This chapter would be divided into two sections. In the first section we would discuss Samuel P. Huntington's – The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order and, in the latter half, we would talk about Amartya Sen's – Identity and Violence – both of which convey the same message. This message itself is really thought provoking and can perhaps explain the major reason behind such worldwide terrorism.

6.1 The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

Different philosophers and thinkers of other disciplines too, have pondered over the causes of 'terrorism'. Many have given different opinions, but Samuel P. Huntington says something totally different from the others. Now let us make an analytic study of the basic contention in his book – The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.

Till date the world had witnessed several kinds of violence. We have already had the two World Wars. The issue of this war would neither be money, nor power but clashes of civilizations. There are in all nine different type of civilizations according to the author and they are :- Western, Latin, American, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist and Japanese.

Each one strives to achieve its own superiority over the rest, out running the others. In such a competition, the two bold competitors are the West and the Islam. These two are poles apart, having totally opposite views; hence lies a sharp clash between these two civilizations. Huntington say that clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order based on civilization is the surest safeguard against world war.

The central theme of this book is that culture and cultural identities which, at the broadest level are civilizational identities, shape the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-cold war.
The First World War was fought with a mission of establishing democracy, the second was fought to establish capitalism. This was known as the cold war, which made world politics bipolar. One pole (U.S) represented capitalism and the other pole represented communalism. Capitalism comprised the higher class of people or the owner class whereas communalism consisted of the class exploited by the bourgeois. Communalism talked about equal distribution of wealth, which is concentrated in the hands of the upper class and which is used as a tool to exploit the working class. In the post-cold war, for the first time in history, global politics become multi polar and multi civilizational. In the post-cold world war, the most important distinctions among people are not ideological, political or economic. They are cultural. People and nations try to answer the most basic question humans can face: who we are. And they answer that question in the traditional way by giving reference to the things that mean most to them. People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs and institutions. They identify with cultural groups, tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations and, at the broadest level, civilizations. People use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity. We know who we are, only when we know who we are not and, often, only when we know whom we are against.

In this book ‘The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order’ – Huntington has emphasized on five major issues.

First, he mentions that for the first time in history global politics is both multipolar and multicivilizational; modernization is distinct from westernization and produces neither a universal civilization in any meaningful sense nor the westernization of non-western societies.

Secondly, he talks about the balance of power among civilizations which is shifting: The West is declining in relative influence; Asian Civilizations are expanding their economic, military and political strength; Islam is exploding demographically with destablising consequences for Muslim countries and their neighbours; and non-Western Civilizations generally reaffirms the value of their own cultures.
The third issue is that a civilization-based world order is emerging. Societies share cultural affinities cooperate with each other; efforts to shift societies from one civilization to another are unsuccessful; and countries group themselves around its lead or core states of their civilization.

The fourth issue stems from the fact that the West’s universalistic pretentions increasingly come into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and Confucianism; at the local level fault line wars, largely between Muslims and non-Muslims, generate “kin-country rallying”, the threat of broader escalation, and hence efforts by core states to halt these wars.

Finally the author in the book shows that the survival of the west depends on Americans reaffirming their western identity and westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal and unity to renew and pressure it against challenges from non-western societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilizational character of global politics.

Thus this may be termed as a new world – where local politics is the politics of ethnicity; whereas global politics is the politics of civilizations. The rivalry of the super powers is replaced by the clash of civilizations.

In this new world the most important and dangerous conflicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined groups, but between people belonging to different cultural entities. Tribal wars and ethnic conflicts will occur within civilizations. Violence between states and groups from different civilizations, however, carries with it the potential for escalation as other states and groups from these civilizations rally to the support of their “Kin-countries”. The bloody clash of clans in Somalia poses no threat of broader conflict. The bloody clash of tribes in Rwanda has consequences for Uganda, Zaire, and Burundi but not much further. The bloody clashes of civilizations in Bosnia, the Cansasno, Central Asia, or Kashmir could become bigger wars. In Yugoslav conflicts Russia provided diplomatic support to the Serbs, and Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and Libya provided funds and arms to the Bosnians, not for reasons of ideology or power politics or economic interest but because of cultural kinship. "Cultural Conflicts", Vaclav Havel has observed, “are increasing and are

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more dangerous today than at any time in history”, and Jacques Delors agreed that “future conflicts will be sparked by cultural factors rather than economies or ideology.” And the most dangerous cultural conflicts are those along the fault lines between civilizations.

In the post cold war world, culture is both a divisive as well as a unifying force. People separated by ideology but united by culture come together, as the two Germanys did and as the two Koreas and the several Chinas are beginning to. Countries with cultural affinities cooperate economically and politically. International organizations based on states with cultural commonality; such as European Union, are far more successful than those that attempt to transcend cultures. For forty-five years the Iron curtain was the central dividing line in Europe. That line has moved several hundred miles East. It is now the line separating the people of Western Christianity, on one hand, from Muslim and orthodox people on the other.

The philosophical assumptions, underlying values, social relations, customs and overall outlooks on life differ significantly among civilizations. The revitalization of religion throughout much of the world reinforces these cultural differences. Cultures can change, and the nature of their impact on politics and economics can vary from one period to another. Yet the major differences in political and economic development among civilizations are clearly rooted in their different cultures. East Asian Economic success has its source in East Asian culture, as do the difficulties East Asian societies have had in achieving stable democratic political systems. Islamic cultures explain, in large part, the failure of democracy to emerge in much of the Muslim world. Developments in the post communist societies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are shaped by their civilizational identities. Those with Western Christian heritages make progress towards economic development and democratic politics; the prospects for economic and political development in the orthodox countries are uncertain; the prospects in the Muslim Republics are bleak.

The West is and will remain for years to come the most powerful civilization. Yet its power relative to that of other civilizations is declining. As the West attempts to assert its values and to protect its interests, non-western societies confront a choice. Some attempt to emulate the West and to join or to “band
wagon” with the west. Other Confucian and Islamic societies attempt to expand their own economic and military power to resist and to “balance” against the west. A central axis of post-cold war politics is the interaction of western power and culture with the power and culture of non-western civilization.

Cultural commonalities and differences shape the interests, antagonisms, and association of states. The most important countries in the world come overwhelmingly from different civilizations. The local conflicts most likely to escalate into broader wars are those between groups and states from different civilization. The key issues on the international agenda involve differences among civilizations. Power shifts from the long predominant west to non-western civilizations. Global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational.

The presence of multiple civilizations and their clashes seem to be the major cause of such a terrorism found worldwide today. But we need to know first, what we mean by ‘civilization’? What is the nature of such a civilization. First a distinction exists between civilization in singular and civilizations in the plural. The terror seen today is the effect of the latter kind of civilization (i.e., ‘Civilizations’ in the plural). The idea of civilization was developed by the 18th century French thinkers as the opposite concept of “barbarism”. Civilized society differed from primitive society because it was settled, urban and literate. To be civilized was good, whereas to be uncivilized was considered as bad. The concept of civilization provided a standard by which to judge societies. During the 19th century, Europeans devoted much intellectual, diplomatic, and political energy to elaborating the criteria by which non-European societies might be judged sufficiently “civilized” to be accepted as members of the European group. This was called Eurocentricism. At the same time, people increasingly spoke of civilizations in the plural. This meant “renunciation of a civilization defined as an ideal; or rather as the ideal” and a shift away from the assumption that there was a single standard for what was civilized, “confined”, as Brandel puts it, “to a few privileged people or groups, humanity’s ‘elite’.” Instead there are many civilizations, each of which is civilized in its own way. Hence, civilization in the singular, in short, “lost some of its cachet.”

Secondly while describing the nature of civilization it can be noticed that civilization is a cultural entity, although Germans drew a sharp distinction
between civilization and culture—the former involved machines, technologies and material factors; whereas the latter has much to do with values, ideas and the higher intellectual artistic, moral qualities of a society. Some anthropologists have reversed the relation and conceived of cultures as characteristics of primitive, unchanging, non-urban societies, while more complex, developed, dynamic societies are civilizations. Again Brandel relates one with the other or defines one in terms of the other as a civilization is “a space, a ‘cultural area’, a collection of cultural characteristics and phenomena”.

**Third**, civilizations are comprehensive, that is, none of their constituent units can be fully understood without reference to the encompassing civilization. Civilizations, Toynbee argues, “comprehend without being comprehended by others”. A civilization is a “totality”.

**Fourth**, civilizations are mortal but also very long-lived unlike culture; they evolve, adapt and are the most enduring of human associations, “realities of the extreme longue duree”.

**Fifth**, since civilizations are cultural not political entities, they do not, as such, maintain order, establish justice, collect taxes, fight wars, negotiate treaties, or do any of the other things which governments do. The political composition of civilizations varies between civilizations and varies over time within a civilization. A civilization may thus contain one or many political units. Those units may be city states, empires, federation, confederations, nation states, multinational states, all of which may have varying forms of government. China, Lucian Pye has commented, is “a civilization pretending to be a state.”

**Finally**, scholars generally agree in their identification of the major civilizations in history and on those that exist in modern world. They often differ, however, on the total number of civilizations that have existed in history. Quigley argues for sixteen clear historical cases and very probably eight additional ones. Toynbee first places the number as twenty-one, then twenty-three, and Spengler mentions eight major cultures. Samuel P. Huntington talks about nine civilizations, as we have mentioned in the beginning of the section; and to him there is no such distinction between culture and civilization.
6.1.1 Rise of the West

So long we discussed about the nature of civilizations. Each civilization has its own identifying character. The west which tries to dominate the rest of the world today, was lagging behind the others, for several hundred years. China under the Tang, Sung and Ming dynasties, the Islamic world from 8th to 12th centuries, and Byzantium from the 8th to 11th centuries far surpassed Europe (i.e. the west) in wealth, territory, military power and artistic, literary and scientific achievement. Between the 11th and 13th century, European culture began to develop, facilitated by the “Eager and Systemic appropriation of suitable elements from the higher civilizations of Islam and Byzantium, together with adoption of this inheritance to the special conditions and interests of the west.” During the same period, Hungary, Poland, Scandinavia, and the Baltic Coast were converted to western Christianity, with Roman law and other aspects of western civilization following, and the eastern boundary of the western civilization was stabilized there it would remain there after without significant change. During the 12th and 13th Centuries Westerners struggled to expand their control in Spain and did establish effective dominance of the Mediterranean. Subsequently, however, the rise of Turkish power brought about the collapse of “Western Europe’s first overseas empire: Yet by 1500, the renaissance of European culture was well under way and social pluralism, expanding commerce, and technological achievements provides the basis for a new era in global policies.(The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order by Samuel P. Huntington; P.50)

Intermittent or limited multidimensional encounters among civilizations gave way to sustained, overpowering unidirectional impact of the west on all other civilizations. The end of 10th century witnessed the final conquest of the Iberian peninsula from the Moors and the beginning of Portuguese penetration of Asia and Spanish penetration of the Americans. During the subsequent two fifty years. Oil of the Western Hemisphere and significant portions of Asia were brought under European rule or domination. The end of the 18th century saw a retraction of direct European control as first the United States, then Haiti, and then most of Latin America revolted against European rule and achieved independence. In the latter part of the 19th century, however, renewed western imperialism extended western rule over all of Africa, consolidated western control in the subcontinent
and elsewhere in Asia, and by the early 20th century subjected virtually the entire Middle East except for Turkey to direct or indirect western control. Europeans or former European colonies (in the America) controlled 35% of the Earth’s land surface in 1800, 67% in 1878, and 84% in 1914. By 1920 the percentage was still higher as the Ottoman Empire was divided among Britain, France and Italy. In 1800 the British Empire consisted of 1.5 million square miles and 20 million people. By 1900 the Victorian empire upon which the sun never set included 11 million square miles and 390 million people. The west won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion (to which few members of other civilizations were converted) but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact, non-westerners never do.

At that time civilization meant western civilization. International law was western international law coming out of the tradition of Grotius. The international system was the western Westphalian system of sovereign but “civilized” nation states and the colonial territories they controlled. But finally in the 20th century the relations among civilizations have thus moved from a phase dominated by unidirectional impact of one civilization on all others to one of intense, sustained, and multidirectional interactions among all civilizations. Both of the central characteristics of the previous era of intercivilizational relations began to disappear.

The aim of the West had always been universalisation of its own civilization, which would mean that they would expect all other civilizations to get modernized, and hence Westernized – so that all others ultimately merge into one. The idea of universal civilization implies a general cultural coming together of humanity and the increasing acceptance of common values, beliefs, orientations, practices, and institutions by people throughout the world. More specifically, the idea may mean something which is profound but irrelevant, something which is relevant but not profound, and some which are irrelevant and superficial.

**Universal civilization in the Indian context would mean :-**

"Vasudaiva Kutumvakam", this means the entire world is our own relative. Such a universalism should bring an end to that kind of terrorism which is based
upon communalism. But the universalism that west talks about, only increases problems as this refers to the expansion of western power and culture over the entire world; which indeed is a threat to the rest (non-westerners).

### 6.1.2 The West and Modernization

The most general argument for the emergence of a universal civilization sees it as the result of the broad process of modernization that have been going on since 18\textsuperscript{th} century. Modernization involves industrialization, urbanization, increasing levels of literacy, and diversified occupational structures. It is a product of the tremendous expansion of scientific and engineering knowledge beginning in the 18\textsuperscript{th} century that made it possible for humans to control and shape the environment in totally unprecedented ways. But such a modernization is not possible for underdeveloped nations or developing nations; due to lack of wealth. So in order to modernize such nations have to fall back on the West for its cooperation and at this juncture comes the domination of the powerful over the weak. Hence the weak, i.e., the rest after tolerating such a domination finally revolts against the west. Again it is very difficult for the orthodox civilizations such as Hindus, Muslims and others to accept such a modernization; as their culture, tradition, heritage – is much more enriched than the Western culture (as they think it to be). Moreover the values of these orthodox civilizations are directly found to be opposite to those of the west. Hence in the micro level the orthodox “Islams” go for a war against the West, as according to the former the latter are exploiting and demeaning the respect of the tradition and culture of the former – in the name of modernization. Here lies the main clash, which leads to open terrorism (by the Islam) against Western domination, in the name of universalism.

Now, a very important question arises. We say that all the incidents of terrorism result from clashes among the multiple civilizations. But why should cultural commonality facilitate co-operation and cohesion among people whereas cultural differences promote cleavages and conflicts?

**First**, everyone has multiple identities which may compete with or reinforce each other like kinship, occupational, cultural, institutional, territorial, educational, partisan, ideological and others. Everyone tries to uplift its own
culture and maintain its superiority over others. Thus the non-Western societies now constantly try to stimulate the revitalization of indigenous identities and culture. Herein lies the problem – as everyone can not be the best.

Second, identity at any level – personal, tribal, racial, civilizational – can only be defined in relation to an “other”, a different person, tribe, race or civilization. Historically, relations between states or other entities of the same civilization have differed from relations between states or entities of different civilizations. Separate codes governed behaviour toward those who are “like us” and the “barbarians” who are not. The rules of the nations of Christendom for dealing with each other were different from those for dealing with the Turks and other “heathens”. Muslims acted differently toward those of Dar-al-Islam and those of Dar-al-harb. The Chinese treated Chinese foreigners and “us” and the extracivilizational “them” is constant in human history – finally giving rise to a clash among various existing civilizations.

Thirdly, the sources of conflict between states and groups from different civilizations are, in large measure, those which have always generated conflict between groups: control of people, territory, wealth and resources and relative power, that is the ability to impose one’s own values, culture and institutions on another group as compared to that group’s ability to do that to the former.

Finally, is the presence of conflict in human beings. It is human nature to hate. For self-definition and motivation people need enemies: competitors in business, rivals in achievement, opponents in politics. They naturally distrust and see as threats those who are different and have the capability to harm them. The resolution of one conflict and the disappearance of one enemy generate personal, social and political forces that give rise to new ones. “The ‘us’ versus ‘them’ tendency is”, as Ali Mazuri points out, “in the political arena, almost universal.”

In contemporary world the “them” is more likely to be people from a different civilization. The end of cold war thus has not ended conflict but has rather given rise to new identities rooted in culture which at the broadest level are civilizations. Simultaneously, common culture also encourages cooperation among states and groups which share that culture, which can be seen in the emerging patterns of regional association among countries, particularly in the economic arena.
6.1.3 A Shift of Power is gradually noticed

West had been the ruling tyrant of the world so long, but the recent shift of power has attracted the attention of many. There is the west on one hand, and Islamic and Sinic civilizations on the other. Islam and China embody great cultural traditions very different from and in their opinion infinitely superior to that of the west. The power and assertiveness of both in relation to the west are increasing, and the conflicts between their values and interests and those of the west are multiplying and becoming more intense.

But the question is will the shift of power bring justice to the rest of the world, or would there be simply a birth of a new tyrant all over again. It can be assumed that there would just be a change of power from west to Islams and Chinese, perhaps – but ultimately once again the world would be ruled by one despot. This is found since the primitive times, where the powers of maker sects were surrendered to one strong, bold authority who would steer the others. Then again the powerful would start dominating the rest, unless there is another strong authority found to subdue them. So terrorists who claim that terrorism is a war to be free from domination of the strong Jihad would perhaps do the same thing to control the others, once they get the power. Thus an equal share of power is desirable than one ruling the rest – but is this not a utopian concept?

Another important question which arises here is that, will the global institutions, the distribution of power, and the politics and economies of nations in the 21st century primarily reflect western values and interests or will they be shaped primarily by those of Islam and China – may be only time could give the best answer to such a question.

6.1.4 Islam and the West

Why do we find severe clashes especially between these two civilizations – which has now become the major cause of terrorism world wide – the question remains. Some westerners, including Ex-President Bill Clinton, have argued that, the west does not have problems with Islam, but only with violent Islamist extremists. But 1400 years of history demonstrate otherwise. The relations between Islam and Christianity, both being orthodox have often been stormy. Each has been the other's ‘other’. The 20th century conflict between liberal
democracy and Marxist Leninism is only a fleeting and superficial historical phenomenon compared to the continuing and deep conflicting relation between Islam and Christianity.

The causes of the ongoing pattern of conflict lie not in transitory phenomena such as 12th century Christian passion or 12th century Muslim fundamentalism. They flow from the nature of two religions and the civilizations based on them. Conflict was, on the one hand, a product of difference, particularly the Muslim concept of Islam as a way of life transcending and uniting religion and politics versus the western Christian concept of the separate realms of God and Caesar. Both are monotheistic religions, which, unlike polytheistic ones, cannot easily assimilate additional deities, and which see the world in dualistic, 'us'-and-'them' terms. Both are universalistic, claiming to be the one true faith to which all humans can adhere. Both are missionary religions, believing that their adherents have an obligation to convert non-believers to that one true faith. From its origin, Islam expanded by conquest and when the opportunity existed Christianity did too.

Moreover, the parallel concepts of 'jihad' and 'crusade' not only resemble each other, but distinguish these two faiths from other major world religions Islam and Christianity, along with Judaism, have teleological views of history in contrast to the cyclical or static view prevalent in other civilizations.

A comparable mix of factors increased the conflict between Islam and the West in the late 20th century. First, Muslim population growth generated large numbers of unemployed and disaffected young people who became recruits to Islamist causes, have exerted pressure on neighbouring societies and migrated to the West. Second, the Islamic Resurgence has given Muslims renewed confidence in the distinctive character and worth of their civilization and values compared to those of the West. Third, the West's simultaneous efforts to universalize its values and institutions to maintain its military and economic superiority, and to intervene in conflicts in the Muslim world generated intense resentment among Muslims. Fourth, the collapse of communism removed a common enemy of the West and Islam was left as the perceived major threat to the other. Fifth, the increasing contact and intermingling of Muslims and westerners stimulate in each a new sense of their own identity and how it differs from that of the other.
Thus the causes of the renewed conflict between Islam and the West thus lie in the fundamental question of power and culture. Who is to rule? Who is to be ruled? The central issue of politics defined by Lenin is the root of the contest between Islam and the West. There is, however, the additional conflict, which Lenin would have considered meaningless, between two different versions of what is right and what is wrong and, as a consequence, who is right and who is wrong. So long as the Islam remains Islam (which it will) and the West remains the West (which is more dubious), this fundamental conflict between two great civilizations and ways of life will continue to define their relations in the future. Even as it has defined them for the past fourteen centuries.

It should now be clear that we face a mood and a movement for transcending the level of issues and politics and the governments that pursue them.

History ends at least once and occasionally more often in the history of every civilization. As the civilization’s universal state emerges, its people become blinded by what Toynbee called “the mirage of immorality”. This is what happened also with the world’s super power. It never expected a revolt from others as it was supposed to control and steer the others. Moreover the continuous enjoyment of power for such a long period convinced them that there can be no second authority.

Civilizations grow, Quigley argued in 1961, because they have an “instrument of expansion”, that is military, religious, political or economic organisation that accumulates surplus and invests it in productive innovations. This is how U.S became the Superpower in the world.

Civilizations decline when they stop the application of surplus to new ways of doing things. In modern terms we say that the rate of investment decreases. This happens as Huntington mentions because the social groups controlling the surplus have a vested interest in using it for “non productive but ego-satisfying purposes...... which distribute the surpluses to consumption but do not provide more effective methods of production.” People live off their capital and the civilization moves from the stage of the universal state to the stage of decay. We assume a decay of Western Civilization because in U.S, this is a period
of economic recession, hence declining standards of living, civil wars between the various vested interests, and growing illiteracy and unemployment. The society gradually grows weaker. Vain efforts are made to stop the wastage by legislation. But the decline continues. The religious, intellectual, social and political levels of the society begin to lose the allegiance of the masses of the people on a large scale. New religious movements begin to sweep over the society. There is a growing reluctance to fight for the society or even to support it by paying taxes.

Huntington further opines in his book that decay then leads to the stage of invasion when the civilization, no longer able to defend itself because it is no longer willing to defend itself, lies wide open to barbarian invaders who often come from another, younger, more powerful civilization.

The overriding lesson of the history of civilizations, however, is that many things are probable but nothing is inevitable.

But far more significant than economies and demography, are the problems of moral decline, which include:

1. Increase in antisocial behaviour, such as crime, drug use, and violence generally;
2. Family decay, including increased rates of divorce, illegitimacy, teen-age pregnancy; single-parent families;
3. At least in the U.S, a decline in “social capital”, i.e., membership in voluntary associations and the interpersonal trust associated with such membership;
4. General weakening of the “worth ethic” and rise of a cult of personal indulgence;
5. Decreasing commitment to learning and intellectual activity, manifested in the U.S in lower levels of scholastic achievement.

The leaders of other countries have, as we have seen, at times attempted to disavow their cultural heritage and shift the identity of their country from one civilization to another. In no case to date have they succeeded and they have instead created schizophrenic torn countries. The American multiculturists similarly reject their country’s cultural heritage. Instead of attempting to identify the U.S with another civilization, however, they wish to create a country of many
civilizations, which is to say a country not belonging to any civilization and lacking a cultural core.

In the Emerging world of Ethnic conflict and civilizational clash, western belief in the universality of western culture suffers three problems: it is false; it is immoral; and it is dangerous. That it is false has been the central thesis of this book (that what we have discussed so far), a thesis well summed up by Michael Howard: “Common Western assumption that cultural diversity is historical curiosity being rapidly ended by the growth of a common, western-oriented, Anglophone world-culture, shaping our basic values... is simply not true.” (Michael Howard, America and the World; St. Louis: Washington University, the Annual Lewin Lecture, 5 April 1984; P.6)

Western universalism is dangerous to the world because it could lead to a major intercivilizational war between core states and it is dangerous to the west because it could lead to defeat of the west.

In short, in the coming era, the avoidance of major intercivilizational war requires core states to refrain from intervening in conflicts in other civilizations. This is a truth which some states, particularly the U.S, will undoubtedly find difficult to accept. This abstention rule that core states abstain from intervention in conflicts in other civilizations is the first requirement for peace in a multicivilizational, multipolar world. The second requirement is the joint mediation rule that core states negotiate with each other to contain or to hault fault line wars between states or groups from their civilizations. Acceptance of these rules and of world with greater equality among civilizations will not be easy for the west or for those civilizations which may aim to supplement or supplant the west in its dominant role.

Huntington in his book ‘The Clash of Civilization and The Remaking of World Order, points out that in the 1950s Lester Pearson warned that humans were moving into “an age when different civilizations will have to learn to live side by side in peaceful interchange, learning from each other, studying each other’s history and ideals and art and culture, mutually enriching each other’s lives. Immanuel Kant assumed that such an interaction among multiple civilizations would actually enrich the civilizations and uplift their development.
Pearson added, the alternative, in this overcrowded little world, is misunderstanding, tension, clash and catastrophe." (Lester B. Pearson, Democracy in World Politics; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955; P.82-83)

The futures of both peace and civilization depend upon understanding and cooperation among the political, spiritual, and intellectual leaders of the world’s major civilizations. In the clash of civilizations, Europe and America will hang together or hang separately. In the greater clash, the global “real clash”, between civilization and barbarism, the world’s great civilizations with their rich accomplishments in religion, art, literature, philosophy, sciences, technology, morality, and compassion, will also hang together or hang separately. In the emerging era, clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order based on civilizations is the surest safe-guard against world war."

Against the backdrop of such a U.S hegemony, Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, several times French foreign minister under a variety of regimes and a man who put principles above regimes, has good words to say about hegemonic behaviour in changing systems of world order, in which he had some experience: “True greatness is that which is limited to itself, true force is that which moderates itself, true glory is that which surrounds itself with national recognition” (1796) “No domination, no monopoly, always the force that protects, never the force that takes over10 (1797).” “Allies are kept only with care, concern, and reciprocal advantages...powerful though the Republic may be, it imposes less confidence than respect. To obtain true and useful allies, it must obtain [their] confidence” (1798). But it takes two to cooperate. There in lie the tension and the dynamics of the new world order to the twenty-first century.

A study says that United States ‘was’ the centre of power in the world for a long time and hence for a very long time a unipolar political and economic power play was found in the world, thus there seemed an imbalance in power. But now even before European entry, most analyses foresee a Chinese entry into a major power position. But some of the analyses, such as those by Gustav Schmidt (as found in Chapter 7 of the book ‘The Imbalance of Power, U.S Hegemony and International Order’ ed. By I. William Zartman) and Charles Doran (in Chapter 5 of the above mentioned book), pay more than passing attention to other rising
powers and regional constellations, none of which is likely to disturb the dominant nature of the polyarchic system or its hegemonic centre like, Europe, China, India, and other rising powers are engrossed in domestic, economic and political development for the foreseeable future, building the ingredients of a later power role but for the time being turned inward. This domestic pre-occupation reinforces the importance of welfare as a goal value for one international system by itself but does not reduce the importance of security for their regional and hence global relations, as the cases of China (regarding Taiwan and Tibet) and India (regarding Pakistan) and the two together (China regarding India) emphasize. Regional constellations can be expected to pay an increasingly important role in managing their own conflicts and coordinating their own economies and politics. The more such self-help develops, the more the burden of security is lifted from the global system, without however, creating a system of political autocracies, and the intensification of economic and cultural globalization exerts a powerful force to counteract centrifugal tendencies.

Here, Samuel P. Huntington has thus tried to mention that due to the presence of diversity of cultures, a superiority and inferiority complex is natural as some races and cultures are more enriched than the others. Thus an identity crisis is noticed among the races, so in order to establish a strong, respectful and honourable identity they fight amongst each other, so that any particular race cannot get dominated, neglected or overlooked by the others. In this context the author also mentions (as we have seen) about the fault line conflict. Depending on different languages, culture, custom, habits and habitats territorial as well as cognitive boundaries have been formed which separate one civilization (culture) from another. Now, during war such boundaries are penetrated and a cross-cultural exchange is noticed which has two sides - good and bad. It sometimes uproots the identity of people by displacement of property, dislocation of a race etc. But sometimes it also develops a relation of alliance between two cultures whereby each one understands the other better than before, each one tries to pick up some goodness of the other. Thus boundaries do not only distinguish but also foster familiarity, proximity and inter-cultural connection; as thought by Kjetil Tronvoll in the book War and the Politics of Identity in Ethiopia. He says such an understanding of boundaries does not always take away identity of a race, person
etc. (due to war or violence) but gives a new identity, a better one if seen positively. Such a discussion of boundaries of distinction and boundaries of connection is also found in Barth’s papers, supported by Kejtil Tornovoll who thought this discussion shows how old enemies become friends and vice versa during war or any form of violence. Thus Hunstintons ‘fault lines’ are not always ‘foe-building’.

To summarise Huntington’s book, we may notice, that the basic problems underlying contemporary terrorism is ‘we’ and ‘you’, in other words, a notion of in-group and out group. As Sigmund Freud in his book “Civilization and its Discontents” says, every person possesses two major qualities – i) narcissism and 2) aggression. The first talks about love for one’s own self and hence love for them or those who are attached to that self. The second is a feeling towards those who are not like the known self of an individual. In case of terrorism it has been noticed that, the war on terrorism had emerged due to the clashes found among groups which differ from each other either due to language or way of life or economy or religion or most importantly ideology. Thus people who belong to the same group would share such things mentioned above. Here narcissism is found among them as they love themselves and also people who are like minded (as they find themselves projected in others) or this love is found towards the group leader who influences their thoughts which seem to be similar to the other members too, or narcissism is found towards an ideology kept infront by them, to which all accord unanimously. In this way a ‘we-group’ or ‘in-group’ is formed which automatically hates the ‘you-group’ or ‘out group’, as the latter has different goals and ideologies to be achieved, as the members of the former cannot relate themselves to the latter, and, therefore, can not find themselves in the others. So a feeling of ‘aggression’ is found in them towards the others. Hence a clash is inevitable. Such is the case with the Islamists and the westerners leading to worlds most heinous forms of violence, the sufferers of which are none other than the common men. Such an explanation of clash between ‘we’ and ‘you’, ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ has been given by Paul Gilbert in the book – Old And New Wars, in the chapter ‘Myths of Identity’, which is the underlying message of Huntington’s book the Clash of Civilization.... According to Gilbert these clashes
are nothing but myths of identity; actually all men are same which even race they might belong to.

While considering this explanation of new wars, it reminds us of the collective identity theory of Sigmund Freud (Freud, S. 1932; Why War? Standard Edition 22:197-215). It is a theory, aspects of which have been alluded to in recent semi-popular accounts of the resurgence of nationalist conflict in the Post-cold War. Thus Michael Ignatieff appeals to Freud to characterize the war between Serbs and Croats. ‘An outsider is struck’ he writes, ‘not by the differences between Serbs and Croats, but by how similar they seem to be’. But ‘Freud’, he notes, ‘once argued that the smaller the real differences between two people the larger it was found to loom in their imaginations. He calls this effect the narcissism of minor difference. Its corollary must be, Ignatieff continues: the enemies need each other to remind themselves of who they really are. A Croat, thus, is someone who is not a Serb. A Serb is someone who is not a Croat. Without hatred of the other, there would be no clearly defined national self to worship and adore.

In this ties between group members Freud explains (as found in the book – Old and New Wars) ‘Love instincts which have been diverted from their original aims’ are drawn upon to establish identification with those who share the same ego-ideal; and because they are aim inhibited the ties they create are lasting ones. ‘If I love someone’, Freud says elsewhere: he must deserve it in some way... He deserves it if he is so like me in important ways that I can love myself in him; and he deserves it if he is so much more perfect than myself that I can love my ideal of myself in him.

But failing this, as one who is not a member of the group will fail, ‘it will be hard for me to love him.’

The question which arises here is that, does this mean that the terrorism, which is found, is purely based on such group-feelings and nothing else? ‘If this is really so, then we must give it a thought as men can kill so many innocents and children only to establish their likes and dislikes – that is, their personal preferences those who are in no way related to such conflicts are actually sacrificed – can we find any justice in it, in any arguable ground – the answer is

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clearly ‘no’. The fundamentalists who are the terrorists here aim at upholding their national spirit in all respect. The citizens of a cosmopolis are not bothered about such a nationalism as they belong to different nations, hence share different custom, culture, ritual, language and religion. They rather criticize those nations who compel all of its citizens to follow one particular language, religion, custom, way of life. This is why we find a major clash between the cosmopolitan U.S and the extreme nationalist, Islamists. In this content Paul Gilbert talks about two kinds of nationalism. Ethnic and Civic. Ethnic nationalism is dangerous and irrational based only on passion for all those, who share a common culture, religion and language – such a nationalism after a point becomes perverted in its extreme form. And this form of nationalism, specially those nationalists endorse terrorism. On the contrary, civic nationalism is more rational in nature. It expresses love for one’s state but also gives tolerance and space for the other existing states, their culture and custom.

We need to talk about self-defense in this context. Now a state can defend itself and its citizens from the other states and, if the other states bring harm then it can also take arms to combat such attacks. But what if the citizens of a particular state go against it for they are being repressed and exploited by the state for a long time? Then the citizens take the measures of self-defense against such despotism of the authoritative state. Sometimes they also go on to revolt against it through several struggles for which the state tries to defend itself once again but this time not from any other state but from its citizens only.

Paul Gilbert argues that terrorism which emerges due to exploitation by the superior, or due to the clash of culture and civilization, can be brought to an end not by counter-attacks, or violent means but by non-co-operation, negotiations (even they do not work as the lead to an unending demands of the terrorists) – but finally by offering amnesty in order to restore peace. That is the state should forgive all those who go against it. The civilizations should be tolerant enough and co-exist peacefully forgetting about ‘narcissism of major differences’. First hatred is found towards the out group which is instantiated by implementing several terror-tactics whereby a revenge is formed in the minds of the victims, and this leads to an ongoing process of throwing tantrums on each other. The main
6.1.5 A critical appraisal of Huntington’s view

After analysing Huntington’s book *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaining of World Order*, we get a clear scenario of the global power struggle leading to widespread international terrorism. But major criticisms have been put forward against Huntington’s civilizational clash thesis.

First of all, Huntington has been criticized for his presentation of ‘new paradigm’. He argues that the dominant cold war paradigm of state-centric realist model can no longer be useful to understand the post-cold war era and claims that civilizational differences will be primary source of regional and global conflicts. The critics suggest that, Huntington’s civilizational conflict paradigms’ is reductionist and deterministic since there are multiple causes of conflict; in which civilizational factors merely plays a significant role.

As opposed to Huntington, many have argued that, “clash of interests” rather than “clash of civilization” will continue to be the real cause of conflict. For instance, Shireen T. Hunter argues that, problematic relations between the West and the Muslim world hardly stem from civilizational differences, as Huntington argued, but from structural, political and economic – inequalities between the two worlds of ‘have’ and ‘have nots’.

Further, Forad Ajami contends that, Huntington over estimates cultural differences between civilization, while he underestimates the influence of the West in the hostile relations with the Muslim world. The critics further argue that, Huntington does not come up with a ‘new paradigm’, since his thesis fits into ‘political realism’ par excellence. The critics contend that, Huntington follows bloc based Cold War mentality while he is basically with West’s technological and military superiority. They also suggest that Huntington’s ‘Machiavellian’ advice of exploiting differences between Islamic and Confucian civilizations can only be considered within the ‘realist’ realm.

Again G. John Ikenberry argues that, Huntington calls forth a new Cold War. Rubenstein and Crocker too assert that Huntington proclaim, ‘Long live the
new Cold War'. Huntington has received general criticisms mainly based on his new 'paradigm'.

Huntington is his book (as we see) mentions that among all civilizations found in this world, the clash is mainly between the two prominent civilizations, the Islam and the West, i.e., between the two major powers – the conservatives and the liberalists. But Bernard Lewis, who inspired Huntington to a great extent, states that, it is true that the clash is between the conservatives and the liberals, but not between Islam and West; it is rather between the more staunch Islam extremists and the flexible liberal Muslims, as mentioned in his book – The Root of Muslim Rage.

Tariq Ali, in response to Huntington and civilization mongers in his book ‘The Clash of Fundamentalism’ in essay 20- ‘A Short-Course History of U.S Imperialism’ states that, the world of cultural differences between Senegalese, Chinese, Indonesian, Arab and South Asian Muslims are far greater than the similarities they share with non-Muslim members of the same nationality. Over the last hundred years, as Ali notes, the world of Islams has felt the heat of wars and revolutions just like every other society. The seventy year war between U.S imperialism and Soviet Union affected every single ‘civilization’. During the Twenties and Thirties, just as they were in Europe, intellectuals in the Arab world were divided between the cosmopolitan appeal of enlightenment Marxism and the anti-enlightenment populism of Mussolini and Hitler Liberalism, perceived as the ideology of the British Empire, was less popular. It is in fact the same today.

After the Second World War the U.S backed the most reactionary elements as a bulwark against Communism or progressive or secular nationalism. Often these were hard line religious fundamentalists: the Muslim Brotherhood against Nasser in Egypt; the Masjumi against Sukrano in Indonesia, the Jamaat-e-Islami against Bhutto in Pakistan and, later Osama Bin Laden and friends against the secular communist Najibullah. When the Taliban took Kabul in 1996, one of their first acts was to drag Najibullah out of the U.N compound where he had sought refuge and kill him. Once this had been done he was hung up on public display so that the citizens of Kabul would count the high price that an unbeliever had to pay. To quote Ali against Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations “To the best of my knowledge not a single leader or leader writer in the west registered a dissenting
opinion. Clash of Civilizations?” Ali tries to show, that clashes were found within a particular civilization only.

Moreover he emphasizes that Islam terrorism upon the west is a consequence of what the west had done to them. No one writes about the sleepless nights of the Palestinians due to constant bombardment of the U.S militants. When U.S yields such acts then those would not be termed as terrorism and only that would be called terrorism which the Islamis perform as a response? Moreover it is the U.S who has formed such fundamentalist terrorist groups for combating their enemies in Soviet Union. Now that their requirement has finished they alienate the same people from whom they had once taken help. They (US) alienate them by stating that they are the inferior, barbaric, uncivilized minority who do not know what modernity means. Huntington mentions that, the clash is originally between the liberals and the conservatives. According to him, liberalism means, in other words, Modernism, which the so-called east lacks. Ali says that the west sees modernity in their own frame. The word ‘modern’ comes from ‘modernus’, whose criterion is determined by pre and post Christianity. To the west, if one is not Anglicized by Christian culture and liberal ways of thinking, then he is not modern. But in such liberalism too we smell a non-liberal essence as Tariq Ali points out. Moreover the east is modern not by virtue of technology but due to its rich ethnic heritage and culture—which the west never takes into consideration. The ritual of wearing ‘Burkha’ i.e. where women are found behind the veil is conservatism as per the westerners, but it is to preserve their dignity from being seduced by the west— that such rituals came into existence. Whether it is good or bad is a different issue altogether—argues Tariq Ali.

Tariq Ali further holds that, the west would not understand the east because their whole life is centred on religion. Religion cannot be discarded from any aspect of their lives, be it political or social. And if the west tries to belittle it, then they are only humiliating their dignity—which is an offense itself. Ali further asserts that, political terrorism cannot be a reply to religious terrorism or jihad. The Jihadis have become so due to the west who have alienated them and given them an inferiority complex—for which they now raise their voice and demand equity.
Ali further argues that, if the Muslims are bearded extremists and fundamentalists, then the Americans are also fundamentalists as they capture the entire world not by sword but by their technological and economic weapon with which they have almost conquered the world. And those parts of the world who acquire similar power (for example, Iraq being rich in its natural resource of oil) and those who want to maintain sovereignty and do not want to co-operate with, or copy U.S policies are termed as terrorists by the west. If it is really a war between the east and the west then proper understanding of the east’s nightmare of history, from which so many struggles arise has to be understood. Serious engagement and proper consideration of this deprived lot is necessary, rather than of play a constant blame game between the east and the west. Proper recognition, if not celebration, of identity of the east is required essentially to overcome such issues—suggests Ali.

6.2 Identity and Violence

Let us now turn to the second section of this chapter where we would discuss a problem of ‘identity’ leading to violence (which sounds somewhat similar to what Huntington mentions as the cause of terrorism in this book The Clash of...). Such a problem has been identified once again by Prof. Amartya Sen and has been explained vividly in his book ‘Identity and Violence The Illusion of Destiny’.

In this book, Sen argues in his book that conflict and violence are sustained today, no less than in the past, by the illusion of a unique identity. Indeed, the world is increasingly taken to be divided between religions which is akin to what Huntington calls ‘Civilizations’. This way of division ignores the other relevant ways in which people see themselves divided through class, gender, profession, language, literature, science, music, morals or politics. When good relations among different human beings are identified in this way, human beings become deeply miniaturized and deposited into little boxes.

Longston Hughes, the African writer, describes in his 1940 autobiography, ‘The Big Sea’, the exhilaration that seized him as he left New York for Africa. He threw his American books into the Sea: “It was like throwing a million bricks out of my heart.”

He was on his way to his “Africa, Motherland of the negro
people!” Soon he would experience “the real thing, to be touched and seen, not merely read about in a book.” A sense of identity can be a source now merely of pride and joy, but also of strength and confidence. Yet identity can also kill – and kill with abandon. A strong – and exclusive – sense of belonging to one group can in many cases carry with it the perception of distance and divergence from other groups. Again the ‘in-group’ superiority can prepare a ground for worldwide violence. Every individual inescapably belongs to some religion, some class, some caste, some nation etc., whether he likes to be in them or not. That forms his identity and naturally any one belonging to either his class or speaking his language or having common interest would be his friend and those who do not belong to his class, creed, religion – with them a bond of familiarity would never be created by him. But there are some fundamentalists or religious fanatics who like to be identified and grouped only and only on the basis of their ‘religion’. They make ‘religion’ such a big issue that they even indulge into wars with that part of the world which does not follow their religion. Hughes points out that, such an ‘identity’ are dangerous. Prof. Amartya Sen too mentions that the issues over which the world is fighting are much less important than those which should be really given a thought, such as the political issues, financial issues which affect the force, security and well-being of various nations.

Religion, culture and civilization cannot be the prime factor of compartmentalisation of the people across the globe. That religion is to be cursed which divides people instead of binding them together. Even all people of a particular religion do not share similar opinions. A clash is thus noticed, not only among the different religions but also among the different sects of the same religion. Thus it seems, feel it is not religion, race, culture or civilization which divides people, but it is their ego which separates them from one another.

Increasing reliance or religion-based classification of the people of the world also tends to make the Western response to global terrorism and conflict peculiarly ham-handed. Respect for “other people” is shown by praising their religious books, rather than by taking note of the many sided involvements and achievements, in non-religious as well as religious fields, of different people in a globally interactive world. In confronting what is called “Islamic terrorism” in the muddled vocabulary of contemporary global politics, the intellectual force of
western policy is aimed quite substantially at trying to define – or redefine – Islam.

Religious or civilizational classification can, of course, be a source of belligerent distortion as well. It can, for example, take the form of crude beliefs well exemplified by U.S Lieutenant General William Boykin’s blaring – and by now well-known-remark describing his battle against Muslims with disarming coarseness: “I knew that my God was bigger than his”, and that the Christian God “was a real God, and [the Muslim’s] was an Idol”. The idiocy of such dense bigotry is, of course, easy to diagnose, and for this reason there is comparatively limited danger in the uncouth hurting of such unguided missiles. There is, in contrast, a much more serious problem in the use in Western Public Policy of intellectual “guided missiles” that present a superficially noble vision to woo Muslim activists away from opposition through the apparently begging strategy of defining Islam appropriately. They try to wrench Islamic terrorists from violence by insisting that Islam - is a religion of peace, and that a “true Muslim” must be a tolerant individual (“so come off it and be peaceful”). The rejection of a confrontational view of Islam is certainly appropriate and extremely important at this time, but we must also ask whether it is at all necessary or useful, or even possible, to try to define in largely political terms what a “true Muslim” must be like.

A person’s religion need not be his or her all encompassing and exclusive identity. In particular, Islam, as a religion, does not obliterate responsible choice for Muslims in many spheres of life. Indeed, it is possible for one Muslim to take a confrontational view and another to be thoroughly tolerant of heterodoxy without either of them ceasing to be a Muslim for that reason alone. The response to Islamic fundamentalism and to the terrorism linked with it, also becomes meaningless when there is a general failure to distinguish between Islamic history and the history of Muslim people Muslims, like all other people in the world, have many different pursuits, and not all of their priorities and values need to be placed within their singular identity of being Muslim. Religion is not, and cannot be, a person’s all encompassing identity.

Sen, opines that, it is true that the so-called Islamic terrorists have repeatedly tried to extend the role of religion very far into other spheres, contrary
to the generally accepted principles and domain of Islam. It is also true that, the recruiters for terrorism would like Muslims to forget that they have other identities too, and that they have to decide on many important political and moral matters and take responsibility for their decisions, rather than being led by the recruiters advocacy based on their uncommon reading of Islam. The mistaken presumptions involved in such efforts can certainly be examined and criticized. But the strategy of trying to stop much recruitment by declaring the recruiters to be “apostate” would also, in a singularist way, – extend the reach of religion beyond its established domain.

The basic recognition of the multiplicity of identities would militate against trying to see people in exclusively religious terms, no matter how religious they are within the domain of religion. Attempts to tackle terrorism through the aid of religion has had the effect of magnifying, both in Britain and America, the voice of Islamic clerics and other members of the religious establishment on matters that are not in the domain of religion, at a time when the political and social roles of Muslims in civil society, including the practice of democracy, need emphasis and much greater support.

What religious extremism had one to demote and downgrade the responsible political action of citizens (irrespective of religious ethnicity) has been, to some extent, reinforced, rather than eradicated, by the attempt to fight terrorism, by trying to recruit the religious establishment on “the right side”. In the downplaying of political and social identities as opposed to religious identity, it is civil society that has been the loser, precisely at a time when there is a great need to strengthen it.

Prof. Sen opines that, as for the global challenge of terrorism, we have reason to expect, from the world leaders working against it, greater clarity of thought than we are currently getting. The confusion generated by an implicit belief in the solitarist understanding of identity, poses serious barriers to overcoming global terrorism and creating a world without ideologically organized large-scale violence. The recognition of multiple identities and of the world beyond religious affiliations, even for religious people, can possibly make some difference in the troubled world in which we live.
Conclusion

Initially while reading the book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order; it seems to us that ‘terrorism’ mentioned here is more ‘political’ than ‘philosophical’ in nature. But in our discussion of terrorism, we are more interested in its philosophical perspective dealing with its ethical, logical, psychological and religious aspects. But as we approach to the end of this book, we notice that a ‘terrorism’ discussed here, levied against one state by another – does not have politics as its rootcause. Such a terrorism is due to the clashes among civilizations existing in this world. To analyse it further, we would rather claim that the terrorism discussed here is religious terrorism and not state terrorism. This terrorism is due to a clash between races, cultures and, finally, between two ‘prominent religions’ of the world – the liberal and the conservatives.

The sense of belonging to a community, while strong enough in many cases, need not obliterate – or overwhelm – other associations and affiliations. These choices are constantly faced (even though we may not spend all our time articulating the choices we are actually making).

For example, The Caribbean poet Derek Walcott’s poem “A Far Cry from Africa”, which captures the divergent pulls of his historical African background and his loyalty to the ‘English’ language and the literary culture that goes with it (a very strong affiliation for Walcott): - is express thus -

Where shall I turn, divided to the vein?
I who have cursed
The drunken officer of British rule, now choose
Between this Africa and the English tongue I love?
Betray them both, or give back what they give?
How can I face such slaughter and be cool?
How can I turn from Africa and live.15

Here Walcott cannot simply “discover” what is his true identity; he has to decide what he should do, and how – and to what event – to make room for the different loyalties in his life.
The clash of civilization was already a popular topic even before 11th September, but after it, it became all the more prominent to mark a sharp distinction between the “western” and “Islamic” civilizations. The Islamists today protest against the West—because, according to them, the West has increased its power and resources by exploiting them—the oppressed, ignored, overlooked minority and they are “minority” because of the Western exploiters who have made them minority. In this book Dr. Sen has tried to explain such an inequality on the basis of economy. Other than the Islamic countries there are other states too where western imperialism is found and hence those states are found to be very poor. Actually the West are the privileged one whose trade is industry based. The author points out that anyone who takes part in their trade cannot remain poor. But the Islamic and other developing nations cannot participate in such trade and commerce as they have heavy debts to clear. Moreover their capital goes into fulfilling the basic necessities of lives—which are also found to be incomplete. Again, their health conditions remain miserable and thousands of them got perished in every week without being able to be treated due to the lack of money. Under such circumstances it would be an extravagance on their part to take part in world trade, as it includes a lot of expenses which they can only dream to bear. In the developed countries (West) such problems are not found. There everyone’s health is insured and even the unemployed get meal twice a day as provided by their government. The market policies are to be blamed too for the poverty amongst the developing or underdeveloped nations. Sen however mentions that the developing countries cannot be so ungrateful to the West, for whatever they could achieve today were in fact possible only with their assistance. It is true that the West who has stretched his hand of help has also been benefitted by extracting the resources from them, who are helped by the West. After utilizing the major part of their resources, the residue which is found to be left over is used by those exploited, and they still very satisfied with that little bit. The basic problem Sen notes, is the problem of distribution due to which the poor remains poor, as they do not have the intelligence and education to understand that they are being cheated. The rich becomes richer in this way and the poor becomes the poorer, because when an industry gains a large amount of profit, the workers are given the same wage, whereas the profit is distributed only among the higher officials. Thus Prof. Sen solely blames the ‘intellect-level’ which makes the poor
countries poor. Lack of literacy, lack of intellect – are sure of the causes of poverty, which causes their suffering and certainly not religion.

There is an immediate and compelling need in the contemporary world to ask questions not only about the economy, and politics of globalization, but also about the values, ethics, and sense of belonging that shape our conception of the global world. In a non solitarist understanding of human identity, involvement with such issues need not demand that our National allegiances and local loyalties be altogether replaced by a global sense of belonging, to be reflected in the working of a colossal “world state”. Infact global identities can bring to receive its due without eliminating our other loyalties.

There is also an important role for the initiatives taken by a great many concerned individuals who demand that more attention to be paid should global justice (in line with David Hume’s expectation, that “the boundaries of justice still grow larger”).

By preventing the miniaturizing of human beings who are repeatedly divided or compartmentalized by their own identities, we can dream of a possible world which would perhaps overcome the memory of its troubled past. In conclusion, I would like to quote Sen: “As an eleven year old boy I could not do much for Kader Mia as he lay bleeding with his head on my lap (during the Hindu-Muslim riot in Bengal 1940). But I imagine another universe, not beyond our reach, in which he and I can jointly affirm our many common identities (even as the warning singularists howl at the gate). We have to make sure, above all, that our mind is not halved by a horizon”.

Thus just as Samuel P. Huntington, Amartya Sen also argues that all the violence which the world faces today, is caused by the strong sense of identity, culture, civilization and religion – all of which remain pent up in one compartment well demarcated by a fault line – beyond which lies the ‘rest’, the ‘others’ – the root cause of all violence.
References

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18. Ibid., P. 185.