Chapter III Rhetoric

How much we are doing is changing the style of thinking and how much I'm doing is changing the style of thinking and how much I'm doing is persuading people to change their style of thinking.

Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics.

Rejection of essentialism leads to the acceptance of rhetoric. Once essences are rejected one does not require any special method, any dialectic, exclusively for doing philosophy. Philosophy is no more the affair of the transcendental. In this chapter I would like to discuss those features of Wittgenstein's thought which would have been appreciated by Aristotle and the sophists. One may feel that perhaps Wittgenstein at the later stage was a committed rhetorician. The presentation of a theory in doctrine, whether it is scientific or philosophical, exhibits its rhetorical character if its acceptance depends on persuasion. There are certain devices of persuasion, such as the choice of words, and the mode in which one argues. It is not the theory but its presentation that is more important, or that the theory is accepted because of its presentation. The words of the theory are so chosen that the hearer is charmed by the imagery which they create. Similarly the argument for the theory is given not solely because it is logical but because it is an argument which persuades. The persuasive power of Wittgenstein's own work depends on the choice of words, his use of aphorisms, metaphors etc. Later Wittgenstein was not only himself a rhetorician, he also believed that the acceptance of a scientific theory so also that of a
philosophical view ultimately depends on persuasion.\textsuperscript{179} And there is no doubt that people can be persuaded by a speech or by a piece of writing only when the words are chosen with care, and the arguments too are convincing. Logic is of no importance if it fails to produce conviction. Logic can even be sacrificed for the sake of conviction. No theory or doctrine would have survived if it did not have an inbuilt persuasive mechanism. Wittgenstein's later work reminds us of Plato, Aristotle and the sophists. It may of course be just a coincidence that his views have some similarities with the Greek thinkers. However, it would be worthwhile to discuss the views of Wittgenstein in the light of what Plato and Aristotle have already said on this subject. What is happening now in philosophy in the West, has its source in the thoughts of Plato and Aristotle. So we are not unnecessarily introducing the Greek scene. Rather the Greek scene may help us to understand the present scene better.

Plato's Rejection of Rhetoric:\textsuperscript{180}

Gorgias calls rhetoric "the ability to persuade with speeches."\textsuperscript{180} This characterisation can as well be extended to writing. For persuasion occurs not only in speaking but also in writing. 'Persuasive writing' is like 'persuasive speaking.' Rhetoric is identified with oratory in Greek thought. Sophists converted oratory into a professional art; they also considered rhetoric as the only proper method.

\textsuperscript{179} This interpretation is well supported by Wittgenstein's Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious belief, ed. C. Barrett, Oxford, 1966.

of doing philosophy. But Plato is not ready to grant the status of art to rhetoric. And the simple reason for his refusal to give this concession is that there is no special subject matter of rhetoric, consider the dialogue between Socrates and Gorgias:

Soc...tell me with what particular thing rhetoric is concerned: as, for example, weaving is concerned with the manufacture of clothes, is it not?

Gorg. Yes

Soc. And music likewise, with the making of tunes. The answer of Gorgias that "rhetoric is concerned with speech" does not satisfy Socrates. For it is not only rhetoric but other arts too that are concerned with speeches. Therefore, Socrates retorts, "then why, pray, do you not give the name "rhetorical" to those other arts, when they are concerned with speeches." Speech simply cannot distinguish rhetoric from the other arts. Again, "the ability to persuade with speech" is also exhibited by other arts. "Rhetoric", says Socrates, "is not the only producer of persuasion" What Plato is trying to show is that not only that rhetoric does not have any special subject matter of its own, even 'the method of persuasion' does not distinguish it from other arts. This means, according to Plato not that it is a special kind of art, but that it is not any kind of art whatsoever. For every art has its own subject matter, rhetoric has none. Every art has its own method, rhetoric has none. From this Plato concludes that rhetoric is not an art but a habitus a producer of "gratification and pleasure". Rhetoric is like cookery and flattery which are no arts. Referring to rhetoric says

Socrates, "It seems to me . . . to be a pursuit that is not a matter of art, but showing a shrewd, gallant spirit which has natural bent for clever dealing with mankind, and I sum up its substance in the name flattery. This practice as I view it, has many branches, and one of them is cookery: which appears indeed to be an art, but my account of it, is not an art but a habit or knack. I call rhetoric another branch of it, as also personal adornment and sophistry.\textsuperscript{185} The denial that there is any subject matter of rhetoric also implies that rhetoric is not concerned with truth, "For the orator and his rhetoric, there is no need to know the truth of the actual matter, but one merely needs to have discovered some device of persuasion."\textsuperscript{186} So what is important is not the discovery of truth but the discovery of a device of persuasion. But then points out Socrates to Phaedrus, "He who knows not the truth, pursues opinions, will, it seems, attain an art of speech which is ridiculous, and not an art at all."\textsuperscript{187} Rhetoric, therefore, "is not an art, but a craft devoted to art."\textsuperscript{188}

One may be moved by a speech in the same way in which one may be moved by a poem. Plato brings rhetoric closer to poetry particularly the poetry of the tragic kind. For such a poetry is also meant for "producing pleasure and gratification."\textsuperscript{189} He says further, "If we strip any kind of poetry of melody, its rhythm and its metre, we get mere speeches as the residue.\textsuperscript{1}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{185} Ibid., 463 B, p. 313.
\item \textsuperscript{186} Ibid., 459 C, p. 301.
\item \textsuperscript{187} Phaedrus, trans. H.N. Fowler, Harvard, Loeb Lib. 262 C, p. 523.
\item \textsuperscript{188} Ibid., 200 E, p. 517.
\item \textsuperscript{189} Gorgias, 502 C, p. 451.
\item \textsuperscript{190} Ibid., 502 C, p. 451.
\end{itemize}
So poetry is rhetoric if poetry is devoid of its melody, rhythm and metre. Or, rhetoric is nothing but poetry devoid of its melody, rhythm and metre. For neither the poets nor the rhetoricians are concerned with truth. Poets, like artists in general, imitate nature in order to please you, and rhetoricians beautify their speeches with metaphors and similes etc., to cater to your taste. Therefore, neither poetry nor rhetoric deserve to be paid any serious attention. Rather, these are the kind of manifestations of the human soul which deserve to be curbed.

In his Phaedrus Plato has proposed that rhetoric could be treated as art if it satisfied certain conditions. While proposing these conditions he says, "If you are naturally rhetorical, you will become a notable orator, when to your natural endowment you have added knowledge." 191 A rhetorician should not restrict himself only to the realms of belief and opinion. He should have knowledge, for it is only by having knowledge that truth will be revealed by his speeches. If what he says expresses truth and knowledge then he will be more convincing, more persuasive. Plato remarks further "All great arts demand discussion and high speculation about nature; for this loftiness of mind and effectiveness in all directions seem somehow to come from such pursuit." 192 Rhetoric could be a great art if it has the backing of 'discussion and speculation'. Plato compares "the real art of rhetoric" with the "art of healing". The method of the art of healing is much the same as that of rhetoric." "In both cases you must analyse a nature, 191. Phaedrus, 263 D, p. 547. 192. Ibid., 263 E, p. 547.
that of the body and in the other hand of the soul."  Why is
the study of the soul a necessary condition for persuasion has
been pointed out by Socrates when he says, "Since it is the func-
tion of speech to lead souls by persuasion, he who is to be a
rhetorician must know the various forms of soul."  But if we
analyse the conditions prescribed by Plato, it seems that rhetoric
can never satisfy them. Because once it satisfies them it would
become dialectic; it would no more remain rhetoric. Consider the
condition of 'discussion'. Oratory is not discussion, it does
not proceed by way of posing questions and obtaining answers.
The question-answer method is dialectic. Again, the subject of
ones rhetorical performance may not at all require 'high specula-
tion'. Not all subjects are in need of high speculation unless
they are subjects of dialectic. It is only dialectic which is
restricted to the areas of high speculation. So also the condition
of knowledge, in Plato's sense of knowledge, is a necessary condi-
tion of dialectic not rhetoric. The latter may be concerned with
the day to day affairs of the world, the affairs which may not
go beyond belief or probable opinion even if one wished to do
so. Lastly, consider Plato's condition that in order to persuade
others you must know their souls. Yes, one has to know their souls
if "knowing their souls" simply means "knowing them". But lurking
behind is Plato's suggestion that one must know the transcendental
nature of the self. And this is certainly not required for an
orator. Neither a judge in the law-court (and not only the criminal)
nor a man of the market-place acts and lives according to a belief

Gorgias and the Phaedrus that rhetoric does not have a special subject matter of its own. Aristotle finds dialectic in the same situation. Like rhetoric, dialectic too does not have any special subject matter of its own. "For both have to do with matters that are in a manner within the cognizance of all men and not confined to any special science." If there is no 'special science' for rhetoric so also there is no 'special science' for dialectic.

Just after settling the issue of the subject matter of rhetoric Aristotle reflected on Plato's worry whether rhetoric could be an art. Since rhetoric, like dialectic, reduces "matters to a system" both are arts according to Aristotle. We are well acquainted these days with the distinction between 'deductive' and 'inductive' arguments and proofs. We owe our present acquaintance with this distinction to Aristotle. According to him it is the function of dialectic to systematise these arguments and proof. His Topica is devoted to them. Rhetoric on the other hand is concerned with 'enthymemes' and 'examples'. But Aristotle seems to have dissolved the distinction between dialectic and rhetoric when he says, "I call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and an example rhetorical induction." What perhaps Aristotle meant was that an orator may use, during his speech, an argument of the 'demonstrative kind', so also he may use an argument of the 'non-demonstrative kind'. He chooses the arguments as the situation demands. But this implies that dialectic has a superior status to rhetoric. Aristotle does not hesitate in accepting the superio-

197. Ibid., footnote to the expression "counterpart" in 1354 a, p. 3.
198. Ibid., 1354 a, p. 3.
199. Ibid., 1356 b, p. 19.
riority of dialectic over rhetoric. He does not mind going to the extent of accepting that "rhetoric is . . . an offshoot of dialectic." But saying that is an offshoot of dialectic does not degrade the status of rhetoric, for it is not an unacceptable offshoot. The unacceptable offshoot of dialectic is sophistry. As Aristotle says, "In Dialectic it is the moral purpose that makes the sophist, the dialectician being one whose arguments rest, not on moral purpose but on the faculty." The footnote on this remark makes Aristotle's position quite clear. "The essence of sophistry consists in moral purpose, the deliberate use of fallacious arguments. In Dialectic, the dialectician has the power or faculty of making use of them when he pleases; when he does so he is called a sophist." Thus, no body can be a sophist if he is not a dialectician. Sophistry is closer to dialectic than to rhetoric. A sophist is a degenerate dialectician. Plato attempted to identify rhetoric with sophistry, Aristotle sends it back to dialectic. In his "On Sophistical Refutations", Aristotle does not deny that the sophists are equipped with an art or a method, what he denies is that they donot "teach their art" to their students. There is a sense in which one learns nothing from the sophists. Referring to the sophists Aristotle remarks, "The training given by the paid professors of contentious arguments was like the treatment of the matter by Gorgias. For they used to hand out speeches to be learned by heart, some rhetorical others in the form of question and answer, each side supposing that their arguments on either side generally fall among them. And therefore

the teaching they gave their pupils was ready but rough. For they used to suppose that they trained people by imparting to them not the art but its products, as though any one professing that he would impart a form of knowledge to obviate any pain in the feet, were then not teach a man the art of shoe-making or the sources when he can acquire anything of the kind, but were to present with several kinds of shoes of all sorts; for he has helped him to meet his need, but has not imparted an art to him. Aristotle's remarks give a very different picture of the sophists. They were no doubt "paid professors of contentious arguments, "but the art of sophistry which they used was not an independent kind of art, different from both dialectic and rhetoric. Rather, they used rhetoric when it suited their purpose. So also they used dialectic when it suited their purpose. Some of the speeches which they handed over to their pupils were 'rhetorical' and others 'dialectical', in the form of 'question and answer'. They supposed that they trained their pupils by imparting to them "not art but its products." So they trained their pupils neither in the art of rhetoric nor in the art of dialectic, they were simply interested in "selling the products of these two great arts." They were undoubtedly great, for they know both these arts, but they were dishonest about their art. But rhetoric cannot be blamed simply because it was a handy weapon with the sophists, for they misused dialectic too. If Plato does not give up dialectic because of its misuse by the sophists, why should he persuade others to give up rhetoric because of its misuse by the sophists. It is not only rhetoric which allows itself to be misused, dialectic is also

in the same situation. For "Rhetoric and dialectic alone of all the arts prove opposites; for both are equally concerned with them." 204

The question arises what is the need of introducing rhetoric when it is just a pair or a copy or a counterpart of dialectic, then it loses its independent significance. Why not manage everything with dialectic alone? The need for rhetoric arises because on occasions the dose of dialectic will kill the patient rather than curing him. The patient on occasions requires a milder dose; rhetoric is a milder dose. As Aristotle points out, "in dealing with certain persons, even if we possessed the most accurate scientific knowledge, we should not find it easy to persuade them by the employment of such knowledge. For scientific discourse is concerned with instruction, but in the case of such persons instruction is impossible." 205 This implies that on occasions it is not the "Knowledge of syllogism" which will persuade people, but methods other than the syllogistic which will work. Aristotle refers to different kinds of situations where rhetoric is the only method which will work, the situation of law-courts, the situation of political assembly or public gathering.

The most important question concerning rhetoric is the question concerning the discovery of the means of persuasion. As Aristotle points out, "It belongs to Rhetoric to discover the real and apparent means of persuasion, just as it belongs to Dialectic to discover the real and apparent syllogism." 206 Plato already pointed out, though for different reasons, that what an orator

204. Rhetoric, 1355 a, p.13
205. Ibid., 1355 a, p.11.
206. Ibid., 1355 b, p. 13.
requires is "some device of persuasion." Plato used the expression "device" in a derogatory sense; Aristotle takes it up in a serious sense. Aristotle takes up the issue of device (means) of persuasion so seriously that he defines the discipline of rhetoric in terms of the discovery of these means. As he says, "Rhetoric then may be defined as the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatsoever." Aristotle puts a heavy responsibility on rhetoric by making it a very superior kind of art. Each of the other arts is "able to instruct and persuade in its own special subject; thus medicine deals with health and sickness, geometry with the properties of magnitude... But Rhetoric, so to say, appears to be able to discover the means of persuasion in reference to any given subject." Therefore, Aristotle devotes the whole of the first book of Rhetoric to the discovery of the means of persuasion, to the discovery of the rhetoric proofs. And the first book itself introduces the problems of the second book. We have already seen how Plato in his Phaedrus considers it essential for the real rhetorician to inquire into the nature of the human soul. Unless one knows the nature of the human souls, it is impossible to persuade the human beings. This condition has been converted by Aristotle into the condition of an inquiry into the nature of human psychology. A speaker can persuade his hearer only if he knows the mental make up of the hearer. In order to persuade others one must know the psychological behaviour of others. So also one must know the moral character of others. The second book deals

207. Phaedrus, 262 c. 208. Rhetoric, 1355 b, p. 15.
209. Ibid., 1355 b, p. 15.
with the moral and psychological nature of human beings. Rhetorical proofs depend on such knowledge. But it is the third book which is partly, if not wholly, responsible for the survival of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. For it deals with the delivery or style of speech. We have not only to consider rhetorical proofs, and human nature in persuading human beings, but also how we do it i.e. to say how we use language in persuasion. It is the fashion of the day to refer to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* when we discuss issues of linguistics or literary criticism.

Aristotle and Wittgenstein: 210

It is very interesting to find some similarities between the views of Wittgenstein and those of Aristotle as expressed in the first book of *Rhetoric*. Wittgenstein's distinction between 'symptoms' and 'criteria', as expressed in his Blue Book, has made a significant impact on the philosophical thought of this century. This is not one of those distinctions which has been introduced in philosophy for its own sake; it has led to the solution of some philosophical problems. For example, the connection between 'the behaviour of other people' and 'their experiences' has remained a source of anxiety to philosophers. The distinction between 'symptoms' and 'criteria' has succeeded in suppressing, if not completely removing, this anxiety. The behaviour of other people is not just a symptom of their experiences, it constitutes, as Strawson would say, a criterion of "logically adequate kind." 211

210. Some of the material of this section is based on my paper "Aristotle And Wittgenstein : Signs, Symptoms and Criteria" read at the Waltair session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1983-84. 211. *Individuals*, London, 1959, p.110.
The distinction between 'symptoms' and 'criteria' was already known to Aristotle. Of course Aristotle did not see those implications of this distinction which have been drawn by the philosophers of this century. But how could Aristotle have seen them? For the philosophical worries connected with 'solipsism', 'other minds' etc., were not Aristotle's worries, therefore, we cannot expect Aristotle to have reflected on them. New problems generate new implications. And it can hardly be doubted that our age has introduced new approaches to philosophical problems, if not altogether new philosophical problems.

While reflecting on the nature of enthymeme (rhetorical syllogism) Aristotle makes a distinction between 'probable signs' and 'necessary signs'. He was led to make this distinction for the reason that "few of the propositions of the rhetorical syllogism are necessary, for most of the things which we judge and examine can be other than they are."\textsuperscript{212} From this is follows "that the materials from which enthymemes are derived will be sometimes necessary, but for the most part only generally true."\textsuperscript{213} Aristotle thinks that "the probability and signs" would exhaust the material in question.\textsuperscript{214} And concerning signs he says, "some are related as the particular to the universal, others as the universal to the particular. Necessary signs are called tekmeria: those which are not necessary have no distinguishing name. I call those necessary signs from which a logical syllogism can be constructed, wherefore such a sign is called tekmerion: for when people think

\textsuperscript{212} Rhetoric, 1357 a, p. 25. \hspace{1cm} 213. Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid.
that their arguments are irrefutable, they think that they are bringing forward a tekmerion, something as it were proved and concluded."215 The distinguishing name for those which are not necessary signs is 'probable signs,' according to Aristotle. When Aristotle takes up the examples of 'necessary signs' and 'probable signs' what he says is very close to what was later said by Wittgenstein on 'criteria' and 'symptoms'. Consider Aristotle's remark, "...if one were to say that it is a sign that a man is ill, because he has a fever, or that a woman has had a child because she has milk, this is a necessary sign. This alone among signs is a tek-
merion; for only in this case, if the fact is true, is the argument irrefutable. Other signs are related as the universal to the parti-
cular, for instance, if one were to say that it is a sign that this man has a fever, because he breathes hard; but even if the fact be true, this argument also can be refuted, for it is possible for a man to breathe hard without having a fever. We have now explained the meaning of probable, sign, and necessary sign, and the difference between them."216

Aristotle clearly maintains that the connection between 'fever' and 'breathing hard' is different from the connection between 'fever' and 'illness'. The latter is a necessary or defining connection but the former is not. Now consider Wittgenstein's remarks from the Blue Book: "To the question "how do you know that so-and-so is the case?", we sometimes answer by giving 'cri-
teria' and sometimes by giving 'symptoms'. If medical science calls angina an inflammation caused by a particular bacillus, and

215. Ibid., 1357 b, p. 27. 216. Ibid., 1357 b, pp. 27-29.
we ask in a particular case "why do you say this man has got angina?" then the answer "I have found the bacillus so-and-so in his blood" gives us the criterion, or what we may call the defining criterion of angina. If on the other hand the answer was, "His throat is inflamed", this might give us a symptom of angina. I call "symptom" a phenomenon of which experience has taught us that it coincides, in some way or other, with the phenomenon which is our defining criterion. Then to say "A man has angina if this bacillus is found in him" is a tautology or it is a loose way of stating the definition of "angina". But to say, "A man has angina whenever he has an inflamed throat" is to make a hypothesis.\textsuperscript{217}

If we apply Wittgenstein's idiom to Aristotle's cases then we can say that someone's having a fever is a criterion for my saying that he is ill. Similarly, if a woman has milk, then there is a criterion for my saying that she has had a child. But if someone 'breathes hard' then there is only a symptom for my saying that he has a fever. And if we apply Aristotle's idiom to the cases cited by Wittgenstein we can say that the 'bacillus so-and-so' is a necessary sign for having angina. But the case is different with the 'inflammation of throat'. For this happens to be only a probable sign for someone's having angina.

Associated with his distinction between symptoms and criteria Wittgenstein makes a distinction between hypotheses and tautologies. When we refer to the phenomenon which is a symptom, we express only a hypothesis which could possibly be false. But concerning the phenomenon which is a criterion what one expresses is a tauto-

\textsuperscript{217} \textit{The Blue and Brown Books}, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969, pp.24-
logy. Aristotle too makes a similar distinction. Referring to the 'probable sign' Aristotle also says "...that which is probable is that which generally happens ...that which is concerned with things that may be other than they are." 218 And when Aristotle says about his 'necessary sign' that it is a tekmerion he clearly means what would have been meant by saying that it is a tautology or a definition. For concerning his use of 'tekmerion', as we have already seen, Aristotle says, "...when people think that their arguments are irrefutable, they think that they are bringing forward a tekmerion, something as it were proved and concluded." 219 Wittgenstein's concept of a tautology clearly satisfies Aristotle's notion of a tekmerion. For a hypothesis can never have conclusive proof or evidence. Thus Aristotle's distinction between 'necessary' and 'probable' signs clearly coincides with Wittgenstein's distinction between 'criterion' and 'symptoms'.

What has really led Wittgenstein to have views similar to Aristotle's? Not only did they belong to different ages, they were also brought up in different philosophical climate. The cultural tradition which produced Wittgenstein was different from the one which produced Aristotle. But were they really so different from each other, that they had no point of contact with each other? Was their philosophical climate so different that it did not allow them to have any similarity of thought? Wittgenstein's distinction between 'symptoms' and 'criteria' is the outcome of his observation of the phenomenon of experience, how does one ascribe experiences

218. Rhetoric., 1357 a, p. 27.  219. Ibid., 1357 b, p. 27.
to others. The right conclusion concerning one's own mind or the mind of others cannot be arrived at by a transcendental method. For arriving at a right conclusion one is required to see how language actually works in concrete situations where experiences are ascribed to oneself or to others. Just before taking up the issue of the ascription of experiences Wittgenstein has been quarrelling with essentialism, quarrelling with those philosophers who have a "craving for generality" and exhibit a "contemptuous attitude towards the particular case."\textsuperscript{220} It is not by having a contemptuous attitude towards the particular cases, not by just knowing their identities, but by observing their individuality, by observing their differences, that one can arrive at the right philosophical conclusion. There is no essential method, there is no general principle, which can lead us to the solution of all philosophical problems. The problem of other minds is no exception. How do I ascribe experiences to others? On the basis of their physical behaviour. Sometimes I may go wrong, but this does not mean that their behaviour is only a 'symptom' of their experiences. Their behaviour is a criterion, "a logically adequate criterion" as Strawson says in his Wittgenstenian tone. Is there a better way of knowing the mind of others than with the help of their behaviour. Then why blame behaviour? Why take it only as a symptom?\textsuperscript{46}

Rhetoric is the context in which on the one hand Aristotle rejects Plato's Dialectic as of no use (Dialectic is Plato's unique method of arriving at all philosophical solutions), and on the
other hand he concentrates on the individual cases. Not all people can be persuaded in one and the same fashion, so also there is no single principle, the principle, of persuasion. There are principles, and principles to be chosen as the need arises. The multiplicity of principles depends on the multiplicity of occasions. It is in the context of his search for the 'rhetorical proofs' (not a single proof) that Aristotle comes to hit at the nature of 'signs' and discovers that signs are of two different varieties the necessary signs and those which are contingent. The mental make up of Aristotle is the same as that of Wittgenstein. Both exhibit a contempt for essentialism, and a respect for the particular cases. For Aristotle, Plato is the target. For Wittgenstein, he himself is the target, for Tractatus too draws an essentialistic picture of the universe. Since Rhetoric is not a science of any kind, it has no subject matter of its own, this is one area where differences of opinion will naturally emerge. Each individual case is to be studied on its own ground, and not by assimilating it to others. It is no surprise that Wittgenstein's views are similar to Aristotle's.

The similarities between the views of later Wittgenstein and Aristotle can be observed not only in the context of the Rhetoric, but also in other contexts. Consider Aristotle's introductory remarks from the De Anima and compare them with Wittgenstein's attack on the philosopher's "craving for generality" as expressed in the Blue Book. Aristotle says,"To attain any assured knowledge about the soul is one of the most difficult things in the world. As the forms of question which here presents itself, viz. the question 'What is it'? recurs in other fields, it might be supposed that there was some single method of inquiry applicable to
all objects whose essential nature we are endeavouring to ascertain (as there is for derived properties the single method of demonstration); in that case what we should have to seek for would be this unique method. But if there is no such single and general method for solving the question of essence, our task becomes still more difficult: in the case of each different subject we shall have to determine the appropriate process of investigation. If to this there be a clear answer, e.g., that the process of demonstration or division, or some other known method, difficulties and hesitations still beset us — with what facts shall we begin the inquiry? For the facts which form the starting-point in different subjects must be different, as e.g., in the case of numbers and surfaces. 221

Since the same question 'What is it?' can be raised on different occasions and situations one may be led to think that there is a single method of enquiry to be instituted for all those occasions and situations. But this is an allurement which we must avoid. The allurement is of course provided by our language, provided by the question 'What is it?'. However, not all subjects which we discuss on different occasions are like 'derived properties' which require only one method, 'the method of demonstration'. The subjects such as 'numbers' and 'surfaces' are so very diverse, therefore it would be a mistake to institute a single method of inquiry for them. Diverse subjects presuppose diverse methods of inquiry. Like Wittgenstein, Aristotle clearly proposes that 'in the case of each different subject we shall have to determine

the appropriate process of investigation'. The issue of method bewilders Aristotle, but resorting to a single method of inquiry for all kinds of subjects, whether the subject requires the attention of syllogism or the attention of one's eyes and hands, does not solve the problem. Wittgenstein can be seen as the fulfilment of Aristotle's dream of a philosopher.

Aristotle and Metaphor:

Before we come back to Wittgenstein, it would not only be interesting but also of some consequence to discuss the treatment of metaphor by Aristotle. Metaphor is a common ingredient in both, poetry and rhetoric, and therefore, Aristotle discusses it in the context of both. If one studies Plato's views on rhetoric and poetry and compares them with Aristotle's views, then one may feel that Aristotle stands to Plato in the same kind of relationship in which Kant stands to Hume. Kant obtains the structure of his philosophy from Hume, yet the main target of Kant's philosophy is Hume. Aristotle too derives his views on rhetoric and poetry from Plato, yet the main target of Aristotle is Plato. Therefore, in order to know Aristotle's views we have to go back to Plato.

Concerning Plato's views we have to be careful that though Plato rejects both rhetoric and poetry, his reasons for rejecting them are not the same. Rhetoric is no art, but poetry is an art. Rhetoric is rejected, because it is not an art but a form of flattery. Poetry is rejected, because it is an art, and all art is third removed from reality. So the deficiency with rhetoric
is not that it failed in acquiring the status of art. For even if it had succeeded in having this status, it would have possibly been rejected by Plato. In his Gorgias and Phaedrus, Plato argues against rhetoric in an exceedingly misleading fashion. It appears as if he rejects rhetoric because it failed to qualify itself as an art, as if Plato would have accepted rhetoric if it had passed the test of being an art. Has Plato accepted poetry, though poetry is an art? Perhaps Plato rejects rhetoric simply because it masquerades as dialectic. Similarly poetry is rejected not because it is third removed from reality or is merely an imitation of nature, but because it masquerades as metaphysics. Poetry is above history, as Aristotle has later shown, and is, therefore nearer the conceptual realm, if not an aspect of this realm. If rhetoric tries to dethrone dialectic, poetry tries to dethrone metaphysics. It is to save dialectic that Plato rejects rhetoric. And it is to save metaphysics that Plato rejects poetry. If rhetoric and poetry are allowed then instead of philosophers, the sophists and the poets will be the kings. For rhetoric is a kind of poetry and poetry is a kind of rhetoric. The most degenerate form of the ideal state would be the state governed by the sophists and the poets. It would not be a state but chaos. Like a Messiah Plato wanted to save the ideal state from chaos.

Plato has not expressed his views on metaphor in any explicit form as Aristotle has done. There is no Socratic Dialogue on Metaphor as Aristotle has a book on metaphor, though all Socratic dialogues use metaphors. It is the use of metaphors that heightens
the poetic quality of these Dialogues. In his Poetics Aristotle considers Socratic Dialogues as poetry.\textsuperscript{222} Plato's metaphors are partly, if not wholly, responsible for this remark. So instead of writing on metaphors Plato demonstrates their nature by using them. From his Dialogues we can very well infer the views of Plato on metaphor. However, one has to be careful. Though Plato does not have any disrespect for metaphors if one uses them in philosophy he disrespects them if they are used in rhetoric or poetry, perhaps because he disrespects these disciplines. But it is only in the context of his views on rhetoric that we have Plato's reaction, however indirect, to metaphor. Therefore, we have again to divert our attention to Gorgias, for it is this Dialogue that Plato refers to metaphor. We would avoid Phaedrus though it is equally important.

The most popular interpretation of Plato's views on metaphor is that metaphors have a kind of cosmetic and ornamental value. Cosmetic and ornamental, not in any aesthetic sense but in a derogatory sense. Plato brings out this derogatory sense when he attacks rhetoric by comparing it with a beautiful but cruel lady, who is interested only in herself. She "cares nothing for what is the best, but dangles what is most pleasant for the moment as a bait for folly, and deceived it into thinking that she is of the highest value."\textsuperscript{223} But the beauty which she has is the result of artificial creation. As Plato exposes her beauty when he says, "...self-adorment personates gymnastic: with its rascally, deceitful ignoble, and illiberal nature it deceives men by forms and colours, polish and dress, so as to make them, in the effort of assuming an extraneous beauty, neglect the native sort that comes through..."

\textsuperscript{222} Poetics, 1447b, Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon Random House. \textsuperscript{223} Gorgias, 464 c-d.
Thus Plato makes the distinction between 'natural beauty' and 'artificial beauty'. Natural beauty is produced by gymnastic, artificial beauty by forms and colours, polish and dress, i.e., by cosmetics, ornamentation and dressing in artistic fashion. Man are being deceived by the artificially created beauty. Metaphors provide colours, polish and dress to rhetoric, i.e. they provide an artificial frame of beauty to it. But what would provide natural beauty to it? Gymnastic. Rhetoric should persuade, not with its cosmetic, ornamentation and dressing, but with its natural beauty which it has acquired by the help of gymnastic. What is the analogue of gymnastic in this context? Are not knowledge and truth such analogues? Are not knowledge and truth the gymnastic of rhetoric? If one speaks with knowledge and truth, then one will have better persuasive power than one who simply wants to cheat people with his coloured and ornamentally dressed speeches. Is Plato right? Certainly not. Too much occupation with gymnastic can produce an athlete but not necessarily a beautiful person. (Don't say an athlete is a beautiful person by definition, for this would produce beauty by definition). The whole trouble with Plato is that he thinks that forms and colours, polish and dress are meant for producing only "extraneous beauty", for they have been added to the body, one has not taken one's birth with them. Unfortunately dress is not a part of one's body, so also lipstick a part of one's lips or ear-rings a part of one's ears, yet their use on the body certainly enhances its beauty. Of course, they

224. Ibid., 465 b.
have a principle of their use, and it is by breaking these principles that 'artificiality' is created, that instead of beauty being produced monstrosity is produced. All art, as Aristotle would say, is the realisation of nature's ideal. The art of wearing dress and ornamentation or powdering one's face or painting one's eyebrows or lips is completing what nature has left incomplete. Cosmetics, ornaments and dresses are the materials with which the nature's ideal, the production of a beautiful form, is realised. Dress is not to hide one's body but to exhibit it in the presentable fashion. So also cosmetical ornaments are not meant for converting something into something else, but only to highlight the achievements of nature. No doubt all art is imitative as Plato said, but imitation is what distinguishes men from animals according to Aristotle. In using art man is only realising the ideal put forth by nature. Plato does not go to the depth of the concept of art or limitation, and therefore rejects it as artificial, deceitful and ignoble.

Aristotle liberates metaphors from Plato's verbal attack on them (The attack is only verbal, otherwise Plato would have refrained himself from using metaphors). Aristotle gives immense importance to metaphors, though himself not a master of metaphor like Plato. Aristotle thinks that metaphors do not occur to every one; for they "cannot be learnt from anyone else." 225 So only a few are gifted with the faculty of generating metaphors, for metaphors cannot be generated as one generates a mathematical equation or a grammatically correct sentence by learning from

225. Poetics, 1459 a.
others. Plato might have learnt the essentials of his philosophy from Socrates but to present that philosophy in the garb of metaphors was his own effort. Socratic philosophy survives because a metaphor as vivid as the metaphor of "the prisoners in the cave" survives. One is persuaded to accept Socratic philosophy because one is seduced by the metaphor of the cave.

In his Poetics Aristotle defines metaphor in the following words, "Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else."²²⁶ In his Rhetoric he includes 'simile' too in the definition of metaphor, for there is very little difference between them. Distinguishing the two he points out "When the poet says of Achilles, 'he rushed on like a lion', it is a simile; if he says, 'a lion, he rushed on,' it is a metaphor."²²⁷ Aristotle further suggests that "similes must be used like metaphors."²²⁸ for both of them serve the same purpose. An 'analogy' is also a variant form. It would be an analogy if one said 'What Achilles is in the city that a lion is in the forest.' It is because of this that Aristotle succeeds in deriving some of his metaphors from analogy. In our ordinary uses we seem to be more Aristotelian when we do not take much care about the uses of metaphors, similies and analogies and use one of them in the place of the other. In the context in which Aristotle discusses the various forms of metaphors, he refers to Plato's use of metaphors. "Plato in the Republic compares those who strip the dead to curse, who spit stones."²²⁹ He also says... the poets' verses resemble those who are in the bloom of youth but lack beauty."²²⁹ Plato's attack

²²⁶ Poetics., 1457 b. ²²⁷ Rhetoric., 1406 b. ²²⁸ Ibid. ²²⁹ Rhetoric., 1406 b.
on metaphor is only a warcry.

It is in the context of the delivery of speech that Aristotle finds an occasion for telling us about the nature of metaphor in some detail. What kind of style should speech acquire that it would have better persuasive power? The ordinary/usual style must be rejected. As Aristotle says, "Departure from the ordinary makes it appear more dignified. In this respect men feel the same in regard to style as in regard to foreigners and fellow citizens. Wherefore we should give our language a "foreign air", for men admire what is remote."230 We admire foreigners and neglect our own citizens, therefore, 'foreignness' and 'remoteness' must be projected in our language in order to be admired. But in order to introduce 'foreignness' we should not sacrifice naturality or acquire artificiality, "for that which is natural persuades, but the artificial does not."231 What Aristotle means is that in order to persuade our fellow beings we are: not to invent new words. We are to use the same words which they use, only these words are to be manipulated in such a fashion that they may find their use surprising. As he makes his point again, "proper and appropriate words and metaphors are alone to be used in the style of prose."232 Aristotle slowly develops the theme to introduce 'metaphors' as the most important element for improving the style. As he declares, "It is metaphor above all that gives perspicuity, pleasure, and a foreign air."233 It gives pleasure not only to those who hear it, but also to the inventor. And metaphors are introduced in prose,

230. Ibid., 1404 b. 231. Ibid.
232. Ibid. 233. Ibid.
not to introduce any poetic quality as many scholars believe. For Aristotle is a purist. He does not want to mix up poetry with prose. He allows rhythm to prose but not metre. He favours the dissolution of simile into metaphor so far as prose is concerned. For "there is something poetical about it." 234

Aristotle, as might have become clear from the discussion we had of him in this chapter, allows rhetoric, allows also the use of metaphors in rhetoric. It is not dialectic or any kind of demonstrative method which is suitable for certain situations. Rhetoric is the only method left for those situations. Every situation calls for its own method.

Wittgenstein and the Metaphor of Language-game:

Later, Wittgenstein, the Wittgenstein of Investigations, is a master of metaphor, is a master of the use of metaphor in philosophy. We are not wrong in considering him a genius. This is further proved by the fact that Wittgenstein invents metaphors in order to exhibit the nature of philosophy; its problems, its puzzlement, and the solutions and dissolutions of these problems and puzzlements. If Aristotle is right then Wittgenstein is certainly a genius, for a metaphor, as we have already seen, is something "which cannot be learnt from anyone else." 235 Wittgenstein enjoys the invention of his metaphors. As he himself says, "A good simile refreshes the intellect." 236 And a simile, as we have already seen, is a metaphor with its poetic qualities. Metaphors are what Wittgenstein enjoys producing while doing philosophy. Metaphor is the medium of his philosophising.

Wittgenstein's first daring step, taken in his *Investigations* is the introduction of the metaphor of *language-game*. The step is daring, for language is so very different from a game. But then it would not be a metaphor if the word 'game' is not very different from 'language'. Unless the name 'game' belongs to something else, attaching it to 'language' would not convert 'language-game' into a metaphor. This is what we have already learnt from Aristotle. In the last chapter we have already seen the consequence of treating language as a game. There we have talked about 'language game', as if what this expression means is not something metaphorical, this expression has a literal sense. So many theories and doctrines were dethroned just by assuming that there is a species of game which is called by the name 'language-game'. When we are using language we are playing a game. Among the philosophers the social scientists and the linguists, the best known game since the publication of *Investigations* is the 'language-game'. If we take such games as football, chess etc., we may be surprised to see that much more has recently been written on language-game by the philosophers and the social scientists than on all the other games combined together. And the most mysterious situation about 'language-game' is that it requires neither captains nor skippers. It can be managed even without referees, for there are no victories and defeats in this game. The people who play this game are indifferent to the situation of having honours and rewards; they are indifferent even to whether this game deserves to be brought to the notice of the public. We know who is the best player of chess or tennis in the world, but we do not know
who is the best player of language-game in the world. Neither the radio nor the television has shown any interest in exhibiting the proceedings of the game, called, language-game.

Post-Wittgensteinian philosophers have developed a habit of talking about language-game, not in the sense that language is like a game, but in the sense that language is itself a game. But our language is neither like an indoor-game, such as chess, nor an out-door game, such as football. Wittgenstein has certainly succeeded in hypnotising us. (The success of a philosopher, so also that of a scientist, if later Wittgenstein is right, depends on his hypnotic (persuasive) powers.) Because of the hypnotic influence we just omit seeing dissimilarities between a game and a language. And however far-fetched the similarity may be we are attracted towards it. A person in love fails to find anything wrong with his/her love. So also we fail to find anything wrong with the metaphor of language-game. It is not a metaphor for us at all; it exhibits the real character of our language - Language is nothing but a game of course unlike other games.

Wittgenstein certainly could not have meant that language is literally one of the numerous games. He could not have meant that we play cards after breakfast, chess after lunch, foot ball in the evening, and language-game at some other time. There is no beginning, middle and end of the language game; for language-game is not a species of game which may have a beginning, a middle and an end. Language-game is not a member of the family of games; the name 'language-game' is a misnomer. But it is not a misnomer
if it is a metaphor, for a metaphor arises only by misnaming.

Is language-game a meta-game, a kind of para-game, which goes on when other games are being played. Now I am playing chess. The game is nearing its end. I make a move and say, 'I move the king; and move it to a new place. My opponent has been watching me, watching for my move. As soon as I make the move, my opponent declares 'Now you have lost the game, 'and shows me how I have lost it. And as a reaction I utter the form of words 'Oh, yes, I have lost it." But in uttering these words have I lost two games, 'the chess game' and 'the language-game of chess'. Is it the case that while playing chess I was also having a language-competition with my opponent? For a conversation was also going on while we were playing. Does this conversation show that we were debating on some issue? Have I also, therefore, lost in the debate? My opponent has undoubtedly defeated me in the chess-game. Has he also defeated me in 'the language-game of chess' if there be any such thing?

There is no doubt that when we were playing chess we were also using language. We were talking, we were informing each other about our moves. I used the words 'I', 'move', 'the', and 'king', and I used these words according to the grammatical rules. So also my opponent used his words 'you', 'have', 'lost', 'the' and 'game', and he too has used the words according to the grammatical rules. Neither he nor I attempted to break the grammatical rules, for conversation between us would have been impossible if we had not observed the grammatical rules. So we were playing the language-
game of chess all along when we were playing the chess game. We were as a matter of a fact following two different sets of rules, the set of rules which governs the movement of words and the set of rules which governs the movement of chess pieces. Words of our language too are like chess pieces, the only difference is that they are not made of wood.

As Wittgenstein remarks, "The question 'what is a word really? is analogous to 'what is a piece in chess?"237

Pieces in the game of chess are moved according to the rules of the chess game. Words in language are moved according to the rules of language. In the absence of rules neither is it possible to play the game of chess nor is it possible to operate with language. If language is a game, then we were certainly playing the language-game when we were playing chess, for we were not silent, we discussed our moves in words. Though we were playing the chess-game, we were also moving the pieces of language, unfortunately without any solid board, perhaps in the air around us. Isn't it the situation for me to have been playing two games at the same time? But then have I lost in both the games, the chess game and the language game of chess? But while playing chess the environment was not that of a debate. We were not appearing in any, such thing as an elocutionary competition, so there is no question of my being defeated in the language-game, if at all we were supposed to be playing such a game. I have lost only in one game, i.e., in the chess game. Doesn't it mean that the other game which I have also been playing, the language-game of chess has ended 237. Investigations, 108.
Language is really treated like a game, and speakers use words as cautiously as they use chess pieces on the chess board. But while participating in a debate, I am not participating in any other kind of game except the language-game. In a debate situation our language is used quite differently from how it is used while playing chess or football. It is only in the former sense that language could be said to be a game. But such uses of language are rare.

The language-game of chess is a metaphor. And it is because it is a metaphor that one is unable to win in this game. Not that there is no winning in this game, or that the concept of winning is not applicable to this game. The truth is that this is no game, therefore, there is no question of our winning it. One can win or lose only in the context of a game. But in denying that there is any such thing as the language-game of chess, it is not denied that we use language in the course of a chess game or that the rules of chess cannot be verbally articulated or be recorded in a book. The use of language in the situation of game is not denied, what is denied is simply that language itself be considered as a game.

Talking about language-game reminds me of Wittgenstein's remark on the nature of 'gifts'. "Why can't my right hand give my left hand money? - My right hand can put it into my left hand. My right hand can write a deed of gift and my left hand a receipt. But the further practical consequences would not be those of a gift. When the left hand has taken money from the right, then
we shall ask: "Well, and what of it." Following Wittgenstein, compare 'gifts' with 'games'. Extending the use of 'game' to 'language' is like extending the use of 'gift' i.e., one's right hand giving a gift to one's left hand. 'Words' of language may be seen as pieces of wood moved on the chess board, therefore, in using them I am playing a game similar to chess. But the further consequences of the use of words in language would not be those of their use in a game. 'Language-game' is an extremely charming metaphor. Its metaphorical nature remains hidden because of Wittgenstein's hypnotic concept of 'family resemblance'. We come back again and again, hypnotised into thinking that language may really be a game, though different in nature from all such games as chess, football, cards etc. Games form a family, having diverse kinds of members, one member wholly different from the other. Not only seeing the agreement between language and games attracts us to assimilate language to games, even seeing the differences between language and games leads us to consider that language is a game. As Wittgenstein says, "The language games are rather set up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities." So even if there is a dissimilarity between language and games, this, does not show that language is not a game. For one game may be dissimilar to the other, language may be a game of a dissimilar kind from other games. The concept of 'family resemblance' is so seducing that we are unable to see that language could not be a member of the family of games.

239. Investigations, 268. 240. Ibid., 130.
Perhaps Wittgenstein was himself seduced into thinking that language-game is not a metaphor, that it is the name of a species of game, that in using language we are playing a game. There is no doubt that Wittgenstein at times has been quite clear that the expression 'language-game' is a metaphor. The example of a game is brought only as an analogy to clear the working of language. As referring to a game situation and comparing that situation with language Wittgenstein raises the question "Doesn't the analogy between language and game throw light here?"\textsuperscript{241} So attention has been drawn towards a game only to exhibit the nature of language. But once the attention has been drawn towards games, it has never been withdrawn from them. Language has come to be dissolved into games. If not the whole, the most important features of Wittgenstein's later philosophy are the result of the observation that language is a game. If Wittgenstein had considered language-game as a mere metaphor, perhaps he would not have drawn some of those conclusions. Drawing conclusions from metaphor has its limitations. But the fact that Wittgenstein continued drawing all those conclusions which he could have possibly drawn from considering language as a game, shows that he was serious in considering language as a game.

While referring to the process of naming objects, learning language by repeating words etc., Wittgenstein introduces the metaphor of language-game by saying. "I will call these games "language-games."\textsuperscript{242} This gives the impression that certain group of activities were game-activities, only the name 'game' was missing for them. The linguistic activities are game activities, only Wittgenstein has baptised them with the name 'language-game'. This

\textsuperscript{241} \textit{Ibid.}, 83. \textsuperscript{242} \textit{Ibid.}, 7.
is like we were playing football all the time, but we had no name for it, so the name 'football' is given to it. Wittgenstein has not brought into existence a new game, what he has brought into existence is only a 'new name' for the game which we have been playing all the time. Wittgenstein has certainly been seduced by his analogy, simile or metaphor, whatever you call it. Wittgenstein himself has brought out the nature of this seduction. He says, 'A simile that has been absorbed into the forms of our language produces a false appearance, and this disquiets us. "But this isn't how it is" we say, "Yet this is how it has to be."'

Similes, metaphors and analogies are introduced in our language in their true nature. We go on using them. A time comes when they are 'dead'; they become part of our everyday language. In Aristotle's idiom, they have lost their 'foreign air'. We do not give them any special treatment; we treat them like our neighbours without any enthusiasm. The same thing has happened to the metaphor of language-game. It has become a part of our philosophical heritage, it is no more foreign to us. We treat it like our neighbour and a fellow citizen. We hardly realise that its original home is in a foreign land. We have written books and articles, we have drawn conclusions, by considering language as a game. If someone says now, that it is really not a game, what are we to do? Give up all those consequences which we have drawn by considering that language is a game? Give up all what we have done so far? No. A better alternative is to give no hearing to one who says that language is not a game, "language has to be a game." This is the

243. Ibid., 112.
the most rational choice at this hour. It is only with this choice that we can save our work from the fate of futility.

By saying that language-game is only a metaphor it is not meant that it is not a significant metaphor or that is has not served the purpose for which it has been introduced or invented. It is also not for the first time in the history of philosophy that a philosopher has used metaphors in order to preach his doctrines, in order to make them acceptable to the people who lack philosophical vigour. If we deprive Plato of his metaphors, there would hardly remain anything in Plato which is convincing, which is worth accepting. To do philosophy well, one has to metaphorphise well. And it can hardly be doubted that Wittgenstein has metaphorphised well. Perhaps Plato was another exception whose metaphors continue to seduce us even now.

Wittgenstein's New Rhetoric:

Wittgenstein is wholly unlike both Plato and Aristotle in so far as the fact that he has not written any book or article on rhetoric. However from what he has written in the later stages of his life it can easily be inferred that like Aristotle he favoured rhetoric. There is a sense in which one can even say that he favoured rhetoric in the spirit of a sophist. Of course if he was a sophist he was an honest sophist. Neither money, which disreputed the sophists, nor power, which Plato attracted him. Plato, as we have already seen, despised rhetoric, because, according to him, it lacked the conditions of knowledge and truth. The sophists, and Aristotle, on the other hand, considered rhetoric
as one of the most appropriate tools for pursuing truth and knowledge. They were trying to curb the tendency of satisfying the concepts of truth and knowledge. Different occasions and situations deserve different kind of treatment. Sophists had no fixed method, fixed way, of dealing with all situations. To conceive that the method is fixed is to assimilate all situations to one and the same kind of situation. This is impossible. The method of persuasion would depend on the situation. Only that method is to be devised which suits the situation. If some method is demonstrative does not mean that it is fit for all situations. Sophists rejected Plato's respect for a single method. Even Aristotle has not given a fair account of his academic competitors, the sophists. In his Rhetoric Aristotle finds a sophist to be a 'misplaced dialectician' Sophistry is fallacious use of syllogism, or using dialectic in a wrong way. The account of sophistry given in the Rhetoric is simply an attempt to bring the sophists closer to Plato, and keeping them away from his own position. But his own position on the question of method is closer to the sophists than to Plato. As we have already seen in his "On Sophistical Refutations" Aristotle accepts that some of the speeches of the sophists were "rhetorical, others in the form of question and answer." Sophists did not use rhetoric by excluding the non-rhetoric form of persuasion. It is the occasion which would decide what kind of speech to be composed, and what method of composition to be adopted. But this was also Aristotle's own position. Sophists were no less responsible for the development of Aristotle's thought on Method.

244. On Sophistical Refutations, 183.
than Plato. Wittgenstein's attitude to the method is the same as that of Aristotle and the sophists. What counts is persuasion? Only that method which works is to be adopted in a given situation.

One remark of Later Wittgenstein would be sufficient to show what he thinks of what he is doing, so also what he thinks of what his other academic colleagues are doing. Referring to what is going on in science and philosophy, i.e., to what he himself is doing and what others are doing, he says, "How much we are doing is changing the style of thinking and how much I'm doing is persuading people to change their style of thinking." This remark clearly exhibits Wittgenstein's rhetoric, a new rhetoric, different from the one condemned by Plato and the one supported by Aristotle. Of course Wittgenstein's rhetoric has its hereditary links with Plato and Aristotle, but it is novel. The concept of 'persuasion' has been given a new dimension of meaning, the dimension which is certainly missing in Plato, and it is doubtful whether it is present in Aristotle.

'Persuasion' for Wittgenstein does not mean what is meant for Plato. For Wittgenstein does not hesitate in equating 'persuasion' with 'propaganda'. As he says, "I am in a sense making propaganda for one style of thinking as opposed to another." This means that a doctrine or a thesis, be it philosophical or scientific needs to be accepted. I am persuading people to accept it; I am making a propaganda for its acceptance. Those who have at any time accepted any doctrine or thesis have accepted it because of the propaganda behind it, because of the persuasion behind

245. Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, 40.
246. Ibid., 37.
it. Now I am presenting my own doctrine. The first condition in presenting my own doctrine is that I am charmed by it. I would have never come to this doctrine if I had not been charmed by it. Now I have to charm others. How would I charm them? So long as the charm with the old doctrine continues, they would not receive my doctrine. So I have to dispel their charm with the other doctrine. Concerning the other doctrine, Wittgenstein says, 'I can put it in a way in which it will lose its charm.' Thus, one aspect of Wittgenstein's concept of persuasion is that I have to interpret the doctrine of the other person in such a fashion that it loses its charm. Unless it loses its charm people would not give it up. So one aspect of Wittgenstein's concept of 'persuasion' is 'brain washing'. Unless I wash and clean the brain of others with the doctrines which they have already acquired, there is no chance of my success with them. So what is important is not that my doctrine is truer than the doctrine presented by my competitor, but my doctrine has more persuasive power.

Wittgenstein's view of rhetoric is certainly different from Plato's. Plato thinks that rhetoric is a kind of flattery, it is catering to the taste of others. The implication is that I am not helping them to grow, I am simply providing them with spicy food which would ultimately ruin their health. Wittgenstein's rhetoric does not preach that I have to make adjustments to the taste of others. It is rather an attempt to persuade them to make themselves adjusted to my taste. I have not prepared dishes for their taste. I have prepared dishes which are of my taste. And

247. Ibid., 39.
now I am making others change their taste. Unless they change their taste, they cannot enjoy the dishes prepared by me. So I am persuading them to change their taste to cultivate a new taste, to cultivate a taste for my dishes. In doing all this I am certainly not lowering their taste but brightening it up. So also I am not lowering myself, for I am not strictly catering to their taste, I am catering to mine. As Wittgenstein says clearly "A present-day teacher of philosophy doesn't select food for his pupil with the aim of flattering his taste, but with the aim of changing it." 248 Thus what is required is to change the taste of others.

Is there any doubt now that Wittgenstein is an advocate of a new rhetoric? I would like to take up this issue for further discussion when I shall be dealing with Wittgenstein's concept of science. It is his new rhetoric which is behind his later conception of science.

248. *Culture And Value,* p. 17.