CHAPTER IV

ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
CHAPTER - IV

ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

The arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union have been conducted both within and outside the framework of United Nations. During the seventies, President Richard M. Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev signed SALT I agreement in 1972 and President Jimmy Carter and Brezhnev signed SALT II in 1979. The SALT I treaty was approved by the United States Senate but SALT II was withdrawn by the President after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. The two sides however agreed that they would abide by the agreement. Thus actually both the agreements remained in operation.

These two treaties limited the strategic weapons but the intermediate range nuclear weapons were not limited. The dual track decision was taken by the NATO Council in 1979 to deploy Pershing II and GLCM and to simultaneously start the INF negotiations with the Soviet Union. Accordingly, Carter opened the INF negotiations in October 1980. The Soviet side was led by L. Viktor Karpov and the American delegation by L.S. Purgeon Keeny. The Soviet Union insisted on the inclusion of Forward Based Systems in the negotiations namely, the U.S. planes stationed in Britain, West Germany and other Western European countries.
The United States and the allies did not accept the Soviet stand. The talks reached a stalemate even before both sides could agree to begin the talks.

**Linkage**

The question of linking arms control talks with the Soviet policy and action in other areas came up with the occupation of Afghanistan. Senator John Tower (Rep., Texas) asked in the Senate for the inclusion of Senator William S. Cohen's (Rep., Maire) remarks on NATO security, made at the Union of Christian Democratic Party in which he had put forward the idea of linkage between arms control negotiations and international strategic environment. Senator Cohen had said:

...there is an emerging consensus in the United States that arms control agreements cannot be negotiated in a vacuum and cannot be considered in splendid isolation from global military and political realities. Agreements that provide for equal aggregates of weapons cannot produce equality where unequal military trends and intentions exist.2

---


   
The Carter administration was divided in its response to the linkage that was being suggested. Cyrus Vance, then Secretary of State, felt that each of the issues like the human rights, trade, and economic relations with the Soviet Union and the arms talks must be treated on its own merits.³ Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Adviser, in contrast, took a hard line approach. He felt that since the Soviet Union had attained nuclear parity with the United States, it was making political advancements and in order to curtail its adverse political movements it was necessary to build the nuclear capability of the allies and talk from a position of strength.⁴ The difference between Vance and Brzezinski on the issue reflected much deeper differences in their attitude towards the Soviet Union.⁵ Further, no progress was made in the negotiations because the US was absorbed in the hostage crisis. It was also a presidential election year and the Soviets waited for its outcome. They too were attending to more serious problems at home.

---


Reagan and Arms Control

At a time when the arms control talks had reached a stalemate due to the political tangle between the Super Powers, Ronald Reagan entered the White House in January 1981. Throughout his first term (1981-84) he adopted a hawkish posture toward the Soviet Union. The US made no effort to initiate the arms control talks, while the preparations for the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM were going on in Western Europe. Around this time, the peace movements against the deployment of these missiles gained strength in Western Europe. This heightened the concern of the allies about the arms control negotiations. In order to enlist public support for the deployment, importance of starting the arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union was stressed by West Germany and Italy.6 Under heavy pressure from the NATO allies, President Reagan opened the arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union in 1981.

Arms control initiative

In May 1981, Reagan wrote to Brezhnev conveying American readiness to start the talks with the Soviet Union. The procedural and preliminary questions concerning the arms control talks were dealt with by Lawrence S. Eagleburger, the United States' Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and Alexander A. Bessmerthykh, second man in the Soviet Embassy in Washington. The major unresolved questions were dealt with by Alexander Haig Jr., then Secretary of State and Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Affairs minister. 7

Haig and Gromyko agreed to open the INF negotiations at Geneva on 30 November 1981. One state Department official was reported to have said "the Europeans would have screamed bloody murder if these talks broke up without a date set." 8

Paul Nitze, seventy year old anti-soviet hardliner who helped to negotiate SALT I in 1972, headed the American side and V.A. Kvitsinsky, the Soviet side, for negotiations. In his first major foreign policy speech on 18 November, 1981, Reagan offered the "Zero-option" as the American arms

control proposal to the Soviet Union. It was telecasted live in Western Europe. Richard N. Perle, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, was reported to be the person behind the formulation of the Zero-option. 9

The proposal offered:

- to cancel the deployment of new US medium range nuclear missiles in Europe if Soviet Union withdrew its medium range missiles aimed at Western Europe;
- to start negotiations on reducing the long range strategic missiles and bombers and
- to reduce the risks of a surprise attack. 10

The Democrat controlled House and the Republican controlled Senate passed the House concurrent Resolution 224 on 19 November 1981, commending Reagan for initiating arms control negotiations. 11 This was an indication that nuclear arms control negotiations had strong bipartisan support.

Casper Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration, summed up the proposal thus, "you take out yours and we won't put in any and that will leave


Europe free”. He viewed the Zero-option as a step toward the opening up of arms control talks.12

But Alexander Haig, the then Secretary of State disagreed with the proposal. He pointed out a fatal flaw in the zero option. It was not negotiable. It appeared to him to be beyond reasonable senses to expect the Soviets to dismantle the missiles they had already deployed, in exchange for the United States' promise of not to deploy the missiles.13

The zero-option raised a lot of doubts about its genuineness in the minds of intellectuals and others who were deeply involved in the arms control process. The media critically analyzed the pros and cons of the zero-option. The Lincoln Star felt that though the proposal was good, its practicability was doubtful. On the contrary, The Evening Gazette called the American offer "sincere". The Denver Post expressed the opinion that Reagan's speech was more directed to the people of Western Europe than to the Soviet Union. The Detroit Free Press stated that Reagan wanted to win the propaganda war against the Soviet Union and that he

12 Quoted in Christian Science Monitor (Boston: Mass), 19 November 1981.

did it successfully by proposing the zero-option. The Christian Science Monitor also doubted the practicability of the zero-option and opined that by the modification of positions by both the Super powers, arms control could be achieved. The Seattle Times wrote that the Reagan's proposal had been offered with the idea to influence the summit meeting between Brezhnev and West German chancellor Schmidt. It was of the view that it was also offered as the starting point of the Arms control negotiations, which was to later start on 30 November in Geneva. The Birmingham News expressed doubts about the sincerity of the Soviets in conducting arms control talks and called for the building up of arms by the United States, even while the negotiations were going on. The Oregonian interpreted the zero-option as Reagan's effort to close the communication gap between the U.S., and the people of Western Europe. 14

There were many who viewed the zero-option as a proposal which Reagan was forced to offer because of the

pressure from West European peace movements. Majority of the media viewed the zero-option as an unviable proposal.

Dimitri Simes, Director of the Soviet East European Programme at the John Hopkins University, argued that the zero-option showed the American disinterest in arms control. Alton Frye, Director of the Washington office of the Council on Foreign Relations stated, "It (zero-option) represents the beginning of a personal education for the President, who may be sensitized to the necessity of sustaining the diplomatic process." 15

Soviet offer

A House delegation led by Representative Thomas P. Lantos (Dem., Calif) visited the USSR and met the two chief arms control negotiators, V.P. Karpov and Yuli Y. Kvitsinsky on 11 January 1983. The delegation also met with Vadin Zagladin, a member of the Supreme Soviet and first Deputy Chief, International Relations Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR.

John F. Seiberling (Dem., Ohio), who was a member of the delegation gave his general impressions of the Soviet

perspective in the House. Seiberling informed that when Kvitsinsky met the delegation, he said that the zero-option was absolutely one-sided and did not include the medium range bombers. He informed that the USSR would be ready to consider the zero-option if some British and French missiles were also reduced. And Vadin Zagladin a member of the Supreme Soviet told the committee that while among the WARSAW pact countries, only the USSR possessed nuclear weapons, in NATO three countries did. Since the zero-option excluded the American nuclear weapon carrying aircrafts, the aircrafts and missiles of France and Britain, the zero-option was against the USSR.16

The Soviet Union officially rejected the zero-option proposed by Reagan as impracticable and proposed instead to reduce the number of its intermediate missiles if NATO gave up its plan to deploy nuclear missiles. The Soviets included both the British and French missiles and the American submarines and aircrafts based in Europe capable of carrying nuclear weapons in their proposal.17

While Americans ignored the forward based systems,

the Soviets went to the other extreme of including the British and French nuclear weapons. The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations began with these two extreme proposals. Both the super powers rejected each other's proposal as unfeasible. While the Soviet Union went on proposing various alternatives even after the negotiations started, the US for a long time did not change its position from zero-option. While these negotiations were going on, some political developments adversely affected the talks.

The crisis in Poland

The revolution in Poland came about gradually. The food and the economic situation in Poland were deteriorating since the end of the 1970s. Firstly, there were sporadic strikes, which later emerged in 1980 as nation wide workers' revolt, in turn leading to the formation of a labour union called Solidarity.

In contrast to Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Polish crisis of 1980-81 was characterized not only by popular dissatisfaction with economic and political conditions but also by a dramatic economic collapse. Poland's hard currency debt to the west reached $22 billion in 1981.
During the summer of 1980 Stanislaw Kamia, the First Secretary of the Polish communist party came to power with the Soviet support. He sought to win the support of workers by giving concessions and bargaining. But when the Solidarity made greater demands, the Soviets considered the military option. Massive military build up along the Polish borders was considered with the help of Czechs and East Germans. But this decision was dropped because the military action was disliked by a part of Polish military; moreover the Carter administration had advised the Poles openly about the probable Soviet military action which focussed the attention of the world on Poland. Thus the advantage of a surprise attack was denied to the soviets.

The Soviets decided to use the Polish armed forces as long term strategy of intervention as the Polish army was more highly esteemed by the Poles than the Communist Party. General Nojeiech Jeruzelski, replaced Kamia as the First Secretary of the Polish party on 18 October 1981, and imposed military rule in Poland.18

The military dictatorship was introduced in Poland when the arms control negotiations were going on in Geneva.

---

The U.S. had enthusiastically welcomed Poland's move towards liberalization. It therefore responded angrily when the communist leadership suppressed the movement led by Solidarity with a heavy hand. The Reagan Administration expressed its strong views without any reservation. However, Reagan decided to continue with the talks, causing displeasure to the hardliners in his administration. When Alexander Haig, Jr. met Gromyko at Geneva, he stressed that "these INF talks must be dealt with outside the context of normal East-West relationship, because there are fundamental advantages to the U.S. in its continuation." Thus the Reagan administration was always divided on the vital issue whether or not to continue the policy of linking the arms control talks with the Soviet Union's political activities. There was a great deal of ambivalence.

On 3 February 1982, the Soviet Union called for gradual reduction of medium range missiles and similar weapon systems to limits of about three hundred on each side by 1991. In making this proposal, it again counted the missiles of the French and the British. Brezhnev proposed a two-third cut by 1990 in the medium range nuclear weapons of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 19

---

19 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 82, no. 2081, April 1982, p. 50. See also Time, 1 February 1982, pp. 31-32.

Immediately on 4 February, the U.S. rejected the proposal and declared that a draft of its position namely the "zero option" had already been given to the Soviet Union. Later on 16 March 1982, Brezhnev declared that the Soviet Union was to adhere to a moratorium, unilaterally on the deployment of medium range nuclear missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union. The moratorium was to be in force until an arms control agreement was reached or until the actual deployment of Pershing II and GLCM began in Western Europe. But in May 1982, while making clear that the Soviet moratorium included the stopping of the construction of the launching sites for new missiles Brezhnev also stated that missiles with capacity to strike West Germany would not be deployed by the Soviet Union.

The new proposals of moratorium put forth by the Soviet Union were again rejected by the United States either on the ground that they were for the purpose of propaganda or because of the incompatibility of the inclusion of British and French missiles with U.S. interests.

---

21 For the text of the draft proposal see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 8 February, 1982, p.


23 ibid.,

Walk in the woods proposal

While the leaders of the two countries were proposing and rejecting each other's proposals, the American and Soviet arms control negotiators worked out an arms control plan quietly in the woods of Geneva.

On 16 July 1982, Nitze and Kvitsinsky took a walk in the woods of Swiss Jusa Mountains near the French border. In this private session, away from the negotiating table, they discussed a compromise and exchanged a package proposal. The key features of the proposal were that the Soviets would give up their insistence on the cancellation of NATO deployment and their demand for compensation for the British and French forces, and that the number of Soviet SS-20s would be reduced from 243 to 75 in Europe and frozen at 90 in Asia and that the U.S., would install 75 cruise missile launchers with four missiles each for a total of three hundred war heads and that it would cancel the Pershing II deployment.

The proposal was discussed by a minigroup under the chairmanship of Robert "Bud" McFarlane, Deputy to Judge


26 ibid., See also Time, 5 December 1982, pp.15-23.

158.
William Clark, who later in October 1983, replaced Clark as National Security Adviser to President. The mini group objected to the fact that Nitze had crossed his limits. McFarlane questioned the rationality behind the idea of giving up Pershing II. Further more he consulted with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whether they could do without Pershing II. Among them, General John W. Vessey and Air Force Chief of Staff, Charles Gabriel, leaned in favour of the plan but the Army Chief of Staff, Edward C. Meyer, who had the responsibility for building Pershing II opposed the plan. It was also opposed by the Naval Chief James Watkins. The chiefs’ report was sent to the President. 27 Nitze discussed the proposal on 27 July with Rostow and Judge William Clark and General Richard Boverie, one of the most able NSC assistants. 28

Clark later personally briefed the President about the "walk in the woods" proposal. On the same day later (i.e.) on 27 July, President chaired a meeting in the White House where the "walk in the woods" proposal was discussed. The meeting was attended by Secretary of state, George P. Shultz, Secretary of Defense, Casper W. Weinberger, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General John W. Vessey Jr. CIA

28 Nitze, n.25, p.386.
Director William J. Cassey, Clark, Rostow and from the President's White House by Edwin Meese, Michael Deaver and James Baker. The proposal was favourably viewed but it was agreed to have further study of the proposal. The National Security Council meeting took place on 13 September 1982. Later, Shultz met Gromyko at the United Nations on 28 September 1982 and informed him of the negative attitude of his government towards the plan. The following day, Kvitsinsky conveyed that his government was not supporting the proposal either.

It showed clearly the infighting among the office of the State and that of the Defense. It was also that the group which wanted an interim treaty short of zero was finally over-powered by the hawks. It could have also been an American trick to estimate whether Soviets were ready to have an arms control treaty and how far they would proceed? Nitze in his memoir has written as to why the Soviets did not support the proposal. Kvitsinsky had confirmed to Nitze

29 ibid.,

30 ibid., *Time*, 5 December 1982. But on the contrary Nitze in his memoir has written that Gromyko did not raise the subject in his meeting with Shultz on 29 September, 1982 and that Shultz told Gromyko that it remained to be seen what might come of the walk-in-the-woods procedure; and that only Kvitsinsky conveyed that Soviet Union was not supporting the proposal on 28 September, p.388-89.

160
later that Moscow in the review of its arms control policy Moscow concluded that the Soviet Union should not accept any agreement that permitted deployment of any number of Pershing II and GLCMs. Because this would undercut the peace, anti-nuclear environmentalist and anti-American movements in Western Europe. It was decided to use INF more as a political device to sow dissension within NATO and between the U.S. and its allies. Moreover since Reagan was still supporting zero-option, the other proposals were dismissed as not feasible. The "walk in the woods" proposal was thus politically not acceptable to both the countries.

The Reagan administration took a serious view of the entire episode and penalised the initiators of the proposal. Eugene Rostow, the Director of Arms control and Disarmament Agency was accused of giving away American interests by the National security adviser, William P. Clark. Later Rostow, was forced to resign by Reagan under the garb of streamlining the Administration.

The newspapers commented extensively on Rostow's dismissal in their editorials. The Minneapolis Star and Tribune stated that it was not only a few senators but the President himself who was against arms control treaty with

the Soviet Union. It went on to question the seriousness of the President's interest in concluding arms control treaty. The Blade in its editorial called the firing of Rostow very unfortunate. But The Atlanta Constitution supported the President on the ground that he had every right to keep in position a person whom he likes. The Post-Tribune questioned the sincerity of the President's intentions of arms control. The Washington Post suggested that the firing of Rostow was to be seen as an action to show the need of discipline in the bureaucracy. It further stated that pressure was mounting upon the president to give an interim proposal. The Hart Ford Courant viewed Rostow's resignation as a success to hardliners in the Congress and in the executive, who were interested in the zero-option and its strict verification procedures rather than in arriving at an arms control treaty with the Soviet Union. The Christian Science Monitor stressed the need to impress upon the West Europeans that the U.S. wanted a real arms control negotiation with the Soviet Union and expressed the view that the proposed new Director, Kenneth Adelman, was not impressive as a person interested in arms control. The Monitor added that arms control would help Reagan solve his

budget problems. *St. Petersburg Times* saw the resignation of Rostow as a symbol of the increasing influence of the hardliners like Senator Jesse Helms (Rep., N.C.) over the arms control policy of the U.S. 33

In general, majority of the newspapers were of the opinion that Rostow's resignation created disarray in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. They feared that it would fuel the anti-nuclear protests in Western Europe and would create doubts in the minds of the allies about the American commitment to arms control. Further it was felt that the firing of Rostow had helped the Soviet Union in its peace offensive against the United States and Western Europe. Many questioned the sincerity of Reagan regarding the arms control negotiation and stressed the need for an interim proposal to restore the confidence of the allies in the U.S. It was also felt that Rostow's sudden resignation would affect the arms control talks with the Soviet Union.

The White House had given overall instruction to Nitze about negotiating with the Soviets. Hence Nitze felt

that he must have more freedom to search for changes in the other side's position. He confessed that he was disillusioned with Rostow's forced resignation. 34

The "walk in the woods" proposal and the consecutive actions of the United States aroused much concern and attention in Western Europe. A state Department official commented that a mythology had been created in Western Europe that the arms control treaty proposed by Rostow and Nitze had not been accepted by the hardliners. 35

Even after the "walk in the woods" proposal had been rejected by both the governments in September 1982, the Soviet Union did not give up its efforts sincere or otherwise to explore the possibilities of coming to terms with the U.S. and to find ways to stop the proposed deployment of nuclear missiles in Western Europe.

Negotiations 1983-85

On 21 December 1982, Andropov who succeeded Brezhnev, again proposed to reduce the number of medium range nuclear weapons to a level of three hundred by 1990. He further stated that the Soviet Union would retain in Europe only as

many medium range missiles as Britain and France. He also warned against the deployment of new Pershing II and GLCM in Western Europe. 36

But the U.S. once again rejected this proposal. It was argued that if British and French forces were threatening the security of the Soviet Union, then the Soviet Union's ICBMs could equally be viewed as a threat to the security of Western Europe. 37

On his visit to Bonn on 17 January 1983, Gromyko again reiterated the Soviet willingness to reduce its medium range nuclear missiles to the combined total of the British and the French nuclear forces and to remove those above this figure to a line in Siberia beyond the range from where they could no longer threaten the security of Western Europe. He also offered to rescue the number of tactical nuclear weapons with a range up to 1000 km. to the number deployed by the West. 38

But along with the proposal to reduce its nuclear forces the Soviet Union also reportedly warned the European

38 ibid., 18 January 1983.
countries of dire consequences if the plan to deploy Pershing-II and GLCM was carried out.

Guidelines for negotiations

Rostow was replaced by Kenneth Adelman. In 1983, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported adversely on Reagan's nomination of Kenneth Adelman as Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Foreign Relations Committee report said, "Mr. Adelman's emphasis on deep reductions and very little else indicates, at best, a narrowly focussed view of the potential value of arms control. At worst, it may mean that he intends to ally himself with those who would establish impossible standards in negotiations with the anticipation of failure." However, Adelman's nomination was approved by the Senate by a narrow vote of 57-42. 39

Reagan gave the general outline within which the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces negotiator Nitze was

allowed to explore the ways to an agreement with the Soviet Union. He stated that the principle of equality must be the basis of the agreement, that the British and French forces were to be excluded from the arms control negotiations and that the Soviet Union was not to be allowed to shift its intermediate range nuclear forces from the European to Asian theatre and that the agreement had to be mutually verifiable.\textsuperscript{40}

The State Department declared in March 1983 that the negotiators were empowered to probe into the new Soviet proposals but were not given power to offer new American proposals. Secretary of State Shultz was given the power to coordinate the arms control negotiations.\textsuperscript{41}

The U.S. did not make any change in its officially declared policy of the zero option though it was willing to explore other proposals put forward by the Soviet Union. In fact, the U.S. not only did not itself offer any other arms control proposal but rejected invariably all the Soviet arms control proposals as propaganda efforts. The West European leaders and people alike began to feel that the American proposal was extreme, inflexible and hence not worthy of

\textsuperscript{40} New York Times, 18 January 1983. See also, Time, 24 January 1982, pp.4-6.

\textsuperscript{41} New York Times, 17 March 1983.
negotiation. The pressure to modify the American position slowly built up. Further, the "walk in the woods" proposal showed that the negotiators without acting on the advice of their respective governments could arrive at an agreement. Doubts began to be raised whether the Soviet Union would have considered the proposal seriously had it not believed that it was being advanced as negotiating position by the US. Hence after this, the pressure on Reagan to offer an interim proposal in response to the various Soviet proposals was built by the press, people and the governments of the allies alike which felt that the American zero option had created only a stalemate in the arms control negotiations.

**Interim proposal**

In order to satisfy his critics, Reagan in his address to the Eureka College in Illinois called for the reduction of the warheads on the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles to an equal number on a global basis. The President stated that, "when it comes to Intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, it would be better to have none than some. But if there must be some, it is better to have few than to have many." 42

---

But he did not mention the number of the Intermediate Range nuclear missile warheads that would be acceptable as an interim step towards the arms control. Paul Nitze formally presented Reagan's proposal to his Soviet counterpart on 29 March 1983. He asked the Soviet Union to be more flexible. But Gromyko, rejected Reagan's offer on two grounds. Firstly, the offer did not include British and French nuclear forces and secondly, the Americans demanded global reduction of Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces.43

The interim proposal was announced by Reagan in order to reduce the opposition to the Pershing II and GLCM deployment in 1983. While continuing to negotiate with the United States, the Soviet Union warned that it would leave the negotiating table once the deployment of new Pershing II and GLCM was carried out.44

Whereas a more conducive atmosphere for arms control was created by Reagan's interim proposal indicating American willingness to be flexible in negotiations, the atmosphere deteriorated again due to a Soviet Union's seemingly hostile action of downing a South Korean airliner in September 1983 in the sea of Japan.

44 Time, 28 November 1983, pp.8-10.
Richard A. Viguerie, the publisher of *Conservative Digest*, went to the extent of asking that the U.S. should suspend the arms control negotiations. He stated that the arms control negotiations were based on trust and the unprovoked attack, along with the Soviet's reported violations of previous agreements, exposed the Soviets as unworthy of trust."45

The U.S. public did not whole heartedly endorse this view. The newspapers reflected and at the same time influenced the public opinion on the issue of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. *Argus Leader* stressed the need for the continuation of talks in spite of the death of Rep. Larry McDonald, (Dem., Ga.) and other victims of the crash. *Minneapolis Star* and *Tribune* also underlined the importance of continuing the arms control talks with the Soviet Union, though its actions might be antagonistic to American interests. The newspaper did not support the strong condemnation of Soviet action by Reagan. *The Providence Journal* on the other hand, criticized the Soviets for caring more about the arms control and less about human lives and human rights. *Rocky Mountain News* in its editorial advised the allies and the U.S. not to overreact.

It did not even advise grain embargo as the difficulty was more likely to be felt by the Americans. The Seattle Times warned that in taking any action against the Soviet Union, all the allies and the U.S. must join together and must not split on the issue. The Honolulu Adviser warned the United States government to make use of the opportunity to increase the Soviet fear in the minds of the West Europeans. The Post-Tribune in its editorial praised Reagan for not succumbing to the pressure from the hardliners to stop the arms control efforts. The continuation of the arms control talks was viewed by it as the only sane approach to avoid nuclear annihilation. The editorial of the Des Moines Register also shared the views of the Post-Tribune. The Kansas City Times wrote that the arms control talks which was mutually advantageous to both his Super Powers must be followed. The Washington Post and Chicago Tribune considered the President's policy to be right. The Dispatch editorial supported the NATO arms modernization programme. The Editorials on file compiled nearly fifty four editorials

on the issue of the shooting down of the Korean airliner and the American reaction. All of the, strongly condemned the Soviet action as inhuman. But only The Burlington press asked for the suspension of talks if the Soviets refused to give a satisfactory explanation. The Union Leader also questioned the use of having dialogues with the people like Hitler. Except for these two all other newspapers called for the continuation of the arms control talks. Besides, stressing the overwhelming importance of the continuation of the arms control talks, some of them stressed the need for the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM also.

On 5 September 1983, Reagan announced only the suspension of certain cultural, scientific and diplomatic exchanges with the Soviets. He took recourse to arms build up. His MX (ICBM) programme easily got the approval of the Congress.


With the announcement of the decision to deploy Pershing II and GLCM in Western Europe from November 1983, in order to assuage the West European public opinion, the Reagan administration showed flexibility in the arms control talks.

The Arms Control session on the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces started within five days of the shooting down of the Korean plane. As its new proposal at the session, the U.S. withdrew its insistence on treating the Soviet SS-20s in Europe and Asia in the same way. It further proposed to let the Soviets have more missiles in Asia in return for the United States being allowed to keep extra weapons of its own in reserve for quick transfer to Europe in a crisis.49 Further more, Reagan announced in the General Assembly of the United Nations, American willingness to accept certain modifications in its own arms control proposals. He stated that though the US still insisted on counting the number of war heads for each side, it would show understanding of the Soviet Concern about the British and French forces, and that it would reduce the number of its own GLCM deployment.50


Yuri Andropov, the then premier of the Soviet Union, raised doubts about the continuation of the arms control talks when the first GLCM arrived in Britain in November 1983. Kvitsinsky, the Soviet negotiator at the INF negotiations, indicated that Moscow would continue to talk with the United States till the missiles were made operational in late December 1983. The Soviet Union further offered to reduce the number of SS-20s to 140 and move the rest to the West of Urals. But it continued to insist on taking into account the British and French nuclear weapons. Even though Reagan had earlier indicated American willingness to accept certain modifications, the proposal was once again rejected by the United States. 51

The Soviet Union was concerned more about the deployment of Pershing II in West Germany. Hence, the decision of the Bundestag was more important. Moreover, with the arrival of GLCMs in the U.K. it was essential for the West German Parliament to approve the deployment plan in order to show solidarity with the NATO allies. Hence the

West German Parliament approved the plan to deploy Pershing II and GLCM by a vote of 286 to 226. On 24 November 1983, the Soviet Union walked out of the arms control talks at Geneva, without setting a date for the resumption of the talks. The Soviet delegation stated that it felt compelled to re-examine all the issues in view of the deployment of new American medium range nuclear missiles in Europe. The deployment had brought about a change in the overall strategic situation.

**Breakdown of Arms control talks and Arms build up**

After breakdown of the arms control talks on 24 November 1983, Andropov read a statement on the Soviet television in which he stated the lifting up of moratorium on the deployment of Soviet Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces on the European side of the Soviet Union. He went on to state that new operational tactical nuclear weapons would be deployed in East Germany and that new Soviet Systems would be deployed in the ocean areas and seas.

---

52 ibid., 23 November 1983.

For the way the US and Soviet Govts. made their last bid efforts to influence the Bundestag decision refer to "Walk in the Park" episode, Nitze, n.25 pp.394-97.

53 ibid.,

54 *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, vol.30, no.9, September 1984, p.33127.
Paul Nitze on the breakdown of the arms talks stated:

"The United States remains committed to reaching a negotiated solution which meets the security needs of all concerned... The United States proposals are flexible and designed to meet expressed Soviet concerns.

The United States stands ready to halt or reverse its deployments if an equitable agreement to reduce, limit, or eliminate U.S. and Soviet missiles can be achieved. For its part the United States remains prepared to continue the INF negotiations until an agreement has been reached and our two countries have thus fulfilled their responsibilities to contribute to the cause of peace.55

On 17 January 1984, the thirty five nation Stockholm Conference on confidence and security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe opened, but Gromyko warned against regarding the Stockholm conference as a resumption of the United States - Soviet Union arms control dialogues.56

In the Congress, issues arising out of the Soviet walk out were discussed.

Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Dem., Mass.) quoted with concern an article by W. Averell Harriman, and President Kennedy's chief negotiator of the 1963 Limited Test Ban


56 Keesing's, n.54, p.33127.
Treaty, in the *New York Times* on 1 January 1984 in which it was stated, "the behaviour and the proposals of the Administration in both the strategic and European nuclear discussions have raised serious doubts in the minds of many about whether there was ever any intention to reach any reasonable agreement." 57

John F. Seiberling (Dem., Ohio), was a member of the congressional delegation that attended the 23rd US Congress-European Parliament exchange meeting at the Head Quarters of the Parliament of Europe in Strasbourg, France on 20-21 January, 1984. He presented a paper entitled "A Democratic perspective on the Intermediate Range Nuclear Weapons", in the House where in he had suggested that US should offer to delay further deployment if USSR would agree for a similar moratorium and resume the negotiations. 58

Lawrence Coughlin (Rep., Pennsylvania) expressed concern about the Soviet walkout of arms control talks. Andrew Jacobs Jr., (Dem., Indiana), in the House of Representatives stated that "Democrats and Republicans in Congress are ready to work with the White House to get arms

58 For the full text of the paper, see *Congressional Record*. 1984, p.H848.
control moving again. It is now upto the President to lead."

Concurrent Resolution 111 was submitted by Charles Mac. Mathias, Jr. (Rep., Md) in the Senate. It urged the Soviet Union to return to the START and INF negotiations. Berkley Bedell (Dem., Iowa) introduced it in the House of Representatives and Congressman Don Young (Rep., Alaska) Representatives called for the return of the Soviets to the talks. The members belonging to both the parties thus wanted the resumption of negotiations and desired the administration to take the lead.

On 27 February 1984 Gromyko expressed the Soviet willingness to resume the talks if the U.S. and NATO were willing to take back their already deployed Long Range Theatre Nuclear forces. But the U.S. Department of State replying to the Soviet suggestion stated that the U.S. was ready to be more flexible once the arms control negotiation began but it was not willing to give any concessions before the talks resumed. Marshal Dimitri Ustinov, the Soviet

59 ibid., p. H881, E 1717.

60 ibid., p. S 5352, E 1955.


minister for Defense, spoke of Soviet willingness to resume the talks, if America did not deploy any more new missiles and those already deployed were removed. This was only reiteration of its earlier position.

After the breakdown of the arms control talks, both the Soviet Union and the United States shifted their emphasis to new areas. During the entire 1984, the discussions in the Congress centered around Soviet violations of arms control treaties and construction of Anti-Ballistic Missile defence popularly known as SDI. Inspite of the large costs, the Congress started allocating funds for its research and development. This search for complete defence by the United States became a matter of serious concern to the Soviet Union. It called for the negotiation to prevent the militarization of outer space, including full mutual renunciation of Anti-Satellite System (AST). The Soviets also conveyed their willingness to accept a mutual moratorium on the testing of space arms. In its counter proposal, the U.S. stated its willingness to discuss a broad range of issues including the resumption of the arms control negotiations on strategic and medium range

63 Keesings, n.54.

nuclear arms. But the American offer was rejected by the Soviet Union as it was more interested in discussing the space weapons. 65

Chernenko, who became the Premier of the Soviet Union in October 1984, suggested four areas for opening up of the talks. He repeated the Soviet view that the outer space must not be militarized and called for mutual freeze on the nuclear weapons. He asked the United States to ratify the treaties banning underground nuclear testing. He further asked the NATO allies and the United States to pledge not to first use the nuclear weapons. He called for mutual renunciation of the development of the anti-satellite systems and to start conducting talks on the Anti-missile systems immediately. 66

But Reagan had stated that the popularly known Star War Plan was beyond the arms control negotiation. This marred the chances, if there was any at all, of the arms talks.

Even after four years of the inception of the INF talks, it had hardly made any head way. The United States started the negotiation because of the pressure from its allies. It was more interested in carrying out its planned deployment of nuclear missiles in West Europe and the arms control negotiation was used more as a ploy to lull the opposition in the implementation of its policy. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was interested in the arms control more as a way to halt the modernisation plan of the NATO.

Throughout the first three years of negotiations, both the Super Powers offered extreme arms control proposals which were mutually incompatible. While Reagan called for the withdrawal of already deployed Soviet SS-20s, the Soviet Union struck to its position that the British and French nuclear forces be counted as part of Western missiles. The U.S. did not want to include these missiles because then the arms control negotiation would have become a more complicated multilateral venture. Furthermore, the Soviet Union called on Britain and France to negotiate separately with it. This was again viewed as a Soviet ploy to split the alliance.

Besides, the political actions of each of the Super Powers adversely affected the arms control proposals.
Though Reagan's policy of continuing with the arms control negotiation in spite of severe pressures on him during the Polish crisis and after the shooting down of the Korean Airliner could be appreciated, at the same time it must also be taken into account that at a time when the peace movements had gained so much strength in Western Europe, Reagan would have faced opposition from the West European public had he decided to walk out of the arms control negotiations. Besides, with the Soviet Union constantly threatening to stage a walk out if the nuclear missiles were deployed, the U.S. could have been more interested in putting the blame for the breakdown of the talks on the Soviet Union instead of taking the blame on itself. It was in American interest to carry out the plan for the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM. Therefore, it did not walk out of the arms control talks in spite of great conservative pressure.

During the negotiations, the U.S. always rejected the Soviet proposals as mere propaganda. It did not go into the details of the Soviet proposals. Both the super powers were unwilling to see the concern of the other and an agreement could hardly be reached even on the basic point as to commencement of the negotiations.

The estimates of the U.S. and the Soviet Union of each other's nuclear weapons differed greatly. While the
U.S. claimed that the Soviet Union enjoyed superiority in theatre nuclear weapons by excluding its own forward based nuclear forces, Soviet Union claimed parity with the U.S. and NATO by including the British and French nuclear forces. While grossly exaggerating the capabilities of the other, both sides equally understated the strength of their own forces.

The U.S. had excluded the Pershing-IA while counting similar missiles of the Soviet Union like SS-12/22. It also excluded its nuclear tactical aircraft in western Europe while including all the Soviet frontline aviation as nuclear capable. The Soviet Union on its part had assumed that all A6s and A7s of the U.S. as available to NATO and had included the NATO short range systems but had excluded its own tactical aircraft. 67

The following tables gives the US view and Soviet view of their respective and the other side's theatre nuclear forces 68:


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US View</th>
<th>USSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>SS-20 - 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>SS-4+5 - 350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS-12/22 - 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>SS-4+5 - 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-111-164</td>
<td>Blackfire IU - 26-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(In Europe)</td>
<td>Binder Tu - 16-350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-111-63</td>
<td>Budger Tu - 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in U.S)</td>
<td>Su - 17  2700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-4-285</td>
<td>Su - 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-6-68</td>
<td>Mig - 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>520</td>
<td>3825</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Soviet view             |                       |
| US + NATO               |                       |
| French IRBM             | 18                    |
| French SLBM             | 80                    |
| UK Polaris              | 64                    |
| F-111                   | 172                   |
| FB-111                  | 65                    |
| F-4                     | -246                  |
| A-6 + A-7               | -240                  |
| French Mirage           | 46                    |
| IV A                    |                       |
| U.K. Julcan             | 55                    |
| **Total**               | **Total**             |
| - 986                   | 975                   |

Thus there were a number of fundamental force asymmetries which severely complicated any efforts to set limits perceived as 'equal' by both sides.69

For the first time in the history of the post second world war era, the President of the U.S. saw frequent changes in Soviet leadership. While before a steady Soviet leadership used to negotiate for years with changing U.S. leadership, Reagan luckily had this advantage. During his first term three changes in Soviet leadership took place.

Moreover, the hawks in the Reagan administration predicted the collapse of the Soviet totalitarian system. In December 1982, Reagan signed a classified policy document which defined the central objective of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union as pushing that country in the direction of internal liberalization.\(^7\) Since the Reagan administration had information with regard to the economic crisis in the USSR, Reagan wanted to deepen the crisis further in order to make the Soviet giant kneel down faster.

The fifth workshop held on June 1985, by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs focused on the internal factors which influenced the U.S. arms control policy making during Reagan's first term. The Carter administration was mainly staffed with individuals who believed that the arms control could play a constructive role in U.S. national security

\(^7\) Richard Pipes, "Gorbachev's Russian: Breakdown or crackdown?", \textit{Commentary} (New York), vol.9, no.3, March '90.
policy. On the outside were conservative critics who were skeptical of arms control. The pattern followed in Reagan's administration was just the opposite.71

Alexander M. Haig has also written about the problems faced by the Reagan administration in 1981 and 1982 thus:

... Unfortunately, the arms control progress, like so many of the Administration's security related and domestic initiatives in the early stages, suffered from the lack of a disciplined inter departmental policy-making structure. The failure to delineate responsibilities clearly, or to establish bureaucratic authority at the outset, generated confusion and liberated a cacophony of vested interests that ultimately affected the quality of policy recommendations to the President ... conceptual clarity was only achieved two years afterward with the formation of a bipartisan Scowcroft Commission.72

During Reagan's first term, the Defense Department was headed by Casper Weinberger, who had no prior experience in arms control. The policy area of arms control came under Richard Perle, who favoured an inflexible zero option. Whereas the State Department head Alexander M. Haig was willing to listen to arguments in favour of arms control.


72 Haig, n.13, p.60.
He was assisted by Richard Burt, who was the Director of Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and the European Bureau. Burt felt that in order to maintain NATO's unity it was essential for the U.S. to appear to be flexible in arms control proposals. But President Reagan decided to favour pentagon's zero-option and remained inflexible.73 This probably was because Reagan had fought the elections openly against SALT II and did not assign arms control any importance in his first term. Top priority was given to building up of U.S. military strength. The lack of White House authority allowed the warring factions viz., the office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to delay and obstruct the formulation of negotiable proposals. Moreover it was easier to prevent the government from acting by obstructing the negotiating process.74

Reagan's Second term

Reagan, the most conservative President of the Post Second World War era was elected for his second term in

73  n.71, pp.31-32. See also Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control (New York Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), pp.81-82.

74  US, House of Representatives, n.71, p.xii.
1984. While his rival Walter Mondale in his acceptance speech at the Democratic National convention in San Francisco, California on 19 July 1984 criticised Reagan for offering interim proposal almost near the end of his first term and questioned why Reagan had failed to negotiate with the Soviets and called for a Summit meeting with USSR every year. 75 To counter Mondale, Reagan in his acceptance speech delivered at the Republican National convention at Dallas Texas on 23 August 1984, went one step further and stated, "...we ask the Soviets, who have walked out of our negotiations, to join us in reducing and, yes, ridding the earth of this awful threat." 76

Reagan had outlined earlier that realism, strength, economic growth, intelligence, shared responsibility with allies and dialogue with adversaries as the principles of foreign policy which he would pursue during his second term in office in his address to the National Leadership Forum of the Centre for International and Strategic studies on 6

April 1984. Further, in his address before the 39th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 24 September 1984, Reagan expressed his desire for mutual dialogue with the Soviet Union. He stated:

...We need to find ways to eliminate the threat and use of force in solving international disputes to embark on periodic consultations at policy level about regional problems. The objectives of this political dialogue will be to help avoid miscalculation, reduce the potential risk of US-Soviet Confrontation, and help the people in areas of conflict to find peaceful solutions.

Days after Reagan's re-election, on 22 November, 1984, the United States and the Soviet Union jointly announced their agreements to renew the arms control negotiations. Gromyko and the Secretary of State Shultz met in Geneva on 7-8 January, 1985.

Reagan had advised Shultz to convince the Soviets that SDI was beyond negotiations and that arms control talks

---


78 ibid., p.85.
could begin on Strategic and Long Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces (LRINF). 79

Shultz and Gromyko agreed to resume the talks and under pressure from the Soviet side, Shultz agreed to include arms race in space in the talks.

American and Soviet Interest in the talks

The change in Reagan's position might have been due to several reasons. During his first term, Reagan concentrated on building up the economy of the country and its armed strength. He evolved the new strategy of increasing security through defensive means instead of through offensive means.


Georgi M. Korneiniko, the first deputy foreign minister, Viktor I. Karpov, who lead the strategic arms talks on the Soviet side, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U.S., Vasily G. Makarov, Gromyko's Personal Assistant and Aleksei A. Obukhov, Deputy head of the American desk and an arms control expert accompanied Gromyko to Geneva on the Soviet side.
Reagan in his inaugural address on 21 January 1985 stated:

We're not just discussing limits on a further increase of nuclear weapons; we seek, instead, to reduce their number, we seek the total elimination one day of nuclear weapons from the face of earth.

On the Soviet side, it was realized that by keeping away from the arms talks, it had put herself in a disadvantageous position before the West European peace movements.

George F. Kennan, in an article in the *New York Times* on 3 March 1985 speculating on what brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table at Geneva, wrote:

... there is more likelihood that the Soviet consent for the talks came because of the impression conveyed to Moscow from sources that Reagan was entering upon his second term, was serious in his desire to get on with arms control and lower tensions in Soviet-American relations. Besides Soviets have realized that their absence at the negotiating table is being exploited at propaganda level...

Moreover the Soviet interest called for stalling or at least delaying the S.D.I programme of the U.S. by opening up talks with them, in order to build up her own economy.

80 President Ronald Reagan, n.77, p.65. Also see *Department of State Bulletin*, vol.85, no.2096, March 1985, pp.28-30.
The New York Times viewed the resumption of the arms talks in a neutral way. It was viewed as an effort which could later turnout to be an agreement to disagree or could lead to sincere and genuine arms control measures. It felt that the regional issues like Afghanistan, Poland, Nicaragua and Cambodia played a vital role. 

Paul Nitze writing on the U.S. objectives reiterated the same goals as pronounced by Reagan. According to him, during the next ten years, the U.S. objective would be to bring about a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive and defensive nuclear arms whether on earth or in space. The U.S. was looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based on an increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms.


Umbrella negotiations

It was agreed upon that the Geneva negotiations, would be conducted in three areas of Intermediate, strategic and space weapons. The joint communique issued by Gromyko and Shultz stated:

The sides agreed that subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their inter relationship.83

The Soviet Union viewed the three sets of discussions as closely linked. The progress in both sets of offensive force negotiations depended on success in discussions dealing with defensive systems. Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, asserted that without reaching "a simultaneous accord in all three directions, there will be no progress in the negotiations."84

Both the teams reached Geneva on 11 March 1985. While the Soviet side emphasized the prevention of arms race

84 "Fundamentals of Nuclear Arms Control", n.39, p.155.
in space in its arrival statement, the American delegation carefully avoided any mention of it. 85

Upon an initial proposal by Senator Robert C. Byrd (Dem., WV), and passage of a Senate resolution requesting it, the Reagan administration welcomed the participation of a Congressional Observer Group at Geneva in 1985. A group of 11 senators went along with Robert Dole (Rep., Kansas) (Senate Majority leader) and Robert C. Byrd (Dem., West Virginia) (Senate minority leader). The group received extensive briefings from the administration and arms control experts.

The observer group enhanced the congressional information on the negotiations and provided a channel for legislative-executive communications. It comprised of representatives of both parties, of the leadership, and of several committees including the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. They received periodic briefings and weekly summary of the negotiations and they demonstrated congressional support for the negotiations to the Soviet Union. It provided the Congress

---

85 The American negotiating team to Geneva was headed by a Washington based lawyer Max. M. Kampelman who headed simultaneously the group which discussed space weapons. John G. Tower, a former Republican Senator from Texas, headed the group to discuss strategic weapons. See New York Times, 27 January 1985.
facilitated by the presence of the congress delegation as an observer group at Geneva. Besides, in order to impress that he was serious about the arms control negotiations, Reagan gave the three chief American negotiators, and their four deputies the rank of ambassadors. Each of the American negotiator was helped in his task by five government agencies namely, Arms control and Disarmament Agency, the State Department, the civilian defense department, and militarily by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CIA.89

The first round of negotiations ended at Geneva in May without much progress. Gorbachev's call for freezing the Intermediate Range Nuclear Weapons at the then prevailing stage was dismissed by Reagan. He felt that it would result in an imbalance of forces. Paul H. Nitze, special adviser to the Geneva talks, defended the U.S. stand in the first round of talks, stating that the ultimate aim of the U.S. was to eliminate all the nuclear weapons, in a speech at the National Press Club.90 Nitze compared the two countries' negotiating positions and objectives. He stated that while the US was interested in seeking an equitable and

89 n.80, p.31.
verifiable agreements leading to deep reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals, USSR proposed to freeze at the current level. On the SDI, while the U.S. wanted to have a general discussion on the offensive and defensive nuclear arsenals, the Soviet wanted to ban research and development of SDI programmes.91

Thus, with the end of the first round of talks, Soviet Union no longer insisted on the removal of the medium range missiles but instead called for a freeze.

Gorbachev replaced old guards with officials who owed allegiance to him. This was needed for implementation of his economic reforms. Hence Gromyko who had been foreign minister for twenty eight years was replaced by Edward Shevardnadze who had no previous foreign policy experience. But Shevardnadze had impressed Western observers as a capable diplomat whose relaxed demeanor was in keeping with Gorbachev's own style of leadership. Some analysts felt that the change might signal a shift in focus from pre-occupation with US-Soviet relations to a broader approach, with special emphasis on Asia. Moreover it could have been that

91 ibid.,
Gorbachev wanted the Summit meeting preparations to be done by a person who would follow his line.  

Moreover for the first time in the history of post-revolutionary Soviet Union, the foundation for relations between the (Congress of people's deputies), the Supreme Soviet and its Foreign Affairs Committee in the area of foreign relations was laid. Shevardnadze had to set out his foreign policy programmes before the Supreme Soviet's Foreign Affairs Committee and had to reply to questions from the deputies.  

Geneva Summit Speculations and Preparations

Reagan's invitation to Gorbachev for a meeting was delivered to him by the then Vice-President George Bush, when he went to attend Chernenko's funeral at Moscow. It was accepted by Gorbachev. It was agreed that the two leaders would meet at Geneva on 19-20 November 1985.  

There was a great deal of speculation as to why Gorbachev agreed for the Summit. Marshal D. Shulman,  

Professor of International Relations at the Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the USSR, Columbia University, felt that the Soviet leadership faced major decisions in 1985. It had to draw up a new five year plan involving calculations about trade, military costs and domestic goals in anticipation of the 27th Communist Party Congress to be held in February 1986. Moreover in 1985, Soviets were at the juncture of a regular five year military planning cycle. That was the reason why Gorbachev accepted the summit proposal. 95

Stephen F. Cohen, Professor of History and Soviet Politics at Princeton University, wrote that since Gorbachev wanted to bring about economic reforms at home front which involved massive expenditure in the non-defense sector, he was interested in freezing the arms expenditures. 96

Adam B. Ulam, Professor of History and International Relations at Harvard University, opined on the Geneva Summit that, "...a new agreement...however far-reaching, can be meaningful and reassuring only within the context of a broad

96 ibid., 11 November 1985.
political understanding between the United States and the USSR."^97

While the analysts were speculating about the summit, Gorbachev called for a direct talk between the Soviet Union, France and Britain. The offer was rejected by both France and Britain.

Shevardnadze met Shultz in November 1985 and offered to mutually cut 50% of offensive missiles. It included all the American missiles, ICBMs and also LRTNF (Pershing Is, ALBMs, GLCMs and SLBMs) and bombers which were capable of hitting Soviet Union. But on the Soviet side it included only the ICBMs, capable of hitting targets in the United States from the Soviet Union. The 50% cut in offensive weapons was on the condition that SDI would be banned. Reagan in his counter proposal stated that the U.S. was willing to accept the offer but with a different method of counting the nuclear arms and on the intermediate nuclear weapons, he expressed America's willingness to limit missile launchers to 140 for each side.

^97 Adam B. Ulam, "Forty years of Troubled Existence", Foreign Affairs, vol.64, no.1, Fall 1985, p.31.
A congressional delegation led by Senator Robert C. Byrd, (Dem., W.Virginia), visited Moscow and met Gorbachev, who had offered heavy reductions in offensive weapons if Reagan agreed to ban the development and deployment of SDI. But Reagan, rejected the proposal as a propaganda ploy. 98

At a time when the Soviets were enhancing the importance of the Geneva summit, from July to November 1985, the Reagan administration was engaged in bringing down the hopes of people about the result of the summit. Reagan emphasised that it was nothing more than a get-to-know meeting and consequently no serious business was transacted in.

There was controversy and infighting between the State Department and the Defense Department in the U.S. While Shultz wanted concrete results out of the summit, Casper Weinberger took to discouraging any hopes with regard to the outcome of the Summit. Weinberger stressed the differences between the Soviet Union and the United States. 99


It was decided by the Reagan Administration, that arms control, regional conflicts, human rights and economic relations would be in the agenda for discussion.

When Reagan reached Geneva for the Summit, Casper Weinberger's letter to Reagan which reported about the Soviet violations of the treaties was made public by the New York Times and Washington Post simultaneously. In the letter, Weinberger had called upon Reagan not to promise to abide by 1979 unratified SALT II treaty and not to limit S.D.I. This raised doubts about the seriousness of the Americans in having the summit. But the 1985 summit ended at Geneva on a positive note. The two leaders agreed to meet again at Washington to be followed by another meet at Moscow.

Reagan in his report to the Congress on 21 November 1985 stated that, "there would continue to be enduring competition between the U.S. and the USSR, but the meeting with Mikhail S. Gorbachev had created a room for movement, action and progress."

Gorbachev in his speech to the Supreme Soviet, stated, "...in spite of the absence of arms control

agreements, I feel bold enough to say that the world has become a safer place.

To sum up, we have every right to say that the overall balance sheet of the Geneva meeting is positive."101

After the summit, Paul Nitze, in his address before the Atlantic Council on 5 December 1985, spoke on the Reagan administration's stand on arms control and on the American position on LRINF. According to him the US position was that the US still preferred total elimination of the entire class of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles. The statement further added that short of this,

The United States would cap its own LRINF missile launcher deployments in Europe at the number deployed as of 31 December 1985 (140 pershing II and GLCM) in return for Soviet agreement to reduce SS-20 missile launchers within range of NATO Europe to the same number.

There would be freedom to mix between systems deployed as of 31 December 1985, but the mix would be subject to discussion.

The Soviets would be required to reduce SS-20 launchers in Asia (not within range of NATO Europe) by the same proportion as the reduction of launchers within range of NATO Europe. The end result would be equal global LRINF warhead limits.102

With the Geneva Summit ending without a treaty it was clear that the hardliners in the Reagan Administration were still in a majority. This group had always insisted that the confirmation of Soviet compliance to the earlier treaties would be the basis on which the future depended. Reagan agreeing with the hardliners submitted to the Congress a report on the Soviet non-compliance of the treaties already signed. This was the second report of its kind submitted to the Congress in 1985.103

While the Reagan Administration was pressing the Soviets hard by its tough posture of rejecting all the Soviet proposals and critically talking about Soviet non-compliance of arms control treaty. On the Soviet side, Gorbachev became more and more lenient and launched his peace offensive, putting Reagan and his advisers on the


103 For the unclassified version of the 1 February 1985 report, see Department of State Bulletin, April 1985, pp.29-34. For the unclassified version of the 23 December 1985 report, see American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1985, n.92, pp.111-23.
defensive. In continuation, with Gorbachev’s offer at the summit to open the laboratories in the Soviet Union for inspection on the condition that SDI would be banned, the Soviet Communist Party daily Pravda offered in its editorial to accept on-site inspections if U.S. accepted moratorium on nuclear tests.104

The year 1986, declared by the United Nations as the International Year of Peace saw a steady advancement towards arms reduction. In January 1986, Reagan in his televised address to the Soviet people talked about arms agreement and complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Gorbachev on his part, put forward an arms control proposal which was to spread over a span of fifteen years. It consisted of three stages. In the first stage, till 1990, he called for the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet INF missiles in Europe and freeze of British and French nuclear forces at the present level. The second stage which

would have been from 1990-95 the other nuclear states would join hands in nuclear weapon reduction. The third and final stage between 1995-99 called for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. 105

Gorbachev’s proposal was an advance over his earlier stand. His call for freezing British and French nuclear forces showed clearly that the Soviets had stopped insisting on separate talks with Britain and France. Besides, in his speech Gorbachev talked about the ban only on the development and deployment of space based weapons, thus indirectly allowing the research part of the SDI programme.

Reagan for the first time in his presidency, welcomed the proposal and stated, that it needed a careful study. He stated that Gorbachev’s proposal appeared "at first glance constructive in respects", adding "many elements are unchanged from previous Soviet positions and continue to cause us serious concern."106

The meeting of Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Dem., Mass.) with Gorbachev as a member of the Senate Arms Control


Observer Group on 16 February 1986 cleared the doubts of the Americans about the Soviet stand. Kennedy in an article in Washington Post wrote,

... he (Gorbachev) told me, explicitly and unequivocally that there are no "pre-conditions" to negotiating the immediate removal of Soviet and American medium-range missiles from Europe. These negotiations can be successful even if there is no progress in the SDI talks. 107

Through his talks with Kennedy, Gorbachev reiterated that he had decided to exclude a ban on SDI as a pre-condition for an INF agreement.

Reagan seriously considered Gorbachev’s proposal and despatched Shultz to Western Europe and Edward Rowny to Pacific and Asian allies to discuss the proposal. Reagan received contradictory opinion on how to react to the proposal. The hawkish Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger suggested that there was no need for the U.S. to change its stand and to outrightly reject Gorbachev’s proposal, whereas the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the State Department were interested in exploring positive ways to reach an INF agreement. New York Times in an article on 21 July 1986 stated, "Many officials throughout the bureaucracy say Mr. Reagan’s tilt is now clearly in Mr. Shultz’s

107 As quoted in Congressional Record, 1986, p.1242.
direction, a change from past patterns on arms control issues of either being slightly pro-Weinberger or splitting the difference between them. 108

Reagan had earlier talked about a step by step approach to nuclear arms control. He thus decided in favour of reacting positively to INF part of the proposal and to explore the possible ways to press Soviet Union for an accord. This resulted in a setback to Casper Weinberger and his camp of hardliners. Shultz began to exert more influence on Reagan in arms control policies.

Reagan responded to Gorbachev's proposal in the form of a letter. He proposed to eliminate all the INF missiles in Europe within a period of three years. In the first year, the medium range weapons in Europe were to be reduced to 140 on each side and SS-20s in Asia to be cut down. The remaining medium range missiles were to be removed in the second year and in the third year the INF missiles in Europe and Asia were to be totally eliminated. 109

Reagan's proposal kept in view the interest of both Japan and Western Europe. The Japanese concerns called for

108 As quoted in ibid., p. S9333.
a cut in SS-20s in Asia and the West European concern needed the presence of some American missiles in Western Europe.

Gorbachev addressing the opening session of the 27th Congress of the Communist Party, stated that, the Soviet Union, was prepared to resolve the question of intermediate range missiles in European Zone separately, without a direct link to problems related to strategic armaments and outer space. 110

While the Soviet Union was making more concessions, Reagan and his aides stressed the non-compliance of treaties by the Soviet Union and the importance of strict verification measures. Besides, Reagan was indecisive about the American compliance to SALT II treaty. Reagan swung between the State and Pentagon. While he responded positively to Gorbachev's proposal, he announced the withdrawal of US commitment to SALT II. But the severe reactions against the announcement on the Hill forced Reagan to back off from his earlier statement.

The draft treaty on LRINF was submitted by the Soviet Union at Geneva. More flexibility was shown. There was no freeze on the British and French weapons. The shorter range

missiles and the Soviet missiles in Asia were excluded by them. 111

Reagan responded in a positive way in his speech at a high school in Glassgow in New Jersy. He stated that he was looking forward for an agreement and the summit. 112 But He kept up his accusations about the Soviet non-compliance of SALT II treaty. The standing Consultative Committee (SCC) formed to discuss the questions of compliance and verification held an emergency meeting at Geneva at the request of Soviet Union. But the meeting broke down. 113

While negotiations were going on in Geneva, FBI arrested a Soviet United Nations' employee Gennadi Zakharov for espionage on 22 August 1986. It was followed by the arrest of an American journalist Nicholas Daniloff in Moscow for receiving classified materials from a Soviet citizen. Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., (Dem., Del.) in his address to the National press club linking the arrest of Daniloff with arms control stated:

112 ibid., 20 June 1986.
113 ibid., 31 July 1986.
... if the seizure of Daniloff represents an effort by the Soviet leadership to criticise the Administration's arms control posture, it has chosen an utterly stupid and self-defeating way to do so... In sum, the Kremlin's outrageous treatment of Daniloff can only give satisfaction to those whose purpose is to derail arms control through one means or another114

Despite such feeling of outrage, the negotiations went on. The Soviet asked for another Summit at Reykjavik.

Preparations for the Summit

Many considerations went into the meeting of the two leaders at Reykjavik. The Soviets wanted the two leaders to meet to bridge the gap. Moreover, the Soviets pressurized Reagan that unless he agreed for a summit, the Daniloff case would not be resolved. Besides, to win over the congress to vote for more defense spending, Reagan had to show interest in the summit.115

The time for the preparation of the summit was very short. Moreover, since the Reagan administration considered it as a pre-summit meeting, much importance was not attached to it. It was a conference in a hurry.

The inter-agency discussion which was held concluded that due to limitation of time, there would be no change in the U.S. stand on the INF issue. The usual consultations with the allies before the Summit to discuss the various possibilities, proposals and the concessions which could be granted were not held.

Discussions in the Congress before Reykjavik

Congressman Dante B. Fascell (Rep., Fla.) on 10 September 1986, spoke on the status of the Geneva talks after the conclusion of the V round on 27 June 1986 thus:

...both sides had proposed zero long range INF systems in Europe. The Soviets proposed the SS-20s in Asia would not be increased and would be reduced contingent upon reduction of U.S. nuclear weapon systems on ships and aircraft in Asia. The United States further proposed no constraints on British and French systems while the Soviet Union proposed that Great Britain and France pledge not to build up their nuclear arsenals.116

Robert J. Lego Marsino (Rep., Cal.) on 9 October stated that as the President was on his way to meet Gorbachev the Congress should present a unified front, and stand squarely behind the President. 117 Fascell asked for unanimous consent that the Committee on Foreign Affairs be

117 ibid., p. H9688.
discharged from further consideration of the House Concurrent Resolution 406 (H.Con.Res.406) which called for a ban on nuclear testing, a ban on chemical weapons production; a ban on anti satellite weapons testing; SALT II compliance and a freeze on SDI funding on President Reagan's request. Fascell along with Wm. S. Broomsfield (D, Michigan) brought instead House concurrent Resolution 406 which endorsed Reagan's 11-12 October meeting with Gorbachev at Reykjavik. It was agreed to by the House of Representatives. 118

Norman D. Dicks (Dem., Washington) stated in the House on 10 October '86 that the persons who were tying President's hands before the pre-summit meeting was not the Congress but the hard liners within the Reagan Administration who were doing everything possible to block progress. 119

The two leaders met at Reykjavik for two days. The U.S. and the Soviet Union reached the following understandings at Reykjavik:

- Total elimination of all American and Soviet LRINF in Europe.

118 ibid., p. H9687-9689.
119 ibid., p. H9844.
- Global ceiling of 100 LRINF for each side. The Soviet Union would be permitted to deploy up to 100 LRINF on its territory in East Asia; the U.S. would be permitted to deploy up to 100 LRINF on its territory in North America.

- The Soviet-American agreement would have no bearing on British and French INF.

- The maximum number of permitted Soviet SRINF would be frozen at the current Soviet level, which the U.S. agreed to accept for its SRINF. Reductions would be addressed at subsequent negotiations.

- The Soviet Union agreed in general terms with the U.S. proposal for an effective verification package including (1) exchange of data both before and after the reductions occur; (2) on site observation of the destruction of weapons; and (3) effective monitoring arrangements after the weapons are destroyed, with on-site inspections of remaining INF systems and associated facilities during such monitoring.120

The Soviets did not agree to the U.S. demand to build up its SRINF to the level of Soviet Union. Besides, contrary to what had been told to Senator Kennedy in Moscow, Gorbachev linked any agreement on INF with an agreement on SDI and strategic weapons, which was rejected by the United States.

The Soviets possibly changed their position after seeing the American non-seriousness about the summit.

Moreover, finding Reagan more in favour of an arms control, the Soviets could have changed their stand in order to gain more concessions from the American side.

The Reykjavik summit thus failed to resolve the arms control issues. On Moscow television Gorvachev blamed the U.S.

... standing one or two, or three steps of a decision that could become historic for the entire nuclear technological age, we were unable to take these steps ... our partners lacked the breadth approach, an understanding of the unique character of the moment, and ultimately the courage, responsibility and political determination that are so necessary for resolving vital and complicated world problems.121

Congressional Discussions - Post Reykjavik:

The Defense Policy Panels of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives submitted a report on the Reykjavik summit failure. It blamed the administration for ignoring the important players in arriving at decisions. For instance, the report stated that the representatives of the military, the Secretary of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency were

121. Haly R. Edward, "You could have said "yes": Lessons from Reykjavik", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol.31, no.1, Spring 1987, pp.87-88. For detailed discussions of the happenings and discussions at Reykjavik, see Nitze, n.25, pp.427-437. 
excluded from decision making. Weinberger was not even consulted. The inner working group in Reykjavik, on the American side consisted of civilian defense department personnel and not from military. While on the American side, no changes in position were considered, the Soviet Union suddenly changed its position of not linking INF agreement with SDI.122

George W. Gekas (Rep., Pennysylvania) in the House on 14 October '86 stated, "We commend the President for standing firm and holding back that powerful move, that piece of chess mastery called SDI for further use in the cause of world peace."123

Similarly Robert E. Badham (Rep., Calif) also expressed similar opinion. He stated, "They (Soviets) came to the Summit looking with all (sic) sorts of things on the table, for the one thing that we would not accept and properly so, the elimination of technological prowess and progress of the United States of America embodied in the strategic defense initiative."124
Duncan L. Hunter (Rep., Calif), expressed the opinion that "Reagan in order to give people pre-election euphoria (Congressional elections) could have come to an agreement at Reykjavik but he refused to his great credit, to surrender our right to defense, and Gorbachev did not get his first round knock out." 125

Thomas D., DeLay (Rep., Texas), stated, "we are finally seeing the fruits of strength that we have been rebuilding. Peace through strength does work and I am confident that in the near future it will work to bring us an arms control agreement that will truly protect the security of our nation and all the free world." 126

Except for a few mild criticisms in the congress about the Reykjavik failure like those expressed by Downey and Berkley Bedell, there was a great deal of support for Reagan's stand at Reykjavik.

Senator Dole stated on 16 October '86 that the public opinion polls showed that Reagan enjoyed public support for his stand on Reykjavik. The ABC - Washington Post public poll showed that 64% of the people of US approved

125 ibid., p. H9905.
126 ibid., p. H9906.
President's handling of the Reykjavik Summit while only 22% were against it.

The Wall Street Journal conducted a public poll on the question "whether Reagan should have made concessions on Star Wars so that a formal agreement could have been reached?", while 31% wanted that SDI concessions should have been given. 60% stated that Reagan should not make any concessions on SDI.

The New York Times - CBS conducted a public poll on the question on "who was to blame for the Summit failure?", while only 17% blamed Reagan, 44% blamed Gorbachev. Again on the question of whether SDI should be given up only 20% agreed that SDI should be given up. 127

Thus on the handling of Reykjavik Summit, President Reagan got widespread public support. In his address to the Americans on 13 October 1986, on the Reykjavik Summit Reagan stated:

...we proposed a 10-year period in which we began with the reduction of all strategic nuclear arms, bombers, air-launched cruise missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the weapons they carry. They would be reduced 50 per cent in the first five years.

During the next five years, we would continue by eliminating all remaining offensive ballistic missiles, of all ranges. During that time, we would proceed with research development and testing of SDI - all done in conformity with ABM provisions. At the 10-year point, with all ballistic missiles eliminated, we could proceed to deploy advanced defenses, at the same time permitting the Soviets to do likewise.128

In the Senate, these remarks of Reagan about the elimination of all strategic nuclear arms were assailed by Senator Nunn who raised questions about the position of other nuclear states like France and China and the instability that could be created by conventional arms in the absence of strategic nuclear arms. He pointed out that the strategic balance if allowed to rest only on bombers and air defense forces, would favour the Soviet Union.129

Later, on 29 January 1987, Robert C. Byrd, (Dem., W. Virginia) Robert Dole (Rep., Kansas) and Boren, placed Senate Resolution 94 wherein,

- the Senate expressed full support to President in his arms control efforts;
- encouraged both nations to use determined and creative diplomacy at the Geneva negotiations to resolve their remaining differences;

128 For the text of the Address by the President, see to American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1986 (Washington: Department of State, 1987), pp.91-97.

- cautioned Soviet Union against using strategies to exploit American domestic politics or divide U.S. from its allies;

- urged the Soviet Union not to condition progress on all arms control matters to issues relating to Strategic Defence technologies;

- urged the President to closely consult with America's allies and the senate in the construction of sound arms reduction agreements, so as to build the greatest possible understanding and consensus in the event that the Senate was asked to provide its advice and consent to the ratification of such agreements. 130

While the Senate supported the policies of Reagan, the President expressed that he had been politically weakened by three episodes viz., the Republican loss in the Senate in November 1986, the Iran-Contra scandal and his own weakening health. 131

When the Reagan administration was being troubled by Iran-Contra deal, Gorbachev in a sudden change of mind, on 28 February 1987, in a statement to Tass official news agency stated:

... the Soviet Union suggests that the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe be singled out from the package of issues, and that a separate agreement on it be concluded and without delay. 132


Many foreign policy analysts believed that since the Soviets failed to create any dissidence within the alliance after the failure at Reykjavik, Gorbachev had come out with the new proposal. 133

American reaction was positive and Reagan welcomed Gorbachev's proposal. On 1 March 1987 Belgium's Foreign Minister Joe Clark and the then West German Foreign Minister Genscher welcomed the Soviet move as an important and positive step. On the other hand the French foreign ministry questioned the wisdom of eliminating medium-range missiles and suggested that it could leave Europe vulnerable to the East's tactical nuclear weapons and advantage in conventional forces. Le Monde on 5 March '87 reported that the French cabinet was divided on the issue. On the 4 March in the meeting of the cabinet the Defence Minister Andre Girand was said to have defied President Francois Mitterand and Premier Jacques Chirac when the latter two suggested French support to Soviet initiative.

Margret Thatcher, Prime Minister of Britain, in her address to the House of Commons cautioned that the West should carefully examine the Soviet offer in the light of the absence of any system of verification. NATO's spokesman

133. ibid.,
for Lord Carrington, Secretary General of NATO, called it a "welcome development".134

While Gorbachev's proposal was welcomed by the West for the first time in six years of arms control negotiations, the Soviet draft proposal which was submitted on 27 April '87 at Geneva included the removal of Pershing I's based in West Germany, which was a new Soviet demand.

West Germany's coalition government was split on the issue. Minority Free Democrats, led by foreign minister Hans-Deitrich Genscher called for acceptance, whereas the majority Christian Democrats led by Defence Minister Manfred Woerner, believed that any reduction should include deduction in Soviet conventional and tactical forces also.135

In the light of this the Washington Post on 13 July '87 in its editorial spoke about the difficulties in an united European effort to have security. It stated that the French refusal since 1986 to participate in NATO's integrated command and Britain's special relationship with the United States, with sharing of nuclear technology and

information had made European co-operation on security difficult. Moreover that rival national interests had frequently prevented practical, step-by-step defense co-operation even when it offered economic benefits.

But the then West Germany did not want to stand in between the United States and the Soviet Union in reaching an arms control agreement. Moreover it was not inclined to regenerate the peace movements in its country. Thus it expressed its willingness to dismantle 72 Pershing IA's if the U.S. and USSR implemented an agreement on a global ban on INF, to which Gorbachev had earlier only expressed his willingness to accept a world wide elimination of INF, thus dropping the Soviet insistence on keeping INF warheads in Soviet Asia.  

Reagan in his address to the nation on 12 August 1987 stated:

We've come this far because in 1980, you gave me the mandate to rebuild our military. I've done that. And today, we're seeing the results. The Soviets are now negotiating with us because we're negotiating from strength.  


137 ibid., no.2135, 24 July 1987, pp.529-30.

Later Shultz and Shevernadze met between 15 September - 18 September at Washington. The joint statement stated:

In particular, the two ministers, together with their advisers, conducted intensive negotiations on the question of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. This resulted in agreement in principle to conclude a treaty.

In order to sign a treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and to cover the full range of issues in the relationship between the two countries a summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev will take place...

Thus it was agreed to hold a Summit. Later on 8 October 1987, it was agreed at Moscow to hold the summit on 7 December 1987 at Washington D.C. The hardliners may be aware of the economic difficulties of the Soviet Union. But this was not reflected in their thinking. The hardliners continued to believe that the Soviet posture was only a shrewd move to gain an advantage over the United States. They did not believe that the Soviet Union's capacity to match the United States had disappeared.

With a prospective summit to be held in December, discussions were held in the Congress about a probable INF agreement. Dante B. Fascell (Dem., Fla.) approvingly quoted in the House of Representatives the statement by Paul

---

Warnke, former Director of Arms control and Disarmament Agency, in the hearings before the sub-committee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, who had linked the viability of the INF treaty to continued adherence to the SALT sublimits:

...If all you do is eliminate the 1500 or so warheads on the Soviet INF forces, they can readily replace them in as much as the SALT II limits have been repudiated. In addition to that, of course, without the SALT limits, they can exponentially increase the warheads on their existing ICBMs which is exactly the opposite to that which we want.\(^{140}\)

Danny Lee Burton (Rep., Indiana) raised similar doubts in the House. He stated that while the Soviets would be eliminating INF, the Soviets would build up a new generation of ICBMs, called the SS-24s and SS-25s.\(^{141}\)

On the other hand, Senator William Proxmire (Dem., Wis.) called attention in the Senate to the discussion of the INF treaty by seven former American Secretaries of Defense, who had served in office for over twenty years between 1961-81. To McNamara, the INF treaty was politically more significant than militarily important. Clifford, Laird and Richardson viewed the INF treaty as a first significant step towards further arms reduction while


\(^{141}\) ibid., p.10649.
for Schlesinger and Brown the INF agreement was better than having no agreement at all. Moreover, they opined that the American interests were best served by the INF treaty. Out of the seven, only Rumsfield did not make a clear recommendation in favour of the treaty.142

The seven years of the United States - Soviet INF arms control negotiations ended on 8 December 1987, with the signing of the treaty. The provisions relating to ratification and verification of the INF treaty is to be dealt with in the next chapter.