession. Asamskrta dharmas are devoid of jāti, jara and maraṇa, origin, decay and destruction, saṃskṛta dharmas are subject to these phenomena.16

The question further arises, 'whether and if so, how does the doctrine apply to the saṃskṛta dharmas, seeing that they remain unchanged and permanent?' The Vaibhāṣikas solve this anomaly by drawing a line between the real essence of an element (dharmaṃsvabhāva) and its 'efficiency moment' (dharmaṃsakṣaṇa); and it is the latter that is termed 'moment' by them. The Vaibhāṣikas speak of four lakṣaṇas in this connection (caturlakṣaṇa) - origination (jāti or utpāda), persistence (sthiti), decay (jara), and destruction (maraṇa or vināsa). According to them these are objectively real (dṛṣṭyataḥ santi) and happen simultaneously.17

The Vaibhāṣikas further advocate paramānuvādā. Every material object (rupa) is made of an aggregate of the fourfold

16 Vaibhāṣika Darsāna, p. 6; also Central Conception of Buddhism, pp. 35 - 36; also Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, p. 44.

17 Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 4; also Sogen, Op.Cit., p.2. A reference to these works will show that the Buddhists were not unanimous on this point. It may also be mentioned here that Stcherbatsky's view as presented in Central Conception of Buddhism and Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa is different from that of Buddhist Logic. The difference, however, is perhaps due to the fact that in the first two he discussed the problem in detail while in the latter he proposed to give a 'brief' summary and therefore could not touch upon the intricacies.
substratum of rūpa (used both in the sense of colour and form), rasa (taste), gandha (smell) and sparsā (touch). The unit which possesses the fourfold substratum is called paramāṇu which is the smallest form of rūpa. It is supersensuous, indivisible, inaudible, untastable and intangible. Though indivisible, it is not eternal in the sense of changelessness. It is changing every moment because of caturlakṣaṇas mentioned above and also because of its constant change in combining. When seven such paramāṇus combine, six from the six sides and one in the centre, they form what is known as sanghāta of paramāṇus called aṇu. This is the first material product which becomes visible and is desirable.

Every paramāṇu possesses the special characteristics of solidity (associated with earth), viscosity (associated with water), heat (associated with tejas) and motion (associated with vāyu). It is not that four qualities belong respectively to these four elements, rather they belong to the same unit. If all material things are collections of atoms and all atoms without exception possessed these characteristics, how is it that objects differ in their nature, some being solid, some liquid and some gaseous? The Vaibhāṣika answers, this is because of preponderance of a particular element. The nature of watery element preponderates over other elements in a flowing stream, and hence it is liquid. Similarly about fire and solid things.\textsuperscript{18} The Sautrāntika accepts

the entire cosmology of the Vaibhāṣika. Only, he does not recognise the asamśkṛta dharmas; for him all things are non-eternal or samśkṛta. Secondly, he also brushes aside the theory of catur-lakṣana and upholds momentariness unreservedly. Things change every moment and nothing lurks beneath the passing phases.

(D) Now, how does all this bear upon our problem of parts and whole? In the light of the above facts we can say that parts and whole (avayava and avayavin, assuming that the Buddhist recognised a distinct avayavin which he in fact does not) are samśkṛta dharmas, being different from the three asamśkṛta dharmas recognised by him. Secondly, because of nairatmyavada a thing is not a substance, therefore neither parts nor the whole are a substance. They are just complexes of qualities. A cloth or a jar e.g., consists of atoms of colour, taste, smell and sound. Now, since the jar and the cloth are made of atoms, the question arises, 'are they just so many atoms lying close to one another or are they unitary things over and above the atoms?' The Vaibhāṣika like all other Buddhists holds that a thing is the sum of its parts; it is really a multitude, not a unity. It is an aggregate of atoms. How imperceptible atoms can for the Buddhist be visible collectively and why the whole is denied the character of unity and put down as a mere sum are questions to which Buddhism has given answers. We shall have occasion in the right place to investigate them and judge their validity.
III

THE NYĀYA VIEW.

The Nyāya Vāisēṣika, like the Vedanta, enjoys immense popularity amongst Ārya and its cardinal concepts are well known. We may, therefore, be excused if we do not linger over the preliminaries and plunge straight away into the problem of parts and whole. We shall use only the word 'Nyāya' instead of 'Nyāya Vāisēṣika' for the sake of brevity.

According to the Nyāya, the avayavin is always a dravya and no other padārtha, and it is a janya dravya at that, i.e., it is a produced substance. It arises from combination of its parts. The parts are its samavayi kāraṇa, combination of the parts; its asamavayi kāraṇa or non-inherent cause and all other materials required for its production are its nimitta or sahakārya kāraṇa (auxiliary causes). A jar e.g. comes into being when its immediate parts (sāksadārambhaka viz., the kapāla dravyas (kapāla and kapālikā) are united. The kapāla dravyas are its formative causes, their conjunction non-inherent cause and other things like stick, wheel etc. are nimitta kāraṇa. The jar, as it arises, resides in the parts by the relation of inherence (samavāya).

Now, the immediate parts of an avayavin (except in the case of a dvyanuka) are themselves avayavidravyas, wholes made up of small parts and hence are themselves janya dravyas, being produced
as mentioned above. Ultimately we come to paramāṇus or atoms which are the ultimate units (antyāvayava), partless (niravayava), indivisible, invisible (except in yogipratyakṣa). The paramāṇus are the immediate parts (sākṣādārāmbhaka) of dyads and ultimate constituents (caramārāmbhaka) of all other sāvayava dravyas. This is paramāṇa kāraṇavāda of the Nyāya Vaisēṣika as distinguished from prakṛtiparīṇāmavāda of the Sāṅkhya, Brahmaparīṇāmavāda of Rāmānuja and Brahmavivartavāda of Śaṅkara.

We may note an interesting point here. Although objects of the world are infinitely various, the atoms are only of four kinds - earth, water, fire and air; and the variety is to be traced to untold permutations of numberless atoms of these four kinds. Not only that, atoms of the same kind are all distinct, each with its own viśeṣa and thus are susceptible of infinite groupings, giving rise to the bewildering multiplicity of the world. A jar or a cloth, when reduced to ultimate terms, do not leave us with atoms of clay or thread, as is often naively supposed, for there are no atoms of clay-kind or thread-kind; but show us atoms of the above kinds - earth atoms being the upādāna karana and others being upaṣṭambhaka nimitta kāraṇa.

Another point the Nyāya makes is that conjunction of parts, whether immediate or ultimate (avāntarāvayava or antyāvayava), which is the asamavāyi kāraṇa of the relevant avayavin, cannot be
automatic or spontaneous. There must be a conscious agent (cetana kartā) to effect this conjunction and bring other causal factors into operation so as to produce the effect. The kapālas require a potter, the threads a weaver and by the same token, the atoms, a God for production of the respective effects.

The Nyāya further holds that the avayavin is something different from its parts (dravyāntara), though connected with them by inherence. This is an aspect of asatkāryavāda according to which the effect is always something novel, something that did not exist before its production (prāgabhāvapratiyogi). The effect need not always be a substance, it may be a bhāvapadārtha or abhāvapadārtha. Of the four types of abhāva again only dhvamsābhāva can be an effect, prāgabhāva being anādi cannot be produced and atyatābhāva and anyonyābhāva, being eternal, having neither beginning nor end, cannot be effects. Dhvamsābhāva being sādi, has prāgabhāva just as prāgabhāva, being sānta, has dhvamsābhāva, but it has no dhvamsābhāva. A jar once destroyed is destroyed once and for all. Even if we remake it, it will not be the old jar over again, it will be a new one. It may be noted that dhvamsābhāva can have only nimitta kāraṇa and no samavāyi or asamavāyi kāraṇa, since abhāva cannot be pratiyogi or anuyogi of samavāya, it is svapratiyogi-samavāyi-kāraṇāsāraya i.e., it exists in the samavāyi kāraṇa of its counter-entity e.g., dhvamsābhāva of a jar has its locus in the parts of the jar which are the samavāyi kāraṇa of the
jar which in its turn is the pratiyoga of its own non-existence.

When however an effect is a bhāvapadartha, it is a substance, a quality or an action. We have already discussed the nature of an effect substance. The Nyāya believes that the quality of an avayavin is also an effect, being determined by the corresponding quality of the parts. Colour of threads determines the colour of the cloth and colour of clay determines the colour of the jar. This is in accordance with the maxim: Qualities of the causal substance condition the qualities of the effect substance (kāraṇa-guṇāḥ kārya guṇamārabbhante).\(^{19}\) Of course we must remember that this applies only to the visēṣa guṇas like colour, smell and not to sāmānya guṇas like number, magnitude etc.\(^{20}\) This is why the gross magnitude (sthūla parimāna) of an avayavin may on occasions be determined not by the magnitude of its parts but by the number thereof, e.g., the grossness of a ṛṣya is due not to the āparimāna of the dyads but to their plural number (i.e., being more than two in number).\(^{21}\) Since the question of produced action (janya karma) has no bearing on our problem, it is not necessary to discuss it here.

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19 Nyāya Paricaya (2nd Edn.), p. 33.

20 Paramānugata eva guṇa rūpa-rasadayaḥ kārye samāna-jātiya-mārabbhante gunāntaram 'Samanyahyamiti visesa guṇābhprāyan' (Ramtirtha) - Ibid.

21 Kāraṇavahutvācēa / VS. 7.1.9. Kāraṇavahutyāt kāraṇamahathāt pracayavisēṣāccā mahat / Sāitraka Bhāṣya. 2.2.11.
(B) Now, as we have seen, the Nyāya view is that the effect, be it substance, quality, action or abhāva, does not exist in its samavāyi kāraṇa (or sva-pratiyogisamavāyi kāraṇa in the case of abhāva) before it is produced, we shall see in the next chapter why it upholds this doctrine. Meanwhile, let us take note of another point before we bring the Nyāya view to a close. Although cause and effect are relative, the two need not always go together. There may be a cause without its corresponding effect, though not vice versa. We may have threads without any cloth being ever made of them. It is of course clear that where there is cloth, there must be threads. A cause therefore may be svarūpayogya or phalopadāya. A svarūpayogya kāraṇa is that which is by its nature capable of producing the effect, though the effect may never be actually produced. Threads which have been lying idle over the years and have not been used for manufacturing cloth are still styled the cause of cloth. It will be a case of svarūpayogyā kāraṇatā. When cloth has been actually produced out of a roll of yarns, the yarns will be phalopadāya kāraṇa. In the former case we speak of classes in general, such as threads as a class are cloth as a class. It is general causality, a cause-effect relation between threads as such and cloth as such (tattvānta tantuḥ paṭatvāvacchinnapaṭām prati kāraṇam). The second kind of causality is particular causality such as between particular threads and particular cloth—rather we should say, between particular instances of thread-universal and particular instances of cloth-universal. Causality is between two class-characters as embodied in relevant particulars.

22. Dinakari, p. 106; also S;a,a r K a 39.
As against the paramāṇukāraṇavāda and Īśvarasṛṣṭivāda of the Nyāya, the Śāṅkhya, as is well known, advocates pradhāna kāraṇavāda and prakṛtipariṇāmavāda. For the Naiyāyika the world is like a giant clock-work manufactured by God, the Supreme Artificer out of the atoms according to the adṛśta of jīvas. It is just creation by combination, there is no growth or development here; such concepts are indeed unknown to the Nyāya cosmology.

The Śāṅkhya, however, does not share this creationistic view, and rejects it as unnecessary. It puts forward the doctrine of evolution and holds that the world is a blooming forth of Mūlā Prakṛti, the Primal Matter, through various stages, from the subtle to the gross, from undifferentiated unity to breath-taking variety. It is not an unearthly ballet of bloodless categories but a living waltz of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas which are the basic constituents of Prakṛti. The throb and quiver of original Prakṛti (in the shape of sadṛśa parināma) bursts forth in the music and dance of sights and sounds of visible Nature. The Śāṅkhya recognises in this cosmic dance-drama twenty five principles (pañcaviṣati tattva) - Mūlā Prakṛti, the uncaused cause, seven prakṛti vikṛties (mahat, āhamkara etc. which are both causes and effects), sixteen vikāras (earth, air etc. which are only effects and not causes of any tattvāntara) and Puruṣa (which is neither Prakṛti nor Vikṛti).
Mūla Prakrti is both the upādāna kāraṇa (material cause) and the nimitta kāraṇa (efficient cause) of Vyaktta Prakrti.

All things are therefore evolutes or transformations of prakrti. Now, what is the place of parts and whole in the Sānkhya cosmology? It may be frankly stated that we do not find any discussion of this point in either in the Sānkhya kārika or even in the Sānkhya tattva kaumudi of Vācaspati. The fact is rather curious, but, as we shall see later, there is also no discussion of the epistemological problem, how the avayavin is known.

It may seem that it is not very difficult to understand what the Sānkhya view would be on the point, viz., that the avayavin is nothing different from the avayava, being only a different formation of the same. The cloth is just threads in a different arrangement from what they had before. This is precisely what has been done by Uddyotakara and the author of the Yukti-dīpika. It will be our endeavour here to indicate the difficulties involved in this view. We may even take the liberty of pointing out that these difficulties are usually glossed over and never thrashed out - at least we have nowhere come across a clear discussion of the point.

22 Vide infra p. 30
23 Vide infra p. 194.
24 N. V. II. I. 33.
(B) The question is, what does the Sāṅkhya think about parts and whole? If we hold that according to the Sāṅkhya the parts or the avayavas are the upādāna kāraṇa and the avayavins are their effect, then obviously the avayavins will be identical with the avayava with only a formal difference. But the point is - can the avayava be regarded as upādāna kāraṇa? Threads of a cloth are its avayava and are recognised as its upādāna kāraṇa. In fact, this is the stock illustration of most of the writers including the Nyāya-vārtika-kāra and the Vākrtidīpikā-kāra, who have reached the conclusion mentioned above. But what about ghaṭa kāpāla? Ghaṭa kāpāla is certainly an avayava of the ghaṭa, but is it the upādāna kāraṇa of the jar? Will the Sāṅkhya recognise it to be so? Seed is assuredly the upādāna kāraṇa of the tree but will it be regarded as an avayava or a part of the tree? Leaves, twigs etc. are undoubtedly its avayavas, but there is one great obstacle to the seed being regarded as an avayava. A tree comes into being only after the particular seed is destroyed and not before. Therefore, the seed and the tree do not exist simultaneously - death of one is the condition of birth of the other. How, then, can they be related as part and whole?

26 This follows from their Doctrine of Satkarya.

27 The Sāṅkhya recognises clay to be the material cause of the jar, and not ghaṭa kāpāla. Certainly clay and ghaṭa kāpāla cannot be said to be identical.
Again, leaves, twigs, branches and the trunk are all avayavas or parts of the tree. Will the Sānkhya regard them as upādāna kāraṇa of the tree? Presumably not. Therefore, we are led to conclude that avayavas as such are not identical with upādāna kāraṇa.

"What about threads?" it may be asked. "Are they not both avayava and upādāna karana? Is it then an exception?" In order to be able to have the correct answer we should here make a distinction between threads existing in the cloth, forming part of it and constituting it (paṭa samāna kāliṇa tantu), and threads rolled up into the form of a ball or in some other manner when purchased from the shop, i.e., threads arranged in a particular manner before manufacture of the cloth (paṭa prākkālīna tantu). Now, it is this latter tantu, i.e., paṭa prākkālīna tantu, which is the upādāna kāraṇa of cloth — not the former. When Uddyotakara and others refer to threads as upādāna kāraṇa of cloth, we should take them as referring to the paṭa prākkālīna tantu and not to threads co-existing with the cloth as its part (paṭa samāna kāliṇa tantu).

(C) That this must be the truth can be shown by analysis of the concept of upādāna kāraṇa. Upādāna kāraṇa, however, defined, has a notable feature indicated by Patañjali viz., it is that substance which remains identically the same in the midst of changes of its phase, form or property (all of which in the end mean the same).

28 This very same distinction is made by the Buddhists. Cf. Tattvasamgraha, Ch. 241-242, 29, Avasādyasya dravyasya purvadharmaṇītvām dharmarthaṁ patiḥ parināmaḥ, yogaḥ samgraha on 3.13.
This brings out the point advocated by the Sāṅkhya that a thing is matter-cum-form (or property), it is matter with a form and in a form. Change of form does not signify change of matter - in fact, matter persists in the midst of formal changes and causation simply means transition from one form to another by the same material content. A content having a given form is the cause of the very content with another form which succeeds it. Milk, liquid in form, is succeeded by curd (which is but milk dense in form) and therefore is the cause of it. Gold in the form of a bar or a lump is followed by the same piece of gold having the form of a a ring and is therefore the cause of it. Material identity and formal difference are the two poles of causal change.

This statement may be called in question in view of the facts that in the case of seed and tree or of milk and curd, the matter is wholly destroyed and replaced by another. Where is the material identity here? For the Sāṅkhya answer we have to concentrate on the concepts of 'form' and 'formal change'.

Form (saṁsthāna) according to the Sāṅkhya is determined by ordering of the elements constituting it (āvayava vyuha). Distribution of the constituents conditions the form of a thing. Different distributions mean different forms. Change of form, therefore, implies a re-distribution of the elements. When some external factor disturbs the existing arrangement, throws it out of gear and affects a new collocation, we have a new form in place of old.
Destruction of the seed-form simply means a considerable re-distribution of its elements (vijāvayava) in such a manner that it comes to wear the 'look' of a sprout (ānkura). The collocation of elements that imparts to a thing the liquid look of 'milk' may be heavily affected under certain circumstances, so that a large scale realignment takes place and we see curd in place of milk. The milk elements (dugdha-vayava) remain the same even here, only their dispersion alters. When there is re-ordering on a small scale, the thing does not lose its former look and continues to be recognised in its new form. If a lump of earth e.g., is moistened and fashioned into a jug, its lump form (piṇḍākāra) gives way to that of a jar (ghaṭā-kāra), but its earthen character (mṛttva) remains. Similarly, when threads are purchased, they are either in a scattered mass or rolled up in a particular fashion. When they are subsequently woven into a piece of cloth, they give up their old form and assume a new one (ātāna-vitāna-vat), but since this is not a sharp change, we can recognise them even in warp and woof. Thus the cases of growth of tree out of seed or making of curd out of milk do not nullify the hypothesis that the process of causation is really the process of transformation and not of transubstantiation.

Now, the constituents of a thing have themselves a form and are therefore collocations of far subtler matter till, in our search for the material stuff, we eventually come to sattva, rajas and tamas. They are the only substantive reals in the universe, only upādāna kāraṇa of all that is and can be. All things are only
modalisations of this primal stuff, various permutations and combinations of this sole material of the universe. Therefore, we see that all avayāvās or components are not really upādāna kāraṇa, only the ultimate components (antyāvayava) are genuine upādāna kāraṇa. Others are called material cause only by way of loose speaking. Even when we do such loose speaking, we should at least be clear in our minds as to the concepts we use. For example, when threads are said to be the material cause of cloth, which threads are meant? Unless that is made clear, the expression is ambiguous and is apt to mislead. In the light of the foregoing analysis we readily realise that it must mean paṭa prākkalīna tantu and not paṭa-samānakālīna-tantu. Paṭa-prākkalīna tantu undergoes a change of its form, the form of loose mass or of being rolled up, and takes on the new form, that of a warp and woof. There is thus formal difference and material identity between such threads and cloth. But as between paṭa-samāna-kāla-bhāvi tantu and the paṭa there is no such relation. Therefore the former and not the latter is the cause of cloth. In fact, cloth is nothing but the threads constituting its warp and woof. It is nothing more than them. They are given the name 'cloth', for they serve a particular purpose viz., protecting one's person against cold, heat etc.

Therefore, we come to the conclusion that according to the Sāṅkhya avayavin is just the avayavas in a particular order, and the upadana karana of such an ordered group of avayavas is, loosely speaking, this group of an earlier collocation, but really speaking, the three guṇas.
We have come to the end of our sketch of the three systems and have, it may be presumed, got the hang of their basic motifs and patterns. We have also seen their views in general about parts and whole. We shall now take the plunge into the core of our discourse, viz., consideration of the arguments by which they seek to defend themselves and attack their opponents. This is obviously the most intricate as well as interesting part of our discussion towards which we now wing our way post-haste.