This work is against foundationalism. Foundationalism as a system of philosophical investigations can be roughly characterized as an investigation which presupposes a distinction in kind, not in degrees, between epistemological investigations and the investigations of natural sciences in general. It presupposes a methodological distinction between philosophy and science which is defended by a supporting presupposition that an epistemological inquiry is completely normative in character as opposed to the descriptive nature of the inquiry of natural sciences. In other words, if we understand a guiding norm as to be the method of an inquiry and the guided descriptions as to be the theories of that inquiry, a method is distinguished from the theory through which it is expressed. And, consequently, scientific theories are distinguished from the epistemological theories for the reason that the methods adopted into the former are founded on, determined by or evaluated in terms of a unique method which stands as the subject matter of epistemological investigations. Epistemological theories are alleged to be the theories of that unique method. Thus foundationalistic theses presuppose a distinction, in kind, between "method" and "theory".

This work adopts Quine's anti-foundationalistic qua naturalistic method to argue against foundationalism. In other words, the theory it defends is the method it undertakes in defending that theory. It does not presuppose a distinction between "method" and "theory". The prima facie circularity- the circularity of building a theory by adopting a method which, in turn, is defended by a theory - disappears in the
inseparability of a method and a theory. The circularity which normally threatens to such an undertaking is based on a false presupposition (namely, the separation of a method and a theory) which has been criticized throughout this work.

One of the primary motives of this work is to establish that Quine's anti-foundationalism is not 'a far cry' against contemporary foundationalism. In this respect, it is important to understand that "Against Foundationalism" does not mean against the foundationalism per se (if, at all, there is any!). It is against certain uncritically accepted theses which express foundationalism. It is not scientific to claim that an unexpressed something is there which has been refuted. It is only an expressed something which is refutable. It is equally unscientific to claim that a particular thesis has been refuted without going against the methodology adopted in upholding that thesis. Because, such a claim leads to the acceptance of a 'Method-Theory' distinction. In other words, if foundationalism is a method of epistemological investigation, foundationalism as a separable method of epistemological theories is not dead because never it is born; and, foundationalism as an inseparable method of epistemological theories is not dead because death can never occur to it.

Thus, strictly speaking, foundationalism and naturalism do not nullify each other. If it is rigidly accepted that there is no separation of a method from a theory and, hence, there is no unique method of investigation in philosophy or epistemology, foundationalism is as much a method as naturalism. What is nullified or, rather,
rectified in one particular methodological investigation is one or another of the theses upheld in carrying out that methodology. There seems to be no meta-level of understanding. One system can be interpreted or understood even if you are not exclusively involved in the system. And, more importantly, these interpretations or understandings are not reductionistic. There remains no method as to reduce one methodological bearing of a theory to that of another. Separation of theories by methodological criterion is fruitless if the separation is meant to be something like a 'category' and "subclass" division. Consequently, indeterminacy of method is inevitable. But this is not an obstacle for our intellectual progress, nor an obstacle for philosophical analysis or clarification. It appears to be an obstacle, to be a block to our intellectual progress, if we are in need of a meta-method to determine the methodological bearing of a theory or to reduce (instead of interpreting or reinterpreting) that into that of another. We do not need that and, hence, we are not in search of that. For the searching of a meta-method is based on the false presupposition that a method is separable from the theory or system which reveals or expresses it. Note that, as there is no meta-method to separate two theories, epistemological and that of natural science, on some methodological ground, so also, there is no meta-theory to separate two methods on some theoretical ground. Consequently, an epistemological theory cannot be found to be a metatheory so as to separate epistemology as a method quite distinguished from the methods of natural sciences. An investigation purported to build meta-theories to evaluate the methods of different theories and an investigation purported to discover a meta-method to evaluate the theories undertaking different methods are on the same
frail footing: the separability between 'method' and 'theory'.

With the above understanding of anti-foundationalism, Quine's naturalised epistemology has been advanced here so as to be identified with anti-foundationalism. However, even if one can find it to be potentially there, the above said conception of anti-foundationalism qua naturalism is not explicitly there in Quine's three seminal theses on Analyticity, Translation and Ontology. Moreover, I am doubtful about a general acceptance of a presentation of Quine's naturalized epistemology qua anti-foundationalism in terms of the distinction between 'method' and 'theory'. For, Quine's sayings are not explicit enough to claim that foundationalism does survive as an epistemological investigation though some uncritical aspects which are dogmatically accepted by the foundationalists are refuted by Quine's naturalism. But, if naturalism does survive, naturalism survives on refuting the uncritical acceptances which really constitute foundationalism and which really compete with naturalistic theses in a more and more sophisticated way. Viewing from this angle, the foundationalistic ingredient associated with a Cartesian mind is, if I am allowed to say, a bit more naturalized by Kantian transcendentalism which, in turn, is further naturalized by the Carnapian "intension". Those naturalisations conceivable of the classical, transcendental and analytical foundationalism are nothing but the very anti-foundationalistic moves they undertake against the preceding systems although they inevitably leave some foundationalistic ingredient for the succeeding systems to naturalize but not to naturalize in an absolute manner. For the meaning of naturalization is quite incompatible with that of Absolutism.
However, even if I suspect the general acceptance of my view, one can be confident enough to claim that Quine is antifoundationalistic as well as naturalistic. To put antifoundationalism and naturalism together, in an integrated manner, is the crux of the problem I have undertaken. Thus I shall discuss on Quine's anti-foundationalistic methodology qua naturalized epistemology in terms of his explicitly said and well argued notions like 'scientific skepticism' and 'reciprocal containment' refraining myself from the suspicion arising due to the use of the notions like 'method' and 'theory'. Nevertheless, I believe, one may find it appropriate to employ these notions, especially, one who is more inclined to view Quine's enterprise as a critic of Carnap's distinction between "method of intension" and "method of extension". But as I see the matter, Quine's naturalised epistemology can be directed against any version of foundationalistic theses though his works like 'Two Dogmas', 'Indeterminacy' and 'Ontological relativity' seem to be directly against the Carnapian enterprise. In fact I have attempted to integrate these two ways of understanding, from Carnap to Quine and from Quine to Carnap, understanding naturalism in terms of the anti-foundationalistic theses and understanding the antifoundationalistic theses in terms of the important features of naturalized epistemology. That is, to wit, I have tried to visualise the anti-foundationalistic theses (which are commonly known to be something like anti-Carnapian) in terms of Quine's naturalized epistemology and, further more, the anti-Carnapian thrust is retained throughout this work by presenting Carnap as the representative of a variety of foundationalism which is more sophisticated than Kantian foundationalism and less complicated than that of the present days.
The varieties of foundationalism I have considered in terms of their development in time are the traditional, modern and contemporary foundationalisms which can be named as the traditional (or transcendental), analytical and justological respectively.

Both foundationalism and coherentism, the two rival approaches to knowledge and justification, are considered here under one name, i.e., "justology", so as to distinguish them from naturalized epistemology. To put them together, as it has been found that they have a common false presupposition which is antagonistic to Quine's naturalized epistemology, I have employed and defended Kornblith's notion of 'The Arguments-on-Paper Thesis'\(^{1}\), in chapter I of this work. Thus, unless it is specifically told in relation to coherentism, the term "foundationalism" is used in the rest of the chapters as covering both foundationalism and coherentism notwithstanding the rivalry they convey. In this chapter, "The Conceptual Backgrounds of Foundationalism, Coherentism and Naturalism", I attempt to show that the rivalry between foundationalism and coherentism is fundamentally based on the structure of a good account of justification and naturalism is antagonistic to the very presupposition of a good account of justification irrespective of the structure one can propose in that regard. Above all, a possible understanding of Quine's anti-foundationalism and naturalized epistemology as one integrated

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thesis has been hinted through the discussions of the conceptual backgrounds for the foundationalistic questions and naturalistic questions, in the same chapter, i.e., chapter I.

In chapter II, "Foundationalism beneath the Analytic- Synthetic Distinction", naturalized epistemology can be identified in Quine's anti-foundationalistic arguments against the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction. The insufficiency of the clarification needed for that distinction is shown to be the result of the Cartesian doubt. The epistemological import of the Analytic-Synthetic distinction presupposes the Cartesian doubt which is criticised in Quine's naturalized epistemology. Abandonment of Cartesian doubt and acceptance of a *scientific doubt* is clearly a fundamental feature of Quine's naturalised epistemology. Moreover, Carnapian foundationalism is considered to be 'one more variant of Kantian philosophy' without succumbing to the 'epistemological nihilism' of Richard Rorty. It is done in view of the fact that the variation is considered to be more on the point of responding to the Cartesian skepticism than on the point of Rorty's idea of "representation" itself. On the former point, the variation is on the conception of a priori - Kantian conceptual a priori and the analytic philosopher's linguistic a priori. On the later point, the variation is from Kantian transcendentalism to the analytic philosophers' linguistic representation of reality.

Sometimes it is called as "revolutionary nihilism" in order to distinguish it from "revolutionary naturalism". See, for instance, Haack, S (1990) "Recent Obituaries of Epistemology", American Philosophical Quarterly, 27, pp. 199–212.
The anti-foundationalism qua Quine's naturalised epistemology is found to be there in Quine's other two seminal theses. The two seminal theses are discussed in two different chapters, III and IV, entitled "Indeterminacy of Translation: A Refutation of Foundationalistic Semantics" and "Ontological Relativity: An Antithesis to Linguistic Absolutism" respectively. The former is purported to establish the dependency of language on reality in order to forbid any system or method to be foundational on a semantical ground. The latter is purported to establish the dependency of reality on language in order to forbid any system or method to be foundational on an ontological ground. The combination of the two is supposed to be establishing the interdependence between language and reality, between language and theory (theory, because reality is theory-relative but without being absolutely determined by the theory). This move runs parallel to that of the "reciprocal containment" between epistemology and natural science, between epistemology and ontology, advocated in Quine's naturalised epistemology.

Whether it is semantical or ontological, a foundation on either of these grounds is tenable only when the separation between language and reality, semantics and ontology, belief and experience, a conceptual framework and the rules governing that framework or, in general, between a method and the theory which undertakes that is plausible. This separation is made, in turn, to respond a Cartesian doubt.

On semantical ground, foundationalism can be upheld through the
determinancy of meaning. The meaning is allegedly retained to be the 'reference point' such that the Cartesian doubt can be appropriately responded in terms of that indubitable 'reference point'.

Refutation of the meaning, the semantical 'reference point', is the well known anti-foundationalistic theme advanced by Quine in his indeterminacy thesis. The integration, I have tried to bring about, owes to the notion of "scientific skepticism" advocated in Quine's naturalized epistemology. The anti-foundationalistic theme as well as the naturalistic theme of the indeterminacy thesis are found to be on the same footing, namely, the replacement of "philosophical skepticism" (i.e., the Cartesian doubt) by 'scientific skepticism'. Consequently, as a result of this integration, it has been shown that foundationalistic semantics has to be replaced by naturalized semantics.

Ontological relativity is found, in chapter IV, to be an antithesis to linguistic Absolutism. The Carnapian 'method of intension' has been refuted by means of Quine's criticism against quantification of modal contexts. Indeterminacy of reference is shown to be against absolute semantical determination of ontology as much as against traditional Absolutism and essentialism. The importance of objectual interpretation contra, substitutional interpretation of variables is emphasised to integrate the anti-foundationalistic theme against an 'intentional' method and the naturalistic theme against a Cartesian mind. Consequently, as a result of this integration, though it has not been said explicitly, a naturalised ontology is brought about to replace linguistic Absolutism.
The replacement of 'philosophical skepticism' by 'scientific skepticism' and the 'reciprocal containment' of epistemology and natural science are the two fundamental features of Quine's naturalised epistemology. In the preceding three chapters, these two features are found to be working against the foundationalistic theses—the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction, determinancy of meaning and Absolutism (traditional as well as linguistic). In chapter V, "Quine's Naturalised Epistemology: Its methodological Perspective", these two fundamental features along with some others are discussed in a more elaborated way.

Barry Stroud's criticism against Quine's "scientific skeptic", Richard Rorty's nihilistic stand-point and Alvin Goldman's reliabilism are taken into account in chapter V. This is primarily meant to lay down the methodological bearing of Quine's naturalized epistemology and, hence, not to fight against Stroud., Rorty or Goldman. However, as Stroud's standpoint is directly against the core of the method of a scientific doubt, I have tried to argue against Stroud but that is also by interpreting Quine's arguments in favor of observation sentences and logical truths as an argument for the integration of anti-foundationalism and Quine's naturalized epistemology.

The methodological bearing of Quine's naturalized epistemology becomes more clear when it is distinguished from Rorty's epistemological nihilism and Goldman's reliabilism. However, this has been made in continuation with Stroud's arguments. Quine's reply to Stroud is very sketchy in the sense that Quine has not argued for his
naturalized epistemology and, instead, retaining his naturalistic spirit he has argued for the consistency in his own views on observation sentences and logical truths vis-a-vis the anti-foundationalistic theme he advocates. Stroud's arguments leave us in a dilemma: If you denounce the philosophical skepticism then it leads to nihilism, if you announce philosophical skepticism then you are a foundationalist or, at best, a reliabilist who announces normativity along with descripticity. An attempt to overcome this dilemma has been made in this chapter by distinguishing the methodological bearing of Quine's naturalized epistemology from that of Rorty's epistemological nihilism and Goldman's epistemics (reliabilism).

The last but one chapter is meant to present Quine's anti-foundationalism qua. naturalism as an investigation to argue against contemporary foundationalistic theses in epistemology. The foundationalistic theses of these days have been conceived of under one name, i.e., justology, in face of the prima facie rivalry between foundationalism and coherentism outlined in the first chapter.

Almost half of the discussions of this chapter owes to Lehrer's exposition of the conditions of knowledge. Besides showing the insufficiency of those conditions which Lehrer takes into account as a groundwork for his proposed 'fourth condition', I have attempted to show the foundationalistic ingredients underlying those conditions and

how Lehrer is also not escaped from that trap. This has been attempted with the belief that the discussions on the integration of Quine's anti-foundationalism qua naturalism are clear enough. And, consequently, any appeal to some unexplained foundationalistic conception by using truth, belief, justification or complete justification as 'instruments' for philosophical analysis or clarification is refuted.

Gettier's problem has been accounted as a paradigm case of the problem of contemporary foundationalists who attempt to answer that problem. These foundationalists are no less victimized by Quine's anti-foundationalism qua naturalism than the traditional and analytical (Carnapian) foundationalists are due to their attempts to respond the Cartesian doubt.

Ketchum's argument against justology has been taken into account to show the unscientific method adopted in justology. In continuation with that, the role of "scientific skepticism" and "reciprocal containment" between epistemology and natural science is shown to be appropriate for a scientific epistemological investigation.


The concluding chapter, "Against Foundationalism: Towards Quine's Naturalised Epistemology", is an outcome of the whole work and stands as a proposal for the abandonment of foundationalism. However this abandonment has been proposed with the conviction that foundationalism is not to be seen as a method separable from the foundationalistic theses. And, consequently, foundationalism is not nullified, rather, the foundationalistic theses are refuted by Quine's anti-foundationalism qua naturalism. Barring the inclinations to interpret Quine's writings in any fragmented way, as there are a plethora of available interpretations which concentrate on particular facets of Quine's writings without attempting for the integration of his early and later writings, the proposal made here is through an integration of Quine's anti-foundationalism and naturalism.

However, the conclusion has also been presented in Quinean terminology. The abandonment of foundationalism is urged by showing the 'doctrinal' incompleteness. In other words, it is described as "The Humean predicament is the human predicament".

OR, p. 72.