CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

We have traversed the ground of our subject as far as possible and are in the last lap of our trek. We have now to wind up our discussion with an assessment of the Nyaya view vis-a-vis the Sankhya and the Buddhist.

We have seen what the Nyaya holds about the avayavins and how it has been subjected to a thorough searching scrutiny by the Sankhya and the Buddhist. These criticisms have served to clear up many ambiguities in the Nyaya and enabled it to define its concepts more clearly, and occasionally to revise some of them within the broad framework of its system. The Nyaya rejoinder must also have an equally salutary effect on them and the whole episode of criticism and counter-criticism is to that extent, a gain to all the three contestants. Still we think that in this battle the Nyaya fares better than the rest because, as we shall see presently, it satisfies certain norms which the others don't - at any rate not to the extent the Nyaya does. This does not mean that all the answers of the Nyaya are sound and impeccable and that the other side will have to stand mute in their face. So, before we undertake the final assessment we should like to speak a word or two about some of the Nyaya answers which can certainly be disposed of from the adversary's point of view.
II

Uddyotakara's reply to some of the arguments of the Sāṅkhya cannot be sustained. These arguments of the Sāṅkhya, e.g., the first and the third, are, inspite of their diversity of forms, basically to the effect that a thing cannot be different from its whole, because it is a part thereof Uddyotakara argues that the hetu here (viz., being a part) is viruddha because it proves difference of the two rather than their non-difference. This is said to be due to the fact that part and whole, 'avayava' and 'avayavin', are correlatives and therefore not identical with but different from each other. This contention of Uddyotakara however does not commend itself to us. Firstly, he assumes in the very beginning what he has still to prove viz., difference between parts and whole and construes the words 'parts' and 'whole' accordingly. Until his thesis is proved, he has however no right to put his own construction on the words used and declare that the other party has no case.

Secondly, use of the words 'part' and 'whole' does not ipso facto commit the Sāṅkhya to the Nyāya view. When he says, 'the whole is non-different from parts because of 'say X' (avayavi avayavebhyoh nartantaram), all that he means is that the whole as recognised by the jayman (i.e., in the sense of a 'thing')
different from the parts. It does not signify his acceptance of
the Nyaya view. Thirdly, and it is the most important, Uddyota-
kara's suggestion that correlativity of parts and whole entails
the existence of the avayavin as distinct from the parts does not
stand to scrutiny. A whole may well be taken as an aggregate or
avayavasamudaya, and a 'part' would then mean a portion of the
aggregate. Suppose there is a collection of 'A, B, C, D' and I
say 'A is a part of the collection', would it be a monstrous state-
ment or self-contradictory proposition - a wretched piece of
logic /not. Hence, Uddyotakara's rejoinder on this count is far
from convincing. In fact, our criticism applies to the other argu-
ments (which we need not specify) where Uddyotakara trots out the
same plea of 'viruddha hetu'.

Similarly, his criticism of Sankhya karya karanabhedavada
on the ground that it makes production meaningless fails to con-
vince us. Indeed the Sankhya has a ready answer viz., production
is not a nullity since it brings out the form latent in the cause -
in the ultimate parts. This is the real meaning of production,
i.e., production is manifestation (abhivyakti), not origination
(upatti). In the circumstances we are of the view that Uddyota-
kara's criticism in these respects is not tenable. This does not
mean, however, that the Sankhya has an invulnerable case or that
the other arguments of the Naiyayika are hollow. What the inherent
defects of the Sankhya are and how it fails to achieve a basic conceptual symmetry will become apparent in course of our final assessment of the three systems.

The Nyāya rejoinder to the Buddhist critique seems to be more critical and to the point, and we shall discuss only one point of its criticism. It is the criticism of the Buddhist view from the point of view of universal or jāti, viz., avayavin must be admitted, otherwise universals will be deprived of their locus and will not be capable of being apprehended by us. If we do not recognise any avayavin 'tree', where would the universal 'tree-hood' subsist and how would it be known to us? This criticism clearly is based on the assumption that universals are objectively real entities, but this assumption is not shared by all. The Buddhist e.g., denies altogether the reality of jāti and sets up his own doctrine of Apoha. Whether jātivāda or Apahavāda is the real solution, or some other doctrines, is itself a moot point and a whole literature has grown around it. The Nyāya criticism can therefore be well met by the Buddhist on the basis of his apohavāda which, being an altogether a different problem, we refrain from pursuing here.

\[2A\] Vide Supra, p. 168.
III

We think that in our final assessment we should be guided by two norms viz., whether the system concerned has been able to do full justice to the logical claims of its concepts, and whether it does full justice to the facts of experience. The norms can be designated 'inter-conceptual compatibility' and 'extra-conceptual reference'. Let us explain:

Every metaphysical system has a conceptual apparatus of its own. It devises a conceptual scheme to explain and interpret experience. Every concept in it has a specific function to discharge, a specific role to play and every concept has certain logical implications. The logical viability of a system depends on how far the mutual implications of different concepts in it fit in with one another and make up a consistent whole. The measure of its greatness lies in the degree of the harmony achieved, and failure to achieve this consistency, especially in respect of basic concepts, proves to be a serious handicap to a system, however brilliant it may otherwise be. The philosophy of Spinoza is an instance to the point. His philosophy is a fabric of three cardinal concepts - Substance, Attribute and Modes. Their mutual relation and implication have to be worked out if we are to judge of its worth. And in trying to do so, we come to realise where the great master faltered and failed. Spinoza defines substance
as 'self-conceived and self-existent' but this logically leads up to the concept of an Indeterminate Being, An Impersonal Reality beyond all determinations and specifications. There remains no scope of importing the further concepts of Attributes and Modes against such an acosmic background, and the passage from substance to these concepts has ever proved to be an unnegotiable chasm in an otherwise magnificent system. It may eventually turn out that every system suffers from such a snag, and a perfect fool-proof system is a myth and a chimera, yet to see the light of the day. Still there is no denying that a system strives to achieve the maximum harmony among its elements and stands or falls by that.

The second of the norms we have proposed is that a system must do justice to the facts of experience. Exception may be taken to it on the ground that there are many systems which censure experience and aspire after getting truth on the higher pedestal of abstract a priori logic. Zeno and Bradley in the West and Sāṇkara and Nāgārjuna in the East may be cited as instances. They do not share the common belief in experience as the conclusive evidence and test of reality. In the circumstances, it may be objected that in assessment of a philosophical system, whatever its colour, the proposed second norm should be eschewed and some other principle accepted in its place.
In answer we should like to point out that the above objection does not stand to reason. It is not correct to hold that the claims of a priori logic are paramount and that experience itself must substantiate its claims to recognition before the bar of reason. This has never been the approach of Indian philosophy and we also feel that claims of experience cannot be subordinated to those of abstract reason. Such abstract counter-factual reasonings are styled in Indian philosophy 'tarka' and 'tarka' is never regarded as a pramana. The Nyāya which is, in the main though not in entirety, the epistemology of Indian philosophy, expressly states that 'tarka' is not tattva-jñāna because it has no certainty (anavadhāranat). It is pramāṇā grāhaka, i.e., it helps a pramāṇa to have certain knowledge about a thing by removing doubts about it, but is not itself's source of knowledge. This view is accepted by all the six systems.

We can cite in our support the authority of no other philosopher than Saṅkara himself who is generally classed with the above thinkers. In fact there is a basic difference between him and the others on the point under consideration. They have sought to repudiate experience on the basis of logic - to put it specifi-

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3 N. S., 1.1.40.

4 Tarkasamgraha (ed. by Bodas and Athalyc), p. 57(27) 44
cally, on the law of contradiction. They set logic against experience and try to pick holes in it. Sankara, for one, would never subscribe to such a viewpoint. This point has been discussed with a rare clarity and refreshing originality by Dr. N.K. Devaraja and we can do no better than quote him. He writes: "It is to be observed that Sankara, unlike Bradley, does not abhor the testimony of experience. Indeed, a careful student of Sankara cannot but be struck with the frequency with which he appeals to loka, i.e., the common sense or everyday experience of mankind . . . . 

While reading Sankara, it is rarely, if ever, that we feel to be moving in a world of abstractions, as we do, for instance, while perusing the Logic of Hegel or the Appearance and Reality of Bradley. No sane critic of Sankara could ever speak of his system as an unearthly ballet of bloodless categories. It is difficult to find a single instance of Sankara's undulgent in a purely logical discussion except when he is specially engaged in exposing the pretensions of abstract logic.  

In fact Sankara categorically states: "Facts cannot be irrational or such as are opposed to reason (na ca drita\textsuperscript{4} mupapa-\textsuperscript{5} mam nasa drstatv\textsuperscript{6} deva)."  

\textsuperscript{4} An Introduction to Sankara's Theory of Knowledge, pp. 55-55. This book is a must for those who intend to have a clear idea about Sankara's views on Sruti reasoning, exp. and other cognate problems of epistemology. 

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., p. 57 (Quoted from Brhadaranyaka Up. 1.4.10)
inadmissible (drṣṭa-viparīṭa-kalpaṇā nupatteḥ). All these excerpts will bear out our contention that where it is a question of sophistry versus experience, tarka versus pratyakṣa Sāṅkara, unlike the rest, is unreservedly in favour of the latter. In this respect Sāṅkara may be said to represent the general temper of Indian philosophy. Therefore, we hold that proposed norms are a sound basis for detached assessment.

IV

When we apply the above two norms to the Sāṅkhya, we find that it is open to two criticisms: (i) it cannot successfully tackle the concepts of form and matter, and their implications and is not quite sure of the status of form and (ii) it cannot sufficiently account for our perception of unity.

(i) We have already had occasion to refer to these concepts and their role in the Sāṅkhya. A thing, says the Sāṅkhya, is 'matter form' complex. It has two aspects - Substantival or material and formal; and the two aspects are inalienable. They are two essential correlatives and together make up a thing. Matter minus form is as much an abstraction as is form minus matter. So far there is nothing objectionable and the Sāṅkhya is

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7 Ibid., p. 57.
on the right track.

But here the Sankhya, paradoxically enough, gets into a contradiction. In one breath it holds that form changes and that the change is real, and yet in the same breath it proclaims that change of form is not real as it does not change the real stuff or matter which remains the same. That form changes and that the change is real is, indeed the burden of the Sankhya theory of causation. As we have seen earlier, for the Sankhya cause and effect are formally different, and it is this formal difference which alone accounts for the differences of function, cognition etc. found in respect of cause and effect. There is also a famous couplet in Sanskrit which says that in the Sankhya parinamavada - formal change is not illusory as it is in the Advaita Vivartavada. The couplet is:

"Satattvato'nyathābhāvāh parināmaṁ udīritah
Atattvato'nyathābhāvo vivartah sa udīritah."

On the other hand, the Sankhya contends that difference of form in no way affects the material stuff. Vyāsa expressly says in his commentary on the Yoga Sutra: There is change only of the form or arrangement of the matter-stuff (bhāvānyathātvam)

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8 Vide Supra., p. 34.
9 Vādantasāra, Sec. 21.
but not of the matter-stuff itself (na dravyāḥḥātvam) 10.
Dharmin remains the same, only its form or dharma changes. Obviously there is a contradiction here and the Sāṅkhya has to face the question: Is the change of form real or unreal? If it is unreal, if the new arrangement of matter-stuff does not constitute a new reality in any way, then the conclusion becomes irresistible that the cause continues to be what it was and exactly as it was. The Sāṅkhya parināma-vāda inexorably shades off into the Advaitān's Vivartavāda. If on the other hand the change is real, the matter-stuff must be deemed to have been affected and the total complex, change as a whole in respect of both matter and form. Since the changes of form are occurring every moment, it would mean accepting the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness. Either of these positions would have been logically consistent. As it stands, the Sāṅkhya position is a precarious half-way house between Vivartavāda and Kaṇabhaṅgavāda and lacks a self-justifying validity.

(ii) The other objection we have to urge is that the Sāṅkhya cannot account for our perception of unity. If a thing is just a complex if the (so-called) avayava is but avayava-samudāya, whence do we have our sense of unity? Of course the Sāṅkhya answer will be that the constitutive elements are not discrete but penetrate through one another; so we perceive a

10 Vide Supra., p.220.
unity, a thing—a table or a chair. Even then we think, as we shall see in connection with the Buddhist, that the answer does not go far enough. If there is no unity objectively such perception would be invalid. Anyway, the Sāṅkhya, like the Buddhist, indeed like any other avayava-samīha-vādin, must feel the difficulty about unity which in our view cannot be explained by them.

The Sāṅkhya thus fails both on the count of inter-conceptual compatibility and on that of extra-conceptual reference to experiences.

V

Buddhism as a philosophy is much more thorough and cohesive than the Sāṅkhya; and it has had the rare distinction of having masters like Dignāga and Dharmakīrti who gave it a decided logical bias and sought to put it on firm conceptual foundations. Still, judged by our first criterion, the following concepts— their implications and their relations with others do not seem to have been fully worked out, and a consequent opacity and anomaly persists:

(1) Samudāya and Samudāyi:— We have seen that according to the Buddhist a thing is a samudāya, an aggregate and its parts are one and all, samudāyi or components. Now, the question is, what is the status of samudāya and how does it stand vis-à-vis the samudāyi? Is it something more than the samudāyi or just its sum total?
The answer obviously is in favour of the latter, i.e., the aggregate is a bare sum of the parts. The Buddhist also admits it and holds that vyāṣṭि and saṃstaṭि, saṃudāya and saṃudāyi are not different - they are identical. By identity here clearly numerical identity is not meant, for an aggregate is not numerically identical with each of its items. What is meant is qualitative identity i.e., what is true of one particular is true of all the particulars. In other words, the characters predicable of one are also predicable of the others. So far, so good, but then this conceptual scheme breaks down on the question of perceptibility of the aggregate. The Buddhist advocates in the same breath imperceptibility of the samudāya and perceptibility of the samudāyi - imperceptible atoms making up a perceptible aggregate. This is clearly in conflict with the above implication, for here the aggregate come to have a character not owned by the components and therefore ceases to be a simple totality. The term used by the Buddhist to denote this extra feature is 'ātisāya' - a term which, as we have noted earlier, is never made clear by him and which, whatever its meaning, is a sure indication of the doom and disaster of his conceptual framework.

11 Cf : Bradley's view as to collective judgment. Cf: Logic, Vol.I.,
12 We have borrowed this expressive phrase from W. E. Moore, Cf: Some Main Problems of Philosophy (4th Imp.'63), p. 37; we have somewhat modified its sense to suit the context.
13 Not all the characters, however we must emphasise this. For the positional and directional character of one parāmanu will not obviously be shared by the others. We mean only relevant characters characters belonging to the atoms as atoms.

13A Vide Supra, p. 261.
(2) Virodha - This is a fundamental concept of Buddhism and the law of contradiction may be said to be the sovereign law of Buddhist philosophy. In our discourse it has come out most prominently in the antinomies against the Nyāya, especially in the criticism that a thing cannot occupy multiple positions in space. In this basis the Buddhist has raised the contention that a thing cannot subsist in many parts, and therefore the avayavini is a myth.

We have observed why the Buddhist makes such assertions. According to him there is a contradiction between one part of space and another. One part is uniformly and consistently the negation of the other and there is no exception to it. The two parts are therefore exclusive of and opposed to each other. Consequently, nothing that is related to one can be related to the other. An avayava, occupying as it does a particular part of space, automatically becomes the anti-thesis of another which occupies a different part. The result is that nothing can subsist in these avayavas.

This kind of reasoning, we must confess, leaves us unconvinced. It seems that the Buddhist is here making a basic confusion between 'bhedā' and 'virodha', between mutual negation and opposition. Any two parts of space are, to be sure, bhinnam, i.e., different - there is anyonyābhāva between them, one is decidedly the

14 Vide Supra., p.78.
negation of the other. But this does not mean they are mutually opposed. Bheda or anyonyabhava consists in negation of identity, but opposition or virodha is something more. When two things are found in experience never to (asūkhāsū), occupy the same locus, they are said to be opposed to each other. Cowness (gotva) and horsemess (asvatva) are never found together in the same āśraya; therefore they are opposed. Dravyatva and gotva, substance hood and cowness, however, co-exist in the same locus viz., the cow (since it is both a substance and a cow); therefore, they are not virodha, though they are, by every standard, utterly different.

The Buddhist may complain that he is being judged by the Nyāya Yardstick and this is not proper. The Nyāya also may be weighed in his scales and found wanting. This argument of the Buddhist brings to the fore his approach and attitude to experience and the problems of experience. For him contradictories are to be adjudged by a priori logic, not discovered from experience. Thought is to sit in judgment on experience and decide which of its contents, are mutually incompatible; and this it seeks to do without reference to experience.

This seems, we must submit, to be going too far. The Buddhist, of course, is at liberty to do what he likes and go where

15 Of course, the Naiyayika, and it seems many of his thinking, would insist that those parts cannot be mere negative entities and therefore would be more than more negations the one of the other.

16 In the Nyaya-Nyaya parlance it is tadatmyasambandha vacchinna pratiyogitatta abhava, i.e., negation the counter-correlative of which is delinieted by the relation of identity.
It suits him; but such a concept of virodha leads to certain consequences which we may notice. Firstly, as we have said above, it obliterates all distinction between bheda and virodha - a distinction maintained in all languages (at any rate in some of the principal languages of the world - Sanskrit, English and Bengali).

It is to be seriously considered whether a conceptual scaffolding that does away with this distinction is preferable, by whatever standard, to another that is equally consistent and yet is able to do full justice to their distinction and individuality. Secondly, on such a view the contradictories can well appear and do appear as objects of experience. Different parts of space are as much experienced by us as are the different parts of a thing, although on the Buddhist calculus, they are contradictories of one another.

But the question is, how those which clash with one another in intellect can go together in reality? The logical tradition over the last two thousand years has taught us to think of logical contradictories as being incapable of being cognised in experience. This is also the view of the Nyāya, one of whose foremost champions, Raghunāth Siromani, gave a classic expression to it which we have referred to so many times in the body of our discussion: That which contradicts another does not appear in experience along with that other and that which appears with another does not contradict it.¹⁷

¹⁷ Vide Supra., p. 34.
There are only two courses open; either to hold that such alleged contradictories are not really so and hence, they come together in experience (this is the view of the Nyāya); or to hold that they are really contradictory (being so adjudged in one’s conceptual system) and therefore our experience of their concomitance is false. The Buddhist adopts the latter alternative. To this, however, we have one objection, viz., can contradictories appear together even in false experience? Can we perceive, even falsely, that a thing is both a rope and a snake at one and the same time? Is it possible for us ever to cognize that the sun is both the sun and the moon at the same time and the same place? It seems to us that the concept of 'virodha' or contradiction cannot be adequately formed without reference to experience, and in this respect the Buddhist conception is vulnerable.

VI

With the above however we come to our second criterion - how far a system explains the facts of experience. Here, again, the Buddhist view fails in the following respect -

(a) Perception of unity - This point came up earlier in course of our discussion of the Nyāya view that svayyavin can be known by perception.\(^\text{13}\) We found there that strictly speaking the

\(^{13}\) Vide Supra., p. 116.
Buddhist had no explanation of our perception of unity. That we perceive a table or a pen admits of no doubt; but if they are one and all a multitude of atoms, why do we see them as 'one' thing? The Buddhist if we may take the liberty of recapitulation declare that such explanation is illusory (bhūkta) and has no objective basis. The Nyāya criticism of that view seem quite sound and reasonable, viz., every illusory experience presupposes a valid cognition of the illusory object in the past. But where and how would the Buddhist find such an authentic experience of unity?

(2) Perception of extension or gross magnitude (mahattva-buddhi): - Here also the same difficulty confronts the Buddhist. How does he come by the concept of mahattva at all? If it is not to be had in a veridical experience, how can it appear in false experience? Moreover, here as also in the above case of 'ekabuddhi', false experience or 'bhrama' is that which is cancelled by a subsequent experience is (vyāhata buddhi).\textsuperscript{19} Snake-experience is cancelled later by the experience of rope and is therefore sublated (vyāhata). Unless the rope experience occurs and until it occurs, there is no means of knowing that we are having an illusion. Similarly in the present case, our experience of unity and gross magnitude could be declared false if it were followed by an experience of unredeemed plurality of atomic reals. But we have no such experience; and until it comes, should it ever come at all, we are not

\textsuperscript{19} Amkasmimnacaka iti vyāhata buddhi na dṛṣṭyate (NB. p. 2135)
in a position to say that our experiences of the world such as they are, are false.

(3) Perception of the substrate and the content (vr̥tti jnāna) : In experience we come across many things existing in some locus as its content, e.g. the book on the table, the table on the floor, the pen in the hand etc. The Buddhist cannot account for this 'ādārā-ādheya sambandha'. For him all things are just atomic aggregates; but the aggregates are not extended or gross/magnitude. They have only atomic magnitude. There can be no connection between atoms - in fact, for this reason the Buddhist recognises no relation, neither the relation of sāmyoga nor of samavaya. There is only close proximity between them. Consequently, we cannot say that 'book-atoms' exist on the 'table-atoms' as their content, or that the table atoms support the 'book-atoms' as their locus - both of which would imply the existence of some relation between them. The Buddhist therefore cannot explain such knowledge of substrate content and has to declare it as false. But this brings all the objections we mentioned above and need not repeat here. We are therefore of opinion that by our standards Buddhism cannot be regarded as a satisfactory 'weltanschauung'.
And this brings us to consideration of the Nyaya view: how far does the Nyaya satisfy our criteria? The long rejoinder of the Nyaya must give the answer for itself. In our view the Nyaya fulfills our requirements more satisfactorily than the others. It is to expect that it is absolutely satisfactory, is not necessary to go over the whole ground covered by the rejoinder but a close study of it will show that the Nyaya does not suffer from any inter-conceptual incompatibility, at least not openly nor at the level we have dug down. The basic concepts of avayava, avayavin and samavaya have been handled with care and their implication laid bare. The antinomies are indeed the most formidable attacks on it and the Buddhists undoubtedly deserve credit for the same. The Nyaya replies are also equally commendable for their penetration and robust grip on certain fundamentals. In this connection, the following points of the Nyaya will enable to follow its logic with greater sympathy and understanding:

(a) Conditions of existence of the avayavin; (b) conditions of perception and (c) conditions of perception of its specific magnitude are not the same. When certain parts of a thing are brought into special type of connection (vilakṣaṇa samyoga), the whole comes into existence; and inheres in the parts. The conditions of its perception, however, are not merely contact of the sense-organ with it but also an auxiliary cause viz., apprehension of
(katipayavayava darsana) several parts. Similarly a further condition for perception of its specific magnitude is apprehension of a large number of parts (bhuyovayavadarsana). In all these conceptual formulations the Naiyayika stays close to experience and takes it for his guide. This must have been already clear from the foregoing pages but we should like to substantiate it by citing few specific instances. While dealing with the Buddhist criticism that a whole cannot subsist in its parts either wholly or sectionally, Uddyotakara observes that it subsists otherwise than in these two ways; and anticipating a further objection of the Buddhist as to how that is possible, he points out: "The nature of the things is the ground of our making such a statement. As the nature of the thing is, so are we to indicate it." 20 Vacaspati also on this very issue, is never tired of pointing out that such subsistence cannot be doubted; it is 'laukiko' "mabhavah", 21 i.e., a fact of experience; it "yathālokapratyaya" i.e., in conformity with knowledge of people. In fact, according to the Naiyayika the way to settle an issue is to make a direct appeal to experience and go by its verdict.

We have also cited the celebrated statement of Vacaspati vii., "samatābhūtā bhāgavatī vāstu-pāgāme naḥ saraṇaṃ." Experience is our authority and we bow to experience in the matter of recognition.

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20 yadyathabhūtam tattatam nirdisyate ityesaiva vaco yuktih / N. V., p. 214.
21 N. V. T. T., p. 332.
of padarthas. All this points to the determination not to indulge in vain sophistry and stray away from experience. Logic however sublime, would lack finality and certitude in its deliverance as to the nature of things if it strayed away from experience and spun out its theories in vacuo. It must be strongly rooted in experience, although its branches may well reach out to the skies above and to sublime things like God, soul and the like.

VIII

This is a position which is however galling to most empiricists of the West. Ayer, e.g., as the noted champion of Logical Positivism, holds that a philosophy based on experience cannot "afford us knowledge of a reality transcending the world of science and common sense".22 Says he:

"Must he (i.e., a metaphysical who believes in such reality) not begin, as other men do, with the evidence of his senses? And if so, what valid process of reasoning can possibly lead him to the conception of a transcendent reality? Surely from empirical premises nothing whatsoever concerning the properties, or even the existence, of anything super-empirical can legitimately be inferred".23 Ayer, therefore, contends that neither deductive nor inductive reasoning can help us in reaching a supersensuous reality from empirical premises.

23 Ibid.,
The Naiyayika, or for that matter any other Indian philosopher, would not acquiesce in such a conclusion. Since we are here concerned with the Nyāya, we shall answer from its point of view. First of all, division of reasonings into deductive and inductive is entirely of western origin and there is nothing like it in Indian logic, not to speak of the Nyāya. In India, reasoning as a pramana, has for its object, the establishment of fact, not unfoldment of implications or drawing of possible consequences. The fact is established inter alia on the ground of vyapti which, we may note, is not inferential but perceptual in character. Therefore, in India reasoning is all along fact-oriented. A purely formal reasoning (what else reasoning could be! the expression 'material reasoning' makes no sense) is only an intellectual gymnastic and cannot be a pramana. Hence, Ayer's conclusion, does not carry much conviction to us.

A more important point is that in the Nyāya repertoire there are two kinds of inferences which together are specifically meant to enable us to draw conclusions about supersensible realities on the basis of sense-evidence. These inferences are known as: Sesavat anumana and samānyatodrsta anumāna. By a successive use of these two inferences, claims the Naiyayika, we can know of supraempirical realities. Let us take the example of soul (in the Nyāya sense of jñāta i.e., subject of knowledge). Vatsayāyana himself proves it in this way. That there is knowledge or desire
nobody can doubt. This desire or knowledge is first proved to be an attribute or *guna* (the steps of this proof do not concern us here).  

Now, by means of *sāmānyatodrśta anumāna* (i.e., on the basis of observed uniformity) it is proved that since every attribute inheres in some substance desire or knowledge must also inhere in a substance. Thereafter the contention is made that such a substance cannot be body, or senses or mind etc., and therefore in accordance with *sēsavat anumāna* this substance must be something different from them and is called soul. Thus by a dual application of these two kinds of inferences soul is proved - in fact any supersensuous entity can be proved, provided, of course, the conditions of such application are fulfilled. Such being the facts of the case we find it difficult to accept Ayer's contention mentioned above and conclude that thought can well grapple the transcendent realities even when it is firmly rooted in 'lakšikapratyaya'.

24 Icchadayo guhah, gunasca dravyasamsthanaḥ, tadyadesam sthanam sa atmeti / N.B., 1.1.5. Vatsyayana here says that 'atman' can be proved only by *sāmānyatodrśta anumāna*. This is, however, not accepted by Uddyotakara and Vacaspati both of whom agree that *sāmānyatodrśta* and *sēsavat anumanas* have to be applied as mentioned by us. Cf: Uddyotakara's and Vacaspati's Commentary on 1.1.5.

It must also be noted that any of the nine specific qualities (of soul can be used as probans for proving soul. Cf: N. S. 1.1.10.