CHAPTER-4

SOME ETHICAL ISSUES CONCERNING THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM

"A people that value its privileges above its principles soon lose both..."

—Dwight David Eisenhower.

The world has seen many horrifying instances of terrorism since the last century. However much we criticize their acts, the terrorists claim to have some justified cause for their acts of violence. This makes us think twice whether they are really wrong or do they have adequate reasons to justify their acts. But, at the same time, the question might arise that, do these acts of violence, perpetrated by the terrorists, present ‘moral issues’ at all? It may be replied that ‘morality seems to be a social institution with a code of learnable rules.’ We learn moral rules, because people living in a group can only lead a happy and satisfied life when they have all adopted an institution of morality.

If the question arises how one can be moral while maintaining social welfare, then Richard Dawkin’s example of a species of birds parasitized by dangerous ticks may be cited. The problem for Dawkin’s birds is that no bird by itself can remove the ticks from its head, and a tick in the head is surely deadly. If none of the birds groomed one another, the species would eventually perish. There are three types of birds among Dawkin’s birds’ species. Some are suckers, some are cheats and others are grudgers. Suckers would groom any bird that needs grooming. Cheats, on the other hand, accept grooming from other birds but would not themselves groom any bird. But grudgers would groom a bird that has groomed it, and would also groom strangers as long as they are reciprocating. It seems then, that the first category of birds would soon be off as the suckers groom all birds including cheats, but the increasing number of cheats would never groom them. Again the cheats are not stable since they would not groom anybody, they would not be groomed by the grudgers either who believe in reciprocation. Hence, an increasing number of grudgers would make them extinct in their turn. So the grudgers survive in the long run. The Law of this Bird Jungle will take the form “Be done by as you did”, which could morph into “Groom only birds that groom
you". Turning society to human society, we find that, if a stable reciprocal altruism could be established among the people (in the collective) then only ethical wellbeing of the society could be maintained. But as such the so-called terrorists violate ethical norms, hence their deeds are not only unjustifiable but also extinction of their race seems not too far.

We thus turn to discuss the issue of morality of terrorism. The terrorists have mainly two points of view behind their actions, which can be explained clearly by two theories namely – the frustration-aggression theory and the rational choice explanation. The former explains terrorism as a response to perceived injustice or traumatic personal loss. This theory further states that terrorism is a form of violent turmoil and civil disobedience is caused when the terrorists are dissatisfied with a number of factors and feel themselves to be the victims of injustice. Rational choice explanation posits that, terrorism is a purposive activity which is strongly influenced by the terrorist cost-benefit calculations of the possible means to achieve their political goals.

4.1 Let us now look into the chief issues of terrorism before going on to assess whether these should at all have been made into issues, for which the terrorists exercise.

First terrorism pertains to a movement of regaining loss of self-identity – be it rational, cultural, racial or political.

Secondly, terrorism as a method of retaliation has some or other goal to achieve. Mainly the goal is claimed to be political, although many analysts presume that the terrorists' main goal is to publicize its cause on the regional and international basis by attracting the attention of the media, or to harass and intimidate the authorities to force them to make conclusions or, again, it can even be to weaken the government security forces so that the government overreacts and appears repressive. The goal, as seen, can also be to polarize the society to bring down the regime, or sometimes to destroy facilities or disrupt lines of communication in order to create doubt among the citizens about the government's ability to provide for and protect them. At other times, again, the goal might be to discourage foreign investments supporting the government in power.
Thirdly, in order to fulfil their goals the terrorists use indiscriminate violence where no one is spared, not even a human baby or other animals. The questions which naturally arise here centre around the following issues: the first concern the effectiveness of terrorism as a means to the goal of socialism; the second concerns the moral admissibility of such means. Hence it seems necessary to discuss the different theories regarding ‘End and Means’ to evaluate the acceptability of their claim, as terrorism is mostly seen as an ideology where a good end is believed or sought to be achieved through the means of terror.

4.2 Some thoughts about the concepts of ‘End’ and ‘Means’

To have some end, what is necessary is to have some values, because values supply us the motivational energy to pursue ends. Russell believes that our feelings and emotions are responsible for providing values leading to ends, while reason supplies us the means to achieve those goals as he mentions in his book *Philosophical Essays* in the article called *The Elements of Ethics*. Aristotle also supports this view as he, in his Nicomachean Ethics, holds that the end is always set by our desires and reason deliberates us about means – reason or the cognitive part of mind determines the best means for satisfying these desires.

Hume, in his book *A Treatise of Human Nature*, says: “Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” Thus Hume in this context holds that our goals, without exception, are set by our desires. Reason as such never sets any goal for an agent; it only works out a strategy for realizing the goal. This view is supported even by the psychological hedonists who think that pleasure is the aim, and reason is used to guide us towards that aim. Even McDougall’s instinct theory suggests a similar function for the intellect. The ends at which we aim are determined by our innate tendencies or instincts, whereas reason assists in discovering the best means for the attainment of these ends.

A good end can be attained by a number of alternative actions (both good and bad). For example a student can achieve a good result either by good means, i.e., by studying hard or by unfair means. Hence, the presumption that means must be morally consistent with the end is not always true. It is seen from experience too that evil means often can effectively produce good ends.
It is the teleological view which regards the supremacy of end over means. This is because true means is means if it can lead us to our desired end. The value of means according to the teleologists is merely instrumental and not intrinsic. In fact means must not be subjected to evaluation. We call it good in the sense that it produces the intended result. This becomes all the more clear in the Discourses of Machiavelli, where he states that, it is legitimate in the sphere of politics to use immoral means in order to attain a good end, namely, preservation of power.

Even the Marxists (notably, Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky) take this position. For them the good ends are what really matter, and not how they are attained (where the ends can be attained even by employing morally corrupt or bad means; such as raising violence to bring change in the system of governance). The proletariats can achieve the goals of overthrowing the torturous and oppressive bourgeoisie system only through a violent revolution, because it was practically found to be absolutely absurd to think that bourgeoisie oppression can be abolished by any peaceful negotiation or through juridical procedure (as the entire state machinery is used for the oppression of the proletariat). This position implies that in a changed situation the goal (of overthrowing the oppressive institutions) may become the means (of establishing a free human society), and at some other times the means may turn into the goal. Again humanism, as a goal embodying man’s freedom and happiness, determines the most humane means of attaining it, i.e., destruction of all oppressive instruments by violent revolutionary means. Such means may seem to be immoral from the point of view of conventional ethics, but it is necessary for a good revolutionary end.

Jean Paul Sartre in his book Being and Nothingness and Simon de Beauvoir, in his book The Bonds of Freedom the well known existentialists, also hold a similar view. Freedom to them seems to be the ultimate value in morality, and whatever action is directed towards freedom of the greatest number – is justified. But if we look at the terrorists of today then we find that they, in the name of freedom, carry out barbaric activities – so the question arises: whose freedom then do we talk about – is it freedom of the citizens from an opposed government or is it their own selfish liberty which can be used by them in whichever manner they want to use it.
The teleologists say that the end has such a great degree of goodness or rightness that such goodness would outweigh the disvalue or the ill feeling that are usually attached to the bad means.

The two arguments upon which the Marxist account stands are:

1. End and means are separable, and the good end justifies any means.

2. Socialism cannot be achieved without revolutionary violence and repression. So whoever desires the ‘end’ of socialism must accept the ‘means’ of terrorism (for a good cause).

D.D. Bandstine strongly criticizes the Marxist standpoint. According to him, to establish the dictum ‘end justifies means’ the Marxists employ wrong analogies to prove their claim. They also commit the fallacy of non-observation as historical evidences disprove their claim, and above all their claim goes against the law of causation.

Unlike Marx, M.K. Gandhi pronounces his desire to keep the purity of means above other considerations. He holds that, means are after all everything. He believes in the deontological view (i.e. duty for duty’s sake) when he states that, the cause (end) has to be just and clear as well as the means. To Gandhi since ends and means are necessarily connected with each other they are convertible terms, and the end alone can never justify the means. Gandhi, while emphasizing the pure character of means, considers ‘means’ to be intrinsically good or the highest virtue, and adds that, the creator has given us control over means, none over the end. His famous utterance in this regard is, “If one takes care of the means, the end will take care of itself.” He believes that, as the means are, so must be the end. Hence no good end can be attained through ill means. Realization of the goal is in exact proportion to that of the means. This is why he thinks ‘Swaraj’ (autonomous or self Government) by violence, will not mean freedom at all because methods of political emancipation based on hatred and violence would degrade the nation (though such methods may temporarily be successful).

Moreover, Gandhi seems convinced that violence begets violence. Violent means might have liberated the nation but that would leave the nation in the web of endless conflict and no peace whatsoever. Use of force can never result in the achievement of non-violence, freedom, equality or similar ultimate values.
Empirical evidences show that use of force as a means of social control almost invariably leads to a result which is very different from the desired goal of the perpetrators of violence. There are ample examples of successful non-violent movements too, such as Hungarian resistance against Austria from 1850-1864, the Chinese boycotts of Japanese goods in the early 20th century, the fights in the Russian empire in 1905-06, the struggles against the Nazis in Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands etc. Gandhi prescribes ‘satyagraha’ (similar to some extent to passive resistance held by some Western thinkers) as a means to Swaraj. Since ‘Satyagraha’ was one of the most powerful methods of direct action, a satyagrahi exhausted all other means before taking resort to satyagraha. His satyagraha was centred on the notion of non-violence, which, according to Gandhi, is the highest virtue as it can be equated to love, truth and finally to God. Hence non-violence has always implied a struggle, not merely for political cause but a struggle to uplift one’s self and reach the ultimate truth, i.e., God. Gandhi was highly influenced by the Jaina and Buddhist thoughts where the notion of ahimsa or non-violence was seen as the greatest human value. The spirit of non-violence springs from an inner realization of spiritual unity. Non-violence, in Gandhi’s view, implies complete self purification— it is a quality of the heart. Man as an animal is violent but as a spirit is non-violent. So to be non-violent he has to awaken the spirit. Non-violence does not show the weakness of mankind; rather to be non-violent even in adverse situations, is a great skill which requires a lot of inner strength. Gandhi finally states that all should practise non-violence because it is an end in itself.

As a matter of fact, however, Gandhi himself does not regard the use of force as necessarily equivalent to a violent act. He even regards killing as consistent with non-violence in certain circumstances. For example, killing for sustaining one’s own body and for protecting those under one’s care. Such cases where force is used is unavoidable according to Gandhi and, again, when the choice is between cowardly submission to the oppression of a tyrannical government and an armed uprising against it, Gandhi would certainly justify the latter.
In this context let us discuss the moral justification for the use of force, where we would see that force can be legitimately used under certain necessary conditions.

4.2.1 Moral Justification for the use of Deadly Force

Human rights generate concomitant duties for others, such as A’s right to life generates a duty on the part of B, not to kill A. And human rights are justifiably enforceable, e.g. if A has a right not to be killed by B, and if B attempts to kill A, then B can legitimately be prevented from killing A by means of coercive force including, if necessary, the use of deadly force.

While there is an enforceable human right to life, killing another person can only be morally justified in very restricted circumstances. The basic among such circumstances is that of self-defense. However self defense is not the only justification for taking the life of another person. We are entitled to defend that right to life by killing an attacker under three conditions.

First, when the attacker intentionally tries to kill someone – either one self or another person – and succeeds if others do not intervene. We are not entitled to shoot dead an attacker whom we know for sure, is threatening us only with a replica gun.

Secondly, when we have no way of preserving our own or the other person’s life other than by killing the attacker.

Thirdly, when the attacker does not have a decisive morally justifiable reason for trying to kill. For example, it may be that legally appointed executioner has a decisive morally justifiable reason for carrying out the death penalty in case of a serial killer, but the serial killer does not have a decisive morally justifiable reason for trying to kill the executioner in self defense, even if the opportunity arises.

Let us now consider a simple example to test our intuitions for the claim that sometimes the use of deadly force to enforce positive rights namely, right to life is morally justified.

Let us consider the case of a destitute African who is dying of HIV- AIDS, and who goes to a pharmaceutical company demanding drugs to enable him to
live. Let us assume further that the pharmacy company is a state subsidized organization, which is subsidized because it has one of its clearly stated institutional purposes to provide cheap life-preserving drugs to the needy; albeit within the parameters of commercial viability. When the AIDS sufferer is refused the drugs, on the ground that he must pay for the drugs at a high price – rather than an affordable lower price – he threatens to kill, one by one, the owner-managers of the company responsible for the high price, unless and until he is provided with the drug at an affordable price. Even though the druggists know that it would be commercially viable to sell the drug at the affordable lower price, they still engage in the corrupt practice of selling it at the high price in order to ensure the resulting enormous profit for themselves. It is assumed further that providing the AIDS sufferer with drugs would be at the expense of some more affluent AIDS sufferer, and that the druggists know this and know that the AIDS sufferer will die unless he is provided with drugs (and the druggist is the only authentic source of the drugs). Finally, let us assume that the only option available to the AIDS sufferer is to allow himself to die or to threaten to kill the druggist.

Intuitively, the AIDS sufferer’s action seems morally justified, (although one might say that under no circumstances should he have taken the law into his own hand) given that this action was the only way to preserve his life, since in this corrupt society there is no legal means of ensuring that the company meets the obligation. For he had a positive right to be assisted, and the ‘bystander’, i.e., the owner – manager druggist, was refraining from carrying out his institutional and moral duty to respect that right.

Here the druggist has freely undertaken an institutional role in the state subsidized company to assist AIDS sufferers and in effect, is paid a salary to do so. He has thereby intentionally put himself under an institutional obligation to assist and, therefore, the AIDS sufferer now has a moral right to be assisted.

Further, there are no counter-vailing moral reasons for the druggist not to assist; his only reason for not doing so would be greed.

Accordingly, and in absence of any intervention from the part of anyone else (including the police), the AIDS sufferer is entitled to threaten the life of the druggist in order to cause him to discharge his obligation to assist.
Evidently, this kind of ease involving the AIDS sufferer is analogous to those involving negative rights, such as the right not to be killed, or the right not to have one’s freedom interfered with. So deadly force can be used, at least in principle, to enforce some positive rights, including presumably rights to subsistence, as well as to enforce negative rights, such as freedom or the right not to be killed.

Here, on assuming the moral principles of proportionate and minimally necessary force, deadly force should be used only as a last resort, and loss of life kept to a minimum. So if, for example, the AIDS sufferer could cause the government to intervene on his behalf, or cause the managers to handover the drug by mere threats, then he should do so. Moreover, as is the case with negative rights, third parties – at least in principle – have rights and indeed duties, to use deadly force to ensure that positive rights (such as rights to live etc.) are respected.

Now a modified version of the above HIV/AIDS scenario may be considered. In this modified version the AIDS sufferer is a young African boy dying in his bed, and it is his father who threatens the pharmaceutical managers with dire consequences – indeed, he kills one of the owner-managers to procure drugs in order to save his son. Here also the father’s action would be morally justified in some cases in which less than life was at stake. This would be so if – as in the previous version of this scenario – the AIDS sufferer could survive without the drugs, but would live a life of intolerable suffering as a consequence of his affliction.

Thus it may be concluded that, under certain conditions third parties might be morally entitled to use deadly force to enforce on others duties to assist.

This proves that use of violence is not always immoral.

4.2.2 Now let us once again embark upon the ethical views. In this context we must be well aware of the object of moral judgement. The ethical theories have evolved on the basis of such an object of moral judgement.

1 Robert Nozick had first mentioned about such negative rights. He says that such rights impose duties on others to leave one alone and let him do things that are important to him like speak his mind or make his own decisions. These rights also carry a great deal of normative weight as we place great importance upon not violating the negative rights of other people.
In the field of ethics there was an age old conflict among the moralists regarding motive and consequence—i.e., which among the two should be considered as the object of moral judgement?

The consequentialists or teleologists (in other words the Empiricists) state that the result or consequence of a voluntary action actually determines the rightness or wrongness of an action. They perhaps believe in the saying ‘All is well, that ends well’. According to them, it is the result of an action which ultimately matters and this result or consequence alone determines an action to be good or bad, right or wrong. Ethicisists like, Mill and Bentham were advocates of such a belief. Thus under them developed the teleological theory (where telos means end). Such a teleological theory can be further classified into Utilitarianism and Hedonism. The former is that theory which talks of a good action as that one which brings maximum utility to maximum number of people. Here providing of utility to the maximum actually means looking after the maximum ‘benefit’ of the maximum number.

Such a principle of utilitarianism can be of two types—Act Utilitarianism and Rule Utilitarianism where AU states that, if in a particular situation one acts in such a manner that it leads to maximum utility to maximum number then that would be called a good action, RU on the other hand, states that if by following a particular rule an action is done, which later on produces maximum benefit to maximum number—then that teleological principle of action would be considered as a good action.

Hedonism, as an ethical standard states, that action to be a moral action which gives pleasure in the end. We cannot deny that each and every one of us are seeking pleasure(as it is a psychological as well as ethical aspect of desire). Again pleasure can be of two types—egoistic and altruistic. When we desire pleasure only for ourselves then that would be termed as egoistic hedonism, and when we aim at universal pleasure, that is pleasure of all, that is, of the entire society then it is termed as altruistic hedonism.

Be it utility or pleasure—both come at the end of an action—thus the teleologists or consequentialists would uphold the notion of telos and would
consider that ‘telos’ or ‘end’ or consequence’ of an action as the object of moral judgement.

The pluralistic utilitarian approach (of G.E. Moore), which is in contrast with the hedonistic position, prefers to interpret the principle of utility as demanding that, the rightness or wrongness of an action is assessed in terms of the total range of intrinsic values ultimately produced by the action. These thinkers are of the opinion that many values besides happiness, possess intrinsic worth, e.g., the values of friendship, knowledge, love, courage, health, beauty etc. According to this view, only the realization of the end is important, for it is the end of the action which is the real repository of value – no matter by whatever actions or means it is achieved. Thus actions do not have any intrinsic value of their own, they have only instrumental value – an action is good or right as a means to the existence of states of affairs which either leads to happiness of the agent or produces some intrinsic value. Whatever value an action has is derived from that of the end which it serves. Hence, the utilitarian view also promotes the maxim: end justifies the means.

Thus utilitarianism is rooted in two corrected theses—(1) that an action or practice is right, if it leads to the greatest possible balance of good consequences and (2) that the concepts of duty and right are subordinated to or determined by that which maximizes the good.

Now let us check with each of the theories of the consequentialists, whether they can justify the notion of terrorism or not.

The ‘telos’ or ‘end’ of the terrorists’ acts have to bring good results for them to be ethical action. To clarify, they should either provide maximum benefits to maximum number of people (as per utilitarianism) or should provide pleasure to one self or society at large (as per hedonism).

Now some might say that in a way utilitarianism justifies terrorism as the latter does satisfy the concept of maximum good to maximum number of people. In a gang murder or a gang rape when five people murder or rape a single individual, then maximum benefit or maximum pleasure is met by the maximum (as here only one who is the victim, is being deprived of benefit of pleasure). But J.S. Mill would never term these as good actions as the nature of benefit or
pleasure has to be taken into consideration. Such brutality or animosity, even if it beings cent percent pleasure to all performing the act – still there injustice takes place as he mentions morality does not merely arise through number. Here the nature of pleasure or benefit is to be taken seriously. Again Bentham the hedonist was not so bothered with the nature or quality of pleasure, to him rather the degree or quantity of pleasure mattered. But this kind of sadistic pleasure derived from a heinous act is not a pleasure of good quality – hence it could not be accepted by Mill (who believed in the qualitative aspect of pleasure and not in its quantitative aspect).

Mill in his book ‘Utilitarianism’ further states clearly that “Never to kill another human being may seem to be a good rule, but it could make self-defense against malevolent aggressions very difficult”. Terrorism, as we all know, is surely not a case of self-defense; thus, mass killing found in terrorism cannot be justified at all by Mill or by his theory of utilitarianism or by that of hedonism.

Even if we try to assess the terrorists’ position by teleological theory of T.H. Green (where he challenges the utilitarian or the hedonistic position) we may find that even from that perspective it is untenable. According to Green, man’s sole purpose of moral life does not lie in seeking happiness, as it is more an instinctive action; but man’s duty issues from the central purpose of making himself better, i.e., to achieve self-perfection, which is the source of ‘duty’ (not the Kantian ‘duty for duty’s sake’). Human action must be determined by motive; it should not be interpreted in terms of mere wants because wants can never be a motive for any human moral action.

But the terrorists’ acts are based on their ‘wants’ – which, however, are endless, therefore, such acts cannot be justified.

Even act or rule utilitarianism cannot justify terrorism as no situation of A.U. and no rule of R.U. can justify innocent killing at all.

The intuitionists (rationalists) on the other hand give emphasis on motive and regard motive of the voluntary actions to be the object of moral judgement. To them motive is more important than consequence. The consequentialists retort with a counter example to show that the rightness or wrongness of an action cannot be determined by the motive alone. For example, two persons might have
the same motive to earn money for their family's survival. But one may earn money through a fair mean and the other through an unfair means. Although both have a common motive which is good, no doubt, but can we call both of these actions to be good? This proves that motive alone cannot act as an object of moral judgement.

To this the intuitionists reply that, although they give importance to the motive this does not mean that they are discard the consequence completely as an object of moral judgement. In fact, they hold that there is a harmony between motive and consequence (as said by M.K. Gandhi too). These two are not different; rather they are the two sides of the same coin or in other words two aspects of judging morality. According to them, consequence is actually the outer manifestation of the inner motive. In this way a harmony is noticed between the two.

But Mackenzie gives an example where such an apparent harmony is missing. For example, a reputed surgeon performs an operation with care in order to cure the patient. But still the patient dies. Thus here although the motive was good, the consequence turned out to be bad. Hence no harmony is found here between motive and consequence—so once again the question arises as to whether motive or consequence is the object of moral judgement.

Now from motive stems our duties—hence still another ethical theory takes birth, which is known as Deontological Theory in Ethics (where ‘deon’ means duty). This gives no importance to the end of an action, nor to its utility or maximum benefit to maximum number of people, neither does it see whether the action gives pleasure or not. This theory holds that we must perform our duty for duty's sake. Duty is the product of goodwill (a component of reason which is unconditionally good). Food is good and is required, wealth is good and it is required, education too is good – but such goods are conditional. In other words, food is good if it is taken in proper quantities, money is good so-long it does not lead to corruption, education is good so long it does not produce pride in oneself. But 'good will' is intrinsically good, i.e., it does not require any external condition to be good. When such goodwill dictates our duties then performing them would automatically lead to moral actions without any doubt. Immanuel Kant, the German Philosopher, was the chief advocate of such a Deontological theory—
which states we must perform our duties at any cost. For example, when a mother at death bed wants to know about her son then the person who relates such news of her son to her should be telling the truth that he has just died in fighting a battle. He should not worry about the consequences thinking that the mother may immediately die, on hearing the news. Rather he ought to speak out the truth since telling the truth is his duty.

Kant further states that the actions which are determined by our sense of duty must be capable of being universalized—i.e. should be treated as a universal law or categorical imperative (unconditional command). Kant in his book *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, mentions the Universal Law formulation or the first formulation of Categorical Imperative as; “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” Can the terrorists will that their maxim become a universal law? Now let us consider terrorism and see whether or not their maxim can be treated as a universal law. Kant stated that if a law is universal then it should be applicable to individual instance too. In that case he conjoins the two propositions to see whether the conjunction is true or false. If it is found to be false then such an act cannot be universalized, hence neither can it be applied to individual instances. For example if the terrorists hold the maxim that—

The innocents should be killed in order to change the Government or in other words everyone should kill the innocents of the society to change the Government.

This is a universal statement and when applied to individual level then it becomes:

I should kill innocents of the society to change the Government.

While conjoining of the personal and universal maxim we get:

I should kill the innocents of the society to change the Government and everyone should kill the innocents of the society to change the Government.

Such a conjunction leads to contradiction, hence it is false. It leads to contradiction because the Government is selected by the innocent citizens for their benefit and if the citizens are killed, then why should be there any need of Government at all? Kant believed that such a contradiction can be of two types—
contradiction in conception and contradiction in will. In the first kind of contradiction the maxim, when universalized, is no longer a viable means to the end. Again the second kind of contradiction is that contradiction where the will of a person contradicts what the universalization of the maxim implies. The first type of contradiction leads to a “perfect duty”, and the second leads to an “imperfect duty”. In case of universalizing terrorism the contradiction which is found is contradiction in conception where the means that is killing of innocents does not lead to a viable end, namely, a change in the Government since the Government is only formed by these innocent civilians or the citizens of the nation. Hence, such a maxim is false and thus cannot be universalized, and therefore, cannot be applied at individual level too. And if it cannot be made a universal maxim, then it cannot be considered as a Categorical Imperative too. Thus it does not abide by good will or pure reason; hence terrorism violates also the duty or ‘deon’ of the deontologists like Kant and others.

Kant further states that, no empirical sentiment, sympathy or desire can constitute morality as none of these can yield objectivity or universality of moral principles. Thus if the terrorists, considering themselves as weak and minority, and demand sympathy for their acts—then they should not deserve sympathy. Most importantly, people who kill innocents of the society do not deserve sympathy at all. Kant in this context also mentions that however the psychology of human beings may vary in time, place or culture, but the fundamental standard of moral good and evil does not vary along with them. It is as independent of human nature as the laws of arithmetic and Newtonian physics. As far as morality is concerned cultural grounds and ethnic deprivations cannot be shown by terrorists as their cause of action.

Kant has emphasized not only upon goodness and humanity but also upon human beings or persons. To him these persons or humans should be treated as the ‘end’ in themselves but on terrorist acts they are treated as ‘means’ to reach at the terrorists’ so called great end; limiting personhood—which is an offense by itself. Kant, further, talks of retributive punishment which can lead to taking away the sinner’s life if the crime done is heinous indeed. Kant even criticizes the ‘best wars’, as there also in spite of all the rules of just war being followed, humans are
still seen as ‘means’ and not as end in themselves. (As in war end would be the victory of nations and not human beings).

The consequentialists at this juncture would retort that exceptions should be made to moral rules. For instance loss of life should be permitted if more lives are saved by doing so. Thus if not terrorism, but counter terrorism and loss of lives for defense may be considered moral.

While discussing such a deontological theory we must talk of act deontology and rule deontology, where the former states that when a particular situation teaches us what duty to perform in that context – then such an act deontological principle is said to carry out right/moral actions. On the contrary when our duty is specifically dictated by certain prefixed rules of society or rules commanded by God then our action ought to be good or right.

But no situation of act deontology dictates innocent killing as our duty and no rule of rule deontology considers mass slaughtering as ethical.

Again the Divine Command Theory upholds God’s will as the determinant of our duties thus it also comes under Deontological Theory of Ethics. The Divine Command Theory is said to be the ultimate standard of morality but the Gods of different religions make different commands; in that case morality or code-of-conduct too gets changed. But morality is supposed to be objective and not subjective in any sense. Christ says, “Do not Murder” (although in the Old Testament of Bible, a lot of killing is found, especially killing of the unethical), but for Mohammad “Slay the Pagans”, and Moses it goes as ‘Kill the Canaanites’. Again Lord Krishna would say ‘the sinner should be punished after certain stage of mercy if he is not rectified’. So which moral code is to be accepted? The terrorists destroyed World Trade Centre, for they believed that they had been commanded by Allah to destroy infidels. Either they misinterpreted Allah’s message (which is plainly set forth in the Koran), or believed that Allah commanded them to do something that was wrong. Either way, we can plainly judge the mass destruction of September 11, to be a wrong act, but who is to be blamed? Thus this theory itself can be criticized, or even if we consider divine command theory then it cannot justify terrorism as no God of any religion can talk of innocent killing.
Thus terrorism seems to fail even this test of Deontology, an ethical theory determining object and subject of moral judgement.

Mackenzie in his book *A Manual of Ethics* while determining the goodness or badness of actions have mentioned about the ‘means’ of actions which cannot be neglected. For example, a student may have a good motive to score good marks in the exam, and he actually does so—in which case both the motive and the consequence are good. But it was later found that he had used unfair means. Can the action be called a good one? The answer is negative. So according to Mackenzie neither the end alone nor the motive alone can be the object of moral judgement; but the motive, means and consequence—when all three are taken together then ‘intention’ is formed which is further manifested by ‘character’ and this character is taken as the object of moral judgement.

Virtue ethics deals with character. It states that it is not the person but his character which should be taken into account while judging the rightness or wrongness of an action. But later on even this was criticized as no man is either good or bad but a combination of both that is, shades of grey. In other words character instead of having two distinct poles, rather have different shades or different poles.

Virtue ethicists neither believes in consequences (as emphasized by teleologists), nor do they believe in motive (as emphasized by intuitionists)—but they rather believe in inner traits (virtue, vice, goodness, badness, sense of rightness and wrongness), while determining ethics of an action.

Every object has a typical nature of its own. Just as the fire always emits upward flame and water travels downward similarly, each man possesses a character peculiar to himself, which is either acquired hereditarily or acquired by his environment. Such a character of any person is found of have certain characteristics—good, bad, polite, arrogant, introvert, extrovert etc. These character traits help to take decisions as to which option we should select, given a choice among many. All good, moral or ethical wilful choices come from virtuous traits of a person’s character, which form an independent branch of normative
study (independent from teleological or deontological theories of ethics) called the virtue ethics, propounded by Aristotle.\(^\text{ii}\)

Now let us consider the salient features of virtue ethics.

**Firstly**, it is an ethics which is ‘agent-centered’ rather than ‘act-centered’. Secondly it asks oneself ‘What sort of person should I be?’ rather than ‘What sort of action I should I do?’ Thirdly, it takes certain aretic concepts (good, well, virtue) as basics rather than deontic concepts (right, duty, obligation) and fourthly, it rejects the idea that ethics is codifiable in rules or principles that can provide specific action guidance, the way utilitarian and deontological theories do. But this branch of ethics can also provide a specification of ‘right action’—as ‘what a virtuous agent would, characteristically, do in the circumstances’—and such a specification can be regarded as generating a number of moral rules or principles. Each virtue generates an instruction — ‘Do what is charitable’, and each vice is a prohibition—‘Do not act, or do what is dishonest, uncharitable’. Such instructions and prohibitions are found in Vedas of Indian tradition termed as Vidhi, Nishedha.

But a practical problem which arises in case of virtue ethics is that not being a normative ethics, it does not provide a decision procedure which resolves dilemma in advance of deciding whether or not there are any resolvable dilemmas. If there are any then action guidance in such cases is not possible. However action assessment is still not only possible, but also needed and virtue ethics can provide a particularly satisfying account of the differences between unworrying,

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\(^{ii}\) Virtue Ethics was first born with Plato and Aristotle; it refers to the individual being rather than his doing. Here morality stems from the identity and or character of the individual, rather than being a reflection of the actions (or consequences thereof) of the individual. In virtue Ethics morality comes as a result of the internal virtues. Aristotle’s main aim was to achieve Eudemonia through virtue ethics, which is an “activity of the soul in accordance with perfect virtue”. (Nichomachean Ethics) The most important virtue is wisdom according to Aristotle. He further argued that each of the virtues was a mean between two corresponding vices, one of excess and one of deficiency. For example courage is a virtue found between the vices of cowardliness and rashness. The ethics of virtue is also followed in Vedic traditions. Thus the Vedas help us in the constant drilling of values of goodness through its various injunctions, moral stories and explanation of natural laws—as nature if violated then vice is sure to overshadow one’s life. Chandogya Upanishad states clearly that it is only virtue and not vice, which can cross the bridge between time and eternity. The Rig Veda (51.15) also states that we may follow the path of goodness as the sun and the moon follow their path. May good thoughts come to us from every side, pure, unobstructed, and overflowing.(89.1)
distressing, and genuinely tragic dilemmas, the latter being those from which even the most virtuous agent can not emerge with her life unmarred.

Moreover 'virtue ethics' states that the virtues benefit their possessor, by virtue of which he cannot act immorally.

It also states that our nature is such that the virtues as we know them, suit human beings. But this is a contingent statement. It is a contingent fact that we can, individually, flourish or achieve eudaemonia, contingent that we can do so in the same way as each other, and contingent that we can do so altogether, not at each other’s expense. If things had been otherwise then, according to the version of virtue ethics presented here, morality would not exist or would be unimaginably different.

Here while discussing virtue ethics, I would like to mention that Aristotle had maintained a good distinction between 1) acting from reason, which we, typically do and what other animals and small children do when they act and 2) he also mentions of a distinction between rational wanting or desire, which we, typically have, and the mere passion or desire that drives other animals and small children. (This distinction reminds us of Freud’s distinction of the ego and id, where he showed ego to be rational and sensible enough to judge things but it is something irrational something which is guided only by our senses to satisfy their respective pleasures.)

So, even if we take ‘character’ of the terrorists as per virtue ethics then also virtue cannot be found in any sense. Even Christ says hate the sin, not the sinner. Thus the traits in a person are important and not the person himself. A terrorist cannot be bad himself, it is because of possession of such inner dispositions—that behaves in such a manner. Such traits are not virtuous in any sense rather they portray vice—hence if not the terrorists but terrorism according to Virtue ethics, is indeed subject to criticism.

Thus neither teleology nor utilitarianism (both act and rule) or hedonism can justify terrorism. As their mass killing cannot balance the end of their actions, as no good consequence (apart from serving their selfish motive) is found by terrorism. Moreover, no decent, meaningful or qualitative pleasure of hedonism is obtained by such means. Thirdly, terrorists snatch away others right to life—hence
terrorism does not follow deontology as the terrorists violate the basic duty to let live and no good traits of character is found in those cruel people who cruelly take lives of non-combatants, women, children and other helpless folks. Thus virtue ethics too would not support it either.

Therefore terrorism is completely unethical at all times and at all places.

Let us now discuss an entirely different point of view regarding moral values, that of Freidrich Nietzsche, where he rejects the idea that there are objective values. We may call him a situational ethicist. In his book *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche points out that, there are no moral facts whatsoever. He believes that moral has this in common with a religious judgment that believes in realities which do not exist. So moral beliefs cannot be justified, instead, we must treat morality as a phenomenon to be explained and interpreted. Thus to him morality is not a timeless product of a priori reason, but it becomes a social phenomenon which changes over time with the historical development of human societies.

It is very clear that Nietzsche admitted perspectivism which means that there is no standpoint from which purely objective knowledge and understanding can be achieved. Nietzsche thus tries to unmask moralities and show them to be quite different from what they appear to be. It is true that thoughts of Nietzsche remind us of the Sophists who believed that morality had a history, and it varies from one society to another. So there is no reason why one society should endorse the morality which is dominant in any other society or in the rest of the world. What if a society does not accept any morality at all? Nietzsche in a similar way would say that there are no moral facts.

Since nothing is absolutely good or absolutely bad, Nietzsche finds the motive force of all actions in the will to power. Domination of the more powerful in inevitable is inevitable since men are unequal in ability. The fittest or the strongest will survive in the struggle for domination. If the concept of morality is eliminated from our discourse and if morality is explained in terms of its genealogy that considers morality as a product of social order, then we would be led to all kinds of ethical relativism, nihilism and subjectivism. But it must be remembered that the rejection of objectivism does not necessarily entail nihilism.
Nietzsche however accepted a part of the real state of affairs and rejected another part. It may be that the sense of morality differs from one society to another, but this does not mean that there is no morality at all. Thus Nietzsche says that, according to their own convenience men would form rules and live according to them in the society. If this be accepted then there would be no clashes among the conservatives and the liberals of the society leading to large scale terrorism. But the question arises can we preserve goodness if society works on the convenience of anyone and everyone. Now in a society, it is not possible for a man to do anything that will not affect the society. This means that he must be guided by a moral ideal, which would make room for social good. So, there certainly are absolute moral values, which guide our social behaviour.

Thus morality has no specific social origin, though it has certain significance. That morality has a social significance is an idea which was expressed in the writings of Aristotle, Mill and even perhaps Kant. The fact that different men act in different ways, is due to the differences between different men’s conscience. The Quaker and the head-hunter, each does right in following his conscience; the Quaker in not killing when the government says he should, and the head-hunter in killing when the government says he should not. The theory has no need of an objective good that right action should tend to realize, since right action is defined, not by its effects, but by its cause, which must be the voice of conscience (here morality becomes subjective).

Russell holds sin as “disobedience to the voice of conscience” – If this is true, then the question is whether the terrorists purposively disobey their voice of conscience or whether such a conscience is lacking in them. Perhaps, the first option is more appropriate. They constantly suppress their inner voice; otherwise they could not have committed such heinous acts – which, according to them, are not sins at all. Rejection of such sins by us would mean that we fail to maintain a distinction between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. ‘Right’ actions are those that it is useful to praise, ‘wrong’ actions are those it is useful to blame. Praise and blame remain as powerful incentives, tending to promote conduct which serves the general interest. But the terrorists do not care whether their actions gather blame from the majority, although their acts do gather a lot of praise as they think that their acts of terror are acts of heroism. Thus they think that such actions are right (as they are...
praiseworthy) and not wrong at all. This is how perhaps they would justify their actions and pretend that they have done no sin.

Now, what applies to punishment also applies to blame. The fear of being blamed is a very powerful deterrent, but actual blame, when the blameworthy action has been performed, is, as a rule, painful (even to the terrorists) without being morally helpful. The person blamed is likely to become sullen and defiant, to despair of the good opinion of the community. This result is especially probable when it is not an individual but a large group that is blamed. After the First World War the victors told the German that the guilt was wholly Germany’s, and even forced them to sign a document by which they pretend to acknowledge their sole culpability. After the Second World War Montgomery issued a proclamation telling German parents to explain to their children that British soldiers could not smile at them because of the wickedness of their fathers and mothers. This was, on occasion, bad psychology and bad positions, of a sort that is encouraged by belief in the doctrine of ‘sin’. We are all creatures of the circumstances in which we are brought up; if that is unsatisfactory to our neighbours, it is for them to find ways of improving us. It is very seldom that moral reprobation is the best way of achieving this object.

There are two types of politically important desires. Let us see whether terrorism can be held to be ethical if it fulfils these natural desires. In the primary group of desires comes the necessity of life: food, shelter and clothing. When these things become scanty then men ought to secure them by violent means, or else they would die.

But these are not the only desires for which men become politically vandal; other desires also keep them active: four in particular, which we can label acquisitiveness, rivalry, vanity and love for power.

Acquisitiveness means the wish to possess as much as possible of commodities scaring that one day they would fall short of such goods. But the problem here is, as the psychoanalysts have pointed out that, however much one acquires one will always wish to acquire more; satiety is a dream which will always elude them.
Rivalry is another motive and a stronger one for which people even sacrifices their lives.

Vanity, the desire for attention paid towards one’s self is still another motive of immense potency. But the problem is the more one (the terrorist) is talked about, the more he will wish to be talked about. And just to seek attention he would go out of his way to do things – which ultimately harm so many innocents just to bring him in lime light.

Love for power is something which the world is fighting for. Who does not want to be powerful? But the more powerful one becomes the more despotic he is found to be – thus such an immense power and its misuse by the government are supposed to be curbed by the so-called terrorists. But in reality, the terrorists perform their acts not to curb the power of the government and save people from its exploitation, they do so for grabbing the power from them to their own stride. This game of power makes the world so turbulent now days.

So it is seen that the terrorists, work out of such political desires mentioned above. Now such desires should be kept in check or else the world would not be worth living anymore. Thus the terrorists cannot be held to be ethical on the basis of these desires which may be considered as normal by some; – but when the limits are transcended then the desires are misused and people are made to suffer for the fulfilment of their selfish motives.

4.2.3 In this section I would try to defend the terrorists by the same ethical theories which belittle their position, and see what would be perspective, or morality behind their actions. We have to remember that the terrorists also have an underlying ethics in striking against, the society.

In line with the ‘utilitarian’ argument, the terrorists would perhaps state that their actions also have much utility, if not immediate but in the long run. They try to eradicate all exploitations of common men by their actions. If really they can do so, then the society at large would be benefitted. And this is how, with public support, they can also change the corrupt Governmental system along with its policies. Although this is a long term vision, but the initiation has already started. Hence for such a greater cause some lives have to be sacrificed which can be considered as ‘collateral’ damage. In that case they would practically achieve
maximum benefit of maximum number of people which would comprise the society, state, nation and finally the world.

Such a consequence would automatically lead to a qualitative as well as quantitative pleasure as freedom is what all of us want, and a non-corrupt, transparent system is desired by us all. What can lead us to more happiness than this—hence such a scenario would serve 'hedonistic' purposes of ethics too, as we would finally get what we had desired—that is freedom which alone is the reason enough for providing pleasure.

'Deontologically' the terrorists might state that they are performing a fundamental duty which the other citizens have forgotten to perform, hence their aggression is found towards such an irresponsible society. It is the duty of each and every one of us to protect our as well as the right of our neighbours as per ‘social contract’ theory which had been formulated long back during the time of Locke, Rousseau. But are the rights of the terrorists well preserved? The answer is no. Their rights and privileges have not only been taken away and utilized by the Government but also have been snatched away by the others in the society who have power—and that is the reason why they have become the minority today.

Moreover another sect of religious fundamentalist terrorists think that it is their duty to spread God’s message amidst the unaware and through Jihad it is only that they are performing their duty. In this way ‘Divine Command’ theory can stand justified as far as terrorism is concerned. It has to be noted here that Jihad which is carried out by them is not mere slaughtering and maiming of innocents—etymologically it means ‘a struggle for sustaining one’s existence’ (something like Darwin’s theory of survival of the fittest).

If we see terrorism from a ‘humanitarian’ aspect then we would find ourselves to be non-humans being completely emerged into the dogmatic slumber of political unawareness, enjoying extravagances—due to which some others have to suffer a bad life. So if we call them inhuman then we are no less than that as we by our non co-operation and indifference to their problems are indirectly taking them to death’s mouth.

Today Palestinians have to spend sleepless nights due to state-sponsored terrorism of U.S.A. Since the rest of the world remains unaffected by such an
event hence they are least bothered. And this attitude of non-solidarity gives an unsocial picture of human beings who are alleged to be gregarious animals. Thus if they are killers then we too by allowing them to die, acting in the similar fashion.

'Liberatarian' theory still another ethical theory can also call us unethical, rather than they being so. The exploited weaker masses that are not looked upon or taken care of become terrorists. Thus whose liberty is being snatched, ours or theirs? No doubt theirs—hence they are the ones shouting and we are leading our lives with peace and tranquility. Is this desirable especially in a democracy?

The terrorists' individuality has been thwarted by the powerful ones—thus are we being ethical by not allowing them to express their thoughts and grievance fully—the question remains; after which we really think twice whether it is our or their individuality which is lost. Hence 'individualitarian' theory would also gain their support.

The 'Entitlement' theory states that everyone is entitled to enjoy what he is capable of achieving. Are the terrorists getting the chance to achieve what they deserve—the question remains. The answer is no and here lies their grudge.

Such ethics of the terrorists cannot be overlooked by merely discarding them as minority or blindly labelling them as bad people. Moreover their ethics would be all the more justified if they use a proper 'mean' which can actually remove their bad name as terrorists and turn them to freedom fighters perhaps. To achieve such a greater good, a corruption free, just, Government, an empathetic society and an equal social structure—do not constitute of any bad end. Rather all of us want to breathe such fresh air of liberty. But everything gets jeopardized once targeting of innocents and not the terrorists' direct target takes place. This also takes off public sympathy and support for them.

Lastly 'Virtue ethics' which talks not of duty, instinct, consequence, mean or any external factors but emphasizes only upon characteristics and character of

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\[\text{The West had always tried to rule over the Middle East, and finally conquer it—but the Palestinians did not give them that opportunity, hence no sooner it became the enemy of the West. Israel being packed up with U.S.A also drain their oil resource for days in and out, when the Palestinians in their turn protest then they become terrorists against whom U.S.A declares a war which they call counter terrorism.}\]
individuals would also talk in support of the so-called terrorist from a presupposition less perspective. It says that a man cannot be formed only of good traits or only of bad traits. Every individual is a mixture of the two. Thus the terrorists alone cannot be blamed. If their cause is realized then automatically the negative side of their nature can be curbed.

Thus viewed impartially the terrorists' vision and aim can be appreciated but their method of bringing about a change—needs to be seriously reviewed.

4.3 Discussion about theories of Morality (Libertarian and Humanitarian Theories trying to justify terrorism)

A question remains, do these terrorists possess any attribute of morality at all?

After trying to find out an answer to this question we would straight away go on to check whether we are responsible for the creation of these so-called terrorists; in other words, are we in any way, responsible for their sufferings? These are moral questions, which would be our central topic of discussion in this section.

Now, to answer the very first issue, it might be said that people who indulge in widespread violence are prepared to accept morality in their personal lives, in the sense of being basically fair, trustworthy, truthful, and non-violent in their relations to others; but they continue to indulge in lying, deception, violence and destruction in international relations, particularly in warfare. They contend that at the international level morality is either irrelevant or almost of limited relevance. Here, they say, duplicity and violence are the norm and one has no choice but to play by the rules.

In the context of terrorism we would find the use of two important terms namely, 'act' and 'omission'. Directly perpetrating terror is an 'act', again non-cooperating with the exploiting government or withdrawing its natural resources is an instance of omission—a kind of negative act. If morally evaluated, the latter is a better option than the former.

4.3.1 In this section we would discuss about bad lives. In this connection we would check whether we are responsible in any way for such bad lives, i.e., are we
responsible for the sufferings of the victims of terrorism or are we responsible for
the bad lives which the terrorists spend for years?

Ted Honderich argues that the Principle of Humanity is that what is right
always consists in what, according to the best available knowledge and judgment,
are actually rational steps, effective and not self-defeating ones rather than
pretences, to the end of getting and keeping people out of bad lives. Now the
question arises, what do we mean by bad lives? Honderich in his book After the
Terror, mentions that ‘bad lives’ include cut short-half-lives one particular group
of which could have been longer by some million years. Honderich defined ‘bad
lives’ as those devoid or ‘deprived’ of fundamental goods: a decent length of life,
bodily well-being, freedom and power in various settings, respect and self-respect,
the goods of relationship, and the goods of culture. Such lives form a world
contradictory to Leibnitz’s best possible world where the moral perfection of the
creator is reflected. Some say that the question whether this world of unfortunate
innocents is the result of our having done wrong to them, does not really arise.
There is no real question of our moral relation to these bad lives. Rather the
statesman or administrator of the nations are partly responsible for them, as they
run their countries and keep relations with other nation not primarily on the basis
of morality but actually on the basis of their self-interests which ultimately affect
a few. Now those who are affected by their (administrators’) negligence form
organization to revolt against the state policies which actually affect their own
policies. And each violent revolution (which are ultimately found to serve their
selfish motive, but said to be for the benefit of majority of the society) finally,
become causes of the bad lives of the innocents. But the government sticks to its
point and sometimes even neglects to save its innocent citizens from having such
bad lives, thinking that its flexibility would lead to further more unjustified
demands of the terrorists.

If the terrorists, as they claim, actually create violence to help the majority
in the society, then instead of using violent means to petrify the same society they
can stand as the representatives of those citizens by democratic elections. The
people would then automatically vote for them as they would speak out their
voices for their well-being.
Since human beings are social animals, they interact with different kinds of people, where each person differs from another. Moreover our relationship with one another also varies. But in all these cases it is necessary to maintain a moral relation. The question arises, what would be our relationship towards those bad lives, what would be the relationship between state and its citizens and what relationship do the terrorists bear with the majority of the society? These are some of the very important questions. Moreover, how far are these various relationships moral? There are two views regarding the ‘morality’ of relationship. One says, I would be moral in my action towards another person, if my action provides good consequences. Another view states that my morality, as far as a second person is concerned, would depend on the performance of my social obligation towards him. But the question is when the mother takes care of her child, is that relationship moral because such an action gives a good consequence in the long run or is it moral because the mother performs her duty towards the child? None of the two matters here. She does it out of her instinct, her loving and caring ‘nature’ towards her child. Thus the state should hold relation of morality with its citizens not out of sheer duty or for expectation of good consequences, but should do so naturally or spontaneously. Then only can a healthy relation be maintained. In that case no citizen would be deprived so that it would give a scope for the terrorists to revolt, for the ‘so-called’ well being of the citizens.

We should be sympathetic and loving towards those possessing bad lives and give them enough strength to survive and hence be moral thereby. The relationship between the so-called revolutionaries and the citizens appears to be moral from the terrorists’ side as they create violence for a moral cause, i.e., to protect the citizens from being deprived. But the fact is that they, by their deeds actually promote their own narrow interest.

In After the Terror, Ted Honderich, also lays out some of the facts of bad lives and good lives, both in poor countries Africa as well as and in the rich countries. With respect to bad lives, Honderich argues that, our omissions have resulted in 20 million years of possible living time lost by a certain sample of Africans. He also considers the creation of Israel in 1948 and records what he describes as the bad lives of the Palestinians as a result of, what is called the neo-Zeonist Expansion of Israel since 1967 war. Honderich asks whether those in the
rich societies do wrong in doing nothing about bad lives. Such outlooks as political realism and ideologies as liberalism and libertarianism are also considered, as what Honderich calls 'hierarchy democracy'. The principle of Humanity is used to judge our moral responsibility for the many bad lives, which Honderich tells us, is great. This is the principle which also condemns the terrorist killings of September 11 as heinous. The killings, he says, were not rational means to an end that was partly defensive. The West’s subsequent attacks on Afghanistan is excused (provided counter terrorism is considered), but the taking from Palestinians of at least their freedom in the last fight of their homeland, historic Palestine, is condemned. Honderich writes: ‘... The Palestinians have had a moral right to their terrorism as certain as was the moral right, say, of the African people of South Africa against their white captures and the apartheid state.’

We would also notice a striking contradiction in the author’s thoughts. Although Honderich talks about principles of morality, but such a “morality of humanity” does not condemn mass murder as such. Faced with the act of terrorism we must always weigh the bad effects it causes against its good results. In the case of 9/11, Honderich states that “the killers... could not know that killings of several thousand people would, in due course, serve the end of the principle of humanity, saving people from bad lives. They could have no such rational confidence” (p.119, After the Terror). Even if the pilots had aimed explicitly to draw attention to the plight of those leading bad lives, Honderich would still condemn their act. As they could not have reasonable cause to believe their murders would have good results. Honderich’s morality of humanity makes us all murderers (as we are also indirectly letting the innocents die without doing anything to save them), yet he refuses to condemn murder as intrinsically wrong in many cases (e.g., in case of self-defense).

Now, in contrast to bad lives there must exist good or decent lives. Those who live such lives – are the classes of ‘haves’ or people belonging to the developed and developing nations – those who have a capital. For example the people United States, Canada, and most western European countries enjoy such good lives. A decent length of life is enjoyed by them. These people can be said to have half lives. These are just living years and not the years we live, that we are healthy and free from illness. Those years in U.S., Canada and Western Europe...
would be 72 on an average and in set of countries such as Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Sierra Leone would be 35 on an average.

4.3.2 Now let us discuss about the natural and other moralities in the context of terrorism. “Morality” is merely a word today; the concept it stood for seems to have disappeared. Could there be good lives and bad lives in this world without morality? Ted Honderich in his book *After the Terror*, has mentioned about the nature of this morality.

First it consists of our desire. It is as Honderich holds the nature of human beings to crave for greatest goods for themselves and for those close to them. We all want our bit of ‘freedom’ in the street or at job, or in the world and want to stop others from frustrating these desires from ours. There is no shame in wanting these things. This truth has had almost as much elaboration as the subject of the nature of morality.

A second truth about us, as pointed out by Honderich, is that, we are subject to consistency, in a way rational. Our beings subject to consistency is to be understood as the fact that we have reasons for belief, want, ask for, demands etc. It is part of having reasons that we are in a certain minimal way consistent, and cannot escape the consistency. It is not something we aspire to, try to learn, or even do learn. What it amounts to is that if today’s weather is a reason for not walking along the stream to Mells, then if the weather is just the same tomorrow, that too will be a reason for not walking along the stream Mells. In other words we have reasons which are general. We do not say or think that a truth about an action can be a reason for it or the rightness of it if a like truth about a like action is not a reason for that other action. None of these should be taken to imply that reasons are always or often overwhelming, that they do not conflict, and they cannot be over borne by other reasons, and so on.

A third thing about us is a kind of addition to the first – which is that, we very much want to have good and avoid bad things for ourselves and such other close persons as our children. The addition is that we also have some sympathy for others not close to us, in fact, for people in general rules we have been caught up in some hostility or hatred.
Out of these three facts of desire, consistency and sympathy, morality seems to arise. To a few thinkers, morality has seemed to arise out of just one of the three facts. It was Hume’s predecessor, Thomas Hobbes, who said that our selfish natures, if we did not restrain our selfish natures by entering into self denying arguments with others, would result in our lives being ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’. In effect, this explains morality as being the result of just the first fact about us; self interest along with the rationally distinguished from the simple consistency talked about above the rationality of choosing means to ends properly and wisely.

Thus a moral action would be going by one’s own choice (without hampering others’ interests of course), having sympathy, not only for one’s own people, but also for the society and choosing rationally. Those who become terrorists cannot be called moral as they neither choose their action correctly, nor are they sympathetic towards humanity.

4.3.3 Worked-out-Moralities

Our entire discussion of morality has a significance as the nature of it is relevant to our condemnation of terrorism and to our judgments on responses of our government to it. Let us now come closer to the question of what worked-out-moral principles we could bring to bear on ourselves; on September 11 and other possible and conceivable terrorist acts. These will be principles of wider relevance, and what strength they have will be owed partly to the fact that there will, indeed, be general answers to the question of what is right – what actions, practices and institutions are right.

Such principles of morality, when brought in practice, or instantiated, the obvious question which arises is what is, to be a good man, a virtuous man? Who is human or decent? Some moral philosophers start by asking questions like, what character we should or should not have, what virtues or good personal dispositions as against vices we should have, rather than what actions are right. Although they do allow that morality is fundamentally about what to do, not about what sort of character we should have, but they have assumed that, we get to right principles of action by thinking about the virtues that express them – say, a man’s disposition to justice. We hold a man as indecent or irresponsible because by his manifested
disposition and not because it is Mr. X or Mr. Y (otherwise the feelings against him would be personal, i.e., due to subjective hatred towards Mr. X). This reminds us of Jesus’s great saying – Hate sin (i.e. the disposition) not the sinner (i.e., the person). Other philosophers state that, a man cannot be labelled as ‘moral’ or ‘immoral’ because of possessing a particular virtue of vice (innate disposition). They argue that there are no ‘valid moral principles’ determining rightness or wrongness of an action, which is general or universal. Thus to them a temperate man is the one who sees what is right in a ‘particular situation’.

Even if these principles are not universally accepted, they need to be clear, to recommend themselves, and to be arguably and reasonably defensible among parties to a discussion. Their definiteness, against the indefiniteness of moralities has to do with such virtues or character – dispositions as justice and love.

Thus a principle, even if not an indubitable one, is at least a better means of arriving at a judgment about the right action, then, to utter, stuff from the ancient philosopher Aristotle about the Golden Mean – about how the man of good character is not intemperate in any direction and is moved to act the right degree on the right occasion for the right reason with respect to the right people.

If there were no general principles of what is right and wrong, then we would have to give up the endeavour of consistency. If there were no general principles to bring to bear on different cases, then there would be no common standard for judging them. It would be like trying to compare size of shoes without having common units of measurement.

Let us now talk about an ideal, moral society devoid of brutal acts, pain and sufferings – which is based on the notion of libertarianism.

Libertarian society is such, where it is thought of some persons starving to death in a perfectly just society. Certainly there can be such persons even though everything is exactly where it ought to be. Here each thing, every means to well-being is owned by exactly the right person or family or co-operation. Nothing has gone wrong with all that – it is just that the starving persons or their parents have been reckless, unintelligent, on drugs, in bad health, had crippling accidents, or something of that sort.
The simple fact to think about is that in this perfectly just society they have no claim to food, no moral right to it. No one and nothing does wrong in letting them starve to death. There is no obligation in this society, on the state or anything or anyone else, to save them from starving to death. It is not true of anyone that he or she ought to have helped them. Every one of us have a right to live happily with full dignity, thus there should not be guilt to carry on such a life just because some others are suffering in that same society. There is nothing immoral in it unless the sufferings are caused by this group of well-being.

While inquiring into morality these are the domains we would bang upon — natural morality, worked out morality, libertarianism (society showing a moral refutation) and liberalism. The rest are discussed above, now we would proceed to the discussion of liberalism.

A society is called liberal where: - Each one of the members of the society is self-interested. They are also equal in putting up proposals as to the right principles. Here each is rational in the sense of choosing effective and economical means to the possession of what are called primary goods, and is not envious. They are said to have a lot of general knowledge or general beliefs, in other words, about human psychology, society, politics and economics. Most importantly, each is absolutely ignorant of his or her individual future in the society to come. No one knows, if he or she will be long-lived or not, rich or poor, shrewd or otherwise, of this race or that, of a particular social or economic class, male or female, of this or that moral outlook or religion and so on.

Such a society can only be formed if the principle of humanity is formed in each and everyone. Now we would go on to talk about what this principle states.

Social morality also consists in a very important factor, not talked of till now, i.e., the principle of humanity or fellow feeling or generosity. This has in it one fundamental principle. The principle of humanity states that morality demands that we should try to save people from bad lives — this is the central content of our moral obligations and rights. The principle is that the right thing to do is the one that according to the best judgment and information is the rational thing with respect to the end or goal of saving people from bad lives.
What we need to try to do, more specifically is to reduce the number of bad lives by certain policies, to preserve humanity.

The first policy is to rescue the badly off by means that do not significantly affect the well-being of the better off.

The second policy is transferring means from the better-off that do significantly affect their well-being – without making them badly off. Real distribution in the world as one has it, this is fundamental.

The third policy of this resolute humanity has to do with something that will come to mind in connection with the second, and come up with liberalism. It is the proposition that taking something away from the lives of the better off – can exactly cause the wrong effect-making them badly off.

The fourth policy has most to do with the goodness of freedom, power and security, and is a prohibition on wounding, attack, killing, torture, sexual attack and violation threat, intimidation, and other violence and near-violence.

The principle of humanity is not complete without the notion of equality which states that in a society all men can be seen as equals only where there would be equal distribution of wealth.

Thus in order to shape our society in a manner that we can stay in it peacefully – morality must be viewed in it so that violence and terrorism gets eradicated. Such a notion seems embedded in a moral society.

Similarly, we cannot even escape the next question, i.e., whether we are responsible or how are responsible in creating the world of bad lives.

Many would say it is a matter of destiny. Karmavadins talk about their Karmas or past actions, for which they suffer now. The terrorists are responsible for such consequences but we too are responsible to some extent. As we often turn our backs from them instead by stretching out hands of help towards them. We usually fulfil our own pleasures where the wealth utilized for our pleasure could

\[iv\] The Karmavadins are those who believe that one’s fate is determined by the actions he performs. Thus to lead a quality life one must do good karmas and the fruits of such actions are preserved to provide wellbeing in the next life too.
have been contributed to these victims. Our little sacrifices and co-operations would make the world a better place to live in.

4.3.4 Here while discussing about the different forms of morality we cannot but talk about Rawls’ principle of justice which states:

**First Principle**: - Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all, and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value. According to this principle of justice the terrorists cannot be ethically right as they affect one basic rights of human beings, i.e., the ‘right to live’: Hence due to their irrational acts the common men fail to enjoy their basic rights and liberties – hence justice is to brought upon the civilians. Thus from this point of view also the terrorists are wrong.

**Second Principle**: Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be the greatest benefit of the “least advantaged members of the society”.

This principle of Rawls might view terrorism as ethical as the terrorists are not treated equally by not providing them equality of opportunity. Thus justice is not bestowed upon them – and this is why they revolt against such oppressions in the way of ‘terrorism’ against the government which deprives them.

The principles are subtly modified from the principles in theory (mentioned above). The first principle now reads “equal claim” instead of “equal right” and “liberties” with a “fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties.”

Here I would like to mention Rawls’ Principle of Utilitarianism which is somewhat different from the general utilitarian theory of Mill, Bentham. Such utilitarianism of Rawls states that, the maximum cannot always be beneficial. This is unlike the standard theory of utilitarianism which promotes the maximum benefit to maximum number of people. Rawls maintains that, people who grew up in a society governed by his principles would come to value the principle and try to comply with it, as he is not concerned about the ‘haves’, but is mainly
concerned with those who are 'worst off'. In a society governed by Rawls' theory of utilitarianism, the 'worst off' know that their society is committed to fulfilling their demands of returning their rights from which they are deprived. But common utilitarians would take care of the majority instead of these deprived minorities. Therefore, it is easier to feel, the allegiance to a society governed by Rawls' principles than it is to feel allegiance to a society governed by standard utilitarianism. If Rawlsian utilitarianism was maintained in today's society, then perhaps the nations would not have seen the rise of terrorism.

Rawls theory of utilitarianism, in its developed form, has three distinctive features:

1. **The Original Principle**
2. **The Difference Principle**
3. **The Priority of Liberty.**

1. **The Original Principle** states that all social primary goods – liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect – are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favoured. This position further speaks of two more principles: (i) Each citizen is guaranteed a fully adequate scheme of basic liberties which is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all others; and (ii) social and economic inequality must satisfy two conditions:

   (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantage (maximin rule);
   (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.

The reason that the least well-off members get benefited is that it is assumed that under the Veil of ignorance under original position, people will be risk aware. This implies that everyone is afraid of being part of the poor members of society, so the social contract is constructed to help the least well-off members.

2. **The Difference Principle**: Rawls does not think that justice requires equality – there may be just inequalities, justified as incentives. This is one of the

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* Veil of ignorance states that in a society where no one knows his place, social position, status, nor does he know his torture in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength – if morality of these social beings is determined then such a morality would be once and for all truly considered.
traditional justifications of social inequalities of the sort – we are familiar within modern commercial societies. It may seem that part is producing a justification of what we have.

But he further adds to this that an inequality is unjust except in so far as it is a necessary means to improving the position of the ‘worst off’.

3. **The Priority of Liberty** or the third principle of Rawls’ utilitarianism states that: - given a certain minimum degree of prosperity, it would be irrational to accept any curtailment of “basic liberties” for the sake of still greater material wealth. By “basic liberties” Rawls means a number of fundamental rights which all same adults should enjoy as a matter of justice: freedom of the person and the right to hold personal property; freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure in accordance with the rule of law; liberty of conscience, of expression, and of assembly; and “political liberty”, i.e., the rights of seeking creation to the legislative and the right to an equal vote in choosing the legislature.

These principles of Rawls’ utilitarianism, when discussed, seem to actually defend those people whom we term as terrorists, as they are the underprivileged minority of the society who, being deprived of their basic rights, go against the government which fails to sanction those rights to them. But even with such arguments, the terrorists can not be proved ethically clean as they attack, not the state or government but, the common men who are not directly responsible for their sufferings.

Fraser in his book *Misrecognition, Social Inequality and Social Justice* summarizes justice as that which requires social arrangements that permit all members to participate in social interaction on a par with one another. So that means they must be able to participate as peers in all the major forms of social interaction: whether it is politics, whether it’s the labour market, whether it is family life and so on.

4.3.5 In this context we would discuss Robert Nozick’s individualistic approach towards ethical views. According to him an action is good if it serves the purpose of respective individuals. Similarly an action would be bad or evil if it affects or harms true individuals. Thus from this it can be directly stated that terrorism would always remain unethical as it never serves the good of individuals but
Individualism is at once an ethical-psychological concept and also an ethnical political one. It holds that a human being should think and judge independently, respecting nothing more than sovereignty of his or her mind, thus it is intimately connected with the concept of autonomy. As an ethical political concept, individualism upholds the supremacy of individual rights.

Robert Nozick, the libertarian philosopher, has given at least three important meanings of individualism in the field of social and political philosophy.

(1) **Ontological individualism**: is the doctrine that social reality consists, ultimately, only of persons who choose and act. Collective, such as a social class, state, or a group, cannot act so they are not considered to have a reality independent of the actions of persons.

(2) **Methodological individualism**: holds that the only genuinely scientific propositions in social science are those that can be reduced to the actions, dispositions and decisions of individuals.

(3) **Politico-moral individualism**: Such individualism maintains that the society should sanction the individual adults with moral and political rights. This view makes demand of certain duties on the part of the enjoyers of such rights.

While performing terrorism, none of the above mentioned kind of individualism is sustained by the terrorists. Ontological individualism which states that social reality depends on individuals’ choice and autonomy is shattered in the process of terrorism as here no such sovereignty or autonomy of individuals is taken care of – hence they are irrationally slaughtered even when they are at no fault and especially when they prefer to live. Methodological individualism on the other hand holds that any method genuinely depends upon the individual’s decisions in terrorism where individuals are treated as means to fulfilling their selfish ends; here individuals’ decisions cannot be upheld at all. Moreover politico-moral individualism, where the society sanctions of politico-moral rights to the
individuals, is also destroyed by the terrorists as the basic right of human being, i.e., the 'right to life' is only snatched away by the terrorists.

Such a notion of individualism does not merely talk about enjoyment of any kind of right of an individual – in that case terrorism would have been justified; but this individualism, as Nozick says, should also include the collective group and society. In other words it has to be seen that while performing a particular right, the individual can not affect or destroy the rights of the other members of the society or group or community. Here comes the concept of duty which says that when a person is enjoying any right he is also committed to perform the corresponding duty, attached to such a right. In this context, the terrorists could retort that their act of terrorism is an expression of violating their own right from the state or government which had deprived them of their rights and privileges so long – hence as per the theory of individualism they are not doing anything wrong. But at that very moment they could be accused of snatching away the rights of the others in the society (through indiscriminate killing). Hence they cannot be ethically justified.

In this connection, I would like to touch upon Robert Nozick's 'entitlement' theory which states that every man is entitled to enjoy his or her property which is earned by him or her in a fair way. Nozick further adds that the government should not interfere in this matter and hence has no right to levy tax on the individuals' property as that individual is the sole earner, which is earned by him in a dignified way. As far as he does not encroach into anyone else's property, no one else (not even the government) should encroach upon his.

Nozick's theory of entitlement, which determines equal distribution of justice in the society is based upon three principles as mentioned in his (Nozick's) book Anarchy State and Utopia. Those principles are:-

1. **Transfer Principle**: Holdings (those freely acquired) from others who acquired them in a just way are justly acquired.

2. **Acquisition Principle**: Persons are entitled to holdings initially acquired in a just way (according to Lockean Proviso).
3. **Rectification Principle:** Rectifies violation of the first two principles by resorting holdings to their rightful owners, or “one time” redistribution according to the difference principle.

Some theorists claim that terrorist use hyper aggressive and ultra-violent means to maintain the sense of entitlement and privilege that they are deprived of.

Amartya Sen has also talked about some kind of “entitlement” which differs from Nozick’s theory of entitlement. Sen says that individuals are entitled to enjoy those which are earned by him through capability and not those which he himself is incapable of earning but has somehow managed to achieve even if without using any unfair mean, for e.g., Wealth by inheritance. If a person who is too lazy to support himself and his family, suddenly acquires a huge sum of money through ascendance, then Sen would say that he has no right upon that money because he is not capable of earning it by himself. And since he is incapable thus he will never understand the worth of such wealth and thus might spend it foolishly which would merely lead to misuse of it. But that individual right states that he has not stolen it or achieved it by any unfair mean, so why can he not enjoy it? Nozick would support this man and would say that it is his wealth now and he is entitled to use it and spend it in any way he wants to – no one should interfere or bother about it. He has attained it not by harming anyone so the question whether he is capable of using it or not does not arise at all. As as per the entitlement theory the terrorists are entitled to enjoy their bit of rights and no one can take these rights from them. But Sen would add that the terrorists should be capable of earning and enjoying them then only those rights would be correctly termed as ‘theirs’. Now if the so-called terrorists earn those rights in a fair manner without affecting the others or if they are capable of earning such rights then they should obviously be sanctioned to them. If they are not, then they can revolt against that body, state or government which deprives them from their right to entitlement. So, in this way they can show themselves as ethical while levying terror for a justified cause.

With this backdrop I would like to mention Professor Amartya Sen's Theory of Justice.
The Idea of Justice (Amartya Sen)

Solution to world's most disturbed problems leading to terrorism is the special concern of the book 'The Idea of Justice' by Prof. Amartya Sen.

Sen, here, is found to be an eminent philosopher. He uses his skill to criticize the idea of justice in both the disciplines (i.e., in economics as well as in philosophy). He says that justice in a nation not only means to form laws in such a manner within a particular nation that only its citizens would be benefitted by them. Such laws have to be used such that people in and out the nation are benefitted, most importantly not hampered by such formulations. This would perhaps bring all ends to international terrorism where the policies of one nation affect or exploit the other leading to widespread terrorism. Amartya Sen, in order to define the term justice also forms a theory known as the "transcendental" theory which describes an ideal state of affairs. But the demerit of this theory is that, it does not tell us what to do in our existing imperfect world, for that he argues, a comparative theory is needed. To consider wealth or add an estimate of happiness is inadequate as Sen opines. In addition, the capabilities of people to achieve good lives need to be addressed. Following Rawls, Sen in this book also stresses on a notion called public reason—a type of democratic deliberation that emphasizes reasonable agreements among people with different conceptions of good. The terrorists in the society come with a mind frame that if such and such conditions are satisfied then social goodness would be brought. But such good conditions might clash with these 'goods' as conceived by the government. If such an agreement is brought about between the two goods (one of the terrorists and the other of the government) then perhaps future terrorism can be curbed. In this book The Idea of Justice Prof. Sen further states that the underprivileged are those who are actually deprived of lives which provide opportunities, hence freedom, hence happiness. Such good lives may be determined by several criteria. Mill, Bentham—the utilitarians had taken the yard stick of 'pleasure' to determine good lives. The more happiness or pleasure a person has in his life, the more free he is. Again the economists would hold that it is wealth or riches which build opportunities, hence freedom leading to a decent living. Sen, in this context adds a new criterion called 'capability'. The more capable a person is the more free he is as he can...
yield much more opportunities than someone who is not so capable. He also states that a person can lead a good life (unlike those of the underprivileged ones who become terrorists) if he has the capability to overcome all odds faced by him. Sen argued for five components in assessing such capability:

1. The importance of real freedom in the assessment of a person’s advantage.

2. Individual differences in the ability to transform resources into valuable activities.

3. The multi-variable nature of activities giving rise to happiness.


5. Concern for distribution of opportunities within society.

If such capabilities are found within a person, then justice and freedom are guaranteed to him even without taking the help of violent means to petrify others to achieve the goal. Such a capability leads to Human Development and also Reduction of Poverty – where poverty and deprivation are the main causes of terrorism in today’s society.

Sen says that if the so-called deprived and exploited, i.e., the so-called terrorists learn to use correctly the resources which they have in their hands and value them and direct them in the correct path then it is possible for them to reach their goals even after exploitations faced by them from the upper classes.

Now, the communal complications behind religious terrorism are found to take place in this world as we usually tend to see a person merely as a member of one social group based on an inadequate understanding of the width and complexity of any society in the world. “The increasing tendency towards seeing people in terms of one dominant imposition of an external and arbitrary priority, but also the denial of an important liberty of a person who can decide on their respective loyalties of different groups (to all of which he or she belongs)” – is
considered by Sen, in this context in his book ‘The Idea of Justice’ (Chapter-
Lives, Freedom and Capabilities, pg. 244).vi

Many theorists claim that poverty is ‘the’ cause for terrorism in general.
Prof. Sen emphasizes an important point as to why poverty is ruling the
underdeveloped or developing nations. The magnitude of the global problem of
disability in the world is truly gigantic. More than 600 million people – about one
in ten of all human beings – live in some form of significant disability. More than
400 million of them live in developing countries. Furthermore in the developing
world, the disabled are quite often the poorest of the poor in terms of income, but
in addition their need for income is greater than that of able-bodied people, since
they require money and assistance to try to live normal lives and to attempt to
alleviate their handicaps. The impairment of income-earning ability, which can be
called ‘the earning handicap’, tends to be reinforced and much magnified in its
effect by ‘the conversion handicap’: the difficulty in converting incomes and
resources into good living, precisely because of disability.

A notion of non-commensurability is found in Sen’s Idea of Justice which
holds those two ideas or entities as non-commensurable which belong to two
contradicting categories. Sen says that all fights due to incompatibilities in today’s
world stand on this notion. The views of the government, those of the citizens and
still others of the terrorists cannot be measured by the same unit – hence non-
commensurable. And wherever this concept exists, conflict would invariably
occur.

Again equality does not always come with the aspect of capability. Both
may be capable in the similar manner – but that would not guarantee that both
would live up to same age. For example, men’s’ mortality role is lower than
women – so even if both men and women are said to be capable but still they are
not equal. So even if all good conditions are sanctioned to the underprivileged

vi Since, I am dealing with the issue of terrorism in my discussion the underprivileged
having bad lives are termed by me as terrorists (that is, the ones who revolt against the
‘haves’ in a violent manner); although Sen has not mentioned any issue of terrorism in
his book. I have tried to accommodate Sen’s notion of justice here.
class of terrorists and even if they are capable of using them properly, still an equality cannot be brought in the society and hence perhaps Rawls states that let the inequality remain as equality is mere utopia.

As far as freedom is concerned, in some theories of freedom, for example what is called ‘republican’ or ‘neo-Roman’ theory; as; Sen correctly points out liberty is defined not just in terms of what a person is able to do in a certain sphere, but also includes the demand that others could not have eliminated that ability of this person even if they wanted to do so. In this view, a person’s liberty may be compromised even in the absence of any interference, simply by the existence of the arbitrary power of another which could hinder the freedom of the person to act as they like, even if that intervening power’s not actually exercised. It seems that this is the reason why the developing nations fail to empower and elevate their levels of freedom. Perhaps direct interventions from developed nations are not found but their bold presence is enough to hinder the execution of the freedom of the poor underdeveloped nations. Thus Sen, says; to take an extreme case, it can certainly be argued that enslaved people remain slaves even if their choices do not conflict with the will of their master.

While discussing the issue of democracy as public reason, Prof. Sen puts forward a thought provoking question to the readers. If public reasoning is so critically important for the practice of justice, can we even think about justice in the world at large, when the art of public reasoning as a part of democracy seems to be, according to common belief, so quintessentially western and locationally confused? This once again forces us to believe that freedom is for few and not for all.

Again the question arises that why do the Muslims consider themselves as deprived, are they really so – are the lights of democracy and public opinion really lacking in this block of Muslim countries? Sen, that the answer is a big ‘No’ as Middle Eastern history and the history of Muslim people also include a great many accounts of public discussion and political participation through dialogues. In Muslim kingdoms cantered around Cairo, Baghdad and Istanbul, or in Iran, India or for that matter Spain, there were many champions in public discussion. The extent of toleration of diversity of views, in fact is found to be exceptional here in comparison with Europe. If this be the case then what deprivation are they
talking about, what is hindering them to compete with the developed nations — it cannot be money also as certain Middle — Eastern nations are rich for their ample availability of natural resources. Actually still they are underdeveloped because perhaps of their extreme conservativeness and lack of dynamicity and progressiveness.

In the context of democracy it is important to consider the concept of human rights and their nature. Ethical proclamations of human rights are comparable to pronouncements in, utilitarian ethics — even though the contents of the articulation of human rights are altogether different from utilitarian claims. Utilitarians want utilities to be taken as the only things that ultimately matter and demand that politics be based on maximizing the sum total of utilities, whereas human rights advocates want the recognition of the importance of certain kinds of freedom and the acceptance of some social obligations to safeguard them. But even as they differ on what is demanded by ethics, their battle is on the same and shared — general territory of ethical beliefs and pronouncements. An ethical understanding of human rights clearly goes against seeing them as legal demands, and also against taking them to be, as in Bentham’s view, legal pretensions. Ethical and legal rights do, of course, have motivational connections. Herbert Hant has argued that people ‘Speak of their moral rights mainly when advocating their incorporation in a legal system.’8 He adds that the concept of a right ‘belongs to that branch of morality which is specifically concerned to determine when one person’s freedom may be limited by another’s and so to determine what actions may approximately be made the subject of coercive legal rules’. Thus to Hart in his book *The Concept of Law* states that human rights are actually moral rights. If human rights are moral rights, then the terrorists are also moral in fighting to get back their moral rights which have been immorally taken away.

Dr. Sen in his book ‘The Idea of Justice’ also mentions that there are certain human rights which can be equated with the term freedom. He says: “To illustrate it is not hard to argue that considerable importance should be attached to all five of the following kinds of freedom of a person — let us call her Rehana:

1. Rehana’s freedom not to be assaulted;

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2. Her freedom to be guaranteed some basic medical attention for a serious health problem;

3. Her freedom not to be called up regularly and at odd hours by her neighbours who she detests;

4. Her freedom to achieve tranquility, which is important for Rehana’s good life, and

5. Her ‘freedom from fear’ of some kind of detrimental action by others (going beyond the freedom from the detrimental actions themselves).”

Similarly freedoms should be sanctioned on a macro level to avoid revolutions (in order to get back freedoms), contemporarily known as terrorism.

Herein, Sen brings in the notion of duty attached with enjoyment of rights. He further divides such obligations into perfect and imperfect ones. Perfect obligations would imply performing correctly one’s duty while enjoying a particular right whereas imperfect obligation is neglecting such duties and only enjoying rights. Such imperfect obligations of the state give rise to terrorism. Again the imperfect obligations of the terrorists give rise to apathy for them instead of sympathy in the minds of the civilians.

Prof. Sen further holds that justice should not only be done, it has to be seen to be done. He adds that it can plausibly be argued that if others cannot, with the best of effects, see that a judgment is, in some understandable and reasonable sense, just, then not only is it implementability adversely affected, but even its soundness would be deeply problematic. There is a clear connection between the objectivity of a judgment and its ability to withstand public security. And the so-called terrorists are perhaps looking for such an objective justice, which is required to end the war of terrorism.

The social contract theory advocated by Thomas Hobbes, later Locke, Rousseau and others stated that in a primitive anarchical society individuals wanted an order and thus they signed a contract amongst each other whereby all the rights of one individual was surrendered to his neighbour who promised to protect them. Sen says that in today’s world it is not social contract but social choice. Here the people do not surrender their rights to anyone but deliberately choose to transfer them to others hoping that they would do the same, hence a
'perfect obligation' would be maintained in society, hence state, hence round the globe – which would perhaps eradicate all violence, vandalisms and blood sheds.

Sen, ends, with the comment that "it is bad enough that the world in which we live has so much deprivation of one kind or another (from being hungry to being tyrannized); it would be even more terrible if we were not able to communicate, respond and altercation” (The Idea of Justice Chapter 18 – Justice and the World, pg.415). But the question at once arises that can the deprived not express their grievance in a more mild and sympathetic manner, rather than taking up arms and killing the innocents. Perhaps their intention is good but this means cannot be supported at all. They are asking for justice in an unjust way – this perhaps leads to circularity; hence an ongoing battle of terrorism and counter-terrorism is found.

I would like to end this section by drawing the attention of the so-called terrorists of our society to Hobbes' suggestion as has been noted earlier in this paper, that, escape from isolation may not only be important for the quality of human life, it can also contribute powerfully to understanding and responding to the other deprivations from which human beings suffer. When Hobbes referred so the dire state by human beings in having 'nasty, brutish and short' lives, he also pointed, in the same sentence, to the disturbing adversity of being 'solitary'. There is surely a basic strength here which is complementary to the engagement in which theories of justice are involved.

4.4 After the discussion of End and Means in the context of several ethical theories and the theories of morality such as libertarianism, equalitarianism, individualism etc. we would now discuss ‘Jus ad Bello’ and ‘Jus ad Bellum’ – i.e., when a war must be waged and methods of legitimate wars respectively to check whether terrorism can be in any case considered as a 'just war'.

We shall discuss the rules and conditions of a just war in detail in the Chapter on the arguments in favour of and against terrorism. Here we would mention in brief'.

Jus Ad Bellum states the conditions under which resorting to war are justified. These conditions clearly state that a war must be waged by a 'legitimate
party'; secondly, there must be a "just" cause for going to a war or, in other words, war must be carried out with a right intention, thirdly, the war must meet some amount of success and finally, the violence that is used during the war should be proportionate to the damage caused as a consequence of war. But in case of terrorism none of the conditions for resorting to war is fully met – hence terrorism does not meet the criterion of ‘Jus ad bellum’ of just war – so it cannot be considered as a just war.

Now let us consider whether terrorism meets the second criterion of Just War, i.e., Jus ad Bello.

Jus ad Bello which gives the methods of Just War have two governing principles, and they are:-

1. **Discrimination Principle**: This limits the amount of violence used in any war and further determines the legitimate targets involved in the war. Terrorism fails to limit the amount of violence and also chooses arbitrary targets. Rather their targets are the innocent civilians who are in no way guilty of them. They would rather choose the weak, non combatants to petrify their original target, i.e., the state or government. Thus this is highly unethical and cannot be accepted under any circumstances.

2. **The Second is the Principle of Proportionality** which restricts the kind of response of a war. In other words the end of the war should be proportional to the means. But such proportionality is not maintained in terrorism, as no good end is brought by the cruel means of terrorism. So even this principle of Jus ad Bello is not fulfilled by terrorism successfully.

   Thus it even fails to meet Jus ad Bello – hence cannot be considered as Just War.

   This once again disapproves of its ethical perspective, if it claims to have any.

   Now, one might ask that if terrorism is not considered as a just war, then can counter-terrorism (which is used to eradicate terrorism) be considered as a
just war. Even if counter terrorism abides by Jus ad Bello and bellum to a partial extent but it does not abide by such rules of just war fully. As a matter of fact the ground which does not allow terrorism to be a just war, on the same ground counter terrorism can also be rejected as here also while attacking the terrorists openly many civilians are killed as terrorists and civilians are found at the same society or sometimes terrorists hide amidst the local residents so that they cannot be easily suspected. This reminds us of the recent death of Bin Laden at Abettabad (Pakistan) who was hiding himself in a mansion not segregated from the commoners. [Although in this case of counter terrorism no collateral damage was found].

So, terrorism cannot be considered as just war; intention wise as its intention is to kill the innocents who do not harm them, it cannot be justified as it is neither brought about for self-defense, nor can it be justified as the last resort. The terrorists although claim that their war on terror is the last resort to grab the attention of the government who has not done anything for them even when they have stated their poor conditions to the state over and over again. Actually the other methods such as sharing a common platform where both the parties can peacefully exchange their views and come to a mutual understanding, or entering into a dialogue – could solve the problem but they straight away adopt this as their means as it is the most short cut of all and secretive in nature and also cost saving indeed. Hence in no way can we see it as a just war – and thus there is no ethical aspect found in it.

**Revisiting the moral issues of terrorism**

The terrorists fail to give dignity to human beings. They go on to slaughter innocent humans to teach the government, their direct target, a lesson. According to them the citizens are not innocents as they are tax payers, whose tax enables the government to buy weapons for defence. Moreover these citizens entertain the corrupt government instead of changing it. Thus they cannot be innocents, hence they must die. To them if amongst these citizens some are found to be actually innocent then they are the infirm, children and mentally deranged persons—who
are really not responsible for the terrorists' cause. But do the terrorists not kill them? They would retort that killing of them comes as a collateral damage which is also found in wars as a military necessity. But the difference between wars and terrorist attacks is that the former targets the party at dispute and not the common citizens; but the latter targets mainly the citizens in order to retaliate to the government. Thus in order to make the government hear their claims the terrorists go on to kill the non-military, innocent, non-combatants and such killing can in no way be justified.

Secondly the terrorists claim that terrorism is their last resort. But in reality we do not see them trying other passive methods of negotiation or sitting at a dialogue with the government. At this they would say that if the government is not willing to listen to them then how can they sit and sort out problems with the latter? Even if the government starts bargaining with the terrorists then also they can not reach at any practical solution as the demands of the terrorists are never ending.

Hence terrorism cannot be ethical because it is neither found originally to be their last resort; moreover they do not at all care for the immunity of the non-combatants and on these two grounds all the arguments of the terrorists would fail to justify. Hence it is completely unethical.
References


