INTRODUCTION

The problem we have discussed in the following pages viz., the problem of 'avayava and avayavin' is one that belongs to the old Nyāya. Indeed it has a long ancestry and makes its appearance in the very early stages of the Nyāya. In the Nyāya Sūtra itself we come across its reference. There it is introduced not in a metaphysical context but in an epistemological one viz., 'how is a thing known? Can it be said to be known by perception, seeing that all its parts cannot be so known?' This is the pūrvapakṣa which Gotama considers and it is in this context as to whether perception is really inferential that Gotama introduces the discussion on avayava and avayavin. The importance that he attaches to it can be gathered from the fact that he not only devotes the next six sutras to its discussion but reverts to it on a number of occasions, in the third and the fourth adhyayas, e.g., 3.1.51. (in course of discussing whether sense-organs are one or many in view of the fact that the avayavin, though residing in many places); 3.2.16 and 4.1.18 (destruction and origin are due to change of old form and assumption of a new one by the parts); 4.1.34 to 4.1.36 (discussion of the Buddhist pūrvapakṣa that a thing is really many, not one); and last-

1 Pratyaksamunanam aparadipusalabdheh / N. S., 2.1.30. For discussion vide infra.
2 i.e., upto 2.1.36.
ly in the Amayavāyavi-prakaraṇa from 4.2.4 - 4.2.17. There are also other places where Gotama has touched upon the problem but the above references are sufficient to show that the builder of the Nyāya system attached more than usual importance to it. Vatsyāyana also has elaborately commented on some of these sūtras, thereby extracting their hidden implications and references; but it is Uddyotakara who for the first time worked out the full details of the doctrine of avayavin. He specifically referred to and discussed the various arguments of the Sankhya and the Buddhist against it, disposed of them and stoutly defended the Nyāya. In his defence of the Nyāya he brought in a logical acumen and a polemical fervour which won him the famous tributes of the great Sanskrit dramatist Subandhu - 'Nyāya sthitimiva Uddyotakara svarūpam'\(^3\) - an embodiment of the Nyāya defence. Vacaspati followed the tone and direction set by Uddyotakara and brought to the exposition and defence of the Nyāya view his massive learning and masterly lucidity. He dealt with the criticisms of Dharmakīrti and other Buddhist Scholars against Uddyotakara and put the Nyāya on a sure foundation. Udayanācārya and Śrīdhara who came after him further enriched the Nyāya with their valuable contributions - this is true especially of the former who is ranked as the doyen amongst the old Naiyāyikas and with whom the age of prācīna-nyāya is supposed to have closed. One

\(^3\) Vasavadatta, Hall's edition, p. 235.
thing we may note here. After Vācaspati it was Buddhism which remained the only formidable adversary, Sānkhya having receded into the background. Udayana has dealt with Buddhist objection in the Atmatatttvaviveka (otherwise known as Buddhādhikāra), but has not given any fresh argument against the Sānkhya. This shows that in the 8th - 10th centuries no Sānkhya philosopher flourished who successfully repulsed the earlier Nyāya criticisms and hence, no further defence of the Nyāya was necessary. After Udayana began the age of Nāyya Nyāya when epistemological discussions came to the fore and metaphysical problems were relegated to a secondary status. Hence we do not hear much of the problem of a parts and whole in this period.

The reason why the problem of parts and whole was such a lively issue as between the Nyāya and the Sānkhya and also as between the Nyāya and the Buddhist is not far to seek. Bigger stakes are involved in the issue. The Nyāya concept of avayavin is bound up with a fundamental tenant of the system viz., Asatkāryavāda. According to this doctrine effects are new products, hitherto non-existent (kārya-prāgabhāva-pratiyogī). An avayavidravya or an effect substance is different from its cause viz., avayavas or parts. Acceptance of

4 Here, as is well-known, Siromani is a glorious exception. Besides writing his celebrated commentary on the Cintamani he wrote commentaries on many metaphysical treatises e.g., on the Atmatattva viveka, the Kiranavali prakāsa, Nyāya lilavati prakāsa; above all, he wrote an independent metaphysical treatise 'Pācarchatattva nirupana' where he formulated many theories diametrically opposed to orthodox views of the Nyāya vaisesika.

5 Tarkasamgraha, (chow.), p. 37.
avayavivada of the Nyāya would therefore mean acceptance of asatkāravāda. But this is something which militates against the Śāṅkhyakārakāraṇa-bheda vāda (and hence satkāravāda) and Buddhist kṣanabhaṅgavāda. They have therefore subjected the Nyāya concept of avayavin to an incisive analysis and a ruthless critical examination, and have pointed out what to them, are the various loopholes in it.

We have given in the second chapter an elaborate account of the Śāṅkhya critique of the Nyāya view and the third chapter we have devoted to a detailed study of the Buddhist criticisms. However, the structure of our essay will be clear from the analysis given at the end of this chapter.

II

The Śāṅkhya critique differs from the Buddhist one in a very important respect. This will become apparent to anyone who goes through the second chapter and compares it with the third. The Śāṅkhya does not criticise the Nyāya concept of avayavin directly as Buddhism does. The Buddhist leads a direct, frontal attack. He not only defends his own position against the Naiyāyika criticism but also counter attacks. He meets the latter on his own ground and challenges the validity of his concept of avayavin. The analysis shows it to be untenable. It leads to various difficulties—various contradictions in particular—and therefore should be summarily rejected. The Sankhya, however, does nothing of the kind.
He remains in his own territory and argues for non-difference of cause and effect (and therefore of parts and whole). So far as his arguments are arguments for such non-difference, they are, to that extent, arguments against difference of parts and whole. The Sāṅkhya therefore, instead of trying to pick holes in the Nyāya theory of avayavān, seeks to justify his own view, viz., kārya-kāraṇā-bheda vāda as strongly as possible.

We have been, it may be noticed, consistently using the expression 'kāryakāraṇābhedavāda' instead of 'satkāryavāda' which is commonly used, to denote the theory that advocates identity of cause and effect, and we may be asked why, if both the terms mean the same, would it not have been better to keep to the old one and not coin another? Our answer is that the two theories are not identical. We have argued the point in the body of our thesis, and even at the cost of repetition which may be excused in the interests of conceptual clarity, we should like to say here why this distinction is made and why we think it has to be made. The Sāṅkhya advocates satkāryavāda according to which the effect pre-exists in the cause. On what grounds is it advocated? The Verse 9 of Sāṅkhya kañika sets forth the grounds one of which is said to be 'kāraṇabhāva' which is interpreted by Vācaśpati as karyakaranatmakatvā, i.e., effect

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6 For relation between avayava and upadana karana, vide infra., p. 47-23
7 Vide infra, p. 23-29
is of the same nature as the cause. Kārya-kāraṇabheda is therefore the 'hetu' of satkārya-vāda and therefore not identical with it.
Sārabodhīnī tīkā also makes it clear that in addition to other grounds already mentioned a further ground is here being given to prove pre-existence of effect in the cause (kārasya sattve hetvantaramuccha payati).\(^9\) In fact, while the satkāryavāda is proved on the grounds enumerated in verse 9, the doctrine of substantival identity between cause and effect is proved by Vācaśpatī on a different set of grounds.\(^10\)

Again, in verse 14 it is said that the qualities of the effect are but qualities of the cause (kāraṇaguṇatmakatvāt kārasya).\(^11\) Not that qualities of the effect are produced by those of the cause as the Nyāya propounds, but that the qualities of the cause themselves appear as qualities in the effect.

Now, we hope, it is clear that satkāryavāda and kārya-kāraṇabheda are not identically the same but that the latter is the basis of the former,\(^12\) and therefore different from it. We should not therefore formulate the satkāryavāda in terms of causal identity with the effect as is often done but strictly in terms of latent or potential existence of the effect in the cause before production. When the kārya-kāraṇabheda vāda brings out the material identity between cause and effect, satkāryavāda refers to the formal difference

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\(^9\) Ibid., Vide infra., p.29.
\(^10\) Vide infra., p.29.
\(^11\) Sk., p.293; Cf: Purnima Tika : yadyadatmakam drstam tad tadatmatmakarana kām (p.97). For the view of Vijnana bhiksū, vide infra, p.18.
\(^12\) Vide infra, p.30.
between the two.

It is for this reason that we have not discussed either Asatkaryavada of the Nyāya or Satkaryavada of the Sānkhyā. Our main concern is whether the avayavin is different or non-different from its parts. We have, therefore, confined ourselves strictly to the arguments that pertain to our problem.

III

The Buddhist critique is in our humble opinion a landmark in Indian Philosophy. The subtle and trenchant criticisms it has made of the Nyāya are an intellectual feat and are matched in our land only perhaps by the acuity of the Nyāya rejoinder, and by the penetration and profundity of Sāṅgītrīt Vedānta. It needed all the guns of the Nyāya to return the Buddhist fire and hold its ground; and in the encounter the Nyāya could not remain exactly as it was in the beginning. It had to accommodate new ideas, face consequences of its views, however seemingly absurd and adopt itself accordingly. Anybody wishing to acquaint himself with conceptual development in the Nyāya cannot do so effectively and correctly without going through both the systems pari passu. In this respect Dr. Dharmendra Sastri's work 13, A Critique of Indian Realism - A

13. Published by the Agra University, Agra, 1964.
Study of the Conflict between the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist Dignāga School is a step in the right direction. Not that he has always held the scales even as between the Nyāya and the Buddhist — his criticism of the Nyāya is too often biased and partisan; nevertheless it is a welcome venture. Probably, we shall not be far from right if we say with due respect to all concerned, that not many scholars are found who are versed both in the Nyāya and the Buddhist works in original — at least such has been our sad and bitter experience. Some scholars, of course, are there who are versed more or less in the six orthodox systems — but as to those who combine proficiency in an orthodox system with scholarship in Buddhism, — Only a few, wretchedly few. It is for this reason that we found the greatest difficulty in following the original works on Buddhism; and it is for this very reason that we have deliberately opened our dissertation with a somewhat lengthy account of Buddhism.

IV

ANALYSIS OF OUR DISSERTATION.

The work is divided into eight chapters. In the first chapter a broad survey has been made of the three systems — Buddhism Nyāya and Sankhya. The purpose is to pin-point certain features or

14 cf. chapters VII and VIII
aspects of their general background which bear directly on our problem.

The first part of the chapter contains an account of Buddhism. We have pointed out in the first instance that Buddhist philosophy is not one system just as Brāhmaṇical system is not one. Various shades of realism and idealism are found therein. We have then given reasons why we have left out Vijñānavāda and Śānyavāda and thereupon proceeded to a consideration of the Vaibhāṣika system. The system has been discussed under two main heads with an eye to bringing out certain features not usually associated with Buddhism:-(i) constituents of the universe and (ii) structure and distinctive features of the constituents. Under the first head is given an account of the reals recognised in the system - Eternal and non-eternal things together with different varieties of non-eternal things. Under the second head comes a bare sketch of the two cardinal tenets of Buddhism - Nairatmyavāda and Kaśanabhaṅgavāda, as generally interpreted. Then follows an account of the distinctive way Vaibhāṣika interprets kaśanabhaṅgavāda, in conformity with its belief in eternal entities, and in caturlakṣaṇa of non-eternal entities. The Vaibhāṣika doctrine of atomism is then barely touched upon followed by a brief reference to the points where the Sautrantika differs from the Vaibhāṣika. The discussion is then concluded after showing where the problem of avayava and avayavin stands against this general background.
The second part of the first chapter is occupied with the Nyaya. Threefold cause of an avayavi is enumerated and it is shown that the causal chain eventually leads back to atoms, thereby giving rise to paramāṇu-kārāṇavāda and Īśvarasvātivāda as distinguished from Pradhānakārāṇavāda of the Sāṅkhya, Brahmaparāhāravāda of Rāmaṇuja and Brahmavivartavāda of Śaṅkara. Thereafter the nature of an effect is explained and it is pointed out that although an avayavi is an effect, an effect need not be so. It may be a negative entity in which case it can be dhvamsabhava only and no other abhava; or it may be a positive entity in which case it can be only a substance, a quality or an action. Thereupon the principle relating to origin of a quality in the effect is explained followed by a reference to the distinction between svarūpayogya and phalopādāyavāya-kārana, i.e., possible and actual cause of a thing, and its importance.

The third part deals with the Sāṅkhya. Twenty five tattvas are stated and the Sāṅkhya view of avayava and avayavin is discussed. It is pointed out that the Sāṅkhya does not contain any specific discussion as to whether avayavin is identical with or different from the avayavas and the problem has therefore to be judged in the context of the Sāṅkhya concept of upādāna kārāna. It is indicated that upadana kārāna and avayava cannot be identified. This brings up the discussion on the concept of upādāna kārāna, matter and form and their mutual relation; and we ultimately conclude that avayavin is
just the avayava in a particular arrangement and the upādāna kārana of such an ordered group of avayavas is, loosely speaking, this very group of an earlier state; and strictly speaking, the three gunas.

The second chapter opens with the ontological problem as to whether the whole is different or non-different from the parts and then, after brief summary of the Sāṃkhya view on the point, proceeds to state and explain the grounds on which the effect is held identical with the cause (and therefore the avayavin with the avayavas). The Nyāya arguments purporting to show difference between the two are considered and refuted.

The third chapter begins with an outline of the Buddhist view on the relation between avayava and avayavin and then enumerates the main grounds of Buddhist attack on the Nyāya theory of avayavin. Thereafter we have an exhaustive explanation of these different grounds.

In the fourth chapter we have given the Nyāya rejoinder to the Sāṃkhya. We have quoted from different works of the Nyāya to show how they refute the Sāṃkhya criticism and maintain that cause and effect, parts and whole cannot but be different.

The fifth chapter is taken up with a comprehensive reply of the Nyāya to the Buddhist objections. All the points raised by the Buddhist have been dealt with and further reasons are given by the Nyāya in support of its thesis.
One of the stock arguments of the Sāṅkhya and the Buddhist alike is the argument from equality of weight as between a thing and its parts taken together. Uddyotakara institutes a meliculous enquiry into various aspects of the problem. He considers not merely the view of the Sāṅkhya and the Buddhist but also refers to some other views held by some Naiyāyikas in the past and finally rejects them all in favour of the orthodox view of the Nyāya.

We have nowhere come across an account of this discussion. We have therefore devoted the full sixth chapter to this problem.

In the seventh chapter we have treated of the epistemological problem 'how is a whole apprehended?' We have first given the Buddhist view according to which a thing, though a conccourse of atoms, is still perceived. An enquiry as to how a mass of atoms can be perceived is made from the Buddhist point of view and Buddhist answer is analysed and explained. Buddhist rejection of 'mahattva' is set out at length and Buddhist conditions of perception are explained. This is followed by the Nyāya examination of all the purvapaksas and their final rejection.

The eighth chapter contains our concluding observation and final assessment. There we have pointed out some loophole in some of the criticisms of the Naiyāyika but we have shown that taking
all in all, the Nyāya satisfies our norms more than the others do. Norms are set forth, shortcomings of the other systems are laid bare and merits of the Nyāya pointed out. Attention is also drawn to/paramount importance of experience in the Nyāya and an endeavour has been made by bringing in and criticising the logical positivist's attempted elimination of metaphysics to show that such a metaphysics can be reared on empirical foundations.