CHAPTER II

DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II AND GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE (GLCM) IN WESTERN EUROPE
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DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING-II AND GLCM

The modernization of the Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF) in Europe with Pershing-II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) by the NATO countries and with SS-20s by the then Warsaw Pact countries brought again to the fore the question whether the weapon systems are built in accordance with the strategies or the military strategies are tailored to justify the weapon systems produced by the military-industrial complex. Several political, economic and strategic questions were raised and discussed in the United States' Congress, in the Reagan Administration and in other NATO countries before these missiles were actually deployed.

The nuclear weapons in Western Europe served different purpose for each one of the NATO countries. For Britain, the presence of nuclear weapons was an expression of its special relationship with the United States which offered it both military independence and political influence. France, though not a part of the integral military programme of the NATO, had benefited by the control of the NATO over West German military strategy. Whereas West Germany being constrained from developing nuclear weapons by West European Union (WEU) Treaty of 1954 and the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, had been subjected to constant tension due to its dependence on the United States' nuclear guarantee.\(^1\) The nuclear weapons were the physical manifestations of the U.S. leadership of the NATO alliance and acted as a symbol of the American commitment to West European security.

As part of the strategy of flexible response, various nuclear weapons with varied capabilities were deployed in Western Europe by the United States. They included conventional, tactical and theatre nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union had countered these by keeping its own Intermediate Range Nuclear Missiles (IRBMs) on the Western part of its territory which had the capacity to strike targets in Western Europe, besides its large conventional force in Eastern Europe.

The famous 1979 "dual-track decision" of the NATO was taken during the presidency of Jimmy Carter. It was a "consensus" decision of the NATO allies. "Consensus" refers to a general acceptance by the leading governing and opposition parties in NATO countries of NATO's military and

political strategies. It does not imply full agreement on every detail of policy, but it goes beyond simple acceptance of NATO membership to include approval of the alliance's general policy framework. 2

The 1979 decision was implemented by his successor President Ronald Reagan during his first term in office in the face of severe opposition. An attempt will be made here to analyze the peculiarities of the weapons systems and the problems which arose between the Soviet Union and the United States on various other related issues pertaining to their deployment against the background of the issues which were considered before reaching the "Dual-track" decision.

Background to the "Dual Track" decision

The modernization of TNF was considered way back in the Eisenhower administration, which towards the end of its tenure analyzed its pros and cons. Later "Multi-lateral Force Plan" was formulated by the Kennedy Administration in order to counter the Soviet missiles targeted on Western Europe. But Great Britain, France and West Germany did not

agree to the plan. Therefore, it was dropped. Years later, President Richard M. Nixon's Public Law 93-365, called for a comprehensive study of the TNF. The role, purpose and the objectives of the TNF were reassessed by the Department of Defense and then a major programme of the TNF modernization was proposed. ³

In 1970s, the two SALT treaties did not limit the TNF. While all these years the U.S. administration was considering the question of modernization at the theoretical level, on 28 October 1977, for the first time in forty years Helmut Schmidt of West Germany from the European side gave expression to the need to fill in the gap in IRBMs, by modernizing the NATO forces. The main reasons behind the concern were SALT II treaty and the Carter administration's withdrawal of the Nutron Bomb proposal. Schmidt stated:

SALT codifies the nuclear strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. To put it in another way: SALT neutralises their strategic nuclear capabilities. In Europe this magnifies the significance of the disparities between East and West in nuclear tactical and conventional weapons ... strategic arms limitations confined to the United States and the Soviet Union will inevitably impair the security of the West European members of the Alliance vis-a-vis Soviet military superiority in

Europe if we do not succeed in moving the disparities of military power in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations.4

Schmidt wrote further on the need for an overall balance of the strategic forces between the US and the Soviet Union:

Soviet superiority in the Central section is further reinforced by about 750 medium range ballistic missiles that have no NATO counterpart. This point more than any other, drives home the lesson that, looked in general and from the theoretical point of view of a conflict extended over a long period of time, there can only be an overall balance in Europe's central sector if strategic nuclear weapons are drawn into the equation.5

Hence in spite of the understanding that in an all-out nuclear war only the overall strategic balance was very important, the need for an effective TNF in Western Europe was stressed as part of the flexible response.

Similar concern was expressed by Geoffrey Pattio, a conservative member of the British Parliament in 1977, who wrote: "In short, the guarantee of US nuclear protection that Western Europe secured twenty years ago - and generally


believes it still has is no more reliable than, say, the mutual agreements exchanged by both sides in the Russo-German pact of 1939."6

The West European side thus raised the question and doubts about the American commitment to their security. Eugene Rostow the first director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in the Reagan administration wrote, "the greatest risk we face is not nuclear war but political coercion based on the credible threat of nuclear war implicit in overwhelming Soviet nuclear and conventional force superiority."7

Consultations: the Congress and the Executive

The role of the modernization of TNF in the NATO military strategy was discussed within the Congress and the executive.


The Congressional Research Service in a background paper argued that the NATO officials felt a compelling need to devise a unified Allied response which would satisfy West German anxieties about the "decoupling" and neutralize the feeling that the theatre power balance was shifting against NATO. The Allied response should also be such which would persuade U.S.S.R. to limit SS-20 and backfire bombers in future arms control negotiations.  

In the Congress, doubts about NATO's defense capabilities, the nuclear strategy and fears about the Soviet expansion in Western Europe were raised and discussed. On 10 March 1977, Senator John Glenn (Dem., Ohio) in his speech in the Senate assailed the administration's policy. He argued that the capacity of NATO has been undermined because of "the slow progress in increasing the degree of standardization and interpenetrability of its weapons systems." Senators Sam Nunn (Dem., Georgia) and Dewey F. Bartlett (Dem., Oklahoma) believed that the Warsaw pact's increased power posed a threat of Red Blitzkrieg in Europe. 

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9 ibid.,
Karl Mommer, President of the Atlantic Treaty Association 1977, read out a letter from President Jimmy Carter, to the Atlantic Treaty Association, which said:

I would also like to reiterate that the United States remains categorically committed to NATO's strategy of forward defense and flexible response. This is my own firm conviction, ... this strategy, kept credible through timely force improvements, can preserve the territorial integrity of all Alliance members.10

Jack F. Kemp (Rep., N.Y.), quoted in the House of Representatives an editorial entitled, "Undermining the Alliance", from the Wall of Journal. It stated that at the formal meeting of the NATO, wherein a communique was issued backing the United States efforts to reach a new strategic arms agreement with the Soviet Union, European fears of their interests being sold out were dominant. It was felt in general that the SALT II negotiations would certainly undercut the efforts to invigorate the alliance.11

On 26 July 1978, John Breckinridge (Rep., Kentucky) in the House of Representatives cited an article - "Theatre Nuclear Balance" by Justen Galen in Armed Forces Journal International, which expressed the opinion that:

the Warsaw pact has a large advantage over NATO for virtually all categories of missile systems. The Soviet Union can effectively dominate Warsaw pact war

10 ibid., p.30225.
11 ibid., p.39611.
fighting. It can choose the moment of attack, the force concentration, and the point of greatest vulnerability.12

On 10 October 1979 Jack F. Kemp (Rep., NY) said in the House of Representatives that the Soviets were concerned about LRTNF modernization since these systems could be directed against the Soviet's operational resources then numbering 58 divisions deployed just out of reach of most NATO theatre nuclear systems in the three western most military districts of the USSR, the Carpathian, Bylorussian and the Baltic.13

It should be noted here that the discussions in the Congress on the modernization of TNF had begun nearly two years prior to the final NATO decision was taken on 12 December 1979.


13 Congressional Record (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), p.27715. During the period from 1973 to 1976 as CIA analysts refined their methodology and obtained better intelligence, they made an important break through. In costing Soviet defense production they had been radiating the Soviets with efficiency which was close to that of the United States. What they discovered was that Soviet defense production, in fact, was not very efficient. Thus, the Soviet defense effort was absorbing a greater share of the GNP than previously believed.
Pershing II and GLCM's impact on the Soviet Economy

The impact of the Pershing II and GLCM on the Soviet economy was also discussed in the Congress. While speaking on the defense appropriations in the budget in the Senate, William Proxmire (Dem., Wisconsin) opposed any further increase in the appropriation for the Defense Department. He argued that the projection of Soviet military superiority was based on an illusion. In support of his argument, the Senator from Wisconsin quoted an article by one Macy Cox, who had earlier served as an CIA official.

The gross over-estimation of Soviet military spending continued in order to enable the passage of increased defense budget by the U.S. Congress while it was stressed that the Soviets had increased their military capacity in 1970s, the inefficiency of their military systems was sidelined. Moreover the adverse impact of the increased military spending on the Soviet economy was not brought to light. A CIA report published in 1978 said: "The new estimate of the share of defense in the Soviet GNP is almost twice as high as the 6-8 per cent previously estimated. This does mean that the impact of defense programmes on the Soviet economy has increased - only that
our appreciation of this impact has changed. It also implies that Soviet defense industries are far less efficient than formerly believed.\textsuperscript{14}

The CIA increased its estimate of the percent of GNP spent on defense from 6 to 8 per cent to 11 to 13 per cent but there was no doubt of the the rate of actual Soviet defense spending as the percentage of GNP was high. There was merely an increase in the CIA's estimates of the share of GNP expanded for defense. What should have been cause for jubilation was never adequately explained to the congress and the public. "In fact, there have been no dramatic increases in Soviet defense spending during the entire decade."\textsuperscript{15}

Thus the Congressmen could foresee that the Soviet economy which was already under stress would go into deeper crisis when the Soviets would make efforts to counter the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM. The defense establishment had the same perception. In the U.S. military posture for fiscal year 1983, prepared by the organization of the Joint Chiefs of staff, General David C. Jones,


\textsuperscript{15} ibid.,
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Frank C. Carlucci III, it was stated:

Current Soviet military capabilities are the result of deliberate decisions based on a coherent strategic doctrine and pursued by the government at enormous economic cost. The Soviets have been willing to incur the drain on their economy partly because their perception of military danger to the USSR is fed by institutional pressures from within the Soviet bureaucracy.

... Guided by these attitudes toward the interrelationship of political objectives and military power, Soviet leaders have taken full advantage of their central control over the economic system to give continuing priority to military needs. The result has been a real increase in defense spending accompanied by declining rates of growth in gross national product (GNP), Capital investment, and per capita consumption. Social and economic costs have been high, but so have the political dividends. The Soviet leaders know that their increased military power has permitted them to undertake politics—military initiatives that would have been too risky only a decade ago.

Trends in Soviet Defense expenditure and Economic Performance

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<th>1961-70</th>
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<td>Soviet Defense</td>
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<td>$223B</td>
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<td>Activities *</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capital investment</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
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<td>GNP Growth **</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Per Capita **</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
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Source: CIA

* Real Average Annual costs in Billions of 1983 Dollars.

** Real Average Annual Rates of Growth (per cent).
The Soviet economic system has serious limitations despite its ability to sustain the military build-up thus far. Resource constraints are severe and will become more so as economic growth continues to decline. The Soviet economy suffers from the excessive demands of defense spending (now estimated at 12-14 per cent of GNP) and the inherent deficiencies of a rigid central planning system. These deficiencies include a long-term decline in productivity stemming from a relative inability to foster technological innovation in non-defense areas and a failure to motivate the work force confronted with these economic problems, Soviet leaders could eventually be forced to reduce the economic burden of their military programs.16

The Pershing II and GLCM were thus seen as weapons programme which would further cripple the already deteriorating Soviet economy. Viewing Pershing II and GLCM as the sticks to break the economic structure of the Soviet Union was also shared by the then Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger. In his statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, on 2 February 1982 Weinberger stated that SS-20s was not a cheap war equipment, and in order to militarily equalise it the Soviets were perfectly willing to cripple their domestic economy and make lives miserable for everybody at home and keep on doing it year

after year. He added, "We have all these factors. We do have the added factor that we have lost a lot of momentum in the previous decades. We have to require that it is a long, slow and very expensive process." 17

**Discussions in the Executive:**

Interagency meetings were conducted to discuss the modernization issue in the situation room in the West wing of the White House. A mini Security Co-ordinating Committee was formed with David Aaron, Brzezinski's deputy at the National Security Council, as the Chairman. The other members included Lesli Gelb, David McGiffert of the Pentagon's Office of the International Security Affairs, Lieut. Gen. W.Y. Smith of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Spurgeon Keeny of the Arms Control and the Disarmament Agency along with their staffs.

In the Committee different views were expressed. While some wanted modernization to include Pershing II and GLCM, others disagreed. Reportedly, the Joint Chiefs of Staffs wanted both Pershing II and GLCMs to be included in the modernization, as the former was an army project and the latter an air force one. But Gelb felt that modernization

17 ibid., p.51.
would result in the escalation of the arms race and hence called for rational planning. 18

The European members of the NATO were briefed by a NATO High Level Group under the chairmanship of David McGiffert about the strategic rational behind the NATO decision. John Hoist, a Norwegian delegate, helped McGiffert in his campaign. Finally Presidential Review Memorandum, PRM-38 was prepared to produce Toma-hawk, Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) and Pershing II.

The New York Times wrote that Cotter, who had served as an Assistant on nuclear matters from 1973 to 1978 under the Defense Secretaries - James R. Schleinger, Donald H. Rumsfield and Harold Brown, played a decisive role in the drawing up of the nuclear modernization programme. 19 The Washington Post wrote that although NATO forces could reach the Soviet Union with both Polaris Submarine Missiles and European based bombers, desire for a visible land-based missile system had developed due to the Soviet deployment of the SS.20s. 20


In both the Congress and the executive, the importance of LRTNF modernization, the Soviet concerns and their possible reactions and the role of the United States in NATO were matters of common concern. In general, the modernization of the LRTNF was visualized as a symbol of unbreakable, inevitable security tie between the United States and the NATO allies and was viewed as the restoration of the faith in the American leadership.  

The NATO Defense Council met at Brussels and the "dual-track decision" was taken on 12 December 1979. This decision was considered as the most democratically arrived policy decision after an exhaustive debate. Brzezinski wrote about it in his memoirs as:

The intense bargaining, manoeuvering and recalculations involved in this issue demonstrate a problem which many outside the policy process frequently forget. In the modern world, at the pinnacle of power, there is no pure, objective analysis of a strategic problem. All decisions are made in a generalised decision-making process that is colored by domestic politics, economics and allied reactions. The question of an objective 'need' for a credible

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2 U.S., Senate, 97th Congress, n.16.
response in Europe (TNF) had to be balanced against internal NATO politics, various numbers dictated by a variety of actors (both domestic and foreign) and the need for numbers high enough to give the U.S. bargaining leverage with the Soviets.23

The NATO dual-track decision was taken against the background of the defense and military strategy of the alliance, arms control, detente and domestic politics. It was aimed at the strengthening of the confidence in American commitment to NATO security, to form a ladder in the military strategy of flexible response and to act as a deterrence to Soviet nuclear and conventional arsenals. It was to act as an inducement to the Soviets to come to the negotiating table. They were to be used as a bargaining chip during arms control negotiations.

Dr. Richard L. Wagner, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, Department of Defense, in his testimony before the sub-committee to discuss Pershing II and its integral role in NATO’s Nuclear Force Modernization Programmes stated:

23 Brzezinski, n.4, p.308. See also, Christian Hacke, "After NATO’s dual track decision of 1979: Where Do we go from here?" Journal of Strategic Studies (London), vol.9, no.4, December 1986, p.85. For the complete text of the communiqué issued at the special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers, Brussels, 12 December, 1979, see the appendix.
... as a symbol of the political determination and cohesion of the alliance, in that our NATO allies have agreed to host U.S. missile units which place the Soviet homeland at risk - even though (or perhaps because) these allies are currently under the threat of Soviet SS-20 Mobile Missiles which can completely cover the European land mass from bases in the USSR.

... We feel that NATO's modernization program accomplishes two important goals: First, it allows us to make militarily significant strikes which the Soviet leadership cannot ignore; and secondly, it provides an incentive for the Soviets to take part in serious arms control negotiations.24

While Dr. Wagner in his statement noted what the 'Dual-track decision of 1979 signified, Richard R. Burt, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, in his statement pointed to what it did not signify. Burt stated:

The Deployment of Pershing II and GLCM do not move NATO away from its strategy of flexible response; the deployment was not thrust by the US upon the Europeans; it does not give the alliance a qualitatively new capability. The US has had systems

in Europe capable of striking Soviet Union since 1952; it does not increase the alliance's reliance on nuclear weapons; and it does not represent a step toward the development of a NATO nuclear war-fighting capability.25

The Dual-track decision was thus justified on different grounds. But the Allies were committed to the modernization of TNF and deployment of Pershing II and GLCMs subject to the progress made in the arms control talks.

The decision was finally taken to deploy altogether 572 Pershing II and GLCM missiles, i.e. 108 Pershing II and 464 GLCMs. Brzezinski, in his memoirs has given the reasons as to why he favoured the magic number of 572 missiles to be deployed in Western Europe: ".... my thought being that we would probably be asked by NATO to scale down or that we would have to engage eventually in some arms control

bargaining with the Soviets and therefore the upper limit was preferable.\textsuperscript{26}

Before going further on to the political issues which shaped NATO decision after the year 1979, it is important to know about the capacities and the unique features of the Soviet SS-20s and Pershing II and GLCMs on the Allies side — the weapon systems which not only aroused mutual concerns but also strong protests from both the camps.

**SS-20s**

The Soviet arms build up increased in 1970s while America was squandering its own resources on the Vietnam war. The Soviet Union replaced its SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with mobile SS-20s with three war heads each in 1970s. SS-20s, could hit the targets with the help of inertia guidance. It had an accuracy or a circular Error Probable

\textsuperscript{26} Brzezinski, n.4, p.308. Michael R. Gordon, in his article wrote that the number must have been chosen taking into account that it should be large enough to create an image of American commitment to West European security but small enough not to create an impression of an immense arms build up. He further contended that the actual number of weapons chosen for deployment, - 572, was somewhat arbitrary. For example, NATO deployed 108 Pershing II missiles because there were 108 existing launchers for American short-range pershing I missiles in West Germany. Michael R. Gordon, "Date line Washington: INF: A Hollow Victory?", \textit{Foreign Policy} (New York), no.68, Fall 1987, p.164.
(CEP) of about 400 m. Though technically more than one missile could be launched from the same launcher, due to the intense heat released during the launch, it is not practical to launch another missile from the same launcher. 27

Richard Perle, the then U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense stated that, "... since 1977, the Soviets have deployed some 280 SS-20s, each with three independently targeted warheads and each capable of striking targets at a range of the order of 5000 kms ... the SS-20 has a refined capability, which given the mobility and survivability of the SS-20 launcher, ... has still more formidable future capability." 28

With its given range of about 5000 kms, the SS-20 was capable of striking all the cities in Western Europe. Its mobility made it less vulnerable to attack. 29

The U.S. military posture for fiscal year 1983, prepared by the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that the Soviets had initiated construction of additional new SS-20 bases, from which missiles were capable

29 Sipri, n.27, p.86.
of striking NATO Europe could be launched in 1981. The remaining SS-20 deployments were likely to be located in the Western Soviet Union. The number of launchers probably were to be less than SS-4 and SS-5 levels, but the number of RVs were to be considerably greater because of the three-MIRV payloads. If one refire was to be allocated to each missile, the number of IRBM RVs were more than doubled between 1977 and 1982.30

Pershing-II:

The Pershing II missile was intended to replace its own earlier version - Pershing IA (P-1A) with 400 miles range. It had high accuracy and lower yield in order to reduce collateral damage. The range of Pershing-II, was 1000 miles. The main difference between Pershing IA and Pershing II was the weight. Pershing II was approximately 15,500 lbs as against approximately 10,000 lbs of Pershing IA.31

The Pershing II programme was to improve the Pershing IA missile with the addition of Radar Area Correlator (RADAG) terminal guidance. The system also was to include the option of a low-yield earth-penetrator (EP) warhead to

30 US, Senate, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, n.16, p.733.
31 Myrdel., n.3, pp.91-92.
facilitate the attack of certain hardened targets. The earth penetrating warhead of Pershing II was designated as the W86. 32

Pershing II's accuracy was ten times greater than that of the SS-20, achieved by its RADAG (Radar Area Guidance). The maximum range of the missile was estimated to be 1800 kms. But the exact range was a classified figure. The range figure was important because Pershing II with a range of 1800 km, could not reach Moscow, but if its range was 2500 km, it was long enough to strike all targets even around the Soviet capital. 33 The Pershing-II could penetrate Soviet air defense and was capable of striking time urgent targets. 34

A report entitled, "Equipping the United States Army", was prepared by J.R. Sculley, Assistant Secretary of the Army Research, Development and Acquisition and James H. Merryman, Lt. Gen, Deputy Chief of Staff for Army Research Development and Acquisition. The report was addressed to the members of Congress. It stated:

33 SIPRI, n.27, pp.7-8.
34 Myrdel, n.31, p.95.
The Army's most powerful weapon is the Pershing II which has twice the range of the existing Pershing I and much more accuracy. The Pershing II system employs radar area correlation to achieve its pinpoint accuracy. Radar "pictures" of the target area, in cassette form, are inserted in the missile prior to launch. As the re-entry vehicle approaches the general target area it takes its own radar "pictures" of the terrain, comparing them to the original. By making course corrections until the two pictures coincide, the missile can achieve surgical accuracy. This permits the use of a small nuclear warhead that reduces collateral damage to the minimum.35

Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM)

Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan Administration stated that the GLCMs were the derivatives of the General Dynamics Submarine Launched Cruise Missiles, and added a long-range, highly accurate system to U.S. forces.36

The GLCM was a winged low flying missile, which could carry either a nuclear or a conventional warhead for nearly 1500 miles. It could fly close to the earth's surface. It had a pinpoint accuracy. It was guided to its targets by a pre-programmed flight plan.37

35 A Report prepared by the Army Research, Development and Acquisition on "Equipping the United States Army", n.16, pp.2184-85.
GLCM was a version of the TOMAHAWK cruise missile, adapted for launching from air transportable, ground, mobile platforms. The GLCM was 219 inches long and was powered by a turbo fan engine. It could fly at a speed of 0.8 mach at an altitude below 100 metres. During peace time, it was to be deployed at permanent sites in hardened shelters capable of withstanding blast effects up to 2,000 p.s.i. The mobile and slow moving cruise missiles were invulnerable to enemy's attack.

As per the report prepared by the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, GLCM was to have an operational range of about 2500 km and an accuracy sufficient to destroy the hardest enemy targets. GLCM was seen as a missile for attacking fixed targets which were then covered by dual-capable aircraft. GLCMs were to enable SACEUR to shift additional aircrafts to conventional roles. It was also to allow the use of more aircraft for nuclear strikes against mobile targets not suited to missile targeting.

The targets of US-NATO Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) were to include:

38 Myrdel, n.31, pp.92-93.
39 n.18, p.704.
IRBM/MRBM sites, naval bases, nuclear and chemical storage sites, airbases, command control and communication (C3) centres, head Quarters complexes, SAM sites, communication and POL storage areas, ground force installations, choke points and bridges. Their military significance derives from the potential contribution of these targets to the support of sustained military operation by the warsaw pact.40

The Pershing II and GLCM, made limited nuclear war a possibility. Two American political analysts Collin Gray and Keith Payne viewed that the most frightening threat to the Soviet Union was the destruction or serious impairment of its political system. Thus, the United States by developing abilities to destroy key leadership cadres, their means of communication and some of the instruments of domestic control through judicious US targeting and weapon procurement policies, would deny the USSR the assurance of political survival.41

The NATO nuclear strategy behind Pershing II was thus to develop a "credible counter". It was to convince the Soviets that a nuclear attack on Western Europe would be to risk a retaliatory attack deep into the Soviet land.42


AFGHANISTAN

In the same month when NATO's dual-track decision was taken at the NATO assembly and the same was being discussed in the Congress, Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, in December 1979. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was followed by the Iran hostage crisis, which changed completely the political atmosphere in the U.S. There was a strong pressure on the government to give up its post-Vietnam policy of non-involvement and isolation in favour of assuming the leadership of the world and counter Soviet political advancements. The SALT II, signed by Carter was shelved by the Senate because of the anti-treaty sentiments aroused by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The call of the day was to reassert the American strategic power.

Change in the US leadership

The decision to deploy pershing II and GLCM was taken in 1979 but the actual deployment began only in 1983. There were important changes in the political leadership in the United States and the Soviet Union. The hurt pride of the

United States swung the people in favour of neo-conservatism. Reflecting the prevailing trend among the people, Ronald Reagan entered the White House in 1981.

Reagan promised to make America stand on its feet and upright among the nations of the world with its superior nuclear force. He charged the Soviet Union with the responsibility for alarming arms build up. It was characterized as posing ideological, political, military and economic challenges to the U.S. 44

In his inaugural address, Reagan stated: "our forbearance should never be misunderstood our reluctance for conflict should not be misjudged as a failure of will. When action is required to preserve our national security, we will act." 45

Right from the time of assuming office, President Reagan's rhetoric was anti-Soviet. At his first press conference, on 29 January 1981, he stated "the Soviet leaders apparently were used to reserve with themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat in order to attain... their goal... the promotion of world revolution and a one world socialist or communist state. 46


73
Reagan thus kept alive the alleged threat of Soviet attack on West Europe. Besides, he followed the policy of negotiating arms reduction from a position of strength, by increasing the military power. In this regard, his speech at Eureka College, Eureka, Illinois, on 9 May 1982, is important. There he stated:

We are now approaching an extremely important phase in East-West relations as the current Soviet leadership is succeeded by a new generation. Both the current and the new Soviet leadership should realize aggressive policies will meet a firm Western response. On the other hand, a Soviet leadership devoted to improving its people’s lives, rather than expanding its armed conquests, will find a sympathetic partner in the West. The West will respond with expanded trade and other forms of co-operation."47

Reagan was referring to the crumbling Soviet economy. While offering the carrot of economic co-operation he was pressurizing the same by new U.S. military build up. He made it clear that the policy of "linkage" would be followed with respect to the U.S.-Soviet relations.

In his address to the United Nations special session on disarmament on 17 June 1982, he again reiterated that:

Since the World War II, the record of tyranny has included Soviet violation of the Yalta Agreements leading to domination of Eastern Europe, symbolized by the Berlin wall...

It includes the take over of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Afghanistan and ruthless repression of the proud people of Poland. Soviet sponsored guerrillas and terrorists are at work in Central and South America, in Africa, the Middle East, in the Caribbean and in Europe, violating human rights and unnerving the world with violence. Communist atrocities in South East Asia, Afghanistan and elsewhere continue to shock the free world as refugees escape to tell of their horror.

The decade of so-called detente, witnessed the most massive Soviet build up of military power in history."48

Through these high sounding and provocative speeches Reagan created an impression that the Soviet political movements posed a real security threat to Western Europe and a challenge to the military and political strength of the U.S. Hence he stressed the need for strengthening the Western security.

Reagan justified the LRTNF modernization on several grounds. To the doves, it was shown as a routine updating of nuclear weapons, which is a must in nuclear technology, and was also projected as a bargaining chip in the arms-control talks. To the hawks they were shown as the much

needed claws to pierce the Soviet security. To the alliance partners, Reagan expressed firm conviction that unless the U.S. speaks from a position of strength, the Soviet Union would not take it seriously and negotiate an arms reduction treaty. The implementation of the deployment decision was thus shown as an opportunity to prove alliance unity to the world amidst its internal problems. 49

Reagan and deployment of Pershing II and GLCM

While before the deployment started Reagan spoke in terms of war with the Soviet Union, at the time of actual deployment of the missiles, Reagan was pressurised by the Allies to start the arms control negotiations with it due to the build-up of peace movements in Western Europe. Hence Reagan on 18 November 1981 proposed his "zero-option" for the elimination of the LRTNF from Western Europe.

Reagan had to adopt a posture that for an arms reduction treaty with the Soviet Union, the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM was absolutely essential. He posed the two missiles as the ones which would force the Soviet Union to have a serious arms talks with the United States. Hence, the stress on arms control was increased.

In an interview, Reagan stated on 21 May 1982:

... why don't we negotiate a total elimination of such weapons in Europe? We won't put in the Pershings and cruise missiles if they'll do away with the SS-20s. I don't think they would have ever come to negotiate had it not been for the imminence of that proposal - the fact that we are all going forward.50

While stressing the fact that Pershing II and GLCMs were essential for West European security, Reagan expressed his willingness not to deploy them in case the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw the SS-20s, which were already deployed. He stated,

... In February our negotiating team in Geneva offered the Soviet Union a draft treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces. We offered to cancel deployment of one Pershing II ballistic missiles and Ground launched cruise missiles in exchange for Soviet elimination of the SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. This proposal would eliminate with one stroke those systems about which both sides have expressed the greatest concern.51

With the Soviet unwillingness to agree to the Reagan's proposal, he stressed that ...we have embarked upon a build up of our defense forces in order to strengthen our security and, in turn, to strengthen the prospects for peace.52

50 American Foreign Policy, n.47, p.478.
51 ibid., p.256.
52 ibid., p.446.
Against the background of Reagan administration putting forward proposals which were rejected by the Soviet Union and vice versa, the Pershing II and Cruise missiles were developed by the United States and preparations for their deployment in Western Europe were made. At the final communique issued by the Nuclear-Planning Group (NPG) of the NATO at Brussels on 30 November 1982, it was reiterated that, "in the absence of a concrete arms control agreement, these deployment would begin according to schedule at the end of 1983."

The same was again agreed upon in the final communique issued by the North Atlantic Council, at Brussels on 10 December 1982. Greece alone reserved the position on this issue.

The United States plans for the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM in Western Europe were as follows.

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53 ibid., p.506, 514.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Pershing II * Launchers</th>
<th>Cruise Missiles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (Sicily)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>112</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>48</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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* Each launcher fires one missile, but could be reloaded with spare missiles.

After the "dual-track" decision of 1979, West Germany agreed for the deployment of the new missiles only on the condition that they would be deployed in another non-nuclear state. These LRTNF, unlike the other NATO theatre nuclear weapons which were under the "turn-key system" of dual nation control were to be under the sole control of the United States. 55

The U.S. continued to stress the importance of deployment of Pershing II and GLCM at the same time stressed that she was sincere in her efforts to reach an arms control agreement.

55 ibid., 2 November 1979.
The US Congress discussed whether to delay the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM. On 21 July 1983, in the House of Representative Bob Edgar (Dem., Pennsylvania), spoke for delaying the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles. 56

Ronald V. Dellums (Dem., California), also spoke in favour of delaying the deployment. He proposed an amendment to H.R.2969, which asked for the delay in deployment upto 31 December 1984. His arguments were based on the fact that since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, neither the U.S. nor the USSR had possessed land-based missiles outside their own territory which had the capability of reaching the other side. He called it a voluntary moratorium which had been maintained by both sides and this would be violated by Pershing II and GLCM deployment. Jack F. Kemp (Rep., NY) interrupted him and said that Kennedy-Kuznetson agreements contained no such promise and that Dellums had not taken into account Soviet SS-20s which if moved to northern deployment sites or if third stage added to it would have capacity to strike USA. But Dellums further argued that the Soviet computer technology not being so advanced would create problems of security. Edgar agreed with Dellums and

felt that while production of these missiles could go on, their deployment could be delayed.

Barbara B. Kennelly (Dem., Connecticut) quoting from John Steinbruner's writing in *Brookings Review* felt that delay in deployments would improve prospects for the treaty.

But the amendment was finally rejected when vote was taken by electronic device. There were 101 ayes, 320 noes with 12 not voting. 57

Vice-president George Bush, in his remarks at the Tri-centennial ceremony of German immigration to America, on 25 June 1983, in West Germany asserted, "...should we not reach agreement this fall in Geneva, U.S. deployments of intermediate-range missiles will go forward - an event the Soviet Union has invested considerable political capital to try to block." 58

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom during her official visit to the US between 25 to 30 September 1983, conveyed the British willingness to deploy the LRTNF in the event of a failure to reach an arms control

agreement, and briefed Reagan about the preparations being made in the U.K. to facilitate the deployment. She said, "if they are not successful in reaching zero option, the cruise and Pershing missiles will be deployed by the end of this year. Our nerve is being tested, we must not falter now." 59

The defense ministers of the NATO members met at Montebello, Canada, between 27-28 October 1983, where in they reiterated their determination to move forward with the "dual-track" approach to Western security. In the final communique they noted with satisfaction that the flight testing of both the Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) in the United States had been successfully completed, that production of the missiles is on schedule and the preparations in the European basing countries would permit initial operational capability, as planned. 60

The deployment began with Britain, a country which had marched in step with the Reagan Administration all along. The Ground Launched Cruise Missile was stationed at Greenham place in Britain on 14 November 1983. It became operational on 1 January 1984. Nine Pershing II Missiles

59 ibid., p.13.
60 ibid., p.24.
were deployed at Mutlangen, in West Germany in November 1983. The cruise missiles deployed in Sicily in Italy became operational in April 1984.\textsuperscript{61} The Dutch Cabinet on 4 June 1984 voted to delay the decision on deploying cruise missiles in the Netherlands and linked it to the advancements in the arms control talks between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{62} Later sighting the increase in the number of Soviet SS-20s as the reason, the Dutch Parliament voted for the deployment of the Cruise missiles on 3 November 1985.\textsuperscript{63}

In the next five years, 464 of cruise missiles were to be deployed in Belgium and Woensdrecht in Netherlands.\textsuperscript{64}

Factors like the penetrating capacity, the range of the missiles and their ability to survive the enemy attack were taken in to account when the allies decided to modernise their Theatre Nuclear Forces with 572 Pershing II and GLCM.\textsuperscript{65}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{61} *New York Times*, 4 April 1984.
\item \textsuperscript{62} ibid., 6 June 1984.
\item \textsuperscript{63} ibid., 4 November 1985.
\item \textsuperscript{64} SIPRI Year Book (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1984), p.35.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Hyrdel, n.31, p.94.
\end{itemize}
These Theatre Nuclear Forces aimed mainly at counterforce attack which were to destroy the command, communication and surveillance centres of the military, missile sites and strategic and submarine bases of the enemy. 66

The conservative policy makers in the United States denounced the "no second use" policy proposed by Robert S. McNamara. The policy called for making sure that the nuclear attack was real and then to launch the missiles. It called for highly qualified communication. The call for "no first use" by Mc George Bundy, the National Security Adviser (1961-68), George F. Kennan, and Gerard K. Smith was again not considered as a viable proposition by the policy-makers in the United States. 67

Soviet Reaction

The Pershing II missiles deployed in West Germany forced Moscow to shift to a "launch on warning" strategy that in turn transferred "the decision to trigger" to the computers. The Soviet Union countered the American move in different ways. It increased the number of SS-20s. It also


84
deployed new theatre nuclear missiles in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. Marshal Ogarkov was reported to have said that their range was sufficient to hit the bases where the new American missiles were being deployed in Western Europe. The Soviet SS-22, with a maximum range of 900 km was on the verge of reaching the cruise missile sites in Britain. The SS-23 with a range of about 500 km could cover almost all the bases in the Federal Republic of Germany from positions in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. 68

Thus with the advancements in nuclear technology, the balance of nuclear terror was maintained at a higher level and at greater risks.

The modernization of the Theatre Nuclear Forces had escalated the arms race. The arms control negotiations were made more difficult. The strategic doctrines, on the basis of which the super powers planned to fight a nuclear war, were very different and radically opposite of each other.

68 SIPRI Year Book, 1985 (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1984), pp.29-30. For the list of Soviet Theatre Nuclear Forces, 1985, see the appendix.