PREFACE

It is observed that one of the unique aspects of the Chinese polity lies in its tendency to give rise to a kind of socio-political tension. It is unique because such tension has almost become a recurring phenomenon within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ever since its inception. In its history, particularly after her liberation, such tension has often found expression either in the form of severe debate and discussion or conflict and contradiction. This is not to say that such tension is confined within the boundary of debate and discussion rather it often leads to purges which eventually end up into a socio-political cataclysm.

It is also unique because despite the proclaimed utterance of the Chinese leadership to put an end to such recurring political tension, this tension continues unabated and has almost been institutionalised so to speak. The perpetuality of such tension has a room within and without the CCP. And, therefore, purges, rehabilitations and again purges have been going on in an almost cyclic manner.

Till recently such socio-political tension has been understood and even interpreted mostly in terms of debate and conflict over the social and economic questions. While doing so the role of Communist ideology
has been given primacy: as the sole factor behind such tensions. It is true that during the period of the 50s and even throughout 1960s almost all incidents that took place in China were interpreted from the point of view of the communist ideology. As a result, this has created a smokescreen that prevents us from understanding the real issues responsible for such tensions. The pronouncements and interpretation of these events has so much been couched in Communist ideology that at times it becomes difficult to differentiate between a power struggle or divergent opinions on policy issues. All this is not to say that one may totally neglect this aspect but to say that ideology only has a limited role.

Indeed, it was Mao's thought which was greatly responsible for shaping the post-liberation Chinese political system. It was Mao's thought which was central for the development of such a polity. Mao's fundamental understanding of the world can be explained into a dichotomy: Conflict and Contradiction. It is this perception that led Mao to see the Chinese society as a testing ground for the justification of his logic. Such perceptual understanding became apparent in almost all major issues when his perceptual understanding came in conflict with other leaders within the CCP. Such intra-party clashes concomitantly became a launching pad
for future major contradictions and conflicts with many other leaders. This finally led to purges and rehabilitations and again purges and so on.

If Gao Gang and Rao Shushi's purge is considered as the starting point in post-liberation politics then it was not an end in itself; rather that purge led to many more purges in subsequent years. Similarly, once such a thing takes place, rehabilitation as a parenthesis of the former also takes place. Therefore, the rise of Lin Biao in place of Pong Dehwal was not an end of the process but that occasion paved the way for the rehabilitation of many others. This process continues till today. The most recent example is the purge of Gang of Four and the rehabilitation of Deng and many others.

It appears that other international factors have had a more significant influence on inner party discipline than actual external threats. In particular, the Sino-Soviet dispute played a pervasive, if subtle role. Mao's anger at Soviet criticism of the Great Leap and Peng Dehuai's exchange of views with Khrushchev probably affected not only his treatment of Peng but also the coercive nature of the drive against right opportunism. Moreover, Mao's preoccupation with Soviet revisionism in the 1962-65 period clearly was a significant factor in the rejection of his leading comrades which resulted in the unprecedentedly harsh Cultural Revolution.
Similarly, after the fall of Lin Biao, Lin was accused of being an agent of Soviet Union. He believed in theory of not having two enemies (USA and Soviet Union) at a given point of time. He chose to emphasize the military aspect of Soviet threat and pushed for reconciliation with her for containing the US threat. Whereas Gang of Four was accused of opposing China's rapprochement with US and thereby throttling the ambitious programme of Four Modernisations.

The events of the Cultural Revolution which shattered long-standing party principles are too well known to require extended discussion. Most startling was the almost free rein given to non-party groups - students Red Guards and "revolutionary rebels" in factories and administrative offices - to attack the highest Party leaders. In Mao's eyes the use of extra-party forces achieved results where traditional methods failed. The distinction between Party and non-Party was not entirely eliminated, however, as the handful of leaders around Mao exercised their authority to limit attack on specific individuals. Nevertheless, the Party as an institution and high-ranking leaders had never been so exposed to spontaneous mass action. In terms of formal organizational sanctions, far more sweeping dismissals and purges of leading figures took place at this time than at any previous time in CCP history. When the Ninth Party
Congress met in 1969, not only were Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping gone, but 60 per cent of the previous Politburo and 70 per cent of the Central Committee members were removed.

The post-Cultural Revolution period saw the emergence of two distinct approaches to norms of inner party life. While Mao still sporadically backed those close to him - most notably the so-called "gang of four" - were determined that the new norms would reflect the basic ideological thrust of 1966-68. At the same time, however, the rebuilding process offered an opportunity for those associated with pre-1966 political institutions - perhaps Zhou Enlai above all others - to try and restore the organizational principles adopted in 1940s. The tensions between these two forces and approaches were considerable, and they became particularly prominent following the 1971 demise of Lin Biao. When a new Central Committee was elected at the Tenth Party Congress in 1973, the purge of Lin's followers together with Cultural Revolution "ultra-leftists" resulted in the ouster of nearly one quarter of the previous Central Committee. Thus extensive purging and rehabilitations remained a feature of post-1966 Chinese politics till the full consolidation of power by Deng Xiaoping and other members of his faction.
It is behind this background that the proposed study seeks to find out - the organizational norms defining acceptable behaviour within the elite. What rights do CCP leaders have in the policy-making process? What principles bind Party officials in the implementation of policy? What types of behaviour are beyond the pale? How is inner-elite conflict ideally handled? What norms guide the administration of discipline? When are purges justified? The subsequent analysis after tracing relevant developments before liberation, then examines in detail the cases of Deng Xiaoping, Lin Biao and the Gang of Four with major attention to these questions.

Analysis will delineate which segments of this elite are the primary targets of a given movement. Does a campaign reach leaders with a role in shaping policy or only those with responsibility for implementing policy? How does the impact of a movement and a purge vary with administrative levels, geographic regions. The answers to these questions will be related to the types of deviant behaviour under attack, the methods used and the degree of their severity, as well as with the relationship of campaign objectives to contemporaneous Party programme and general political context.

Sources and Notes:
The sources used for this study fall into three categories:
1. Original (mainly Chinese language) books; newspapers, journals and documents of various kinds. Some of the
translations from Chinese materials to English have been done by the author herself.

2. English language materials published in China (journals, magazines and books).

3. Secondary sources (mainly in English) published outside China. These include books, journals, Western and Eastern newspapers.

Most of the primary sources for this thesis were collected during my two-year stay at Beijing University, China.

The Chinese names and places are spelled out according to the Pinyin system but retained the original when appeared in quotation.

In this study certain caveats need to be kept in mind; firstly, the events discussed in this study are very recent and many of the personalities appeared in the discussion are still alive. If past experience is any guide then there is a likelihood that Chinese political pendulum may swing again to the other extreme. Thus, the conclusions drawn in this study are tentative. Secondly, the primary materials used in this study are primarily 'Official Sources' which almost invariably carry dual meaning. Therefore, this research work tries to sift the chaff from these 'Official Sources' so as to bring out the nuances of the subject under study as clearly as possible.
I take the opportunity of gratefully acknowledging my profound gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. (Mrs) Gargi Dutt of the Division of Chinese Studies of the Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, for her invaluable suggestions to improve the thesis and constant encouragement in completing the work I have received from her.

During the final stages of my work on this thesis, I have greatly benefited from the perceptive comments and discussions with distinguished China scholars whom I met during my field trip to different Universities and institutes in U.S. and Hong Kong. They are Steve I. Levine, Lowell Dittmer, Merie Goldman, Roderick McFarquhar, Lucian Pye, Joyce Karlgren, S.K. Chin and Thomas Chen.

To my parents, I owe a very special debt for their unfailing encouragement throughout the years of research and writing. And I have a particular debt to my husband for his support and critical comments at different stages of this work.

Finally, I gratefully acknowledge the assistance rendered by the library staff of JNU, ICWA Library, New Delhi and Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies Library of George Washington University, American University Library, Library of Congress, Harvard University Library, University of California Library, Berkeley, Universities Service Center Library, Hong Kong, Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong.

New Delhi

(KAMINI MISRA CHAUDHURI)