Having disposed of the Sāṅkhya criticisms the Naiyāyika now proceeds to consider the Buddhist critique. He takes up all the Buddhist criticisms and refutes them. We shall here give their refutation in the order in which the criticisms have been listed in the third chapter.

I

Refutation of the Buddhist view that avayavin cannot be known by inference:

We have already explained the Buddhist view in the third chapter. The Buddhist position in a nutshell is: Avayavin cannot be proved by inference, for it can be neither pākṣa nor sādhyā of such inference. This is because only recognised entities (prasiddha vastu) enjoy this privilege and avayavin is obviously not one of them.

The Naiyāyika rejects this contention of the Buddhist. He points out that if the sādhyā or the probandum were to be an admitted entity recognised by both the disputants, then what was the necessity of proving it at all? It already stands established and any attempt to prove it would involve the fallacy of siddhasādhana. What is needed is that it should be recognised by one of the parties. In fact, the Buddhist plea is self-contradictory.
For when does the Buddhist recognise an entity? Before proving it or after? Obviously it cannot be the former, for certainly the Buddhist does not recognise unproved padarthas. But the latter course is also not open to him, since he cannot prove an unrecognised padartha.

As regards the point that avayavin cannot be subject of inference (i.e., pakṣa), the Naiyāyika's stand is the same. An alika padārtha, an entity recognised by none (at least by neither party), cannot certainly be the pakṣa, for then there would be the fallacy of āsrayāsiddhi e.g., sky-lotus is fragrant. Here the pakṣa is something universally regarded as non-existent. But an entity admitted by one of the combatants can well serve the purpose of 'pakṣa'. Indeed this is an established practice amongst philosophers and even a cursory glance at the arguments advanced by them against their opponents will bear this out. The Sankhya arguments to prove identity of avayava and avayavi (the latter being not recognised by him) are an instance to the point.

Therefore, the Naiyayika contends that the Buddhist plea of non-inferability of avayavin is untenable and that avayavin can be inferred, where and if necessary. This must not be taken to mean that avayavin cannot be perceived. That would be wrong, for, we shall presently see, according to the Naiyayika the avayavin cannot be perceived. That would be wrong, for, we shall presently see, according to the Naiyayika the avaya-

1 Tarka Samgraha (Chow.); p. 60.
vin is capable of being perceived, given the conditions of perception. What the Naiyāyika really means is that avayāvin can be known both by perception and by inference. Effectiveness of one pramāna does not signify ineffectiveness of another. This is because the Naiyāyika believes in both pramāna sampūrṇa and pramāna vyāvasthā, and not, like the Buddhist, in pramāna vyāvāsthā only.2

II

Refutation of the Buddhist view that the avayāvin cannot be known by perception.

The Buddhists point is that, given condition of perception, dispute as to the perception of a thing is proof of the thing's non-existence. If in broad daylight I deny in all honesty that I am perceiving an avayāvāini, it means that the avayāvāini cannot be held to exist. The Naiyāyika argues that by the same token the Buddhist view that what we really perceive is a cluster of atoms and not an avayāvāini can also be challenged. Since the Naiyāyika disputes it. If the Buddhist's doubt as to perceptibility of the avayāvāini is proof of the latter's non-existence, then the Naiyāyika's denial of the perceptual character of paramāṇu sañcaya should also be crushing in effect.

2 kim punah pramanam pramayamabhisamplavante tha prati prasneyam vyavahathanta iti, ubhayathadarsanam / N. B., p. 1.1.3.
The Naiyāyika brings on another objection. That we have knowledge of the form 'This is a table', 'this is a chair' etc. cannot be doubted. It is attested by introspective deliverance as also by linguistic usage. When there is a table before us we know by anuvyavasāya that 'we are seeing a table', 'we are seeing a chair' etc. That we are seeing one thing, a single object, is the clear verdict of 'introspection and nobody contradicts it, since it belongs to the common stock of knowledge. Language also bears this out. Use of singular number of the table, chair etc. and of indefinite articles 'a', 'an', before the corresponding nouns shows beyond doubt that the content of perception in such cases is a single object (ekabuddhi). It is one, not many. The Naiyāyika asks how the Buddhist would account for this perceived unity. For the Naiyāyika the reason is obvious. This unity indicates that the object is a unitary entity, i.e., an avayavān.

The Buddhist differs and holds that this sense of unity (ekabuddhi) is really nānārtha-visayaka, not abhinārtha visayaka, it relates to many and not to a single substance. The object in all such cases is a group of atoms and not any avayavārdaya. Therefore the knowledge of unity in respect of this plurality is false.

3 ekamidam dravyam ityekabuddhervisayam paryanuyojyah kimekabuddhirabhinnartha visaya ? aho nanartha visayeti / N. B., 2.1.35.
4 Evamamisu sancitesva grhyamanaprthaktvesvekamyadityu papadyate buddhiriti / N. B., 2.1.35.
It is illusory or bhākta pratyakṣa. We are mistaking a number of avayavas closely situated for an avayavi. The Buddhist further observes that this is nothing unusual and is not the only instance of its kind. We have many other such instances where many is mistakenly treated as one. A forest e.g., is but a collection of trees, each existing separately from others and not very far from them. Yet, when referring to those trees together, we say 'one forest' or 'there is a forest'. An army (senā) is nothing but an aggregate of four senāgas - elephant, horse, chariot and foot all distinct and separate. Though they are many, we refer to them all by the omnibus expression, 'an army' or 'there goes an army'. In both these cases sense of unity is non-veridical and the use of singular number in language is misleading. Similarly, a pot or a cloth is in reality an aggregate, a cluster of components and not a whole; and our perception of it as a thing is ayatharthā.

The Naiyāyika sets his face against this tissue of arguments of the Buddhist and levels a number of objections. Firstly, he asks, 'how is it possible for a group of atoms to be perceived when the atoms are each of them imperceptible? Certainly a group of imperceptibles cannot itself be perceptible. That being so, we cannot even perceive an object, far less falsely perceive it.⁶⁶

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⁵ eka vibhramat / T.S., Ka., 588;
yathā dipadā . . . satyāpi bhedaḥ lokatva bhavati tatha nairantarāryananaṃ śaśamataḥ padartha saṃvedanata yamakatva vibhrama/
T. S. P., Ibid.,
⁶ Ibid., p. 173.
⁶⁶ This question together with the Buddhist answer is dealt with in Chapter VII.
Secondly, he points out that the illustrations of army and forest are far from happy, in fact they are incorrect. A forest or an army is not at all an aggregate or avayava samāha, each of them is an avayavin, at least on the Nyāya reckoning. Therefore the use of singular number in these cases is perfectly in order and our perception of unity is fully justified by the objective facts. Thirdly, even if the army or the forest were regarded as aggregates, that would not help the Buddhist, for on their analogy he would not be able to explain how a number of atoms can be falsely perceived as one. The components of these things, viz., senāṅgas (i.e., elephant, horse, etc.) and vanāṅgas (i.e., trees, etc.) are by nature perceptible. Under appropriate conditions they can be perceived and distinguished from one another (grhyamāṇa prthakṭvamāt). It is only certain frustrating factors like distance, dim light etc. which make it impossible for us to discern their separateness.7

Now, false perception or bhakta pratyaya is possible when something is presented to the senses and apprehended in its general character, the specific features being unnoticed. The character perceived bears a strong resemblance (bhakti)8 to a feature of the illusory content. In case of forest the trees are apprehended not in their specific character of 'manyness' (nanatva) or separateness (prthaktva) but as a single non-distinguished something which has the 'look' of

7 Senāṅgeseu vanāṅgeseu ca duradagrhyamanaḥ prthaktvam eti ekam idam ity upāpyate buddhiḥ / N. B., 2.1.36.
8 Bhaktinamatathabhūtasya tatha bhavivih samanayam ubhayena bhajyate iti bhaktiḥ / N. V., pp. 243-4.
a forest. Hence we falsely perceive the trees as a forest. In case of a jar or any other single entity, the atoms which appear together as a jar must first of all be presented to the senses with their separateness obscured. But the atoms being supersensible, cannot be apprehended; and if the dharmin is not apprehended there can be no question of failure to take note of their distinctive character. Therefore, atoms cannot be held to account for our false perception of unity.

Fourthly, every illusion presupposes a veridical experience of the illusory object. A man having rope-snake illusion must have had earlier experience of snake in a valid cognition, otherwise he cannot even know that there is such a thing as snake in the world, far less have an illusion of it. Similarly, mithya eka-buddhi presupposes yathartha eka-buddhi - false perception of unity presupposes a genuine perception of it in the past. But no such perception is possible on the Buddhist theory of the cosmos. There is no unity anywhere, either in the physical or in the psychological realm. All things are only agglomerations or samghata, hence there can be no veridical experience of unity. In that case, asks the Naiyāyika, how can there be false perception of many atoms as a unity? This is also borne out by the fact that if the Buddhist still tries to prove the possibility of such false percep-

10 Mithya-pratyaya apycte na bhavanti pradhanabhavat / N.V., p. 244.
tion, he will find no instance (drṣṭānta) in his support. The illustrations of army and forest, as we have just now seen, will not do. The Buddhist cannot cite any instance where a real unity of many atoms has been actually perceived. Hence, one of the five essential elements (pañca-vāyava) of demonstrative argument (parārthānūmāna) is lacking viz., udāharana or illustration. Therefore, the Buddhist view of illusion of many atoms as one is untenable.

The Buddhist in reply repudiates the allegation that there are no instances in support of his thesis (i.e., no sapaksa). While admitting that such sapaksas are not forthcoming in the field of visual perception, he emphasises that they are to be had in plenty in other fields viz., those of auditory, tactile, olfactory and gustatory perception (indriyāntara visayebhartazaar pratyayah).\(^{11}\) The Buddhist makes no difference between substance and quality; hence the contents of these perceptions, as those of visual, are so many bunches of paramānu. A sound e.g., is composed of sound paramānu, even so is touch, taste etc. Now, when we hear a sound, or have a taste or a touch, they are each a single content either one sound, one taste or one touch, as distinguished from numerous other sounds or tastes or touches we are sensing at other times. These are all

\(^{11}\) N. V., Ibid.,
numerically different and we can perceive their differences. Therefore in these cases, our perception of numerical unity as the basis of numerical differences is genuine, not fake. Here, therefore, we get the required basis of illusory experience (pradhāna) - a veridical perception of unity. On this basis, says the Buddhist, we can easily prove that our perception of many atoms as one is false.

The Naiyāyika is quick to pick a hole in this argument. Why does the Buddhist regard our perception of one sound, one taste etc. as veridical? Is there any distinction between experience of a sound and that of a jar, in so far as they are experiences of a unity? In both cases we perceive a unity; yet the Buddhist invests one with authenticity and denies the same to the other. It is surely arbitrary! Therefore, perceptions of unity in these fields cannot be cited as instances because of lack of any special, distinguishing feature in them (visēṣahetva/bhāvād drṣṭānta avayavasthā). Hence, the Buddhist view cannot eventually be sustained and our experience of unity must be reckoned as valid.

III

Refutation of the Buddhist criticism of relation between parts and whole:

12 Ibid.
The Buddhist view has been given at length in the third chapter and we cannot obviously go over the whole ground here again. The pith of the Buddhist contention is: (i) One cannot subsist in many, and (ii) The whole cannot subsist in its parts either wholly or in part. Therefore the whole is a myth.

(i) This contention appears again in the antinomies referred to by the Buddhists. The Nyaya answer is clear and simple. His point is, as we shall have occasion to indicate when dealing with the antinomies, that experience is our guide in such a case. Experience determines the truth and content of propositions and it is to experience that we have to turn to see whether one resides in many or not. Experience shows that in some cases one resides in one as in the case of a man lying on the couch and that in some others it resides in many e.g., the whole is in the parts. This is not however a solitary case where we find the relation of container and contained (āśraya āśrayi) between many and one. There are other instances to which Uddyotakara has drawn our attention, i.e., number, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, universal. How can the Buddhist deny, in the face of these facts, that one can dwell in many? Moreover as Raghunath Siromani points out if this were really self contradictory, how could this be found

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14 Evam sarvesvane kādravya vṛttisu sāmkhya prthaktva samyoga bibhaga samanayadivanyogadhi karana vyapya vṛth dōso vaktavyah / N.V., p. 215.
at all in experience? Contradictions under no system are admitted to be objects of experience, for if they are experienced, they cannot be deemed to clash with each other. Since we get instances galore where a manifold is the substrate (āsraya) and a unit is the content (āsrayi), we have to conclude that there is nothing monstrous in holding that one can and does reside in many.

(ii) The Naiyāyika controverts the Buddhist thesis that since the whole cannot exist in the parts either wholly or in part, it cannot be admitted. Following Vatsyayana Uddyotakara challenges the very basis of the Buddhist contention and says that the concepts of 'existing wholly or in part' (kṛṭṣṇyana ekadesēnava) do not apply to the whole. When there are many things in a group and we include all of them without remainder, we use the term 'kṛṣṇa' or 'all' (or complete or exhaustive). However we may translate it into English, the underlying idea is that it implies a totality, a manifold, each member of which has been included in our calculation and none left out. Naturally, it cannot be applied to the avayavā which is a unitary substance and not a manifold. Similarly, concept of 'part' does not go with it.

Again for the reason that it has no parts except the avayavās or the components which are its inherent cause and therefore different

16 kim prtyavayavam kṛṭṣnovayavi tarpate athaikadesēnena nopapadyate prasnah / N. B., 4.2.11.
kimāvaya vyekadesēna vartate atha kṛṣṇenaiva vartate iti na yuktah prasnah navayavi kṛṣno naikadesāh / N.V., p. 214.
17 kṛṭṣnamiti khalvanekasya sesasyabhidhanam / N.V., Ibid., also N. B. Ibid.
from it. In fact, the word 'ekadesā' as distinguished from the word. 'Kršna' is used when some members of a given total are left out. The avayavin, being a unitary and not a multiple substance, obviously does not admit of being conceived as existing in part.

It may be asked 'If the whole does not subsist in the parts, either wholly or partly, how else does it do so? These are the only modes of subsistence and there is no third one.'

Vācaspati answers this question. He says it is not correct to hold that subsistence must always be either in entirety or in part, i.e., subsistence is vyāpya and either of these modes (prakārādvāyānyatāra) is vyāpaka. There is a third mode viz., subsistence by nature (svarupatāh). The thread running through the flowers of a garland is such that, by nature, it has to exist in the flowers. It does not exist there wholly or in part but by reason of its being what it is. Similarly guna subsists in its locus by force of its nature, i.e., because of its being a guna. Even so is the relation of avayava and avayavin. The avayavin is such that it cannot but be in its avayavas - that is its nature, its svarupa. Therefore the aforesaid bi-modality cannot be said

18 - ekadesa iti canekeatve sati kasyacidabhidhanam. Tairman.krtsnaikadesasabdavekasminnanupapannan / N. V., Ibid; also N. B. / Ibid.
19 Na ca krtsnaikadesaabhyaṃ prakarantamasti / N. V. T.T., p.381.
20 Na kmcitrvakacit kartnyenaika desena va vartamanam drstam iti tayorvrttinprati vyapakatvamasiddham / N.V.T.T., p. 332.
21 Tatra sutrasya krtthi kusmesu naikadesena va napi kartvane yena kimtu svarupah; evamavayavesvavayavinah svarupatah eva / N. V. T. T.,Ibid.
to cover all cases of subsistence. Hence, the subsistence of
the avayavin in the avayavas cannot be "multiplied. In fact, the
problem of how many ways are there of a thing being subsistent
in another is to be empirically determined and we cannot start
with any preconceived notion in the matter.

Thus, we see that subsistence of the avayavin in the
avayavas is natural, not circumstantial (svabhāvika na tu āgaṇ-
tuka)22. This relation is called samavāya. It is āśraya
āśraya-bhava - the avayavas are the āśraya or substrate and
the avayavin is the āśrayi or, the content. In this relation
one is in many at one and the same time. Of course the Buddhist
does not admit any such relation and this brings us to the next
point viz., his criticism of samavāya.

IV

We have seen in the third chapter that the Buddhist does
not admit samavāya. Indeed, it should be clear by this time that
the Buddhist admits no relation whatsoever. 22A For him reality
is but detached and discrete bits called moments (ksanās) and all
relations are only upakalpita or imaginary, being subjective pro-
jections on an infinitely pluralistic universe. This being so,

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22 Kiranavāli, p. 251 (Dr. Gaurinath Sastri)
22A Samyoga vibhagayoh pratisedhah / T. S., p. 270.
Samyoga vibhagan kalpitan tavanarthakan / Ibid.,
Also, samavayadusanam / T. S., p. 627.
it is not surprising that the Buddhist has severely denounced samavāya. We have noted his arguments together with the Nyaya replies thereto. We, however, made it clear, and wish to reiterate, that our concern is with samavāya not in all its aspects but only in so far as it bears on our problem in hand, i.e., as the relation of substrate and content between the cause and the effect, between parts and whole.

Now, we have seen as a result of our discussion in the last chapter that the difference between the contestants boils down to a simple issue: Is the effect something different from the cause or not? If it is held to be different, then samavāya or inherence becomes necessary to bring them together and keep them connected. This is the view of the Naiyayika. If, however, the effect is deemed to be but a form of the cause, they would turn out to be an identical substance. Naturally, there would be no necessity of samavāya. It is for this reason that the Sāṅkhya has no room for samavāya in his cosmological scheme.23 The Naiyāyika will press the fact that the avayavin is a distinct entity and can be proved to be so by various reasons. Therefore, samavāya must be admitted. Besides holding between avayava and avayavin, Samavāya holds also between substance and quality,

substance action etc. with which we are not concerned here. The Navya Nyaya has therefore sought to prove it on another ground. The ground is: we have qualified knowledge (visista buddhi) of qualities, action etc., e.g., the jar is blue (which is guna visista buddhi), Devadatta is in motion (which is kriya visista buddhi) etc. Now such determinate knowledge has three contents viśeṣya or qualificand, viśeṣana or qualifier and a relation between the two. Now, such relation cannot be samyoga which holds only between substances and not between a substance and a quality or an action. It cannot be tādātmya because the substance, and the quality or the action are perceived to be different. It cannot also be svarūpa sambanda because in that case absence of a pen from the table e.g., cannot be explained. Therefore it must be some other relation which the Naiyāyika designates as inherence. The pros and cons of this reasoning are beyond our purview but the interested reader may consult Kiranāvalī and Bhasapariccheda along with Ṣīnakari and Rāmūḍrī, whatever the ground on which it is established, the Naiyāyika asserts that reality of avayavin cannot be disputed.

Gunakriyadi visistabuddhirvisesana visesyasambandha visaya vrṣista buddhitvat . . . / S. M. on Ka. 11.

24
Refutation of the Buddhist criticism of citra rupa:

We have dwelt at length on Buddhist criticism of the Nyaya doctrine of citra rupa. We here propose to give the Naiyāyika's view on the point. The Naiyāyika's basic contention, simply stated, is that if the avayavin is admitted at all, then citra rupa has to be admitted. Recognition of avayavin is the ground of recognition of citra rupa and not vice versa, i.e., it is not that citra rupa is first of all proved and then the avayavin is said to follow from it as a consequence. This will go to dispose of the Buddhist criticism that if citra rupa is proved to be inadmissible, the avayavin will have to be scrapped - as if citra rupa is the basis of recognition of avayavin. But this is just putting the cart before the horse. The avayavin is proved, the Naiyāyika asserts, not on the ground of citra rupa but on other grounds, but once proved, it demands a colour of its own when the parts are all of different colours. The result is recognition of citra rupa. Uddyotakara who for the first time introduces the concept of 'citra rupa' in the Nyaya philosophy makes this clear. A thing cannot be perceived by the colour of another, as in that case the colour of the wall of a room might make the air associated with it visually perceptible. 25 Since the avayavin is per-

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ceived, it has to be assigned a colour of its own different from that of the parts.

The Buddhist insists that his thesis is not adversely affected by the above facts. If there is no such colour as citra rūpa, how can the avayavin have it? And his point is that there is no one species of colour called citra rūpa. It is just a mixture of colours and that's all. The Naiyāyika here makes two points. Firstly, his contention that recognition of avayavin is the ground of recognising citra rūpa does not mean that it is the only ground and there are no other grounds. All that is meant is that it is the sufficient condition, though not the necessary condition, of recognition of citra rūpa. Secondly, the further ground on which citra rūpa or variegated colour is admitted is that it is perceived. We perceive the variegated colour as we perceive yellow or blue. This is borne out by the fact that when different parts of a cloth have different colours, we speak of 'the colour of the cloth' and not 'of colours'. There we have a perception of unity which is expressed by the singular number and not by plural. There we feel we are in the presence of a unitary colour and not of a variety of colours.

The Naiyāyika offers another reason. Colour, he says, is universally recognised as vyāpya vṛtti, unlike conjunction which is always sectional. A thing cannot have many colours. It may be
red or yellow, green or blue but it cannot be all of them together. Hence, the very concept of mixture of colours or variety of colours is alien to him - he will not touch it with a barge-pole or a pair of tongs.

The Buddhist raises another objection. What would happen if the border of a variegated cloth were not variegated? Inasmuch as the cloth as an avayavin exists in the border, its variegated colour should also be there and should therefore be perceived. But as a matter of fact we do not perceive it. How would the Naiyayika account for it?

As we shall see, this criticism is of a piece with the antinomies raised by the Buddhist. The Naiyayika answer here, as there, is in the same strain. Variegated colour or citra rūpa is produced and revealed by a variety of colours present in the parts (avayava vṛtta vijātiya rūpa samāhāra abhivyāṅgyatvāt). Hence we cannot perceive the citra rūpa unless we are perceiving at the same time many colours belonging to parts; it does not reveal itself through a part of one uniform colour (ekavayava sahitasya vayavina upalambhephupalabhya). This is the solution of Udayana. Sridhara also supports it. The condition of perception of variegated colour (citra rūpopalambha sāmagrī) is perception of colour of various parts.27

26 A. T. V. (Chow.), p. 274.
27 [Footnote]
It must, however, be mentioned that this is the traditional and orthodox view of the Naiyāyikas who following Uddyotakara, regard colour as vyāpyavrūṭti. There is another group of Naiyāyikas who do not accept it. The Neo-Naiyāyikas — many of them, not all — hold that rūpa, like saṁyoga, is avyāpya vrūṭti. Raghunāth Siromani, e.g., is a champion of this view. In the Padārtha-tattva-nirūpaṇa he argues that there is no valid reason for holding that colour must be vyāpya vrūṭti. In a cloth the different threads may be of different colours. Obviously none of these colours extends to the other avayavas. Then why on earth, he asks, should we persist in saying that colour is vyāpya vrūṭti? Hence he rejects the concept of citra rūpa and holds like the Buddhist, that it is just a variety of colours.

It must also be added that Siromani's view is not accepted by most of the Naiyāyikas and they follow the old masters and their approach as sketched above.

VI

Refutation of the view that avayavin is not different from avayavas because they occupy the same space:

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28 Navyastu tatvapi avyāpya vrūṭtya eva navarūpa / N. S. M., ka. 130.
29 Nyāyadarsana by Mahamahopādhyaya Phanibhusana Tarkavagisa, Vol. VI., p. 36.
We have already seen how Uddyotakara has answered a similar criticism of the Sāṅkhya. Here however the Naiyāyika has something more concrete and positive to say. It is conceded that parts and whole, threads and cloth do not occupy different portions of space; but this is because of the relation of Samavaya. Samavaya is āśrayāśrayi sambandha, it is the relation of substrate and content between two inseparables (ayuta siddha). In it, the samaveta resides in the samayāyi, the cloth in the yarns. The content naturally occupies the space of the substrate, and the two therefore come to occupy the same space. Cloth occupies no other space than that of the yarns. Although difference of space signifies numerical difference of the things, non-difference does not point to identity. It is due to the fact that the avayavin is asrita in the avayavi and not because there is no distinct avayavin (tatvavayavāsritatvameva nimittam nāsattvam).

VII

The five-fold antinomy (pañcavidha virodha):

We have noted these objections of the Buddhists in the third chapter and need not give them here again. We shall here set forth the Nyāya reply together with such further objections.

29A Vide Supra, p. 95.
30 N. M., Pt. II., p. 114.
Also: dravyanam ekatva samavayena samanadesatam vyasidhamo / N. V. T., p. 1069 (Calcutta Sanskrit series).
of the Buddhists as were not mentioned there and the Nyāya answer thereto.

The Naiyāyika like the Buddhist admits the value and importance of the law of contradiction and agrees with his opponent that nothing can be recognised that goes against the law. But he also emphasises at the same time the supreme authority of experience. Experience is the touchstone of truth and reality and nothing that we get by experience can be declared contradictory in the interests of one's own metaphysical system and logical consistency. This loyalty to experience and logic which according to the Naiyāyika can never be in the end at loggerheads with each other is inimitably summed up by Raghunāth Siromāṇi in his Atmatattva viveka didhiti. While dealing with these very objections of the Buddhists he says: "Yādṛśasya virodho na tasyā dhyāso yādṛśasya cādhyāso na tasyā virodhah" - contradictories are never cognised in experience and things cognised are never contradictions. 31

In line with this stand the Naiyāyika asserts that the concept of avayavin involves no logical absurdity or contradiction. This is because either the alleged attributes are not really con-

31 A. T. V. D., p. 536.
tradicory as the Buddhists contend, they being found to go together in experience and their reality being thus vouch-safed by experience; or being genuinely contradictory, they do not really co-exist, although the Buddhists wrongly think they do. The Naiyāyika thus meets the Buddhist charges by denying either the contradictariness or the co-existence of the alleged predicates. Against this backdrop let us proceed to the discussion of these objections by the Buddhists.

(a) Grahanāgraḥaṇa virodha:

There is no antimony here, says the Naiyāyika. It is never the case that the avayavin is at once both perceived and unperceived for if the avayavin is at all apprehended in a given situation, how can it at the same time remain unapprehended? Under what circumstances the avayavin is apprehended - is an altogether different matter, it will engage our attention presently, but once the whole is apprehended, whatever the conditions, it is apprehended once and for all and cannot be said to be unapprehended. Hence compresence of these characters in the avayavin is neither experienced by any body nor recognised by the Naiyāyika (māmubha vah naipyabhypagamah). Having thus denied their co-existence on the strength of experience, the Naiyāyika next proceeds to

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33 A. T. V. / Ibid.
repudiate their mutual contradictoriness on grounds of logic. 
Apprehension and non-apprehension as such are not opposed, says 
he, but they come to be so only when the subject, the object, 
place and time are the same (prameyapramātṛdesakālakākatva sati). 34
Udayana expressly states the condition: "Yo yena yatraiva yadaiva 
apalabhyate sa tena tatvama tadaiva nopalabhyata iti," i.e., if 
a thing is apprehended at a given time and at a given place by a 
person and yet is not apprehended by him at the very same time and 
place, only then the alleged antinomy would arise, otherwise not.

The Buddhist feels nothing dismayed and points out that 
precisely the same conditions obtain in the present case. When 
a man stands facing a tree, he perceives the tree in and through 
the front but has no apprehension of it in so far as it inheres in 
the hind. Here the object (viṣaya) is one and the same viz., the 
avayavin 'tree', the subject, time and place are also the same. 
How then can the contradictariness be denied? 36

It may be said that the Buddhist contention is not correct 
inasmuch as the object here is not quite the same. 37 The tree 
being apprehended is arvāghbhāga visiṣṭa or arvāghbhāga vacchina, i.e., 
the tree as qualified by or delimited by the front, and the tree

34 Narayani tika / Atmatatha viveka (ed., Ch.) p. 258; Also .
Samsakara tika: grahanagrahane hi tada viruddhesyatam yadi 
35 A. T. V. (a Ch.), p. 258.
36 A. T. V. (Ch.)/ Ibid.
37 A. T. V. (Chow.); p. 258.
that is unapprehended is parabhāga viśāṣṭa or parabhāgavacchinna, i.e., qualified or delimited by the posterior portion. The viśeṣāna (adjective or qualifier) are different and the tree as viśeṣya or qualificand is not identically the same.

The simple answer to it would be that characters of viśeṣyatā, viśeṣaṇatā, viṣayatā etc. are only epistemic, not metaphysical. The tree as an avayavin, as a substance and objective entity remains absolutely the same, though it appears to us in different knowledge situations and takes on varying epistemic characters. Hence, the above line of defence will not pay. That is why Udayana follows a different one. He argues that the Buddhist has erred in construing the knowledge situation. In this situation we have two judgments, one after the other - "The arvāghbhāga-visiṣṭa-vṛksa" is known and "the parabhāga-visiṣṭa-vṛksa' is not known". Now, there is a universally recognised maxim for proper construction of such judgments. It is: If an affirmation or a denial (vidhinisedha) is found inapplicable to a subject by reason of its possessing a given character, the affirmation or the denial is to be deemed to pertain to the character and not to the subject. In the present situation the subject is the 'tree'. When the second knowledge arises, the

38 Strictly speaking, it is delimited both by the hind-part and the central part (madhyabhāga). We have referred to one only for the sake of brevity and convenience.

39 Savisesane hi vidhi nisedhan vișeṣanamupasamatah / A. T. V. (Chow.), p. 259. Udayana does not cite the full maxim which is: Savisesane hi vidhi nisedhan vișeṣanamupasamkramat sati vișeṣye gadhe.
subject is already cognised; hence the second judgment that it is not known cannot as such apply to it. It has therefore to be related to the qualification viz., parabhāga or the hind-part; in other words, the second judgment really means that the hind-part is not known. Similarly, if we take the second judgment first and hold that the tree is not perceived, then the first judgment will contradict it and cannot apply to it. Hence the first judgment is to be taken to refer to the vīsesa, viz., 'fore-part' (arvāghāga) and not to the subject 'tree'. These being the facts of the case, the supposed contradiction is seen to be an illusion and the Buddhist contention forthwith flops.

(b) Avaranānāvarana virodha:

We now come to the second antinomy, viz., that of being covered and uncovered. The Naiyāyika's stance here as before is that there is no contradiction, strictly speaking. In accordance with the above maxim Udayana says that since the contradiction arises only when we import the different sides of the thing, it is these different sides or parts which are really contradictory and not the whole. What is covered is one part and what is not covered is another part; hence the contradictory predicates pertain to two distinct entities and not to the avayavin.

41 Avayavini tadubhaga samāvetabhavebhyarthaḥ / A. T. V. (Sanadhī Tīkā), p. 588; āvayavānānuvartatvānāvartate avayavāh te avayavāh eva / A. T. V. (Bh. Tīkā), ibid.
Of course, as it stands, the answer does not go far enough, for a pertinent question arises: What happens to the whole when a part is covered? This is precisely the question with which the discussion started in the preceding chapter. The Nyāya answer is that covering of a part does not mean that the whole is covered, as the Buddhists argue, for firstly the avayavin is different from and other than the avayavas (avayavasyāvaraṇam na vayavinah tasyānyatvat) and the covering of one is not ipso facto the covering of a different thing. Secondly, if upon a part being covered the whole were also covered, it would not then be capable of being apprehended; but as a matter of fact the whole is apprehended in such a contingency, being capable of being perceived through the exposed parts.

Indeed, it is interesting to note that we never see a thing in its entirety. We always see only the front, the interior and the back portions ever remain hidden and obstructed by the front. If the Buddhist were correct and if covering of a part entailed covering of the whole then, as Bhāgiratha Thakura in his commentary on the Ātmatattva viveka ingeniously points out, we should not be able to apprehend the whole even through the frontal part. But this is surely absurd, for in that case

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42 N. V. T. T., p. 383
43 na hyānyasyāvaraṇe anya-vārtam bhavati / N. V. T. T., Ibid.
44 N. L. V., p. 125; also avayavāvaraṇe pi tasya katipayavayava vasthanasya grahanadeva / N. V. T. T., p. 384.
45 Kimeidavayavāvaraṇevayavi yadyavrta stada parabhagavacche denavarvagbhagavacchidenapi sa nopalabhyaña / Bhū tika., p. 522 (A T V J)
nothing in the world could be known and everything would have been in the dark. For these reasons, the Naiyāyika holds that avayavavāraṇa is not avayavyavaraṇa. To put it more precisely, covering of a part is not the sufficient condition of covering of the whole.

The question naturally comes uppermost: 'when, then is the whole covered if not in the above circumstances?' Is it ever covered according to the Naiyāyika? The Nyāya answer is that it is covered when it is not apprehended, its covering being the cause of such non-apprehension; and it is exposed to the view when it is seen, such exposure being the condition of its apprehension. Now, whether a thing is or is not being apprehended can be judged only by experience. Experience alone tells us whether in a given situation we are perceiving a thing and therefore whether it is open to our view or not. And on the strength of experience the Naiyāyika asserts that a thing is apprehended only when several parts of it (katipayāvayava) - and not merely one - are apprehended. Apprehension of several parts is thus the condition of apprehension of the whole. 46

46 katipayāvayavopālambhasamagrhasamagrhasyavayavavyupālambhasya . . . / Narayani Tika., p. 239; Also, . . . katipayāvayavasthanasya grahanadeva . . . / N. V. T. T., p. 334.
We may, however, note that this is the view of the later Naiyāyikas of the earlier period like Vācaspati, Udayana and their successors. In the Nyāyabhasya and even the Nyāya Vartika we find a different view expressed. In the Nyāya Bhāṣya it is stated that there can be no mere apprehension of a part for there is also the whole (na caikadesopalabdhiravayavisadbhāvat).\(^{47}\) Apprehension of a part is at the same time apprehension of the avayavi related to it (skadesopalabdhistatsahacaritavaya vyupalabdhisā).\(^{43}\) All this suggests that no part can be apprehended without the whole being simultaneously apprehended. It is nowhere said that not one part but several such parts are required for perception of the whole. Uddyotakara also lends support to this view.\(^{49}\) It seems that the Buddhist criticisms made the Naiyāyikas conscious of the drawback of their system and they mended it accordingly.

So, we see the Naiyāyika holds that the whole remains open to our view when several parts remain open, and it is closed and covered when fewer parts are available for perception. As to how many such parts are the minimum requirement for perception of the whole, the Nyāya gives no hard and fast rule but refers again to experience. Experience defines the minimum number which varies from case to case and therefore defies a rigid calculus.

\(^{47}\) N. D. / 2.1.32. p. 150. Some commentators have taken it to be a sutra and not a part of the Bhāṣya (Cf: the footnote, Ibid.).

\(^{43}\) Ibid., 4. N. V., \(\S\) 2.1.32., p. 213.

\(^{49}\) Ibid; also \(\S\) 2.1.32.
The Buddhist takes exception to the Nyaya view that the avayavin remains uncovered despite some parts being covered. He argues that in that event the Naiyayika has to recognise varieties of anāvrtatva (i.e., of being uncovered), for a thing, a table e.g., never looks quite the same when half covered as when it is fully uncovered. But since according to the Naiyayika in both the cases the table is anāvṛta or uncovered, he has to admit, by force of logic, various forms of anāvarana. This is however pretty absurd. Anāvarana does not admit of forms or degrees - either it is there or not.

The Buddhist makes another point. When there is no cover on any part of a thing, the thing is apprehended along with its magnitude. Similarly, if the thing remains uncovered even with some parts behind a cover, we should be able, as before, to cognize its magnitude (sthaññayopalambha). But as a matter of fact we are not able to do so. Some parts remaining covered, we fail to take a correct measure of its magnitude.

50 Strictly speaking, this way of putting things is not correct, for on the Nayaya view, the avayavin, having no parts belonging to it, cannot be half-covered, or fully covered - it is either covered or not and that's all. What is really meant is respectively that half the parts in which the whole inheres are covered and no parts are covered. But since this is rather a cumbrous one, we have avoided it in favour of what is certainly more common and idiomatic in English language, hoping that with the explanation given here, no difficulty will arise here or hereunder.


52 Anavarana dasavat katipayayavavarani pi tathavidhasthanly opalambhah kinna syaditi / A. T. V., p. 259.
In order to understand the Buddhist contention as also the Nyāya reply thereto we have to be clear about the term 'magnitude of the thing' (sthaulya). What is the Buddhist speaking of here? Just the gross magnitude (sthūla paramāṇa) or the specific gross magnitude of the thing viz., 2 or 3 cubits in length (dvihastatva-trihastatvādi-rūpa sthaulya)? The Buddhist undoubtedly has the first in mind, for Pandita Asoka expresssly says that if the Naiyāyika pleads that a thing can be apprehended minus its magnitude, then he should be asked, "Is the gross any different from the whole (kim sthūlo nāmāvayavinoh anyah)? A gross object according to the Naiyāyika is what pervades many parts. So if the gross and the avayavi are identical, then how can the apprehension of the avayavi be not also apprehension of the gross? Pandita Asoka here clearly takes the Naiyāyika to mean gross magnitude and bases his criticism on that interpretation. We do not however find any evidence for this view in the Nyaya literature. Rather the Naiyāyika is emphatic on the point that only the gross (sthūladravya) is perceptible, the atomic (including the dvyanuka) and the ubiquitous remaining beyond the reach of the senses; therefore, perception is

53 Samkara Misra's tika on A.T.V/pp. 586-87; also Bh's tika on A.T.V./ Ibid.
54 S.B.N.T., p. 35.
55 Sa eva aneka vyapi sthulah / Ibid. 'Aneka' here is to be taken in the sense of many (vahu) and not in the sense of 'na eka', i.e. 'not one'; for in that case 'two' could be included in 'aneka' and dvyanuka or dyad would be 'anekavyapi and therefore gross, which however is not correct.
56 yadyavayavyeva sthulah tada tadgrahane kathanna sthulagrana miti cintyam / Ibid.,
always of a gross substance, a substance with gross magnitude, gross magnitude (avāntara mahattva) being a condition of perceptibility. Hence apprehension of a substance is also apprehension of its gross magnitude.

What the Naiyāyika contends however is that specific magnitude of an object may not known in knowing the object. When we are perceiving a thing, we are certainly also perceiving its gross magnitude, but it is also no less certain, being assured by experience, that we cannot always grasp its true measure, viz., whether is two or three cubits long. So far as specific magnitude is concerned, the Buddhist is right in thinking that according to the Nyāya knowledge of an object is not ipso facto but knowledge of its specific magnitude. The Naiyāyika argues that there is nothing absurd or anomalous in it. Sthūlatva or grossness of magnitude is the condition of perception of a substance but not so is the specific magnitude which is a species under the genus ṣṭhūlatva; (parināmagatamavāntara-sāmānyam). A thing and its specific measure are different and therefore known under different causal conditions. The condition of apprehension of a gross substance is katipayāvayavopalambha, i.e., apprehension of several parts, the condition of apprehension of specific magnitude,

57. *Nk.*, p.133, (Ed. VSS)
however, is bhūyāvayavopalambha, i.e., apprehension of a large number of parts. Hence, a substance may well be known without its specific magnitude. Again, no definite answer can be given as to how many such parts are required to be perceived; all that can be said is that they should be sufficient for the purpose of knowing the precise dimension of the whole. So, when the requisite number of parts are covered, the true magnitude of the whole is not perceived.

The Buddhist raises certain other objections viz., 'how can a thing be known minus its own determinate magnitude?' Since every object must be known along with a certain magnitude, is the whole known as possessed of magnitude of any of its parts? In that event how can it be distinguished from that part? etc. All these however presuppose that a thing must appear to us in its own magnitude - a presupposition not warranted by experience.

The Buddhist, besides making the assumption, has not adduced any reason why he thinks so - why a thing and its own magnitude must be apprehended together. The Naiyayika, on the other hand, has shown on the basis of experience, that the two need not go together. Vacaspati who has a genius for lucidity, very aptly observes:

Avayavin is apprehended solely by means of the contact of the sense

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60 kati-pāya-vāyavapalambhasamagrikasyayāvayavupalambhāsya sattvepi tato vahvāyavopalambhasamagrikasya sthāulyopalambhasyabhavo yujyate iti / Narayani tika, A.T.V., p. 259.
61 S.B.N.T., p. 85; N.L.V.P., p. 126.
62 S.B.N.T., p. 86.
with it (of course through a large number of parts). But its measure is apprehended by means of contact (i) of the sense with the object (indriyenārthasya), (ii) of parts of the sense with the object (indriyāvayavairarthasya), (iii) of the sense with parts of the object (indriyenārthāvayavānām and (iv) of parts of the sense with parts of the object (indriyāvayavairarthāvayavānām). Owing to the difference of causal factors apprehension of a whole can well go with non-apprehension of its specific measure. 63

(c) Kampākampavirodha :

Here, as before, the Nāyāyika repudiates the co-existence of motion and its absence in one and the same locus viz., the whole. In conformity with the maxim enunciated above54 he contends that sakampatva and niskampatva pertain to the parts concerned and not to the avayavin. The leaves and twigs may be in motion but not the tree; the hand may move but not the body. Hence, it is not the case that the whole has and has not movement simultaneously. The Buddhist argues that this is wholly untenable. A part in motion must logically entail motion of the whole, otherwise even were all the parts in motion, the whole should still be motionless.65 But this is not a fact. Therefore it should be conceded that the whole inhering in a part-in-motion is itself in motion and as inher-

63 N. V. T. T., p. 335; 64 Vide Supra, p. 137
65 Avayave karmotpade avasyamavayavini karma, anyatha sarvayavakampi pi niskampo vayavyupalabhyeta / A.T.V.D., p. 59/
ing in the other part is unmoved. Thus, the contradiction becomes inescapable.

The Naiyāyika, of course, strongly demurs to it and points out that experience is the supreme test of truth. Vacaspati brings this out admirably when he says in that memorable expression of his: 'Samvid eva hi bhagavatī vastupagame nah sāraṇam', i.e., experience is the supreme authority, and our resort in the matter of recognition of entities. So experience is to determine the issue on hand, and there is no gain-saying the fact that in experience we find, as in the above illustrations, that while a part is in movement, the whole is not one does not entail the other. This difference in fact naturally necessitates the hypothesis of difference of causal conditions, viz., the conditions that produce movement of a part do not produce that of the whole, a different causal set-up does it. When a hand moves, it is due to the desire in the soul to move it (ātmanaḥ pāṇikampaneechā), followed by a corresponding effort (prayatna) and then by conjunction of the hand with the soul possessed of such effort (pratya tnavat ātmapaṇi saṃyogat). In the case of the body, however, the conditions are: desire to move the body (sarīra kampaneechā), corresponding effort and conjunction of the body with the soul.

66 N. V. T. T., II. I. 36., p. 399
67 Phalavaṭat sāmagrīviseṣa kalpyate / A. T. V. D., p. 591
68 Samagribhedena avayavaniyata kampotpada tasyam dasayam avayavino niscalatvat / A. T. V., p. 280.
having such effort. So, the originating conditions for actions of the part and the whole being different, the one is not always followed by the other (avayavayavikarmano bhinna nimittatvat). In some cases, however these conditions obtain together (nimitta yaugapadyat), and therefore, their effects also follow suit e.g., movement of the wheels of a chariot and that of the chariot itself, or movement of the chariot and that of the charioteer.

Both Raghunath Siromani and Bhagiratha Thakkura discuss in this connection and dispose of an alternative hypothesis. Instead of saying that avayavakarma and avaya/vi-karma are differently produced, it may be contended, they say, that karma or action, like samyoga, is avyapyavrtti, i.e., non-pervasive - it does not pervade its locus just as conjunction does not. A thing may be both samyogi and asamyogi; similarly, the avayavin on this view may be both kampa and akampa without being in any way involved in contradiction.

Bhagiratha Thakkura rejects it summarily on the ground that there is no evidence of it (manabhavat). An avayava is seen to be quaking all over and not merely sectionally. Raghunath

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69 S.B.N.T., p. 82;
70 Ibid.;
72 Bh's Tika, Ibid.
Siromani first points out that the comparison of karma with samyoga is defective. Samyoga is and has to be taken as avyāpya vṛtti; otherwise it would be either vyāpya vṛtti or anumātra vṛtti, but in either case we fail to explain either the origin or perception of substances (ghaṭāderapratyamāṇupattisca). An external substance like a jar is made by conjunction of its parts, kapala and kapalika, each of which again is made up of smaller parts. If conjunction were pervasive or vyāpya vṛtti, then all these conjunctions should be capable of being perceived in the final avayavi (antyāvayavī). But they are never perceived. Hence samyoga cannot be vyāpya vṛtti. It cannot also be anumātra vṛtti, i.e., existent only in the atom, because it would then be imperceptible. Therefore on both these alternatives external substances would be imperceptible and also non-est. Hence, samyoga cannot but be avyāpya vṛtti. On the other hand, karma is seen to be pervasive (vyāpaka) in respect of parts and if it is regarded as non-pervasive (avyāpaka) in respect of avayavin, it would have to conceded two modes of being which cannot obviously be accepted. Hence this view that the avayavin can be both moving and unmoved is dismissed by the Naiyāyika who holds that movement of a part does not entail that the whole is in motion.

73 A.T.V. D., p. 59
74 Ibid.
75 Gale ca avayave karma vyapakameva upalabhyate avayavinī ca tasya avyapakatve karmatvasya tadabhayavṛttītvamupapattih / A.T.V. D., p. 94a-b.
The Buddhist then brings another objection. In the above situation where a part moves but the whole stands still, the other part would remain static, with the result that the two parts would get separated or dissociated from each other. Their conjunction would thus snap and the avayavādin which resulted from such junction would forthwith come to an end. In experience however we never come across such disruption; the Nyāya contention therefore is belied by experience and has to be rejected.

The Naiyāyika challenges this analysis and argues that movement of a part does not necessarily lead to disjunction with the other part and ultimate dissolution of the whole. For example, movement of the hand does not tear it away from the body any more than the shaking of leaves or twigs pull them apart from the tree; but a split bamboo is wrenched from the other part and the whole is destroyed. Movement therefore does not, as a rule, beget disjunction leading to disintegration of the thing. Only visiṣṭa karma or a particular movement may have this effect because of particular causes being present (karaṇa visēṣat).

The Buddhist rejoins that this defence of the Naiyāyika goes against the basic concept of 'karma' as formulated by Kanāda, Kanāda says karma or action is the independent cause of conjunction.
It is in the nature of karma as conceived in the Nyāya Vaisesika, to provoke disjunction in a relevant situation; and how can there be disjunction, queries the Buddhist, if there be no disjunction from other parts?

The Nyāya affirms that there is no such anomaly, because disjunction from other parts is not the only sort of disjunction possible; there is another sort, viz., disjunction from the portion of space earlier occupied by a thing, when the hand moves into a new position, its contact with the earlier part of space (ākāśa pradesa) is disjoined and with a new part formed. This kind of disjunction where there is no severance of connection of one part with others is always due to motion produced by pressure or abhīghāta. Every motion produces either of these disjunctions and hence Kanāda's definition is satisfied in any event.

The Buddhist fires a final shot. He says that in case a part moves and the whole remains still, they cannot surely be inseparably related (ayātasiddha) but only accidentally connected (yutasiddha). Vācaspati charges the Buddhist with opacity and asks what he means by yutasiddha. Does he mean difference of avayava

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81 samyoga vibhagesvanapeksa karanam iti karma laksanam/V.S.1.1.1.
82 Nodyakarmavat / A.T.V., p. 233
83 Ākāsadi desa vibhagopajanenapi tad upapatteh / Ibid, p. 262.
84 Vācaspati and Udayanacarya refer to this Buddhist objection but we must admit it is not found in the Buddhist works, not at least in the extant works, and nor at any rate in the present context. We shall presently mention where it occurs and discuss it there. For the present we have followed Vācaspati and Udayana.
and avayavin, or that they stand unrelated to each other? If it is the first one he has in mind, if in other words, his point is that parts and whole are different, then there is no quarrel between him and the Naiyāyika, for that is also the point of the latter. If, however, the Buddhist's contention is that the two are unrelated, then obviously he is wrong, for the avayavin comes into existence only by being related to the parts (jātaḥ sambaddhasćetyekah kālaḥ).

The Nārāyaṇī Tīka of all the commentaries on the Ātma-tattva-viveka deals with this point with some clarity. Yutasiddhi, it says, may be of two kinds: (i) the two relata can either of them have a locus other than themselves (dvayorapi sambandhinoh sambandhidvayātiriktāsrayāsrayitvam) and (ii) one of the relata has its own motion (dvayānayanatarasya vā prthaggatimatvam). When a pen is put on the table, the table is the locus (āsraya) and the pen is the adjunct (āsrayi), when it is picked up and kept in hand, the hand which is other than the relata becomes the locus. Also one of the relata viz., the pen has its own motion not shared by the other.

Now both these features must be absent in ayutasiddha padartha. In other words a-yutasaiddha padartha, i.e., entities inseparably related may have one of these features but not both.

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86 Ibid.
87 A.T.V./p. 265.
88 Dvividhayutasiddhashhavascayutasiddhīḥ, ekaika bhave pyayutasiddhitvabhavat / Ibid.
i.e., they cannot have both prthag-gatimatta and prthag-śrayāśra yitva. Of two ayutasiddha entities one may have independent movement but neither can exist elsewhere and otherwise than at present. Now it becomes clear why the Buddhist has made the point under consideration. His contention seems to be that there can be no prthag-gatimatta or independent action of any one of ayutasiddha padarthas. The parts and whole which according to the Naiyāyika are ayutasiddhas cannot be so, claims the Buddhist, for on the Naiyāyika's own saying, parts can have movement without the whole having any. But as we have just now noted, this contention of the Buddhist is not correct. Since the whole and parts are ever related as āsrayāśrayi, they are ayuta-siddhas inspite of the parts having separate movement.

For these reasons the Naiyāyika rejects the Buddhist view that there is a relation of entailment between movements of the avayava and the avayavin. A pertinent question arises which we must answer before we round up our discussion here. When according to the Naiyāyika, does the whole move? The answer is: the avayavin is in motion when all the avayavas are in motion (sarva vayavā-vacchedena), contrariwise, when the avayavi moves, all the avayavas do so. Movement of all the parts is therefore both the

89 For further discussion see the Narayani Tika, A.T.V./ Ibid.,
90 Avayavikampasya sakatavayava kampa niyatatvat kvacidavayava kampe pyavayavi niskampah / Bh.Tika., A.T.V., p. 579
91 S. B. N. T., p. 84.
necessary and the sufficient condition of movement of the avayavin.

(d) Raktārakta virodha:

The point here is that if one part is red and the rest not-red, the avayavin inhering in both must partake of these characteristics, be red and not-red and thus self-contradictory. The answer of the Naiyāyika is different from what it was to the previous objections of the Buddhist. Instead of denying co-existence as in the other cases here he denies outright the contradictoriness of the proposed alternatives; he denies, apparently paradoxically, that being red and being not-red at the same time are contradictory (raktāraktayor ekatra virodhah). Why? Because they are found to go together (sahadarsānāt).

In order to understand the Nyāya view we must pause and thrash out certain preliminaries. Firstly, the Buddhist is not here referring to natural colour 'red' but to artificial colouring of red. It is only in this context that we can understand the point the Naiyāyika is going to make in course of his answer viz., red colour of the avayavin is due to contact with a colouring substance (mahārajanasāmyoganiśittvāt). Moreover, if red colour

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92 This has been taken as illustration; any other particular colour would have served, but most of the commentators have taken 'red' for explaining their point.
93 N. V. T. T., p. 385.
94 Ibid.
95 N. V. T. T., p. 385; N.K., p. 42.
spoken of here were natural and intrinsic, the Naiyāyika's straight reply would have been that colour is always vyāpyavṛtti and therefore a thing would be red all over and not partly red; hence the Buddhist contention would be declared senseless. As it stands, however, the objection turns out to be this: If a part of a thing be dyed red, the rest being what is, what would be the colour of the avayavīn?

Secondly, it may be contended that the parts being red and not-red, the whole would be citra rūpa. But this is wrong. 'Not-red', it must be understood, is not a species of colour, not even a quality, being an abhāviya padartha; as such, red and not-red together cannot be said to produce citra rūpa. It must be emphasised, however, that though 'not-red' is not itself a colour, the not-red part will not go without colour; it will have some colour other than red.

Thirdly, in the light of the foregoing observations one may be tempted to argue that the red colour and the colour of the rest—green, yellow or whatever it be—should give rise to citra rūpa of the avayavīn; and the objection here as also the Nyāya reply thereto eventually reduce to the problem of citra rūpa. But this is not correct. Citra rūpa arises only in the event of the parts having natural colour. If a cloth is constituted of green, red and yellow fibres, it will have variegated colour. But the
cloth having been made, if a part of it is bedaubed in red (which case is being considered here), the whole will not be variegated in colour. Against this background we proceed to discuss the matter in hand.

The Naiyāyika contends in the first instance that a part being red does not entail the whole being so; therefore the whole in such an event is not-red. It is not both red and not-red and hence, there is no contradiction.  

The Buddhist objects to it on the ground that on the same logic even if all the parts were red the whole should still be not red. But this is never the case; therefore the Nyaya view is untenable.

The Naiyāyika points out that in such a case the redness of the whole and even of the parts is illusory, for it is really due to conjunction with a colouring substance (rāgidravyasamgyoga). Bhagiratha Tīkā on the Ātmatattva-viveka expressly says that such redness does not really inhere in the cloth it is only aropita i.e., attributed thereto. Therefore perception of it in the cloth is false.

96 *Raktaraktatvam ca navayavin ekasya, tasya raktatvadeva/
N. V. T. T., p. 385*

97 *Patarakta iti tu bhramah / N.V.T.T., Ibid.,
Raktatvam tatra nastyeva ekadese tat pratitistu bhranta /
Raghunath S.'s Tika thereon.*

98 *Raktah pota ityanubhavasya maharajanaalauhityam visayo, na tu pate lauhitya rupa samavyah / A. T. V., p. 651*
The Buddhist even now remains unconvinced. He argues that on the Nyāya view it has to be admitted that the whole is both conjoined and not conjoined with the dye stuff (rāgidravya) - conjoined in respect of the portion that is red and not conjoined with regard to the rest. But this is clearly self-contradictory. There cannot be both conjunction and absence of conjunction in the same locus (saṃyogāsaṃyoga virodha). 99

The Naiyāyika here joins issue and points out that conjunction, by its very nature, is avyāpyavṛtti. It is sectional in its incidence and can therefore co-exist in the same locus, albeit in different parts. When a book is on the table, there is admittedly a conjunction between the two, but the conjunction is restricted only to a particular portion, the other parts being devoid of it altogether. Hence, conjunction and its absence are quite compatible with each other in the same locus in respect of different parts. 100

The Buddhist impugns this logic and argues that bhava and abhāva, existence and non-existence are acknowledged contradictions. They are mutually exclusive and one is the avowed negation of the other. 101 This being so, existence and non-existence of conjunction must be held to be contradictions, all arguments to

100 . . . prakarabhedaviruddha svabhava sañña / A.T.V., p. 283.
the contrary being so much moon-shine, and expression of false knowledge (mohavijñāmbhitam). Vacaspati contests this claim of the Buddhist and holds that bhāva and abhāva as such, in the abstract, are far from being contradictories. Experience determines whether they are in the same locus or in different loci and therefore whether they are contradictories. Certainly existence of pen on the table and its non-existence on the ground do not contradict each other! The subject, the time and the locus must be the same as the frame of reference.

Conjunction and its absence are found in experience to go together in respect of different parts of the same substratum and cannot therefore be held contradictory.

The Buddhist sets aside this plea of prakāra-bheda-aviruddha-svabhāva-sādesya of samyoga-asamyoga, i.e., samyoga and and its absence by their very nature occupy different portions of the same locus. In other words, he denies the avyāpya vṛtti or non-pervasive character of samyoga and argues that if samyoga inheres in its locus as colour does then like colour it should also be vyāpya vṛtti. Vyāpya vṛttitva and a-vyāpya vṛttitva cannot

102 S.B.N.T., Ibid.,
104 ... tasyaiva samyogasya tasminnekada bhavabhavan vyavasthapaniyan, tathaiva darsanat / N.V.T.T., Ibid.,
105 A. T. V., p. 268.
106 yadi hi svasraye samaneto rupadivat vyapyavṛttitirevayam / S.B.N.T., p. 88.
surely be adjudged according to one's convenience!

The Naiyāyika points out in answer that it is experience that alone decides the issue. If colour is regarded as pervasive in nature, it is because experience reveals it to be so; and if conjunction is adjudged non-pervasive, that is also because of the deliverance of experience. Knowables are infinitely various and the character of one cannot be judged by proxy, on the analogy of another, without reference to the necessary experience. Hence Naiyāyika concludes that the characters of being coloured and not coloured (with a specific colour) are not contradictories but perfectly consistent; hence the avayavin is not vitiated by them.

(e) Taddesātva and ataddesātva:

Of the two ways in which the problem can be discussed the Naiyāyika prefers the second one viz., how can the avayavin subsist in many avayavas at the same time? The Naiyāyika begins by asking for a clarification. What does 'ataddesātva' mean? Does it mean 'tadanyadesātva', i.e., existence in another avayava or 'taddesātvābhāva' i.e., non-exis-

107 Tasmaddarsanamurodhāt pramaya vaichitryasiddhāh
. . . avyapavruttvamasthiyate, rupadīnām tu na drstah/
N.V.T.T., Ibid.,
108 Na ca padarthantaravaidharmyena samyoga eva nirakartavyah /
A.T.V., Ibid.,
108 Vide Supra, p. 72
109 At least this is how Samkara Misra and Bhagiratha Thakur have interpreted the Atmatattva viveka. Raghunath Siromoni with his uncanny insight, however deals with it in a way that covers both the points of view. Cf; A.T.V.D., p. 607.
ence in the avayava concerned? If the Buddhist refers to
the second sense, then his objection comes to this: how does the
self-same whole exist and yet not exist in a particular part?
But this does not arise, as the Naiyāyika does not hold that this
is ever the case. It is admitted by all including the Naiyāyika
that a thing cannot both be and not be at the same time in a
place. Therefore, the Buddhist must be taken to mean the first sense and his objection therefore turns out to be: how can a thing (i.e., the avayavin) exist in many parts simultaneously?

The Naiyāyika’s straight answer is that there is no con­
tradiction involved here. There is no rule, nothing to warrant
the assumption underlying the Buddhist position viz., to be in one
place means to not to be in another. Rather experience tells
us quite the contrary. It shows with unmistakable evidence that
a thing can exist in many places and many parts. A table pervades
all the parts of space covered by it and all its own avayavas
occupying those parts.

The Buddhist would reply, as we have noted earlier, that
appeal to experience here is unnecessary. His assumption, to borrow

110 Ibid.,
111 Here again Raghunath Siromani with his characteristic genius
points out that even this is not really contradictory, for a
thing’s simultaneous presence and absence are possible from the
point of view of different divisions of time (kalava cchedena)
Cf: A.T.V.D., Ibid.
112 ATV., p. 271.
113 Vide Supra, p. 79
a modern expression, is a simple tautology which needs no empirical confirmation. It is the basis of experience rather than experience being its basis. Since different parts are mutually exclusive (itaretarabhāvātmaka), it logically follows that position in one of them means exclusion from another. We need not rush out for experience to check up the truth of this statement, for experience, whatever its form, has to conform to the Law of Contradiction.

The Buddhist also tries to defend his position in another way, a very subtle and ingenious way. He says in accordance with the above maxim that if a thing is at a place A, it is excluded from all other places, i.e. from Not-A. But to say that a thing is at A means that we deny its exclusion from A. Therefore it follows that denial of exclusion of from A means its exclusion from Not-A. To put it in concrete terms, if we deny that the book is excluded from the table (which is only the negative way of saying it is on the table), it means that the book is nowhere else (i.e., excluded from all other places). The Buddhist contends that a thing's presence at a place is determined by perception, and thereafter, by the law of contradiction we can infer its negation at other places. Now, says the Buddhist, suppose we are perceiving that a thing is subsisting in a particular part, this

115 Vyapakasya taddesavṛttitva bhavasya nivṛttan vyapasya tadanyavrīttitvasya api nivṛtteviti/A.T.Y., p 659
fact of perception entails the further fact that the thing is not absent in the said part. Denial of its absence in that part leads us to conclude that it is absent in all other parts. That is, a thing cannot be present simultaneously in many parts.

The Naiyāyika only points out that all this elaborate piece of sophistry avails the Buddhist but little, for the very first premise viz., presence at one place means absence at another is faulty. Experience belies it and condemns it as false. If they were really contradictory, how could they be known together in perception? Certainly we cannot perceive contradictories! And if we do perceive, they cannot be adjudged contradictories. Raghunāth Siromani's observation cited above is classic and as regards the Naiyāyika, final.

VIII

Independent considerations for recognising avayavin:

(i) Besides meeting criticisms of the Sankhya and the Baudhā the Naiyāyika offers certain independent arguments of his own to prove the existence of avayavin. He says that if the avayavin is not admitted, everything in the world would remain unappre-

116 Katvnekasamsargitvasya pratyaksaśiddhavanna tadṛṣṭi vyaptirityaḥ / A.T.V.D., p. 607
Also: etadṛṣṭamadhyakṣameva noditityaḥ / A.T.V., (Sankara Tika), p. 608.

hended (sarvāgraṇāṇam avayavasiddheḥ).

And by 'everything' he means not merely all other substances but all other categories of reality viz., attributes, motion, universal, viśeṣa and inherence. His contention, in other words, is this: if the gross substance (sthūla dravya) is not recognised, as the Buddhists think it should not be, then we cannot also recognise atoms, or a concourse of atoms (paramāṇu puṇja), for ex-hypothesi they are imperceptible (at least on the Nyāya view). Consequently, we should fail to perceive any substance whatsoever, whether gross or atomic. If substance went by the board, how should we be able to apprehend guṇa and karma which are not self-subsistent but always exist in the substance as their locus? If the locus (āśraya) went unperceived, we could not obviously perceive the content. Similarly, the universal has its locus only in substance, attribute and action, and if the last three go, the universal cannot remain as a perceptible object. On the same ground of the locus being non-perceivable, inherence and viśeṣa also fade into oblivion. Non-recognition of the avayavin thus entails non-apprehension of all things under the sun. But certainly this is not true. It contradicts our universal experience and cannot be accepted.

118 N. S., 2.1.34.
119 Kim tat sarvam? Dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānyā, viśeṣa-samavāyāḥ / N. S., 2.1.34
'What is the harm if perception were rejected as a pramāṇa and things went unperceived? There would still remain other pramanas and things might be apprehended by means of them', the Buddhist might retort. Uddyotakara answers that this is not possible. All other instruments of valid cognition - anumāṇa, upamāṇa and sūruti - depend on perception. They presuppose perception in one way or the other, and failing perception, they are unable to operate. Hence, the Buddhist contention does not stand and we have to admit the avayavin.

(ii) Another ground for recognising avayavin is mentioned by Gotama viz., holding (dharāṇa) and putting (ākārsāṇa). A thing is said to be held when a part of it being held, it is restrained from moving to another place. When we hold a part of a book in the hand, the book itself is held and does not move apart. To hold a part of a thing is therefore to hold the thing itself. This is possible, says the Naiyāyika, because the thing is a unity. If it were a mass of atoms, detached and disjointed, these things would not have happened. We should have a slice in our hand, the other part remaining where it is. Similarly, if a part is pulled, the whole also gets pulled and drawn. This
also shows the unitary character of the whole.

The purvapakṣin does not accept this view and argues that the acts of holding and pulling can be attributed to avayavin if there is vyāpti between the two either by way of anvaya or of vyatireka; that is, if it can be proved that wherever there is avayavin, we have an instance of holding and pulling (anvayavyāpti), and where there is no avayavin, there is no such instance (vyatireka vyāpti) only then would the Nyāya contention be tenable. But this cannot be proved. A heap of dust is an avayavin but we do not find that holding or lifting a portion of it leads to the entire heap being held or lifted. Similarly, straw, stone and wood stuck together by lac do not become an avayavin but remain a bundle; yet if we pull at one part, the whole bundle will come along. Thus dharana and ākarsana cannot be said to be produced by avayavītsa but by some other factor, viz., saṃgraha or adhesion. 124

Vātsyāyana says, adhesion is a peculiar quality (of the components themselves) which is concomitant with their conjunction and is produced by their viscidity and fluidity. 125 In the case of the unbaked jar water (which is both viscid and fluid) produces this quality of adhesion, in the case of the baked jar fire is an additional condition. 126 The purvapakṣin maintains that not the avaya-

124 N. B., 2.1.35. 125 Samgraho nama samyoga sahacaritam śneḥadravatva karitam / Ibid., it may be mentioned that the list of qualities recognised in the Nyāya Vaisesika does not include saṃgraha. Sridhara, however, takes saṃgraha as a kind of samyoga. Cf: Samgrahah ... samyoga visesah (N.K., portion dealing with gana).
126 Apamsamyogadame kumbhe ānisamyogat pakve / Ibid.
vin but sneha and dravatva are together the cause of adhesion and the notion of a distinct whole is uncalled for.

This is how Vātsyāyana has put the case of the opponent. Uddyotakara, however, differs from him in his interpretation of the sūtra and holds that it is far from Gotama’s intention to hold that every avayavin is capable of being held and pulled as mentioned above. All that is meant is that the phenomena of dhāraṇa and ākāraṇa do not appear apart from the avayavins. Even the apparent exception will be found to conform to this rule e.g., in the above case of straw, stone and wood, each one of these is an avayavin and therefore capable of being held and pulled. Indeed, a genuine exception to our case would be one where there is no avayavin i.e., savayava dravya e.g., ākāśa or jnana or atoms (which are niravayava or partless) and yet there are holding and pulling.

(iii) The Naiyāyika supports his thesis of avayavin by appeal to a special type of judgment we make, viz., ‘The object is one and gross’. Here we have a sense of unity and a sense of gross magnitude with respect to one and the same thing (mahat pratyaya saamānādhi karanyādekapratyaya). That which appears

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127 na brumah sarvasminnavayavini dharana karsane bhavatah, api tu anyathra na bhavatah / N. V., p. 241.
128 N.V., p. 246.
as one to us also appears as gross unity is predicated of what is apprehended as gross substance. Thus, the gross object e.g., the jar or the cloth is proved to be a real unity. Unity cannot therefore be said to characterise a number of atoms which are admittedly devoid of extension. In other words, on the strength of such judgments we can hold that a thing is not a manifold of atoms but is really one and perceptibly extended (mahat).

The Buddhist controverts the above conclusion and observes that there is nothing gross in the world - only one kind of magnitude is there and that is amutva or atomic magnitude. He explains our perception of gross magnitude or mahattva as follows: Atoms are individually imperceptible but collectively they become perceptible and it is this additional feature (atisaya) which is responsible for our apprehension of extension or mahattva (anu sanūhe atisāya grahanām mahat pratyaya iti cet).

Uddyotakara puts in a query: what is the nature of this 'atisāya', this speciality which makes the imperceptible perceptible? If this speciality is something new which is produced in them, it would be nothing but avayavin according to the Naiyāyika, for avayavin is the only new phenomenon produced; and in such an event the Buddhist has to admit avayavin. If the special feature is the special connection or vilakṣaṇa samyoga amongst the atoms (howsoever the Buddhists may choose to call it) the Naiyāyika

129. NB., 2,1.36
129A Tamadutpadyate avayavi yo laksanavya visaya iti /MV, 4.2.16. Also vide infra pp. 262-284.
replies, such connection would remain imperceptible. The atoms themselves being infra-sensible, their connections cannot be any different. Moreover, as in the case of cognition of unity, so here, the Buddhist must be able to trace the false cognition of mahattva to a past authentic cognition of the same. This, however, is something more than the Buddhist can comply with. His contention must therefore be rejected and it should be concluded that our cognition of mahattva is a valid one and consequently, gross objects are indisputable facts of reality.

(iv) This argument is made from the point of view of jati. The Naiyāyika argues that jāti or class-character has to be admitted. Knowledge consists in classification and classification presupposes class-character. Because of this class-character we are able to perceive different things as belonging to different classes. The Buddhist may not recognise an objectively real class-character but he believes at least in the ideality of it; even if he rejects it, he has to explain the fact of perception of different classes of things. The Buddhist may speak of Apohavāda but the Naiyāyika at any rate believes that an objective basis of classification is the minimum requirement of the situation and argues accordingly.

\[ jātivisesasya pratyāyānvrttīlingasya \ldots \] N.B., 2.1.36.
Now, the universal cannot be known, says the Nyaya, except as subsisting in a locus (vyādhisāraṇa syanabhivyakteḥ). What then would be the locus of the universal on the Buddhist view? Obviously, the aggregate of atoms, for that is the only reality for him, the unitary thing being declared a pure myth. But a difficulty arises here. The entire aggregate is certainly not visible at a time, for our sense-organ cannot come into contact with all of them. How can the entire aggregate then, be said to be the locus? The Buddhist may contend that this criticism is not sound, for he does not believe in sense-object contact as a condition of perception. For him pratyakṣa-yogyatā is the sole determinant of perception. If a samudāya is fit to be perceived, it will be perceived without fail, no matter whether there is sense-object contact or not. The Naiyāyika however is left unconvinced. He points out that even the Buddhist admits certain frustrating circumstances of perception. One such frustrating condition is 'being covered by something else', e.g., we cannot see the other side of the wall because it is covered by the side in front. So, in case of perception of an aggregate, that certain parts remain unperceived is a fact admitted by him. The point is that all the parts are not known at a time; hence it is not possible for the whole aggregate to be the locus and revealing medium (vyāñjaka) of the class-character. If the Buddhist

Vide infra, pp. 209-212.
insists that the unapprehended parts can reveal the universal perfectly well, the Naiyāyika asks, in that event why can they not reveal themselves? It cannot also be said that only the parts perceived are sufficient for the purpose of revealing the class-character. In that case there would arise the absurd eventuality that there are many trees, e.g., in the same aggregate of atoms, for we can perceive different sections of twigs, leaves etc. on different occasions, and each such section would be tree, in so far as it is the portion perceived by us at the moment. Obviously this cannot be accepted and the Naiyāyika therefore contends that his is the better hypothesis - the hypothesis that a thing is a unitary substance and as such, can well be the locus of the corresponding universal.

Thus the Nyāya answers the various criticism made by the Buddhist and concludes that they cannot be allowed to stand in the way of recognition of a distinct avayavin.

\[\text{N. B., Ibid, 132}\

vyavahitasyāpnumāvasthanasyapypalabhiprasangah /

\[\text{N. B., Ibid.}\]