CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
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The world was divided into two military blocs soon after the second world war. The Western group of nations was led by the United States and the Eastern bloc of nations by the Soviet Union. The Soviet bloc has now broken to the wonder and surprise of many at the end of the decade of eighties. The 1980s has thus been a decade of memorable changes. The West with its belief in the government chosen through popular elections, a multi-party system, universal adult franchise, freedom of association and discussion, freedom of the press, and the independence of judiciary and the rule of law, has given an economic and ideological blow to the countries with faith in Marxism-Leninism which believed in the common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange, the exclusive control of political powers by the Communist Party as the "vanguard" of the proletariat and a "command economy", in which the economic decisions were taken primarily through centralized bodies.

The ideological incompatibility and the antagonistic perception of various political, economic and international issues of the two power blocs led to the stockpiling of dreadful nuclear arms and ammunitions on both sides. The nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union
alone could destroy the world several times over. As a result, the fear of nuclear war hanged like the sword of Democles over the entire humanity. But in spite of various regional conflicts, the outbreak of a nuclear war was avoided. While the United States provided nuclear umbrella to the countries of Western Europe and Japan, the Soviet Union provided the same to the countries of Eastern Europe. While this had prevented conflict in this region, it resulted in the qualitative and quantitative proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Both the Super Powers vigorously pursued research and development of nuclear weapons for nearly forty years despite the great economic strain it imposed on their resources. The mounting stockpile of nuclear weapons made both the countries vulnerable to each other's nuclear attack and made them realize the limitations of their power. Hence both the United States and the Soviet Union arranged their priorities in an ascending order, from peripheral to vital interest. Rivalry arises when two nations with equivalent military capacity view their vital interests at stake in the same region. Such a rivalry had arisen in the past quite often in Western Europe. ¹ Since the end of the

Second world war, peace had been maintained by a balance of terror with armed forces and nuclear weapons stationed on either side of the iron curtain.

An attempt will be made here to emphasise the competing strategic, geographic, economic and political interests of the United States and the Soviet Union in Western Europe. This will be followed by a description of the strategic doctrines that was evolved by the two rivals to counter each other's move in the area. This will help us to understand the reasons for the large stockpile of nuclear weapons in Europe.

SOVIET INTEREST IN WESTERN EUROPE

Economic

Lenin foresaw the establishment of peaceful commercial relations with the capitalist countries. However, during the inter-war period, Soviet Union's economic relations with the West went through sharp ups and downs. Its repudiation of all obligations incurred by the predecessor government and its refusal to pay compensation to foreign investors following nationalization stood as a

serious obstacle in the way of greater economic cooperation. With the rise of the menace of Hitler which threatened both England and France on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other, there was a modicum of rapprochement between leading Western powers of the time – France, the UK, the United States and the Soviet Union. The second world war completely devastated the latter. After the end of the war, the Soviet Union, like the countries of Western Europe desperately needed the infusion of aid and investment for the reconstruction of its shattered economy. But the beginning of the cold war led not only to the denial of any aid but also to the commencement of an economic war against it. The Western bloc adopted a policy to forbid any trade with the Eastern bloc that would result in the enhancement of its war making capability.

From time to time the Soviet leadership, more particularly after Khruschev's rise to power, made an attempt to improve economic relations with Western Europe. In 1958, Khruschev designed a programme to liberalize the Soviet Union from within and to increase the interaction with the outside world. His effort to increase the agricultural productivity required increased use of imported chemical fertilizers, which could come from Western Europe. Similarly, in 1966, Premier Kosygin announced the increase
in the purchase of foreign technology and machinery. The West being technologically more advanced these could be imported from there. The Soviet Union imported grain even in good harvest years and in years when the harvest was low, the grain import was as much as 25 percent of total needs. Some American analysts have contended that the modernization of Soviet military forces was dependent to a high degree on the pirated Western technology. But no evidence has comeforth. The West took enough care not to export any technology which would enhance the strategic capacity of the Soviet Union.

Soviet trade turn over in millions of rubles with the following countries, in the first half of the eighties clearly shows the increased trade interaction with the West. The West's stakes in the Soviet Union and vice-versa was rising. The trade war, if not over, had at least been suspended.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>1982</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1984</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>6,629.7</td>
<td>7,022.0</td>
<td>7,501.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>5,193.5</td>
<td>5,173.3</td>
<td>4,728.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4,086.0</td>
<td>4,434.7</td>
<td>4,480.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3,558.7</td>
<td>4,149.9</td>
<td>4,224.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>3,692.4</td>
<td>3,004.0</td>
<td>2,894.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>5,279.0</td>
<td>1,800.5</td>
<td>3,134.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1,926.5</td>
<td>1,713.5</td>
<td>1,888.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1,604.5</td>
<td>1,602.0</td>
<td>1,698.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1,209.8</td>
<td>1,352.8</td>
<td>1,652.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1,398.8</td>
<td>1,301.9</td>
<td>1,421.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>523.2</td>
<td>414.0</td>
<td>503.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above table, it can be seen that the United States had been the greatest trading partner of the Soviet Union in 1982 next only to West Germany. But Soviet trade with the West European Countries, namely, West Germany, France, England and Italy had increased by about 871.5, 865.6, 647.1 and 384.8 roubles respectively and the same with the United States and Japan had decreased drastically by about 2144.1 roubles and 788.1 roubles respectively.

Besides the trade, large joint projects in Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were completed with the help of American and West European assistance. For example, the
trans-European gas pipeline, five thousand kilometers long was constructed by major firms from France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Austria; the automatic plants in Izhevsk was built with the help of American, West German, Italian and French companies, a fertilizer complex in the Soviet Union was constructed with American participation, and a large iron and steel plant near Kursk was built with the participation of West German firms. 6

While the Soviet Union had always viewed trade and economic relations as a means to reinforce the foundation of detente, the U.S. had always tried to use trade as a weapon in its cold war, aimed at "punishment" or to squeeze political concessions. The Soviet Union too had always been aware of the fact that economic influence could be used as a weapon against them. 7 But such was its compulsion, as we now know, that it decided to risk it in order to keep its stagnant economy going on. On the other hand increase in the economic interaction between the East and the West was viewed by West Europeans as one of the ways to make the relations more normal. 8


8 ibid., p.38.
Political

Besides being interested in stabilizing the strategic relationship with Western Europe, the Soviet Union was also keen on reducing the influence of U.S. in these countries. The political interests of the Soviet Union was in turning Western Europe against the U.S. Thus its efforts were to turn the U.S. West European differences within NATO in its favour. The Soviet Union wanted to have maximum influence over the developments in former West Germany in particular and in Western Europe in general. There were dissensions within the Western alliance on economic and political issues. For example, during the sixties and the seventies, the East-West trade policy of America and Western Europe were relatively harmonious. But when the United States imposed trade sanctions against the Soviet Union after its intervention in Afghanistan, it was no doubt supported but only by a very reluctant Western Europe. Besides, when martial law was declared in Poland, the validity of American sanctions against the Soviet Union, in this case the banning of the sale of gas pipe line technology, was again questioned by the West European allies.
In January 1982, the Reagan administration imposed a ban on the sale of equipment made in the U.S. for use in building a planned 3500 mile pipeline to deliver natural gas from Siberia to Western Europe. President Reagan in June 1982, extended the ban to include sale of equipment produced by U.S. subsidiaries abroad or foreign firms that were licensees of American companies. This action was condemned by the European leaders. An unanimous declaration by the ministers of the European community on 22 June '82, protested that the restriction on licensees, implied extraterritorial extension of United States jurisdiction. The news papers in general viewed this crisis as a threat to the unity of the alliance. The comment by the Guardian (Manchester) showed the typical exasperation. It wrote, "the trouble with East-West crises, is that they all too rapidly turn into West-West crisis. So it is again."  


Strategic

Its geographical proximity and the presence of nuclear weapons in Western Europe aroused great concern in the Soviet Union.

The flexible response strategy and the possibility of a limited nuclear war advocated by the United States raised Soviet concern about its security. Even a limited tactical/theatre nuclear exchange would have badly affected the Soviet population. Hence from 1960s onwards, the agenda of the United States-Soviet arms control negotiations included not only the strategic nuclear forces but also the Forward Based System (FBS) of the United States in Western Europe. The FBS included the United States war planes stationed in Britain, West Germany and other European countries. Besides the Soviets were also concerned about the independent nuclear forces of Britain and France. Strategically, in order to balance the "theatre" nuclear forces of Britain and France, the Soviet Union had stationed Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) on its western side with capacity to hit targets in Western Europe. Politically, these nuclear weapons also served the purpose of warning Western Europe to keep off from the United States-Soviet rivalry.
In 1975, the Soviet Union began the modernization of its SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with mobile three war headed SS-20 missiles. The NATO consequently took the decision to modernise its theatre nuclear weapons to counter the SS-20 missiles in 1979. It was decided to deploy new Long Range Theatre Nuclear Missiles like Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM). These long range missiles were capable of hitting targets deep inside the Soviet Union. Thus they posed a direct threat to latter's security. These nuclear missiles enhanced the strategic importance of Western Europe to the Soviet Union.

AMERICAN INTEREST IN WESTERN EUROPE

One should not forget that not too long ago the United States was viewed as an extension of the Atlantic Community. Even today ethnic groups of European origin (like Italian Americans, Polish Americans, etc.) feel emotionally and culturally linked to countries of their origin. The broad American interest in Western Europe would be discussed under the following three categories:

Economic Interest

The economies of Western Europe and America are inter-connected. For instance, during early 1980s, of all the United States' investment abroad nearly half was in Western Europe. The European investments in the United States amounted to more than 70 per cent of all its overseas investments. The United States was running a trade surplus with Western Europe of about $20 billion. Besides, the United States and Europe had about equal shares of the total Gross National Product (GNP) of the world's market economies. America's interest in maintaining a free trade system led to a close collaboration with Western Europe in the management of the world economy. Besides, its interest in encouraging a free market system in the third world and its interest in applying joint economic pressure, when feasible and appropriate, against hostile political forces resulted in a close collaboration with Western Europe.12

The United States policy after the second world war has operated from Sir Halford F. Mackinder's (the great British geopolitical thinker) frame work. Mackinder predicted that Moscow's victory in second world war would

make her the greatest land power on the globe. Moreover, she will be the power in the strategically strongest defensive position. The Heartland is the greatest natural fortress on earth. For the first time in history it is manned by a garrison sufficient both in number and quality. In tune with this the American foreign policy was essentially formulated with the conviction that no hostile or potentially hostile nation should be permitted to dominate both the Atlantic and Pacific rimlands which are rich in raw materials and industries. Integration of the economy of the independent West European countries by a hostile nation had to be resisted. Their national security objective was the "containment" of Soviet geographic and ideological expansion.

Cultural Ties

The United States has rich cultural linkages with Western Europe. Up to 1700, the great majority of immigrants into the U.S. were English. Later, the largest group of immigrants came from Scotland and Ireland. After


1815, the European immigration into the United States began to gather momentum. Nearly all the immigrants came from Northern and Western Europe, mainly - Ireland, Germany, Britain, Canada and smaller numbers from Switzerland, the Netherlands and Scandinavia. They came mainly because of the economic pressure at home. Between 1815 and 1860 there were nearly five million immigrants, more than the entire population of the United States in 1790. During 1930s, most of the immigrants were refugees mainly German Jews who had fled from Nazi persecution. Until the end of the nineteenth century, many private enterprises in the United States were nourished by European capital. These early European immigrants introduced a culture which was economically more productive and militarily stronger. Thus the Europeans who had immigrated to get better jobs stayed back and settled in the United States. These immigrants slowly stopped identifying themselves with their countries of origin and worked unitedly to build up the present America into a powerful Super Power. Thus a very large number of American families are of European origin in some way.

Strategic Interests

The foreign policy of the United States has evolved from isolation to entering into an entangling military alliance with Western Europe. NATO is the result of the realization on the one hand of the Soviet threat to the United States and on the other the importance of Western Europe in its ideological and military confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee Report of 29 April 1947 analysed that the vulnerable portion of the United States defence lies on the eastern shore of the Atlantic and suggested the Western Europe as the potential ally in case of war with the Soviet Union.

Hence from 1945 till today, Western Europe has remained an area of vital national interest to the United States. President Richard Nixon in his foreign policy report to the Congress on 18 February 1970, stated that "we can no more disengage from Europe than from Alaska" and he went on to say that despite the hegemonic position of the United States in the alliance, it has never conceived of its


17 ibid., p.73.
relationship with the Europeans narrowly in terms of absolute power positions. Its aim in Western Europe is to have a viable partner. \(^{18}\) This has made the Atlantic alliance workable and durable. The report stated:

...the defense of the United States and Canada in North America and of Great Britain and France in Western Europe is inseparable from the combined defense of them all is not a question of what men think now, but is something that has been demonstrated... in actual warfare in the past. This means that the entire area of Western Europe is in the first place an area of strategic importance to the United States in the event of ideological warfare. \(^{19}\)

The five permanent members of the United Nations were the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. With the latter two being communist powers, the United States was politically interested in the other two countries remaining as free, and democratic so as to have more influence in world affairs.

The game between the United States and the Soviet Union was essentially a non-zero sum game. Not every gain for the Soviet Union was a loss for the United States. But America was interested in keeping Western Europe out of Soviet influence. Besides, the ideological division of


\(^{19}\) Etzold and Gaddis, n.16, p.73.
Europe into East and West, the maintenance of the military balance and retaining peace by balance of terror, in a way served the interests of both the United States and U.S.S.R.

THE STRATEGIC DOCTRINES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

In post second world war years, for America, the Soviet Union was the main concern in the formulation of its foreign policy and containment of Soviet power globally and particularly in Western Europe was its prime national interest. The Soviet Union's vital interests were in matching the nuclear power of the United States and simultaneously competing with the power and influence of the United States over its allies by successfully projecting its image as a peace seeker in Western Europe. Hence, Western Europe became the stage where the Super Powers competed to gain political, economic and propaganda advantage. It was also pictured as the potential theatre for any future dreadful nuclear war.

The table given below captures the complexity of the competing Super Power interest in Western Europe.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of National Interest</th>
<th>Elements of Policy</th>
<th>Military Strategy</th>
<th>Strategic Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic well-being</strong></td>
<td>Maintain and expand trade and investments. Continue free passage over international air/sea routes.</td>
<td>US/NATO naval force presence to demonstrate access to lines of communication. Forward Basing to enhance force presence.</td>
<td>Burden sharing. Rationalization, standardization and interruptability.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The term "strategy" is derived from the Greek word "strategos" i.e., the art of the general. Policy and strategy are two different terms. While policy outlines the general principles governing a country's relations with the other nations, strategy devices the means or ways to effectively implement the policy.\textsuperscript{20}

The two Super Powers had formulated various policies and strategies to balance each other's power and influence in Western Europe. To politically contain the spread of Soviet power and Communist ideology, and in order to safeguard its own security interests, the United States formulated the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in 1947. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in 1949 to militarily contain the spread of Soviet Union's power.

The strategic doctrine was a sort of justification for the use of the nuclear force. It included various targets for nuclear attack, detailed plans for the implementation of such an attack and encompassed the goals for which the nation would go to war and the conditions under which wars would be fought. In both its technical and

its political aspects, strategic doctrine was constrained by the available technology and "lies at the inter-face of technology and politics". 21

In the Soviet Union, military doctrine had a broader meaning. It had been defined as "an officially accepted system of views in a given state and in its armed forces on the nature of war and methods of conducting it and on preparation of the country and army for war. 22

American Nuclear Strategy:

The American strategic nuclear doctrines and its strategy for ensuring the security of Western Europe had evolved over the past years in response to the developments in the Soviet Union. One of the significant developments to which the United States had to respond was that Soviet Union's stockpile of nuclear weapons had increased and due to technological advances in the missile technology its nuclear weapons had become more accurate and precise. The US also felt the need to counter Soviet propaganda in the Third World. Therefore it changed its nuclear strategy. It


wanted to ensure its own security and that of Western Europe.  

The United States enjoyed nuclear monopoly till 1949, when the Soviet Union first exploded its nuclear device. The year 1950, saw the preparation of the highly secret National Security Council document NSC-68, with its evaluation that a world-wide communist threat existed.

The decision to deploy nuclear weapons in Western Europe was taken by President Eisenhower in his "New Look" policy in 1953. The "New Look" policy required the amendment of the United States Atomic Energy Act, so that technical information about the nuclear weapons might be made available to the allies. The idea that a massive conventional attack by the Soviet Union on Western Europe would be countered by the American nuclear weapons bolstered the confidence of West Europeans.

During the first world war, the ability to strike at the heart of enemy's power was described as a "strategic" capability. Thus during the second world war there was "strategic bombardment" using "strategic bombers" under a "strategic Air Command" (SAC)  But after the availability

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of atomic weapon, the question much more was of how to carry and deliver these atom bombs into the territory of the enemy. It was believed in the 1940s that for the next decade the only vehicle for delivering an atomic bomb with adequate accuracy would be the conventionally piloted aircraft. 25 The progress in the technology of guided missile changed the situation radically.

Deterrence

Deterrence was the credible threat of unacceptable counteraction communicated to the enemy by a variety of means: policy statements, statements of one's intentions, diplomatic notes and actions. The deployment of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) in Western Europe was mainly based on this concept of deterrence. The idea of deterrence was based on three expectations, rational behaviour of the enemy, that the enemy did not have the technical capacity to deter the attack and that it was daunted by the thought of the attack. 26 The Atlantic defence was mainly concerned about the territorial integrity and political independence of the Atlantic states.

25 ibid., p.27.

Deterrence could be said to be based on offensive capability, meaning the ability to inflict intolerable damage on the adversary. Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defence in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, stated that unacceptable destruction would require one-fourth to one-third fatalities to a population of a large industrialized nation and destruction of half to two-thirds of the entire industrial capacity.\textsuperscript{27} Thus, according to American strategy, the best way to deter the atomic bombardment by one state was to threaten it with counter-attack by nuclear weapons. Mutual vulnerability of both the Super Powers assured security.

In 1946, General Arnold who developed the concept of "retaliation", stated that "Our first line of defense is the ability to retaliate even after receiving the hardest blow the enemy can deliver".\textsuperscript{28} Thus with the advancements in nuclear technology, both the Super Powers reconciled to the fact that there could be no absolute defence and that the mutual vulnerability to nuclear attack maintained the balance of terror in the nuclear age.


\textsuperscript{28} Freedman, n.24, p.41.
Massive Retaliation

In 1954, the then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced the "Doctrine of Massive Retaliation". He stated that the United States "reserved the option to retaliate,...by means and at places of our own choosing."\(^{29}\)

It was adopted at a time when the United States was rapidly losing its ability to strike the Soviet Union without the fear of an unacceptable Soviet retaliation.

Under this doctrine, the retaliatory capacity had to be maintained with high precision and readiness and from time to time technologically updated. The situation would remain stable till neither power by striking first could destroy the other's ability to strike back. This doctrine was applied by America only to places which were of vital importance to its interests like Western Europe. It meant that any incursion by the Warsaw Pact forces in Western Europe would be met with an overwhelming strategic nuclear onslaught.

In 1955, the talk about the "bomber gap" was started by the United States and it began to spend more on defence. Later between 1957 and 1961, with the Soviet Union

\(^{29}\) ibid., p.85.
successfully placing the first earth satellite in orbit, there was talk about, "Missile gap". But in 1961, Secretary of Defence McNamara, claimed that the missile gap was a "myth". But this illusion helped in the development of advanced nuclear weapon systems and caused shift in the American nuclear strategy.

Thus the fear of Soviet aggression helped in the construction of advanced missile systems. With the Soviet advancements in nuclear technology, the vulnerability of the United States to the attack by the Soviet Union began to increase. The weakness of the American inability to fight a limited nuclear or conventional war with the Soviet Union was realized.

Flexible Response

"Flexible Response" was the United States answer to the Soviet advancements in nuclear technology and delivery system. Substantial part of the doctrine was developed by Kennedy and McNamara.

In 1962, Robert McNamara announced the change in the strategic doctrine to that of "flexible response". It meant that the United States would respond according to the degree

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and kind of challenges covering both limited and major conventional war capabilities. McNamara felt that the nuclear superiority, should be measured not in terms of the number of missile launchers available but only in terms of the number of warheads that could be delivered on individual targets efficiently so as to destroy them completely.31

Flexible response meant that any attack on NATO would be met with appropriate conventional, tactical, theatre or strategic nuclear arms. From this point onwards, a number of tactical and theatre nuclear weapons were deployed, essentially to counter the Soviet superiority in conventional weapon systems. Western Europe was the only area where a large number of the United States nuclear weapon systems were set up. The doctrine rested on the threat to resort to nuclear weapons in the event of the failure of conventional weapons and the gradual escalation of war.

The United States nuclear forces in Western Europe were capable of conducting both counter force attack, with the aim to knock out enemy's strategic forces and counter-

value attack, with the aim to destroy the cities of the enemy. 32

To implement the policy, McNamara established the United States Strike Command by placing the Strategic Army Command and the Tactical Air Command of the Air Force under joint command. This force was to provide an "...integrated mobile, high combat ready force, available to augment the unified commands overseas or to be employed as the primary force in remote areas. 33

As Kennedy stated: "Any potential aggressor contemplating an attack on any part of the Free World must know that our response will be suitable, selective, swift and effective". 34 In the sixties, the Soviet Union reached nuclear parity with the United States. This led to the situation of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). The American military strategy had always been formulated keeping in view American role in the world and the extent of its commitments to allies. It realized the importance of strengthening the


33 McNamara, p.27, p.56.

conventional forces so as to avoid recourse to strategic nuclear weapons as far as possible. Thus the doctrine of fighting, "two and a half war" was developed by Kennedy and McNamara. McNamara later stated, "...we had to provide in addition to our NATO requirements, the forces required to meet such an attack in Asia (by China) as well as fulfill our commitments in the Western Hemisphere". 35

**Limited War**

The American strategists advocated, "a limited War" concept whose intellectual genesis could be traced to Captain Basil Liddell Hart. Later, Robert Osgood, an eminent scholar of International Relations, stated that if there was to be a strategy of deterrence it had to be credible and that "credibility, in turn, requires that the means of deterrence be proportionate to the objectives at stake." 36 Further, Osgood in his book, *Limited War Revisited* talked about the nuclear war as a rational instrument of

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policy which was being facilitated by new technical advancement. 37

The Presidential Directive 59 was signed by President Jimmy Carter on 25 July 1980. It marked an important change in America's nuclear policy. It was derived from a war Plan known as National Security Decision Memorandum 242 formulated in the closing months of the Ford administration. The document states that the American nuclear forces "must prevail and be able to force the Soviet Union to seek the earliest termination of hostilities on terms favourable to the United States." The American ability to fight and win a limited nuclear war was advocated in this document. 38

While the American strategists called for the following up of limited objectives through limited nuclear war, most of the wars had started with confusion over war aims. Besides, the war resulting in the use of only theatre nuclear weapons might be a limited war for the United States but for the Soviet Union and Western Europe, even a tactical...


or theatre exchange was strategic because a large part of their population and territory would be affected.

When President Ronald Reagan came to power in January 1981 he increased the intensity of confrontations between the Super Powers. He promised to ensure the nuclear superiority of the United States. With him in office, the attention of the American nuclear strategists turned from building offensive to defensive nuclear weapons. With the American search for more security and superiority, the arms race had escalated into space. Air Force major General Keegan and Army Lieut. General Daniel Graham were the leading advocates of the space weapons. Reagan discussed about missile killing technology based on laser and particle beam technology with his science adviser George Keyworth II. Still in the research and development stage, it was known as the "Strategic Defense Initiative"; popularly known as "Star war". 39

Doubts were raised whether the space weapons could strike the Soviet missiles even before they were launched. The technological development was stated to have the capacity to destroy the Soviet Missiles only after they were launched.

39 Time (Chicago), 4 April 1983, p.4.
It was claimed that when the Soviet missile would be launched it would send warning signals to the sensor satellites orbiting above and one of the satellites would send a powerful beam of light or some sub-atomic particles which would hit the missile and fasten it to the ground. It was stated that when the missile re-entered the atmosphere, it would be reduced to harmless fragments.40

The United States under Reagan had started searching for new defensive systems which would make the large stockpiles of nuclear weapons redundant. But no nation could possibly get absolute security in this nuclear age. The Star War weapons could lend only to the escalation of arms race. However, the basic strategic doctrines of the United States did not change since the Star War plans were only in the research and development stage. Jonathan Alford of the International Institute of Strategic Studies; London, stated that "the proposal intends to put a bubble over the United States and that would be followed by a bubble over the Soviet Union. If we cannot threaten to strike the Soviet Union, we Europeans are going to be out in the cold".41 Thus the American commitment to West European security was doubted because of this Star War initiative.

41 ibid., p.4.
The Europeans felt that once the American territories were protected from the Soviet attack, the United States would not protect the West European territories. If the Star War plans proved practicable it would cause revolutionary changes in the nuclear strategy.

The Soviet Union vehemently opposed the Star War plans. Yuri Andropov, the then Soviet Premier commenting on the American Strategic Defence Initiative stated:

...On the face of it, laymen may find it even attractive as the President speaks about what seem to be defensive measures. But this may seem to be so only on the face of it and only to those who are not conversant with these matters. In fact the strategic offensive forces of the United States will continue to be developed and upgraded at full tilt and along with a definite line at that namely that of acquiring a first nuclear strike capability. Under these conditions the intention to secure itself the possibility of destroying with the help of the ABM defenses (of) the corresponding strategic systems of the other side, that is of rendering it unable of dealing a retaliatory strike, is a bid to disarm the Soviet Union in the face of the United States nuclear threat.42

While the United States believed in fighting and winning a limited nuclear war and followed a strategy of

flexible response with gradual escalation of war the Soviet Union had different strategic concepts and doctrines of its own. While it was essential that two person - playing a game - came to an understanding on the basic rules of the game, the two nuclear Super Powers followed opposite strategies and did not believe in the concepts advocated by the other.

SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

Soviet Union viewed America as the yardstick by which to measure its successes. It had always yearned for acceptance of its equality by the United States. At the same time it had always adopted a hostile posture and attempted to undermine America's international position thereby enhancing its own Super Power status. Since 1945, from Stalin down to Gorbachev, the United States had been considered as an obstacle to Soviet international ambitions. But at the same time, the Soviet Union had needed scientific and technological assistance for its economic growth. Thus while it was competing militarily


with the United States, it always maintained its economic ties with the latter. The Soviet nuclear doctrines were not generally as openly expressed as in the case of the United States.

The official Soviet doctrine till Stalin's death was, "permanently operating Factors". It was war seen as a massive fight between two societies, in which the final outcome of the war depended on the strength or the weakness of the attacker. The permanently operating factors were: "The stability of the rear; the morale of the army; the quantity and quality of divisions; the armaments of the army; and the organizational ability of the army commanders". 45

After Stalin's death in 1953, it was realized that with the employment of atomic and hydrogen bombs, surprise was one of the important factors for the attainment of success in war. The ground forces were considered to be very important in the war. 46

"Vnezapnost" was one of the most important Soviet military doctrine. It envisaged the selection of the

45 Freedman, n.24, p.58.
military action in such a way that at the proper time it hit
the enemy when he was least prepared for the attack. Then
the enemy would be in no position to organize resistance.
It was to be achieved by confusing the enemy of one's
intentions. The preparations for the war were to be kept
secret and new methods to fight the enemy were to be used.
The correct place for a strike was to be chosen in such a
way that by using methods unfamiliar to the enemy advantages
were to be gained. 47

Thus, the Soviet military doctrine envisaged a
traditional strategy, which was aimed at achieving victory
in war by destroying the enemy's war potential and by
surviving its attacks. Hence, victory in a nuclear war had
been the basis of Soviet strategic thinking through these
years. 48

Analysing the potential objectives of the Soviet
strategic doctrines, John D. Ziak, a renowned political
scientist, stated that the aim of the Soviet Union was to
continue working politically, economically and militarily

47 Jennie A. Stevens and Henry S. Marsh, "Surprise and
Deception in Soviet Military Thought", Part I,
Military Review (Ft. Leavenworth), vol.62, no.6, June
1982, p.5.

48 Keith B. Payne, ed., Nuclear Deterrence in US-Soviet
even after the nuclear exchange and that it primarily aimed at the complete destruction of the enemy forces and at the same time to occupy Europe. He further stated that the Soviet Union planned to recover from the ravages of the nuclear was as soon as possible. 49

The Soviet Union had built its nuclear weapons to act as a deterrent to any American attack and at the same time with the capacity to fight a nuclear war. The Soviet nuclear forces were divided into "active" forces which were maintained in order to conduct surprise nuclear attacks on the enemy and the "passive" forces which were maintained in order to defend its territories from the enemy attack. Thus the Soviet Union prepared its nuclear forces for both offensive and defensive purposes. 50

Till 1958, the Soviet Union relied on its ICBM capacity to carry surprise attacks. But with the missiles of the Soviet Union not possessing the capacity to travel intercontinental distances, Khrushchev in 1962 tried to place Soviet medium and Intermediate Range Nuclear Missiles in Cuba with capacity to strike the targets in the United States. But the latter demanded their withdrawal prior to


50 Payne, n.48, p.156.
A vital lacunae was revealed in the Soviet strategic plan, when under pressure from the United States, the missiles had to be withdrawn from Cuba.

After this incident, Khruschev realized that it was much more in the interest of the Soviet Union to follow friendly relations with the United States. He took the option of influencing moderate elements within the decision making process in the United States into adopting policy favourable to the Soviet Union. 52

But when Khrushchev fell in 1964, once again the voice of the persons favouring the build up of military gained ascendancy. Besides, the political situation in the later 1960s favoured the Soviet arms build up. In 1960s, while the American resources where diverted towards the Vietnam war, the Soviet concentrated their resources during that time in the research and development of nuclear weapons and gained strategic parity with the United States. The SALT I treaty signed between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972 was considered by the Soviets as the


American recognition of their equal status. There had been shift in the Soviet military policy from time to time.

In the early 1960s, when the Soviets were lagging behind the United States in strategic forces, the Soviet military thought stressed the importance of preparing to fight and win a nuclear war, and superiority was to be of great importance. At the end of the decade, when the Soviet Union achieved strategic parity, some military theorists came to accept that this relationship of parity while far from ideal, was the best that could be attained in the circumstances. The pursuit of superiority would be costly and would possibly not succeed, because the United States would respond in similar vein by building up its own nuclear arsenal.53

The Soviet Union had always relied on the policy of minimum deterrence and threatened to use the nuclear weapons only in retaliation against their use by the United States. It had renounced the first use of nuclear weapons. Time and again the Soviet Union had made this clear through public statements made in different world forums. Foreign Minister Gromyko stated in the United Nations General Assembly in 1982 that his country would not be the first to use the

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nuclear weapons in any war. 54 Besides, the Soviet Union distinguished between the use and non-use of nuclear weapons but never the different levels of escalation of nuclear war as envisaged by the United States in its "flexible response" doctrine. It always issued warnings of massive retaliation against the territory of United States even in response to the attack by theatre nuclear forces of the United States stationed in Western Europe. 55

Besides, the Soviet Union did not believe in the "assured vulnerability" of the targets. While it wanted to destroy the strategic forces of the United States, it was always prepared for the protection of its vital social assets. It felt that the attainment of strategic parity with the United States helped it to support and protect its targets from the attack. 56

Ironically, despite the enhanced nuclear weapon capabilities, the Super Powers, instead of feeling more secure felt more insecure. While, each nation had been able to develop its nuclear weapons with capacity to strike targets deep inside the territory of the other, it could not

54 Payne, n.48, p.134.
55 ibid., p.135.
56 ibid., p.151.
effectively produce nuclear weapons or any defensive system which could protect its territories from the nuclear attack of its enemy. Thus, in spite of the Soviet Union attaining nuclear parity with the United States the mutual vulnerability had helped in preventing a nuclear war and in stabilizing the strategic situation. The Soviet Union had also accepted that any future nuclear war would prove to be destructive both for the aggressor and the victim.

But during Khrushchev's leadership the Soviet Union came to believe that it could fight and win a conventional warfare. This was alleged by the United States as the main reason behind the Soviet declaration of no first use of nuclear weapons. Besides the Soviet Union wanted the United States and Western Europe to pledge no first use of nuclear weapons. It was viewed by the United States as its strategy to win an exclusively conventional war since the Soviet Union enjoyed parity with the United States in strategic nuclear forces and superiority in conventional nuclear weapons. 57

Besides, the Soviet Union did not believe in the concept of assured vulnerability and flexible targeting. It

was officially stated in the United States Department of Defence publication that:

...In developing and deploying their strategic nuclear forces, the Soviets have subscribed neither to Western notions of strategic sufficiency nor to the concept of assured destruction. Instead, while they believe that nuclear war and its debilitating results must be avoided, they see the development of superior capabilities wedded to a strategy designed to achieve military victory and a dominant postwar position as the only national approach to nuclear forces.58

The Soviet Union viewed the various strategic doctrines of the United States like the first strike theory and the limited war concept as not conducive to peaceful coexistence. It did not believe in the gradual escalation of the nuclear war and had repeatedly warned that any nuclear war once started would only be an all-out war and could not be limited as the United States believed. It viewed the theatre nuclear forces of the United States in Western Europe as strategic as they were capable of striking targets in the Soviet Union. Besides, the fear of Soviet retaliatory strikes against the United States had forced the latter to seek political rather than military answers to the threat posed by the Soviet Union.

Through its military strategic doctrines the Soviet Union sought to achieve certain objectives. These doctrines revealed the method by which Soviets would wage war.

58 Payne, n.48, p.205.
### SOVIET PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY ART

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles of Military Art</th>
<th>Primary Objectives</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobility and high tempo of Combat operations</td>
<td>To achieve and sustain rapid combat force movement for rapid mission accomplishment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Concentration of Efforts</td>
<td>To achieve superiority by massive fire, to create breaches for breakthrough operations and so-forth.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Surprise</td>
<td>To attain rapid and complete victory by surprising the enemy losses and minimizing friendly force attrition.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat Activeness</td>
<td>To seize and maintain combat initiative and reduce the likelihood of successful enemy breakthrough operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preservation of combat effectiveness</td>
<td>To reduce the loss of personnel and equipment, enabling pursuit of combat objectives; to allocate and reallocate units effectively within the order of battle.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conformity of goals</td>
<td>To assure that military objectives conform to the actual battle-field situation based on asset availability, enemy capabilities so-forth.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-ordination/integration</td>
<td>To assure the success of combined aims operations.</td>
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59 Stevens and Marsh, n.47, p.9.
The strategic perceptions of military balance of the two Super powers were different from each other.

The advanced nuclear technology of the United States facilitated the missiles to have greater precision and serve its flexible response strategy. But the Soviet nuclear weapons were intended to smash the paths through enemy formations. They were not intended to have pinpoint accuracy. This lead to the different ways of fighting a nuclear war while the United States liked to limit the nuclear war, the Soviet missile technology did not permit the same. 60

The United States was often reluctant and hesitant in the pursuit of detente with the Soviet Union because of its fear that such a policy would lead to the establishment of a world order with Soviet strategic superiority. Besides, the strategic policies of the United States had always evolved taking into account the security interests of Western Europe. Europe had been artificially divided and had remained so since the end of the Second World War till the last years of 1980s. The peace was maintained in this

region by the fear of mutual annihilation which retracted the aggressive intentions of both the Super Powers.

With the increasing strategic capability of the Soviet Union, the strategic policy of the United States had evolved and changed but within the overall perspective of its commitment to European security. But the West European countries had entertained serious doubts about the reliability of the United States commitment and this had caused strained relations within the alliance. For example, though the West European governments joined the United States in condemning the Soviet action in Afghanistan and Poland, they were reluctant to impose economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. 61

Time and again the United States had tried to demonstrate the sincerity of its commitment by stationing American troops in Western Europe and by strategic policy of flexible response which linked the use of tactical, theatre and strategic nuclear weapons in a process of escalation of the nuclear war. Once again, in 1979 in order to prove its

commitment to the security of Western Europe the United States agreed to the European request for the deployment of Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missile. The political, economic and the strategic reasons which aided the implementation of this NATO theatre nuclear modernisation programme will be dealt in the following chapter.