Section III

Appayya Dīksita's Contribution to the Vedāntic Thought.
SECTION II

Appayya Diksita's Contribution To The Vedantic Thought.

INTRODUCTION

Indian philosophy, it is rightly claimed, is not merely a system of thought, but it is essentially a system of life. Mere intellectual satisfaction has never been the goal of Indian philosophers; they have always aimed at spiritual experience. Indian thinkers, in other words, have always striven to 'live' philosophy, rather than merely to 'learn' and 'teach' it. The philosophical systems of ancient India further claim to have been mainly based on the Veda. Among the valid means of knowledge, therefore, authority of the Veda is invariably placed over and above the sensual perception and the logical inference. In the course of the development of Indian philosophical thought, however, the absolute validity of the Veda came to be questioned by some free thinkers. They even went to the extent of openly denying the authority of the Veda. The philosophical systems in ancient India consequently fall into two categories - the āstika (orthodox) which swear by the ultimate validity of the Veda and the nāstika (heterodox) which have no faith in the Veda as the ultimate pramāṇa. The orthodox systems asserted that human sense-organs and human intellect are necessarily limited in scope and power. They would, therefore,
certainly fail to comprehend the all-comprehensive ultimate reality, "wherefrom the words turn back, together with the mind not having attained it"\(^1\). The ultimate reality is indeterminable except through a human faculty which transcends the senses and the intellect - namely, intuition. And the Veda is believed to be the most perfect expression of the intuitional vision of the ancient seers.

The earliest Vedic texts, namely, the Rgveda and the Atharvaveda, are, broadly speaking, collections of prayers and magical incantations respectively. Of philosophy in the strictest sense of the term, we find in them but vague beginnings. They rather represent the two types of religion - the Rgveda, which is a collection of hymns and prayers employed in nature-worship, fire-worship and hero-worship, represents the religion of the 'classes', while the Atharvaveda, which contains incantations and formulas of magic and witchcraft, represents the religion of the 'masses' among the Vedic Indians. After a long and strenuous period of conquest and colonisation, the Vedic Aryans finally settled down in the fertile 'land of seven rivers' and beyond.

\(^1\) Taittiriya Up., II.4.1 : 

यतो वाचे निकर्वते अग्निर्प्रय मनसा सह ।
They soon became rich and established prosperous kingdoms. This change in their way of life effected a change also in their religious outlook. They utilised their newly acquired prosperity and leisure towards elaborating the simple religion into a complicated system of ritual. And, in course of time, the formal details of this ritual became so very complex that a new well-organised class of priests, who alone could master those details arose in the Vedic society and this priestly class, secured domination over other classes in the society.

In a sense, this undue exaltation of sacrifice must be said to have prepared the way for the rise of the truly philosophical speculations in ancient India. For, the mechanical ritualism sponsored by the Brāhmaṇa-texts had its inevitable reaction in the form of a two-fold revolt - intellectual and social. The teachers of the early Upaniṣads raised the banner of free thinking, and generally encouraged an attitude of enquiriness. The Upaniṣads dealt, more or less exclusively, with the four main problems of philosophy, namely, the world, the man, the ultimate reality, and the mutual relationship of these three. The thinkers of the Upaniṣads argued that this manifold phenomenal world can be reduced to one single ultimate principle, which they
called the Brahman, and this Brahman is the essential reality underlying the phenomenal world— the phenomenal world itself being merely a bundle of names and forms, and, therefore, essentially unreal. But these Upaniṣadic teachers did not care for the process of thought—they only gave the results and conclusions without their logical back-ground. In other words, their method was intuitional, and their appeal mystical. This was surely beyond the common man. Moreover, the essentially individualistic attitude of the Upaniṣadic teachers, the apparent lack of uniformity in their teachings, and their open contempt for this world were also responsible for the fact that the Upaniṣads did not take deep roots among the people at large.

This failure of the Upaniṣads resulted in the rise and growth of the heterodox systems of thought, like Buddhism and Jainism. They took advantage of the intellectual atmosphere created by the Upaniṣads—particularly their refusal blindly to accept the authority of the Veda—as also of the philosophical and religious democracy established by them. At the same time, they corrected the obvious weak-points of the Upaniṣadic methods. Consequently these two—more especially Buddhism—became strong anti-vedic forces; so much so that, on account of their onslaught,
Vedic way of life and thought were seriously jeopardized. In the development of the orthodox philosophical thought these thus ensued a fairly long interregnum.

But the spark kindled by the Vedas and the *Upanisads* was not completely extinguished. A large number of Vedic thinkers bravely followed in the trail so finely blazed by their ancestors. (They started a comprehensive movement for consolidating, systematising, and popularising the Vedic way of life and thought.) One aspect of this great movement related to the orthodox philosophical thought. This latter now came to be properly organised in the form of six principal systems. In a manner more methodical than the *Upanisads*, these systems dealt with all the outstanding problems of philosophy. They made abundant use of logical reasoning. They became at once critical and constructive. In short, with the systems, Indian philosophy became truly self-conscious.

The traditionally recognised six systems of orthodox philosophy are - *Pūrva-māṇḍya, Śāṁkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya* and *Vedānta*. The *Pūrva-māṇḍya* is mainly

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1. The original propounders of the six systems are believed to have been respectively, Jaimini, Kapila, Patanjali, Kanada, Gautama, and Bādarāyana.
a science of interpretation of scriptural texts. According to the Śāmkhya, the two entities, namely, the prakṛti and the Purusa are the main cause. Out of these two, prakṛti is the cause of the phenomenal world, while the purusa is the nominal cause and is a passive witness. The Yoga is a manual of spiritual discipline. The Vaisēśika system upholds the view that the world is formed through atoms. At the time of creation these atoms come together while at the time of destruction these atoms are separated from each other. The Nyāya is a system of logic. The Vedānta sponsors the view that monism is the absolute reality. The individual soul is not different from this ultimate reality, and the phenomenal world is only relatively real.

Though all the six systems claim to owe allegiance to the Veda, only two of them, namely, Purva-mīmāṃsa and the Vedānta can be said to be directly based on Vedic scriptures, while the remaining four, namely, the Śāmkhya, the Yoga, the Vaisēśika and the Nyāya, are only indirectly, and, in many cases, in a forced manner, connected with the Veda. The truly metaphysical systems are the Vedānta, the Śāmkhya and the Vaisēśika.

The Vedānta aims at establishing a harmony among the apparently inconsistent and self-contradictory teachings
of the Upanisads. One of the basic texts of this system, namely, the Vedanta-sutras of Badarayana, have been commented upon by various acaryas like Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Bhāskara, Nimbarka, Madhva, Śrīkantha etc.. These different commentaries have naturally given rise to different schools of Vedanta, Śaṅkara, for instance, has sponsored the view of absolute monism, that is, the view that the ultimate reality (Brahman) is one without a second, that the individual soul is essentially identical with that ultimate reality, its separation from that reality being merely a temporary phase occasioned by the superimposition of body-mind-complex, and that the phenomenal world is just a figment of avidya. Rāmānuja on the other hand, thinks that the Supreme Lord (Viṣṇu) is the ultimate reality. The phenomenal world is also real, and the individual self which also is real is different from the Supreme Lord. When by self-realization ignorance is wholly removed, and when a man attains superior devotion to god, he is received into god. Bhāskara and Nimbarka are the propounders of the dvaita-dvaita or bhedabheda doctrine, according to which both the Jīva and the physical world evolve out of the Brahman. The things are non-different from the Brahman in their causal and generic aspects and different as effects and individuals.
On the spiritual side the Brahman is transformed into the antaryāmin and the Jīva; on the physical side into avyakta, sūtra, virāj and devatā which are all cosmic; and jāti, and pīṇḍa, which are not cosmic. Mokṣa is conceived as being achieved in two stages — the first leading to aparārga, where samsāra is overcome through the overcoming of asānga; and the second leading to Brahmanhood through the dispelling of avidvā. Madhva thinks that the supreme god i.e. Viṣṇu is the ultimate reality while the Jīva is subordinate to Him. The relation between the Supreme Lord and the Jīva is that of a master and servant. The Jīva can attain similarity with the Supreme god through his grace only. Śrīkanṭha, the propounder of the Śiva-dvaita doctrine sponsors the view that Śiva is the ultimate reality. The phenomenal world is created by Śiva with the help of his Śakti. The Jīva is not different from Śiva but appears being different through avidvā. When this avidvā is removed, the Jīva becomes identical with Śiva, the absolute reality. The Jīva is bound by pāsa and only through the grace of Śiva, these pāsas are removed and the Jīva becomes entitled to mokṣa.

There is ample evidence to show that Appayya Dīksita had critically studied and mastered these different schools of Vedānta — both dvaita and advaita—, but he must
be said to have belonged intellectually to the Śāṅkara school of Vedānta and emotionally to the Śivādvaita school of Śrīkanṭha.

An attempt has been made in this section to reconstruct, so to say, the philosophical thought of Appayya Dīkṣita on the basis of the ten works so far studied and analysed in this thesis. This has been done both from the positive point of view and the negative point of view. That is to say, the various views which Appayya Dīkṣita seems either to accept and support or to refute and reject are filled together from his Vedāntic writings, rearranged under different headings, and then set forth in such a way that they represent, in a positive way, what may be called the philosophical thought of Appayya Dīkṣita.
Methodology

A brief reference may first of all be made to some of the main features of what may be called the methodology of Appayya Dīkṣita’s philosophy, as known from the various indications - direct or indirect - available in his works. Appayya Dīkṣita straightway declares that the pramanās which are to be made operative in connection with the Pūrvamīmāṃsa are different from those are to be made operative in connection with the Uttaramīmāṃsa (i.e. Vedānta). For example, while determining the import of the injunctions in the Pūrvamīmāṃsa the following pramanās are made use of, namely, śrutī (statement), linga (import), vākya (sentence), prakaraṇa (topic), sthāna (position), and samākhyā (appellation). Out of these six pramanās each preceding one is regarded as being more powerful than the each succeeding one. In addition to these six major pramanās, the Pūrvamīmāṃsa mentions such minor pramanās as pātha (text seriatam), krama (juxtaposition), which are also useful in determining the meaning of the words or sentences.

1. VKP. I.1.1.

2. Jaimini Sūtra, m.>(ṛ).
in the Purvamimamsa. In the Uttaramimamsa, different pramanas are used. The most important pramaṇa used for the determination of the meaning of the Vedanta texts is what is generally known as the tātparya-linga\(^1\) or the purport of the passage. This tātparya-linga or the tātparyartha is based upon the following seven marks: (1) beginning (upakrama), (2) conclusion (upasamhara), (3) repetition (abhyaśa), (4) novelty (apurvatva), (5) fruit (phala), (6) glorification (arthavāda) and (7) fitness\(^2\)(upapatti).

This tātparyartha is generally based upon two important points from among the seven mentioned above. These two are upakrama and upasamhara\(^3\). Between these two, again, the upakrama-pramāṇa is more powerful\(^4\). The validity of the tātparyartha is recognised even by the dvaitins like Madhva\(^5\). This tātparyartha as has been already pointed out is dependent on the power or pravrtti of a word. There is no such a rule that if a pravrtti of a word is dependent on

1. Nayamanjari I.1.4.
2. Śivārkamanidīpikā, p. 179-
something, the word must necessarily denote that same thing. For example, if a king causes injury (duhkha) to the enemy, the king himself does not suffer from the pains arising from the injuries, even if the king is the cause of the injury. The pravṛtti of the word injury is dependent on the king or his actions which result in causing injury to the enemy. Without the help of the sabda endowed with such a power, the Brahman cannot be grasped.

The meaning of the Vedic passages, again, can be properly determined with the help of the sentences having prescriptive sense (vidhi). Such vidhi-sentences create urgency (cödana). Like vidhi-sentences, the sentences denoting prohibition (niśedha) such as, Brahmanah na hantavyah, indicate nivṛtti from some such thing as would put obstacles in the way of knowing the Brahman.

Śrīkāṇṭha, however, thinks that both the Purvamīmāṃsā and the Vedānta-sāstra are related to each other, so all those pramanas which are useful in determining

1. Ibid. p. 118.
2. Ibid.
the exact meaning of the sentences having a ritualistic
purport, are also helpful in fixing the exact sense of
the Vedanta sentences also. Appayya Diksita, while
commenting on this view of Srikantha, does not oppose
Srikantha.

Refutation of Unacceptable Doctrines.

Always keeping in view all these rules, governing
the interpretation of Vedic texts as also other
conventions of Mimamsa which together constitute, in the
main, his methodology, Appayya Diksita has refuted the
doctrines of various schools of philosophy. The Dvaita
doctrine of Madhva may be said to have been the first
victim of his severe attack. In his Madhvantramukhamadana,
Appayya Diksita, emphasises that the various
conventions and rules of Mimamsa which are usually
respected and followed by wise men have been violated by
Madhva. Apart from this, the main objections raised by
Appayya Diksita against the Dvaita doctrine are the
following: The Jiva and the Brahman cannot be said to be

2. Madhvantramukhamadana.

तयाम्य नन्दतीर्थ्यर्द्वियं मस्थानांमेव न: ।
वद नैदैम्यमेद-'भृमस्थायुक्ती गतः ॥
different from each other, for, all the vedānta texts assert the identification of these two. The duality, on the other hand, has been treated with contempt, as has been indicated by such passages as "यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तद्विव भिन्नति।१२ सोऽऽ ब्रह्म ते पराभोक्त्यत्स्म्यो ब्रह्म वेद।२१"

The happiness etc. of the Jīva is due to its own karmas; the Jīva itself is responsible for all that, while Paramesvara cannot be said to be directly connected with it. According to the advaitin, though the Jīva is essentially full of bliss, still its knowledge is obscured by avidya. This fact gives rise to the imagined difference between the Jīva and the Brahman. The dvaitins, on the other hand, think of a power namely, Vīsesa, which is believed to be the cause of this difference. But there is no evidence available in the sruti to justify such an assumption. In the condition of mokṣa, the Jīva becomes one with the Brahman and enjoys all powers except the power of creation etc. which are regarded as belonging exclusively to Isvara. There is further no ground to say that even after mokṣa, duality persists.

1. Nyāyarākṣamani I.1.1, Nayamanjari IV.1.2.
3. Ibid. II.3.6.
5. Siddhantalesasamgraha IV.
Another important philosophical system, which has been subject to criticism by Appayya Dīkṣita, is the system of the Sāmkhyas. Especially, the claim of the Sāmkhyas that the Pradhāna is the cause of the universe is stently opposed by Appayya Dīkṣita who asserts that the cause of the world must be some sentient entity\(^1\). The Ātman which invariably implies some sentient entity, has been variously described in the śruti-texts as being the cause of the whole universe\(^2\). The Pradhāna of the Sāmkhyas being non-sentient cannot be the cause. The attributes like thinking, etc., which have been indicated in such sentences, as tat aikṣata\(^3\), etc. are not possible even in the secondary sense in the case of the pradhāna. The Prakṛti of the Sāmkhyas cannot be said to have been intended in the upaniṣadic sentence, वज्रामेंवा लेहित सुकलक्षणाः, because the word aja is used in this passage in a general sense and may be taken to denote any entity. As there is no specific attribute of the Prakṛti mentioned here, the Prakṛti of the Sāmkhyas cannot be said to have been

\(^{1}\) Taittirīya Up. II.1., Katha Up. I.12.18
\(^{2}\) Chandogya Up VI.1.2.
\(^{3}\) Svetāsvatara Up. IV.5.

1. VKP. I.15.
referred to at all. Similarly, the phrase *pañca pañca janah* in the sentence *पञ्चमन् पञ्च ज्ञानव आकाशरः* does not denote the twenty five (five into five) principles of the Śāmkhyas. The word *pañca-janah* is a *sāmjayā* denoting particular objects, and the whole phrase that is, *pañca pañca-janah* denotes five sense-organs only. In such a manner, the theory of the Śāmkhyas has been refuted in detail in the *Vedānta-sūtras* by the *Sutrakara* himself. Śāmkara, Śrīkantha and Appayya Dīkṣita have closely followed the *Sutrakara*.

The yoga-doctrine also, has been refuted, as not being useful as a means of attaining the knowledge about the Brahman, for, it has not been stated as such in the *sūrati*.

The doctrine of the Bauddhas is shown to be thoroughly unacceptable as they do not believe in the existence of the Ātman. Moreover, the Bauddhas are unable to answer such relevant questions as the following: If the

1. *Nayamanjari* I, 4.2.
3. *Nayamanjari* I, 4.3.
4. *Nayamanjari* II.2.2. and *VKP* II.2.2.
world is assumed to have been formed through *samudāyas*, such as *prthvi*, *jala*, *tejas*, and *vayu*, who is responsible for forming these *samudāyas*, which latter are themselves insentient? why are they formed?\(^1\) If only *vijñāna* is real and everything is momentary, how is it that one momentary thing can create the second one, when the first is destroyed at the very moment when it is created?\(^2\) If nothing is real and non-existence is the cause of existence\(^3\), then anything can be created from anything without any efforts\(^4\).

The *Jaina-mata* is not acceptable because, according to this system, nothing can be definitely described in terms of existence and non-existence. One cannot have the knowledge of the existence and non-existence at one and the same time, without any specification of time and place\(^5\).

The *Pañcarātra* theory, which looks upon *Pañcarātra* as the only authoritative work, and which regards the Vedas as being not so authentic, is rejected on the ground

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1. It is the view of the *Bahyārthavāding*, which is being refuted.
2. The view of the *Vijñānavādi-Bauddhas* is refuted.
3. The *Śūnyavadins* are being refuted here.
that the Jīva is not anitya as is supposed by the followers of that system. If the Jīva is anitya, the attainment of mokṣa will not be possible in its case.

Similarly, the four gods, namely, Vasudeva, Saṃkaraśaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha cannot be taken to be related to one another as cause and effect, if all these gods are of equal status.

Appayya Dīkṣita finds himself in a rather awkward position when he has to tackle with the Nakulīda pasupata system, which has been refuted by Saṃkara in his commentary on the Vedanta sutras, II.2.37-41. Here, Appayya Dīkṣita says, as Śrikanṭha has said in his commentary on the relevant sutras of Badarayana, that what the Sutrakāra wants to refute here, is, the claim of the Purvapakṣin that Śiva is not both the nimitta-kāraṇa and the upadāna kāraṇa of the universe. The Siddhāntin states that Śiva is not only the nimitta, as has been stated in the sruti-texts like

1. 
2. Śrīkanṭha-bhāṣya on the Vedanta-sūtras II.2.37-41.
4. Śvetāsvatara Up. IV.10.
5. Ibid. III.4.
All these texts lead to the conclusion that Śiva or Īśūna is the cause of the universe. He created the universe through his uncommon power, which is otherwise known as the māyā or cīte sakti or Uma or Parvatī, or Ambikā, etc. In proving this, the Siddhāntin mainly depends on the Saiva Purānas, such as the Śiva Purāṇa, the Skanda Purāṇa and so many others.

It is interesting to note that Appayya Dīkṣita straightway refutes the Saiva-mata in his Nayamanjari in the same way as Śamkhya. While refuting this Saiva-mata, Appayya Dīkṣita says that the view of the Saivas who suppose Ṣiva as only nimitta kāraṇa of this universe cannot be accepted. Because, according to the Vedānta the highest Brahman is capable of appearing in various forms simultaneously. And as the Brahman functions of its own free will, there is no possibility of its being controlled by others. But in his Nayamanimala, Appayya Dīkṣita follows Śrīkaṇṭha in entirety.

1. Nayamanjari II.2.7.
2. Nayamanimala II.2.7.
The Brahman

We may now turn to some of the more important positive aspects of Appayya Diksita's philosophical thought which can be established on the basis of his principal works. Naturally enough, we have to begin with what Appayya Diksita has to say about his concept of the Brahman.

The Brahman is beyond the scope of speech and mind\(^1\). A description of the Brahman in positive terms is not possible, hence, the Vedanta-texts describe the Brahman with the words, \textit{na iti na iti}\(^2\). However, as pointed out by Appayya Diksita, this description, namely, \textit{na iti, na iti}, does not negate or deny the very existence of the Brahman, but it negates only the abstract and concrete terms, such as Agni, Aditya and other animate beings, as the Brahman\(^3\). That is to say, Aditya etc. are to be meditated upon as the Brahman but these symbols are not the Brahman itself. The Brahman is different from such symbols. The real nature of the Brahman can be adequately known through the Vedanta only. The other

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  \item \textit{Taittirīya Up II.4.1.} कलो वाचे नित्यिन्ते अप्राप्य मन्त्वते सह।
  \item \textit{Bṛhadarābhyaaka Up. II.3.6.} नैति नैति अमृत्योगं न हि गृह्यते।
  \item \textit{VXP. III.2.6., Nayamanjarī III.2.6.}
\end{itemize}
minor pramanas like patha-krama (text), sthana-krama (juxta-position) etc. which are useful in determining the nature of the other objects, are not helpful in determining the nature of the Brahman. It is repeatedly asserted that Brahman is knowable and can be known by means of the repeated study of the Vedanta. The meritorious deeds, such as sacrifices, etc. are to be performed for the purification of the mind. Because, such purification of the mind is also one of the essential conditions for obtaining the knowledge about the Brahman.

The Brahman appears to assume different forms, but these forms are not real; they are due to various upadhis. Such forms are mentioned in the srutis only in order that the meditation on the Brahman should be facilitated through these forms. The Upasana of the Brahman consists of three stages, namely, sravana, manana and nididhyasana, if these stages are properly brought into practice one can

1. VKP I.1.1.
2. Śivārkamanidīpika, I.1.1.
4. Ibid.
visualise the Brahman. Appayya Dīkṣita strongly endorsed the view that though the Brahman is generally invisible, it can be visualised by yogins. The Brahman is always full of unceasing bliss. Essentially, the individual souls is not different from the Brahman.

The Brahman alone is the creator of this universe. The act of creation is a mere sport on the part of the Brahman. It is emphasised that in the act of creation, the Brahman does not depend on any extraneous help. While creating the Brahman does not show any partiality towards anybody. The general inequality which is evident in this universe is the result of individual karmas. The Brahman alone and no other entity, can be held responsible for ensuring that such individual enjoys

1. Nayamanjari III.2.6.
2. Ibid. I.1.6.
3. Ibid. III.3.23., VKP, III.3.23.
5. Ibid II.1.11. Ibid II.1.11.
6. VKP. II.1.11.
8. Ibid.
or suffers the fruits of his actions\(^1\). Though, for all practical, phenomenal purposes, the Brahman is regarded as transforming itself in various forms, still the Brahman is essentially one, without a second full of knowledge, full of ananda, and the inner soul of every object\(^2\). It is just like the water of the ocean, which shows itself in different forms, such as waves, bubbles, etc., but, which, as water is one and undifferentiated everywhere\(^3\). As the Brahman is omniscient and omnipresent, nothing can be regarded as being different from or unrelated to it\(^4\). The realisation of the Brahman, that is the experience of being identical with the Brahman, is the highest philosophical goal and it becomes possible through the knowledge of the Vedanta texts only\(^5\). Nothing is superior to the Brahman.

From absolute point of view the Brahman is nirguna\(^6\). In some sruti-passages, the sagunatva of the Brahman is described, but such passages are intended to

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1. Ibid
2. Nyayarakṣaṁani I.2.7 VKP I.2.7
4. Ibid. II.1.13.
6. VKP. I.1.1.
facilitate meditation\(^1\). The fruit of the \textit{upāsana} of the \textit{saguna} Brahman is limited, but the fruit of the meditation on the \textit{nirguna} Brahman is unlimited. This \textit{nirguna} Brahman is \textit{Vibhu}. The negation of the \textit{anutva} of the Brahman, as has been stated in the \textit{sruti}-passage, is to be understood in a universal sense, because all the \textit{sruti} texts aim at one common goal, that is, the Brahman\(^3\). Though the Brahman is described variously in various texts, still its essential nature is everywhere regarded to be the same, and the description of the Brahman in one text can be made applicable elsewhere. The only exception to this is those cases where \textit{aupadhika bhedas} are imagined\(^4\).

At this stage, it must be pointed out that Appayya Dīkṣita, while commenting on the \textit{Śrīkṛṣṇa-bhāṣya}, expresses the view that the \textit{saguna}-Brahman is also the ultimate reality\(^5\) and that the fruit of the \textit{upāsana} of

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1. \textit{Nayamānjari} I.1.7. III.2.5.
the *saguna* Brahman is not different from that one obtained through the meditation of the *nirguna* Brahman¹.

All the *Āśrama-karmas* are helpful for the knowledge of the Brahman, but, the *samnyāsa-Āśrama* is more propitious for attaining this knowledge². Direct realisation of the Brahman is the ultimate aim of the knowledge derived from the *vedanta*-texts³.

**Śiva**

The highest reality which is referred to as the Brahman by the advaitins, is not different from Śiva⁴, who is otherwise known by various names such as Īśvara, Rudra, Ugra⁵, etc. This Śiva is the cause, both material and efficient, of the whole universe, including the sentient and the non-sentient beings⁶, Śiva creates this universe through *cit śakti*, and hence, this *cit śakti* has to be regarded as the material cause of the universe⁷. The

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cit-sakti is not different from the body of Siva\(^1\).

Siva supersedes all the gods, even Viṣṇu or Narayaṇa\(^2\). But from absolute philosophical point of view, there is no difference between Siva and Viṣṇu - both of them are identical with each other\(^3\). In fact, the Brahma, which represents the ultimate reality, may, in its bodily personal aspect be called Siva or Viṣṇu\(^4\) or Brahma. All these three are the creators\(^5\). As Siva is identified with the Brahma, all the attributes, which are mentioned in connection with the Brahma, are present in Siva. Siva is indeed, described by all the Vedanta-texts in the same terms as the Brahma\(^6\). Siva though possessed of the quality of being merciful, is still the destroyer of the world\(^7\). However, the destruction is caused by Siva with the compassionate intention, namely, that those souls, which are moving through various yonis and which are not able to

1. Ibid.  
2. Ibid. I.1.1.  
3. Madhvaṭantramukhamardana, I.1.3.  
4. Ibid. p. 99.  
5. Ibid.  
6. Nayamaṇimalā I.1.3.  
7. Śivarkamaṇidīpikā, I.3.9. Śivadvaitānirṇaya.
attain salvation, may enjoy some rest. The power of giving eternal salvation belongs to Śiva alone. Those who attain such salvation are finally liberated. Through Śiva's grace only, can one become inclined towards non-dualism (advaita-vāsanā).

Śiva is the lord of all the saktis, including Lakṣmī, such as Vaiṣṇavī, māheśvarī, Brāhmī, etc. With reference to him the sruti-text says: 'rūp ca śrīh ca te patnyau'. Narayana or Hiranyagarbha originates from the body of Śiva. All sacred works and compositions, including the Puruṣa-sūkta, the Gītā the Mahābhārata, the Ramāyana etc., describe Śiva alone as the essential reality. Śiva can assume any form at his will at the same time, he is not subject to sins, etc. because the bodily form of Śiva is dependent on his own will, while...

1. Śivadvaitanirnaya.
3. Śivārkamanidīpika I.3.2.
4. Ibid. I.1.1.
5. Śivakarnāmṛta.
6. Ibid, Ratnatrayaparīkṣa, Madhvatantramukhamardana.
7. Madhvatantramukhamardana, Śivakarnāmṛta.
the bodily forms of other souls are dependent on their karmans. All gods meditate on Śiva. Śiva alone is the giver of the relevant fruits.

The Vedānta-texts describe Śiva, the saguna Brahman. Such vedānta texts as describe the nirgunatva of the Brahman (that is of Śiva) are really intended to deny only the objectionable qualities or attributes.

Sakti

Śiva, who is identified with the highest Brahman is the lord of all saktis including such saktis as Vaiṣṇavī Brahmi etc. The most important among these saktis is that sakti which is called Uma, Ambika or Parvatī. This sakti or energy helps the Brahman (i.e. Śiva) in his act of the creation of the world. As a matter of fact, sakti is the material cause of the universe. Sakti is unborn and at the same time is the effect of Śiva. During the time of dissolution, this

1. Śivārkaṇḍaṁdīpikā I.2.2.
2. Ibid. I.3.7.
3. Śivadvaitanirṇaya.
4. Śivakārṇāṁrtā.
5. Ratnatrayaṇaṁrīka. 4.
6. Śivārkaṇḍaṁdīpikā, I.4.2.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
śakti abides in subtle form as the body of the great lord that is Śiva. That power of Śiva by which this cit-śakti abides in a subtle form is called as acit-śakti or non-sentient power. The first manifestation of cit-śakti is Narāyana who is thus the material cause of the universe. As this cit-śakti abides in a subtle form in the body of Śiva, it is unborn. Again, during the time of creation, it comes to be endowed with name and form, and, in this sense, this śakti is said to be the effect of Śiva. The body of Śiva which is not covered by māyā or acit-śakti is known as Narāyana. The Śakti known as Bhavānī is the direct cause of the salvation. But the Kurma-purāṇa states that, out of the three śaktis, namely, Śaṃbhavi, Vaiṣṇavi, and Brahmi, the Brahmī śakti is endowed with the three qualities, namely, sattva rajas, tamas, and it should be meditated upon along with Śiva in order to obtain the final liberation. Though Śiva and śakti cannot be separated from each other, still Śiva alone can bestow salvation.

1. Anandalahari.
2. Ratnatrayaparīkṣā. 6.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid 8.
The Jīva

The Jīva or the individual soul is essentially eternal, and, hence, is inherently entitled to liberation or salvation\(^1\). On the other hand, according to those who believe that the Jīva is created (as, for instance, the followers of the Pañcarātra view), the liberation would not be possible in the case of the Jīva which is anitya since it has been created\(^2\). From the absolute philosophical point of view, the Jīva is identical with the Brahman, the ultimate reality\(^3\). Being thus essentially identical with the Brahman, the Jīva is in reality endowed with such qualities as blissfulness, etc. But since the knowledge of the Jīva is obscured by avidyā, the Jīva is not able to realise these qualities\(^4\). When, however, the avidyā is removed, the Jīva shines with knowledge like the moon coming out of the dark clouds\(^5\).

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1. Madhvatatramukhamardana.
2. VKP. II.2.9, Nayamanjarī II.2.9.
3. Ibid. IV.1.2. Ibid, IV. 1.2., II.3.12.
5. SiddhāntalesASASamgraha, I.
The Jīva is the creator of the dream-world. As the Jīva does not possess those unrestricted powers which are possessed by the Brahman, it cannot be taken to be the creator of this universe. The Jīva is the enjoyer of the fruits of its karmās. Though the Jīva resides in the human body it is altogether different from the human body. In a sense, the body may be said to be serving as the medium through which the Jīva attains immortality. The samskaras, such as upanayana etc., relate to the body and not to the Jīva. The Jīva is really vibhu, and even though, in texts, it is described as being anu, that description has to be regarded as aupadhika. Similarly, though the Jīva is considered to be the agent of various actions, that agency of the Jīva is not natural but is occasioned by upādhi. Indeed, the Jīva is dependent on Isvara so far as its character as agent is concerned.

1. Navamāñjarī. III.2.1.
2. Ibid, I.4.2. VKP. I.4.2.
3. Ibid III.3.30. Ibid III.3.30
4. Ibid. II.3.13.
6. Ibid. II.3.15
7. Ibid. II.3.16.
The relation between the Jīva and Paramesvara is sometimes stated by saying that the Jīva is the reflection of the Brahman\(^1\). This bimba-pratibimba relation, however, is imagined only on account of adhyāsa. In the absolute sense, the Jīva is not at all different from the Brahman\(^2\). The Jīva, when it is conditioned by avidyā, itself becomes sāksin\(^3\), but this sāksitva is after all a particular form of the supreme Brahman. Or, as has been sometimes stated, the Brahman, through avidyā attains the condition of the Jīva\(^4\). The Jīva temporarily merges into the Brahman at the time of deep sleep\(^5\), and the Jīva which comes out at the time of waking up is assuredly the same\(^6\).

According to some teachers, there is only one principal Jīva. It is Hiranyagarbha, the sole reflection of the Brahman. Other Jīvas are the reflections of this.

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1. Siddhantaleśasamgraha. I.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. VKP. III.2.2. Nayamanji III.2.2.
6. VKP. III.2.3. Nayamanji III.2.3.
Hiranyagarbha. Or the Jīva is regarded being essentially one. This one Jīva which is without distinction, infuses life into all bodies\(^1\).

When the Jīva passes from one body to another, the five great elements also go with it\(^2\). As long as the Jīva is involved in this worldly life, it is expected to perform sacrifices etc.\(^3\). The Jīva alone is concerned with good or bad deeds, and the deities presiding over the sense-organs are passive in that respect\(^4\). But at the time of liberation the Jīva abandons both these good and bad actions\(^5\). Only when the fruits of the actions done by the Jīva are fully enjoyed, then only the Jīva leaves this human body\(^6\). Mere enlightenment or realisation of the Brahman does not mark the end of the enjoyment of the fruit. The limit of śarira pāta (that is natural death) indicates the full enjoyment of the fruit of the karman\(^7\).

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1. Siddhāntaśāsanaśāstra.
2. Nayamaṇjari III. 1.1., VKP. III.1.1.
4. Ibid. II.4.7.
5. Ibid. III.3.16.
7. Ibid.
Praṇa

The Praṇas are the modification of the Brahman. The number of the praṇa is fixed; it is eleven. There is one principal praṇa and the other praṇas such as apana, vyana udana etc., are subordinate to it. These subordinate praṇas are anu and their activities are also limited. Hence they can go out of the body after death. The praṇas are created and they are different from wind (vayu). For, the praṇas and vayu differ in status. The praṇa is adhyatmika while vayu is adhibhautika. The vibhutva of the praṇa mentioned in the śrutis relates to Hiranyagarbha praṇa. The individual praṇa possesses only limited power, and it can go out of and come back into the body. The main praṇa is different from the other sense organs. This becomes clear from the phenomenon of deep sleep. During deep sleep, this main praṇa alone

1. Nayamanjari II. 4.1.
2. Ibid. II.4.2. VKP II.4.2.
3. Ibid. III.4.3. Ibid II.4.3.
4. Ibid. II.4.4. Ibid. II.4.4.
5. Ibid. II.4.5. Ibid. I.4.5.
functions while other organs do not function at all\(^1\).
The prānas of the enlightened person, do not leave the body, but are merged into the Jīva which ultimately becomes one with the Brahman\(^2\). All the eleven prānas function together, but the main prāṇa is really responsible for the movement and various actions of the body. This main prāṇa really causes the sense-organs to work\(^3\).

**Creation and Dissolution**

The Brahman, the highest reality, is self born, ever existing entity. Like the Brahman, the Jīva also as has been pointed out, is essentially eternal. The Vedas also are eternal\(^4\). As for the creation of the phenomenal world, the Brahman first created ākāśa\(^5\). From ākāśa, Vāyu was created\(^6\). This Vāyu is the source of

\(^{1}\) Ibid. II.4.8. Ibid. II.4.8.
\(^{2}\) Ibid. IV. 2.2.
\(^{3}\) Ibid. IV. 4.5.
\(^{4}\) Ibid. I.1.4. VKP I.1.4.
\(^{5}\) Ibid. II.3.1. Ibid II.3.1.
\(^{6}\) Ibid. II.3.2. Ibid. II.3.2.
The fourth element, namely, water was created from tejas. The Brahman, with a desire to become manifold, entered into these elements. Appayya Diksita adopts what is popularly known as the trivṛtkarana theory. This theory is restricted to the three elements, namely, prthvī, āp, tejas. When the remaining two elements, that is vāyu and ākāśa, were added to these three, the trivṛtkarana-theory was further enlarged into the Pāncīkaraṇa-theory. Then out of the varying combinations of the elements all the objects, animate as well as inanimate were created, The sense-organs like mind etc. are merely the modifications of those elements.

The destruction or dissolution of the five great elements occurs in the reverse order, that is to say, the earth merges into water, water into tejas, and so on. But the five subtle elements by which the human body is formed

1. Ibid. II.3.4. 2. Ibid. II.3.4.
3. Prthvī is believed to have been created from water. cf. VKP. II.3.6. NM. II.3.6.
are not absorbed in Paramesvara\(^1\). But the sixteen kalas through which the human body is formed and in which are included the five great elements are absorbed into Paramesvara\(^2\). Similarly, not the speech itself, but the function of speech is merged into mind\(^3\). The function of mind is absorbed in the prāṇa\(^4\), and the prāṇa ultimately is absorbed in the Jīva\(^5\).

**Adhyāsa and Avidyā**

Adhyāsa means superimposition of the qualities belonging to some other substance, on the object which is present before the eyes\(^6\). For example, the qualities like being coiled etc. are superimposed on a rope (on account of insufficient light). This superimposition is caused by ignorance\(^7\) about the object before our eyes. Through this adhyāsa, caused by ignorance about the nature of the Brahman, the world appears as real. The knowledge

1. Ibid. IV. 2.5. Ibid. IV. 2.5.
2. Ibid. IV. 2.7. Ibid. IV. 2.7
3. Ibid. IV. 2.1. Ibid. IV. 2.1.
4. Ibid. IV. 2.2. Ibid. IV. 2.2.
5. Ibid. IV. 2.3. Ibid. IV. 2.3
6. Ibid. I.1.1.
7. VKP. I.1.1.
of the Brahman first removes the ignorance, and when this material cause is destroyed, the world too comes to an end. Ignorance is of not of one kind. There are so many ignorances, such as ignorance about the nature or ignorance about the form etc. and all ignorances do not obscure all things at one and the same time. Through the mental operation (vṛtti) of the Jīva, one ignorance is destroyed but another ignorance obscures the object. It is only when the knowledge of the Brahman arises that all other ignorances are destroyed. As the Jīva has got limited power, the vṛtti of the Jīva cannot destroy all ignorances without the help of the knowledge of the Brahman. The Vṛtti of the Brahman being without limitations can destroy all the ignorances at one and the same time. By this vṛtti of the Jīva the primal ignorance is not destroyed, but a mode thereof is destroyed and there results the removal of obscuration. This removal of obscuration belongs only to the vṛtti, directly relating to the external objects.

1. Siddhantalesasamgraha I.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
Vidya and Upasana

The Vidya means knowledge. The word vidya is derived from the root vid 'to know'. So by vidya the knowledge (about the Brahman) is meant. While the word upasana, which is derived from the root upa + as denotes the manner or method of esoterically thinking about the Brahman.

Though in the various Upaniṣadic texts, various upasanās and vidyas are mentioned, still, the Brahman being all the same everywhere, all the vidyas may be regarded as aiming at one and the same thing\(^1\). However, for all practical purposes, where different symbols (pratikas) are required to be meditated upon, the vidyas may be treated as different. The vidyas are different like upasanās when different symbols are intended. Some of these vidyas are meant for the meditation upon the saguna Brahman\(^2\). Such vidyas as Madhu-vidya or Paryanka-vidya, which relate to the qualified Brahman, have limited fruit. On the other hand, the vidyas which aim at the

\(^1\) Nayamanjarī III.3.3.\(^2\) Ibid. III.3.25.

2. Ibid. III.3.25. Ibid. III.3.25.
meditation on the nirguna Brahman, have the final liberation as their fruit. Both the symbolic and non-symbolic vidyas are taught in the Upanisads, and one may choose any one vidya\(^1\). Persons belonging to all social orders, except the śudras, are allowed to practise the vidyas\(^2\). The symbols in these vidyas are to be looked upon as being identical with the Brahman\(^3\).

Like vidyas, upāsanās also are principally meant for obtaining knowledge about the Brahman. What upāsanā needs is manana, and manana implies repeated hearing\(^4\). These upāsanās are meditations to be performed with the concentration of mind\(^5\). Being seated one has to practise meditations. The knowledge of the Brahman is not directly obtained by practising the upāsanās. Mokṣa is attained by the removal of avidya. The removal of avidya is possible only when the Brahman is

1. Ibid. III. 3.34.
2. Ibid. III.4.9.
3. Ibid. IV.1.3.
4. Madhvatantramukhamardana, commentary p. 19
5. Nayamanjari Ṭ.1.7.
visualised\(^1\). The Brahman is visualised only when obstructions such as sins etc. are removed, and in order to remove such obstacles, these upāsanās are to be practised\(^2\). When one once takes up the practice of the upāsanās, one must not abandon it but must continue to practise it till the time of his death\(^3\). There are, no doubt, several kinds of expiations prescribed for the removal of sins, but, through these expiations, only the sins in this present birth are removed\(^4\). The upāsanās are necessary for removing such obstacles in the way of mokṣa which are not seen.

The upāsanās are of two kinds\(^5\) (1) Vyāsta and (2) samasta. The vyāsta upāsanās are those in which the symbols such as āditya, etc. are individually and separately meditated upon as the Brahman, while in the samasta upāsanā, only the Brahman, which is imagined as including all these symbols such as āditya, vāyu etc., in

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1. Nayamanjarī IV.1.5.
4. Ibid. III.4.12.
5. Ibid. III.3.32.
one single entity (i.e. the Brahman itself), is meditated upon. The vyāsta upāsanās actually appear to have been treated with contempt by Appayya Dīkṣita. Those upāsanās like that of the udgītha, which are mentioned in a general way, may not be restricted to that particular vedic text where that upāsana is mentioned but may be taken as being applicable to other vedic sakhas. These upāsanās, such as the meditation on om are anitya. These upāsanās may be included in the karman such as sacrifice etc., if they are related to that particular karman.

Mokṣa

The word mokṣa is derived from the root muc; hence, by the term mokṣa, liberation from the cycle of births and deaths is indicated. (This mokṣa can be attained through the knowledge of the Brahman only.) Or, since, according to the Śivādvaita system, the Brahman is identified with Śiva, (this mokṣa can be attained through the grace of Śiva alone.

1. Ibid.
3. Ibid. III.3.27.
4. VKP. IV. 1.1.
5. Śivārkamanidīpikā, I.1.
Every soul must attain mokṣa, and the nirguna Brahman will emerge after the exhaustion of the world-process with the redemption of all personal selves\(^1\). So long as a single soul is in bondage, the rulership of the saguna Brahman will continue\(^2\). But Īśvara being of compassionate nature, will be bestowing final liberation on every soul. The highest form of salvation is the attainment of unqualified identity with the personal godhead. This attainment of unqualified Īśvaratva is possible only for those who have received the highest spiritual illumination. About the worshippers of saguna Īśvara, Appayya Dīkṣita is in thorough agreement with Śaṃkara in postulating that their salvation consists in the attainment of the glories and powers of god, excluding, of course, the cosmic activities of the lord\(^3\).

At the time of salvation, the liberated soul abandons all his karmans, good as well bad\(^4\). The path, namely Devayāna or Arcirādi is common to both the

2. Siddhāntalesasamgraha, IV.
3. Siddhāntalesasamgraha IV.
worshippers of the *saguna* Brahman and the meditator on
the *nirguna* Brahman.

There occurs perfect identity between the Jīva and the Brahman in the condition of the *mokṣa*, and no
consciousness of duality persists. There are no
stages in *mokṣa* nor does the Jīva assume different forms
at the time of *mokṣa*. The attainment of *mokṣa* can be
achieved during this very life if there is no obstruction
of *karmas*. If there is some such obstruction, the
*mokṣa* may be a little delayed. The *samnyāsa-sūrāṇa* is
most propitious for the attainment of *mokṣa*. This
renunciation produces *apūrva* that destroys sins which
obstruct knowledge.

1. Ibid. III. 3.17. VKP. III. 3.17
2. Ibid. IV. 4.2. Ibid. IV. 4.2.
4. Ibid. IV. 4.1. Ibid. IV. 4.1.
5. Ibid. III. 4.16-17 Ibid. III. 4. 16-17
6. Ibid. III. 4.16-17.
7. Siddhānta-lesa-samgraha III.
The situation at the time of death is common to both the enlightened person and the ignorant one. The Jīva of the enlightened one goes out of the body through the aperture known as the Brahmarandhva. Even if a person dies at night time, he can proceed to the Suryaloka as the human body is always related to the sun. The enlightened person need not wait up to the Uttarayana to cast away his body, for, in his case, even the Daksinayana gives the same fruit as the Uttarayana. The enlightened person should not eat anything which is normally prohibited, and the nitya karmans such as agnihotra etc., are not lost by the knowledge of the Brahman. The mokṣa is eternal.

References:

1. Nayamanjari IV. 2.4.
2. VKP. IV. 2.9.
3. Nayamanjari IV. 2.11.
4. Ibid., III. 4.7. VKP. III. 4.7.
5. Ibid. IV. 1.12.
6. Siddhantalesasamgraha IV.
It will be seen from the brief statement made above that Appayya Diksita can be said to have made hardly any original contribution to Indian philosophical thought.

While commenting on the works of Śaṅkara, Appayya Diksita does not express any difference of opinion with him even when he is actually expected to do so. Appayya Diksita is a distinguished grammarian and rhetorician. Grammarians and rhetoricians usually swear by the sphota theory. Sphota is a particular power of word (sabda-sakti) by which their meaning is conveyed. This sphota is eternal, and independent of krama (order of syllables in a word). So even though a word when uttered is lost, still, the meaning conveyed by that word is suggested. Śaṅkara in his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtras of Bādarāyana criticises this theory as being untenable, while commenting on that

1. cf. Kavyaprakāsa, I.4 :

2. Vākyapādiya, I.44.

portion Appayya Dīkṣita, a well-known grammarian and
rhetorecian, was expected to support that theory by
controverting Śaṅkarā's view. But Appayya Dīkṣita accepts
the refutation of the sphota-theory without uttering a single
word in its favour.1

Śaṅkarā has again refuted the doctrine of the
Nakulīsa-pāṇḍita as being not acceptable.2 By and large,
the refutation also constitutes a kind of refutation of
the Śivādvaita system which Appayya Dīkṣita sought to sponsor.
While commenting on that part of the Śrīkañṭha-bhāṣya
Appayya Dīkṣita has nothing to say against that refutation.
Śrīkañṭha, the founder of the Śivādvaita system, on the
other hand asserts that those Vedānta-sūtras which are
supposed to be refuting the Pāṇḍita system, really do not
refute the Pāṇḍita-maṭa; they are merely intended to reject
the view that Śiva is the only efficient cause of the
universe. The Śiddhānta in that adhikaraṇa according to
Śrīkañṭha, is that Śiva is both the material as well as

1. WKP, p.331.
2. Śaṅkarabhaṣya on II.2.35-38.
the efficient cause of the universe. Appayya Dikṣita does not refer to this Śrīkaṇṭha-mata while commenting on the Śaṁkarabhaṣya in his Vedāntakalpataruparimala. Nor does he point out any fault in the commentary of Śaṁkara, when he himself comments on the commentary of Śrīkaṇṭha in the Śivārkamāṇidīpiκā. This indicates that Appayya Dikṣita did not assert his personal views even though there had been available opportunities of expressing either in favour or against a particular doctrine.

Again, it does not become quite clear as to what particular doctrine Appayya Dikṣita has to advocate. For example, while commenting on the works of Śaṁkara, Appayya Dikṣita advocates the Kevaladvaita of Śaṁkara. While commenting on the works of Śrīkaṇṭha, Appayya Dikṣita seems to preach the doctrine of Śivādvaita. Thus Appayya Dikṣita

1. Śrīkaṇṭhabhaṣya on II.2.35-38:

पत्युः परमेश्वरस्य त्रिविदिक्यायामाहारात्वत्वस्थापित तद्गमनिष्ठान्तम्यात्मभ्रा अक्षरिषिन्स्तानिक्रमः केेरिनिभित्तिविद्वत् वर्द्धिति... अण्वयते पत्युः परमेश्वरस्य केेरिनिभित्तिविद्वतया न युक्तम्. भूतिकर्षणोस्तमस्मादेवसाम्भवालयु... एवमेव न केेरिमीरो निःमितभविभिक्षार्थायं भवादानात्।.
only represents the view of the teacher on whose work he is commenting. Appayya Dīkṣita exhibits great capacity to interpret the views of the Ācāryas with clarity and without in any way doing injustice to that Ācārya; but he hardly has any distinctive view of his own.

The only feature of Appayya Dīkṣita's thought which can be stated with definiteness is his strong and unequivocal refutation of the dvaita-philosophy. Even in the Siddhāntakesarasaṃgraha, which may be regarded as one of his earlier works, Appayya Dīkṣita criticises the dvaita-doctrine. But Appayya Dīkṣita's refutation of Madhva must be said to be quite superficial; it is merely a question of Appayya Dīkṣita's (or Śaṅkara's) interpretation of Vedānta texts as against Madhva's interpretation. Appayya Dīkṣita does not seem to attack Madhva on what may be called an intellectual plane.

Most of Appayya Dīkṣita's works are of the nature of summaries or commentaries. There is no independent treatise on Vedānta to his credit. To a certain extent the tradition is largely responsible for this. Philosophical writers in medieval India preferred writing expository treatises on traditionally well-established works to writing
original treatises. But then there were thinkers like Śaṅkara who made use of the works, on which they commented, merely as pegs to hang their own philosophical thought. Appayya Dīkṣita has done no such a thing. He belongs to the period of stagnation which had been reached in the history of Indian philosophical thought after the first bhaṣya-kaśīras on Vedānta.

(Appayya Dīkṣita's writings, considered in their totality, abound in repetitions.) The first chapter of the Vedānta-sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa forms the central theme of his following works: the Nayamaṇimalā, the Nyāvarakṣemāṇi, the Madhva-tantramukhamardana. This portion deals mostly with the interpretation of śrutī-texts where the indications of the Brahman are either distinct (spaṣṭabrahmalīṅgata) or indistinct (aspaṣṭabrahmalīṅgata). Naturally, there is little scope for logical intellectual discussion. Only Śaṅkara's line of argumentation is repeated in each āśe. This has resulted into mere repetition of discussions in adhikaraṇas as it is found in the Nayamaṇi and the Vedāntakaḷpatarpuruparimala.

Indeed, Appayya Dīkṣita does not seem to go to the core of any philosophical problem. In the Siddhānta-lesa-samgraha, there was available an opportunity for critical
discussion of various topics, but Appayya Dīksita contended himself only with a rather pâdentic statements of topic. In that work he could have expressed in more or less denifite terms his own views about such topics as whether the plurality of the Jīvas is possible, whether the Jīva is a reflection of Paramēśvara, etc. But Appayya Dīksita merely mentions the views of various scholars on various topics. This, no doubt, establishes Appayya Dīksita's great erudition and his skill in compiling, but it does not prove that Appayya Dīksita had independently to contribute anything solid and substantial to the vedic thought.

It seems that Appayya Dīksita suffered from a kind of dichotomy between the intellectual conviction for Kevalādvaita and religious propensity towards Śivādvaita. For, even while propagating the Śivādvaita doctrine of Śrikanṭha he could not abandon the Kevalādvaita of Śamkara. He seeks to reconcile the two systems by saying, for instance, that, through the grace of Śiva, the advaita-vasanā is caused. But this can by no means be regarded as establishing any kind of reconciliation between these two systems. The struggle between Appayya Dīksita as scholar and Appayya Dīksita as missionary seems to have been the central motif
of Appayya Diksita’s life and work.

Nevertheless, there can hardly be any two opinions about the deep learning and wide scholarship of Appayya Diksita. That he was well-versed in various branches of learning, such as grammar, rhetorics, Vedanta, Mimamsa, etc., is amply attested by his numerous writings. His style was at once lucid, forceful and dignified, and, even as specimens of literary art, his writings have to be reckoned fairly high. Apart from being a profound Pandit, Appayya Diksita was a person of earnest religious conviction, and, with his fervent missionary zeal he accomplished quite a good deal for Shivadvaita. It will accordingly have to be conceded that Appayya Diksita represents a significant landmark in the history of Vedantic thought, of Saivite religion, and of Sanskrit literature.