CHAPTER SIX

NYÅYA DISCUSSION ON WEIGHT OF THE WHOLE

The argument that a thing does not weigh differently from its parts (taken together) and therefore is identical with them is one that appears not merely in the Sankhya but also in the Buddhist philosophy. That this is a very weighty argument is proved by the fact that Uddyotakara devotes special attention to it. He discusses various possible theories on the point and concludes after a lengthy discussion that they should all be rejected in favour of the Nyåya view.

In view of the importance of the objection and the further fact that no work on Indian Philosophy contains even a tolerably fair account of the controversy, we propose here to discuss it in full mainly after Uddyotakara.

The argument is that if the whole were different from parts it should have a separate weight as distinct from that of the parts. When a cloth is produced, we have not merely the constituent yarns but also an additional thing, viz., the cloth.

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1 Vide Supra, pp. 32 and 71.
Consequently, when we weigh the cloth, we are, on this view, weighing really two things - the parts and the emergent whole, the yarns and the cloth. There should therefore an increase of weight - in fact the weight should get doubled; otherwise it will have to be assumed that as soon as a new effect is produced, the cause has lost its weight. Alternatively it may be held that the same weight is shared by the two entities. The purvapaksin points out that since none of these alternatives is a fact, the whole cannot be proved to have any separate weight of its own. Therefore it cannot be regarded as a new entity, it is just parts in a new form or a new arrangement.

Uddyotakara discusses this point in great detail. He discusses, in the main, three views:

A. The whole has no weight for the simple reason that it is no new substance. There are only parts and the weight of the whole is nothing but the weight of the parts.

B. The whole is a new thing but its weight cannot be distinguished from that of the parts because the weight of the parts is obstructed or absorbed (pratibaddha) by the weight of the whole.

C. The whole is a new substance, but its weight cannot be ascertained because the weight of the parts is destroyed by the weight of the whole.
The first view is held in common by the Sāṅkhya, the Buddhist and the Māmāsaka, the last two by some sections of the Naiyāyikas.

A.1. Uddyotakara takes up the first view for discussion. How would the ādvaita, he asks, the pūrvapakṣin formulate it? The pūrvapakṣin may do it as follows:

"The composite is not different from the components, because we do not find the effect of a different weight in its case." Weight of a thing according to the different systems of Indian Philosophy, it may be noted, is not directly known - it is not a matter of perception but of inference - it is inferred from turning of the scales. The scale sinks under heavier weight; the lowering of the scale is thus the effect of weight, and from it we can infer whether a thing weighs heavier than another. Now when a thing is put in the balance, the scale is not found to dip lower than in the case of the parts taken together. A textile made of a ton of fabrics does not weigh more than a ton and the fabrics, when put in the scales, do not register a smaller weight.

Now, Uddyotakara points out that the 'hetu' in the above formulation has nothing to do with the 'pakṣa'. The hetu is 'gurutvāntarakāryāgrahaṇa', i.e., 'non-apprehension of the effect

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2 Nanyo vayavyavayavebhyo gurutvantara karya grahanat / N.V., p. 233.
of different weight' and the paks'a is 'the avayavin' or the composite. From such non-apprehension all we can infer is the absence of effect of a different weight, but neither weight nor different weight nor the composite. From denial of water e.g., it is not right to conclude that there is no water-pot or even any pot-sherd (nodakapratisedhât kamandaloh kapâlanâm vâ pratis edho yuktaḥ). Hence the fallacy here is that of 'svarûpâsi-dhâti', i.e., non-existence of the probans in the paks'a.

A.2. In view of this criticism some people construe the above argument in this way. What is really meant they assert is repudiation of production of a new quality in the effect, such as is advocated by the Naiyâyika. Denial of a different weight of the effect is taken here only by way of illustration. The point is that the qualities of the cause do not produce like qualities in the effect - the colour of the product, e.g., is not brought about by the colour of the cause; in that case, weight of the cause might also be regarded as producing a different weight in the effect. But we should then be able to perceive the effect of such different weights viz., lowering of the scale and in actual practice the weight of the product should be different

3 Gurutvantara karyagrahanat gurutvantara karyam na syat na gurutvam na gurutvantaram navayavi / Ibid., p. 234.
4 Ibid.,
5 Eka tu gurutvantara karya grâhanadityanana gunantararambham pratisedhânti udaharanamatraarthatvat gurutvantararambha pratisedhasya / Ibid., p. 234.
from that of the cause. As a matter of fact, however, it is never found to be so; hence it follows that just as no separate weight accrues to the product, so no new attribute emerges in it. In other words, the Nyaya doctrine of origination of attributes in the effect is to be given a decent burial and it should be concluded that the quality of the cause appears as the quality of the effect, the two are not different.⁶

In this matter, Uddyotakara concedes, the fallacy of 'svarupasiddhi' or 'non-existent probans' may be obviated, for production of a new attribute (guṇāntaraṁbha) undoubtedly takes place in respect of the composite (according to the Nyaya). So, the probans is in the pakṣa. But, says Uddyotakara, this reasoning has no force as it goes against a well-established fact of perception.⁷ The opponent admits the product and yet, if he does not admit because of the above reasoning that the product has any quality of its own like colour etc. he should then hold that the product is entirely devoid of qualities. But this is surely absurd! We do not find any product in experience that has no quality whatsoever. Hence the above reasoning falls to the ground. In order to avoid this difficulty the purvapaksin may argue that the product itself does not exist;⁸ in that event,

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⁶ Tanturupameva suklaṁ tantuṁ pataḥbhāvatapamāṇesu patarupataya pratiyate na tu rupantaram / Sastra Dipika (N.S.P.), p.107
⁸ As a matter of fact, as we have seen, the Śāṅkhya, as also the Mīmāṁsaka repudiate distinct existence of the product, in the avayavīn.
says Uddyotakara, the assertion that the product possesses no qualities (like colour etc.) produced by like qualities of the cause becomes meaningless; for if there is no product, what is the sense of making an assertion about it? "It is as meaningless", to quote Uddyotakara, "as it is to say that the water-pot is without water when the water-pot is non-existent."

A.3. The opponent in a bid to circumvent these difficulties may stop talking about origination of qualities in the product and restrict himself only to the point at issue viz., different weight of the whole. He may point out that if the whole were a distinct emergent entity, it would necessarily have a different weight; and it should certainly be possible in experience to find that out. And yet, curiously but no less certainly we never find it to be so. When two separate pieces of clay for instance are placed in the balance, the effect produced by their weight viz., the lowering of the scales, is exactly the same as that produced by the weight of the two pieces lumped up together. This shows that the composite object enjoys no different weight and therefore no independent status. This, the opponent may observe, is exactly what he has been trying to say since he formulated this argument; and all talk of new qualities being born to the effect is really introduced by the Naiyayika who wants to cloud the issue.

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... na hi kamandaloravhave anudakah kamandaluriti yuktam vaktum / N. V., p. 234.
The Naiyāyika hits out that, however well-intentioned, the argument as stated by the opponent was defective, and being defective, failed to prove his case. Even now he must prove and not merely assume his point. And how does he prove it? What is the hetu here? Formerly, it was 'non-apprehension of the effect of a different weight (gurutvāntarakāryāgrahana) and that sparked off all sorts of troubles. Now, what probans would be used by the opponent? There are some persons who now frame the pūrvapakṣa argument thus: The composite object is non-different from the components because the balance indicates (lit. possesses) no effects of a different weight; and as a ground for saying that the balance indicates no effects of a different weight, they urge the fact that there is absence of a different lowering of the scales. But this probans again is one that really subsists, though it does not look like doing so, elsewhere than in the subject; for the absence of a different lowering of the scales is not a property of the balance (so 'yam vyadhikarapah avanamanavisēbāvāsyātūḍadharmatvat) - the absence, being a negation, cannot be a property subsisting in the balance. According to the pūrvapākṣin negation being nothing else than the substratum, the said negation would be nothing apart from the balance itself, so that the reasoning would be tantamount to this: the

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10 kecittu . . . avanamanavisēbhabhagaditi hetum vrievate / N.V., p.235. Here 'non-apprehension' (agrahana) is deleted, thereby eliminating the difficulties arising therefrom.

110 yad vapiyamavaranam vissesabhavastulavvyadhikaranatna, tathapi na sabditutasamvandhita sya pratiyate /N.V.T.T.,p.393.

11A N.V., p. 235
balance does not indicate the effect of a different weight because it is the balance.

A. 4. The argument may however be restated in a more acceptable form: The balance does not indicate the effect of a different weight, because it is not the substrate of a different lowering. But here, too, the probans would be open to the charge of being 'unknown', as the character of not being the receptacle of different lowering does not in fact subsist in the balance.

The opponent retorts that this is not true. The balance is not found in reality to possess a different lowering (i.e., the scale with the product on it is not found to register a heavier weight). The Naiyāyika, then, points out that even so, the probans is not a genuine one, being inconclusive (ayamapyanai kāntinkatvādahetuḥ), i.e., it is not invariably concomitant with the probandum, because as a matter of fact we find that in some cases there is no heavier weight even though there is contact of things of varying weights, e.g., an atom. An atom being the immediate samavāyikārana of the dyad is the receptacle of the dyad. Similarly, a dyad is the immediate substrate of the triad;

12 This is what a section of the siddhantins would like to do. Cf: . . . ekadesino dusanam / N.V.T.T., p. 393.
13 N. V., p. 235.
14 gurutvantaravad dravyasannipate satyavanamana viseṣa anadhāratvasya drstatvat / Ibid., p. 235 (Literally it would mean — even though things of different weights fall, the character of not being the receptacle of a different lowering is present).
and the atom through its being substrate thereof is, by reason of the causal chain, the ultimate repository or substratum of the triad, of the quartet (caturaṣṭu) and thus of all the bigger wholes. Though each of these wholes is endowed with a weight different from that of each component atom, which is their ultimate resting-place (āśraya), yet this does not bring about any difference of weight in the atom. It continues to possess the same simple, primitive weight. Thus, in the case of the atom, though there is contact in it of things of different weights, there is no different lowering (i.e., different weight). Here, therefore, is an exception (vyabhicāra) to the invariable concomitance sought to be established by the opponent. The Nyāya thus repudiates the opponent's contention that combination of things of diverse weights means heavier weight or greater lowering of the scale.

A. 5. The pūrvapakṣin, however, stands his ground and refuses to budge. He asks, can we not find out whether a thing is equal in weight to another, or more or less weighty? Can we not do the same with regard to the avayava and the avayavin also? If we can, how do we do so? By what means? Certainly by means of the scales! After all weight is always measured by the scales. If an avayava viz., a dyad or triad registers a certain weight, two such dyads or triads would obviously be double that weight. If the weight of the product is greater than
that of the component cause, we should be able to find an increase of weight; similarly, if the product be lighter, a difference would surely be perceptible. In any case the scales would indicate whether the product has equal weight as the cause or a different weight (greater or less). Since, however, they do not tell us anything of the sort, it can be safely concluded that the product has no weight of its own (apart from that of the components).

The Naiyāyika does not accept the conclusion. Limits of the weights of the product and of the component cause he asserts cannot be discerned. If it were possible to determine by means of the weighing instrument how much was the weight of the whole, and how much of the component parts, then alone could it be said, as does the opponent, that the whole was equal to, weightier, or less weighty than, the parts. Failing such nice and delicate discrimination, however, the opponent is not within his rights to draw his conclusion.

A. 6. The opponent however resolutely maintains his position. If there were no discernment of the weight of the product from that of the components, says he, we could not have such conceptions as 'this weighs two palas', 'this weighs five

15 karya karana gurutveyattanavadharanat . . . tattva navadharitiamiyatkarane gurutvam iyatkarye gurutvamiti / N. V., p. 235.
palas,\textsuperscript{16} when we put a thing in the balance. The underlying point here seems to be that such distinctions indicate difference of weights of parts and therefore of respective wholes.

The Naiyāyika of course whacks it to bits and observes that the other side is all in a mess. The above differences are differences of weight of one group of components from that of another, not from that of its own avayavin. Weight of 5 or 2 palas represents weight of the entire aggregate from the ultimate atoms up to the final product (a jar or a cloth).\textsuperscript{17} Such being the case, it is clear that neither man nor any instrument devised by him can decipher the correct weight of the parts or of the whole.

A. 7. The pūrvapaksin, in defence seeks to turn the tables on the Naiyāyika and argues that if the latter is correct, there can be no proof whatsoever of the weight of the product; and hence the Nyāya position is self-stultifying. If the addition of things of different weights does not produce any appreciable effect in the form of a different lowering of the scales, how can it be known that the product (i.e., the whole) has any weight at all?

\textsuperscript{16} Pala is a particular measure of weight adopted in ancient India.

\textsuperscript{17} Natra karyakarana gurutve avodharyate, kim tva caramada ca paramanosca dravyasamahara unmiyate / N.V. p. 236.
The Naiyāyika replies that the weight of the avayavin can certainly be known, though of course not by means of the scales; it can be known only from the act of falling. The effect of weight is not as the pūrvapakṣin wrongly thinks, lowering of the scales (tulāvanamanam) but falling of the body (patanam). There can be no other cause than its weight. The fact that a thing falls is proof that it has weight, weight is thus inferred as the cause of falling. These arguments also serve to demolish the earlier argument of the opponent viz., the product has no weight of its own, because we cannot perceive a different lowering of the scale. Neither the lowering nor our apprehension of it has anything to do with the weight of a body.

A. 8. The pūrvapakṣin may rejoin that it is not correct. A thing falls not by its own weight but by the weight of its components. Falling of a thing thus has causes other than the Naiyāyika thinks. Hence it does not prove that a product has a weight of all its own. The Naiyāyika of course rejects it. Where the weight of a thing causes another to drop, their conjunction is found to be a necessary factor e.g., conjunction of the scales and a weighty substance is the cause of lowering of the scales. But there is no conjunction between

18 Na hi karyagurutvamantarena karyapate anyoheturasti, tasmat gurutvantaravat karyamiti / Ibid., p. 235.
19 It would be inference of sesavat variety Cf: N. S. 1.1.5.
the avayava and the avayavin, they are what is technically known in the Nyāya as 'ayutasiddha', i.e., inseparable (na tu kāryakāraṇayoḥ samyogo 'yutasiddhatvāt'). Separability consists in absence of relation but the whole is never without its component causes, the parts. In fact, the product emerges only as, and never without being, related to the cause, there is no time-gap between its being born and being related.

In that event, observes the pUrvapaksin, what makes the product fall is the weight of the component causes aided by the relation of inherence. Mere weight of the constituents may not lead to fall of the body; the tie of samavāya is a must. Hence, samavāya must be declared to be a cause of the fall of the product. Whether it is samyoga or samavāya that is to be credited with causal attribute is to be decided by experience; experience alone is the supreme arbiter and the judge in the matter, not a pre-conceived theory. Anyway, experience does not point to any distinct weight of a thing as the cause of its fall.

The Naiyāyika rejects this contention on two grounds: firstly it offends against the basic meta-physical scheme of

\[\text{Samavayo gurutvapaksah karyam pataisyati} / \text{N. V., p. 236.}\]
the Nyāya Vaisēṣika system, and secondly, it involves an incongruity and infinite regress. Firstly, inherence is nowhere described in the system as the cause of action (falling is a variety of action) (na samavārah kriyāhetuṃ kva cidapi samkīrtitah). Kanāda has expressly spoken of conjunction as a possible originator of action e.g., 'Action' in earth is due to propulsion impact and conjunction of the conjoined. Secondly, if inherence were the cause of action, then colour etc. of the components should also fall, since these also inhere in them in the same manner as the product does. But certainly this is not possible. Colour etc. is a quality and cannot be substrate of action, action being exclusively dravyāśrita. If the opponent goes to the length of accepting even this position, the Naiyāyika points out that in that event the opponent has to hold that even weight itself can fall and does fall. Just as the colour etc. of the cause falls in the wake of the product, so must its weight, since it inheres in the cause exactly in the same way as colour does. And if the weight falls, the opponent has to explain what it is due to. He cannot say, as he does in the case of the composite whole, that the fall is due to its

22 N. V., p. 237.
23 Nidanabhīgataśamyuktasamyogacca prthivyam karmeti / V.S. 5.2...
24 Ekadārayam ... karmalaksanam / V.S. 1.1.17.
weight, for obviously there can be no weight of weight. All this shows, says the Naiyāyika, that weight or for that matter colour or a quality cannot be said to have any act of falling.

A. 9. Vacaspati elucidates the point as follows. The purpavaksin may think that the case in instance is analogous to that of candle-light. Candle-light (or lamp) in revealing others, also reveals itself and is thus self-revealing unlike other material objects like jar or cloth; it does not depend on any other lamp for its prakāśa, otherwise it would not be distinguishable from darkness (svamahimanīśiddhādatamonaṃsaṅgāt). Similar is the position of weight. While all objects depend on weight for their act of falling weight causes falling independent of everything else in the world - independent of its own weight (should it be possible) and of weight of every other thing.

The Naiyāyika disputes the analogical validity of this argument. He points out that self-revelation requires no other operative cause, irrespective of whether it is of a jar or of a lamp. The self-revealed must be svātmakaranaṇaka - must be

26 Na tu gurutvasya gurutvantaram pataheturasti / Ibid.
27 N.V.T.T., p. 393.
28 Gurutvam tu svasya canyesam ca gurutvantaranapeksam patanahetutiti vaktavyam / Ibid.,
29 Na hi pradipena svatmanī prakasayitavanye kim cidanyat kriyate; yadṛṣu ghatadayah svapraṇasuptade tadrṣah pradipo aπi / Ibid. It may be mentioned here that the Nyaya believes in no self-revelation as a matter of fact. All is nramanāsiddha and nothing svayamāsiddha. ☞
its own efficient or instrumental cause (in the language of the Nyāya) — in fact strictly speaking, in such a case there should be no karana at all, for the svayamprakāsa is svatahsiddha and not a prameya. But the lamp, like all other objects, needs the assistance of the visual organ. It is the eye that lights up all objects including the lamp. The lamp, therefore, is not the instrument, though it is the object, of its revelation.30 Similarly, if the weight were the cause of its own fall, it would have to be both the karana and karma of the act.31 But that is clearly absurd, kāraṇatva and karmatva being incompatible. It must however be borne in mind, as Vāsaspati hastens to add, that karṇatva and karmatva are not inconsistent, they can co-exist in the same locus, e.g., self, if the self is regarded as self-cogniser (as the Advaitin does), it would be both subject and object.32 In fact, even according to the Nyāya, in self-consciousness we are both the knower and the known. But experience provides us with no instance of instrumentality and object-hood being co-present in the same locus. Hence weight or for that matter a quality cannot be credited with dynamic character.

A. 10. The purvapakṣin remains unconvinced and shoots back a pertinent objection. If colour etc. do not fall when relevant

30 Tasmanna pradipasya svatmani karmakaranabhavah / Ibid., p. 394.
31 Svagatasya tu patanakarmanah karanatvē tadeva karma karanam ceti svatmani vṛtti-virodhah / Ibid., p. 394.
32 Atmanastu svatmani prakasayitavye kartrtvameva na karmatvamityupapaditam iti / Ibid., p. 394.
substance has fallen, they would stay back in the original position and would subsist without any locus (ādṛavyāḥ rūpādayāḥ).
While the substance would be devoid of qualities (dravyāṁ ca rūpā dihīnāmupalabhyeta); if on the other hand they do fall, they would be seats of action (kriyāvanto rūpādayāḥ prāṇuvanti). In any event the Naiyāyika is in an unenviable position and cannot try to get out of the dilemma by saying that the qualities like colour etc. neither fall nor stay back when the substance falls. It would be plainly self-contradictory and opposed to all canons of reason.

The Naiyāyika rejoins by challenging the validity of the objection. He argues that the question whether a quality moves when its substrate does or whether it remains static is inadmissible for it presupposes three things all of which are untenable: (a) postulation of weight in weight itself (b) postulation of substance without colour etc. in course of its existence, (c) postulation of existence of qualities (colour etc.) separated from their locus.

Moreover, the expressions 'the thing falls' or 'it moves' mean that it leaves behind what it was in contact with and comes

33 N.V., p. 237.
34 Atha na tisthanti na patanti ? so yam yuktivirodhovasyam bhavatabhyupagantavyah patati patanti tisthanti veti / Ibid.
35 Aynktam tarhidam patati patanti tisthati tisthatiti va taccoktam / Ibid.
36 The Nyaya Vaisesika recognises the possibility of substance without quality at the first moment of its existence, not later. Cf: Adye ksane nirgunam dravyam tisthati.
into contact with what it was not earlier in contact with. 37
They cannot obviously be used with reference to qualities which
cannot perform these functions. The opponent differs and con-
tends that qualities are certainly capable of such functions.
When two substances come into contact, their patches of colour
also do the same. How, then, can the Naiyāyika deny to qualities
the capacity to come into contact with or lose contact of one
another?

The concept of contact in the case of colours, says the
Naiyāyika is not because of actual contact between them but be-
cause of our non-perception of disjunction. 38 When a person sees
two substances in contact with each other, he fails to perceive
the non-contact or disjunction between their colours. To this
opponent puts in a query - "why the same thing cannot be said about
contact of substances?" Why, in other words, can it not be said
that the notion of contact of substances is due not to their con-
junction but to our non-perception of their disjunction? The
Nyāya’s answer is that the same notion may be used for two differ-
et things in two different contexts. Such difference of deter-
use is determined by various reasons (naiṣa doṣāḥ pratyayadvaita
syanekeṇaṁ nimittaṁ; na khalu pratyayadvaiṣameka nimittam drṣṭam). 39

37 . . . calpraptam jahati apraptam capnoti / Ibid.,
38 kimayam prapti pratyayah praptinimitta aho aprapteradarsana
nimitta iti sandihyate. Vayantu brāhmaṇ aprapteradarsananimitta
iti / Ibid.
39 N. V., p. 238.
So, the notion of contact may in one case be due to actual contact and in another case to non-perception of disjunction. Hence it is concluded that weight does not fall nor for that matter, any quality does. After considering all the pros and cons of the matter the Naiyāyika finally holds that the weight of a thing is its own and not derived from that of the parts; therefore, the whole is a single entity; it is a unity, not a complex.

B. Uddyotakara now disposes of the view that the weight of the parts is obstructed (pratibaddha) or rendered ineffective by the weight of the whole. So long as the whole exists, the parts have practically no effect; there is thus no increase of weight, no lowering of the scales; hence, weight of the whole vis-a-vis parts is not ascertained.

This view is untenable. If on the fall of the whole the parts remained stationary, we could accept the conclusion. But, in fact, both the parts and the whole fall together. Such fall of the parts would be impossible if its weight were nullified by the whole.

C. The third view supposes that the weight of the parts is not obstructed but completely destroyed by that of the whole.

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40 Apare tu karyagurutvena karana gurutvam pratibaddham brubate ato avanatviseso na bhavati ? Etattu na yuktamiti pasyamah/ Ibid., p. 238.
41 karye patati na karanam patediti karyamanadharam syat /N.V.p.238.
Uddyotakara dismisses this view on the same grounds. On this view on the destruction of the whole the isolated parts would be incapable of falling, because they would no longer possess any weight.

Uddyotakara accordingly concludes that these theories must be rejected and the theory of human limitation must be accepted as the only explanation of our failure to distinguish between the weights of a whole and its parts.

II

Sridharacarya in the Nyaya Kandali also discusses the problem of weight of the whole and accepts the Vaiseshika maxim emunctiated by Kanada and followed by Prasastapada viz., weight is the cause of fall of a body.

He states his view as follows:—

That the whole has weight is proved by the fact that it falls and that it falls is an undoubted fact of experience. It cannot be said that the fall is due to weight of its parts, for on

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42 Etena karyagurutvena karana gurutvavinasopi vyakhyatah / Ibid.,
43 V.S. 5.2.1.; also gurutvam jalabhumyoh patana karmakaranam; P.P. Bh. (gunanirupahe gurutva prakaranam) (N.K.P.P. 640-41) V.S.V.
the same reasoning falling of those parts should be ascribed to their own components and so on till we come to atoms. Finally the atoms alone should be credited with weight, and no composite object—big or small. The opponent however dissents and argues that falling of parts cannot be assigned to weight of their parts, for in that event falling and weight would be in different loci—there would be no co-existence of the two in the same locus. But it would be an absurd position. Hence, the act of falling cannot be referred eventually to atoms. If that is so, says, Srīdhara, why should not the whole, by the same token, be credited with its own weight? Since it is the whole that falls, it must be the whole that should be allocated a measure of weight; for, Srīdhara argues, the act of falling (patanakarma) and weight (gurutva) cannot be vyadhikarana but must be samānādhikarana—cannot belong to different substrata but must have the same substratum. In fact, weight is the non-material cause of falling and subsists, along with it, in the composite body that falls (yadekarthasamavetasaṃavāyikāraṇam tadeva hi gurutvam). Srīdhara however admits that we do not as a matter

45 Atha vyadhikaranevyah svavayava gurutvebhyah avayavanam patanasambhavat tesu gurutvam kalpyate/ Ibid.,
It is difficult to ascertain whose view being the purvapaksa represents here. It cannot definitely be Sankhya or Bauddha, for they categorically affirm that it is the atoms whose weight accounts for the weight of the whole.
46 Tada avayavinyapi kalpaniyam nyayasya samanatvat/ Ibid.,
47 N. K., Ibid.,
of fact see that the whole is heavier of weight than its parts taken together, but according to him that is due to the fact that the difference of weights is infinitesimal\footnote{\textit{Yat punah avayavigurutvasya karyatirekah na grhyate tadavayavavayavi gurutva bhedasyalpantaratvat. \cite{Ibid.}}} E.g., when a large body is placed in the scales, we do not perceive any effect of weight of a smaller object that may be lying on the larger body.

Sridhara therefore holds like Uddyotakara that the avayavadin cannot be denied a specific weight of its own, though we may not always be able to discern it. Such being the case, the Ny\={a}ya is of the view that the whole cannot be identified with parts and must be accorded a distinct status and reality.