CHAPTER III

THE ISSUE OF DEPLOYMENT, SOVIET RESPONSE AND PEACE MOVEMENTS
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The United States and the Soviet Union made moves and counter moves to gain dominance over each other, or at least create a balance in their power game. Quantitatively and qualitatively, their aim was to match one another in terms of both nuclear and conventional weapon systems. Each of them blamed the other for accelerating the momentum of the ongoing arms race. But they had also repeatedly indicated by their behaviour that neither of them wanted to lose their presumed edge over the other, inspite of the high economic cost involved.

The arms race was played against the background of the overall political and economic environment of the world in general. In 1970s, the global scene alternated between detente and cold war. Towards the end of the decade, the period of co-operation slowly gave way to that of confrontation. This directly influenced and accelerated the pace of arms race between the two powers.

To counter the threat arising out of the deployment of the Soviet SS-20s, the NATO adopted the "dual track policy" in 1979. What it meant was the simultaneous
deployment Pershing-II and Tomahawk Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) in Western Europe and to have arms control talks with the Soviet Union.

The members of NATO have popular, democratic governments. Hence, they could not agree in totality to all the arms build up measures proposed by the United States. Moreover, the public in Western Europe increasingly opposed the American nuclear arms build up in their countries, especially the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM. The West European governments had always found it difficult to carry the people along with their decision for militarization.

The New York Times in its editorial entitled, "the Euromissile Game" on 27 December 1979, characterized the deployment of Soviet SS-20s and NATO Pershing II and GLCM as part of "the dream of nuclear psycho-politics." It stated that when the Soviet Union tried to split the alliance, the United States assured its commitment by deploying more accurate and sophisticated nuclear missiles on the West European soil. The arms control part of the 1979 decision had been taken in order to cool down the popular opposition to the deployment of the missiles.

The psychological warfare programme (PSYWAR) was viewed as the most powerful factor in the East-West relations during the first Administration of President
Reagan. The United States administration believed that the Soviets conducted a "PSYWAR operations (PSYOPS) against the TNF deployments in Western Europe.¹

The Soviet Union tried to counter the American moves through propaganda. Propaganda is "written or Oral information which deliberately seeks to influence and/or manipulate the opinions and attitudes of a given target grouping."² The term "psychological warfare" was formulated during the cold war years. It was to demoralise the enemy, undermine his world view and shake his faith in the integrity of his teaching and foist their own ideas on him.³

Though the decision to deploy the Pershing II and GLCM was taken by NATO in 1979, the actual deployment started only in 1983.⁴ In the middle, the arms control talks with the Soviet Union was started in 1981 to assuage

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the feelings of the public against the deployment. The public opinion in the Soviet Union then had little effect on the Soviet government policies, where as the strong opposition expressed by the public opinion in Western Europe put their governments under great pressure. Between 1979 and 1983, the United States tried hard to justify its new missiles deployment on the ground of Soviet threat, and the need to speak from a position of strength. The Soviet Union on its part tried to make use of the democratic decision making process in Western Europe to its advantage. It tried its best to further the dissensions within the alliance. In its diplomatic manoeuvres to stop the modernization of NATO weapon programme, the Soviet Union offered various attractive arms control proposals, the sincerity of which were questioned by the United States. It also threatened Western Europe with dire consequences, if deployment programme was carried out.

While the super powers were mudslinging at each other, there was a genuine scare among the West Europeans about the nuclear holocaust. Out of the fear grew one of the most historic peace movements, between 1979 and 1983.

It is intended to examine here the broad structure of the West European peace movements which particularly opposed the deployment of the missiles. The talk about the united
European community had been gaining ground in the early and middle eighties. How effectively, the European sentiment to reassert itself in the world polity was exploited by the Soviet Union to its advantage would be shown here. The validity of the American accusation that these peace movements were manipulated by the Soviet Union would be carefully examined.

**PSY-WAR**

At the time when NATO was considering the dual-track decision, on 6 October 1979, in East Berlin, the then Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev offered to withdraw twenty thousand Soviet troops and one thousand tanks from East Germany if only Western Europe would not deploy new missiles. He also ventured to offer the European countries to have independent bilateral dialogues with the Soviet Union. He promised that the Soviet Union would not use the nuclear weapons against those countries which did not acquire nuclear weapons or deploy them on their soil. He followed the speech with notes addressed to the NATO governments. The West questioned the credibility of Brezhnev's proposal, since the offer did not include the Soviet SS-20s. *The New York Times* characterized the offer as "Soviet blackmailing the west with detente." 5

However, the Soviet Union withdrew its first batch of twenty thousand troops and thousand tanks from East Germany on 5 December 1979. It coincided with the convention of the Social Democratic party in West Germany which met to approve the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM. The convention, went on to support the NATO modernisation programme. Further, the NATO council met on 12 December 1979, to approve the deployment plan. In retaliation, the Soviet Union took back its offer to withdraw its medium range nuclear missiles from its western region. The Soviet demand for the dropping of NATO modernisation programme as a pre-condition for starting the arms control was however dropped after the Brezhnev-Schmidt Summit meeting on 30 June 1980.

The Soviet Union directed its efforts to influence politicians and persons in power in various West European governments on the one hand and on the other to influence the people or the common man in Western Europe. It was a classic example of carrot and stick. While on the one hand the Soviet Union offered the carrot of arms reductions through negotiations on the other hand showed the stick by arms build up and flexed its strategic muscles. Both acted as stimulants to the peace movements.

6 ibid., 17 December 1979.
At the governmental level, Brezhnev paid a state visit to West Germany in November 1981. After the summit meeting with Helmut Schmidt, he stated in Bonn:

Putting new American missiles in Europe, means making Europe empty of people... It is as if Europe where hundreds of millions of people live is already sentenced to become a battle field. It is as if Europe were a card board box with tin soldiers who deserve nothing better than to be melted down in a nuclear blast.7

In an interview to a West German news magazine, *Der Spiegel* Brezhnev offered a mutual moratorium on the deployment of theatre nuclear forces to be effective from 30 November 1981, the day the negotiation would begin, till a treaty to that effect was actually signed. To allay the fears of West Europeans, he went on to state that the Soviet military doctrine was defensive in character and that it did not believe in preventive wars and first strike concept.8

The moratorium offer was rejected by the United States. But Brezhnev's statements indicated that the Soviet Union was moving towards opening serious arms control talks with the United States. But it is noteworthy that the Soviet Union was primarily interested in the arms control talks that would result in stopping the deployment of the

7 ibid., 25 November 1981.
new Pershing II and Cruise missiles. Besides, it attempted to exploit West European concern and fear of a possible nuclear war at their door-steps. The Soviet official news agency TASS accused Western Europe of obediently supporting the decisions that were prepared in advance in Washington and for allowing themselves to become hostages to the Pentagon's nuclear strategy. \(^9\)

In January 1981, Ronald Reagan entered the White House with the promise to make the United States a superior nuclear power. He took up the new NATO deployment plan as a show of American commitment to the security of Western Europe and as a symbol of the unity of alliance. \(^10\) With the hard-liner at the helm of affairs in the United States, the Soviet Union wanted to exploit the liberal opinion in NATO in its favour.

**The United Nations**

In the United Nations General Assembly special session on Disarmament held in June 1982, the Soviet Union pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in any war. But instead of matching the offer Reagan in his address accused the Soviet Union of manipulating the peace

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10 ibid.
movement in Western Europe and went on to provide a detailed list of disarmament efforts of the United States. In various foreign policy statements, the Soviet Union was showing the olive branch sometimes and at others the threats of nuclear attack on Western Europe. The United States, on the other hand, aroused only the fears of Soviet invasion in the minds of West Europeans. 11

West European Tour

Brezhnev died in 1982 and Yuri Andropov succeeded him. When change in the leadership took place in Moscow, elections were due in two important West European countries, namely Britain and West Germany. Andropov made his first move on the issue of the reductions of nuclear weapons in Europe by offering on 21 December 1982 to reduce the number of SS-20s aimed at Western Europe from the current level of 250 to around 162, equal to the number of British and French missiles. 12 Later, while on a visit to Czechoslovakia's capital he made his next move by producing a long

11 ibid., 18 June 1982.
declaration that included almost every "peace" proposal that Kremlin had made before, for the consumption of the European people. However a more important step taken by Kremlin during the early Andropov administration was the Soviet President's tour of Western Europe, specially to Britain and West Germany where the election politics were heating up.13

Andropov through his statements attempted to convince the Europeans that while Moscow wanted peace, Washington took an aggressive step by deciding to deploy Pershing II and GLCM in Europe. The Soviets tried to make the arms control issues a decisive one in the West European elections. To counter the effect of the Soviet leader's tour of Western Europe the American vice-president George Bush undertook a similar tour of the West European capitals to convince the US allies of the validity and necessity of the American decision to deploy new missiles in Europe. Yet another purpose of the tour was to reassure the allies that America was not unduly inflexible in its arms control proposals.14


The American media was divided in its opinion about the Soviet and American role in the arms control. The Oregonian felt that the United States by sending Bush wanted to influence the West German elections. The Tennessean wrote that the West Europeans were "irritated" by the arms control game played by both the powers. The News and Courier believed that West European charges about American inflexibility inspite of Reagan's zero-options, was a result of bad communications. A substantial number of newspapers viewed the Bush's tour as an American effort to improve its communications with Western Europe. They also regarded the Soviet proposals as propaganda measures.\(^{15}\)

**West European Elections**

During the national elections in West Germany and Britain in the first half of 1983, the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM became an important issue. The congress of the British Labour Party in October 1980 had strongly opposed the deployment of American missiles in Britain.\(^{16}\) The Labour Party under the leadership of Michael


Foot was committed to complete disarmament and removal of all nuclear weapons from the British soil, quite unlike that of Tories' stand under Margret Thatcher's leadership which gave unflinching support to the deployment of United States missiles in Britain. Like wise, in West Germany Hans Jochen Vogel and his Social Democratic Party were against the stationing of American missiles in their country.

The Soviet government newspaper Izvestia sternly warned the West European nations to reject the NATO plans to station medium range nuclear weapons. It compared the anti-war movement in the west to a hammer and the position of the United States at the arms talks at Geneva to an anvil and added that, "between the hammer and the anvil is not among the most comfortable place to be". In fact, on the eve of West German elections in March 1983, Gromyko visited Bonn in January in order to boost Vogel's image. He offered to include SS-21 and SS-23 missiles for talks on the basis of NATO reduction of Pershing IA and lance missiles. Gromyko made an appeal to the West German public. He stated:

... one would like to give expression to the hope that the federal government, political parties independent of their current role in governing the


state and the entire West German public would soberly judge the present situation and do everything to avert the danger of a nuclear arms race in Europe.19

Gromyko's effort however ended in smoke. The pro-American leader Helmut Kohl came out victorious in the 1983 election. The defeat of Vogel came as a blow to the Soviets as they had openly supported him. Inspite of the tremendous popular support for peace movements, people voted Kohl to power in the elections.

The general public in both West Germany and Britain appeared either to support NATO policies, or assigned the whole question of defense a similar low priority when compared with issues like unemployment, prices and welfare etc.20

Public Opinion Polls

Public opinion poll conducted on stationing of nuclear weapons in U.K. showed the following results.

Yeats Percentage Opinion

1960s - 1970s
2/3rd of U.K. population
It was best for U.K. to possess nuclear weapons

1979 - 1980
67%
- do -

1982 - 1983
60%
- do -

1983
65%
Thought it was a bad idea for U.K. to give up nuclear weapons

From 26% in August 1980 to 35% in January 1983, testified to a rising concern among people that stationing of nuclear weapons would increase the U.K.'s vulnerability to nuclear attack.

In West Germany in May 1981, 37% thought that NATO deployment should be prevented while 39% thought that NATO deployment should not be prevented. 21

But in spite of these rising concerns, conservatives swept the elections.

The public opinion poll in Norway showed in 1980 that while 37% supported the NATO dual track decision, 44% were against it. The Danish public opinion on nuclear

21 ibid., p.113.
weapons were close to that of Norway. 22 By late 1981, a majority opposed INF deployment unconditionally in Netherlands; the opinion poll showed that the opposition was much stronger when deployment of INF was posed without mentioning the negotiating option. 23 Inspite of these strong opinions against nuclear weapons, the conservatives who supported deployment won the national elections in Denmark, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands and local elections in France. 24

The propaganda and counter propaganda efforts of the Soviet Union and the U.S. did not end with the elections in Western Europe. The Soviet Union was deeply concerned about the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM and wanted it to end in a fiasco just as its own futile attempts to deploy IRBMs in Cuba in 1962. The propaganda was intended to influence the West European public opinion which would in turn pressurise their government against the deployment. Besides, it constantly threatened to quit the arms control talks if the new long range theatre nuclear weapons became operational in 1983.

22 ibid.
23 ibid., p.119.
Propaganda to influence Bundestag decision

The Soviet efforts were regarded by the U.S. as aiming to make Europeans believe that the cause for the arms race was the aggressive military posture of the US and if possible, split the alliance. It was also seen as an attempt to generate world opinion that would project the Soviet Union as a peace loving nation. To confuse the public opinion, a rumour about an informal proposal was allegedly created by the U.S. which was later denounced by the Soviet Union as totally false and baseless. The American motive was to weaken the peace movement.

According to the American version, Soviet negotiator Kvitsinsky got in touch with US negotiator Paul Nitze on 13 November 1983 and informally proposed the reduction in nuclear warheads of both sides to 572 and that the Soviet Union would agree to exclude British and French missiles in Western Europe in the arms control talks. But the Tass gave an opposite version of the whole incident. It acknowledged that a 'signal' had been given but contended that it was given by Paul Nitze, the U.S. arms control negotiator. The Tass denounced the announcement as an American move to mislead the people. This confusion was created just, one

week before the opening of the discussions on the NATO LRTNF modernisation programme in the West German Parliament.

George P. Shultz, the US. Secretary of State, immediately met with the West German envoy Peter Hermes and gave him a written assurance that the new proposal was offered by Kvitsnisky and not by Nitze. This was again asserted publicly by the State Department. On the eve of the parliamentary debate, Andropov wrote a letter to Helmut Kohl, warning about the consequences West Germany would have to face in the event of deployment. In the midst of this great propaganda pressure from both the powers, the West German Parliament approved the plan to deploy Pershing II and GLCM by a narrow margin of 286 to 226.26

Both the US and the Soviet Union while publicly acknowledging that a move had been made, accused each other of misleading propaganda about each other's proposal. The real truth behind the entire episode was hard to make out. Since each of the power announced that the other was willing to give up a position which it had maintained until that time, it could at best be viewed as the worst kind of

26 ibid., Helmut Kohl made public the informal Soviet proposal in a television interview in the middle of November 1983. The American diplomats felt that, the Soviets denied the proposal since Kohl had revealed the Soviet move before it was formally made.
mudslinging at a crucial time when the West German Parliament was to vote for the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM. Thus the U.S and U.S.S.R. tried to influence the elections and parliamentary decisions in Western Europe.

**Peace Movements in Western Europe oppose Deployment**

Brezhnev in his message to the Assembly of representatives of public opinion for European security and co-operation in Brussels in June 1972 had said:

> Without the consistent and purposeful efforts of the public, residue of the cold war cannot be finally cleared away and the militarist, revanchist and conservative forces opposed to relaxation cannot be isolated. Public opinion is called upon to say its word in favour of strengthening all sided peaceful co-operation among the European states.27

The Soviet Union therefore carried on a relentless propaganda drive to win support of people in Western Europe for its objectives. It primarily aimed to reduce the influence of the anti-communist governments and the anti-soviet rhetoric of the Western leaders and to keep up the spirit of *detente* alive. It also aimed to disintegrate the Western alliance, if possible.28

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tactics, an American news paper The News and Courier wrote:

... using a mixture of blandishment and bullying, with offers to reduce the number of nuclear missiles targeted on European cities coming in one breath, only to be followed by threats to blast them to oblivion in the next, the Soviet union has seized the initiative from the United States.29

While the Soviet Union accused the West of trying to undermine the world of socialism and subvert socialist countries ideologically through its propaganda, the Soviet Union in turn was accused of trying to disintegrate the Atlantic Alliance by persuading individual NATO countries, such as Norway, Denmark and Iceland to leave the organisation. The Soviet Union's praising of the anti-nuclear stand of the communist parties of Western Europe were alleged by the US as the Soviet's indirect support of these parties. The denouncement or the approval of the deployment programme by the different West European political parties were in turn welcomed or condemned by the Soviet Union.30

For example, the denouncement of deployment by the


30 For the arguments listing the reasons which will lead to Soviet "soft" dominance over Western Europe refer to R.J. Vincent, "Military Power and Political Influence: The Soviet Union and Western Europe", Adelphi Papers, no.118, 1975.
Labour Party in Britain and the tactics of delaying the process of giving consent to the deployment by the Labour Party in Netherlands and Socialists in Belgium were welcomed by the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Soviets showed displeasure over the stand of West German Social Democrats who had not opposed the deployment. 31

Though the West European governments supported the NATO decision to modernise their LRTNF, at the grass root level, there was severe opposition to their decision. The people of Western Europe vehemently opposed the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM and organised peace movements in large numbers.

Composition of West European Peace Movements

In Western Europe, the peace movements gained support at different levels. In some countries, such as Britain and Netherlands, the proposals of the leading peace movements were adopted by major political parties.

The public concern over the nuclear weapons began in 1950s. Peace groups like the scientist groups, pugwash movement in 1953, mass organisations like campaign for

Nuclear Disarmament in the United Kingdom and the committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy in the US were formed over years. Due to Vietnam war, the emphasis shifted to more broader anti-war movements from anti-nuclear sentiments. But in 1979, the movement's aim was to stop the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM. The West Europeans were averse to the idea of their land being the theatre of a nuclear war. Just like the anti-Vietnam protests, the peace movement also drew support from all sections of society. 32

Commenting on the composition of the peace movements, Stanley Hoffman wrote,

... the current movement is new and formidable in several respects. It is a mass movement of continental dimension, which mobilises and moves people across borders—something quite exceptional even in the partly integrated western Europe of today. 33

In Great Britain, there were certain sub-groups which took political interest in the issue. Philip A.G. Sabin has divided these groups into

- "the interested public" of demonstrators and political activists

"the informed public" of those actually aware of the details involved; and

"the influential public" of politicians and defence commentators, who lead public opinion in society. According to him, though these people formed only a small fraction of the entire population and though most of these sub-groups' members overlap each other, they grew very significant since they could exercise influence on those in power and could directly affect the policy decisions of their government and are the opinion makers of their society. 34

In Britain, the Greater London Council had officially launched a policy in 1983 to "make London Nuclear Free". Besides, many local governments had passed resolutions declaring their areas "nuclear-free." At the Greenham Common air base, where GLCM was later stationed, a large number of anti-nuclear protesters assembled in a large area of fourteen miles which included besides the Greenham Common, two other British nuclear facilities. A small group of women, continued their protests at Greenham base for nearly a year. 35


Willy Brandt, the former chancellor of West Germany in 1970s, followed the policy of Ostpolitik (policy of looking to the East) in 1970, because of which Soviet Union tried to influence West Germany. The Communist party in West Germany to a great extent was influenced by the policies of East Germany. But the anti-nuclear protesters were drawn from different walks of life. It included the ecologists, feminists, academicians and conservatives. Between 1979-83, more than nearly three hundred peace groups were active in West Germany.

Commenting on the peace movement in West Germany, Izvestiya wrote:

A mass-based, truly popular movement is mounting in the Federal German Republic. Over 1 million people have already signed the Krefeld appeal calling on the federal government to reverse its agreement to the deployment of US Pershing II Missiles and cruise missiles in the federal Republic. Ferment is growing in both ruling parties.36

The Krefeld Appeal sponsored by former Bundeswehr General Kurt Bastian and others was supported by the environmentalists, youth groups and the communist party. It called for the withdrawal of the support of West German

government to the 1979 dual track decision.37 It collected more than two million signatures.38 The peace movements were very vigorous in West Germany as it provided the military bases for the stationing of American nuclear weapons. But interestingly, some people who received short term benefits which these military bases provided like increased employment opportunities resisted the peace movement. For example, at Bitburg, the West German base for ninety-six cruise missiles, the local population resisted the efforts of the peace activities at the national level.39

The peace movements in Norway attracted people in large numbers. The call of these peace activists was for a nuclear weapon free-zone in the Nordic area. A large number of protests were organised in Denmark as well. In Italy, most of the anti-nuclear demonstrations were organised by the Communist and Socialist parties. But in other countries, the peace movements had the support of religious and humanitarian groups as well.40 The American churches

37 Newsweek, 28 February 1983, p.20.
promulgated religious documents which had extra national ramifications involving Alliance security. It inspired a series of similar pronouncements in England, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan and the Netherlands. 41

The demonstrators in West European countries ran into thousands. Only the degree of concern varied from place to place. Fifty thousand men and women marched through the streets of Paris... public involvement was even greater in Bonn (with an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 participants), in Athens (300,000) and in Amsterdam (350,000). The Spaniards beat all records with an estimated 500,000 marchers. 42

Writing about the participants of the Green Peace Movement the West German Deizet commented that they defy any categorization. It stated that in the Green Peace Movement:

... there are feminists and ecologists, pastors and pacifists, hard core Leninists and starry eyed idealists, the old Eastern marchers of the 1960s, left-wing social Democrat and Kulur minded conservatives, neutralists of the right and neutralists of the left, students threatened by proletarization as status avenues are blocked by

42 Bark, n.36, pp.97-88.
economic decline, and peasants threatened by the nuclear power plant next door.43

About the participants of the peace movement, Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European command stated that:

... there are three segments included in these movements. Persons who are the dupes of the Soviet Union, those who are representing front organisations who assist in organising these demonstrations and seeing that the results of them are what the Soviet Union wishes; secondly there are activists who are waiting for a cause to come along that they can join; and thirdly, there are young people who have never known war and thinking adults who are worried and concerned about a war.44

The peace movements in Western Europe increased in great vigour when the deployment of the LRTNF missiles began. Even conservative governments like that of Kogel-Genschcher coalition in West Germany in order to soothe the public sentiments started saying, "Toward Peace with ever fewer weapons."45

Trade Unions in the West and Peace Movement

The British Trade Union Congress and the Association of German Trade Unions in West Germany passed many resolutions supporting peace and against the deployment of missiles in Western Europe. The American trade unions, incorporated in the AFL-CIO, tracked the call for nuclear peace.46

Thirty trade unions from the West, East and the developing countries set up for the first time the World Trade Union Committee for Peace and Disarmament in May 1982. A joint meeting of national peace organisations of Western and Eastern Europe, the USA and Canada was conducted in Athens in 1984 and 1985 and the World Congress in Copenhagen in October 1986.47

Some of the peace protests in Europe received coverage in the American media. The West European peace movement thus gained sympathy among the Americans also. On the International Day of protest 21-24 October 1983, thousands of activists staged demonstrations at weapons facilities in the US. In suburban El Segundo, near Los Angeles, around 60000 people demonstrated in a dozen

46 Fedoseyer, n.31, p.38.
47 ibid., pp.44-45.
facilities under five major defence contractors. Outside the gates of the Savannah River Plant near Aiken, South Carolina, where all the plutonium and tritium used in American nuclear weapons is produced, eighty protesters were arrested on 24 October 1983. But these movements supportive of West European peace movements remained sporadic and lacked mass support. 48

Soviet Strategic Measures

In November 1983, with the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM missiles, the Soviet Union walked out of the arms control negotiations. In order to gauge the Western public opinion the Soviet Union launched trial balloons in the form of unofficial statements, articles or messages by Soviet officials. These were intended to influence the world opinion. 49

The Soviet Union in its efforts to threaten the West European countries with its nuclear power, lifted the moratorium on the deployment of SS-20 missiles and speeded up the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in East


Germany and Czechoslovakia and Submarine launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) at a very short distance from the U.S.\textsuperscript{50}

Forward deployment of SS-21 in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia was carried out. It was reported that SS-21 was replacing Frog-7, and SS-23-Scud B missiles at a rate of four per month. The replacement was stated to be complete. The deployment of new 152 mm and 240 mm towed and self-propelled gun howitzers were considered to be nuclear capable.\textsuperscript{51} The following table gives the list of Soviet Theatre Nuclear weapon systems introduced or were under development between 1981 and 1985.\textsuperscript{52}


\textsuperscript{52} ibid.
Theatre Nuclear Weapons
SS-X-28 (replacement for SS-20)
SS-21
SS-22
SS-23
Replacement for SS-21
Replacement for SS-22
Replacement for SS-23
SS-CX-4
MIG-27 Frog Foot
152-mm howitzer -M-1987
SS-N-21
SS-N-22
Next Generation SLCM/GLCM

Both the Soviet peace proposals and the Soviet strategic measures contributed much to the vigour of the peace movements in Western Europe. The increasing arms build up by both the super powers created new fears about catastrophic nuclear war in the minds of the Europeans. Militant statements outlining aggressive tactics by the leaders of the U.S raised the level of concern throughout the world but much more in Western Europe.

For instance, Reagan talked about the possibility of using the tactical nuclear weapons against the Soviet troops
and limiting the nuclear war before the need for the super powers to use the strategic nuclear weapons would arise. Encouraged by the Soviet Union, West European socialist groups vehemently protested against Reagan's statement.

On 11 August 1984, Reagan thinking that microphones were not working made an off the record joke. He said: "I have just signed legislation which outlaws Russia for ever. The bombing begins in five minutes." But his remarks made headlines all over Europe. It was taken so seriously that the official Soviet denouncement came on 15 August 1984. Tass wrote that Reagan's comment was "unprecedently hostile toward the USSR and dangerous to the cause of peace." Even psychological tests were suggested to examine the subconscious importance of Reagan's playful remark about bombing Soviet union.

The President's gaffe drew adverse critical comments from the American press as well. The Philadelphia Inquirer remarked that what Reagan did was "not a bad stuff for a B-grade war Movie." But Ronald Reagan is in the White House now grappling with a gunslinger image that is unsettling voters at home, not to mention millions of

Europeans and the thinkers of Kremlin." The Albuquerque Journal remarked that "the nation expects much more from the office of president than loose lips." The West German opposition social Democratic Party called him "incalculable, insatiable person." It added,

The lord over life or combustion of all Western Europe...is obviously an irresponsible old man, who gets grinning pleasure from the action element of mass destruction and who probably can no longer distinguish whether he is making a horror movie or commanding a super power.54

While due consideration can be given to the fact that Reagan was only joking when he thought that the microphones were off but his faux pas gave a boost to the peace movements in Western Europe.

American reaction to the Soviet peace proposals

To counter the Soviet peace proposals, which the American government viewed as propaganda aimed at the public opinion in Western Europe, Reagan called Peter H. Dalley, his campaign and advertising adviser in 1980, to help him. National Security Adviser, William P. Clark, was asked to head a top level "Public Diplomacy Committee" with the aim

to change the officials who favoured a nuclear weapons freeze in the U.S. government. The American popular political analyst Theodore White characterized the Pentagon's propaganda machine as the most powerful system of brain-washing, man has ever known. But the *New York Times*, wrote that, "what is surprising about all this is that the United States which invented modern advertising, is not keeping the historical facts straight, even in its own defense."  

While the mass media in the West concentrated more on militarist approach, the Soviet Union through its Moscow radio scared the West Europeans every night with the effects of a nuclear war and at the same time appealed for peace and compromise.

Casper Weinberger, the US Secretary of Defence, stated that though the U.S. was aware of the Europe's proximity to the Soviet Union, it should not allow this fact to let the Soviet Union promote peace movements in Western Europe. He emphasized that appeasement of Moscow must be avoided.

56 ibid., 30 January 1983.
57 Konstantinov, n.16, p.53.
In the peace movements of Western Europe, the US saw the revival of the neutralist and pacifist sentiments of the 1930s, which encouraged Hitler to start the Second World War. But the policy pronouncements of the U.S. created a different picture in the minds of West Europeans. The New York Times reported that the President may be a "great communicator," but the fact that he was communicating mainly a "military confrontation with the Russians", brought the opposition to the streets of Europe. 59

American Reaction to the Peace Movements

Due to heavy pressure from the people of Western Europe, Ronald Reagan opened the arms control talks with the Soviet Union in November 1981. He offered the zero-option to counter the Soviet peace-offensive in 1981. But the arms control talks did not make any progress. The hard-line taken by the U.S. became another point to agitate for the peace movement activists. Hence on 2 April 1983 Reagan came out with an interim proposal. He stated that "when it comes to intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, it would be better to have none than some. But, if there must be some, it is better to have few than to have many." 60 The speech

59 ibid., 23 October 1981.

was directed at the people of U.S. Europe and Soviet Union. Ambassadors from five NATO countries, namely, Britain, West Germany, Italy, Belgium and Netherlands sat in the front row of audience when Reagan made his pronouncement in the East room of the White House.

The U.S. realized that the younger generation in West Germany did not seem to have a positive image of the former. The new generation did not have the experiences of their parents of the Second World War. Besides, the Water-Gate scandal, and the Vietnam war seemed to have enhanced the intensity of the negative image of the U.S. in West Germany. In order to promote more understanding, Charles L. Wick, the Director of the United States Information Service (USIS), raised several million dollars privately to double the youth exchanges between the U.S. and Europe from 15,600 to 30,000 in the following two years. 61

Peter Dawey, the U.S. ambassador to Ireland, had recommended an "Arms Reduction Ombudsman", to help present Reagan's arms polices more effectively. He gave his suggestion in his report submitted about the ways to strengthen European support to Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missile. 62

Stephen F. Szato, has written a book on "Successor Generation", wherein he had stressed the importance of closing what he called the "memory gap" between the older Europeans whose images he said were shaped by CARE packages, Marshall plan and Berlin airlift and the younger or successor generation responsible for carrying out the peace movements.  

The Reagan administration was able to persuade the Congress to earmark 704 million dollars for the fiscal year ending on 1 October 1983 to carry on counter propaganda offensive by projecting the "truth". It was called "Project Truth". The US planned to carry out its counter propaganda by combating Soviet misinformation and educating its foreign service officers how the Soviet Union misrepresented the American policies. 

In July 1982, Reagan in his speech delivered at the United Nations listed the US Disarmament proposals since the end of second world war. He recounted:

Since the end of the World War II, the United States has been the leader in serious disarmament and arms control proposals. In 1946, what became know as the Baruch Plan, the United States submitted a proposal for control of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy by an international authority. The Soviets rejected this plan.

63 ibid.

In 1955, President Eisenhower made his open skies proposal, under which the United States and the Soviet Union would have exchanged blue prints of military establishments and provided for aerial reconnaissance. The Soviets rejected this plan.

In 1963, the limited test ban treaty came into force. This treaty ended nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, outer space or underwater by participating nations.

In 1970, the treaty on the non proliferation of nuclear weapons took effect. The United States played a major role in this key effort to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives and to provide for international safeguards on civil nuclear activities. In the early 1970s again at United States urging, agreements were reached between the United States and the USSR providing for ceilings on some categories of weapons...65

Later, the hard-liners asked Reagan to publicise the Soviet violations of the treaty in a big way as a sort of justification of NATO's modernisation programme. The President wrote to the Congress on 23 January 1984, which was submitted along with a report to the Congress on Soviet non-compliance with the arms control agreements. The letter gave a list of Soviet violations of the following arms control agreements:

- the 1925 Geneva protocol;
- the 1972 Bacteriological and toxic weapons convention;
- final Act of the 1975 Helsinki conference on security and cooperation in Europe;

- the two provisions of 1979 SALT II - on telemetry encryption and ICBM modernization;
- the 1972 ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty. 66

The Soviet Union responded by sending the U.S. State Department a memorandum on 30 January 1984. It was delivered by the Soviet embassy in Washington and Pravda published it on 30 January the same day. The memorandum accused the U.S. of certain violations of the arms control agreements and, indeed, it was Soviet response to the repeated charges of their treaty violations by Reagan. 67

The Soviet Union asserted in the memorandum:
(i) that the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles itself violated the provisions of SALT II,
(ii) that the 1972 ABM Treaty had been violated by the creation of an important radar station on Shemya (an island in the Aleutians), by the installation of roofs over silos for launching anti-ballistic missiles and by preparations to set up mobile anti-missile radar stations; and

67 ibid.,
(iii) that the USA had also infringed the 1963 treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and below water. 68

Thus, the two Super Powers justified their arms build up on the ground that they were forced into it by the other side.

While encouraging the peace movements in Western Europe, the Soviet Union repressed the peace movements in its own state and in Eastern Europe. There were only official peace organisations like the Soviet Peace Committee, the Soviet Peace Foundation and the Soviet Pugwash Committee in the Soviet Union. They were critical about the nuclear weapon systems and policies of the Western countries only and supported unanimously the official line of the Soviet government. 69

President Reagan in his radio address to the nation on 22 October 1983 questioned this Soviet stand.

KGB and the Peace Movements

The U.S in its turn very strongly accused the Soviet Union of manipulating the peace movements in Western


69 SIPRI Year Book 1984, p.122.
Europe. The intelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation prepared a report entitled, "Soviet Active Measures Relating to the U.S. Peace Movement" the declassified sections of which were released by C.W. Bill Young (Rep., Fl) in the House of Representatives, on 24 March 1983. C.W. Bill Young (Rep., Fl) served in the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Appropriations Sub-committee on National Defense.

The FBI report was divided into two sections. Section I identified the Soviet organisations and front groups that were involved in the Soviet Peace campaign, and section II gave the specific Soviet active measures and focussed in particular on the Soviet efforts to influence the 12 June 1982 demonstration for peace and disarmament in New York.

Edward O' Malley, Assistant Director of the FBI's Intelligence Division, in his testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in 1982 stated,

... the KGB is particularly interested in information concerning the peace movement's slogans, political platforms, plans for conferences or demonstrations, and relations with European anti-war groups.

The International Department of the central Committee directs the activities of the Communist Party USA and its front organizations involved in the U.S. Peace Movement.
The FBI report identified the Soviet groups involved in the peace movement in the U.S. It stated that the World Peace Council (WPC) at the direction of the Soviet Union, had placed the highest priority on the peace movement and a campaign against INF deployments in Western Europe.

In 1979, the CPUSA (Communist Party USA) established a chapter of WPC known as U.S. Peace Council and the leadership positions were given to CPUSA members.

The national Council of American-Soviet-Friendship, through its regular meetings, press conferences, interviews in media, and lectures influence the public opinion.

The Committee for US-USSR citizen's dialogue was formed in 1979 in the U.S. In 1981, it hosted a 28 member Soviet delegation.

But at the end of the report, FBI in its assessment on the extent of Soviet involvement stated,-

Whenever a political movement supports policies that coincide with the goals or objectives of Soviet Foreign policy, the exact contribution of Soviet active measures to that movement is impossible to determine objectively.70

The suspicion about the Soviet involvement in the Western Peace Movements had taken deep roots in the minds of some Americans. Anthony T. Bouscaren, Professor of Political Science, Le Moyre College, Syracuse, in a speech delivered in his college on 7 December 1982 openly talked about the Soviet involvement in the Western Peace Movements. He stated:

In its 34 years of existence, the World Peace Council has not deviated from the Kremlin's line of the movement. It did not raise its voice against Soviet suppression of Polish and East German workers in 1983, Soviet slaughter of Hungarians in 1956, the clandestine emplacement of nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the projection of Soviet military power in Angola, Ethiopia and Yemen. The World Peace Council has failed to criticise a single Soviet armament programme, only those of the West. And it endorsed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

However he conceded that the World Peace Council had no visible means of support from the Soviet Union.

Bouscaren, connected the activities of the Western Peace Movements with the official pronouncements of the Soviet Union. He provided evidence to the participation of Soviet delegates in Western Peace Movement meetings. He said:

Shortly after Leonid Brezhnev called for a "freeze" in nuclear weapons production on February 13, 1981, the first international strategy conference for an American nuclear freeze campaign convened at George Town University. According to a "peace" movement
newspaper, the organizers at George Town comprised between 175 and 300 predominantly white middle class people from 33 states, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Records available today identify only two of the invited Soviet guests. One was Oleg Bogdanov—an International Department specialist in Active measures, who flew in from Moscow. The other was Yuri S. Kapralov, who represents himself as a counsellor at the Soviet embassy in Washington. Kapralov was not only an observer. He mingled with disarmament proponents, urging them on their efforts to abort new American weapons. He was an official member of the discussion panel, and, as one listener put it his statements were very impressive. 71

Reagan in his speech delivered at the United Nations second special session on Disarmament on 17 June 1982 at New York, accused the Soviet Union, of influencing the peace movements:

At the very time, peace movement the Soviet Union is trying to manipulate the in the West it is stifling a budding peace movement at home. In Moscow, banners are scuttled, buttons are snatched and demonstrators are arrested when even a few people dare to speak about their fears. 72


72 Klaus Ehring, "The Peace Movement in East Germany - Its origin and future, Telos (St. Louis, M.O), no.56, Summer 1983, pp.183-92, for the letter written by a grassroot level worker of a peace circle in East Germany to a friend in West Germany.
In this regard, in East Germany also the peace movement was absolutely unthinkable independent of the church. The church acted as a buffer in the conflict between the state and the citizen's initiative for peace.

But though the Soviet Union could be accused of trying to manipulate and accelerate the growth of peace movements in Western Europe, it could not have possibly created any peace movements in Western Europe. Besides, though the people of Western Europe lent support to the anti-nuclear movements, they always supported their country's continued membership in NATO. Their concern about the nuclear weapons were genuine. The President's allegations about the Soviet KGB infiltrations into the peace movements in Western Europe were not supported by the House Select Committee on Intelligence. Though it stated that the Soviet Union talked about the co-operation among the peace activists of the East and the West. Among the several organisations to which the Soviets extended their support were the World Peace Council, Pugwash Movement of Scientists, the World Youth Federation, the World Federation of Scientific workers and the World Federation of Trade Unions.73

73 Congressional Record, n.70.
The British minister for the Armed Forces alleged that $6 million a year was being spent by the Soviet Union in influencing West European Peace Movements. Though the British government firmly believed in the Soviet involvement, no evidence was forthcoming. 74

Oleg Gordievsky, the top KGB man in London in 1982, who had also been British intelligence agent for a decade in 1985, escaped to the West. He stated that the Soviet Government took active measures to thwart Reagan's re-election in 1984 and the slogan that "Reagan means war" was popularised. 75

Besides, West German Communist Party had an official membership of only about 50,000. While the Krefeld appeal calling for the annulment of NATO decision on the deployment of new US missiles was signed by about a million West Germans within just half a year. 76 It was, however, no conclusive proof of Soviet involvement. The Communist Parties undoubtedly were greatly interested in peace in Europe. It is possible that they received Soviet backing but

74 SIPRI Year Book 1983, p.124.
75 Time, 22 October 1990, pp.72-82.
it was difficult to prove that without their backing there would have been no peace movement.

But the Soviets themselves had spoken about the participation and support given by the Communists to the Peace Movements in Western Europe. In France the Peace March of 1983 was supported by the Communists. In the 25th Congress of the French Communist Party the highest priority was given to working for peace.

The Italian Communist Party which had a large faction in the Parliament in 1982, also backed the Peace Movement. The Communist Party in West Germany and Greece also supported the peace movements in large numbers. 77

In 1981, the Dutch government expelled a Tass "correspondent", who had openly boasted of Moscow's part in the peace movement. In 1981, Denmark expelled Vladimir Merkulov, a second secretary of the Soviet Embassy who was identified as a KGB major and head of line PR or the field section conducting active measures in Copenhagen operation. A Dane, Arne Herlov Peterson was described as an "agent of influence" for Moscow.

Peterson was not prosecuted by the Danish government

77 Fedoseyer, n.31, pp.32-34.
for fear of backlash from peace activists but the Minister of Justice, Ole Esperson in a television statement challenged Peterson to sue the government for slander if he had been wrongly accused and even proposed to pay the legal fee so that the case could be aired in public. But the offer was not accepted. 78

The Communists were not the first ones to use the propaganda to influence the foreign policy of other countries. Earlier Nazi propaganda had made a special appeal to an assumed international fraternity of former combat soldiers. 79

Robert Michel (Rep., Ill.) in the House of Representatives quoted from John Vinocur's article "The KGB officers try to infiltrate Anti war groups", in the New York Times that, "the anti-war movement is not the creation of KGB but is seen as an unusual target of opportunity for a full range of Soviet influence. in Western Europe, the influence are handled by the local communist party. 80

Besides the peace movements in Western Europe, the nuclear Freeze movement in U.S. gained much popular support.

79 Bark (ed), n.36, pp.103-04.
80 Congressional Record, n.78.
But the peace movements in Europe and the freeze movement in USA remained as two separate movements.

The Nuclear Freeze Movement

The anti-nuclear movement began in U.S. in 1981. It gained popular support to the extent that the nuclear freeze resolution became the largest single issue referendum in the U.S. history. The newspaper editorials gave a helping hand in making it a big issue. The electorates in many states were advised either to vote for or against the resolution. The Los Angeles Times opined that the nuclear freeze resolution would at least remain the policy-formulator to be moderate in their approach, but opposed to this was the view of The News and Courier which stated that the resolution would hamper the pace of the arms control negotiations at Geneva. 81

The Saginaw News stated that the nuclear freeze resolution should not be supported if it called for an unilateral freeze. The Chicago Tribune found the nuclear freeze to be an unfeasible proposition but advised the American government to act according to the public moods.

Arkansas Gazette blamed the American government's hawkish attitude to be solely responsible for the growth in the nuclear freeze movement in the United States.\textsuperscript{82} The freeze resolution was passed by 125 city councils along with one or both houses of twelve state legislatures.

Addressing the meeting of a veteran's group in Columbus, Ohio on 4 October 1982, Reagan assailed the nuclear freeze movement and said that it was led by those individuals who were not interested in the security of the U.S. and were trying to corrupt the minds of genuine American citizens. He went on to add that, "the nuclear freeze Movement that has swept across our country that I think was inspired by not the sincere, honest people who want peace, but by some who want the weakening of America and so are manipulating many honest and sincere people."\textsuperscript{83}

The newspapers across the country strongly assailed Reagan's remarks. The Des Moines Register called it loose talk and compared it with anti-communist movement led by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. It challenged the government to


\textsuperscript{83} As cited in Editorials on File, vol.13, no.20, 16-31 October, 1982, p.1204.
provide documentary evidence to prove Reagan's charges. St. Louis Post Dispatch wrote that just because some Soviet KGB agents attended the freeze movement meetings it could not be argued that they had infiltrated into the movement. Detroit Free Press asserted that the nuclear freeze resolution was not a symbol of playing into the hands of the Soviet communists but was to be seen as a symbol of the common people's concern about the nuclear war. The Sun quipped that such statement against the nuclear freeze movement must be put in deep freeze. But Birmingham News suggested that the Soviet Union had always infiltrated into the peace movements in the past and may have done so again. 84

Majority of the newspapers were critical of the President's remarks. It was reminiscent of the return of the old McCarthy spirit of 1960s when any anti-government person was branded as a pro-communist and anti-national.

Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Secretary of State during the Reagan's administration (1981-82), had highlighted his own attitude towards the peace movements in his memoirs thus:

Now many Europeans feared that the United States would, after all, be willing to fight a nuclear war with the Soviet Union, but would structure US Theatre Nuclear forces so as to confine hostilities to Europe. This new paranoia, which proved to have contagious appeal, brought tens of thousands of demonstrators into the streets in the cities of Europe. The Soviets were quick to see in this situation an opportunity for disturbing the internal political stability of the countries of Western Europe, and especially West Germany, thereby weakening the Western alliance. In a massive propaganda campaign the Soviet Union played skillfully upon popular fears. Some of the rhetoric issuing from Washington on questions nuclear unfortunately helped to energize the frenzy.85

Haig further stated that he was opposed to the idea of calling the peace marchers unpatriotic. He felt that both the US government and the people had the same view on nuclear arms reduction but followed different methods. He wanted the hard-liners in the government to understand the genuine fear of the peace marchers. He went to the extent of stating that the peace movement was more vigorous in the West only because of the people's faith in their ability to change the government's attitude which they lacked in the totalitarian government like the Soviet Union.86

86 ibid., pp.236-37.
Due to the great resentment created by his remarks in June 1982, Reagan softened his attitude towards the freeze movement.

While delivering a speech at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council in March 1983, Reagan underlined the importance of being patient while negotiating with the Soviet Union. He stated:

If we appear divided, the Soviets suspect that domestic political pressure will undercut our position. They will dig in their heels. And that can only delay an agreement and may destroy all hope for the agreement ... most of those who support the freeze, I'm sure, are well intentioned - concerned about the arms race and the danger of nuclear war. No one shares their concern more than I do. But however well intentioned they are, these freeze proposals would do more harm than good.87

Reagan's speech showed a change in his attitude towards the freeze movement. When the freeze resolution came up for voting in the Congress, he was forced to take a milder attitude towards it. When the President made his speech he had Congressmen in view whom he wanted to placate by underlining the complexity of the problem and by appealing to their patriotism by stating that their support for freeze would put the country at a disadvantage in the bargaining.

The nuclear freeze resolution was passed in the House on 4 May 1983, after adopting an amendment requiring suspension of freeze agreement if it was not followed by mutual arms reduction within a specified period. This amendment was proposed by Elliott H. Levitas (D, Ga). 88

A nationwide professional sampling of public opinion was conducted by the firm Peen & Schoen for the committee on the Present Danger. It was released in April 1984. It found that most Americans view the nuclear freeze "as a way to reduce the expense of nuclear arms" rather than as a measure that would reduce the threat of nuclear war. 89

But in the U.S. Congress, the members were concentrating more on fighting against the MX missile which was of greater concern to the people of the U.S. 90

The peace movements in Western Europe and the nuclear freeze movement in the U.S. were viewed with suspicion by the Western governments. In Western Europe the movement

88 Congressional Record 1983, n.70.
89 Congressional Record 1985, p.E.370.
failed to prevent the deployment of the new Pershing II and GLCM. What really mattered was that in spite of the unprecedented Soviet propaganda, the U.S. had successfully implemented its NATO weapon modernisation programme.

With the successful implementation of one part of the 1979 "dual-track decision", Michael A. Leedeen, the senior fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, George Town University and the then consultant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and to the Secretary of Defense, wrote on the change in the American perception of the Soviet threat as follows:

As late as the Cuban missile crisis, the United States was far and away, the predominant military power in the world (at least in nuclear terms) and the Soviet Union was the bearer of an ideology that threatened to enlist the world's masses... we no longer believe that our system and our allies will be subverted by communism. On the contrary, today it is the Soviet Union that fears the spread of democratic ideas, (dissident movements Sic).91

Reagan by not submitting to the demands of the peace activists and by deploying the Pershing II and GLCM in Western Europe proved to be a tough person, at the helm of affairs in the U.S.

Peace Movement - A Symbol of Resurgence of Europe:

While overtly the peace movement was against the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM, certain intellectuals saw in it under-currents of European resurgence. It was seen as a step towards European unification and as a national identification movement.

The cultural tensions between the United States and West Germany were attributed as the reasons for the rise in the West German peace movements by Russell A. Berman. He wrote that, the cultural tensions were the main reasons for the peace movements rather than the new generation of missiles. 92 Berman further saw the economic and national resurgence of West Germany from the American tutelage as the reasons, which found its mass cultural expression in the peace movements. 93

David Capitanchik on the other hand saw the economic conditions as the reasons for the upsurge of peace movement in Western Europe. He wrote that:


93 Berman, "Opposition to Rearmament and West German Culture", Telos, no.51, Spring 1982, p.141.
... the European economy is in strong competition with the American and there is considerable resentment over American economic policies (e.g., interest rates, objections to EEC exports of agricultural produce, sanctions policies against Warsaw Pact countries) which appear to exacerbate the current economic depression as it affects Europe.94

According to him it was factors such as these which conditioned the public attitudes towards nuclear weapons rather than the activities of organised anti-nuclear protest movements.

On the other hand, Joachim Hirsch felt the nationalist undercurrents as reasons for the upsurge in West European peace movements. He wrote that, "Under the cover of anti-Americanism and anti-Sovietism there is doubtless also room for nationalist currents, but there is as well as clearly defined line dividing the movement from the radical right.95

E.P. Thompson, a social historian who was in the Coordinating Committee of European Nuclear Disarmament (END) movement which supports the idea of making the whole of Europe a nuclear weapons free zone. He wrote that, "the European unity could be made possible only if the statesmen

94 Capitanchik, n.20, p.120.
of East and West kept out of the way of Europe. Similar opinion was expressed by William E. Griffith. According to him the West German peace movement questioned the fundamentals of West Germany's post-war orientation. He wrote that,

Although the immediate focus of the movement is the missile issue, the deeper problem fueling it is the question of national identity. What does it mean to be a German? Why should Germany be allied with the materialistic, bourgeois policies of the economic miracle?

Thus, it is substantially true that the European economic, trade interests which were in conflict with American interest were the main reasons which motivated the peace movements in 1981-83. Considering the events like the German re-unification in late 80s, the peace movement could well be seen as an outburst of an European nationalism which helped in the process of national identification which compared and contrasted the European interests with those of the United States.

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It would thus appear that the peace movement was a multi-facet phenomenon. While on surface it was directed against the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe, at a deeper level it was sustained by resentment at the subordination of economic interest of Europe to those of the US. So long Western Europe was weaker, it tolerated and even accepted earlier policies of subordination, but once their economies gained strength and were able to confront the US, their suppressed feelings found an outlet in the peace movement.