Chapter - 4

Philosophical Psychology

There is a kind of general disease of thought which always looks for (and finds) what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring as from a reservoir.

The Brown Book

The expression 'Philosophical Psychology' is a misnomer. It is not an expression of the kind 'Freudian Psychology' or 'child psychology' etc. We are certainly not going to discuss Wittgenstein's views on a branch of psychology. What we are concerned with is a branch of philosophy, traditionally known as epistemology. Our conclusions may not only differ from those at which psychologists arrive, we may even contradict the conclusions of the psychologists. For we do not use the method of psychology; we do not make appeal to experiments and experiences in order to solve our difficulties. "Psychology according to Wittgenstein, "is no more closely related to philosophy than any other natural science." We are dealing with certain concepts which, at least superficially, appear to be psychological. We are only making explicit the philosophical implications of these concepts. We are talking about the theory of knowledge, not talking about any theory of psychology. While discussing about the nature of this kind of theory Wittgenstein remarked, "Theory of knowledge is philosophy of psychology." So in this chapter we shall be

249. Tractatus, 4.1121  
250. Ibid.
concerned with issues that are quite unlike the issues discussed by Freud. (The switch from Freudian psychology to philosophical psychology is qualitative) What we are going to do in this chapter is no kind of psychology.

The subject matter of philosophical psychology is quite vast, and Wittgenstein's own contribution to it is considerable. As a matter of fact the image of later Wittgenstein emerges with his work in philosophical psychology. He has given a new turn to this subject. If one compares Wittgenstein's treatment with the treatment given to this subject by the traditional philosophers one would detect novelty in Wittgenstein's treatment. One would feel that for the first time that philosophical treatment has been given to the issues of psychology. Concerning the treatment of philosophical problems by the traditional philosophers Ryle points out, "From the time of Locke to Bradley philosophers had debated their issues as if they were psychological issues . . . if they asked themselves as they seldom did ask, what they were investigating, they tended to say that they were investigating the workings of the mind, just as physical scientists investigate the workings of bodies. The sorts of 'Mental Science' that they talked were sometimes positivistic, sometimes idealistic, according, roughly, as they were more impressed by chemistry than by theology or vice versa."251 In this chapter we shall see how different Wittgenstein is even when he is discussing the psychological issues. Traditional philosophers converted philosophy into a kind of "mental science", converted it into a branch

of psychology. Wittgenstein has shown that psychology is as removed from philosophy as any other natural science. Philosophers are not mental scientists even when they are discussing the issues of mental science. Though the discussion of philosophers may have an 'empirical air about it' (to use Wisdom's expression) but it is not about empirical facts.

'A believes that p': I would like first to consider Wittgenstein's reference to the disease of thought which always looks for and finds a mental state. Not only in his later work, in his earlier work Tractatus too Wittgenstein makes a vigorous attempt to cure himself of this disease. His earlier attempt at fighting this disease is best exhibited by his analysis of the psychological propositions of the form 'A believes that p'. 'A has the thought p' etc. Not only do these propositions introduce mental states, they go against Wittgenstein's thesis of extensionality. Suppose I believe that it is raining outside. Then the fact that it is not raining outside does not mean that at this moment I do not happen to believe that it is raining outside. So the proposition 'I believe that it is raining outside' is true even when one of its constituents 'it is raining outside' is false. This goes against the extensionality thesis. What has created a problem is the psychological state of belief. Once this state has been posited it does not seem to care for the weather outside. What ever the weather outside the psychological state occurs, and the proposition in which it occurs remains true solely because of this state. In this respect the proposition 'I believe it is raining
outside' does not behave very differently from such a tautology as 'Either it is raining or it is not'. This tautology remains true whatever the condition of the weather outside, whether it is raining or it is not raining. Our belief-proposition also remains true, whatever the condition of the weather outside. In order to know the truth of the tautology you have not to look outside, you have not to go beyond the sentence, you have simply to look into the sentence, you have simply to look into the sentence, you have simply to look into the words 'either-or'. The rules governing the use of 'either - or' decide the truth of the tautology, in the case of our belief-proposition as well you have not to look outside, you have simply to look into the sentence, you have to look into the operation of the word 'believe'. Rather you have to look into yourself and see whether your psychical state of belief is operative. So the belief-proposition in question is like the report of a sensation. (On the one hand it behaves like a tautology, and on the other, like the report of pain. In order to know the truth of, if there is any such thing as knowing the truth of. 'I have a pain', you have not to look outside, you have to look into yourself if looking into yourself makes sense. The occurence of a belief-state is like the occurrence of pain-state, and not a report of the weather outside. It is because it is not a report of the weather outside, that whatever the weather condition outside, the report remains true. The only way in which perhaps it could be false is that I could be lying. I have no pain yet I lie 'I have a pain'. So also I do not believe that it is raining outside yet I say that it is raining outside. A state of belief is like a state of pain,
a psychical state. Is having a belief like having a pain? Is belief a kind of sensation, that I am led to report about it when it occurs? Could there be violent beliefs as there are violent pains?

The thesis of extensionality has been rejected in terms of such a proposition as 'I believe that p' only by producing curious analyses of this proposition. This proposition is certainly not a tautology, for this proposition certainly asks you to look outside, it is a report of the weather outside. So also it is not a proposition expressing one's sensation, for there is no such thing as a sensation of belief. And even if there was a sensation of belief, this sensation is as irrelevant to the situation as is my sneezing when I am reporting about the condition of the weather outside. If I sneeze while telling you that it is raining outside you would not take my statement be a description of my sneeze, you would not say that I am simply saying something about my sneezing. So also if there is a sensation of belief occurring while I am telling you about the condition of the weather outside, I am not telling you anything about this sensation. I am not directing your attention towards my sensation. I am telling you only about the condition of the weather outside. 'I believe it is raining outside' is neither a tautology nor a sensation report, it is a proposition which has been used to describe the condition of the weather outside, and hence, like any other proposition it is a description of reality.

Wittgenstein is quite aware of the misleading nature of the psychological propositions, they seem to go against his extensionality thesis. As he says, "At first sight it looks as if it were possible
for one proposition to occur in another in a different way. Particularly with certain forms of proposition in psychology, such as 'A believes that p is the case' and 'A has the thought p' etc. For if these are considered superifically, it looks as if the proposition p stood in some kind of relation to an object. A. (And in modern theory of knowledge (Russell, Moore etc.) these propositions have actually been construed in this way.) How to save the thesis of extensionality? Its safety depends on the elimination of the pseudo-psychical state, on the dissolution of fictitious sensations Wittgenstein finds a solution. He says, 'It is clear, however, that 'A believes that p', 'A has the thought p', and 'A says p' are of the form '"p" says p'; and this does not involve a correlation of a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of facts by means of their objects." He has provided his own analysis and rejected the analysis of the psychological propositions given by Russell and Moore. For these philosophers have analysed the propositions in question in terms of a relation subsisting between a person and what he believes, thinks, says etc. (fact, proposition). But Wittgenstein eliminates both the psychological states (beliefs, thought etc.) and the subject (A) of these states. It is because the physical states are redundant that the subject of these states is also redundant. For in the immediately succeeding section Wittgenstein remarks "This shows too that there is no such thing as the soul - the subject etc. - as is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day." If there are no physical states, there is no necessity for postulating a soul or a subject for these states. Psychologists do not hesitate in postulating a realm of

psychological states, different from, and independent of, the physical
realm. And once these states are postulated, the bearer of these
states is also postulated. But if there are no psychological states,
there is no necessity of a bearer of these states.

What does Wittgenstein mean when he says that the proposition
'A believes that p' is of the form "p" says p'? This is the form
of any significant proposition, and not only of 'A believes that
p'. Any significant proposition means (says) a fact. In his analysis
"p" stands for a proposition and p for a fact. But propositions
for Wittgenstein are themselves fact. "A propositional sign is a
fact." 255 Thus, names in the proposition "p" must be correlated
with the objects in the fact p. This is what Wittgenstein means
when he refers to the "correlation of facts by means of their objects".
"It is raining outside" says (Means) that it is raining outside'.
But what is the expression 'A believes' doing here? If the fact
meant (said) is that it is raining outside, then 'A believes' is
superfluous. "Being believed" is not a part of the proposition be-
lieved. Wittgenstein has given the same treatment to the act of
belief which he has given to Frege's act of assertion. The psychical
states of believing, thinking, asserting etc., are as distant from
the proposition are the physiological states of sneezing, yawning
etc., which may also accompany the proposition in question. The
conditions which make the expression of a proposition possible are
not any kind of constituents of the proposition. If not the only,
this is an important purpose of Wittgenstein's analysis.

255. Ibid.
Let us consider Wittgenstein's treatment of Frege's sign of assertion to see whether his treatment of the signs for believing, thinking, saying etc., is different from his treatment of the sign of assertion. Against Frege's move Wittgenstein remarked in his Tractatus "Frege's 'judgement-stroke' '\|' is logically quite meaningless....'\|' is no more a component part of a proposition than is, for instance, the propositions' number."²⁵⁶ His later position remains the same as his earlier position. As he remarks in the Investigations "Frege's idea that every assertion contains an assumption, which is the thing that is asserted, really rests on the possibility found in our ordinary language of writing every statement in the form "It is asserted that such-and-such is the case" - But "that such-and-such is the case" is not a sentence in our language - so far it is not a move in the language-game. And if I write, not "it is asserted that ....but "It is asserted : such-and-such is the case", the words "It is asserted" simply become superfluous.²⁵⁷ Though Wittgenstein does not say, he means a similar thing concerning the signs for believing, thinking, saying etc. "It is believed : such-and-such is the case". "It is thought : such-and-such is the case." "It is said : such-and-such is the case." The expression 'It is believed', 'it is thought' and 'It is said' are superfluous in the same way in which 'It is asserted' is superfluous. Dummett accepts that "Frege could never quite rid himself of the idea that assertion is the expression of a mental attitude."²⁵⁸ In attacking the linguistic sign of assertion Wittgenstein is attacking the mental attitude.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., 4.442.
²⁵⁷ Investigations, 22.
²⁵⁸ Frege, p. 312.
Most of the known interpreters of Wittgenstein's remark 5.542 have missed the point of Wittgenstein's analysis of the signs for believing, thinking, saying etc. They seem to have missed that Wittgenstein treats these signs in the same fashion in which he treats Frege's sign of assertion, all these signs stand for mental states. 'A believes' is no more a constituent of the proposition believed than 'A asserts' is a constituent of the proposition asserted. What proposition is coordinated with reality is not 'I believe that it is raining outside' but the proposition 'It is raining outside'. A pseudo-proposition is rejected. When Wittgenstein analyses 'A believes that p' in terms of "p" says p' he is referring to the redundancy of the expression 'A believes'. But philosophers were never satisfied with Wittgenstein's analysis, they thought that the remark 5.542 is obscure. In the very Introduction to the Tractatus Russell remarks "What Mr. Wittgenstein says here is said so shortly that its point is not likely to be clear." 259 Referring to Wittgenstein's remark Ramsey says in his review of the Tractatus "As to the relation between a proposition and a thought Mr. Wittgenstein is rather obscure." 260 And after his failure to give a satisfactory explanation of Wittgenstein's remark Urmson in his Philosophical Analysis expresses his dejection "We cannot go further now into this problem of 'intensional functions'. We must be content to see it as a running sore for the upholders of the view that language has the logical skeleton of a truth-functional logic." 261 And more recently the dedicated Wittgensteinian Hacker remarks, "The

obscure relation between the mind and the un-coordinated terms of
the judgement in Russell's theory is here replaced with the (hardly
less obscure) method of projection correlating elements of thought
or utterance with objects."262 What has led philosophers to think
that Wittgenstein's remark is obscure? Perhaps they try to read
those features in Wittgenstein's remark which this remark has been
articulated to reject.

I would like to discuss Hacker's interpretation of Wittgenstein's
remark. Wittgenstein's remark according to Hacker does not reject
the psychological states, it retains them. While reflecting on Witt-
genstein's analysis of 'A believes p' Hacker concludes, "The person
A is not an object but a complex array of psychical objects....From
the logical point of view the only important points to establish
are that 'A believes p' is appearance not withstanding - extensional
and that it has the same logical multiplicity as p. It thus emerges
that Wittgenstein was willing to adopt a neo-Humean analysis of
the empirical self. There is no empirical soul-substance thinking
thoughts, there are only thoughts. The self of psychology is a mani-
fold, a series of experiences, a bundle of perceptions in perpetual
flux."263 This is a purely Humean account of Wittgenstein's analysis.
The source of Hacker's account are two. First is Wittgenstein's
immediately succeeding remark that a "composite soul would no longer
be a soul."264 The second is Wittgenstein's letter to Russell, dated
19 August, 1919 which has been reprinted in the Notebooks. Quoting
Wittgenstein's letter Hacker writes, "But a Gedanke is a tatsache:

262. Insight And Illusion, p. 61. 263. Insight And Illusion, Hacker,
p. 62.
264. Tractatus, 5.5421.
What are its constituents and components, and what is their relation to those of the pictured \( \text{\textit{B}} \) \( \text{\textit{C}} \) \( \text{\textit{D}} \)? I don't know what the constituent of a thought are but I know that it must have such constituents which correspond to the words of a language... (A gedanke consists) of psychical constituents that have the same sort of relation to reality as words. What these constituents are I don't know (NB, pp. 129-30)." 265 It is by taking both the sources together that Hacker's picture emerges. In his notes dictated to G.E. Moore in Norway Wittgenstein does say "It is just as impossible that I should be a simple as that "p" should be." 266

Consider the status of a 'composite soul'. If maintaining that there is no soul means the same thing as maintaining that the soul is not simple, then there is no doubt that Wittgenstein maintained that the soul is not simple. What kind of simplicity does it lack? Perhaps it lacks the simplicity of entering into a thought (proposition, fact) as one of its objects (constituents). The soul is not simple means that the soul is not an object in Wittgenstein's sense of 'object'. This is what Hacker also means when he says with approval that "The person A is not an object'. But if the soul is composite, it would no longer be a soul according to Wittgenstein. Why? Wittgenstein is using the expression 'composite' in a technical sense, the sense in which he denies his objects to be composite. "Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite." 267 If they are composite, then they are not unalterable and unchanging. So if the soul is composite, whatever be the objects which compose it, it would be non-substantial, alterable, changing...

266. Notebooks, p. 119. 267. Tractatus, 2.023.
etc. Perhaps Wittgenstein accepts the standard definition of soul that the soul is substantial, unalterable, unchanging etc. So as a matter of fact Wittgenstein rejects both the proposals, the proposal that the soul is simple and the proposal that it is composite. If it is simple it would be a constituent of a thought (fact or proposition) which is absurd. If it is composite it would be changing, altering etc., like any configuration of objects. So it would not be worth its name as soul.

Hacker thinks that Wittgenstein does not reject the view that the soul is composite. For this view simply means that a person "is a complex array of psychical objects", Hacker feels that Wittgenstein has simply adopted the neo-Humean view in rejecting the soul-substance and accepting that a person is a bundle of perceptions. But Hacker's interpretation of Wittgenstein's view in terms of Hume's cannot be accepted. If a person is not an object, then in Wittgenstein's sense of 'objects' a person's pain and pleasure, his experiences of hot and cold are also not objects. If pain, pleasure, hot and cold were objects, then they should have been substantial unchanging and unalterable; what changes is only a configuration. But according to Hume pain and pleasure, hot and cold, occurring in one configuration (stretch of perception or observation) cannot be the same as pain and pleasure, hot and cold occurring in another configuration. Hume denied that the constituents of one perception are identical with the constituents of another perception. Then how could Hume's plain, pleasure, hot and cold be Wittgenstein's objects? A person is not an object, so also a person is not a complex
array of psychical objects, in Wittgenstein's sense of an object. Instead of clarifying Wittgenstein's view, such an attempt as the one made by Hacker would lead to more confusions about Wittgenstein's view. For 'I believe that p' could mirror the structure of 'p' only by eliminating the psychical constituent 'I believe'. As Wittgenstein says in his Investigations, perhaps while reflecting on his Tractatus analysis, "The expression 'I believe that this is the case' is used like the assertion 'this is the case.' 268 In a similar way he says, again, "The statement 'I believe it's going to rain' has a meaning like, that is to say a use like, 'It's going to rain'." 269 Wittgenstein is conscious of the intensional analysis of belief-statements. As he remarks, "The language-game of reporting can be given such a turn that a report is not meant to inform the hearer about its subject matter but about the person making the report." 270 The intensional-analysis is such a turn.

Experiences Without the Subject: No less difficult is the section 5.631 of the Tractatus, for it allows divergent interpretations. Consider the first remark of the section, "There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas." 271 At a superficial glance this remark would appear Humean. For Hume denied that there is any subject that thinks or entertains ideas. And Hume reached this conclusion after his failure to have an encounter with the subject. Hume's argument may be described as the non-encounterability of the subject. But non-encounterability of the subject, in the context of Hume, has two essentially connected aspects. Hume fails

268. Investigations, x. 269. Ibid. 270. Ibid. 271. Tractatus, 5.631.
to have an encounter with the subject, but in the process he succeeds in having encounters with experiences. In a situation in which one is expected to have an encounter with the subject, one has only to encounter experiences. As Hume says in his treatise, "When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure." But it is an open question whether Wittgenstein denied the subject of experiences without denying the experiences of that subject. It is not clear whether he retained experiences and only denied the subject of those experiences as Hume did. It is possible that he denied both, the subject of experiences and so also the experiences of the subject. Consider his immediately succeeding remark of the section, "If I wrote a book called The world as I found it, I should have to include a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject, for it alone could not be mentioned in the book." If one reads this remark, even without reading it carefully, one would find that Wittgenstein has reported only on two items, my body and my will. No other item has been mentioned. Of course, Wittgenstein's world is open to other kinds of objects than the two mentioned by him. But whether 'experiences' would be allowed in that world is not clear. May be not only the subject of experiences is withdrawn, the experiences of the subject are also withdrawn from the world. Obviously my will, which is mentioned in the book, is not an experience. As Wittgenstein says in his Notebooks: "The act

of will is not an experience." Immediately preceding remark in the Notebooks is even more helpful. Wittgenstein says, "All experience is world and does not need the subject." So the need for the subject of experience is denied because there is no independent status of experiences. If all experience is world, then the world is not required to have an independent item called 'experience'. An experience is not a third independent item occurring in the world two other independent items being my body and my will. It is possible that Wittgenstein considers the Cartesian subject of experiences as illusory because he considers the Cartesian (Humean) experiences as illusory. As on Wittgenstein's analysis of 'A believes that p' so also on Wittgenstein's elimination of the subject of experiences Hacker's views are misleading. His own Humean prejudices seem to have been working on his mind while he is interpreting Wittgenstein consider Hacker's comment on the section 5.631. "Wittgenstein's first point is that there is no such thing as the thinking, representing subject...The argument supporting this contention is the standard Humean argument of the non-encounterability of the self in experience." Compare 'someone has constantly been deluding me in my dreams' with 'someone has constantly been deluding me in my life.' Have I lost anything if I have lost someone only in my dreams. But I certainly suffer a great loss if I have lost someone in my real life. One's failure to find the subject when one is day-dreaming, imagining, introspecting etc., must be distinguished from one's failure to find the subject in the world. Wittgenstein is heading for a qualitatively different kind of tragedy from that

with which Hume suffered. Wittgenstein is certainly not using the Humean argument of the non-encounterability of the self. Though Hume fails to find the subject, he does succeed in finding its substitutes, the substitutes being the experiences of love and hatred, pleasure and pain etc. For Wittgenstein there is no subject, but so also are there no substitutes, or, if you wish, the substitutes are such objects as tables and chairs, not very likeable substitutes.

Strawson is quite cautious in not being misled by Wittgenstein's denial of the subject in the Tractatus. The fact that the subject is denied does not mean that one accepts the no-subject theory of experiences. No-subject theory of experiences is possible only when one believes in the existence of experiences. Had Wittgenstein rejected the subject without rejecting its experiences, then it would have certainly been possible to level the charge of the no-subject theorist on him. While charging Wittgenstein for holding the no-subject views on experiences Strawson refers to "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-35", later published by Moore in the Mind, Vol. LXIV. This was the period of the composition of what is now known as the Blue Book. And this was also the time when Wittgenstein comes out of his Tractarian Cave. What is the no-subject theory of experiences which Wittgenstein developed in his lectures of 1930-35, and which was later attacked by Strawson in his Individuals. Let us consider this theory briefly so as to see whether or not we can find its roots in the Tractatus.

Referring to Moore's articles in Mind Vol. LXIV Strawson comments on Wittgenstein's no-subject theory of experiences, "He is reported
to have held that the use of 'I' was utterly different in the case of 'I have a tooth ache'...from its use in the case of 'I've got a bad tooth'...He thought...that in one of them 'I' was replaceable by 'this body'...But he also said that in the other use (the use exemplified by 'I have a toothache' as opposed to 'I have a bad tooth), the 'I' does not denote a possessor, and that no Ego is involved in thinking or in having toothache, and referred with apparent approval to Litchenberg's dictum that instead of saying 'I think' we (or Descartes) ought to say 'There is a tought.'

The view of Wittgenstein, as stated by Strawson above, refers to two uses of 'I'. In his Blue Book Wittgenstein calls these uses as 'the use as subject' and 'the use as object'. Wittgenstein does not deny the use of 'I' as object, he simply denies the use of 'I' as subject. But what gives flavour to his view is not the fact that he denies the use of 'I' as subject, for in his Tractatus too he expressed a similar view. The flavour comes from the fact that Wittgenstein now allows the thoughts and ideas to occur in the world, not only independently of the subject but also independently of other objects of the world. He does not suggest the reduction of ideas and thoughts to the world. Thus, his view now is not very different from the view of Hume so far as his treatment of 'I' as subject is concerned. Therefore the rejection of 'I' as subject now is quite unlike its rejection in the Tractatus. So also the present use of 'I' as object was just missing in both the works, Tractatus and Notebooks. What he now calls as the legitimate and genuine use of 'I' (i.e., its use as object) was no kind of use

in his earlier work. In his earlier work he did not allow the reduction of 'I' to 'my body'. It would be quite misleading to say that Wittgenstein rejected the use of 'I' as subject in his earlier work and continued to reject it even in his later work. For the use of 'I' which has been rejected in the 'Lectures of 1930-35' is contrasted with the use of 'I' as object. No such contrast was appealed to in his earlier work.

The contrast to which Strawson is referring in his Individuals, is a different kind of contrast from that to which Wittgenstein was attracted in his earlier work. The earlier contrast was the contrast in which the use of 'I' as subject was contrasted with the use of 'I' as metaphysical. The Cartesian self was distinguished from the metaphysical self, rather than from the physical self. Therefore, what is interesting in the context of his earlier thought is how Wittgenstein arrived at the contrast between the Cartesian subject and the metaphysical subject.

To understand his earlier view I would like to refer to two remarks from the Notebooks. First remark has already been quoted earlier in this section. This remark is "All experience is world and does not need the subject."\(^{279}\) And the second remark is "Physiological life is of course not 'life'. And neither is psychological life. Life is the world."\(^{280}\) These I consider the key remarks for understanding Wittgenstein's earlier view, for understanding the contrast between the Cartesian subject and the metaphysical subject. These remarks clearly show that Wittgenstein gives no importance to the 'experiential' or 'psychological' life. Life is the world. But then the question of the bearer of the psychological does not

\(^{279}\) Notebooks, p. 89. \(^{280}\) Ibid., p. 77.
arise. There is no Cartesian soul or that the Cartesian soul is illusory, for there is nothing significant existing for such a soul to be the bearer of. Instead of asking the question "Who is the bearer of the psychological?" we should have asked the question "Who is the bearer of the world?". And the proper answer is not "The Cartesian soul is the bearer of the psychological". The proper answer is "The metaphysical soul is the bearer of the world". For the bearer of the world could not be in the world. If it is in the world, then it is impossible for it to be its bearer. Therefore, Wittgenstein is led to say in the Tractatus "The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a metaphysical limit." It would not be the subject if it is not metaphysical. Wittgenstein raises the question "Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found." The subject would simply not be metaphysical if it is found in the world. Could a bearer of psychological state be a constituent of that state? It could not be, it must lie outside the psychological state. On a similar pattern the bearer of the world could not be a constituent of the world, could not be an object existing in the world. It is to elucidate this point that Wittgenstein brings the analogy of the eye and the visual field. The eye is not a part of the visual field. "You do not see the eye." The subject is not a part of the world. You do not see the subject.

Now consider the nature of the 'will' which is one of the items mentioned in the Book entitled The world as I found it. Will is not an experience; hence the willing subject cannot be an experiencing or a thinking subject. Rather Wittgenstein introduces the willing

subject in such a fashion that it gives the impression as if the willing subject replaces the thinking subject. As he says, "Thinking subject is surely mere illusion. But the willing subject exists." But what kind of existence is the existence of the willing subject? Willing subject is the same as the metaphysical subject, a limit of the world and not a part of it. Wittgenstein does not intend to introduce the willing subject in the place vacated by the thinking subject, rather than its limit. For, if it occupies the place vacated by the Cartesian subject, it would be part of the world rather than its limit. For the hypothetical Cartesian subject, being the bearer of the psychological, should be a part of the world. Whether the willing subject could or could not be a part of the world cannot be decided by introspection or day-dreaming, the kind of activity in which Hume got himself involved. Wittgenstein uses a kind of deductive reasoning. As he says, "The willing subject exists." "If the will did not exist, neither would there be the centre of the world, which we call the I." The I to which Wittgenstein refers in this remark is neither the 'I' as subject nor the 'I' as object of the Blue Book. For the Blue Book 'I' is neither of its two senses is the centre of the world.

The necessity for postulating a willing subject arises also because of ethics. For "Good and evil enter only through the subject." But the willing subject is transcendental, so ethics also becomes transcendental. And Wittgenstein is led to accept the view "Ethics does not treat of the world. Ethics must be a condition

285. Ibid.  
286. Ibid., 79.
of the world like logic."\textsuperscript{287} And being a condition of the world it is an essential character of the I. As Wittgenstein says, "What is good and evil is essentially the I, not the world."\textsuperscript{288} And concerning this I he says, "The I, the I is what is deeply mysterious."\textsuperscript{289} However, in spite of its mysterious character Wittgenstein is sure that this "'I" is not an object."\textsuperscript{290} Though I "confront every object but not the I."\textsuperscript{291} And concerning this I Wittgenstein said in a conclusive tone, "So there really is a way in which there can and must be mention of I in a non-\textit{psychological sense in philosophy}."\textsuperscript{292} Philosopher's concern is not the psychological sense of 'I'.

The above discussion shows that the usual interpretations of the remark 5.631 of the \textit{Tractatus} must be rejected. For it is not the psychological I but the non-psychological I which Wittgenstein attempted to isolate, about which he said that it cannot be mentioned in the book entitled \textit{The world as I found it}. What Wittgenstein fails to encounter in the world is not the Cartesian or the Humean subject, but the willing subject, the meta-physical limit; the subject about which he said that it is not a part of the world but a presupposition of its existence. Thus, to view the Tractarian Wittgenstein as a neo-Humean is obviously wrong. He was not searching for the 'thinking subject', therefore, he did not fail in his search. What he was searching for in the world is a willing subject, and he failed. Hacker is quite right when he points out that "Schopenhauer's distinction between the illusory

\textsuperscript{287} \textit{Ibid.}, 77. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{288} \textit{Ibid.}, 80. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{289} \textit{Ibid.}, 2.\hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{290} \textit{Ibid.}\hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{291} \textit{Ibid.}\hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{292} \textit{Ibid.}
Cartesian self and the transcendental self was adopted by Wittgenstein. 293

The relation between the transcendental subject and the world can best be understood by the example of the imaginary landscape to which Wittgenstein refers in his Investigations. "I think of a picture of a landscape, an imaginary landscape with a house in it. - Someone asks "whose house is that ?" - The answer, by the way, might be "It belongs to the farmer who is sitting on the bench in front of it." But then he cannot for example enter his house." 294 The transcendental subject is like the farmer sitting on the bench in front of the house. The house is the world. And just as the pictured farmer cannot enter into the pictured house, inspite of the fact that he is its owner, so also the transcendental subject cannot enter into the world inspite of the fact that it owns it. The fact that the subject is transcendental does not mean that it is without any limitation. It has all kinds of limitations. "I cannot bend the happenings of the world to my will" I am completely powerless." 295 In such a situation it is natural for Wittgenstein to develop the attitude of renunciation. "I can only make myself independent of the world - and so in a certain sense master it - by renouncing any influence on happenings." 296

293. Insight and Illusion Hacker, p. 66.
295. Notebooks, p. 73.
296. Ibid.
stein passes through a great philosophical turbulence. And this turbulence continued till the end of his life. He started question- ing his earlier views. Transcendental subject seems to have lost its hold on his thought, and we do not hear anymore of the metaphy- sical subject or the subject that used to be the presupposition of the world's existence. Attack on the Cartesian subject for some years became his obsession. He devised very persuasive argu- ments against it. The Cartesian subject is undoubtedly to be reje- cted, but it has to be rejected with due respect. For it is not Descartes who invented the myth of the psychological self; Descar- tes' role was only the recording of this myth. Therefore it is a serious issue how the simple and honest people, and not only the philosophers, were misled by their language to arrive at the myth of the psychological self. Again the human bodies seem to have obtained a greater significance in Wittgenstein's later life. Perhaps because as we grow in our age we take more interest in our bodies than at the earlier stages. Our bodies become the centre of aesthetic, religious and moral values. They are certainly not such centres at the earlier stages. And early Wittgenstein was afterall a child-prodigy; he completely ignored the history of philosophy. In his Notebooks Wittgenstein says, "The human body ...is a part of the world among others, among beasts, plants, stones etc., etc." No special attention was paid to the human body inspite of the fact that Wittgenstein was aware of the fact that the human will successfully operates only on the human body. I can will to lift my arm but not to lift the building which I

297. Notebooks, p. 82.
own. Only my body is subject to my will, yet bodies were not given any significance. But now Wittgenstein has a very different concept of the human body. "The human body has become now "The best picture of the human soul." Wittgenstein has now come down from his transcendental height to the mundane level. What attracts him now are the human soul and the human body; for none of them is beyond reach; both have the name 'human' attached to them. Even at the time at which Wittgenstein talked so much about the transcendental self, the transcendental self was a "deep mystery." to him. While talking about it he said, 'I am conscious of the complete unclarity of all these sentences.' Yet this mystery continued haunting him. It is only in the later phase of his philosophy that he gives up the mysterious universe. Now he is occupied with the "body", something concrete, a part of the physical world, not its metaphysical limit. The body becomes a 'genuine subject' and the 'metaphysical subject' has given way, as we shall see, to a new distinction between 'the psychological subject' and 'the bodily subject'. In his Tractatus Wittgenstein said, "The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world - not a part of it." But now the philosophical self is the same with which psychology is concerned. He is now interested in human being, human soul and the human body. They were rejected earlier because they were parts of the world. They are accepted now exactly because of the same reason.

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300. Ibid., 79. 301. Tractatus, 5.641.
What was earlier a philosophical crime is now a philosophical achievement. The focus of philosophical interest has changed. Of course Wittgenstein does not suggest that we have to accept the verdict of the psychologists. We remain philosophers.

Before we proceed further it would be interesting to compare the views of Wittgenstien with the views of Aristotle. By saying that the human body is the best picture of the human soul Wittgenstein's views on the relation between the human soul and the human body comes very close to the view of Aristotle. Aristotle revolts against the Pythagorean-Platonic conception of the soul. Pythagorean-Platonic view allows a soul to enter into any kind of body. The soul which is associated with the body of a man in this life may be associated with the body of a dog or a plant in other lives. For Plato bodies can be distinguished into kinds, but no such distinction of kinds, exists for souls. But Aristotle finds it absurd to think that the human soul may enter into the body of a dog or a plant. The human soul is restricted only to the human body; for it requires the form of the human body and this form is lacking in other animals and vegetables. As Aristotle says, "Most theories about the soul involve the following absurdity: they all join the soul to a body, or place it in a body, without adding any specification of the reason of their union, or of the bodily conditions required for it...they do not try to determine anything about the body which is to contain it, as it were possible as in the Pythagorean myths, that any soul could be clothed upon any body - an absurd view, for each body seems to have a form..."
and shape of its own. It is a absurd to say that the art of carpen-
try could embody itself in flutes; each art must use its tools,
each soul its body." 302 Not all dresses fit all kinds of beings.
The dress which fits a human being is unfit for a dog or a plant.
If the human body is the dress of the human soul, then it is im-
possible for the body of a dog or a tree to accommodate the human
soul. The human soul is restricted to the human body. Wittgenstein's
metaphor of 'the body as the best picture of the soul' can easily
be substituted for Aristotle's metaphor of 'the body as the dress
of the soul'. The fact that the human body is the best picture
of the human soul shows that no other kind of body would picturise
the human soul so well. This also shows that one way, if not the
only way, to understand the nature of the human soul is to under-
stand the nature of the human body. (The dress of a man shows
whether he is a rogue or a gentleman). Both Aristotle and later
Wittgenstein reject the a priori understanding of the human soul,
the kind of understanding which Pythagoras and Plato exhibited.
Human bodies give us glimpses of the human soul. Without there
being human bodies there is no question of our having glimpses
of human souls. Of course this glimpse of the human soul is not
any kind of inference. It is not the case that 'I have inferred
the existence of a 'soul' by 'observing the human body'. If I
have to depend on 'inference' then I could have had no glimpse
of the human soul. For the requirements of inference are not satis-
fied in this case.

Wittgenstein at times does not distinguish the concept of 'human body' from the concept of 'human being'. In his *Remarks On The Philosophy of Psychology* the human soul has been picturised by the human being. As he says, "The human being is the best picture of the human soul." This indifferent attitude to the distinction between the concept of a human being and the concept of a human body shows that Wittgenstein in his later work gives much importance to the concept of a human body, that this concept is equated with the concept of a human being.

Had Aristotle anticipated the further consequences of Wittgenstein's later thought he would have certainly imposed more restrictions on Plato's view of souls. Not only would it have been impossible for Plato to allow the entry of human soul into the body of a dog or a plant, but that it would have been impossible for Plato to allow plants to have any kind of souls, and in the case of animals having souls would have been quite complicated. For Wittgenstein's concept of soul, in his later writing, is the concept of a thinking experiencing subject. In his earlier writing he sacrificed this concept for the concept of a 'willing subject', and therefore, he failed to find it either in the world or outside it. It is in the search for the human soul in the world that Wittgenstein's attention is diverted towards the human body. If human body could also function as the thinking experiencing subject or else in some way could lead us to such a subject then it is possible for us to have discovered the human souls. The search for a soul is the search for a thinking experiencing subject.
Only those things (to use 'things' vaguely) have souls to which it is possible for us to ascribe 'thoughts' and 'experiences'. Prohibiting the ascription of thoughts and experiences to a thing is prohibiting that it is (has) soul. This becomes clear from Wittgenstein's raising the question whether a stone has a soul. "In what sense will the stone have the pains...In what sense will they be ascribed to a stone? And can he say of the stone that it has a soul and that is what has the pain? What has a soul, or pain, to do with a stone?"\textsuperscript{304} Thus, one of the ways in which an object could be conceived of as having a soul is that experience are ascribed to it. The soul is the subject of experiences. So the issue whether something has a soul depends on the issue whether experiences could be ascribed to it.

But what leads us to say that something has experiences? We ascribe experiences to a thing by observing its behaviour. As in his \textit{Investigations} Wittgenstein reacts about this view "But doesn't what you say come to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behaviour."\textsuperscript{305} In this context Wittgenstein has no intention of reducing 'pain' to its 'bodily expression'. But the fact that pain cannot be reduced to its bodily expression, does not mean that it could exist independently of all its connections with the bodily behaviour. It simply makes no sense to talk about 'pain' without using 'behavioural criteria'. Pain is supposed to be an inner process. "An inner process," as Wittgenstein points out "is in need of outward criteria." \textsuperscript{306} On the basis of all this Wittgenstein is led to say "Only of a living human being and what

resembles (behave like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious.\textsuperscript{307} We ascribe experiences to living human beings. And this we are able to do by observing their bodily behaviour. If they did not behave in the way they do behave, we would have failed to ascribe experiences to them. This implies that the living human beings are according to Wittgenstein the thinking experiencing subjects: they are the souls to which experiences are ascribed. In this \textit{Tractatus} Wittgenstein did not give any importance to human souls, human beings and human bodies. They were supposed to be the kind of things with "which psychology deals."\textsuperscript{308} But now he does not restrict himself only to human souls, he goes to an even lower level. All those living beings are the subjects for the ascription of experiences that behave like the living human beings. Wittgenstein clearly makes 'human behaviour' as the paradigm for the ascription of experiences. A living being which is different from the human being could be a thinking experiencing subject, could be a soul, if its bodily behaviour resembles the bodily behaviour of the human being. So the human body is not only the paradigm for the ascription of experiences, it is also a paradigm for saying that something has a soul. As Wittgenstein says, "If one considers the behaviour of a living thing one sees its soul."\textsuperscript{309} Consider the variety of living beings to which Wittgenstein succeeds in ascribing experiences. "Look at a wriggling fly...pain seems able to get a foothold here.\textsuperscript{310}"

\textsuperscript{307} \textit{Ibid.}, 281.  \hfill \textsuperscript{308} \textit{Tractatus}, 5.641.
\textsuperscript{309} \textit{Investigations}, 357.  \hfill \textsuperscript{310} \textit{Ibid.}, 284.
'wriggling fly' does not seem to very unlike a 'crying man'. It is because we say of a man who is crying that he is in pain, that we also say of a wriggling fly that it is in pain. Wittgenstein further says, "One can imagine an animal angry, frightened, unhappy startled." 311 One can imagine the psychical experiences in connection with an animal because of the fact that the behaviour of an animal resembles the behaviour of man. But if it is possible for us to ascribe experiences to animals, it is also possible for us to say that they have souls. Can experiences be ascribed to plants? Can we say of tomatoes and cabbages that they have souls? Why not? Wittgenstein does not hesitate in allowing vegetative life to have thoughts and experiences, to have souls. As he says, "When you see trees swaying about they are talking to one another." Everything has a soul", you compare the branches with arms." 312 Like Plato, Wittgenstein seems to have permitted everything living to have soul, to have thoughts and experiences. He seems to have accepted the Aristotelian restriction that the human soul is restricted only to the human body. Perhaps animals have their own variety of souls, so also the vegetable world its own.

Wittgenstein's view, however, is not as simple as that of Plato or Aristotle. What his one hand gives to the animals and plants, the other hand takes away from them, and the result is that they remain animals and plants, qualitatively different from men and women. At first step we can see Wittgenstein assimilating the vegetables to ordinary material objects. As he reacts, "But doesn't

311 Ibid, part ii, i.p. 174.
one say that a man has consciousness, and that a tree or a stone
does not ?" 313 This implies that trees are not unlike stones.
Upto this stage we have the picture that only human beings and
animals have souls. But why do we deprive the material objects
and vegetables to have consciousness? Does the behaviour of
a stone or a plant fail to resemble the behaviour of a man?
It does. Wittgenstein refers to a chair to see whether experiences
could be ascribed to it. Where do the experiences occur if they
occur & to a chair. "In one of its parts? Or outside it body." 314
This kind of questioning is justified, for "we want to know how
the chair is supposed to be like a human being, whether, for
instances, the head is at the top of the back and so on. 315
So also if a rose is allowed to be conscious, we would like to
see how does its body resemble the human body. Suppose it is
said, "A rose has no teeth". Is it like the raising of the ques-
tion "A new born babe has no teeth"? Wittgenstein comments "One
has no notion in advance where to look for teeth in a rose."
316
So the question of ascribing experiences to a rose does not arise.
Thus, Wittgenstein has restricted Plato's souls to the animal
kindgom, for men too are a species of animals (of course men
suffer from the self-deception that they have something of the
divine in them. Perhaps animals do not have any such suffering.)

What follows may be taken as the next step of Wittgenstein.
He himself introduces difficulties for considering animals as
the thinking experiencing subjects. Consider his reaction to
313. Investigation, 418. 314. Ibid., 361.
315. Ibid. 316. Ibid., part 11, xi, 221-222
the use of the expression 'think'. Wittgenstein remarks "We learn to say it perhaps only of human beings? We learn to assert or deny it of them. The question "Do fishes think?" does not exist among our application of language, it is not used." 317 Similar is the remark, "We don't say of a table and chair that they think; neither do we say this of a plant, a fish, and hardly of a dog; only of human beings. And not even of all human beings." 318 If we have been taught to assert or deny 'thinking' to human beings, then we cannot extend its application to fishes, dogs and flies. As in his Investigations Wittgenstein remarks, "If a concept refers to a character of human handwriting, it has no application to beings that do not write." 319 The concept of thinking refers to a human being, therefore it has no application to those objects that are not human beings. Fishes, dogs and flies are not human beings. The concept of thinking is tied to language; or, rather 'Our concept of thinking is tied to our language. 'Fishes, dogs and flies do not use our language; hence we do not know what would it be for these animals to use our language. As Wittgenstein says, "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him." 320 Therefore, we just do not know, hence, do not say, what it is for an animal to think.

Wittgenstein has introduced for us a paradoxical situation concerning his views. On the one hand he has led us to think that not only animals have souls even trees have souls. On the other hand he means to say that only human beings have souls, because in a legitimate sense we ascribe experiences only to

317. Philosophy of Psychology, 201. 318. Ibid., 192.
320. Ibid., Part II, xi, 223.
human beings. One solution could be that Wittgenstein deprived
the animals and plants only from having reason, from having thou-
ghts. He allows them to have sensations. So his view is not very
different from the view of Aristotle. Animals and plants too
have souls, for they are experiencing subjects, not thinking
subjects. This solution prohibits the entry of human soul into
the body of a dog or a fly. But when Wittgenstein denies 'thinking
to animals and trees his denial also covers the having of 'sensa-
tions' by the animals and plants. For our concept of sensation,
like our concept of thinking, involves a linguistic structure.
If we cannot ask the question "Do fishes think?" We can also
not ask the question "Do fishes feel?". How to reconcile Witt-
genstein's denial that animals are thinking experiencing subjects
and his assertion that they are such subjects? The solution seems
to be that when he denies thoughts and experiences to animals
he denies them only in the secondary sense. In the primary sense
thoughts and experiences can be ascribed only to human beings.
It is only in the secondary derivative sense that animals have
thoughts and experiences. But this solution would keep Wittgenstein
away not only from Plato but also from Aristotle. Our ascription
of experiences to animals would not be very different from our
ascription of experiences to dolls and pots. So also ascription
of souls to animals is in no better situation. Only human beings
have experiences, and it is only in connection with human beings
that we can say that they have souls. It is only in a secondary
sense that we talk about a dog or a tree that it talks and feels
sensations, that it possesses a soul.
Two Uses of 'I': It has been pointed out earlier in this chapter, that Wittgenstein makes a distinction between the use of 'I' as subject and its use as object. The period when he was charmed by this distinction can be described as the Blue Book period. The period when he was charmed by this distinction can be described as the Blue Book period. it spreads over the years 1930-35. In the preceding section we have seen that the concept of a human being is not complete if only the human body is mentioned, we must also take note of human experiences. Now the question arises whether experiences can be ascribed to the body, whether the body can function as the thinking experiencing subject. Suppose my hand is injured. Do I say that my hand feels pain. Though I have no qualms in saying that my hand is injured, I have qualms in saying that my hand feels pain. We do not say of our hands and heads that they feel pain. For it is I who feels pain in this hand or head. As Wittgenstein raises the question, "Isn't it absurd to say of a body that it has pain?"321 Wherein lies the absurdity? Wittgenstein reacts, "What makes it plausible to say that it is not the body? - Well, something like this, if someone has pain in his hand, then the hand does not say so (unless it writes it) and one does not comfort the hand, but the sufferer."322 Wittgenstein does not equate the 'sufferer' with the 'hand'. The sufferer, the thinking experiencing subject, is not the body. Bodies could be injured or wounded, so they are the subjects of such injuries and wounds. But they cannot be the subjects of pains and pleasures. We must introduce a different subject for experiences in case we reject bodies as their subjects. All

321. Investigations, 286. 322. Ibid.
this has led Wittgenstein to differentiate between the two uses of 'I'. As he says "There are two different cases in the use of the word 'I' (or, "my") which I might call "the use as object" and the "use as subject". Example of the first kind of use are these: "My arm is broken", "I have grown six inches", "I have a bump on my forehead", "The wind blows my hair about". Examples of the second kind are: "I see so-and-so", "I hear so-and-so", "I try to lift my arm", "I think it will rain", "I have toothache." In the case of 'I' as object 'I' refers to the body, but it is certainly not the body that is being referred to when 'I' is used as subject.

In his Individuals Strawson has attacked Wittgenstein for his distinction between the two uses of 'I'. For Wittgenstein intends to show that the use of 'I' as subject is illegitimate, it is not required. The legitimate use of 'I' is made only when it is used as object, when it is used to stand for the body. This conclusion according to Strawson makes Wittgenstein a no-subject theorist, a theorist who believes that there is no thinking experiencing subject, that thoughts and experiences could manage their affairs by themselves. While explaining Wittgenstein's view Strawson remarks, "He thought that there were two uses of 'I', and that in one of them 'I' was replaceable by 'this body'...But he also said that in the other use (the use exemplified by 'I' have a toothache' as opposed to 'I have a bad tooth') the 'I' does not denote a possessor, and that no Ego is involved in thinking or in having toothache; and referred with apparent approval to Lichtenberg's dictum that, instead of saying 'I think',

we (or Descartes) ought to say 'There is a thought.' 324 Wittgenstein is clearly a no-subject theorist. For he retains thought without retaining the thinking subject. His position is different from the position of Hume, for he retains the body. But his position is also different from the position of Descartes, for he rejects the thinking experiencing subject.

Before we go further into the details of Wittgenstein's rejection of the Cartesian subject some minor clarification concerning Strawson's characterisation of his view is essential. Strawson says, 'We may notice...a possible connection between the no-owner ship doctrine and the Cartesian position. The latter is, straight forwardly enough, a dualism of two subjects, or two types of subjects. The former could, a little paradoxically, be called a dualism too: a dualism of one subject - the body - and one non-subject. We might surmise that the second dualism, paradoxically so called, arises out of the first dualism, non-paradoxically so called; in other words, that if we try to think of that to which one's states of consciousness are ascribed as something utterly different from that to which certain corporeal characteristics are ascribed, then indeed it becomes difficult to see why states of consciousness should be ascribed to, thought of as belonging to, anything at all.' 325 I do not know whether Strawson has given a criticism of Wittgenstein's view or an accurate representation of his view. I simply do not find anything critical in it, except perhaps a critical tone. For Strawson accepts that if we try to think of that to which experiences...

324. Individuals, 95 (footnote) 325. Individuals, p. 98.
are ascribed as something utterly different from that to which certain corporeal characteristics are ascribed then it becomes difficult to see why states of consciousness are ascribed to anything at all. This means that if we start with the Cartesian dualism of two subjects then we must end with the Wittgensteinian no-subject position (of there being no subject for experiences.) And this is what Wittgenstein wanted to show. No-subject doctrine is a natural heir of Cartesian dualism, therefore Cartesian dualism must be rejected. The kind of no-ownership view which Wittgenstein has proposed is straightforwardly dualistic. There is no paradoxicality or roundaboutness about it, for Wittgenstein was certainly not pleading for the neo-Humean analysis of experiences. If there is no reduction of experiences to physical states then the view is undoubtedly dualistic. But the consequence of dualism is solipsism. In rejecting the 'I' of the solipsist Wittgenstein is rejecting both Cartesian dualism and solipsism as ordinarily understood. Strawson does not recognise the service rendered by the no-ownership theorist. Strawson finds Descartes mistaken, and the no-ownership theorist doubly mistaken. For the no-ownership theorist as depicted by Strawson carries all the difficulties of the Cartesian dualism plus a few more. But Wittgenstein is certainly not pleading for Descartes. He is simply showing that Descartes is mistaken, that from his assumption solipsism follows and from solipsism follows the rejection of the thinking experiencing subject. So Cartesian dualism involves its own death. The no-ownership theory is a concrete rejection of both, Descartes and Hume, by mirroring the features of both.
Wittgenstein's distinction between the use of 'I' as subject and its use as object should be studied along with his introductory remarks on this distinction. What leads him to make this distinction, and what purpose does this distinction serve. Wittgenstein says, just before proposing this distinction, "When I said, from my heart, that only I see, I was also inclined to say that by "I" I didn't really mean L.W....I could almost say that by "I" I mean something which just now inhabits L.W., something which the others can't see. (I meant my mind, but could only point to it via my body.)"  

It is evident from these remarks that there is a clear connection between solipsism and dualism. Solipsism helps dualism and dualism helps solipsism; they survive on each others mutual assistance. Unless the thinking experiencing subject is totally different from the body, though hidden in the body, dualism does not get started. And thinking experiencing subject could be independent of the body only in the condition when its sole function is to stand as the subject for the ascription of experiences. As Wittgenstein points out, "in the cases in which "I" is used as subject we don't use it because we recognise a particular person by his bodily characteristics; and this creates the illusion that we use this word to refer to something bodiless, which, however, has its seat in our body. In fact this seems to be the real ego, the one of which it was said, "Cogito, ergo sum"."  

Whether such an ego is illusory or not would be seen later. Suppose it is not illusory, then is there any way for it to push aside the body? Is there any way for this...  

327. Ibid., 69.
ego to peep through the body? But without pushing aside the body, how could this ego, how could this subject, have the glimpse of other egos, other subjects? So there is only one ego, one thinking experiencing subject. Only I am real, I am the only thinking experiencing subject. Neither this type of solipsism is coherent nor this type of dualism is coherent. Both solipsism and dualism are internally incoherent. To be a clear and coherent solipsist one must reject the myth of thinking experiencing subject. One must show that the pure ego is a myth. So Wittgenstein makes an attempt to present himself as a coherent and consistent solipsist. His kind of solipsism is solipsism without the myth of the thinking experiencing subject.

According to the notes dictated to Alice Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald, Wittgenstein remarked, "(Getting into the solipsistic mood means not using the word "I" in describing a personal experience) (Acceptance of such a change is tempting) because the description of a sensation does not contain a reference to either a person or a sense organ."328 So Wittgenstein's solipsistic mood is very different from the solipsistic mood of an ordinary solipsist. We must distinguish Wittgenstein's solipsism from ordinary solipsism. When an ordinary solipsist gets into his mood he starts prefacing his experiential reports with "I", for he thinks that all experiences are his experiences. In the solipsistic notation of an ordinary solipsist the use of "I", "My" and "mine" become supremely important; nothing is to be spoken without prefacing one's speech with one of these expressions.

Wittgenstein is aware that using one or any of these expressions

is self-defeating; for their use presupposes the use of "you", "she", "his" etc. if all experiences are declared as mine then no experience can be declared as mine. Hence the solipsist would be preaching an incoherent doctrine if he uses such expressions as "I", "My" and "mine". They should be removed from the description of experiences. Ordinary solipsism gives way to Wittgensteinian solipsism, incoherent solipsism gives way to coherent solipsism.

It is to bring coherence to the solipsistic doctrine that Wittgenstein becomes a no-subject theorist, first a qualified no-subject theorist then a fullfledged no-subject theorist. At times Wittgenstein simply denies "I" as the subject of experiences without denying Smith or Jones as the subject of experiences. When he is denying only "I" as the subject of experiences he is a qualified no-subject theorist. Let us consider the remarks which show that Wittgenstein is a qualified no-subject theorist. Again let us take the notes of Alice Ambrose. "The function x has toothache" has various values, Smith, Jones etc., But not I. I is in a class by itself. The word "I" does not refer to a possession in sentences about having an experience, unlike its use in "I have a cigar." I can possess a cigar but not a toothache. The question arises what prohibits me from possessing a toothache but not a cigar? And we have to answer this question keeping in view that it is only I who have been refused to possess a toothache, no such refusal for Smith and Jones, for they are values of the function "x has toothache". Though I can possess only a cigar, Smith can possess both a cigar and a toothache. The easiest interpretation which would occur to an interpreter.
is that something is wrong with the sense of possession or ownership in the case of experiences like toothaches and headaches. Wittgenstein is using 'possession' and 'ownership' in a sense that I am deprived of possessing and owning experiences. In the case of experiences the possession and ownership is necessary; it makes no sense to say that an experience is unowned or unpossessed or that it is being transferred to another person. But the concept of 'necessary ownership' or 'necessary possession' is illegitimate, hence it is impossible for me to possess or own an experience. Referring to Wittgenstein's views on this issue Hacker points out, "It makes no sense to speak of an owner, because it makes no sense to speak of an owned pain. A matchbox can have an owner, because it can lack one. It makes sense to speak of ownership only when it makes sense to speak of none." 330 But this simply could not be the exclusive reason for denying I to own experiences. For in this sense even Smith should not own experiences. The sense of ownership of toothache remains the same whether "toothache" occurs in the sentence "Smith has toothache" (uttered by Smith) and "I have toothache" (uttered by Smith). Since Wittgenstein allows Smith but not "I" as the value of the function "x has toothache", there is a deeper reason for denying experiences to be owned by me.

It is interesting to read the immediately succeeding remarks of Wittgenstein as Alice Ambrose reproduces them. These remarks also show that Wittgenstein is a qualified no-subject theorist. "We could have a language from which "I" is omitted from sentences 330. Insight And Illusion, p. 189."
describing a personal experience. (instead of saying "I think"
or "I have an ache" and might say "It thinks" like "It rains"),and in place of "I have an ache", "There is an ache". Under certain circumstances one might be strongly tempted to do away with the simple use of "I". 331 The temptation is restricted to doing away with the simple use of "I" (the use of "I" as subject). This temptation is not extended to doing away with Smith and Jones etc. Wittgenstein does not suggest the use of "it" in the place of Smith. There is nothing wrong with "Smith has toothache", for "I" is in a class by itself. In doing away with "I" Wittgenstein is removing the monopoly of ego. As he says, "The statement "Only I have real toothache", either has a commonsense meaning, or, if it is grammatical proposition, it is meant to be a statement of a rule. The solipsist wishes to say, "I should like to put, instead of the notation 'I have real toothache' 'there is toothache'." What the solipsist wants is not the notation in which the ego has monopoly, but one in which the ego vanishes. 332 So Wittgenstein is opposing the concentration of ego in one person. And he considers 'I' as the representative of the ego in the language-game. Perhaps Smith does not represent ego in our language, therefore Wittgenstein does not have any objections to retaining Smith.

So far as solipsism is concerned there seems to be some incoherence in retaining Smith and doing away with 'I'. What would be the use of the name Smith for a solipsist? Are there

any Jones, Hicks and Toms, so that Smith maybe distinguished from them? If in the solipsistic notation 'I' is a useless piece so would Smith be a useless piece. Qualified no-subject doctrine must give place to an unqualified no-subject doctrine. Wittgenstein perhaps is aware of this, therefore, he suggests the use of "There is real toothache" instead of "Smith (the solipsist) has toothache." 333 "We could adopt the following way of representing matters; if I, L.W., have toothache then that is expressed by means of the proposition 'There is toothache.' 334 So like 'I' Smith too is not the value of the function 'X has toothache'. Wittgenstein was certainly wrong in thinking that 'I' is in a class by itself. So far as solipsism is concerned, Smith belongs to the same class as 'I'. It is to eliminate the subject of experiences that in his Investigations Wittgenstein was led to think that it is a contingent fact that experiences are ascribed to a person, they could very well have been ascribed to physical objects like plants and stones. As he says, "Let us imagine the following: the surfaces of the things around us (stones, plants etc.) have patches and regions which produce pain in our skin when we touch them...In this case we should speak of pain-patches on the leaf of a particular plant just as at present we speak of red-patches." 335

Lastly on this issue I would like to draw attention to some remarks of Wittgenstein which remind us of the metaphysical subject. Wittgenstein says, "Does a person enter into the description

of the visual sensation? If we describe the visual field, no person necessarily comes into it... The same applies to the description of an auditory sensation... The audible phenomenon is in a auditory space, and the subject who hears has nothing to do with the physical body. Similarly, we can talk of a toothache... Pains have a space to move in, as to do auditory experiences and visual data." 336 In the Tractatus he said that the willing subject is not a part of the world. Now the experiencing subject is not a part of experience. There is some kind of helplessness in allowing the subject to occur as a constituent of an experience. It is like the painted farmer who is sitting in front of his painted house, who owns the house but cannot enter it. Nothing corresponds to the use of 'I' as subject in experiences, so it is redundant. But 'I' as object must be retained. As Wittgenstein says in his Philosophical Remarks, " 'I' clearly refers to my body, for I am in this room." 337 The consequence of distinguishing 'I' as subject from 'I' as object is doing away with the former sense of 'I'. Thus, in order to save solipsism from its incoherence Wittgenstein has produced a highly controversial doctrine, no less controversial than the doctrines of Descartes and Hume.

Identifying Persons and their Experiences: On the one hand Wittgenstein has succeeded in generating a spirit of admiration for his views, on the other he is also responsible for generating more heat; of course not an unusual situation for a great philosopher. In this section I have chosen Strawson's reactions to Wittgenstein views. Strawson is one of those critics of Wittgenstein

whose writing has perhaps been much influenced by Wittgenstein. If one reads such critics of Wittgenstein as Chomsky and Katz one would feel that these critics have an extremely superficial study of Wittgenstein. Of course philosophy for the linguists is a side affair, and therefore one should not expect much from them. But if one reads carefully then one may feel that Strawson's **Individuals** is a good ladder for understanding some of the issues of Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology. Strawson has a rare insight into Wittgenstein's thought. Because of this one may even feel that Strawson's position on nature of persons, their identification and identity is the logical culmination of Wittgenstein's position. Strawson has taken those steps which Wittgenstein has only suggested but not taken.

At times the kind of difficulties which Strawson raises against Wittgenstein's view could easily be raised against Strawson's own views. At other times Strawson's views appear to be the modified version of Wittgenstein's own views. Sometimes Strawson disagrees with Wittgenstein simply because he is looking at Descartes in a fashion quite different from that in which Wittgenstein is looking at Descartes.

Strawson, as we have already seen in the preceding section, finds Descartes views as straightforward dualistic, dualism of two independent subjects, quite distinct from each other. Rather, the dualism which is presupposed by Wittgenstein's no-subject theory is not straightforward. For it is "a dualism of one subject the body - and one non-subject."\(^{338}\) The expression "non-subject" is not a special kind of subject, therefore no request has been

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\(^{338}\) *Individuals*, p. 98.
made to search for a subject corresponding to the expression "non-subject". This characterisation which Strawson uses for Wittgenstein's view is precisely the characterisation which Wittgenstein uses for the view of Descartes. To Wittgenstein Cartesian dualism appears quite paradoxical. It is a dualism of two subjects "Mr. Body and Mr. Nobody". Wittgenstein feels that the Cartesian subject "Mr. Nobody" is a myth. How could such a myth as the myth of "Mr. Nobody" arise? It is interesting to know about the generation of such myths. On the genesis of the myth "Mr. Nobody" Wittgenstein reflects, "Imagine a language-game in which, instead of "I found nobody in the room", one said "I found Mr. Nobody in the room". Imagine the philosophical problems which would arise out of such a convention. Some philosophers brought up in this language would probably feel that they didn't like the similarity of the expressions "Mr. Nobody" and Mr. Smith".339

It is in the context of distinguishing "I have pain" from "He has pain" that Wittgenstein brings the analogy of "Mr. Nobody". The use of "I" in "I have pain" is like the use of "Mr. Nobody". And the use of "he" in "he has pain" is like the use of "Mr. Smith". As Wittgenstein points out concerning the distinction between 'I' and 'he'. "The difference between the propositions "I have pain" and "he has pain" is not like that of "L.W. has pain" and "Smith has pain". Rather it corresponds to the difference between meaning and saying that someone moans."340 Saying that 'I have pain' is nothing but moaning. The fact that the word 'I' has occurred in this sentence 'I have pain' does not mean

340. Ibid., p. 68.
that this word is the name of, or refers to, a person. So also
the word 'pain' is not necessarily a name or a description. As
Wittgenstein remarks "Words are connected with the primitive,
the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place.
"The verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not
describe it." If 'pain' has not been used as the name of a sensa-
tion, if its use is only as an expression of a sensation, then
neither pain nor anything else has been described by the use
of this word. Therefore, the expression 'having pain' also denotes
no sort of possession. But if 'pain' has lost its descriptive
function in the sentence "I have pain", the word 'I' too has
lost its referring and naming function. I cannot be merely refer-
ing to something if I am not in a position to say something about
it. If in saying 'I have pain' I am not ascribing a sensation
to a person then I have also failed in referring to that person;
the word 'I' in such a situation has become a non-starter. The
word 'I' in such a situation is performing the role of "Mr. Nobody",
it is not performing the role of "Mr. Smith", hence it is better
to translate the sentence in terms of the sentence "There is
pain".

It is possible that Descartes was not aware of the above
difficulties. Perhaps he was not cautious that in distinguishing
the subject of experiences from the body, he was not distinguish-
ing any subject from the body, that no subject existed which
correspond to the verbal expression of the subject as the body

corresponds to the verbal expression of the subject for the ascription of physical states. Descartes invented the hidden "ego" to stand for the non-subject, to convert the non-subject into a subject. Since the ego is hidden its existence cannot be disproved.

Strawson would oppose Wittgenstein's distinction between 'I have pain' and 'he has pain'. According to him these sentences are not only grammatically similar but also logically similar... As he says, "In pain" means the same whether one says 'I am in pain' or 'he is in pain'. The dictionaries do not give two sets of meaning for every expression which describes a state of consciousness: a first person meaning and a second-and-third person meaning. There is no doubt that we do not find in the dictionaries two sets of meanings for 'in pain', for the reason that the dictionaries are not concerned with the phrase-meanings and sentence meanings; they are concerned with the word-meaning. 'In pain' is a phrase and not a word, it can occur as a part of a sentence in a different sense than that in which a word occurs as a part of a sentence. So far as the dictionaries are concerned the expression 'in pain' has neither one set of meaning nor two sets of meanings. Since the dictionaries are concerned with the word-meanings one may find the meanings of both the words in it, 'in' and 'pain' separately. Once the meanings of these words are secured from the dictionaries, one may use them in framing phrases and sentences; 'in pain' is one of such phrases.

And the fact that a word is given its meaning in the dictionaries 342. Individuals, p. 95.
does not mean that its uses are also given in the dictionaries. It is neither tragic nor comic that philosophers go beyond the dictionaries; for anyone who uses phrases and sentences goes beyond the dictionary-meanings. Moreover Philosophical problems cannot be solved by making an appeal to dictionaries. Saying that a word is "the description of..." "The name of..." etc. etc., is doing philosophy, is doing something which goes beyond the dictionaries. Granted that there are occasions on which the word 'pain' is used in those sentences that are descriptive, how does it imply that there are no occasions on which the word 'pain' is used in those sentences (or putative sentences) which express one's experiences. What Wittgenstein maintains is that the word 'pain' has a manifold role in language: a role which is descriptive, but also a role which is expressive. Wittgenstein is drawing attention to the complexities of human language.

If the statement 'I have pain' is a description of person's experience, as Strawson suggests, then it is possible to be mistaken about its truth. Two kinds of mistakes are possible with respect to this statement. One is concerning the experience game-designated by 'pain' and the other is concerning the subject designated by 'I'. What would it be to be mistaken about one's experience? And what would it be to be mistaken about oneself? These questions are not absurd, for they are connected with the question concerning the identification of persons and their experiences. I must have criteria for identifying experiences; so also I must have criteria for identifying persons. Strawson
too does not deny the issue of identifying experiences. So also he does not deny that there is such an issue as the issue of identifying persons. As he says, "A twinge of toothache or a private impression of red cannot in general be identified in our common language except as twinge which such and such an identified person suffered." 343 But if an experience depends for its identification on a person, then it should be possible to identify the person in question. As he says further, "It would be necessary, in order for the experience-description to be given currency, that someone or other, who gave it currency, should also have been able to give an independent identification of the sufferer of the experience." 344

Granted that persons and their experiences are the items to be identified. But then it is a precondition of identification that sometimes I misidentify those items which at other times I succeeded in identifying. Success in a game goes along with failure. If there is no possibility of my ever losing a game then it is also not possible for me to have won the game. Victory presupposes a possible defeat. Identification presupposes misidentification. Further, talking about the identification of pains and visual experiences provides to them some kind of independent status. Pains and visual experiences have to be assimilated to wallets, shoes and jackets, for we have the same sort of concern about both the group of objects. In his Philosophical Remarks Wittgenstein did not hesitate in treating toothache on

343. Ibid., p. 41. 344. Ibid.
par with a wallet. Referring to the identification of other's toothache Wittgenstein remarked: "But what does 'he' mean and what does 'have toothache' mean? Is this a relation toothache once had to me and now has to him? So in that case I would also be conscious of toothache now and of his having it now, just as I can now see a wallet in his hand that I saw earlier in mine.**345**

Treating a toothache exactly in the same fashion as a wallet is the consequence of Wittgenstein's distinguishability criteria for two toothaches. As he remarks, "How are toothaches to be distinguished from one another? By intensity and similar characteristics, and by location."**346** If a toothache is to be identified in terms of its intensity, location etc., then it is not absurd to say that the toothache which have is the same as the toothache which you have (had). Wittgenstein goes a step further in assimilating toothaches to wallets. If it is logically ruled out for me to own his wallet, then it is also logically ruled out for me to own any wallet, including mine. The expression 'ownership' means that it is trasnferable from him to me and from me to him. It is in this spirit that he remarked in the Blue Book, "If we exclude the phrase 'I have his toothache' from language, we thereby also exclude 'I have (or feel) my toothache.'**347** It is clear why toothaches are to be treated like wallets. If they are not so treated then there is no question of identifying them, i.e. for saying that they are mine. Pains and visual experiences must be given the same treatment as shoes, jackets and wallets. A

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pair of shoes and a jacket fit my body does not mean that they could not have fitted to the body of some other person. It is a contingent fact that I own a given pair of shoes and a given jacket; they could have very well have been owned by some other person. Similarly, it is a contingent fact that I own a given toothache and a given visual experience, they could have been owned by some other person.

The assimilation of toothaches and visual experiences to shoes, jackets and wallets has its own difficulties, and Wittgenstein is quite aware of them. On occasion I have been searching for my jacket, it got mixed up with the jackets of other people. Ultimately I succeeded in searching it out. I succeeded in identifying it, in recognising it as my own. I separated it from the jackets of other people. Similarly, on occasions my shoes got mixed up with the shoes of other people. I have been searching for them. I try my feet in this pair of shoes and that pair of shoes. Ultimately, I succeeded in identifying my shoes. Have my experiences ever behaved in this fashion? Have my visual experiences and toothaches ever got mixed up with the visual experiences and toothaches of other people? Did I ever have the same sort of confusion about my private sensations which I had about my shoes and jackets? Wittgenstein connects the issue of 'misidentifying experiences' with the issue of 'misidentification of persons'. So also he compares 'misidentifying experiences' with 'misidentifying bodily states'. Concerning the misidentification of bodily states he says, "It is possible that, say in an accident, I should feel a pain in my arm, see a broken
arm at my side, and think that it is mine, when it really is my neighbour's. And I could looking into a mirror, mistake the bump on his forehead for one on mine." \(^{348}\) So someone else's arm or the bump on his forehead could easily be confused as mine. Therefore, it makes sense to say that I identify my arm or the bump on my forehead. But toothache and visual experiences do not behave in the same fashion. As he says, "There is no question of recognising a person when I say I have toothache. To ask 'Are you sure that it's you who have pains?' would be nonsensical"... "It is as impossible that in making the statement 'I have a toothache' I should have mistaken another person for myself, as it is to moan with pain by mistake, having mistaken someone else for me." \(^{349}\) Misidentifying a toothache is impossible, because such misidentification presupposes misidentification of a person. And it makes no sense to say that I confused myself with someone else. To talk about identifying my arm makes sense. For saying that an arm is mine means that it is not someone else's. But it could have been someone else's And it is because it could have been someone else's that it makes sense to say that I identify or recognise that it is mine. The same analysis however does not hold good for my toothache. Could it have been someone else's? Does it make sense to say that I misidentify my toothache? Do I say 'As a matter of fact this toothache is someone else's, only I confused it as mine'. Then how could I say that it is mine? I do not fail, so also I do not succeed in identifying a toothache as mine. No such difficulty exists for the toothache

\(^{348}\) Ibid., p. 67.  
\(^{349}\) Ibid.
of some other person.

Attacking Wittgenstein, Strawson remarks, "States, or experiences, one might say, owe their identity as particulars to the identity of the person whose states of experiences they are." 350 This is to reject Wittgenstein's distinguishability criteria for two toothaches in terms of intensity, location etc. And this is to accept Wittgenstein's other suggestion that experiences are defined in terms of persons. But Wittgenstein is worried that if experiences are identified in terms of persons then in what sense would 'I have pain' be an assertion. Strawson has not even attempted to remove Wittgenstein's worries. While putting forward an alternative suggestion to identifying toothaches in terms of intensity, location etc., Wittgenstein remarks, "But if it is objected that the distinction is simply that in the one case I have it, in the other he; thus the owner is the defining mark of the toothache itself; but then what does the proposition 'I have toothache' (or someone else does) assert? Nothing at all." 351 Thus, like Strawson, Wittgenstein also contemplated the possibility of identifying toothaches and visual experiences in terms of their owners, but rejected it.

The fact that the identification of a toothache is postponed till the identification of the person who owns it, is simply postponing the difficulties. For the person in question has to be identified independently of identifying this toothache. Such a kind of identification is essential in order to avoid vicious circularity. If the identification of a toothache depends on the identification of a person, then the person's identification,

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to avoid vicious circularity, should not depend on the identifi-
cation of his toothache. Would the identification of the person
in question be conducted in terms of his body - my body in the
case of 'I have' toothache'? But what is 'my body' doing here?
Isn't it the body in which I feel my toothache? So my body itself
demands its identification prior to identifying a person. And
if my body too is identified in terms of my experiences, then
neither the services of my experiences nor the services of my
body can be utilised while conducting identification of person
(in this case 'myself'). How is a person identified independently
of identifying his body and his experiences, is a mystery. If
a toothache is identified as my toothache, whatever be the means,
methods or ways of doing so, we must allow the possibility that
it could possibly be someone else's. We must allow the possibility
of defeat otherwise we cannot be victorious. We must allow misid-
entification in order to have identification. But once the possi-
bility of misidentification is accommodated in the game of identi-
fication, then the experiences would not be owned in the sense
of "logically non-transferable kind". I am not convinced that
Strawson has provided a satisfactory solution to Wittgenstein's
worries concerning either the identification of experiences or
the identification of those who happen to own experiences.

Strawson has of course succeeded in showing, inspite of
his failure on specific issues, that our philosophical worries
concerning mind and body would continue if we do not in some
way jump out of the Cartesian circle. Most of the Wittgensteinian
worries were the outcome of the Cartesian circle. Wittgenstein failed to jump out of the circle. Strawson has certainly succeeded in jumping out of the circle. The inspection of 'I am tall' and 'I see a spider on the ceiling' have not led Strawson to make a distinction between the two senses of 'I' but to discover that there is only one sense of 'I' though two different uses of the word. It is one and the same entity that is involved in having two different kind of predicates. Similar thought is present in Wittgenstein but he did not develop it. Consider Wittgenstein's remark, "Pain-behaviour can point to a painful place - but the subject of pain is the person who gave it expression."352 The person who is the subject of pain is also the subject of bodily-states, otherwise it would be impossible for him to give physical expression to his pain. The remarks such as the present one are found in Wittgenstein's later work. Only Wittgenstein did not develop this line of thinking. Perhaps he had no wish to jump out of the Cartesian circle. Whatever may be said against Descartes his thinking is extremely bewitching. Much of what Wittgenstein says on the issues of philosophical psychology is a reaction to Cartesian thinking.