Chapter I

FROM CAVE TO LIGHT

What men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find reasonable what at other periods they find unreasonable and vice-versa.

On Certainty

Revolution in Philosophy: Early Wittgenstein: It has been said that the Tractatus brought about a revolution in philosophy. What kind of revolution was brought about? Who was responsible for bringing about this revolution? Wittgenstein. He was a living legend. Barely three decades have passed since his death, yet I feel I am working on a Philosopher of great antiquity perhaps because he has received as much attention as any great philosopher of the past. As early as November 15, 1914, Wittgenstein remarked, "Don't worry about what you have already written. Just keep beginning to think afresh as if nothing at all happened yet."¹

True to this remark Wittgenstein kept on writing and sometimes really did not worry about what he wrote the day before, so he left behind him highly stimulating yet controversial views. He did not hesitate in considering some view as reasonable which at some other time he had considered to be unreasonable. So one need not read the writings of others to either praise or condemn his views for he was his own critic. He was not the kind of philosopher who would defend a given view simply because it happened

¹ Notebooks p.30 (6)
to be his own. He knew he was not incorrigible. The publication of the Tractatus in 1921 was considered to be a landmark in the history of philosophy and was so highly celebrated that some people thought that philosophy was born in 1921. This is an extreme view to which Russell reacted in the following manner: "Those who really think philosophy began in 1921, or at any rate not long before, fail to see that current philosophical problems have not arisen all of a sudden and out of nothing." \(^2\) The extreme view that philosophy was born in 1921 did not come about without reason. It was perhaps an exaggeration of the impact of the totally novel spirit and technique of doing philosophy introduced by Wittgenstein. Philosophy did not emerge "all of a sudden and out of nothing" but what went on before 1921 was according to Wittgenstein, something like alchemy. Just as alchemy gave birth to chemistry (a science) so also, the earlier writings gave birth to philosophy. Even Russell cannot deny the new way of philosophising introduced by Wittgenstein. The Wittgensteinian and post-Wittgensteinian philosophy is quite unlike what was done in the pre-Wittgensteinian days. In his Blue Book Wittgenstein comments about his own kind of philosophising, "Every particular notation stresses some particular point of view. If, e.g. we call our investigations "philosophy", this title, on the one hand seems appropriate, on the other hand it certainly has misled people. (One might say that the subject we are dealing with is one of the heirs of the subject which used to be called "philosophy")" \(^3\) Wittgensteinian philosophy is a class apart and


\(^3\) Blue and Brown Books p. 28.
cannot be compared with the works of his contemporaries or pre-
deceivers. What has been done by Wittgenstein has no historical
analogue. This however does not mean that there were no similarities
between his thoughts and say the thoughts of Plato, Aristotle,
Hume, etc.

About his own way of philosophising, Wittgenstein never admits
that it "happened all of a sudden and out of nothing". If he meant
this he would not have considered his Tractatus as "dealing with
problems of philosophy." 4 Moreover further remarks of the preface
would have been impossible to make. He says "I do not wish to judge
how far my efforts coincide with those of other philosophers. Indeed
what I have written here makes no claim to novelty in detail the
reason why I give no sources is that it is a matter of indifference
to me whether the thoughts that I have had have been anticipated
by someone else." 5 It is seen that Wittgenstein himself makes
no claim to novelty of thought, though his Tractatus has been de-
clared to be an extremely novel experiment in philosophical thinking.
He is quite conscious that his thoughts might have been "antici-
pated by others." However he made no attempt to see whether his
views were anticipated by any other great philosopher of the past.
Neither was Wittgenstein a historian of philosophy nor was the
history of philosophy important to him. What was of importance
to him was the solution of philosophical problems. He was aware
that others too have offered various solutions. Wittgenstein's
mind was philosophically sensitive and recepitive to philosophical

4. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Preface, p. 3.
5. Ibid.
influences. About the influence of others on him Wittgenstein admits in the *Tractatus* that "I am indebted to Frege's great works and to the writings of my friend Mr. Bertrand Russell for much of the stimulation of my thoughts."\(^6\) Frege's influence on Wittgenstein was profound and it continued till the end of his life. Frege's influence is present even in the repudiation of the *Tractatus* and Frege in the later part of his life. Even in *Zettel*, Wittgenstein states, "The style of my sentences is extraordinarily strongly influenced by Frege. And if I wanted to, I could see it."\(^7\) Wittgenstein seems to accept the influence of Frege an innocent and child-like manner. According to Dummett, Frege influenced Wittgenstein more than Russell. Dummett says, "The *Tractatus* pays profound homage to Frege, homage that is pointedly more intense than that paid to Russell, and is crammed with reference to his doctrines; indeed, the book is virtually unintelligible without an understanding of its Fregean background."\(^8\) However, what I feel is that the conceptual apparatus of Frege and the atomistic hypothesis of Russell, were partly, if not wholly responsible for the production of the *Tractatus*. But this does not decrease the superiority of Wittgenstein or his work in any way. For the *Tractatus* remains a landmark in the history of philosophy. According to Dummett Wittgenstein gave a specific formulation to the task of philosophy. He says "It is to Wittgenstein that we owe the formulation of the thesis that 'all philosophy is critique of language'. Frege never formulated a programme for philosophy as a whole, nor claimed to be

\(^6\) Ibid. \(^7\) *Zettel*, 712. 

more than a logician and a philosopher of mathematics."9 Dummett further accepts, "It is probably due to Wittgenstein that Frege is read by philosophers to-day."10 Frege will live so long as the Tractarian Wittgenstein lives.

The view that philosophy is a critique of language, helps to purge philosophy of its Cartesian element, from its epistemological bias. Wittgenstein gave a new turn to philosophy, a new direction to its flow. Though later he discovered that it was not the right kind of turn. Although when he wrote the Tractatus he sincerely believed that "the truth of the thoughts" he expressed is "unassailable and definitive" and he has produced the final solution of the problems."11 What was the new turn that Wittgenstein gave to philosophy with the publication of his Tractatus? It is true not only of Descartes, but also true of his adversaries the empiricists, that they reduced philosophy to epistemology. Dummett too points out, "For Descartes, the question 'What do we know?' was not just the starting point of philosophical enquiry, but the central question of all philosophy." For the "empiricists ... epistemology was prior to other branches of philosophy because it indicated the only possible route to the analysis of ideas."12 The empiricists differ from Descartes because they have changed the central question of philosophy from "What do we know" to "How do we know".13 Frege wanted to liberate philosophy from the Cartesian - empiricistic hold. As Dummet further

12. Dummett, p. 676. 13. Ibid.
remarks, "It was Frege who first perceived both the irrelevance of genetic questions and the inadequacy of the empiricistic conception of ideas." 14 Wittgenstein carried Frege's thought to its logical end. To quote Dummett again "The first philosopher fully to adopt Frege's perspective was Wittgenstein: the difference between him and Russell is brought out sharply if we compare the _Tractatus_ with _The Philosophy of Logical Atomism_. Many of the same doctrines are argued for in the two books, but in Russell's work they take on an epistemological guise which is lacking in the _Tractatus_. The _Tractatus_ is a pure essay in the theory of meaning, from which every trace of epistemological or psychological consideration has been purged as thoroughly as the house is purged of leaven before the passover." 15 It is because of Wittgenstein's constant attack on Frege for his psychologism that Wittgenstein succeeded where Frege failed.

It seems that for Wittgenstein anti-psychologism is connected with the anti-metaphysical. The removal of one will result in the removal of the other. If language is purged of its psychologism it would also be purged of its metaphysical bias. At that time the Vienna Circle philosophers were also in search of a theory of meaning which would purge philosophy of its metaphysical element and would give a dignified status to science. The metaphysicians of their time were Hegelians, who gave no importance to science, perhaps because they had no technical knowledge of science, and considered knowledge of science to be of no philosophical consequence. Not finding what they needed with the Hegelians, the Vienna Circle philosophers looked for

14. Ibid.  
15. Ibid., p. 679.
other avenues and finally found that the Tractatus fulfilled their need, for the theory of meaning propounded in that work is not only free from the psychological considerations, but it also prohibits metaphysics as an independent academic pursuit, and considers philosophy to be a method rather than a body of propositions. "Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts".... "Philosophy does not result in 'Philosophical propositions, but rather in the clarification of propositions."\textsuperscript{16} Thus Wittgenstein's Tractatus became the Bible of the circle. The major slogan of the Circle," The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification' was rightly or wrongly taken to be a variant of the picture theory of meaning. Of course the followers of Wittgenstein did not relish the idea that Wittgenstein should be treated as the God-father of Logical Positivism or that the Tractatus be treated like the Bible or the Communist Manifesto. Again, Dummett brings out the situation very clearly. He does not share the view of the followers of Wittgenstein. He gives his objective opinion when he says, "Admirers of Wittgenstein have complained that the positivists misinterpreted the Tractatus as a positivistic manifesto, and it may well be true that there is very little positivism actually in the Tractatus: but the complaint is unjustified all the same, because the book directly lends itself to this use. For the positivist, the sense of a sentence consists in the method of its verification, and verification is conceived of as direct confrontation with sense-data; verification on this view, is pure observation, into which linguistic operations (save the comparison with the actual sentence to be verified) do not enter.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{16} Tractatus, 4.112.  
\textsuperscript{17} Dummett, p. 636.
So viewed objectively Wittgenstein did encourage the positivistic movement and the positivists did make an attempt to study and understand the Tractatus, and its theory of meaning. However, when the positivists started making sense out of Wittgenstein's "essay in the picture theory of meaning", he had already started preparing his notes for writing another essay in the theory of meaning, "Meaning as use".

When one analyses the question about the originality of the Tractatus one notes that there is a sense in which the Tractatus is highly original, and also a sense in which nothing contained in it is original. In this book one can discern the thoughts of such great philosophers as Frege, Russell, Hume, Descartes, Schopenhauer; even Plato and Aristotle if one wishes. But it goes beyond all of them, not only singly, but also jointly. For none of them has the credit of achieving singly what Wittgenstein has achieved, and that too in just about twenty thousand words. While introducing the Tractatus Max Black points out, "Within a span of some twenty thousand words there are comments on the nature of the universe and the essence of language, important contributions to the foundations of logic and mathematics, penetrating criticism of the work of Frege and Russell, the outlines of a theory of probability, revolutionary ideas about philosophy of science, ethics, religion, and mysticism."18 The list given by Max Black is incomplete. What is striking is not just the long list of topics covered in these twenty thousand words but also the fact that these words have been articulated in a fairly

short time. Wittgenstein himself never claimed any originality except the originality of his style, method or approach. The philosophical problems which challenged Aristotle and Wittgenstein might have been the same, but Wittgenstein's solution of the problem is not Aristotelian. Wittgenstein reaffirms faith in the kind of originality he has in his later writing *Culture and Value*. He says, "I believe that my originality (if that is the right word) is an originality belonging to the soil rather than to the seed. (Perhaps I have no seed of my own). Sow a seed in my soil it will grow differently than it would if in any other soil." 19

Wittgenstein's soil however does not allow a seed to grow for a long time. Before it sprouts so much as to take the form of a tree Wittgenstein pulls it out, and again prepares the soil for sowing a new seed. He says, "Each morning you have to break through the dead rubble afresh so as to reach the living warm seed." 20 But he should have added that the 'living warm seed' of to-day will become the dead rubble of tomorrow. There is no chance for this warm seed to grow and mature into a living tree. In his *Notebooks* (Earliest Wittgenstein) he advised us to go "on thinking afresh as if nothing at all happened yet." And now in the days of *Culture and Value* (Latest Wittgenstein) he advises us to 'break through the dead rubble each morning'. This certainly exhibits a continuity of thought in the two Wittgenstein's. The later Wittgenstein approves of what was said by the early Wittgenstein, "Each morning think afresh", "Each morning break through the dead rubble". What was said in the past

19. *Culture and Value*, p. 36.
20. Ibid., p. 2.
is dead and gone. It is no use remembering it, for there can be no freshness in what is dead and gone. One has to bring out new fresh living thoughts from the dead rubble of the past. A philosopher who continues to stick to the dead issues is no philosopher.

While writing on the "Evolution of Prege's thought" for his book on Frege, Dummett quotes from William Black, "The man who never alters his opinion is like standing water, and breeds reptiles of the mind." 21 I do not know much about Frege, but whatever little I know about Wittgenstein leads me to say that Wittgenstein's mind was not of the kind to allow the breeding of reptiles. Although attempts have been made to find unity in Wittgenstein's thought, it is doubtful whether one would succeed in finding the kind of unity in Wittgenstein's thought as Dummett finds in Frege's thought. In fact it goes against the very spirit of Wittgensteinian thought to search for unity. The whole idea of search for unity is misleading. It is wrong to argue that I have only one body and therefore I have only one mind and therefore I have only one thought, or different thoughts having oneness in them. Just as the mind of man is unlike his body and cannot be compared or deduced from the body similarly about thoughts. I can have a thought today which is wholly unlike the thought I had yesterday. My thought today may contradict my earlier thought or exclude my earlier thought. But it just makes no sense to say that today my body is wholly unlike my body yesterday, or contradicts the body I had yesterday excludes it in any sense of the term.

What is the revolution in philosophy which the Tractatus has

brought about? The revolution consists in purging philosophy of its epistemological and psychological ingredients. The Tractatus is a revolt against the Cartesian empiricistic philosophy. Philosophers should direct their attention to the logic of language, and not to the epistemological or psychological questions.

Counter-Revolution in Philosophy: Later Wittgenstein. Every revolution is followed by a counter-revolution however short-lived the counter-revolution may be. The reactionary forces do not like the revolutionary changes. The counter offensive is launched with the intention of bringing back the old state, i.e., the state which existed prior to the revolution. Later Wittgenstein launches a counter-offensive against early Wittgenstein and in a sense also against Frege who inspired the revolution of the Tractatus. Perhaps Wittgenstein did not like the idea of his views being attacked by others. So, when he realised that his position was open to attack he started the attack himself. Wittgenstein thus excelled in both construction and destruction. Attack on his views from without would be superficial and Wittgenstein disliked superficiality, so he began the attack from within. He sought dignity even in rejection. Other philosophers may not give a fair treatment to his Tractatus. Dignified rejection lies in first understanding the views and then rejecting them and not in just superficial rejection. Therefore Wittgenstein himself became the leader of the counter-offensive. After all, who can know the strategy of the enemy camp better than the enemy himself. The seed of the Tractatus is no more warm and living, it is part of the dead rubble, therefore it is better to clear it out, Fresh seed is to be sown. In order to understand Wittgenstein's counter-revolution.
nary offensive, I would like to point out that the Tractarian de-
finition of epistemology or Theory of Knowledge is in terms of "Philos-
ophy of Psychology." The revolution that was brought about by
the *Tractatus* in Philosophy, as discussed earlier, was in terms of
purging philosophy of its epistemological and psychological ingre-
dients. The counter-revolution consists in converting the whole
of philosophy into philosophical psychology or making philosophical
psychology as the major theme of philosophy. All the work of later
Wittgenstein, whether it be the Blue and Brown Books or Zettel,
are full of philosophical psychology even if we exclude the two
volumes recently published on the *Philosophy of Psychology*. Later
Wittgenstein has shattered Frege's dream by bringing epistemology
back as the centre of focus. The Cartesian-empiricistic trend in
philosophy has been revived. The questions such as 'what do we know?'
and 'how do we know?' have again become the central questions of
philosophy. It seems as if later Wittgenstein is concerned only
with the solution of psychological muddles and logical rigour accord-
ing to Russell is at zero level. There is no scope for doubt that
the later work of Wittgenstein exhibits a counter-revolution for
it has brought philosophy back to its original state. The tractarian
ideal of purging philosophy of its epistemological and psychological
ingredients is not respected any more. Now it is not surprising that
Wittgenstein finds Freudian psychology interesting. From the Trac-
tarian point of view this is Wittgenstein's degradation to the lowest
nadir because he has started discussing empirical issues.

In his counter-offensive later Wittgenstein attacks not only
early Wittgenstein but also Frege's views on meaning, or rather,
the attack on Frege is one of the ways in which he is attacking his own earlier view. The theory of meaning proposed in the Tractatus according to later Wittgenstein is grounded in the false picture of language. It is this false picture which has led him to talk about the logic of our language" (23) or to think that 'all philosophy is a 'critique of language'" (24) Thus in his Blue Book Wittgenstein attacks Frege and lays a foundation for the new theory of meaning 'meaning as use'. If the earlier theory of meaning helped the Logical Positivists, the later theory helped the Ordinary Language Analysis Movement in Philosophy. Making explicit Frege's view of meaning Wittgenstein remarks, "Frege ridiculed the formalist conception of mathematics by saying that the formalists confused the unimportant thing, the sign, with the important, the meaning ... Frege's idea could be expressed thus: the propositions of mathematics, if they were just complexes of dashes, would be dead and utterly uninteresting, whereas they obviously have a kind of life. And the same of course, could be said of any proposition: Without a sense, or without the thought, a proposition would be an utterly dead and trivial thing." (25) Wittgenstein makes explicit the reason which might have led Frege to his dualism of 'sign' and 'sense', to his postulation of 'thought' as distinct from the psychical arts on the one hand and the physical universe on the other. But Wittgenstein thinks that one need not postulate the 'realm of sense' as distinct from the 'realm of sign' in order to search for the meaning of a sign. Arguing against Frege he says, "If we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we should have to say that it was its use." (26) Making explicit his

position he says further, "The sign (the sentence) gets its significance from the system of signs, from the language to which it belongs. Roughly: understanding a sentence means understanding a language." Wittgenstein is drawing our attention to the 'macro aspect of language' rather then to its 'micro aspect'. In his *Tractatus* he attempted to draw attention to the micro aspect for then he was of the opinion that a proposition "is understood by anyone who understands its constituents." And if a proposition "has no sense, that can only be because we failed to give a meaning to some of its constituents." Thus the basic unit of meaning or sense is a constituent of a proposition. If a 'word' is the constituent of a proposition, and if the proposition is identical with a 'sentence', then we can say that the meaning or sense of a sentence depends on the meaning or sense of the words occurring in it. The journey is towards the micro-aspect of a sentence. This journey according to later Wittgenstein is futile, is ill-directed. The idea of making such a journey arises by interpreting the expression 'sense of a sign' on the pattern of 'brother of Mary'. A sign is different from its sense as Mary is different from her brother. Instead of searching for the use of a sign, i.e., how the sign is used in a language both Wittgenstein and Frege were searching for what the sign stands, for the sense of a sign. As he says "The mistake we are liable to make could be expressed thus; We are looking for the use of a sign, but we look for it as though it were an object co-existing with the sign. (One of the reasons for this mistake is again that we are looking for a "thing corresponding to a substantive."). If the use of a sign

27. Ibid., p. 5. 
29. Ibid., 5.4733. 

*Tractatus*, 4.002.
is not something independent of the sign, then Frege's postulation of 'thought' involves the same kind of mistake as Wittgenstein's search for the 'simples'. The use of a sign does not presuppose a second reality co-existing with the sign. There is no need to consider the micro-aspect of a sentence. A sentence itself becomes the basic unit of meaning and meaning of a sentence depends on its use in a given context, and not on the fact that its constituents words stand for independent simples.

Those who deny the view that there are two Wittgenstein's the earlier and later, the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary would argue that the *Tractatus* itself presents a revolt against the view that in order to understand the sense of a sentence one must understand the sense of its constituents. In his *Tractatus* itself Wittgenstein revolts against commitment to logical atomism. For he said, "Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is - just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are produced." This implies that a proposition can be constructed without knowing the meaning of 'names' occurring in it. But how would it be to not know the meaning of names? The analogy of words with sounds misleads only if one is already captive of a certain picture about language. One may not know how the sounds are produced, yet as a matter of fact one produces them. Does Wittgenstein mean to say that one may use a sign but one may not know what its meaning is? But if one does not know what its meaning is, then how has one succeeded in using it at all. In understanding Wittgenstein's view one may find difficulties if one has

already fallen prey to the picture that the use of a sign depends on its having a meaning. Unless the sign has a meaning, there is no question of its being used. So I must first know the meaning of a sign in order to use it. But if the use of a sign is its meaning, or confers a meaning on it, then the sign can very well be used if one does not know the meaning of a sign in advance in order to use it. Meaning is use. The use of the sign is not consequent upon its meaning.

Consider now the view presented in the _Tractatus_ that all philosophy is a critique of language or that its function is to make explicit the logic of our language. When Wittgenstein presented this view he certainly did not mean to say that philosophy is concerned with _logics_ (plural) of languages (again plural). Though he had difficulties with his conception of language, the conception was, all the same, that of a straight forward simple language. At that time he did not feel that the difference between two languages could be the sort of difference which exists between two objects of a totally different kind, say, triangle and a tiger. That is why, he was led to think of the logic of language, as something which is the essence of language. It was because he pictured a simple language that he could think of its essence. According to him philosophical nonsense arose because philosophers fail to understand the logic of our language. As he says, "Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language." But even if we succeed in understanding the logic of our language, we cannot express our understanding in words, therefore all philosophy spoken or written is nonsensical. If this is the real situation then

32. _Tractatus_, 4.003.
Wittgenstein should not blame philosophers for their failure to understand the logic of our language, for their success too would not have been of much use. As a matter of fact, the word 'success' has also lost its meaning whether you understand or fail to understand, in both cases you cannot express yourself. This led Wittgenstein to the doctrine of maintaining silence, if the dignity of philosophy is to be maintained. This revolutionary consequence follows from the simplistic view of language. For he considered language to be a 'totality of propositions.' And he thought that "a proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it." This implies that the former can be considered as reality in miniature; it exhibits the structure of reality; it is its "logical picture." But all this implies that neither logic nor philosophy can be expressed in words. As Russell points out in his introduction to the Tractatus that a "proposition. . . . has in common with the fact a certain structure"...
"but the structure cannot itself be put into words, since it is a structure of words as well as of the facts to which they refer. Everything, therefore, which is involved in the very idea of the expressiveness of language must remain incapable of being expressed in language". . . . "This inexpressible contains, according to Mr. Wittgenstein, the whole of logic and philosophy." Wittgenstein is quite consistent in his views. For he treated his own philosophical work in exactly the same way in which he treated the philosophical work of others. About his Tractatus he said, "My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands

33. Ibid., 4.001  
34. Ibid., 4.01

35. Ibid., 4.03  
36. Ibid., xx - xi
me eventually recognises them as nonsensical." 37 The propositions of Tractatus too belong to the realm of the unspeakable; for they are attempts at saying what cannot be said. It is doubtful whether Frege ever imagined giving such a treatment to the issue of the logic of language.

Wittgenstein's conception of language in Tractatus, as it has been pointed out earlier, was that of a simple descriptive language, a language in which we name things, and then we talk about them. Language was a totality of propositions and propositions had truth value. This simplistic view of language was given the refinement of logic and philosophy was made to appear as if it was something unique. But the Wittgenstein of Investigations is disillusioned about such a simplistic view of language. Reacting to Frege's view of assertions Wittgenstein remarks, "But how many kinds of sentences are there? Say assertion, question and command? There are countless kinds." 38 He concludes, "It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language (including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus)." 39 What Wittgenstein means is that the logic of assertions cannot be the same as the logic of questions and commands. When one talks about the structure of language one has already presupposed that there is only one kind of language or that there is only one language game. In his Tractatus he said that "Every language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated

37. Ibid., 6.54
38. Investigations, 23
39. Ibid.
than it." \textsuperscript{40} From this he inferred that "It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is." \textsuperscript{41} But the complication to which he is referring in the \textit{Tractatus} is not the same as the one referred to in the Investigations. In the former work the varieties of logic are missing; logic, like language, is of only one kind, and this too remains hidden behind the grammatical form. Praising Russell, Wittgenstein says, "It was Russell who performed the service of showing that the apparent logical form of proposition need not be its real one." \textsuperscript{42} So what was complicated in the \textit{Tractatus} was the concept of language as a totality of propositions. The \textit{Tractarian} Wittgenstein did not and could not think in terms of those languages or language-games which do not express propositions, say, the languages of commands, questions, etc. The real complications of language were not even touched upon in the \textit{Tractatus}. And he realises his mistake when he says in the Investigations, "We see that what we call "sentence" and "language" has not the formal unity that I imagined, but is the family of structures more or less related to one another. But what becomes of logic now? Its rigour seems to be giving way here." \textsuperscript{43} There is no one given structure of language, there are structures and structures. So also there cannot be any such thing as the logic of language, there are logics and logics, for there are languages and languages.

An allied issue is the issue of a "logically perfect language" or "ideal language". The fundamental confusions of philosophy could

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Tractatus}, 4.002. \textsuperscript{41} Ibid. \textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 3.323
\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Investigations}, 108.
be removed, thought Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus*, if we used "a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar - by logical syntax. (*The conceptual notation of Frege and Russell is such a language.*"  
This is a clear indication of Wittgenstein's preference for a logically perfect language as against the language of our everyday use. This preference is exhibited by his remark, "In everyday language it very frequently happens that some word has different modes of signification - and so belonging to different symbols - or that two words that have different modes of signification are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way."  
He cites the case of 'is' and 'green' in this connection. In this as in other respects Wittgenstein shares the view of Frege in rejecting ordinary language. Concerning Frege's view Dummett points out that Frege "started from the assumption that natural language is a defective instrument, and that what the logician needs is not a theory of the working of natural language but the theory of the working of an improved language which could ideally replace it."  

Though he protested time and again, early Wittgenstein did not have the favourable attitude towards ordinary language which later Wittgenstein had. Earlier he thought that our language is full of confusions, and therefore, it requires reformations. But now the picture is very different. In his *Investigations* he says, "when I talk about language(words, sentence, etc..) I must speak the language of everyday. Is this language somehow too coarse and material for what we want to say ? Then how is another one to be constructed ?

44. *Tractatus*, 3.325  
And how strange that we should be able to do anything at all with the one we have. These are his current thoughts. In his earlier days he did not think that our everyday language is too coarse and material and that in communication it would lead to ambiguity and vagueness. It did not occur to him then that despite of the vagueness and ambiguity of certain expressions of our ordinary language, it does succeed in performing its role. Moreover any other language, that has to be constructed, has to take the help of ordinary language, so why blame ordinary language. Wittgenstein's transition from the logically perfect language to the language of everyday use is his transition from one way of philosophising to another way of philosophising.

Lifting the Ban from Philosophy: Early Wittgenstein imposed a ban on philosophy, i.e., to the expression of philosophy. Philosophy for early Wittgenstein, as we have already seen, is the "Critique of language." This was supposed to be the revolutionary concept of philosophy which he obtained from Frege. This was the concept that was used to purge philosophy of its epistemological and psychological ingredients. However, Wittgenstein saw to it (his originality) that no critique of language could ever be written. For the writing of such a critique presupposes knowledge of the logic of language. Unless a philosopher knows the logic of his language he cannot write a critique of it. But the logic of language cannot be expressed in language. Hence philosophy too cannot be expressed in language. So the revolutionary concept of philosophy implies that the philosopher must remain silent. It he is not concerned with any other kind

47. Investigations, 120
of questions, other than the questions of philosophy, then there
is no option left for the philosopher but to keep silent. As Wittgen-
stein points out in his Notebooks "It is one of the chief skills
of the philosopher not to occupy himself with questions which do
not concern him." 48 The last line of the Tractatus is also a last
warning to philosophers. "What we cannot speak about we must pass
over in silence." 49 Thus, Wittgenstein puts a ban on philosophy and
also warns the philosophers not to lift it. However, not only has
Wittgenstein himself spoken so much of philosophy, he has also pre-
scribed some tasks to be done by philosophers, i.e., some problems
to be solved by philosophers, and some questions to be answered
by philosophers. Perhaps these tasks, these problems and these ques-
tions are of secondary importance. Wittgenstein might have thought
that philosophers should not be allowed to sit silently and do noth-
ing. They should be provided with some task, some job. If they do
not have their own specific doctrines to pursue or own programme
to execute, they can at least help others in executing their pro-
grames, in pursuing their doctrines. What then was the job of philo-
sophers? Wittgenstein prescribes, "Philosophy sets limits to the
much disputed sphere of natural science." 50 So philosophers do have
something to do, they can offer their services to the scientists
But what would happen to philosophy once the boundaries of natural
science are demarcated? Why should we assume that the natural sci-
cences would continue having their boundary-disputes so as to provide
some job to the philosopher? While referring to the remarks on philo-
sophy from 4.1-4 which we are considering in this context Max Black

48. Notebooks, p. 44 (12).
49. Tractatus, 7
50. Ibid., 4.113.
says, "It is noteworthy that in this part Wittgenstein allows philosophy a positive function." But what is really noteworthy in this part is that Wittgenstein has provided philosophy only a secondary function. A philosopher has been given a parasitic existence; he has been given second class citizenship of the academic world. His existence depends on the existence of science. He does not have a language of his own, so he has been debarred from touching reality. (How would you feel if you have no land and no language?) A philosopher is prohibited even from giving uninteresting descriptions of reality. Only a scientist possesses the right of describing reality, of doing whatever he feels like doing with reality; he can describe or distort it; he can synthesise it or break it into parts. What is the role of a philosopher while the scientist is doing all kinds of things to reality? Perhaps he is the mute observer of what the scientist is doing. Wittgenstein has reserved both language and reality for science; the status of philosophy has been completely degraded. The status of science is decided first. Then on the basis of this important decision, Wittgenstein decides the status of philosophy. Since science has doctrines to pursue, therefore there should be no doctrines in philosophy. "Philosophy is not a body of doctrines." Since science is the totality of propositions, therefore, "Philosophy does not result in "philosophical propositions." Science is the paradigm of academic virtue, the status of philosophy is to be decided in terms of science. "Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences," says Wittgenstein. Who can object to it, except perhaps a philosopher.

52. Tractatus, 4.112
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., 4.111
But the philosopher has already been silenced by Wittgenstein. Read and see the difference, 'Science is not a branch of philosophy. Philosophy is so and so, therefore, science cannot be so and so.' Wittgenstein goes on deriving the nature of philosophy from his prior decision about the nature of science. "(The word 'philosophy' must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them." 55 The nature of philosophy which emerges as a result of the decision about the nature of science is that philosophy is an activity. And this activity is directed towards the welfare of science. Philosophy is at the service of science. On a superficial reading, the following remark may give some hope, "Without philosophy thoughts are as it were, cloudy and indistinct." 56 But this remark really deprives philosophy from having even confused and unclear thoughts. For a thought is nothing but an unarticulated position. Whatever can be thought, whatever can be said, and whatever can be articulated belongs to science. Philosophy is that which cannot be thought, cannot be said, and which cannot be articulated. When Wittgenstein says about philosophy that "it must set limits to what can be thought." 57 "to what can be said," 58 etc., he simply means that it must "set limits to the sphere of science". The job of a philosopher is to sharpen the boundary of science. Philosophy will "signify what cannot be said by presenting clearly what can be said." 59 So the philosopher has been thrown back-stage; his only job is to see that an actress/actor produces a presentable impression on the stage.

55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., 4.114
57. Ibid., 4.114
58. Ibid., 4.115
59. Ibid.
He has merely to see that the body of science has proper make-up that it is presentable on stage.

Philosophers would perhaps prefer later Wittgenstein's counter-revolutionary concept of philosophy to his Tractarian revolutionary concept. What are we to do with a revolutionary concept if it does not allow philosophers to express their enchantment or puzzlement with philosophy. Later Wittgenstein lifts the ban from philosophy, and in lifting this ban he has also seen that philosophy does not play second fiddle to science; it has to look after its own problems, its own difficulties. It would not be wrong to say that later Wittgenstein brought philosophy to light by liberating it from the dark Tractarian cave. He reinstated philosophy to its former glory, glory which was suspended by early Wittgenstein.

The question what is Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophy has never been answered by the followers of Wittgenstein in satisfactory terms. The reason is that one hopes to get as clear and precise an answer to this question as one would have obtained while referring to the Tractatus. Later Wittgenstein must tell in a nutshell what his conception of philosophy is as early Wittgenstein told in a nutshell that "all philosophy is critique of language." But later Wittgenstein provides no such nutshell response. This is so, firstly because Wittgenstein now realises that the concept of philosophy is not one of those concepts which has sharp boundaries. Secondly, he is unable to reduce all philosophy to the kind of philosophy he has been doing in his later days. He did not feel shy of such reduction in the Tractatus. There is no doubt that he is doing some kind of philosophy, but all philosophy is not of one kind. And while super-
ficially it may appear that he is doing one kind of philosophy, as a matter of fact he may be doing so many different kinds of things under one name 'philosophy'. If 'philosophy' does not refer to a sharp concept, then it is possible that it refers to a 'family of concepts', having one and the same name 'philosophy'. On one occasion Wittgenstein is doing one kind of philosophy, and on another occasion he is doing another kind of philosophy. The only way in which it is possible to know something about Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophy is to make a general survey of his remarks on philosophy. But his remarks on philosophy are so numerous that one can write a whole dissertation by just analysing them. However, I have selected a few which appeared to be quite interesting and striking.

While referring to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy Rush Rhees points out, "philosophy was a method of investigation, for Wittgenstein, but his conception of the method was changing." Perhaps he was not doing the same kind of philosophy on different occasions, so he could not use the same method. In his *Tractatus* he thought that telling philosophers that they talk nonsense would be "the only strictly correct method of doing philosophy." But later Wittgenstein's attitude to philosophy has changed. He now thinks "There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies." He is now quite open on the question of method. A philosopher's condition sometimes is the condition of a sick man, therefore the method of therapy in this context occurs to Wittgenstein. "The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness." If philosophy is sickness or disease

(in one of its uses), we cannot blame a philosopher if he does not have it. What is required is a cure, to find a therapy for the illness. For philosophy is not only a disease it is also an attempt to cure the disease. Philosophy brings puzzlement and frustration, but it is also an attempt to remove puzzlement and frustration. "What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle."\textsuperscript{64} \textsuperscript{64} \textsuperscript{65} The philosopher, as Wittgenstein describes in his Notes on "Private Language" and "Sense-data", "flutters and flutters in the fly-glass, strikes against the walls, flutters further. How can he be brought to rest."\textsuperscript{65} The only way seems to be that he be shown the way to go out of the fly-bottle. The method of showing such a way however is not simple. It is as complicated as the complication of a philosophical problem. This becomes clear from what he says in the \textit{Philosophical Remarks}, "Philosophy unties the knots in our thinking, which we have tangled up in an absurd way; but to do that, it must make movements which are just as complicated as the knots. Although the result of philosophy is simple, its methods for arriving there cannot be so."\textsuperscript{66} 

Though we may not succeed in obtaining a very clear picture of the positive aspect of philosophical method, its negative aspects are quite clear. As has been pointed out earlier that later Wittgenstein does not allow philosophy to play second fiddle to science, and therefore the method of philosophy is not akin to the scientific or empirical method. As he says in the \textit{Investigations}, "It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones. It was

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Ibid.} 309 \hfill \textsuperscript{65} \textit{Private Language Argument, ed. O.R. Jones, p. 256} \hfill \textsuperscript{66} \textit{Philosophical Remarks, 2}
not of any possible interest to us to find out empirically 'that, contrary to our preconceived ideas, it is possible to think such-and-such.' In his Blue Book he condemns those philosophers who consider science as the paradigm of philosophical pursuit. (Perhaps Russell is one of them.) He says, "Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness."68

Later Wittgenstein's refusal to mix philosophy with science led him to deny that philosophy has anything to do with explanations. As he says, "It can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is 'purely descriptive.'" The same ideal occurs in the Investigations, "Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. And in a more forceful way he says, "We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place." What he means by description is that philosophy does not "interfere with the actual use of language". . . "It leaves everything as it is."72

At times Wittgenstein exhibits the hangover of Tractatus even in his later writing. Consider his remark, "If one tries to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them." In his Tractatus he rejected the possibility of a 'philosophical doctrine', now he is rejecting the possibility of a 'philosophical thesis'. There is no doubt that

the style of rejecting philosophical theses is novel. Why advance theses if they cannot be debated? Wittgenstein's acceptance of the possibility of philosophical propositions in his *Philosophical Remarks*, is also similar, he says "Philosophy is constantly gathering a store of propositions without worrying about their truth or falsity: only in the cases of logic and mathematics does it have to do exclusively with the 'true' propositions." Why to gather those propositions about which you do not raise the question of truth and falsity? Are you not increasing the stock of useless propositions? The enterprise of gathering such a system of propositions is certainly not praiseworthy. Finally consider, "The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language." The expressions such as 'piece of plain nonsense' and 'limits of language' remind us of *Tractatus*. Of course there is nothing wrong in later Wittgenstein's supporting the views of earlier Wittgenstein. One of the ways in which philosophy could be done was how it was done in the *Tractatus*. What was wrong on the part of the author of *Tractatus* was simply to think that this was the only way of doing philosophy; or, that all philosophy is reducible to the way philosophy is done in the *Tractatus*.

Language remains the major source of anxiety to both the Wittgenstein's, so also to the two schools of thought which were inspired by him - Logical Positivism and Ordinary Language Analysis movement. Of course the manner in which language worried earlier Wittgenstein

74. Cf. 60.
75. *Philosophical Investigations*, 119. What Wittgenstein means is that philosophy goes beyond the limits of language.
is different from the manner in which it worried later Wittgenstein. Language has become an obsession with later Wittgenstein, perhaps because he is fully concerned with philosophy now. And philosophy for him has its birth, life and end in language. He has started suffering from "language-neurosis". He exhibits his neurotic behaviour when he says, "Philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday."76 What is it for language to go on holiday? When it relaxes when it relaxes its grammatical rules. But then it is not functioning as language. As Wittgenstein remarks more clearly on the issue, "The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work."77 An idling engine is no engine; one cannot know how the engine works when it is idling. And finally on this issue, "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language."78 These fascinating remarks exhibit Wittgenstein's deep-rooted concern with language, a philosopher's concern with language.

A few days before his death Wittgenstein said about the fashion in which he pursued philosophy. "I do philosophy now like an old woman who is always mislaying something and having to look for it again; now her spectacles, now her cap."79 But this has been the fashion in which he has been doing philosophy throughout his later days. And it is impossible to convert an old woman into a young girl. A philosopher would always go on mislaying something or the other, and would continue searching for it. To stop mislaying things would be to stop the search, and to stop the search would be to stop

76. Ibid., 38
77. Ibid., 132.
78. Ibid., 109.
79. On Certainty, 532.
Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophy succeeds in answering satisfactorily certain questions raised recently against philosophy. It has been pointed out that there has been no progress in philosophy. From the days of Aristotle (for whom the present-day scientists have high regards) to the present day there has been tremendous progress in science. This progress is missing in philosophy. We have not reached the heights of Plato. And the fact that we have not reached the heights show that we have made no progress. Wittgenstein shows that it is silly to ask the question of progress in philosophy. As he reacts, "Philosophy hasn't made any progress? - If somebody scratches the spot where he has an itch, do we have to see some progress? Isn't it genuine scratching otherwise, or genuine itching? And can't this reaction to an irritation continue in the same way for a long time before a cure for the itching is discovered."\textsuperscript{80} If philosophy is an itch then the right sort of question concerning philosophy would be, when faced with a problem, whether it is a genuine philosophical problem (a genuine itch). So also it would be right to ask whether an appropriate method for the solution of the problem has been discovered (scratching the exact spot where the itching occurs). The fact that we are seriously attending to our itching exhibits our honesty. What can we do about it if the Platonic itch continues. There is absolutely no necessity for us to give any tragic significance to the fact that we have made no progress in philosophy. For we are not scientists, and we know that we have no ambition to become scientists. Whether we are good or bad we are philoso-

\textsuperscript{80} Culture and Value, pp. 86-7.
Religion, according to the Notebooks and the Tractatus, belongs to the realm of the 'mystical', the realm of the inexpressible. But one should be very careful in describing the mystical as inexpressible. For not only is religion inexpressible but logic and philosophy too are inexpressible. But it would be quite wrong to think that Wittgenstein's mystical is extended to logic and philosophy. There is nothing mystical about them. The mystical ranges over the valuational activities only: the activities like religion, ethics and aesthetics. Wittgensteinian scholars distinguish the inexpressible that is mystical from the inexpressible that is not mystical. For example, logic cannot be said, therefore, it is inexpressible, but logic can be shown, therefore, it is not mystical. Mystical is that which can neither be said nor shown. As Max Black points out that "any effort to express the mystical, whether by saying or by showing, must result in absurdity."\(^{81}\) This implies that it would be wrong to equate the 'mystical' with the 'inexpressible'. In his Introduction to the Tractatus Russell wrongly equates them. (Incidently, Wittgenstein did not appreciate Russell's Introduction). As Russell says, "Mr. Wittgenstein's attitude towards the mystical ... grows out of his doctrine in pure logic ... This inexpressible contains, according to Mr. Wittgenstein, the whole of logic and philosophy."\(^{82}\) Yes, logic and philosophy are not expressible, but they can be shown. But there is no such thing as showing of religion unless one uses 'showing' for an actual demonstration of how one lives a religious form of life. Religion neither succeeds nor fails to picture reality in language; it is concerned

\(^{81}\) A Companion to Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus', p. 374.

\(^{82}\) Tractatus, xx-xxi.
with what transcends both language and reality.

Wittgenstein however manages to say so many interesting things about religion in the Tractatus itself. Later Wittgenstein breaks his silence for the second time and not for the first time. The first time silence over religion was broken in the Tractatus itself. Tractatus provides the structure of Wittgenstein's own concept of religion. The central issue of religion is the issue of God and his relationship to the world. The issue of human life and human destiny depends on the issue of God. But Wittgenstein's remarks on God and the world may disturb the Orthodox. He says, "How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference to what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world."83 This remark is quite unorthodox. If God is indifferent to the world, then all our prayers become useless, the concept of 'Grace' also becomes useless. There is no special favour in special circumstances. Religion would become deterministic. One should never go wrong. If God does not reveal himself in the world then it becomes senseless to talk about incarnation or re-incarnation etc. Wittgenstein's view clearly goes against any theory of incarnation, therefore, also, against any theory of re-incarnation. Unless incarnation is accepted talk of re-incarnation makes no sense. And if incarnation is accepted then there is no logical obstacle to re-incarnation. If God is allowed to visit this planet once, how can we prohibit his visit for the second time, how can we prohibit this repeated visits. The rejection of the theory of re-incarnation implies the rejection of the theory of incarnation. If the Saviour comes once, we just cannot

83. Ibid., 6.432.
Prohibit the Saviour from coming again and again, perhaps that is why Wittgenstein does not allow God's entry into this world even once. He introduces a kind of logical and not merely a physical prohibition. Suppose we consider God as the creator of the universe. Then it is logically ruled out that God appears in the world. For he can appear in the world only in the mode of created being. But if he is a created being then he is not a genuine creator.

No less interesting is the further remark of Wittgenstein. "Death is not an event in life, we do not live to experience death." 84

This remark again goes against all those religions, including Christianity, that preach the doctrine of the temporal immortality of the soul. The doctrine of resurrection clearly implies that 'death' is an event in one's life; it is an event that occurs prior to the event of one's resurrection. Birth, death and resurrection are all events in one's life; one lives "through one's death". This implies that 'death' is not strictly an end of life, but then death has lost its sense. How different an ordinary concept becomes when given a religious significance. The concept of death is an ordinary concept handled in a special way.

Wittgenstein again expresses quite an unorthodox view on the nature of survival. Survival of one's death should not be interpreted in terms of 'surviving for ever.' For even if one survives for ever one survives in time. If one has failed to jump out of time then all the miseries of one's temporal existence continue. Existence in space and time has its own riddles to solve. These riddles will not be solved if one is given an extension of one's

84. Ibid., 6.4311.
life in space and time. It is only by jumping out of space and
time that the riddles connected with space and time can be solved.
Thus the religious interpreters of 'eternity' are on a wrong track
who interpret this concept in terms of 'never ending temporal dura-
tion'. As Wittgenstein says, "Is some riddle solved by my surviving
for ever? Is not this eternal life as much of a riddle as our pre-
sent life? The solution of the riddle of life in space and time
lies outside space and time."85 One's living for ever is not qualita-
tively different from one's living for a short time.

Interesting implications may be seen in Wittgenstein's transi-
tion from Tractatus to the view expressed in his "Lectures on Re-
ligious Belief". In one of these lectures he imagines a situation
where people give linguistic expression to the religious . . .
"They have sentences, and there are also religious statements.86
Though linguistic expression to religious beliefs has been given,
they have been kept apart from the scientific beliefs. Referring
to the religious statements he further says, "These statements
would not just differ in respect to what they are about. Entirely
different connections would make them into religious beliefs.87
What is the nature of the object of a religious belief, i.e., how
can it be distinguished from the object of a scientific belief?
And what connections does a religious belief have which are missing
in the case of a scientific belief? Consider first the question
of 'object'. Compare two statements, a religious and a scientific
statement. We are going to have resurrection one day' with 'We are
going to have rainfall one day'. The latter statement refers to

85. Ibid., 6.4312.
86. Lectures on Religious Belief. 87. Ibid.
an event of history, spatio-temporal history, of the world. In this sense the former is not a statement of history. Inspite of the historical idiom, the statement cannot be treated as historical or empirical proposition. If resurrection is an event of history it will lose its religious significance. As Wittgenstein says, "Suppose for instance, we knew people who foresaw the future; make forecasts for years and years ahead; and they described some sort of a Judgment Day. Queerly enough, even if there were such a thing, and even if it were more convincing than I have described, belief in this happening wouldn't be at all a religious belief."\textsuperscript{88} It would not be a religious belief for the simple reason that the evidence given for it suits only a scientific prediction. And religion is not science, so also religious statements are not scientific predictions. If the Day of Judgement is a scientific forecast, then why should I worry. As Wittgenstein says further, "Suppose that I would have to forego all pleasures because of such a forecast. If I do so and so, some one will put me in fires in a thousand years, etc. I wouldn't budge. The best scientific evidence is just nothing."\textsuperscript{89} The religious beliefs are given the garb of history but are not historical. But a Christian may find it paradoxical that his religion is not based on historical truth. According to Wittgenstein there is no paradox in it. As he says, "Christianity is not based on a historical truth: rather it offers us a (historical) narrative and says now believe! But not believe this narrative with the belief appropriate to a historical narrative, rather, believe, through thick and thin, which you do only as the result of a life. Here you have a narrative, \textsuperscript{88} Ibid., p. 56. \textsuperscript{89} Ibid.
don't take the same attitude to it as you take to other historical narratives! Make a quite different place in your life for it. — There is nothing paradoxical about that!" 90 Don't be misled by the historical garb.

A religious belief has peculiar connections in the sense that it is shown by a religious believer "not by reasoning or by appeal to ordinary ground for belief, but rather by regulating for all in his life." 91 Therefore, we use different words for a religious belief; words such as "'dogma', 'faith'." 92

The game which we play with words in religion is very different from the game which we play with these words in science. Though the words may be the same they do not have the same significance. As Wittgenstein says, in religion "we don't talk about hypothesis, or about high probability. Nor about knowing. In a religious discourse we use such expressions as: "I believe that so and so will happen", and use them differently to the way in which we use them in science." 93 This leads Wittgenstein to the concept of religion which shows that religion exhibits an "alternative mode of rationality". Needless to point out that much has been written recently on this issue. When we find religious people arguing we may think that "they reason wrongly" or that "they don't reason at all" or that "It is an entirely different kind of reasoning." 94 If we make scientific reasoning as the paradigm of reasoning, then religious reasoning is no kind reasoning. Why don't you say that it is a di-

90. Culture And Value, p.32.

91. Lectures on Religious Belief, p. 54. 92. Ibid., p. 57.
93. Ibid. 94. Ibid., p. 58.
ifferent kind of reasoning. Why don't you accept that religion is an alternative mode of rationality? In religion we play a different kind of game with language than that which we play in science, not that we play no kind of game with religious language.

Wittgenstein of course does not mean that the language of religion is marked by any system of precise rules. He is well aware that the rules of the game which are proper to the game of science have sometimes been used in the game of religion. This of course does not mean that the game of science is played with clear and precise rules. If the anarchy of rules is sometimes glimpsed in religion, it is also glimpsed in science. We use language appropriate to one area also in the area which is not appropriate to it. Sometimes we wish to say something but the language which we use is not proper for the expression of this wish. Perhaps religion suffers most in this respect. Consider Wittgenstein's later reflections on the issue of immortality. "Philosophers who say "after death a timeless state will begin", or "at death a timeless state begins", and do not notice that they have used the words "after" and "at" and "begins" in a temporal sense, and that temporality is embedded in their grammar."95 How wrong it is to talk about "timelessness" through a language which has all the corruptions of "time". But Wittgenstein himself is not free from this corruption. Consider his reputed Tractatus remark, "If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to them who live in the present."96 What is "present" doing here?

95. Culture And Value, p. 22. 96. Tractatus, 6.4311
Is not "timelessness" being corrupted by "time"? Be it the issue of our eternal existence, be it the issue of death, be it the issue of the existence of God, it does not lead us to a sound doctrine which may be free from difficulties. And the root of these difficulties is language. It is this realisation which led Wittgenstein to say: "I believe that one of the things Christianity says is that the sound doctrines are all useless. That you have to change your life. (Or the direction of your life.)"97 What is important in a religion is not the body of doctrine it is not like a scientific doctrine; the former is used for shaping one's life, for giving sense and direction to it.

It would be interesting to consider Wittgenstein's attitude to religion, whether it has changed from his Tractatus days to the days of his Lectures On Religion. Superficially there appears to have occurred a change. Earlier he denied giving linguistic expression to religion. For language is restricted to the world, and the fundamental concepts of religion like God, survival and creation etc., lead you beyond the world. What lies beyond the world cannot be articulated in language. Later Wittgenstein allows linguistic articulation to religious beliefs, but at the same time also maintains that this articulation leads to all kinds of confusions and difficulties. A religious belief may be confused with a scientific belief because of its linguistic similarities with the latter. Language also hides the real function of a religious doctrine. Instead of shaping one's life on the pattern of Christ, one starts arguing about the exact place and time on which Christ was born, as if a religious believer is no better than a common historian.

97. Culture And Value, p. 53.
Wittgenstein, as is well known, was a religious person. He considered that "religion, as it were, the calm bottom of the sea at its deepest point, which remains calm however high the waves on the surface may be." But this calmness of religion demands silence. What is the use of shouting which may sink the ship. All his talk about religion is a kind of justification of his earlier mystical attitude to religion. Wittgenstein hardly accepted any of the Christian doctrines. But he also rejected none, for all of them he saw lead to the shaping of one's life, all of them give sense and direction to one's life on the earth.

Art And Aesthetics: Aesthetics, like religion, is another area which attracted Wittgenstein's attention as much as the conceptual questions of logic and mathematics. Talking about his attitude to aesthetics as late as 1949, Wittgenstein remarked, "I may find scientific questions interesting, but they never really grip me. Only conceptual and aesthetic questions do that. At bottom I am indifferent to the solution of scientific problems, but not the other sort." Perhaps by 'conceptual questions' he means the questions of mathematics and logic. Wittgenstein's earlier attitude to aesthetics was the same as his earlier attitude to religion; the former too like the latter belongs to the realm of the mystical. And the amount of attention Wittgenstein paid to aesthetic in his Tractatus is nothing when compared to the amount of attention he paid to religion and ethics. Aesthetic is perhaps more mystical than even ethics, for in order to understand the nature of an aesthetic object, one may feel, one is also required to understand the

98. Ibid. 99. Ibid., p. 79.
nature of an ethical object (if there is any such thing). One is required to see how what is beautiful is connected with what is good. For it is in connection with ethics that Wittgenstein makes his only reference to aesthetics. As he says, "It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)" Even in his Notebooks Wittgenstein says very few things about aesthetics. However, what little has been said there makes us aware of Wittgenstein's earlier views on aesthetics, and it also makes us aware of the connection between ethics and aesthetics. He says in his Notebooks, "The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis." What he means is further explained "The usual way of looking at things sees objects as it were from the midst of them, the view sub specie aeternitatis from outside. In such a way that they have the whole world as background." This "viewing from the outside" is the connection between aesthetics and ethics. Both see objects from the outside, keeping the world as mere background. As Wittgenstein says, "the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis. This is the connection between art and ethics." Neither ethics nor aesthetics can be expressed, for both are connected with the view "from the outside", both are transcendental. Therefore, any attempt to talk about ethical or aesthetical matters would result in nonsense. Calling ethics or aesthetics as nonsense however is not to reject them as garbage. What is rejected is only their linguistic expression. This becomes clear from Wittgenstein's conclusive remarks on Ethics which he made a decade after the publication of Tractatus. He says, "My whole

102. Ibid., 83 (7-8). 103. Ibid., p. 83 (6).
tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to
write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries
of language. . . . Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say
something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good,
the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not
add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency
in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply
and I would not for my life ridicule it. 104 So 'nonsense' is a tech-
nical term in the context of Wittgensteinian philosophy it is not
a term of abuse.

Wittgenstein's later views on art and aesthetics are no less
unconventional. Though now he allows expression of art in words
(it is no more an affair of the mystical), what he says about it
does not support any contemporary school or system of aesthetics.
His views even now do not fit into any given pigeon-hole. But before
we proceed with his later views it would be better to clarify a
minor issue. Earlier, Wittgenstein prohibited the expression of
aesthetics in language, therefore, also he prohibited any kind of
philosophical analysis of such a language. He thought that the lan-
guage of art is impossible but he did not thereby think that the
expression of art is impossible. For he said that "Art is a kind
of expression." 105 "Good art is complete expression." 106 A painter
expresses himself into his painting, a musician in his songs, a
dancer in his dancing and a poet in his poetry. This kind of ex-
pression has not been prohibited by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein was
certainly not a Plato who suggested that art be banished from the

105. Notebooks, p. 83 (4).
106. Ibid., p. 83 (5).
state. What he suggested to be banished was merely the philosophers' talk about art and the subject matter of this talk — the language of aesthetics. He perhaps did not allow calling a poem good or a face beautiful, though would have no objection to the writing of good poems or having beautiful faces around him. So Wittgenstein's earlier view of art did no injury to artists, it injured only philosophers, art-critics and a host of other people who have no artistic talent but go on talking about art. The attack was clearly directed on the language of art rather than on art as such. Perhaps he thought that the linguistic expression of art leads to the same paradoxical situation to which the linguistic expression of religion lead. We have to see in what respect later Wittgenstein has taken a departure from his earlier position.

As soon as one opens his Lectures on Aesthetics, one would feel that Wittgenstein is opposing those philosophers who have reduced aesthetics to the analysis of aesthetical words. These philosophers detach certain words from the natural context of their use, and concentrate their attention on them. Whatever amount of concentration, whatever amount of gazing of these words, is done, the result can never be satisfactory. For once the words have been detached from their natural habitation, they lose their real significance. Therefore, Wittgenstein persuades philosophers to draw their attention to the aesthetic situations. As he says, "Language is a characteristic part of a large group of activities — talking, writing, travelling on a bus, meeting a man etc. We are concentrating, not on the words 'good' or 'beautiful', which are entirely uncharacteristic, generally just subject and predicate ('This is beautiful),"
but on the occasions on which they are said. 107 This is a clear revolt against the reduction of aesthetics to the analysis of certain words. For further clarification the note of Rush Rhees is also significant. Rush Rhees writes, "When we build houses, we talk and write. When I take a bus, I say to the conductor: 'Threepenny'. We are concentrating not just on the word or the sentence in which it is used — which is highly uncharacteristic — but on the occasion on which it is said: the framework in which... the actual aesthetic judgement is practically nothing at all." 108 What is worth noting is the fact that the later Wittgenstein allows linguistic expression to aesthetics, but does not allow these linguistic expression to play any significant role. He made them very minor aspect in the situation. What is important is the aesthetic situation, and in that situation the occurrence of an aesthetic judgement is uncharacteristic. This shows that Wittgenstein has made very minor adjustment to his former attitude to aesthetics. Pressed from all sides he allowed the expression of aesthetic language, then allowed that language play only a subsidiary role.

The reason why those philosophers who describe themselves as analysists (there is a wide range from Moore to Stevenson) do not concentrate on the situations is that they suffer from Platonism, they suffer from the essentialistic tendencies. They would object to Wittgenstein's reference to the aesthetic situation. What is important to them is not a given aesthetic situation, but what is common to different aesthetic situations. They would argue against

107. Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, p. 2.
108. Ibid., Note of Rush Rhees on page-2.
Wittgenstein that though the occasions and situations differ, there is something which is common to them, something which is identical in them. It is this common element which is the object of aesthetics, with which aesthetics is concerned. When such a judgement as 'This is beautiful' is made, it is made after comparing this situation with other situations. Beauty is what is common to different situations, therefore we are not dealing with a mere word 'beauty'. Aesthetics is concerned with beauty, as ethics is concerned with goodness, therefore derivatively it is concerned with the word 'beauty' as ethics is concerned with the word 'good'. The linguistic analysis of aesthetical words presupposes a non-linguistic reality. And this reality can be obtained only by neglecting the differences. A situation becomes secondary once it is compared with other situations. Once the aesthetical object is discovered in them, the object which is designated by the word 'beauty' too becomes secondary. In his *Blue Book* Wittgenstein explicates such a view: "Beauty is an ingredient of all beautiful things as alcohol is of beer and wine, and that we therefore could have pure beauty, unadulterated by anything that is beautiful."\(^{109}\) So what is important is this pure beauty, expressed by the judgement 'This is beautiful', and not the situation as such which was the occasion for making this judgement. A fundamental aesthetic judgement cannot be something minor in aesthetics. Wittgenstein is wrong in converting what is fundamental to aesthetics into what has a very minor role to play in aesthetics. His approach is wrong, for he concentrates on the particulars without concentrating on the universal features. He condemns philosophers for their "contemptuous attitude towards the particular case\(^{110}\), and he him-\(^{109}\) Blue and Brown Books, p.17. \(^{110}\) Ibid., p. 18.
self exhibits a contemptuous attitude towards the universals. Granted
that it is a vice to have a contemptuous attitude towards the parti-
cular cases. But it is also not a virtue to neglect the universal
features of the particular cases, in case there happen to be such
features. Of course the situation is different if there are no uni-
versal features.

But is it true that the differences do not matter? In aesthe-
tics the differences do matter. As Wittgenstein remarks, "Perhaps
I shall not even feel like comparing the beauty of expression in
a pair of eyes with the beauty in the shape of a nose."111 Not only
is the nose different from the eyes, even the beauty of a nose is
different from the beauty of eyes. Criticising further the search
for a common aesthetic object-beauty – in different aesthetic situa-
tions Wittgenstein points out, "If I say A has beautiful eyes someone
may ask me: what do you find beautiful about his eyes, and perhaps
I shall reply: the almond shape, long eye-lashes, delicate lids.
What do these eyes have in common with a gothic church, that I find
beautiful too? Should I say they make a similar impression on me?
What if I were to say that in both cases my hand feels tempted to
draw them."112 If 'similarity of impression' is allowed then 'tempta-
tion to draw them' should also be allowed.

The word 'beauty' is an extremely complicated word, and these
complications arise because of the situations. One situation is
so different from the other situation. There is no simple analysis
of 'beauty'. A simple analysis is possible only by detaching the
word 'beauty' from the actual contexts in which it is used. As Witt-

111. *Culture And Value*, 24. 112. Ibid.
gentein points out, "the main mistake made by philosophers of the present generation, including Moore, I would say that it is that when language is looked at, what is looked at is a form of words and not the use of the form of words." 113 Once the 'use of words' is taken into consideration, contexts and situations would emerge.

On a superficial glance one may think that Wittgenstein's own view of aesthetics supports some kind of naturalism, subjectivism and emotivism. He opposes only objective aesthetics, the kind of aesthetics inspired by Moore's analysis of ethical terms. Consider his remarks, "If you ask yourself how a child learns 'beautiful', 'fine', etc., you find he learns them roughly as interjections. ('Beautiful' is an odd word to talk about because it's hardly ever used) A child generally applied a word like 'good' first to food. The word is taught as a substitute for a facial expression or a gesture." 114 More direct is the further remark, "Would it matter if instead of saying 'This is lovely', I just said 'Ah' and smiled, or just rubbed my stomach?" 115 This kind of remark can be made only by an emotivist. But Wittgenstein is no emotivist. This becomes clear from his remark, "We use the phrase 'A man is musical' not so as to call a man musical if he says 'Ah' when a piece of music is played, any more than we call a dog musical if it wags its tail when music is played." 116 What Wittgenstein means is that the schools of aesthetics are formed by clinging to one feature of the situation by overlooking the other features. Different schools take up different features. For example, the emotivists cling to the primitive level. At the primitive level the words such as 'good'

114. Ibid.  
115. Ibid., p. 3.  
116. Ibid.
and 'beautiful' are taught and read as interjections. But this does not mean that we continue at the primitive level. As Wittgenstein says, "As far as these primitive languages go, problems about what these words are about, what their real subject is, (which is called 'beautiful' or 'good' -R) don't come up at all."\textsuperscript{117} It is impossible to keep aesthetics restricted to the primitive level. One may even question whether there is any aesthetics at this level. However, it would be another extreme to say that 'good' and 'beautiful' refer to some kind of Moore's non-natural properties or Plato's essences. Both extremes, the positivistic and the emotivistic, are to be rejected.

Those who cling to the linguistic analysis of aesthetics, whether the followers of the objectivistic tradition, have just failed to see that the aesthetic taste of a person develops. (An objectivistic closes his eyes to the primitive stages.) As Wittgenstein says, "In what we call the ARTS a person who has judgement develops."\textsuperscript{118} If the issue of the development of taste is omitted, so would the issue of the cultural background of this taste be omitted. Wittgenstein gives more importance to the connection between the language of aesthetics and the culture of a people. As he says, "What belongs to a language game is a whole culture. In describing musical taste you have to describe whether children give concerts, whether women do or whether men only give them, etc., etc.,"\textsuperscript{119} This idea has been expressed also in his \textit{Culture and Value}. As he says, "I believe that if one is to enjoy a writer one has to like the culture he belongs to as well. If one finds it indifferent or distasteful, one's admiration cools off."\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., p.3. Within brackets occurs the note of Rush Rhees symbolised by 'R'. \textsuperscript{118} Ibid., p.6. \textsuperscript{119} Ibid., p.8. \textsuperscript{120} Culture And Value, p. 85.
Finally, I would again like to discuss Wittgenstein's attempts to subordinate the role of aesthetic words and judgements in aesthetic situations. Not the words and judgements but it is the aesthetic reaction which is important. And an aesthetic reaction may or may not involve language; and the language involved may not be the same which philosophers call aesthetic. According to Wittgenstein "the most important thing in connection with aesthetics is what may be called aesthetic reactions, e.g., discontent, disgust, discomfort." He has cited the cases of negative aesthetic reactions. To justify his view he points out "suppose our children draw windows and when they draw them in the wrong way we punish them. Or when someone builds a certain house we refuse to live in it or run away." In punishing the child or running away from the house I am doing an action, and not saying 'this is bad' etc. He treats the positive aesthetic reaction in the same fashion. "What are expressions of liking something? Is it only what we say or interjections we use or faces we make? Obviously not. It is, often, how often I read something or how often I wear a suit. Perhaps I won't even say: "It's fine." but wear it often and look at it." The expression of aesthetic reactions is possible without the use of aesthetic language without the use of such words as 'beautiful', 'fine' etc. It is not words but the actions which sometimes matter.

Wittgenstein in his later years observed that it is "strange that whole epochs can't free themselves from the grip of certain concepts -the concept of 'beautiful' and 'beauty' for instance."

121. Lectures on Aesthetics, p. 13.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid., p. 12.
124. Culture And Value, p. 79
He has been struggling throughout his life to get freedom from the conceptual bewitchment, from essentialism. I do not know whether he succeeded or failed in his attempt in other areas, but in aesthetics he failed. Wittgenstein is exhibiting his failure when he says, "What is pretty cannot be beautiful." What prohibits a pretty thing to be beautiful? Why cannot it be beautiful? One explanation could be that what is pretty is a concrete object, occupying space-time position, whereas 'beauty' is something abstract, it is a concept. This would be the fashion in which a Plato could argue. He would deny the identity of what is pretty with what is beautiful. The other explanation could be like that of Kant. A pretty thing arouses only our passion and emotions, but fails to give aesthetic delight (Let us accept that there is such a thing as 'aesthetic delight'). Beauty is an object of aesthetic delight and not of emotions and passions. Whether Wittgenstein's position is justified in terms of Plato or in terms of Kant, the justification goes against the spirit of later Wittgenstein. Is it possible that Wittgenstein could never liberate himself from the conceptual bewitchment of beauty? Or did he wish to be liberated from, as Freud would analyze, some beautiful person who might have bewitched him at one time? The best way is to philosophise the whole affair.

Early Wittgenstein: A Stage set for Later Wittgenstein: It would be interesting to consider the implications of Wittgenstein's remark, "Perhaps what is inexpressible (what I find mysterious and am not able to express) is the background against which whatever I could express has its meaning." The inexpressible forms the background

125. Ibid., p. 42.  
126. Ibid., p. 16.
of the expressible. Expressible is impossible without the inexpressible — Early Wittgenstein forms the background of later Wittgenstein. *Tractatus* is the setting up of the stage for work like *Investigations* to follow. Early Wittgenstein is only setting up the stage; later Wittgenstein is acting on the stage. The stage, though mute, must be suitable for the actor who speaks and acts. If one is not acquainted with Early Wittgenstein one cannot understand the Later Wittgenstein. If this is what is meant by unity in Wittgenstein thought then there is certainly unity in Wittgenstein's thought. Wittgenstein himself suggested in his Preface to the *Investigations* that his later thought could be seen "in the right light only by contrast with and against the background" of his earlier work."127 I have tried to carry out the wish of Wittgenstein. Of course I am quite aware of my limitations.

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127. Cf. p.x.