CHAPTER FIVE

PHILOSOPHY OF ORDINARY LANGUAGE ANALYSIS

I

CATEGORICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE WORLD. The world can be thought of altogether differently from our familiar world. Our experience can be differently interpreted. But any interpreted description, even if, grammatically correct may not result in an intelligible description. The reason is that there are certain limits of our thinking about the world. One may try to understand the world in terms of its general structure. Another may be interested to understand it in details. For one's purpose mathematical or some other formal language is ideal, but for another's what is necessary is perhaps ordinary language. Rightly understood the demarcation between structural understanding and understanding in terms of details is not tenable. For no structure is devoid of stuff (i.e., details) and no stuff without structure. Consequently, it is found different types of language, mathematical, ordinary etc. with varying degrees of ontological commitment, are not quite separable from one another. Whatever language one chooses for interpreting or explaining the world or any part thereof is bound to encounter a limit for obvious ontological and epistemological reasons. We cannot describe the world in any way we like. There
are certain principles which limit and regulate our thought of the world and experience as a whole. Kant tries to find out these limits and principles.

He gives a categorical description of the world, i.e., he wants to make the world phenomena intelligible by general description. One-sided empiricists tried to explain the origin of human knowledge by the mind's passive reception of impressions from the external world. Extreme rationalists thought that all knowledge sprang from within the mind out of its own independent activity. Kant corrects and reconciles both, by showing that mind is partly passive and partly active. Mind in its passive aspect is sensibility which receives impressions in its own form of space and time. In its active aspect mind is understanding which works on the raw materials supplied by sensibility with its own concepts or categories and thus produces judgments which constitute knowledge proper. Sensibility supplies the matter of knowledge, whereas understanding gives it an intelligible form. The nature of abstract categories, which are the forms of thought, becomes evident when we apply them to determine the objects sensed in the forms of space and time. We perceive an object in space and time due to the functioning of categories and forms of sense. But sense and understanding are but forms of thought. Thus it is clear that perception of object is a sort of externalisation of thought. But for the externalisation of thought no objects would appear to us. Kant is conscious of this fact and he declares

understanding maketh nature. Kant emphasises the importance of a principle: that every meaningful employment of concepts implies the ability to point out the kind of experience-situations to which the concepts are applied, i.e., must point out the empirical conditions of their application. Otherwise it would be a misuse resulting in contradictions or paradoxes. The so-called philosophers, Kant maintains, neglected this principle. They do not find it obligatory to specify the empirical conditions of application of the concepts they made use of. It must seem that they are describing reality as it is in itself, and not as it appears in our sense-bound experience. But Kant points out, their seeming knowledge is delusion.

It is true that in the course of scientific investigation certain ideas which are bereft of empirical significance emerge and help scientific knowledge by stimulating its unlimited extension. The illusion of metaphysical knowledge turns up only when it was believed that there are realities corresponding to these ideas and the knowledge of them can be grasped by pure thought unaided by experience.

Kant thought of himself as investigating the general structure of ideas and principles, i.e., the universal and necessary presuppositions of all our empirical knowledge. Moreover, he thought this investigation possible because he believed it to be an investigation into the structure and workings of the cognitive capacities of human beings. Our own cognitive constitution is
the source of possible limiting or necessary general features of experience. He thought this idea indispensable because it will explain the possibility of knowledge of the necessary structure of experience. Yet there is no doubt that this doctrine is inconsistent in itself and does not explain the real character of his enquiry.

Kant tries to give the general description of the world with the help of categories as he tries to avoid scepticism. The central problem of classical empiricism was set by the assumption that experience really offers us nothing but separate and fleeting sense-impressions, images and feelings. Knowledge does not mean mere accumulation of sensations but arranging them and interpreting them according to and for our needs. Kant rejects the basic empiricists' dogma and says that the empiricist conception of experience was incoherent in isolation. It made sense only within a larger framework which necessarily included the use and application of concepts. The world we conceive is only a world of thought. It is conceived according to some categories and forms of sensibility. The world known to us is the symbolic world. The real world - the noumenon is behind this. Our ideas are only signs and symbols of something unknowable.

But all these limiting features alike simply represent the ways in which things must appear in the experience of finite beings like ourselves. Of things as they are in themselves as opposed to these appearances of them, we can have no knowledge whatever.
For knowledge, he thinks, is possible only of what can be experienced, and nothing can be experienced except as subjected to the forms imposed by our sensibility and understanding. The forms of sensibility and categories of understanding which make knowledge possible also make it, according to Kant, certain, i.e., universal and necessarily valid. The certainty is "achieved" by postulating and approving that what make knowledge possible are themselves unquestionable. Thus his attempt to make knowledge certain and infallible ultimately lands him, contrary to his profession, in a sort of dogmatism—pre-critical philosophy.

II

RUSSELLIAN DESCRIPTION OF THE WORLD AND ITS INADEQUACY.

There is another way of "showing" that description of the world in terms of a set of deductively connectable categories is certain or unquestionable. Description of the world can be made by deducing the lower order categories from the higher order ones. All the phenomena of the world can be made intelligible in terms of certain categories arranging them in a hierarchical fashion. It is one of the main claims of Russell that he has succeeded in showing that so-called structural or categorical description of the world turns out on logical analysis, indefensible. Russell

believes that every philosophical problem when subjected to the necessary logical analysis and purification is found to be something other than what it looks like. By logical analysis he splits up a general proposition into its truth functional components and then further into the constituents of each of the terms used in the component-propositions. He finds in *PM (Principia Mathematica)* the proper form of a theory of knowledge and wants to represent the whole of human knowledge in a logically articulated system in which everything was derived by explicit definitions and rules of inference from certain undefined basic concepts. Russell suggests the principle of extensionality where he gives an account of compound propositions as truth-functions of elementary ones. He asserts that all compound propositions were no more than collection of these elements, and thereby gives a classification of the possible forms of propositions.

Russell\(^3\) devised a technique for the analysis of definite descriptions, in which problematic expressions were eliminated in principle from discourse by rules of translation. It consists in translating sentences in which they occurred into sentences from which they were absent. By means of these definitions in use, references to material objects, minds etc. were shown to be 'incomplete symbols'. The entities to which these symbols seemed to refer were reductively analysed into the unquestionably empirical data of sensation.\(^4\)


The theory of description gives a reduction of all propositions in which descriptive or denoting phrases occur to forms in which no such phrases occur. If we regard descriptive phrases as standing for genuine constituents of the propositions in whose verbal expressions they occur we have to face unavoidable difficulties. Meinong believes any grammatically correct denoting phrase stands for an object. Thus "the round square" is supposed to be genuine object. It is admitted that such objects do not subsist, but nevertheless they are supposed to be objects. This is a difficult view. The main objection is that such objects are apt to violate the law of contradiction. It is maintained that the round square is round, and also not round. This is a difficult problem indeed.

Frege proposes to tackle the problem in a rather novel way by drawing the celebrated distinction between sense-meaning and referential meaning. He distinguishes, in a descriptive phrase, two elements, which he calls the sense (meaning) and reference (denotation). This "the-centre-of-mass-of-the-solar-system at-the-beginning-of-the-twentieth-century" is complex in meaning, but its denotation is a certain point, which is simple. The solar system, the twentieth century etc. are constituents of the meaning, but the denotation has no constituents at all.

If we accept the view that descriptive phrases express a meaning and denote some definite existential object, then we feel puzzled by the absence of the object supposedly referred to by
denoting term or expression. If we say "the king of England is bald", it will not perhaps be a statement about the complex meaning "the king of England", but about the actual man denoted by the meaning. Now if we say "the king of France is bald", then this also ought to be about the denotation of the phrase "the king of France". But this phrase might have a meaning if "the king of England" has a meaning, but certainly has no denotation. Hence it might be thought that "the king of France is bald" ought to be nonsense; but it is not nonsense, since it is false. If we believe that the descriptions have two sorts of meaning, denotative and sense, then the cases where there seems to be no denotation cause difficulties, because of the underlying assumptions that there is really a denotation (object) and that there really is none. 5

When a description occurs in a proposition, there is no constituent of that proposition corresponding to that description as a whole. In the true analysis of the proposition the description is broken up and disappears. That is to say, when a proposition like "Scott is the author of Waverley" is made, it will be wrong to suppose that the proposition has three constituents, "Scott", "is" and "the author of Waverley". Because "the author of Waverley" is not a constituent of the proposition at all. 6

There is no constituent really there corresponding to the descriptive phrase.

The most obvious reason is that we can have significant propositions denying the existence of "the so and so", "The unicorn does not exist". A proposition of this sort is perfectly significant and also be a true proposition and that could not possibly be the case if the unicorn were a constituent of the proposition, because it could not be a constituent as long as there were not any unicorn. Because the constituents of propositions are the same as the constituents of the corresponding facts, and since it is a fact that the unicorn does not exist, it is perfectly clear that the unicorn is not a constituent of that fact. Because if there were any fact of which the unicorn was a constituent, there would be a unicorn, and it would not be true that it did not exist.

Russell did not draw any distinction clearly between sentences and propositions. Unreal objects are admitted when the sentences are not properly analysed. In that case the sentences though actually do not stand for any actual existent entities seems to have stand for actual existent entities. "I met a unicorn", if "a unicorn" is taken in isolation, it has no meaning. Such entities correspond to what are called by Russell "incomplete symbol". Such symbols are meant to be used in specified sort of context and it is useless to enquire what they stand for in isola-

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tion. If we supply a context then and only then these words express a fact. They have a meaning in so far as their role in that particular context is concerned. But they have no meaning taken by themselves. In other words, their meaning is context-bound.

Russell recognises both proper names and descriptive phrases as units of meaning. The meaning of a proper name consists in its denotation. The meaning of a descriptive phrase consists, if we are allowed to say, in intention. Carnap developed this theory in his "Meaning and Necessity". There he recognised degrees of completeness or independence of meaning.

Russell wants to show that the question whether a phrase is a definite description turns only upon its form, not upon the question whether there is a definite individual so described. "The inhabitant of London" is a definite description, although it does not in fact describe any definite individual.

The discussion of propositions in whose verbal expression definite or indefinite descriptions occur should enable us to see how such propositions can be significantly asserted even though there is no object which is described. Their analysis shows that the description in no case names a constituent of the proposition with which we are acquainted, and in the analysed form of the expression the description disappears. Hence, we can assert that the sound square does not exist without having first to assume
that there is an object which is both round and square and then denying that there is such an object. The analysis of propositions in whose verbal expression descriptions occur is precisely the same whether these descriptions do in fact describe an object, or not.

Having the paradigm of mathematical language in mind, it has been said, Russell seems to have failed to note the peculiarity and diversity of informal language in use. He has also perhaps not taken due note of the importance of social context in the behaviour of language. Drawing his inspiration from ordinary language philosophy of Wittgenstein and Ryle, Strawson has proved to be the most influential contemporary critic of Russell's theory of description. He argues that Russell made at least two mistakes. He did not fully realise that a sentence can have variety of uses, and he mistakenly thought that every meaningful sentence must be either true or false. According to Strawson, a sentence such as "The present king of France is bald", when used to-day, is neither true nor false, for the question of its truth or falsity does not even arise. Russell's distinction among true, false or meaningless no longer exists, Strawson thinks, once we understand that a sentence can be meaningless or significant but is never true or false, but a statement can be true or false but is never meaningless. Again, on a great many of the occasions on which a sentence is being used, the question of truth or falsity does not arise at all.

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By a 'sentence' Strawson means a set of words or expressions. The same sentence, according to him, can be used to make quite different statements.

Russell's theory of descriptions begins from the presumption that since "the king of France is wise" is neither true nor meaningless, it must be false. And again that since it obviously does not describe "the king of France" - when there is no such person - it must really describe something else. Russell finally says that all propositions really ascribe predicates to "logically proper" names only to find out that there are no such names. But if we realise, Strawson says, first, that the question whether "the king of France is bald" has a meaning is quite independent of the question whether there is in fact such a thing - it has a meaning if it could be used to talk about somebody. Secondly, such a sentence presupposes, but does not assert, that there is a king of France, and since this presupposition is false, the question of truth or falsity cannot be an issue. Russell's theory is unnecessary since the problem it was designed to solve does not exist.

But this theory of description is of utmost importance in logic, mathematics and in theory of knowledge. "The chief importance of knowledge by description is that it enables us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience. In spite of the fact that we can only know truths which are wholly composed of terms
which we have experienced in acquaintance we can yet have knowledge by description of things which we have never experienced. In view of the very narrow range of our immediate experience, this result is vital, and until it is understood, much of our knowledge must remain mysterious and therefore doubtful."

Another important factor was the so-called theory of types, a doctrine which overcame some difficulties in logic by excluding certain kinds of expression as meaningless. This suggested the possibility of drawing the boundaries of meaning, rather than the boundaries of the knowable as had been more usual in Philosophy. Russell's theory of types added logical to grammatical limitations on the possible ways of combining expressions to form meaningful assertions. The logical paradoxes had led Russell to see that grammatically well-formed sentences could nevertheless be meaningless. It was concluded that an essential preliminary to a theory of knowledge laying down conditions for the distinction between the true and the false was a theory of meaning to distinguish between the significant and senseless. Russell's predicament with the theory of description is mainly due to his pre-natural desire to assimilate language as closely as possible to a logician's calculus. It has been rightly argued by philosophers like Strawson that "referring" propositions are not necessarily of the existential type. It would be wrong to think that all "referring" expressions have unique reference.

"Referring" expressions like non-referring indicatives succeed only in specifying the character of object within categorical limits set by predicative expressions. Specific referents are not unique referents, for specific identification cannot, strictly speaking, rule out at least some other objects of the same species. In other words, one might say, type, category and species with varying connotations are terms of the same sort.

The theory of types consists in the idea that all concepts, both properties and relations, are classified according to types. The paradoxes all arise, he argues, out of certain kind of vicious circle. Such a vicious circle is generated whenever it is supposed that a collection of objects may contain members which can only be defined by means of the collection as a whole. To take a case; Suppose we say "all propositions have the property x". On the face of it, this is itself a proposition, so that the class of propositions has among its members one which presumes that the class has been completed - because it talks of "all propositions" - before it has itself been mentioned. This contradiction - that the class must at once have been completed and not been completed - brings out the fact that there is no such class. We shall have to say then, Russell concludes, that statements about "all propositions" are meaningless. Then how are we to develop a theory of propositions? The "pseudo-totality all propositions", Russell says, must be broken up into sets of propositions, each capable of being a genuine totality, after which a separate account can be given of
each, such set. This 'breaking up' is the object of the theory of types; it is however, applied to propositional functions rather than to propositions, because they, Russell thinks are more important for mathematics. By a 'propositional function' Russell means an expression like 'x is a man', which in itself is neither true nor false; it is converted into a proposition by substituting, say, "Socrates" for "x". ¹⁰

Russell thinks that distinctions between types have been unconsciously respected in everyday speech, unconsciously because one would want to say, for example, that 'Humanity is not a man'. But whereas the difference in type between 'Humanity' and 'a man' is an obvious one, the fundamental notions of logic - such notions as truth, falsity have no fixed or definite type. We talk simply about "truths", whether we mean first order truths (x is y) or second-order truths (x is y is true) or third-order-truths ('x is y is true' is true). Paradoxes are then inevitable; we are led to imagine that propositions about truths are, as true, about themselves, whereas they are really second-order-truths about first-order truths.

Later Russell was a bit uneasy about type itself. ¹¹ Is this, too, of different types? But how is it possible to say that Socrates and mankind are of different types, unless there is some single general sense of type? For this sort of reason,

Russell welcomed the 'linguistic' interpretation of the theory of types offered by Carnap, for example. It is a mistake, he came to think, to speak of entities as being of this or that type, it is expressions which differ in type. And it can be said without any contradiction, in a language of the second order, that the words "Socrates" and "Humanity" have different syntactical functions.

Ramsey, among others, attempted a solution to the paradoxes. He says that Russell has grouped together paradoxes which are quite different in character. There are those paradoxes which arise with the attempt to construct a logical system and those which are "linguistic" or semantic in their origin, i.e., which arise only when we try to talk about that system. What is important here is that the effect of Russell's theory of types encouraged the view that linguistic enquiries, of one sort or another, are of special importance to the philosopher.

Ryle thinks that category-distinguishing involves philosophical argument, a point ignored by those who define philosophy as analysis. Ryle says that we can consider an incomplete expression as '... is in the table'. Then, he points out, we can insert "Book" or "Pencil" in the gap, but not Socrates. This is sufficient to prove "Book" belongs to a different category from 

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"Socrates". Even then it does not prove that "Book" and "Pencil" belong to the same category; for there might be other 'incomplete expressions' Ryle argues, in which "Book" could be inserted but "pencil" would not fit without absurdity. Ryle points out that in such a case the absurdity resulting from the inappropriate completion of a sentence-frame (i.e., incomplete expression) is obvious; but it is not obvious, in contrast, that we shall face antinomies and contradictions if we fill the gap in '... is false' by the phrase 'the statement I am now making'. Such absurdities which are not so obvious are the philosophically interesting ones.

What Ryle intended is to point out the inadequacy of the Russellian theory of type developed having the mathematical model of language in view and, develop a weaker theory of type instead. His notion of category has been fashioned, as he claims, primarily having ordinary language in view. Boundary between the kindred categories is not so clear cut as the Russellian theory with its mathematical formulation claims to have achieved. Generally speaking, Ryle would claim that because of the imprecise character of the distinction between the concepts "about the mind" and those "about the body" we are often unconsciously led to misallocate the concepts (under inappropriate categories). "Failing" to apply some concepts to the "outer" (body) we are led to postulate something "inner" (mind); Ryle is anti-reductionist against reducing every personal predicates to bodily predicates but this, contrary to widely prevalent pro-Humean reductionist view, does not entail all
personal concepts are bodily concepts.\textsuperscript{14}

Philosophical arguments, Ryle says, are neither inductions nor demonstrations; the philosopher has his own method of procedure, of which the most characteristic is the \textit{reductio ad absurdum}. By deducing from a proposition or complex of propositions consequences which are inconsistent with each other or with the original propositions the philosopher demonstrates the absurdity of the proposition or complex of propositions in question. Ryle is not suggesting that philosophical arguments are purely destructive. The \textit{reductio ad absurdum} determines the boundaries at which absurdity appears and in doing so it outlines the actual field of application of a proposition.

III

\textbf{WITTEGENSTEIN'S THEORY OF ISOMORPHIC ATOMIC PROPOSITION AND ATOMIC WORLD: ITS INADEQUACY.} There are different types of propositions, but there cannot be complete inventory of the types of propositions. The interest of the philosopher should be directed to the endless diversities of the types of propositions. The philosopher should be concerned with the details and peculiarities rather than with the generality. Concern for details is the very characteristic of scientific spirit. Generalising discipline

or nomothetic science is concerned with the general properties of a class of objects while the individualising discipline or ideographic science is concerned with the peculiarities of the objects included in the class.

Linguistics can be studied as a natural or formalistic science or as a descriptive anthropology and sociology, i.e., in social context or in social discourse. In other words, language can be seen as a physical object having sensible properties. But language may be studied as consisting of objects which have nonsensible intelligible properties. Language in natural science is one-dimensional but it is claimed that language has its depth and that its meaning is intensional.

The logical atomists develop a metaphysical system in order to give a true description of the world. In their system two things are evident. One is that the logical structure of the world can be revealed by an analysis of language because language is the picture of reality. The logical structure of reality is identical with the logical structure of language. So the logical structure of reality should be revealed through language.

The second is that not all forms of language are capable of representing the reality as it is. For instance, if it is said that 'England has declared war against Germany', prima facie it may appear that the country called 'England' has declared war against the country called 'Germany' or 'the totality of the people of
England has declared war against the totality of the people of Germany. But in actuality, it is possible that 'the prime minister of one country has declared war against the other country'. Hence it is evident that we have two forms of language - one is that which gives us the exact representation of reality and the other is that which distorts or fails to give us a true picture of reality. If we are to be aware of the actual state of affairs we should reduce the incorrect language to the correct language. As the propositions are nothing but expressions of language, so propositions can also be classified into ideal and non-ideal type. The non-ideal ones are to be reduced into ideal ones to serve our purpose.

The logical atomists try to explain the nature of reality with the help of analysis. If we are to analyse, we have to take the help of language and ultimately of propositions. From this it follows that there is some sort of a correspondence between the propositions on the one hand and reality on the other.

Now the inevitable question which would arise: Does an entity or an object corresponding to every proposition or expression exist? The answer would be in the negative because corresponding to the expression 'round square does not exist', there is nothing actually existing. Yet it is true because the non-existence of the round square is a fact. So we find in actuality that there are several true propositions corresponding to which there are no facts to be identified in any straight forward way.
Here even though there is no entity like 'round square', we have to accept a proposition containing this expression as true. In other words, this proposition is true though in actuality there is no 'round square'. In order to accommodate these propositions, it is held that this sort of propositions is to be reduced to propositions which in actuality have certain entities corresponding to them.

Wittgenstein, in his Tractatus, sets out a general theory of language in relation to the world. He asks, like Kant, how is language and therefore thinking, possible? He was trying to reveal the essential structure of language which is hidden behind the known surface of our ordinary language used in everyday life.

Philosophy, he says, attempts to formulate an 'ideal language', a language the terms of which are precisely defined and the sentences of which clearly reveal the logical form of the facts to which they refer. Such a perfect language rests upon atomic propositions; the fundamental philosophical problem is to describe the structure of the atomic propositions. These are the propositions which owe their meaning and truth not to their relation to other propositions but to their relation to the world. What makes it possible for a sentence to express an elementary proposition is its being a picture of possible state of affairs, a possible arrangements of objects which, if it obtains, constitutes a


fact. The proposition, as an arrangement of names, pictures the state of affairs, an arrangement of objects. The compound propositions are all truth-functions of elementary propositions, generated from the latter by the operations of denial and conjunction, disjunction, implication etc. They owe their meaning and truth-value wholly to that of their elementary components. Sentences that do not express elementary, pictorial propositions are either collections of elementary propositions or they express no propositions at all. They are devoid of meaning. Philosophy conceived as analysis of propositions becomes a search for the translations of various kinds of sentences into explicit truth functions of elementary propositions.\textsuperscript{17} The meaning of an elementary proposition remains \textit{same} in all context, because they are basic, or atomic, or picturous or because they are self-evident in character; they are ultimate verifiers.\textsuperscript{18}

There are certain propositions which have no reference but they exist. Coming to the point of reference we have to deal with general facts. Because there are atomic propositions which refer to atomic facts, but it is said that there is no general fact. The real intention of Russellian theory of description is to show that the subject-expression of non-atomic proposition has no referential meaning. So they believe in only atomic propositions because they refer uniquely to atomic facts.

The critics have pointed out that it is not quite clear from Wittgenstein's theory whether his proposed picture theory is a theory primarily of language or that of reality or that of both taken together isomorphically. The difficulty arises, Gellner says, if one tries to find out and identify the atoms, whether they are atoms in language or atoms in reality, that are supposed to be the basis of cognition. It is perhaps the failure to find the atoms which destroyed the theory of world picture and the 'reductionist' programme associated with it.

Again, Gellner points out, the atoms of the world which are known to correspond to the ultimate atoms of language, were not only beyond characterisation, they were also with a metaphysical air. So there arises a suspicion of the existence or nature of these atoms.

Besides, it can be asked, "if all discourse was either atomic sentences or conjunctions or abbreviations of them, what room was there for the assertion for instance that all discourse is made up of atomic sentences?"

This theory, again, faces a difficulty when it deals with the existence of people and of minds. When it is stated that Jones believes that the cat is on the mat, it cannot be said to be a simple conjunction of two or more atomic sentences; because it is clearly pointed out that all the atoms are totally independent of each other. That is, any true atomic sentence can take


20 Ibid., p. 83.
the place of any other true one, or a false of a false one
everything else remaining the same. When on the otherhand sen-
tences are said to be believed or doubted, they are no longer independent. "For although it is true that Jones believes that
cat is on the mat, and it is true that cat is on the mat, and it
is true that the dog is in the kennel, we cannot substitute 'The
dog is in the kennel' for 'The cat is on the mat' and rely on the
result still being true: for quite possibly Jones does not believe
that the dog is in the kennel even though he is. This shows
something very important — namely that, on occasions at least;
sentences such as 'The cat is on the mat' seem not to enter into
larger complexes as independent atoms, replaceable by other true
sentences without affecting the whole."

Wittgenstein, in his *Tractatus*, dealt with this difficulty
and tries to offer a behaviouristic solution. Complex statements
of the form that somebody thinks something were all to be explain-
ed as the different formulations of the statement that somebody
says something. At the outset there is no real difficulty. Some-
body's saying of something can be said to be a complicated descrip-
tion of his physical condition. "An activist philosophy of mind
went hand in hand with an activist or functionalist theory of
language and the two reinforced each other. Both provided expla-
nations of why the very presuppositions of logical Atomism, the
assumptions that knowledge must always be a case of fact-sentence
parallelism or mirroring, should not be presupposed at all (for

speech acts were *acts*, not mirror-images).\textsuperscript{22} Knowing and believing can be interpreted in a behaviouristic way which can be without 'objects', i.e., logical atoms, with which logical atomism is concerned.

Again, it can be pointed out that in the theory of logical atomism there is no place for the human world of values, for ethics, aesthetics, religion and so on. There is no mention of some features of the world which seem to make it a place of interest and of value. The defect is removed by Linguistic philosophy which tried to restore all the diverse human values and uses of language to their proper places.

\hspace{1cm} IV \hspace{1cm}

**PHILOSOPHY OF ORDINARY LANGUAGE GAME.** The inadequacy of the ideal logical language (ideal for true, i.e., scientific understanding of the world) proposed by himself was later on realised by Wittgenstein. Initially, Wittgenstein's interest was mainly in the philosophy of science. That divorced of science philosophy is left with no genuine philosophical problems drew his attention and interest later on. His theory of ordinary language was designed mainly to show the illusoriness of philosophical problems and their resulting insolubility. Philosophical problems are intimately associa-

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., pp. 84-85.
ted with, if not grounded in, language and are to be dissolved through analysis of ordinary language. They arise from the use of words or from deviations from it.

The fact that language exists and that there are some facts about language, is very important for philosophy. They are the conditions for solving the fundamental problems of philosophy. Ordinary language is in use in dealing with these problems, and therefore relevant in this case. The diversity of ordinary language is necessary for the understanding of it and of philosophic problems.

In the past what we term philosophy is nothing but the pathology of language: philosophic problems arise from misunderstanding or misuse or both of language. Consequently philosophica1 theories result from linguistic muddle. From this it follows that common sense view is to be taken into consideration. Common sense is closely related to what is implied in the common use of language. On the basis of this it can be said that the proper job of the philosopher is to detect a certain type of error arising from misunderstanding of language. The philosopher has no positive function to perform. Positive views can be left to common sense or to some other source. There is no place in the knowledge situation for the kind of special insights that past philosophy claimed, or for the kind of strange questions with which it was preoccupied. These alleged questions and insights

are to be eliminated as far as possible. Only such therapeutic elimination can give us some idea of how we use language.

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein pointed out that the limits of language are the limits of reality, of the world. The totality of propositions is language. The language is an ideal of which none has complete knowledge. All that can be said significantly is how reality is, i.e., certain states of affair exist and certain others do not. Nothing can be said about reality as it is in itself. He concludes what can be said at all can be said clearly and what we cannot talk about we must keep silent.

Philosophers, Wittgenstein maintains, are mistaken in trying to model their activities on those of scientists. In order to do so they lay down strict definitions and try to discover true, universal propositions. Wittgenstein argues that such a strict definition is not possible. We can make our definitions strict by arbitrarily ruling out this or that. But this is not knowledge in the true sense of the term and implies the misunderstanding of the nature of philosophical issue. If one wants to have the proper idea of the word knowledge, he must undertake a detailed concrete examination of the instances in which people actually use the word 'knowledge' the roles that word plays in ordinary, everyday language, not in a purified language. These diverse roles, Wittgenstein says, cannot be summed up in a brief formula, or a strict definition. Exact definitions would make philosophy look like species of science. Philosophy, as Wittgenstein defines it, explains nothing, analyses nothing. - it simply describes.
In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein found language as a logically rigid essence hidden behind the contingent surface of everyday discourse. In the *Philosophical Investigations* language is accepted as it actually is, as a *living* unsystematic array of working conventions. If we look without superstition at the way words are actually used, Wittgenstein says, there will be no mystery of meaning. We can be more confident, he maintains, if we start by considering possible, rather than actual, languages. Carlznap says almost the same thing, but his possible languages are complex artificial formulae, which could not possibly be used in the ordinary affairs of life. Wittgenstein describes a mode of social behaviour and asks us to consider the sort of language which would be practically useful within such a "form of life".

What is important here is that Wittgenstein upholds that the meaning of a word is not any sort of object for which the word stands. Certainly it is a feature of the meaning of some words to stand for things, but these, the proper names, constitute only a small part of the language as a whole. And even in their cases, the object they stand for is not their meaning, which is, rather, their *conventionally* established capacity to stand for objects. Wittgenstein believes, that we are helped by the model of *ostensive definition*, the direct correlation of words with elements of the world. The idea of pointing to an object is a somehow self-explanatory way of giving the meaning of a word pronounced at the moment of the act of pointing to. But to make the matter clear it can be said that *ostensive definition* is just one conventional
use of the act of pointing to things, which can also be used to give orders rather than to introduce new words. In other formulation, before pointing can give meaning to a word it must itself be understood as having meaning.

To find out what meaning is, we should consider questions that arise about meaning outside philosophical discussions. How is the meaning of a word learned or explained; how do we tell that someone understands the meaning of a word? To say of a man that he understands the meaning of a word is simply to say that he understands how to use it, that he has become party to a certain established social convention. The identification of meaning with the way a word is used is vague, but cannot be avoided, for words have many different sorts of meaning or sense.

Wittgenstein concludes that the meaning of a name is not the object it denotes which he previously accepted. What corresponds to the name is its bearer, not its meaning. A man's name does not lose its meaning when he is destroyed. So the bearer of a name is one thing, and its meaning is another. The meaning of a name is given by the various descriptions which apply to the bearer of the name and enable one to identify it.

Wittgenstein feels that the language is responsible for failure of atomic proposition showing of atomic fact. The character of language is deceptive. The problem of communication and the immediacy of knowledge becomes all the more acute because
of the failure of fact-proposition-isomorphism.

The forms of truth-functional language is deceptively neat. Real forms of language are immensely complex and are to be found in ordinary language. No general term has a unitary meaning, and the terms have no fixed meaning; the cluster of characteristics associated with the term is always subject to change. So all words which are philosophically interesting have no unitary, fixed meaning. They do not designate essences. Once this is understood, i.e., that the uses of language are extremely diverse, then the philosopher will no longer simply take it for granted that identical grammatical features entail identical kinds of meanings or uses.

The connection between the words and the world must be made by a mental act of meaning: the speaker means his words to stand for something. But if the alleged act of meaning consists merely in conjuring up an image, it will not do what we require it to do. Because the connection is made by the way he uses, or would use, the image or picture, the applications he makes, or would make, of it.

This is what accounts for the failure of ostensive definition. No word is uniquely and logically proper. Propriety of a word is context-bound, and is to be sought in its context of actual use. We use language to give orders, to express our feelings. It should not be assumed that there is some common
element to all these different uses of language, some residual essence that pervades and somehow unifies them all.

The uses of language, in Wittgenstein's words, are like games. There are as many relations between a name and the thing named as there are language-games in which they play a part. The name and the thing named should not be abstracted from all language-games, from all contexts of their employment. All that is actually required, in addition to the words themselves, is the behaviour of human beings, the language-games which they play with the words. It is the use of words which give them life. In use, they are alive. He sums up his theory of meaning by saying that the language-games, within which alone words have meaning, are forms of life, modes of activities governed by system of rules. The rules, Wittgenstein alludes to are not as systematic as the rules of formation and transformation obtained in formal systems of language. However complex, peculiar or local the rules might be they perform invariably that subtle task of distinguishing proper uses of words and expressions from their misuses. The distinction, however, between use and misuse cannot be uniformly generalised.

This theory of meaning has of course a certain plausibility, it has its own limitations.

It is plausible in the sense that in a given and determinate language, there is no justification in denying that a word is rightly applied in those very cases which are a statement of
its right application. The argument from Paradigm cases does not even say that a word is always rightly used, but merely it is rightly used in the Paradigm of its employment. It is a contradiction to deny it. Words mean what a given language, its rules, its custom say they mean, neither more nor less.

Yet the argument is not quite persuasive. The fact that a term has a use, or range of uses, or a paradigm use only shows that the users, not only attribute some sense to it, also suppose that this sense finds that to which it refers, i.e., its denotation. It in no way establishes that they are right in this supposition. They do certainly 'have a use' but this in no way proves that the terms are appropriate.

The terms like Beauty, Goodness designate categories. The category indicates a whole class of or range of objects actual as well as possible. When a man denies a category he denies a class of objects necessary for successful communication within a definite human discourse. He mistakenly thinks he is making a move within a language game, when in fact he is denying the existence of the language-game as a whole.

The language philosopher is interested to find out the proper use or natural place of an expression or word in a particular language-game. He is of the view that propriety or otherwise of the use of a word cannot be definitely determined in terms of a general theory. For this he wants to show the paradigm use of that word (in a definite context). This method of determination of the best possible use of a word is often called argument from Paradigm case (APC). The language philosopher denies the possibility of theorising in philosophy for theorising involves gene
ralising and thereby ignoring the peculiarities of individual cases or uses of what is mistakenly thought to be philosophical concepts. No concept, no word, has any intrinsic general meaning or theoretical status of its own independent of the context wherein it is found. Its meaning has to be gathered from its appropriate context or form of life according to the appropriate rules.

If every individual use of a word is unique and knows no kind, the question of its correctness or otherwise, of its use or misuse is difficult to ascertain. For there is no other ideal case in comparison with and in contrast to which its identity or deviation may be rationally decided.

However, the language philosopher might and in fact do speak of using the rules of game (the individual case) to determine the correctness or otherwise of use (or misuse) of a particular word in a given context.

But again the critic may raise the question: what is the identity of the individual case itself, upon the determination of which the rules to be applied are to be determined? If the identity is not correctly established, then the rules in terms of which the appropriateness of use of a word is decided may be questioned and declared inapplicable in the case in question.

Naturally the question arises: If the identity of the case (of the correct use of a word) cannot be settled according

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to interpersonally (objectively) accepted way the problem of incomplete designation or description will stage a comeback.

The defensive strategy of the language philosopher is to fight with back to the wall; and the wall is "meaning is use." And this dictum is not further questionable. This amounts to a retreat to a dogmatic theory of meaning — and at the same time it will be said it is not a theory. But in fact it is a general theory, for in all cases meaning is said to be determined by use. In the traditional rationalist's (idealists) theories of meaning, meanings are given an ontological status of their own; they (meanings) are believed to be independent, eternal and universal although they are exemplified in individual cases.

The language philosophers' theory of meaning denies any such theory of meaning — meanings independent of their actual uses and outside spatio-temporal context. The language philosopher thinks that meaning is in actual use and not in realm of ideality.

We can point out another mistake in this connection. The language philosopher commits the Naturalistic fallacy. This fallacy is the fallacious inference from what is to what ought to be. In ethics by naturalistic fallacy we mean the non-derivability of a norm (ought) statement from fact (is) statement. Gellner speaks of a similar fallacy in respect to linguistic theory of meaning. The language-philosopher thinks

25 Ibid., pp. 40 - 43.
that to ascertain the meaning of word we must look for its \textit{use}, and that "\textit{use}" must be contrasted from \textit{misuse}. The contrast between \textit{use} and \textit{misuse} is determined by rules (of language-game). As the propriety or otherwise of a "move" in the game is determined by the rules of the game, similarly it is in terms of the rules of a language-game that we have to determine the correctness or otherwise of use of a word. It is in the appropriate form of life that the use of a word has to be ascertained.

The problem arises: How to ascertain the appropriateness of the form of life (language-game) itself. Use or misuse of a word is a fact. Any statement about it is a factual statement. If we take it as a factual statement, the applicability or otherwise of certain rules to it, has nothing to do with its facthood. If every fact is by its facthood really autonomous, from it we have no logical passage to any other fact, for the latter will claim to be equally autonomous. In that case from a factual statement of a use of a word we cannot gather any meaning other than what it \textit{immediately} possesses entirely on its own (i.e. autonomy). But it raises another problem: it rules out the significance of the contrast theory. If any use of a word by its factual autonomy claims to have immediate meaning on its own; the relevance of rules (of language game) is little or nothing. But if rules are irrelevant, then how to determine the contrast between use and misuse of a word?
In short, from the fact of "use" or "misuse" of a word we cannot logically determine what other "uses" of the word are really use or (misuse).

But it can be shown that the idea that we can grasp linguistic function in its fullest extent without generalising is not convincing. Philosophy, according to linguistic philosophers, is an activity and not a doctrine. But even when they are able to uphold this theory and merely display how a word is used—which is not always the case—all that happens is that some general idea is terminated, by means of which the 'usages' are exhibited.

It can be pointed out that the great stress on variety of role does not necessarily lead the linguistic philosopher to an image of language as a chaotic aggregate. The stress is not merely on diversification, but on diversification of role, of function.

Though the linguistic philosophers would not claim in so many words that any natural language is perfect, yet there is a strong presumption in favour of treating any particular usage, as not requiring improvement, as beyond criticism.

There is a confusion between the various justifications of ideolatry of ordinary language. In the first place, it demands itself to be its own standard (there can be no other) and so there can be no improvement. Secondly, ordinary language has stood the test of time. Thirdly, changes are possible but they are
extra-philosophical. Lastly, changes are only called for in technical subjects, not in ordinary language.

We can say that the perfection of actual, natural language may indeed be the case. But from this it does not follow that there are many other criteria other than those implicit in the notion of a perfect language, which may not be applicable to actual ways of conversation.

It follows even less from the denial of a perfect logical language that the application of other criteria to natural language is 'outside philosophy'. What is important here is that the valid sense in which Wittgenstein is right directed mainly at his own earlier ideas - is not separated by him from the other, invalid sense, i.e., from the attempt to exclude, arbitrarily, evaluation of concepts from philosophy.

Wittgenstein makes it clear that the philosophy, understood as the clarification of meaning, will be something very different from the construction of a rigidly formal hierarchy of forms of discourse which he developed in the Tractatus. It would have to be more complicated and more diverse in its technique than the philosophy of logical analysis with its intention of reacting the exact rules of translation. But nothing said so far entails the extreme rigorism of the view of philosophy which he actually arrived at. Philosophy is not just any enquiry into meaning. It consists of enquiries into meaning directed towards a specific purpose, the analysis of a particular puzzle-
It is this relevant point of metaphysical confusions that separate Wittgenstein's idea of the proper method of philosophy from that of Austin. For Austin seemed to be fascinated in the rules of language for their own sake. Wittgenstein's view is that men are usually led into metaphysics, into the making of assertions. These assertions in turn make us uneasy by the collision between their apparent deductive inevitability and their incompatibility with deep rooted common sense beliefs. In this collision, it is the metaphysical paradoxes that must give way. They are, he maintains, the outcome of our misunderstandings of the logic of our language. They arise from the misleading influences of verbal analogies. The task of philosophy is to undermine these analogies by recalling our attention to the actual working of the puzzling words in all its variety.

He concludes that it is no part of the task of philosophy to reform language. It must leave everything as it is. He is upholding that language cannot be changed but rather that such changes must arise from the concrete needs of language users and not from abstract reflection about the nature of language. Another conclusion is that the philosopher must not simply replace old, misleading analogies by new ones, for he seems to assume that these will be no improvement in the end on the theories they replace. What a philosopher must do is simply describe language about its everyday work, assemble reminders so that the actual pattern of uses is made clear to us. Everything in the pattern
Both of these conclusions have been criticised. Considering the meaningless assertions made by philosophers due to the misunderstanding of actual use of words we can say that corrective philosophy will try to clear up these misunderstandings by bringing into light the actual use of words. But the original thesis about the causes of metaphysics is not very convincingly established. Wittgenstein provides us with some tests for metaphysics, but they are of an imprecise and subjective character. It can be said as a feeling of a particular sort of perplexity. His rejection of the whole idea of philosophy as a criticism of ordinary ways of thinking is brought out in his attitude towards the problem of justifying kinds of belief. If we want to find out what justifies a belief, he says, all we have to do is to see what is generally accepted as justifying it. The role of philosophy becomes then, purely negative or therapeutic. It is the removal of obstacles to understanding, not a business of making discoveries. Philosophical activity is a sort of curative operation designed to cure a (pretended) philosophical discourse from its philosophical disease, i.e., conceptual muddle due to misuse or misapplication of language. Wittgenstein compared philosophy with psycho-analytic therapy, which not only finds out what is wrong with neurotics and tells them but gradually induces them to recognise the real significance of their words and actions. The psycho-analyst thus has a theory himself about the nature of his patient's disorder which the patient can
come to understand. The situation is not same with his meta-
physical patients. For he says that philosophy must simply
describe and remind and not theorise. It is true that his
account of previous philosophy as pathological does not seem
to have been confirmed by much therapeutic success. In history
we find the refutation of his view when he says that it is no
part of philosophy to interfere with our existing use of words
or with our existing standards of justifying argument. Lastly,
his own practice makes it clear that, inspite of the most strenu-
ous efforts, no sort of philosophy can confine itself to the presenta-
tion of exemplary reminders. The motive of collecting reminders
is to correct a wrong analogy, and if we want to do this, we have to
replace it by a correct one. If *PI* (Philosophical Investigations) is
nothing but the collection of accepted uses of words (as suggested by
Wittgenstein) it would not have had the wide influence which it had.

V

**LANGUAGE ANALYSIS AS METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY.** Ryle contrib-
utes to the view that the task of philosophy is to detect the
sources in linguistic idioms of misconstructions and absurd theo-
ries. Like Bradley, Frege and Russell, he distinguishes between
the syntactical form of an expression and the form of the facts
it describes. He says that a great many of the expressions of
everyday life are, by their grammatical form, confusing and mislead
us. Because the metaphysicians as they are interested in the 'structure of facts' or 'the categories of being' are tempted into their strange theories because they take the grammatical forms of statements at their face value.

In order to avoid the misleading suggestions of everyday speech, Ryle says, the philosopher must learn to restate sentences, in the manner of Russell's theory of descriptions, which for Ryle as well as for Ramsey was 'the paradigm of philosophy'. By doing so the philosopher will be able to exhibit the form of the facts into which philosophy is the enquiry. Philosophical analysis, according to him, issues in such reformulations. It is clear that for Ryle philosophy is both therapeutic and it has a positive task to reveal the real forms of facts. And in this respect Ryle leaves behind the curative concept of philosophy of Wittgenstein and develops a constructive concept of his own. But, as we all know, Ryle was creatively influenced by the Wittgensteinean method of ordinary language analysis. Ryle thinks that of all philosophical myths which have exerted tremendous pernicious influence on the development of philosophy, encouraging empty philosophical speculation and system-building, is the Cartesian myth of ghost in the machine (i.e., body-mind dualism). The first thing that we have to do is to destroy this myth that mental-conduct expressions refer to a peculiar sort of entity 'mind' or 'soul'.

This is distinguishable from

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the body because it is private, non-spatial and can be known only by introspection. As it is believed that words like 'thinking' do not name entities governed by mechanical laws, so they name entities which are governed by non-mechanical, i.e., spiritual laws. Ryle is of the opinion that it is a 'category mistake' to suppose that they name entity whatsoever. The function of the word 'thinking' is to describe human behaviour, not to name an entity. Descartes believes that a human being is composed of two separate entities, a mind and a body; to put it differently, a ghost and a machine. But this is immediately followed by a host of problems. How can a spirit, being immaterial itself, influence the functioning of a material body? Or metaphorically, How can the ghost peer through the machine to the world around it? Ryle thinks we have no answers to these questions. The human being is not to be identified with a ghost, or a machine; he is what he is, a human being.

Philosophers think that 'thinking seriously' is analogous to 'theorising' or 'discovering the truth'. Since thinking is usually carried on in private it is then an easy step to the conclusion that every function of thinking belongs to a secret, private, world. But Ryle argues that the case is not actually so. He says that theorising is only a species of thinking capacity - the species he calls, 'knowing that'; most intelligent action consists in 'knowing how', to carry some action to its conclusion. 'Knowing how' to play a game is definitely differ-
ent from theorising about games. If we like to believe that practice can be intelligent only when it is proceeded by intelligent thinking, then at once we will be involved, Ryle says, in an infinite regress. If we think that an intelligent chess-playing must be proceeded by intelligent theorising about chess, there would be exactly as much reason for thinking that intelligent theorising must in its turn be proceeded by intelligent theorising about theorising, and so on ad infinitum. At one point we have to see that a form of activity is intelligent, whether it is proceeded by some process or not. 27

The critic might object by saying that we cannot say that an act is intelligent only by seeing it. It might be a mere lucky accidental stroke. It is seen that worst of chess-players will from time to time make a truly formidable move. In this circumstances, Ryle says, we have to look beyond the isolated act in order to determine whether it displays "intelligence". This looking beyond does not consist in probing into an intelligent mental act which is as we suppose, inaccessible to us. Rather, we enquire into the general abilities and propensities of the agent concerned. Does he make similar moves in similar conditions? Is he thoroughly acquainted with the move which he made? If the person concerned can answer all these questions, then it is admitted that he 'knows how' to play chess.

Ryle concludes that 'knowing how' is 'dispositional'. He is not suggesting that it is the name of a special sort of

entity - a 'disposition'. To look for the entity named by a disposition is to search for the unicorn. When we say that we have a certain disposition what we actually mean is, Ryle says, that our conduct is law-like, i.e., that it follows a regular pattern.

Ryle so far tried to reformulate and solve to some extent some of the problems which had disturbed Wittgenstein. Now he concentrates on another of Wittgenstein's main ideas. This is the problem of overcoming the apparently irresolvable dilemmas. The philosopher is confronted, frequently by two conclusions, reached separately, yet so connected that one of them must be totally wrong to make the other only partially right. Ryle tries to point out that in these cases the conflict is only a superficial one - a pseudo-conflict between theories which are in a different line of action and there arises no question of reconciliation.

If, to understand it properly, we take an example such as how the world of science is related to 'the world of everyday life'. From one standpoint the physicist says with all seriousness that things are actually arrangements of electrons in space, that there is no colour or solidity in them. But from a altogether different standpoint we do believe strongly that material objects, like chairs or tables are real and they are really coloured or solid. How are we to solve this dilemma? Here Ryle says that the main point in this connection is that the conclusions of the physicist do not come in conflict with our everyday judgments. Therefore the supposed dilemma is nothing
but difference in standpoints.

It is now perhaps clear from the foregoing discussion that Ryle never engages himself exclusively in linguistic analysis. He has his own positive points to make out. It was left to Austin to take the Wittgensteinian method of analysis to its logical conclusion, bringing philosophy indistinguishably close to philology, if not identifying it altogether with the latter.

VI

AUSTIN ON ORDINARY LANGUAGE. Like Wittgenstein Austin engaged himself in a detailed study of language qua philosophy. He is against the study of ideal construction as it neglects the varied range of the uses of language. It is true that in a logically perfect language unambiguity and mathematical precision are to be encouraged, but at the same time we cannot overlook the fact that this language in question should be learnt and communicated since we do not get it from the very start of our life. And this communication is not possible without ordinary language. Even while we construct artificial languages and make use of them to systematise and formalise the different levels of our thought, we ourselves continue to think in terms of ordinary language. In other words, artificial languages, though useful for certain theoretical purposes, are not natural place or means for our thinking.
The ultimate intelligibility of higher order languages is spontaneously or instantaneously derived from their connection with or derivability from corresponding natural or ordinary language. So we are to accept the situation that the language as it is given cannot be separated from the concrete situations of our (i.e., social) life. Thus the diversities and complexities in the use of language are to be accepted.

What we find is that language phenomenologically is flexible, ambiguous and if we try to construct it as ideal with neatness and simplicity, then we will do injustice to it. Because in that case we will do so by abstracting it from concrete context which means we miss language while everything is alright.

It is to be noticed that the ordinary man's authority is admissible only in the practical affairs. When the philosopher is more intellectually and extensively interested than those of ordinary men, it is then necessary to point to new distinctions to invent a new terminology. If a distinction acts well for practical purposes in ordinary life, then there is definitely be something in it. At the same time it cannot be the best way of arranging things if our interests are more sophisticated, technical or abstract than we ordinarily need. And it is a matter of common belief that the abstract or formal modes of experience are derived or abstracted from ordinary and pre-reflective modes of experience. Ordinary modes of experience are not regulated either by well-defined language or by experimental
instruments and it must be pointed out that superstition and error and fantasy of various kinds do become incorporated in ordinary language and sometimes survive: because of our failure to detect them. Scientific language does not contain expressions of dreams, fantasy, myths etc. The reason is simple. The conditions of construction of scientific statements are not fulfilled by these discourses. In that case we have to admit that ordinary language is not the final word, in every possible way it can be replaced and ornamented and therefore ordinary language can be said to be the starting point. "Certainly, then, ordinary language is not the last word: in principle it can everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and superseded. Only remember, it is the first word".

Ordinary language is natural language in the sense that it serves the purpose of communicating ordinary experience. Scientific experience is not ordinary experience, it is obtained from ordinary experience through definitions, classifications and abstractions. In a somewhat similar way the language of science based on the meta-language of ordinary life (i.e., ordinary language) is a well-defined, classified, generalised and abstracted from form (or forms) of ordinary language. This point has been well brought out, among others, by Stephen Toulmin.

Toulmin says that philosophers sometimes speak as if

science could be separate from ordinary experience and as if the scientist had a completely free choice of starting point. Though it is accepted that once his standpoint is established, a scientist will decide what experiments to perform and how to perform them on the basis of scientific considerations alone. From this it does not follow that at the very beginning of a science - the scientist can start anywhere. But the everyday regularities of everyday experience pose to the scientist his first theoretical problems. When we go back to the stage in any science at which the first systematic attempts were made to theorise, it is the ideas of contemporary common sense which provide the background of ideas by reference to which phenomena are chosen for investigation. And as commonsense here means recognising the regularities with which we are acquainted from day-to-day experience, it is only natural that these should play an important part in the early stages of most of the sciences. And when we would like to go beyond the simplest everyday phenomena to a study of more systematic things in laboratory, it is in the form of laws of nature that the scientist generally aims to express the results of his experiments.

To the laws of Nature the words 'true', probable and the like seem to have no application. They are not themselves true or false, though statements about their range of application can be. But this should not cause any misunderstanding. If it is said that laws of nature are not true, false, or probable, and
that these terms are indeed not even applicable to them, and that the scientists are not concerned with the question of 'truth' of laws of Nature, there is nothing wrong about saying all these things. But from this it should not be concluded that the scientists do not seek for the truth. And this fact should be borne in mind that saying a law holds universally is not the same as saying that it is true always and not only on certain conditions. Besides, laws of nature are used to introduce new terms into the language of physics. The laws of nature express only the forms of regularities. If, Toulmin points out, we are asked what the task of Newton's laws is, we may not be able to know at first whether to say that they describe the way things move, define such terms as 'force', 'mass', etc. But actually there are good reasons for this uncertainty. The laws themselves do not do anything. It is really we who do things with them. As a result we need not be puzzled by the question whether Newton's laws, for example, are descriptions, definitions, or assertions about methods of measurement. On the contrary, we are to see how in some applications physicists use them to describe, say, the way a shell moves, in others to devise a method of measurement of a new type of fundamental particle. The laws have no ambiguous status. The fact really is that the physicists are versatile in the applications of these laws.

Locke and Kneale are of the opinion that laws of nature are principles of natural necessitation. The necessity of the
laws of nature is not immediately visible, i.e., obvious, but is rather forced on us as a result of our experiments. Hume and Mach do not appreciate this view. They think that nothing which a scientist can properly be said to discover could be, in the logical sense, necessary. They prefer to say that the laws of nature are statements of constant conjunction, which point out that such and such sets of characteristics have always been noticed to go together. Whitehead maintains that laws of nature are to be considered as conjectures about uniformities. They are not to be confused with universal generalisations for they have spatial and temporal limitations. M. Schlick and F.P. Ramsey maintain that laws of nature are not propositions which are true or false. They are, to put it properly, established instructions for the formation of such propositions. In other words, these are the rules of behaviour which help the observer to get some idea about reality.

Toulmin points out that the conclusions about the world which the scientists deduce from the laws of nature are not derived from these laws, but rather drawn according to them. Schlick speaks of the laws as directions to the observer to his way about in reality. Ryle maintains that law like statements are "inference tickets" which help us to argue from the circumstances of the phenomenon to its characteristics. Professor Toulmin thinks that perhaps both these expressions can be combined. Because there is one sort of railway ticket, he maintains,
called 'runabout ticket' which has some similarity with laws of nature. Tickets of this sort do not have a single starting point and there is no mention of any destination on them. They are valid for an unlimited number of journeys within a given region of country. The boundaries of this region generally are not written on the ticket, that might be written in a different place, on posters, for example, and they can have varied applications, while the ticket is the same. With the help of this sort of ticket one can, by experiments, find out its region of validity by seeing at what stations it was taken by the authorities.

The physicist should not be considered as a person who, in formulating the laws of nature, prints his own runabout tickets and makes it the goal of his experiments to find out where he can reach with their assistance. The formal statement of a law, Prof. Toulmin points out, is like the runabout ticket itself, which displays on it nothing as to its scope. It is only by experiments that the physicist knows within what region it can be definitely applied.

The physicist thus making the inferences so licensed, makes his way around phenomena. But it needs mention that the physicist must possess the ability to identify each system, recognise its place on the map, i.e., recognise where on the map a particular object of study belongs. Physical systems, like railways stations, do not carry identification labels. Again there is no way in which they can tell us themselves where on the
theoretical map they belong.

The philosophy of science of the ordinary language philosopher betrays its instrumentalist bias. The ordinary language analyst thinks that language is an instrument (or served the purpose) of expression. But he is careful enough to point out to give a new analysis of "expression of" without committing himself to a sort of dualism.

And here lies the fundamental distinction between the phenomenologist and the ordinary language philosopher. The former rejects instrumentalism and offers his own analysis of "expression of".

Austin, like Wittgenstein, thinks that the use of language is all the time connected with concrete situations. He is of the opinion that language puts forward traps mainly for philosophers and for this reason ordinary language should be carefully investigated before we can be prepared against these traps. From this observation we can point out wherein the distinction between Austin and Wittgenstein lies. In the first place, it shows that when ordinary expressions are distorted or misplaced, then there arises philosophical problems. This resembles Wittgenstein. In the second place, it points out that ordinary expressions when investigated carefully will give rise to multiplicity of distinctions which in turn answer philosophical problems. This emphasis on minute analysis turns out to be a characteristic of Austin and not of Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein maintains that philosophy is a practical activity, to say precisely, its business is therapeutic. He is more concerned with the key-concepts involved in philosophical puzzles, and likes to dissolve these concepts by pointing out their incompatibility with our common sense beliefs. He tries to show that philosophical confusions are mainly produced by considering words in peculiar combinations in support of which no rules can be cited. This shows the necessity of minute analysis in language. Without this analysis it is not possible to know where language is misinterpreted and then problems enter into it. The need of giving one's attention to multiplicity of distinctions in our everyday speech is felt by Wittgenstein alright, but his interest centres round philosophical puzzles and he attends to ordinary use only in connection with them. And therefore Wittgenstein finds out that analysis of language has only a negative or therapeutic function to solve problems, and so it is only a means to an end. Austin, on the other hand, feels that ordinary language has an intrinsic value of its own. Moreover the function of philosophy, according to him, is the construction of an empirical science of language. What Austin wants to point out is that the hair-splitting analysis of language is an end in itself and once we are able to do so, we will be free from any philosophical puzzles. It is clear that a serious and earnest study of the intricacies of language is what is required for it. If we are able to do so, we will be cautious
and free from the traps that language sets for us. The solution of puzzles which Wittgenstein offers with reference to ordinary language points out that he was conscious of this vital need for finer and minute analysis of language. What is worth remarking here is that Wittgenstein did not pursue this as much seriously as is done by Austin.30

Again, this concern with the finer distinctions displays more justice to philosophy. If we consider Wittgenstein's basic contention which states that philosophy is a therapeutic activity, then it leads to an unhappy state of affair. It amounts to the saying that philosophy is not a normal and natural activity of human mind. Only when we are deviated from the actual functioning of language in the concrete situations of life, that the philosophical problems come into being. But this sort of looking at philosophy is to do away with philosophy, for, when the puzzles will be removed there will be no philosophical speculation left. This will obviously give rise to the interpretation of philosophy as basically and inherently corrupt and distorted.31 But Austin takes a different attitude. He maintains that it is only to solve philosophical puzzles or dissolve philosophy that language is asked for, in fact, analysis of language

is what is philosophically important. It clearly shows that Austin takes a more respectable attitude towards philosophy than Wittgenstein does. At the same time it is to be admitted that only a good amount of words cannot provide a good or profitable place for philosophy.

VII

LIMITS OF ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY AND THE REVIVAL OF METAPHYSICAL INTEREST. The meaning of the expressions change not only at different levels, i.e., depths, but also in different contexts. The meaning of a move in the game cannot be ascertained without being acquainted with the rules of the game.

The rules of an extensional logical language are both few and simple, but those of ordinary language are enormous in number and bewilderingly complex in details.

Natural or ordinary language is more powerful, capable of handling and expressing infinite variety of things, objects, situations etc.

There is one clarity in artificial language, clarity here is due to well-defined character of the concepts and rules governing the operations of the concepts. The clarity of ordi-
nary language is due to its context-bound character. An expression in itself is neither clear nor ambiguous which depends upon its context.

Clarity is conditional, condition is dependent upon contexts and contexts are constituted by things; being, i.e., their minds and tradition. We can find out the particular context concerned and the place of language in the context. But the main point in consideration is that there is language-games which lead to context-bound expressions which in turn point to clarity. Thus we see that the clarity of expressions in ordinary language is context-dependent. The same language might be used differently having different meaning in different language-games which are played according to different rules. But the question arises: why we seek clarity? The answer is to see that there are no philosophical problems. 32

Carnap holds the same view and tries to show it in a different way. 33 Philosophy, Carnap puts it, does not give us information about transcendental entities, since all sentences containing what purports to be a reference to such entities are senseless. Most of its propositions tell us nothing whatsoever about the world. The propositions which tell us something belong to the empirical science of psychology, not to philosophy. Those

propositions which remain philosophical are nothing but descriptions of scientific language. Carnap wants to say that the logic of science replaces the tangle of problems known as philosophy.

The linguistic interpretation of philosophy is a difficult view to maintain. For the propositions of philosophy appear to be about kinds of entity-relations, quality and so on, which are definitely not linguistic forms.

To meet this objection Carnap distinguishes between three classes of statements, syntactical, object-sentences and pseudo-object sentences. A syntactical sentence describes a language. An object sentence depicts a physical object; pseudo-object sentences within which philosophical sentences are included, look like object sentences but are revealed by analysis to be syntactical.

Carnap maintains that all sentences form part of a single language. It shows that a sentence is completely tautologous or non-tautologous; meaningful or meaningless. Later Carnap argues that whether a sentence is tautologous or not depends on the language we are making use of. There are as many languages as we choose to construct and nothing except convenience, to decide what rules shall govern them. A philosophical statement, according to Carnap, is not fully expressed unless it contains reference to the language, or languages, to which it is applicable. When this condition is satisfied philosophical disputes will
disappear. They are to be looked upon as alternative recommendations for language forms, not dispute about the facts.

We can try to make the situation clear illustrating an example. When one mathematical philosopher asserts that numbers are classes of classes, another points out that they are primitive expressions, then according to Carnap, either each is describing his own language, or else each is recommending to mathematicians a particular mode of construction for mathematical systems. They are not, Carnap says, contradicting one another. When coming to philosophical expressions which defy restatement in a syntactical form, Carnap states, these should be rejected as nonsensical.

All said and done it is to be admitted that philosophy has a subject matter of its own. Wittgenstein admits that the propositions are without sense and he himself believes in the existence of the mystical which shows itself.

But this conclusion dissatisfies the scientific minded positivists. Russell tries to suggest one way out. He maintains that although a language cannot describe its own form, its form can be described in another language, the form of that language in yet another language and so on - which actually points to the fact that the form of the language is all the time

34 B. Russell: Introduction to Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus, 1922.
Russell's idea of a hierarchy of language is very important as to the development of logic. Carnap gave importance on the distinction between statements in a given language and statements which depict such statements, these forming the 'meta-language'. At the same time he maintains that propositions depicting a language can form part of the language they depict. He believed this because he had to show that statements which describe the language of science fall within that language. It is true that they are not tautological - we cannot derive from rules that a particular language contains a specific rule and was definitely not ready to regard them as nonsensical. So they must form part of science, otherwise Carnap's threefold distinctions scientific, nonsensical, or tautological break down.

Carnap, unlike Wittgenstein believed, that he could show that the form of a language can be described within that language itself. Wittgenstein maintained that the form of language is that which points out to something beyond language and therefore can never be described within language.

Carnap takes this from a different standpoint. He says that the 'form' of a language consists in the rules it lays down - 'formation' rules which decide whether a sentence is 'well-formed' or 'grammatical', and 'transformation' rules which describe the
way in which one sentence can be deduced from another. According to Carnap, the language of science can contain such rules within itself. Empiricists, Carnap continues, ought not to make such assertions as "all knowledge is empirical" — assertions which profess to tell us something about the world. They must point it out clearly what they are doing is to recommend certain restrictions on the use of language, restrictions which do not exist within a natural language like French. Their aim, then, is to work out, an 'ideal language', which would make them able to assert whatever an empiricist desires to assert — scientific and mathematico-logical propositions, but would rule out all metaphysical statements as meaningless.

The traditional concept of philosophy has been criticised not only by the thinkers like Carnap who are strongly influenced by natural science and mathematical logic but also by those who like Wittgenstein and Ryle are mainly interested in linguistic analysis. While one group wants to "save" philosophy only by reducing it or to the extent it is reducible to well-defined natural sciences, another wants to dissolve the puzzles or pseudo-problems of philosophy through language-analysis. But it is to be stated here that neither all scientific minded philosophers share the reductionistic zeal of the positivist like Carnap nor all language philosophers intend to reject philosophy or even metaphysics lock stock and barrel. Wisdon, for example, thinks that though metaphysics in its face-value cannot be defended but
it contains some insights about the world - but these insights are hidden beneath philosophical jargons and highly coloured by the psychological biography of the concerned philosophers. Wisdom hopes to show that metaphysics can be valuable without reverting to the pre-positivist doctrine that it provides us with a description of supra-empirical entities.

To bring out the special character of metaphysical controversies, Wisdom points out three different kinds of disputes. Empirical disputes are settled by observation and experiment, logical disputes, he says, is settled by reference to a 'strict rule of usage', and finally 'conflict' dispute resolved only by establishing a new convention.

The peculiar thing about philosophers, Wisdom says, is that they hold views which, judged from the point of view of strict logic, are definitely false. They are confident of the fact that the laws of mathematics are really rules of grammar; even after we point out to them that a rule cannot be either true or false. They still insist that material objects do not exist even if we point out a material object which is there. How to account for their refusal to accept the regular methods of settling a dispute? Wisdom suggests that the case is that the philosophers are not satisfied with our ordinary usage, and so will not have any fascination for it. They are in favour of a linguistic innovation; they see a 'conflict', where we see a 'logical' dispute. The philosopher, Wisdom says, is interested with the
realms of being, facts and values. But this will mislead us to believe that there are strange entities - 'sense-data', 'values' which the philosopher is to relate with facts. Wisdom thinks it will be less misleading if it is thought that philosopher is one who 'describes the logic' of different classes of sentences - points out how they are verified with reasons. When, Wisdom points out, the positivist says that 'metaphysical propositions are meaningless', his paradoxes show the differences between the logic of scientific and logic of philosophical assertions. Again, when the positivist tells us that we can in no way really know that other people have minds, he helps us to see that we do not verify statements about other people's minds in the same way as we verify statements about chairs and tables. But it is true, Wisdom says, it is not easy to account in these terms for the peculiar intensity of metaphysical disputes.

The upshot of this discussion shows that Wisdom is not very much definite or explicit in his ideas. At one time he makes an assertion that philosophical paradoxes are verbal recommendations and then asserts its contradictory. This follows as a consequence from his firm belief that philosophical theories are at the same time illuminating and misleading, and that both these points need to be made. It is not possible to transcend this peculiar situation and to arrive at philosophical conclusions which cannot mislead. All that the philosopher can perform is to mislead and
then can point out the situation at which what he has said is misleading - and not misleading.

Wisdom is in favour of analytic method and he distinguishes three sorts of analyses: material, formal and philosophical. Russell's theory of descriptions, he maintains, can be taken as an example of 'formal analysis'. The ordinary definitions of science are examples of material analysis. Both of these analyses are same-level analyses. Philosophical analysis is new-level which advances by superseding the less final by the more final. To explain his position clearly he says 'individuals' are more final than 'nations'. 'Sense-data', 'mental states' are in their turn more final than 'individuals'.

He attempts to show the logical assumptions implicit in 'philosophical analysis'. In what respects, he asks, is an ordinary proposition an unsatisfactory 'picture'? There is a sense, it is clear, in which 'England declared war on France' is already a perfectly satisfactory picture, we have clear idea of this assertion. The analyst has to point out that there is another sense in which such a 'picture' is not satisfactory. This is attempted by Wisdom. The ordinary sentence displays in so far as it tells us something but it does not point out the ultimate logical structure, i.e., what is ultimately the case. He suggests that a similar duplicacy is exhibited by all the other words which we would wish to employ in an account of the functioning of propositions.


Wisdom defends philosophy in a round about way discovering it from the hidden substructure of language and mind of the philosopher in question. Nursed up in the tradition of language philosophy, Strawson, however, has found a more straight-forward defense of metaphysics. He proposes to make out two points: first, underlying diverse expressions of ordinary language there is an unalterable conceptual scheme of things in terms of which and in terms of which alone all our experience is to be meaningfully and coherently ordered; and, secondly, though neat, perhaps too neat, formal logic is slightly deceptive and partly inadequate and, therefore, to be complemented by a logic of informal or ordinary language. Strawson\(^{37}\) points out that he has no objection to the construction of a formal system as such. Formal system, he holds, are useful in evaluating 'context-free' discourse, as is seen in mathematics for example. A formal logic needs to be superseded by a logic of everyday discourse, as it is incapable to assimilate the complexity of ordinary speech. The 'if-then', the 'and', and the 'not' of the logician, he says, are only a selection from 'the ordinary use' of these expressions. There are many kinds of entailment, for example, which the formal logician overlooks; the formal logician cannot deal effectively with arguments which depend on temporal relationships. These drawbacks can be overcome, Strawson believes, in an 'ordinary language' logic which begins by asking such questions as 'what are the condi-

tions under which we use such and such an expression or class
of expressions? This may not be as systematic as formal logic,
but Strawson maintains, that this logic can provide a field of
intellectual activity unsurpassed in richness and complexity.
Strawson's point regarding the inadequacy of formal logic has
been admitted, of course from a different point of view, by the
formal logicians themselves. The Kantian inspiration underlying
Strawson's unalterable scheme of description of the things of
the world is unmistakable but hardly defensible. His view that
the basic concepts operative behind the diverse expressions of
ordinary language are unalterable, i.e., unchangeable is not
supported by the changing career of science and philosophy. The
concepts we use in describing the diverse and changing facts of
the world cannot but be influenced by the latter. Concept-
object relation cannot be unilateral. Concepts interpret objects
(of experience) and are influenced or modified by them. Strawson's
theory that our conceptual scheme of description is unhistorical
betrays his unawareness of the historical legacy and prospect of
his own theory. We will have occasion to spell out this point
later on when we discuss our own concept of critical philosophy.
THE MYTH OF CLARITY. Clarity is not enough - not enough for the purpose of establishing the pseudo-characters of philosophical problems. For although some formulations of philosophical problems are due or have bearing upon language, philosophical problems, contrary to what the ordinary language philosopher alleges, are not essentially linguistic.

To make the point further clear we can once more deal with the relation between ordinary language or natural language on the one hand and constructed or scientific language on the other. We can try to find out to what the clarity of the latter, i.e., scientific language, due?

To make this point clear we can, once more, discuss the view of Austin. He says that we must do away with the old-working-model, the moment we recognise the distinction between syntactics and semantics. But at the same time it is also to be pointed out that the new-working-model, the supposed ideal language, is in varying ways, not suited to be an adequate model for any actual language. Its careful demarcation of syntactics from semantics, its number of explicitly formulated rules and conventions, these are all misleading. An actual language, Austin thinks, has a few, if any, explicit conventions. There is no definite limits to the spheres of operations of rules, no marked separation between syntactic and semantic.
Austin is of the opinion that ordinary language breaks down in extraordinary cases, here the cause of the breakdown is semantical. But the case is different with ideal language. An ideal language would not break down whatever the case might be. In dealing with any scientific enquiry where our language is lightened up in order to describe clearly complicated unusual cases, we prepare linguistically for the worst. But where we deal with ordinary language, words fail us. If we try to maintain that ordinary language stands on the same footing as ideal language is, we shall positively misinterpret facts.

It is not only the difficulty of imagining or experiencing extraordinary cases which is disturbing. There is also another point to consider in this connection. We can only describe what it is we are trying to imagine, by means of words which clearly depict and evoke the ordinary case, which we are trying to think away.

Austin says that we must pay attention to the facts of actual language, what we can and cannot say, and actually why, another and converse point takes shape. It may be that there are innumerable events take place that would require new and better language to describe it in. Very often philosophers are occupied with this task, when they appear to be using words in a way which is meaningless according to 'ordinary usage'.

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may be usual, out of the ordinary facts about our everyday experience which ordinary men and ordinary language do not notice. In other words, that there is a case for ideal or constructional language is outright denied, at least from the philosophical point of view, by Austin. He is for nicely graduated differences of ordinary language and not broadly classified (or types of) ideal or scientific language. Subtle differences of idioms, phrases and expressions find their justification in the economy or simplicity of an ordinary language as a whole. No apriori legislation or logical reform can be philosophical substitute for the purpose of expressing and communicating the widest natural spectrum of human experience with subtle and fine differences in it. By implication this means philosopher has nothing to do with what we call growth or modification of knowledge. Philosopher is not a reformer; his is a naturalistic job.  

Language, no doubt, Waismann says, is made up of separate sentences, but such sentences make cuts through reality; they do not merely picture facts which are already there, waiting to be recognised. The way how we make our cuts will very largely depend on the structure of the language we are using. He is very strict in maintaining that facts do not "speak for themselves".

though it is equally true that we do not invent them. He thinks that there is a sort of uncertainty involved in language. But what is important here is that, he believes, this uncertainty is not a sign of imperfection, it is the great virtue of language as it leaves room for us to say something unexpected, unconventional. The philosopher, he thinks, moves within the limited set of categories implicit in the forms of his own language, he thus cannot perform the philosophic task. Philosophy begins with disbelieving language. It is desirable, he says, that the philosopher should pay some attention to the 'stock use' of expressions; but if he has anything to contribute, then he must make himself free from the stock use.

Philosophy is said to have no language of itself. Ordinary language is the mother of our all systematic languages, of physics, mathematics.

It is said in ordinary language there is no philosophy. The presupposition underlying propositions and arguments that ordinary language and language of science is discontinuous, and therefore while in one, i.e., in science, problems do exist, in another problems cannot exist. Our view is what makes existence of problem in one possible also makes the same in another.

Benson Mates criticises the linguistic conception of philosophy which gives rise to the idea of ordinary language as

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a philosophical touch-stone. He asks: How one comes to know what language is ordinary, or when a use of an expression is an ordinary use? Again, how to settle disputes between those who hold different standpoints about a point of language? Mates is confident of the fact that these questions are not properly treated in ordinary language philosophy.  

He tries to show the difficulties which are concerned with the interpretation of factual statements which are formulated by ordinary language philosophers about language. The question is: how these statements are to be verified? Because it is maintained that meaning is associated with verification. It can be said that the senses of the assertions are clearly understandable, but in that case also the difficulty arises regarding the exact sense. Again, the question of terminology occupies an important place, because the right type of vocabulary is useful for their purpose.

Ryle attempts with the help of a distinction between use and usage to show the irrelevance of empirical studies to the truth of statements about the ordinary use of language. Such studies are important as they determine the usage of a word, but not the use of it. Uses are ways or techniques of doing the thing. Usages are more or less accepted practice of doing. Further, Ryle says that 'ordinary use' is to be distinguished

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from 'non-stock use' and, that commonly 'use' is differentiated in these situations, from 'misuse'. Mr. Mates points out that Prof. Ryle is not right as he cannot show properly the distinction between use and usage. Further, because of some confusion in this case philosophers have misunderstood ordinary use of a word. But it is to be admitted that his discussion is meaningful, it seems to point out that according to him ordinary use is a normative term because he believes that there is a normative element in expressions about ordinary use.

Mr. Mates does not hold the same opinion. He maintains that it is a descriptive term and moreover there is a belief which is not included within the meaning of 'ordinary use'. This belief points out that it is wrong to use ordinary words in ways otherwise from those in which the ordinary people use them.

It is also assumed and sometimes asserted that in day-to-day life words function quite satisfactorily and lead to no genuine difficulties. It often happens that when it is asserted that the ordinary use of a given word is thus and so, then the use in question is really said to be frequent among ordinary people.

Mr. Mates questions what is the possible way to verify an assertion that a person in particular uses a word in a specific way or with a specific sense? The answer can be formulated extensionally and intensionally, but in order to treat it in the right way these approaches are to be combined. When the approach is extensional one notices a somewhat large class of cases in
which the subject applies the word, and then one observes a meaning by looking into what is common to them all. Alternatively, when the approach is intensional, one asks the person concerned what he intends to mean by the given word or what is the process of using it. Things become confusing when, the two approaches are succeeded with different results. Both of them may be equally interesting, having no scope for one to be more scientific than the other. Again, it is clear that when the meaning of any word is determined as something for example, solid, there may be various senses in which it is used ordinarily. So the clash is within ordinary usage, and not between it and scientific theory. Another difficulty is that the meaning of a word cannot be abstracted from the entire context of its occurrence. It takes into account not only the actual linguistic context but also the aims, feelings, beliefs, and hopes of the speaker, the social situation and so on ad infinitum. There is, it is true, some truth in this, but it is difficult to find out how it helps one to start an empirical investigation of language. It appears that emphasis is to be given on syntax-semantic-pragmatic division. The ordinary language philosophers, Mr. Mates believes, have a tendency to overlook the semantic-pragmatic distinction if they come across the common in the places where a particular word is used.

It is true that it could easily be the case that from experience we could learn to change our conceptual framework or
we can somehow modify or revise our idea or notion of importance and value. It may be thought to be necessary to point out different senses of the expression 'ordinary use' in accordance with various methods of verifying statements where this expression takes place. The case being such it is important to show whether in any of these senses it would be true, and this leads us to conclude that in philosophical problems words cannot be said to be used ordinarily.

It must be said here that there are different ways of studying language - physical, sociological, logical or mathematical, and philosophical. From their views it is clear that language analysts were overimpressed by the empirical traits of language (as used) and almost uniformly ignored the philosophical implications of the actual uses of language and their changing fortune over time. In fact, language analyst's analysis of language lamentably lacks in philosophical explications of language in its entirety and complexity. When one studies Husserl's philosophy of language one finds to one's delight that one's philosophical foundation of language is clarified the empirical traits of actual uses and logical issues of language assume added significance. Husserl treats language as an institution and gradually explores its (ontological) semantic structure layer by layer.
ONTOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF LANGUAGE. Husserl thinks that language can be treated as an institution, i.e., permanent expression of the experience of a community, experience of all sorts, emotive, cognitive etc. Language is indeed a form of life. There are levels of inter-personal communication:

First level can be pictured as original body and other body which can be defined as pairing community or bi-lateral community.

It is essential to make clear the notion of community as it develops at different levels, which is manifested at once by virtue of experiencing someone else. Husserl writes, "The first thing constituted in the form of community, and the foundation for all other inter-subjectively common things, is the commonness of Nature, along with that of the Other's organism and his psychophysical Ego, as paired with my own psychophysical Ego." 43

It is true that the body belonging to myself and the body made up distinctly in the otherself are identified and is known as the identified body of somebody else. How is this identification possible? But the puzzle appears only if the two original spheres have already been demarcated which shows that experience of some one else has performed its function. But we, Husserl says, are not considering the temporal origin of such experience which has its basis on the same type of previous self-

experience. There will be no longer any puzzle if we can
know the motivations underlying the intentionality which we
observe in our experience of someone else.

If we apply the general cognition, Husserl maintains,
to the case of experiencing someone else we see that experience
of someone else with its intricacies establishes a connection
mediated by presentation. That connection is established
between the undisturbed living self-experience and, the outside
element presented therein. The only possible way in which others
can have for me the sense and position of existent others by
being present in me as others. They exist for themselves as
monads as I exist for myself. At the same time they exist also
in communion which implies their connection with me through
concrete ego, i.e., qua monad. "Something that exists is in
intentional communion with something else that exists. It is
an essentially unique connectedness, an actual community and
precisely the one that makes transcendentally possible the being
of a world, a world of men and things." 44

Now Husserl concentrates on the second level, i.e., the
multilateral community. I know myself as a member of commu-
nity, the open community of monads. Having started from me,
from the one who is the primal monad, I find out what are for me
other monads. But when there is a community of men, there is

44 Ibid., p. 129.
hidden a mutual being for one another, which points out to an "objectivating equalization" of my existence with that of all others. It shows anyone as a human being among other human beings. It follows that as a matter of fact, other experiences me at once as an other for him in the same way as I experience him as my other. It can also be shown that men are apperceivable when they are able to find others and still more others, not only in the field of actuality but also in the field of possibility. It is clear that endless Nature itself then includes an open plurality of men scattered in infinite space.

"To this community there naturally corresponds, in transcendental concreteness, a similarly open community of monads, which we designate as transcendental intersubjectivity."45

The constitution of humanity, i.e., I-belonging-to-community-belonging-to-humanity, - that community which belongs to the full essence of humanity, does not end with what has been considered up to now. But after the discussion which we have made it is easy to understand the possibility of acts of the Ego that reach into the other Ego through the medium of representative experience of someone else. And it points out also the possibility of specifically personal acts of the Ego that possesses the character of social acts, by means of which all the human personal communication is established. With communalization proper, i.e., social communalization, there is the consti-

45 Ibid., p. 130.
tution within the objective world of the various types of social communities with their possible hierarchical order.

Naturally, now, arises the problem of constitution of the specifically human surrounding world, a surrounding world of culture for each man and each human community. Similarly, there arises the problem of the genuine kind of objectivity belonging to such a world. Everyone, it is clear, lives in the same Nature. With the necessary communalization of his life and the lives of others, he is in a cultural world—a human world. Each man understands his concrete surrounding world or his culture as a man who belongs to the community historically oriented. A clear understanding with certain originality is essentially possible to all members only of that community. This is not allowed to anyone from another community who comes in contact with them. There is no difficulty for such an individual to understand men of the different world as men of a different cultural world. Having got hold of this position he must make attempt to show for himself the possibilities of deeper understanding. He must proceed with what is most generally understandable in order to understand the present. After this he will concentrate his attention on the historical past, for this will help him to have wider acquaintance with the present. The multiplicity of the Other's world is given as oriented peripherally to mine, and is thus a world, because it becomes constituted with a common Objective world immanent in it, and the
Spatiotemporal form of this objective world functions at the same time as a form that gives access to it. 46

The phenomenological approach which Husserl made towards language shows that it is not apriori construction of grammar, but it is a gradual discovery of higher-order signs and symbols underlying lower-order ones.

A developed phenomenology constructs apriori the forms of conceivable worlds and also the worlds within the limits set by all conceivable forms of being and by their system of levels. But it constructs them in correlation with the constitutinal apriori, the apriori of the intentional performances that constitute them.

Man is essentially a dealer in signs. Man is a sign using animal—whether the language in question is suggested, delivered or written and anything of this sort.

Cassirer also supports this view. 47 It is true, he says, that ordinary language is the mother of scientific language. There are ordinary conceptions in ordinary language. These conceptions of ordinary language are imprecise but precisifiable, precisifiability connects conception of ordinary language to those of scientific language. In this connection the critic might say that the concepts which are not operationally definable

46 Ibid., p. 134.
are devoid of any scientific value. It can be pointed out that the parasytical character of scientific language and its justifiability by parent language shows that scientific language cannot be said to be too artificial and too sharp a distinction cannot be drawn between these two types of language.

Cassirer's philosophy of language indicates the theory linking science with metaphysics and myth.

He was primarily interested by the fact that the 'theory of knowledge' as thinkers formulated it, concerned itself mainly with the recognition of 'facts' and the development of systematized thought about facts. The deep-rooted belief of all human beings in myth, sometimes regarded as dogmas, sometimes as superstition, was never given importance from philosophical standpoint. It is regarded either as divine revelation, or wrong interpretation of logical explanation, a result of ignorance. But, Cassirer points out, that the field of mythical conceptions cannot be discarded as a 'mistake' because there is the absence of logically connected facts. He is confident of the fact that language is man's main instrument of reason, displays his myth-making tendency more than his rational tendency.

Myths, Cassirer maintains, are inherent in language, they are the capacities exercised by language on thought in every possible place of mental activity. Again, the mythical formulations as they are cannot be realized and appreciated simply by determining the object on which it is directly and originally centered. It requires the help of the spirit.
He thinks that mythical and verbal thought are inter-related in every possible way. And there is the same spiritual motives which determine and guide the great structures of the mythic and the linguistic realms. What is more is that both myth and language are subject to the same laws of evolution. The similarity in their results, in the forms which they produce, point to a final community of function, of the principles by the help of which they are operative. If we are interested to represent this function clearly we have to follow up the ways of myth and language not in their development, but in regress, back to the point from which those two opposed standpoints originate. And this common point can be demonstrated, for, no matter how widely the contents of myth and language vary, yet the same form of mental conception is operative in both the cases. It is the form which can be termed as metaphorical thinking.

The real source of metaphor, Cassirer says, is sought sometimes in the construction of language, sometimes in mythical imagination. The 'basic metaphor' at the basis of all mystical formulations was regarded as an essentially verbal phenomenon, the root character of which was to be investigated and understood. Language and myth stand in an original and indissoluble connection with one another, from which they both emanate but gradually as independent elements. They are two divergent lines of thinking, spring from the same basic mental activity, a concentration and regulation of simple sensory experience.
Myth, as Cassirer points out, never frees itself from its magic circle and its figurative ideas. But language, though emerges in that same magic circle, has the capacity to break its bounds. Language takes us from the myth making stage of human mentality to the stage of logical thought and the conception of facts. Cassirer's ideas which are founded on the evidence of language and verified in proper ways point out that philosophy of mind is more than the theory of knowledge. It is actually a theory of prelogical conception and expression which finds its highest point of development in reason and factual knowledge.

Philosophy, according to Cassirer, is 'self-knowledge' and self-knowledge is the knowledge of the human spirit at work in culture. He says that none of the great areas of human culture—science, religion, art, myth, language—can ever be able to offer us a picture of 'reality' regarded as an 'external world' which the human being is simply to apprehend. Each of them, he points out, is 'a form of apprehension', not a bare perception of a given world, but rather the construction of a way of dealing systematically with our experience. It is a mode of apprehension which is communicable and intelligible in symbolic structure and saved from arbitrary subjectivity by its rationality and systematization.

The point central to the understanding of man, Cassirer concludes, is not his science but his language. Man is the symbolizing animal. And human language also develops from the sensuous and the immediate towards the abstract and the universal.
Human experience is necessarily significant, i.e., conceptually interpreted and identifiable in terms of concepts. It must not be understood that language makes experience significant from without. One might say that in human experience there is always an endlessly rich and a hidden language. And it is to this language the essential human character of human experience lies. It is by reflecting on this hidden language or infra-structure of signs that we understand more and more clearly what the units of experience mean or stand for.

Husserl takes up sign as a phenomenon, it is a combination of endless experiences in a combined unity. By endless is meant the sign as an intentional object, having directedness and objectivity. The common characteristics of phenomena are present both in "natural" and "artificial" signs. In a sense all signs are natural - natural because they have their own essential (ego-independent) properties.

It seems that the philosophers of language tend to gather together around two extreme views - Transcendental Platonism and radical nominalism. While one tries to uphold the view that there is no part of speech or element of language which could strictly be regarded as meaningless, the other asserts that every bit of human expression owes its meaning to human convention or tradition and has nothing to do with "the real and independent world of reference". The nominalist also denies the intentional relation between sign and significatum; the only relation he
speaks of is *associational* (and not intentional). In other words, while the pro-Platonist thinks that all meaning is "natural", the pro-nominalist regards all meaning "artificial".

True that all linguistic signs are not purely nominal (provided one does not evoke the doctrine of nominal essence), but the opposite idea, namely, all signs are ontologically committed, seems equally impossible. For, if all signs are said to have irretrievable ontological commitment then the changing career of almost all meanings over time raises another difficult problem. Even then the pro-Platonists might say that historical changes of meaning are only gradual (but connectable in terms of type or pattern) approximation to the identical meaning. But, the empiricists reply that to say this is not to prove but merely to postulate that there is a transcendental Platonic world of *fixed* meanings.

**PHILOSOPHY FROM PHILOSOPHER'S PSYCHOLOGY.** In point of meaningfulness natural language is more meaningful than artificial language. On this point, from different points of view, Husserl and Later Wittgenstein agree.

For clarity of language or expression Wittgenstein insisted on taking the complexity of the context (game) into account, while Husserl insists on going into the depth of language.
Husserl seeks eideatic, i.e., structural depth, Wittgenstein seeks complexity of the context. Differing from the both Carnap and other artificial language philosophers insist on precision and definiteness and exactness (but not depth) of language. According to the latter, seeking depth is to run after the metaphysical which is not there.

There are two approaches towards language, phenomenalistic, i.e., surface; phenomenological, i.e., depth. Wittgenstein tries to compensate the lack of depth by taking into account the complexities of the surface.

Heidegger develops Husserl's theory of language. According to Heidegger philosophical concepts are to be properly understood in their original linguistic setting. That is why he emphasises the necessity for philosopher of going into classical languages. Language in its historical perspective (as contrasted with contemporary Wittgensteinian approach) has profound relevance to philosophical concepts. There is continuity between pre-philosophical and philosophical levels of thinking. If the question is asked: why Husserl-Heidegger approach is irrelevant to artificial (scientific) language philosophers? The answer is for the latter's occupation is only with the language of signs, and to them science is the paradigm of knowledge.

Language, as is supposed by Husserl, not so permanent, but at the same time it is to be admitted that it is not only an
instrument. We can show two points where language has definitely a better position than a mere instrument. In the first place, language is more or less permanent institution which an instrument is not. Secondly, language cannot be considered merely as an instrument among others. The relation between man and language is very intimate, one might even say essential. The instrumentalist thinks that man may or may not use language and that has nothing to do with the very being of man. But the critic says man by his very nature is linguistic or, in other words, the true definition of man is 'sign using animal'. Use of signs or language is in the very constitution of man.

This point may be formulated in another way. Instead of saying language is in the very essence of man, one might say man by his very nature, belongs to the institution of language. Language is perhaps literally a form of human life.

Man-language relation may be studied both statically or structurally and dynamically or historically. Perhaps the latter approach is more instructive, for it is more comprehensive. Together with other institution language changes through time and human "Use". Since language is in man in a sense man is not free not to make use of language. This is another way of saying that man is essentially a linguistic creature or, sign-using animal, as Gassirer puts it. The historicity as distinguished from temporality of language means that without man or without human use language is not what it is meant to be. Language not under-
stood, meant and used by man, may have a physical or natural existence as a body of (uttered) sounds as of scratches and scribbles, but is hardly historical. Living in language but partly enjoying a sort of autonomy, man "uses" a language, changes it and in the course of doing so, is himself changed by it. Individual man, however gifted he might be in the use of language, is more influenced by "his" language than he can himself influence it.

True that man is "producer" of language, but it is perhaps even more true that he is "consumer" of it as well. Man stands in a dialectical relation (giver-and-taker or producer-and-consumer) to the process and product of all cultural phenomena like language and philosophy. In philosophical activity, as in linguistic activity, man has to act as a part of social or cultural milieu (linguistic or philosophical) and both as a producer and a consumer. In other words, even when he is a creator or author of an idea or expression he is always influenced by his background knowledge of the relevant field. In the cultural field there is no absolutely free creator - cultural influence is always there.

Some philosophers think that philosophy can be completely explained in terms of its author - rather the psychological biography of the author.

Lazerowitz, for example, is of the opinion that philosophy reflects the philosopher. To understand a philosophy the philosopher concerned must be understood. He says that if we refer to
the philosophy of permanence as depicted by Permenides, Samkara and Spinoza or to that of the philosophy of flux, as propounded by Heractitus and Bergson, then the point will be clear. He maintains that there is evidence for assuming that the philosopher, in spite of all appearances, does not use language to express scientific propositions. His medium of expression is language, and he has the outstanding ability to mould language until it expresses his hidden ideas in a way which can be shared by others capable of abstract reasoning.

He thinks that the philosopher plays a deceptive game with language and that his theories are theories only in appearance. In other words, with his utterances he produces the false notion that he is formulating theories. The philosopher, he maintains, is able to perceive the inherent workings of language and with the help of this he performs magical things with terminology. He produces with it at one level the intellectual illusion of formulating a theory about the nature of the world, time, space etc. At the same time, at another subconscious level of his mind, he uses it to express thoughts which cannot be clearly stated but possesses great psychological value. He makes use of language to produce a double effect, the convincing similarity of science and the manifestation of a cluster of inner fantasies. Lazerowitz wants to show that the philosopher does not use language to make factual declaration about the world, but uses it to bring about the false impression of stating such claims. He is sure

that the unconscious is present in our thinking and behaviour. This unconscious, he thinks acts as a barrier and prevents us from getting close enough to the philosopher's theories to see them as illusions which actually they are.\textsuperscript{49} He says that a philosophical 'theory' is not a theory and a philosophical argument is neither a demonstration nor a refutation. A philosophical theory can be said to be a statement of a concealed alteration of terminology, i.e., the sentence we generally think to be the expression of the theory. Again, a philosophical theory can be interpreted as the delusive appearance presented to our conscious awareness that the sentences state a theory about the existence or nature of ultimate reality. Lastly, a philosophical theory can be explained as an unconscious fantasy which is important to our emotional nature. Men are both blind and with powerful intellect in time of doing philosophy. Men are not able to penetrate an illusion and at the same time they are clever enough to find out reasons for accepting or rejecting philosophical theories. The reasons increase the illusion that philosophy is a kind of science, actually, the a priori science of the ultimate aspects of reality. But underneath the form in which a philosophical argument is put forward, the form of an apriori demonstration or rejection, the argument itself does nothing more than point to similarity or otherwise in the functioning of expressions. The philosopher uses the facts about expressions

with the help of his argument to give justification or proof for the linguistic decision embodied in his theory.

To make out his point clearly Larerowitz refers to Bradley's theory. Larerowitz points out Bradley's view that "there is nothing which to speak properly, is individual or perfect except only the Absolute". And again he says, "Anything less than the whole has turned out to be not self-contained". Everywhere the finite is self-transcendent, alienated from itself, and passing away from itself towards another existence. Hence the finite is appearance because, on the one side, it is an adjective of reality and because, on the other side, it is an adjective which itself is not real.

What he wants to say is that contradictions are, somehow or other, generated in phenomena. These contradictions show them to be mere appearances as dependent on something other than themselves, i.e., they belong to something and can be regarded as attributes of it. Reformulated in terms of language, contradictions are introduced into everyday nouns and noun phrases which describe spatial phenomena, temporal phenomena, physical things and so on. Contradictions "show that these terms have a use only as the descriptive parts of appearance expressions of the form '. . . appearance of X' or of the form 'X looks . . .'. This ostensively brings out their linguistically dependent cha-

51 Ibid., p. 486.
character and reveals their status to be that of adjectives. But we know, Lazerowitz maintains, that the nouns and noun phrases descriptive of various phenomena in ordinary language are not contradictory. They have a use other than in the context of appearance expressions, and they are not adjectives. What is stated here cannot be denied by one who knows and makes use of ordinary language. What actually the case is that the nouns of ordinary language have, somehow, been reclassified with adjectives. This view can be said to be a reconstituted subject-predicate language in which only term plays the role of noun. Ordinary subject-predicate discourse is pluralistic. It has a plurality of subject terms, "a plurality of independent reals".

But behind it, what the metaphysician wishes to make it appear, is a monistic language, which has only one subject term and this is the language of reality. This is clear if one knows his view which runs thus: "Reality is one. It must be single, because plurality, taken as real, contradicts itself. Plurality implies relations, and through its relations, it unwillingly asserts always a superior unity."

By pointing out the limited subjects of ordinary speech, he increases the illusion that he has found out the true nature

of things and the form of language adequate to its expression. It can be said that he has made up a language, not, definitely, for practical utility, but for the atmosphere it creates by expressing a super-scientific theory about the structure of the world. The expression of this is made possible by an artificial language in which all ordinary nouns are transformed into adjectives which are dependent and incomplete. But everything gets completion in the Absolute, the ultimate reality in which harmony is achieved. "The Absolute has no seasons, but at all once bears its leaves, fruit, and blossoms. Like our globe it always, and it never, has summer and winter." 55

When Bradley says that the finite is an adjective of the Absolute, he creates the illusion that he discovers a language more basic than ordinary. Further, he maintains that he makes us acquainted with the mysteries of the universe with the help of that language. The metaphysician's theory, Lassereowitz thinks, is a subtle and good piece of verbal art. Its language is not for practical discourse, but, just like a piece of art, is for contemplation. It creates the appearance of a valuable theory about the universe, while it really shows the dramas of internal psychic life. There is dynamic relation between the appearance and dramas. The appearance acts as a screen for the inner dramas and the dramas in turn help the appearance from being identified.

55 Ibid., p. 500.
We will have the same consequence if we consider, Lazerwitz says, the metaphysical view propounded by Spinoza and others that every event has a cause. If we consider two sentences "Every effect is a caused event" and "every event has a cause", here, the first one is an analytic proposition and the second, according to Kant, is a synthetic apriori proposition. The first one gives no more than an impression of expressing a theory about the nature of effects. It is clear that the term 'effect' means precisely the same as 'caused event'. To understand the sentence is to know nothing but this linguistic fact. And no one will think that this sentence propounds a theory or hypothesis, subject to confirmation or rejection.

But the second philosophical utterance, i.e., 'Every event has a cause', does appear to state a theory about the nature of happenings, pointing out that all events have causes. It is true that the words 'event' and 'cause' are ordinarily used, the meaning of "has a cause" is not part of the meaning of "is an event". If it is to be accepted that the utterance is apriori, then it would express a logically founded generalisation. It appears to state a theory which is both about reality and certifiable apriori. But this is a deception. If philosophical utterance were apriori its purport could be a verbal consideration regarding actual usage; it would not express a theory about the nature of events. But the terms 'event' and 'has a cause' are
so used in day to day speech that 'is an event but has no cause' is a descriptive phrase. This is the case, how then are we to explain, for one thing, the claim which is made by many people over many years that the utterance is apriori? Again, how are we to account for anyone's idea that a proposition could be both empirical and have a truth-value possessing logical necessity?

Lazerowitz points out that what we actually get here is a conversion analysis to justify a linguistic alteration. The words, 'Every event has a cause', do not originate from a mistaken analysis of the actual use of 'event' and 'cause', but embody a linguistic conversion. The philosopher like Spinoza will not say that the term 'uncaused thing' has no descriptive use in his special language. He will rather say that it is impossible for there to be an uncaused thing, as if it were fact that 'uncaused thing' has no use in ordinary language. The philosopher accomplishes unusual things with ordinary terminology. He performs this in such a manner as to make it appear that he is using ordinary language in the usual way to express an important theory about the universe. Thus, with the help of a hidden linguistic alteration, the structure of which he himself is not consciously aware of, he produces at the conscious level the false notion that a theory is being expressed. Lazerowitz maintains that what follows from this discussion is that psychoanalysis is important concerning philosophical utterances. It alone can find out for
us what they actually say, as against what they seem to say.

Semantic exposition shows the linguistic import of these statements and helps to point out how they produce their interesting intellectual illusions. Psychoanalysis brings to our conscious level the non-verbal things they are unconsciously made to state, and it also interprets the durability of the illusions.

But we can ask the question: Is not the thesis of Lazerowitz vitiated by psychologism? Is it not possible for a philosopher to exceed or transcend his personal life by reason or thought? Can't a subject achieve objectivity in thought, (philosophical or scientific)?

Lazerowitz seems to have taken philosophy as a part of what happens in the psychological field and stream of this or that individual philosopher. According to his personal motivation the philosopher is fascinated by this or that sort of phenomena or idea. While some philosophers are fascinated by change for example, others are drawn by the idea of permanence or changelessness. One and the same idea may be expressed in different sorts of linguistic terms. To defend the idea of permanence one may like to argue that change is unreal or the idea of change is incoherent, another may state more positively that absolute reality is absolutely permanent, or that it cannot be spatio-temporally identified. This view of philosophy or rather of the philosopher ignores the basic facts (a) that a philosophical view or theory is to be understood in terms of and with reference to a
definite problem-situation and (b) that its tenability or otherwise depends on certain considerations and arguments which are objective and impersonal.

It is clear, Hall says, that Lazerowitz is deeply concerned with the lack of positive results in philosophy. He thinks that his own account explains this peculiar phenomenon of metaphysical controversy left unexplained by opposing hypotheses. For him, the exponents are presenting rival proposals of linguistic innovations. When Permenides says that nothing changes, he is saying neither about things nor about words, he is asking for a change in our use of words about things.

But the point which is ignored by Lazerowitz is that philosophers in their controversies are not definitely just competing with one another in formulating linguistic innovations of different sorts. Actually if they were, their differences would long since have been obliterated. Now the question is, is there any very good reason for accepting the theory maintained by Lazerowitz rather than some one of his rival's theories? We know by this time that his view that philosophical systems are proposals to linguistic innovations is not able to stop the metaphysical conflicts. Can it explain the interminable nature of this conflicts?

It may seem all right at first if we consider the linguistic innovation theory along with its rival metaphysical theories,

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as empirical hypotheses concerning the psychology of metaphysicians. But it is to be pointed out that psycho-analysis is the subject of much disagreement even when dealing with rather ordinary irrationalities of ordinary men. But Lazerowitz, without giving it serious consideration, has jumped quite directly into the deep end of speculation. Consequently, his hypothesis is a subject matter of psychological analysis because it concerns the philosophers and not philosophical systems.

We can ask: How much a person is free in his choice of a philosophy? In answering this, we are to clarify the meaning of the term 'free'. We cannot conceive the possibility of any disengaged spirit. Causal conditions are always present—physical, chemical, biological, cultural, ethical, sociological. No one is free from such conditions.

We can reformulate the question: Is the choice of a philosophy determined in any way by the nature of the person? The conception that the character of a person determines his choice of a philosophy is partly correct but at the same time leads to wrong direction. It is suitable and is obviously often correct to think individual's perversities are responsible for his absurd and unreasonable thoughts. But it would be totally unjustified if we commit us to a general psychological interpretation of philosophy. This does not mean that psychological interpretation has never got any value. Sometimes it is
relevant and useful to study personal facts about philosophers more intimately. To state it clearly the psychological approach even rightly employed cannot be a self-sufficient method in the historical interpretation of philosophy.

It is true that there is influence of temperament in the choice of a philosophy. Some persons speak in favour of an absolutist philosophy because all things are strongly established. There are others who are against the rigidity of absolutism and in favour of a view which has scope for openness and is tinged with a adventurous spirit. But the social-historical perspective cannot be set aside which points out the interests appreciated by a philosophy of change, for instance, or by a philosophy intended to study the prevailing order of society.

One cannot speak of a determined ontology of man. What a man is can only be decided by his actions. "One is nothing in himself, except an organic being, or a complex psycho-chemical structure, which is dynamic in character. The patterns of behaviour which a person may exhibit, whether more or less regular, are culturally conditioned. Conscience and self are variables. The occurrence of types of men, and their individual differences, can be accounted for causality." 57

Individual peculiarities sometimes determine one's point of view. Temperament may be a contributing factor in a particular case; psychological traits may be important or simply

accidental. It is convenient to say that they are not totally absent, even where purely theoretical issues are at a crucial point. It is also to be admitted that the social-historical intentions and influences are never wholly absent even in the case of philosophers who are against scientific advancement because they think that they belong to an authoritarian tradition.

We can say that there are definite causes of psychical differences, physical, organic and to some extent cultural. It cannot be maintained that every great philosophy is an autobiography when it is so clear that a great philosophy exhibits interests and scientific accomplishments of a cultural heritage. Ethical considerations can be accepted as basic in the description of a general philosophy. They should not be deduced uncritically. The deduction must be logical and must be based upon the objective facts about man who is treated as an individual and as a social being. Such factual considerations direct and justify the theoretical enquiry of the special sciences and philosophy. This, on the whole, gives factual basis to ethical and philosophical enquiry.

XI

WORLD AND LANGUAGE. The question might arise in the connection of this discussion: why ordinary language philosophers attached so much importance to ordinary language; and again why they thought all problems of philosophy are essentially problems
of language? - why of ordinary language (and not why of e.g., scientific language)?

Language is very important in the life of men. The principal form of human activity is sign-using activity. Man is social with the help of his sign using ability. Whatever man performs for meaningful interpersonal as well as intrapersonal communication he performs it socially. Man's capacity to know depends upon what actually he is. Man can go beyond his own existence and understand the ever-changing nature of his self-identity in language. Man alters himself and everything around him by the available form of his life, i.e., language. Language is a social institution, and there is nothing private in it. Human life is surrounded by and in language. It is in language that man moves and has his being. Language is a social form of life through which human beings get associated with thought and action.58

The problem which man has to face are actually the problems of ordinary language, which is the mother language. The language which is abstracted from ordinary language and is precisified and make accurate for scientific reason is known as scientific language.

Ordinary language is recognised to have basic importance because whenever men express and exchange their experience and ideas they do so in and through ordinary language. Language is

a changing set of signs related by some changing rules of connection. It may be stated as an ill-defined system of meaningful activities. It is said to be improperly defined because human participation in language always changes its boundaries. Rigid and strict definitions are the result of human decision. The need for definition may be due to a disbelief towards human experience and an inclination to go beyond experience on the basis of experience.  

It is believed that the rules of the different language games are ascertainably independent from one another. But the questions are: how to determine the definite area, if any, of application of a set of rules of ordinary language? Can the rules of ordinary language overrule or govern the sets of the rules of all ordinary languages (language-games)? Can there be a universal ordinary language?

Ordinary language as is well known restricted to a particular time and society. If it is universalised, then ordinary language will be artificially constructed and cease to be universal.

How to explain and understand the relations (of translatability, e.g.) between different ordinary languages and their rules?

There are some structures more or less common in all languages - parts of speech, noun, verb, interjection etc.

There are points of community between language structure and structure of reality. We cannot deny the word-object relation or the sign-signified relation. The shortcomings of pro-empiricist and anti-realist dicta like esse est percepit, Nominalism are quite evident.

Human experience is significant; to signify is its very nature. An act of experience does not mean the act signalling, but it is an act of signifying which implies an act of perception as well as an attempt of disclosing the relation between two things. To be conscious of the gap between perceiving and disclosing is not to bridge it over. The relation between signal and signalled is conventional and that between sign and designatum is intentional and at the same time experiential. As a result the former is more or less stable, while the latter is not so. To signify mind requires signs by which it projects and intends. In a world where there are no signs, there cannot be any mind also. To say this is to offer, probably, the most basic description of the most basic human activities. Mental beings are recognised as sign-using animals in the natural history. It is in language they live and move socially and do philosophy among other things. Language is a form of life, it is the essence, and not instrument, of living. The instrumentalist theory is mistaken when it states that we can experience without language and that it is only to communicate experience that we require and

make use of language. By implication it is suggested that there may be a sort of significant intra-personal communication without language. But this is patently false. For man being what he is - essentially a sign-using animal - cannot have or own any experience which is languageless. As the patterns of our life change, the language which is in use at a given period cannot set limit to our world. The world definitely has existence outside language.

Ordinary language philosophers' presumption that world(s) (common sense, historical, mythological, scientific mathematical) are not only to be understood and explained through and by ordinary language but also to be found in it to be defined by it shows uncritical trend towards a sort of linguistic solipsism.

It is in language that the individual identifies the world and the objects because he is not the world, i.e., he is different from it. It is possible for him to identify the objects of the world because he is in the world. Though the individual belongs to the world, yet unless he dies, he cannot be completely identified with the world. His demarcation from the world makes him able to encounter it meaningfully. He can reformulate the patterns of the world fresh for himself and others. Our knowledge of the world or any object thereof is embedded in language. The same form of life may be lived in different ways. We are bound to live in changing worlds. There cannot be one world,
even our imaginations and dreams of one world are not same.

Human experience is indissolubly related with language. Language presupposes a society and society in turn presupposes a world. The conditions of our knowledge are in language. There is nothing as universal language but there are different languages which are structurally (but not in respect of every detail) inter-translatable.

The world is not in language, rather language(s) are in the world as cultural or human phenomena. Before the appearance of man in and after the disappearance of man from the world there will be no language worth the name. This implies the world has an identity (natural identity) of its own which is independent of and has nothing to do with any (human) language whatsoever. True that we cannot encounter the world going out of our language, but that does not mean world is in language. World is in language for man. Our anthropocentrism must not be confused with solipsism and it is quite consistent with realism. Without language we do not know the world, but from that it will be rash to conclude that the complete identity of the world is in a language.