There is no sense of a doctrinal (justificatory) theme independent of a conceptual (explanatory) theme. There is no sacrosanct conceptual theme so as to enable us to obtain an absolute verdict of justification from a conceptual analysis itself. Hence, in principle, no doctrinal 'completeness' is possible. The Human predicament is the human predicament\textsuperscript{1}.

A doctrinal completeness can be distinguished from an absolute certainty. The former can be said to be framework dependent whereas the latter is framework independent. In other words, an absolute certainty has no bearing of a conceptual theme, it is something like 'intuitively distinct and clear'. A doctrinal completeness can be said to be complete only in relation to a conceptual framework. It is something like conceptually, semantically or conditionally complete.

But this distinction is fruitlessly employed if one attempts to defend contemporary fundationalism in terms of this distinction. For doctrinal completeness is just a variation of absolute certainty and the latter is no less untenable than the former. A set of 'transcendental categories', a set of 'intensional semantic rules' or a set of "necessary and sufficient conditions of justification" is a set of epistemic norms. These epistemic norms are supposed to be limiting, building or conditioning the whole framework of knowledge so as to enable an epistemologist (Kantian, Camapian or a contemporary

\textsuperscript{1} OR, p.72.
foundationalistic one) to give the verdict of justification on any claim of knowledge by holding those epistemic norms. Thus the 'intuitively distinct and clear' has been replaced by 'conceptually', 'intensionally' or 'justifiedly' distinct and clear. For this 'distinctness and clarenness' is a pseudo response or an unscientific response to a pseudo or unscientific doubt, namely, the Cartesian doubt. In response of that doubt, the variation runs from an appeal to 'intuition' to the appeals to 'concept', 'intension' and 'justification'.

The positive point is, of course, the recognition of a conceptual theme. It is the epistemic bearing of the categories, semantical rules or the justificatory conditions that really is the positive point of a doctrinal dimension of our epistemological inquiry as far as doctrinal dimension is dependent on the conceptual dimension envisaged in terms of categories, language or epistemic conditions. But this recognition of the conceptual dimension of our inquiry becomes fruitless if we go back enquiring the doctrinal dimension. That is, if we look into the categories, language or epistemic conditions in order to go back to some unexplained and unclear 'intuitively distinct and clear'. This going back to the doctrinal side is done, precisely, by upholding the unexplained and untenable notions like 'transcendental', 'intensional' and epistemic normativity', A 'transcendental a priori', a 'lingustic a priori' and an 'apriori epistemic normativity' are all in the same boat, in a foundationalist's boat, opposed to that of Neurath. They are all after absolute certainty but, interestingly enough, they run surreptitiously because they are running back to the darkness they
The variations made out of the foundationalistic approaches, construed as three stages of development of foundationalism, can be roughly summarized as foundationalism varying from a nonsensical one to a conditional meaningful one through a 'meaning' made out of the nonsensical one. A Carnapian move is a meaningful Kantian move and, stretching it further, a justological move is a conditional meaningful Kantian move. A Carnapian inquiry of the normative semantic rules is replaced by a justologist's inquiry of the justificatory (normative) conditions of knowledge. This normativity of conditions is professed by both the foundationalists and the coherentists of these days and thus bound to suffer from the misgivings of a justological move. The underlying methodological outfit of both the contemporary foundationalists and coherentists, though their outflows display an explicit rivalry, presupposes the 'doctrinal' completeness.

Transcendental foundationalism -epistemic normativity in terms of an a priori characterised as 'absolutely independent of all experience'-\textsuperscript{2} is after an absolute certainty to defend epistemology against Cartesian skepticism. It is untenable due to the meaninglessness of a framework independent doctrinal theme it upholds. If every experience we inclucate is dependent on a 'conceptual'\textsuperscript{3} framework we have adopted beforehand, an a priori independent of all experience amounts to an a priori independent of all conceptual frameworks.

\textsuperscript{2} Critique, b-3.

\textsuperscript{3} Contra transcendental.
The Carnapian move of a language relative completeness of the semantic and syntactic rules, a move that professes a theory-relative completeness of epistemological normativity to subdue the talk of ontological sovereignty, is good but not good enough. It overlooks reality; the world is missed into the words. A Quinean enterprise aspires to track the reality, to track the world out of the words.

The tracking is made with an 'enlightened' empirical spirit, the spirit that a natural scientist uptakes to look into the reality or the external world, even if, the world he looks into is the world interpreted in terms of his theory. The interpreted world is not a fiction. Interpretation is hinged on some background beliefs and what generates those beliefs is the rudimentary links we have between our five sense organs and the world outside.

An instance of doubt on the service of our five sense organs is intelligible only when it presupposes a knowledge which, in turn, is nothing but another instance of a bridging between the 'meager input' at our sensory surfaces and the 'torrential output' in the form of acceptable true sentences about the external world. A doubt is not a doubt on the eyes, for example, but on the illusive knowledge of a bent stick with the presupposition of the reality of straight stick which, in turn, can imply no doubt on the eyes but very much on the knowledge of the straight stick due to some different background beliefs (Suppose, for example, the density of the liquid in which the stick is partially immersed is, somehow, exactly the same as that of the air in the surrounding environment and the stick happens to be a
bent one Thus the knowledge of the straight stick is dependent on the background belief that the density of that liquid is not same with the density of the air). Thus the starting point of our knowledge is not to be a Cartesian doubt and, hence, the epistemological search is not to be indentified with a response to philosophical skepticism. 'Doubt prompts the theory of knowledge, yes, but knowledge, also, was what prompted the doubt. Skepticism is an offshoot of science'.

The problem before Cartesian skepticism is quite philosophical—a two pronged general question about knowing reality, i.e., "what is reality?" and "what is real knowledge?"—a metaphysical and an epistemological one. But the approach to that problem, the method of a philosophical doubt, is mistaken for the correct approach and adopted, more or less, implicitly or explicitly, by many since those days to till today. With no reality for itself to stand on, it dreams of diving into the reality of every sort. The requirement of an ontological base for an epistemological investigation is overlooked because, though epistemology is rightly kept as a base for ontological investigations, it is dogmatically kept as a foundational base by overlooking the 'reciprocal containment' that holds good between epistemology and onotology. And, precisely, this overlooking concedes

"NNK", p.67.

5 In its neutral sense it is neither foundationalistic nor naturalistic.

A mistaken conception of the nature of a philosophical - metaphysical or epistemological - question enforces into the dream of an answer which is exclusively under the purview of a philosopher. A genuine metaphysical question, "what is reality?", demands an answer that can account "what sorts of things there are" and, since no sort of thing can be meaningfully accounted without a conceptual framework which, in turn, is dependent on some background knowledge, "what is reality?" presupposes "knowledge" of something. Thus a doubt that presupposes no knowledge of anything cannot be indentified with a meaningful ontological question, "what is reality?" (i.e. with a question about "what sorts of things there are"). "What is reality?" makes no sense if it amounts to a Cartesian doubt; if it is identified as a doubt against everything that is said to be there.

The empty dream recurs in Carnap's conventionalistic relaxation. The best achieved through relaxing on a conceptual framework, conventionally adopted and chosen with some practical considerations, is the giving up the idea of an absolute reality independent of a theory or a conceptual framework of language. In other words, a meaningful metaphysics or 'ontology' replaces a meaningless metaphysics; the problem being unchanged remains "what is reality?". But, on the other hand, linguistic absolutism replaces Absolutism and the former incurs no less misgivings than that of the latter though

---

7 The overlooking of this reciprocal containment is shown, throughout our discussion against foundationalism, as the fundamental mistake in foundationalistic theses.
The good of a Carnapian move into "What is reality?" consists in its making sense of "What is reality?". "What is reality?" or "what there is" is clarified to mean "What is said to be real?" or "What is said to be there?" and this move suggests to explore on 'existence' qua reality of anything (concrete or abstract) through a conceptual framework and, hence, through the fundamental rules governing the conceptual framework. Lacking of the said sense permits one to say of anything on reality, to say of anything to be real, due to the lack of the ontological commitment one is supposed to have on a theoretical basis. An implicit assumption of 'no ontological commitment' implies an assertion of anything to be real as much as an assertion of contradictory premise validly implies an assertion of any conclusion to be true.

The worse about the move is, though it paves the way to make sense of reality, it misses reality in the way itself. The irony of its semantical determination of ontology is that it puts semantics as making sense of reality and, at the same time, leaves no reality to be made any sense of. Semantics is mistaken for an ideal instrument to the philosophical problems on reality. It is good of a semantical method that we can make sense of reality only when reality is not independent of language because the sense of reality is nothing but

Note that the transformation to "What we say to be there" from "What there is" is mainly due to the same kind of urgency, the theoretical urgency, of explaining reality.

they vary in the degree of their sophistication like transcendental a priori and linguistic a priori do.\footnote{Note that the transformation to "What we say to be there" from "What there is" is mainly due to the same kind of urgency, the theoretical urgency, of explaining reality.}
the reality said to be there and; moreover, a saying pertains to semantical rules. But language is no less dependent on ontology than ontology is dependent on language. No conceptual framework, no particular system of beliefs, hails from the blue but depends on some background system of beliefs which, in turn, represents an ontology, i.e., saying of certain things to be there.

The inbuilt scientific bearing of the existence of a framework or theory dependent object is the conceptual or theoretical explanation it does have. This scientific bearing is abandoned once we abandon the search of the background beliefs of the conceptual framework or theory. This search is abandoned, not only if we are complacent enough to our currently achieved fallible conceptual frameworks and mistake it as being infallible but, also if we are dogmatic enough to believe an absolute determination of any ontology. Linguistic absolutism is no better than metaphysical absolutism except that the latter makes no sense of reality whereas the former makes no sense of the senseful reality (i.e., no sense in its very way of making sense of reality). If the metaphysical absolutism is an utter unscientific approach to reality due to the conceptual or theoretical explanation it lacks in overlooking the conceptual or theoretical bearing a thing has; then even if linguistic absolutism unravels that pitfall, it is no less unscientific in overlooking the background systems on what the systems representing the ontology do depend.

Representation makes nothing unscientific, it is absolustic representation that does. Absolustic representation is conspicuously held by an adherent of Kantian transcendental a priori. Such a
conspicuous holding is shadowed by the ASD. The absolustic representation becomes more sophisticated when it is made in terms of the completeness of the semantical rules that govern the representing framework. This completeness is shadowed by determinacy of meaning.

Translation being indeterminate, the inbuilt requirement (of a choice) of translation retains the indeterminacy of an ontology, represented by a conceptual framework, language or theory. Of course both the indeterminacies, of a translation and of a conceptual framework qua an ontology contra, metaphysics, resulted from an approach quite behaviouristic; in particular, or naturalistic, in general. The demand of behaviourism or naturalism is not at all arbitrary. It is due to the very urgency of the scientific search over the background beliefs as well as over the beliefs themselves.

The theoretical drawback of linguistic absolutism is revealed in its blocking of the scientific pursuit of truth, in its complacent move of upholding independent conceptual frameworks which are alleged to be perfectly determining the reality they account. The behaviouristic explanation is a theoretical explanation to start with from where the scientific pursuit of truth is blocked due to a Cartesian threat of gaining nothing philosophical unless you gain something beyond the conceptual frameworks. The pursuit is based on the finding of a partnership between language and ontology, between beliefs saying an 'ontology and ontology saying the (background) beliefs.

Since it is their partnership, not the foundationalistic
upholding of semantics' upper hand over ontology that theoretically holds good - holds good for the conceptual or explanatory consistency urged in answering "What is said to be there?"\(^9\) - a study of the framework explaining their partnership is urged. This partnership is traced back from their respective rudimentary stages - the learning of our language and individuating the objects of our external world - such that it may explain further, in future, through a physicalistic framework, "What is said to be there?". The partnership found through a behaviouristic framework is expected to be explained in physicalistic terms.

Note that the question "What is said to be there?" is transformed into "What is objectually said to be there?" which is distinguished from "What is substitutionally said to be there?" With the conceptual clarification of the misleadings of pseudo names due to a mistaken presupposition of direct one-to-one relation between names and objects, quantifiers are placed to function parallel to the pronouns such that only the values of variables bound by a quantifier meaningfully amounts to be the objects parallel to the subjects or objects replaceable for the corresponding pronouns. So also runs the development from variables in general to the objectual interpretation of variables in particular, parallel to the distinguished function of an identifiable pronoun (contra an unidentifiable pronoun that becomes true of any substitutional value).

\(^9\) In this work, both conceptions of the a priori, are shown to be the foundationalistic responses to the Cartesian doubt in epistemology and both overlook the "reciprocal containeament' between epistemology and ontology.
The partnership between language and reality, in a behaviouristic framework, observing the untenability of linguistic absolutism, leads to naturalized epistemology: the thematic current of what upholds the 'reciprocal containment' of epistemology and natural science (ontology)\(^\text{10}\). Natural Science qua fallible theories or frameworks on natural phenomena qua the relativistic ontology of the concrete and abstract objects posited to understand the natural phenomena contains epistemology and epistemology contains natural science.

The subject predicate unit, the statement instead of a term, a sentence instead of a word, is well adopted as the minimal unit of any instance of a significant/meaningful use of language in human communication. The subject-part roughly stands for the ontology, the predicative one is for the epistemology and, hence, no significant philosophy without the unity-in-difference of the two, without the intercurrence conceptualized between the two.

Ontology is the study of what sorts of things are said to be there and epistemology is the study of "What sorts of things can be said about the sorts of things said to be there".\(^\text{11}\) The cleavage between the two 'sayings', a detachment between ontology and epistemology, by a misconstrual of the latter (i.e. saying associated with epistemology) as superior to the former (i.e., saying associated

\(^{10}\) Because the true sense of ontology is nothing but the scientific way of saying "what there is", the relation is "saying of what there is" in relation to a theory or conceptual framework.

with ontology) allures one for foundationalistic spading on epistemology. A foundationalist's appeal to semantics is meant for spading on the 'saying' itself of the epistemological kind which, in turn, is alleged to provide the foundation (linguistic one).

However, in both the investigations, ontological and epistemological, 'saying' of some sorts of things is the main concern. And, of course, it is not just a meaningful saying of our ordinary language. It is a framework's accounting of certain things. But, more importantly, since no such account is absolute, it is futile to spade on 'saying' itself (i.e. on semantics itself) to gain a philosophical uphold of an ideal (determined) 'saying' for the doctrinal completeness. This completeness is available neither for semantics to make linguistic absolutism tenable nor for any conceptual framework or theory to make justology qua contemporary foundationalistic and coherentistic study of justification tenable. On the other hand, since there is an intercurrence between the ontological 'saying' and the epistemological 'saying', a systematic study of the intercurrence is required with an 'enlightened' empirical spirit. This spirit's requirement is due to the availability, the only availability, of some empirical ground on what the said intercurrence's rudimentary stages can be studied.

Needless to say that philosophy is not ordinary language, nor it is about ordinary language itself. And, no doubt, ontology is philosophical. Ontological discussions, for Quine, are not about the the rules or principles guiding the ordinary language. Nor, they are just the ordinary way of speaking that there are trees, tables, men and animals. There are in fact the questions on how we say about those objects but the answers are not based on any intensional semantical rules.
No conceptual clarity is available, neither on ontological ground nor on semantical ground, which could have satisfactorily explicated the ASD such that the ASD would have foundationalistically demarcated a clear-cut distinction between philosophical (contra naturalized) epistemology and the natural sciences. Ontological realtivity shatters any faint hope for an analyticity's privileged ontological status and the IT does the same on semantical grounds. Thus no privileged status can be, ontologically or semantically, conceded to some statements (alleged to be analytically true) distinguished from all other statements (alleged to be non-analytically or synthetically true). On the other hand, intercurrence among all the statements (the so called analytics as well as the synthetics) enables one to pursue the matter naturalistically.

The matter at hand is epistemological. To specify further, it is the 'conceptual dimension' of epistemology. It is to provide an adequate explanation for our knowing of anything (concrete or abstract) in this world. It is the explanation and, remember, not the justification what we are to search for.

It is typically an illusion of the apriority (transcendental, linguistic or conditional) of normativity alleged to be indispensably associated with epistemology, as if eternally infused in epistemology, accrues to the hope imbibed for justology. The Humean predicament is vainly attempted for its removal. But, to repeat, the 'Humean predicament is the human predicament'.

Justology undertaken by the contemporary foundationalists and
coherentists presupposes an epistemic normativity parallel to that of the Carnapian enterprise. The versions prominent in these days do immunize themselves against the charge, by which the traditional foundationalists were victimised, that if certainty qua incorrigibility can be entrusted on any knowledge claim then their certainty or incorrigibility must be extended either in an arbitrary manner or in an obscured manner of what there is no sense. For the independence that such certainty qua incorrigibility requires on behalf of the conceptual frameworks is shown to be untenable. Thus the stronger versions of contemporary foundationalism are criticised on the ground that they uphold framework independent truth, belief or prepositional meaning in their analysis of knowledge.

The modest versions resist, against the above said usual criticism, mainly by distinguishing 'indefeasibility' from 'incorrigibility'. However, a priori epistemic normativity is upheld in both the cases (stronger and modest) with the difference that the truth, belief or prepositional meaning are framework independent in case of the stronger versions whereas those are framework dependent in case of the modest versions. (Parallel to the difference between the traditional foundationalists' Absolutism and the Carnapian foundationalists' linguistic absolutism).

The Gettier's problem, the problem of identifying 'knowledge' with 'justified true belief, replaces the Cartesian problem of 'indubitable' knowledge. Consequently, as a response to Gettier's problem - parallel to any response to the Cartesian problem - justology is no less vulnerable than the traditional foundationalism and the
Carnapian foundationalism are shown to be vulnerable to the criticisms provided against the ASD, determinacy of meaning and absolustic determination of ontology.

Justology is untenable on the ground that its very objective of providing necessary and sufficient conditions for "justified true belief" is unviable. Knowledge identified with 'justified true belief in order to lay down the epistemic norms in terms of the conditions necessary and sufficient for "justified true belief is untenable. For, precisely, the required epistemic normativity is unviable. It matters the least whether a subjective or a propositional or a doxastic account of justification is upheld. So also, if that epistemic normativity is upheld, it matters the least whether those accounts are relative to certain conditions or not. For the supposed relativeness is just a bit of sophistication added to the old absolustic conception of knowledge and justification identified with an absolustic conception of truth, belief or meaning that plays the vital role in the analysis of knowledge or justification.

Thus, as far as I succeed in showing the absolustic character of truth, belief or meaning as to be the fundamental requirement of a justological move, I succeed in advancing Quine's anti-foundationalism qua. naturalism as a critic of contemporary foundationalism. Quine's anti-foundationalistic theses themselves do go against the absolustic, essentialistic or metaphysical account of truth, belief and meaning. But neither the theses of contemporary foundationalism are explicit enough to be claimed as absolustic nor the Quinean anti-foundationalistic theses are explicit on that any fora of
absolutism can be criticised.

The reciprocal containment between epistemology and natural science (ontology) and the scientific skepticism in place of Cartesian skepticism, both together, can explain the above said implicit bearings. Truth, belief and meaning are not independent of experience precisely because epistemology is not independent of natural science. Cartesian doubt is the root cause of the requirement of that independent status.

Thus finding two fundamental features of Quine's naturalized epistemology inside his anti-foundationalistic theses I would like to claim that an independent status conceded to any form of concepts, beliefs, truths, meanings or conditions so as to be epistemically prior to experience can be criticized by Quine's anti-foundationalism qua naturalism. And, to speak against the other side, I would like to claim that the traditional foundationalists, analytical foundationalisms and the contemporary foundationalists do illegitimately concede some form of belief, truth, meaning or conditions so as to make them epistemically prior to experience. For, as I have tried to show, foundationalists uphold the separation of epistemology from natural science as well as the incompatibility between knowledge and doubt; and these two features play a major role for that illegitimate concession.

Thus Quine's anti-foundationalism qua. naturalism is a genuine epistemological investigation which is worth pursuable in philosophy, not only for its prims facie arguments against absolutism but also for
its naturalistic ingredient antagonistic to any version of foundationalism. Both the moves—the anti-foundationalistic and the naturalistic—plead for an indeterminacy which can be called as the indeterminacy of method, the fourth indeterminacy. Indeterminacy of translation, inscrutability of reference and underdetermination of scientific theory are the three indeterminacy theses conspicuously figured in Quine's writings. The fourth indeterminacy, the indeterminacy of method, works for and resulted from the three indeterminacies. For anti-foundationalism is nothing but naturalism and the three conspicuously figured indeterminacy theses have been shown to be against foundationalism. And, it has also been shown that a genuine naturalism, a Quinean naturalized epistemology, advocates for the indeterminacy of method. Thus it can be said that to go against foundationalism is nothing but to go towards Quine's naturalized epistemology.