CHAPTER- III

CONCEPTS

1. Anumāna
2. Apabhramśa
3. Apoddhārapadārtha
4. Itikartavyatā and Śabdabhāvanā
5. Kālaśakti
6. Dhvani
7. Śabda
8. Sphoṭa
9. Vāk
Anumāna and Šabdapramāṇa

1.1 Pramāṇa: A historical overview

Most of the philosophical systems consider the problem of language as the parts of their epistemological concern, otherwise known as pramāṇa śāstra. While analyzing the concept of pramāṇa, they categorized different methods or means of knowledge called pramāṇa. Thus, pramāṇa is that, by which something is measured i.e. known: (pramīyate jñāyate anena iti pramāṇa). The first reference regarding three pramāṇas namely; pratyakṣa (perception); anumāna (inference); āgama or śabda (scriptures) is found in Manusmṛti.

pratyakṣaṁ cānumāṇaṁ ca śāstraṁ ca vividhāgamam 2
trayaṁ suviditaṁ kāryaṁ dharma suddhimahīpsatā 1 M.12/105

1.1 Pratyakṣa, anumāna and śabda: The three pramāṇas accepted by grammarians

There are three methods of acquiring knowledge.

i) We ordinarily acquire the knowledge, when our sense organs come in contact with the external world. This is called direct perception or pratyakṣa pramāṇa.

ii) In every day life, we also get knowledge of things with which our senses are not in contact. Even though we do not see the fire, we can infer its presence when we see smoke. This is inference, which is otherwise known as anumāna.
iii) The another way of acquiring knowledge is word i.e. śabda pramāṇa. This is the speech of a reliable person, which tells us about an event and from that speech only we get the knowledge of that event. This is called śabda pramāṇa or verbal understanding.

Of course, there is no homogenous views regarding the number of such valid methods of knowledge. The Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools of Indian philosophy accept three pramāṇas: pratyakṣa, anumāna and śabda. The Prabhākara school of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā defines five pramāṇas; pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna śabda, arthāpati, but the Bhaṭṭa school accepts one more in addition to the above i.e. abhāva. The same six pramāṇas are also stated by Vedānta. On other hand Cārvāka and Bauddha have accept only one. However, Patañjali accepts three pramāṇas in his Mbh.

He mentions pratyakṣa, which is the substratum of anumāna, is not always reliable. Bhartṛhari, in his commentary, Mahābhāṣya Dipikā on Mbh., accepts also three pramāṇas. Following the foot steps of Patañjali, he states that, direct perception is judged as liable to be erroneous, and at times inference is seen as superior to perception, But śabda or āgama which consists of the revealed (Śruti) and remembered (Smṛti) scripture, is a strongest pramāṇa.
1.3 The efficiency of inference and scriptures

1.3.1 Reason Vs faith

The efficiency of both inference and scriptures has been the issue debated by the scholars since ages until the present date. In spite of the change in the form of arguments and proofs, the fundamental point of this tussle: whether to favour the reason or faith is still unchanged. At the time of Bhartrhari, Indian metaphysics was divided into orthodox, (those who accepted the authority of Veda) and heterodox (those, who rejected authority of Veda) school. The former included the Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta, whereas the later included Jaina, Buddhist, and Cārvāka. In other terms orthodox group was in favor of faith, where the later in favor of the reason.

1.3.2 Bhartrhari’s argument in favor of āgama

Though it is true that, Bhartrhari nowhere declares pratyakṣa and anumāna to be unacceptable or always unreliable but he always argues for the acceptance of āgama, which he treats equal to the direct perception.

Verses from 30 to 42 of Bk. make his stand clear in this regard. Among the grammarians, Bhartrhari is chiefly concerned with establishing the authority of grammar. It can be authority only if it gives valid knowledge about something, and it is in this connection that Bhartrhari was led to make some observations on the valid knowledge, and how it arises.
1.3.2.1 Limitations of pratyakṣa and anumāna

According to Bhartṛhari, all methods are the means to acquire the valid knowledge, but they have some limitations. Bhartṛhari recognizes the usefulness of inference and reasoning in every day life. He points out that, even the direct perception would be incomplete without the help of inference. In this world we can not see whole of a thing. We can only see some of it and infer the rest. What we see is enough to bring the universal of the object to the mind and it is that which is directly perceived.

Thus, it is said

\[ durlabham kasyacilloke sarvāvayavadarśanaṁ \]
\[ kaiścitvavayavairdrṣṭairarthah kṛtsno'numiyate \] \[ Vk. 156\]

1.3.2.2 Reasoning is closely connected with the power of the words

It is also with the help of inference and reasoning that we understand the full meaning of words. The meaning of the Vedas would not be understood without their help. That kind of reasoning is the eye of those who can not see the truth otherwise. It never goes against fundamental teaching of Veda because its only purpose is to grasp that fundamental teaching. It is easy to see that such reasoning is closely connected with the power of the words themselves. In fact, its purpose is to determine the exact scope of the words. Context and other such considerations do not transcend the innate power of words. When such reasoning leads to particular conclusion, the power of words must be deemed to have led to it.
1.3.2.3 Āgama: The only source of knowing Dharma and adharma

To begin with, there are certain matters like dharma and adharma, which are beyond the scope of human intelligence. Dharma can be known only through āgama, scripture. To know the dharma and adharma means to know which act will lead to which invisible fruits. Only the scripture can tell us that. Human intelligence is unreliable even with regard to visible objects, then there is no question about the invisible objects. In the world objects are constantly under the effective influence of all sorts of factors. Their changes depend on time, place, and associations. One can therefore never be sure of them through inference. Human beings also differ greatly in their power of reasoning. What is established, after great deal of labour, by one thinker, is upset by a clever one.

1.2.3.4 Practice, invisible force and insight: The three special means of acquiring the knowledge

a) Practice (Abhyāsa)

The knowledge like distinguishing between different diamonds and coins etc. cannot be obtained through the famous means of cognition, i.e. perception, inference and scripture. One could know them through the intuition (practice). Vṛṣabhadeva insists that the expert’s knowledge of the genuineness of the precious stones cannot come under pratyakṣa,
because it is not caused by the mere contact of the senses with the object. It is not inference, because it is not based on any ground of inference (liṅga). It is not āgama, because it can not be communicated to others nor was it conveyed to expert by the words of others, whereas traditional knowledge can be so conveyed.

b) Invisible force (Adṛṣṭa)

Adṛṣṭa is an invisible force generated by one’s own deeds in the previous birth. It determines many things in one’s present life. Among them, it is the power to confer special knowledge on some. The example given in the vṛtti in this context is that of the power of demon and spirit, which enables them to enter into bodies of others and to make themselves invisible. It might be said that, it is a case of the invisible force resulting in power to do things and not in a special knowledge, which is the result of the previous birth (adṛṣṭa).16

c) Insight

According to Bhartṛhari, there are some other persons than these expert who are sometimes called Rsis and sometimes śiṣṭas and who are credited with a special insight into things, which other person can not see. They are persons whose impurities have been burnt away by tapas and whose cognition is free from all types of limitations. They alone can see the past, present and future. Their vision is divine. They can see things, which are beyond our senses and our mind.17
1.3.2.5 Scripture and popular tradition: The only medium of knowledge for common man

The direct perception of sages is however far from the ability of common man and at the same time the intricacies of inference are also beyond their reach. But if a person has strong faith in those sages then he even starts thinking their perception just as his own. Thus, even those matters which could be only be perceived by sages could also be comprehended by the common man through the medium of scripture.

"How can one, who dose not question the authority of such persons any more than his own experience and has, therefore, taken his stand on direct vision, be set aside by others (who follow reasoning)".18

Authenticity of this type of congenial or natural knowledge is proved even the fact, for the sake of the knowledge of ‘sin’19 and ‘good’ even the most ignorant and illiterate man does not require any help from one or the other scripture. By tradition, he learns it in an automatic way. Thus, popular tradition which has its roots in scriptures can not be defeated by mere dry logic.20 Those to take recourse to mere logic even in such situations, where the object of knowledge is beyond its purview, their fall is certain - just like a blind man running on the uneven path.21
Thus the key for the successful application of inference lies in the fact that, it should be in conformity with the scripture and the popular tradition or in other terms inference has no role to play in matters that are beyond its reach.

1.4 Summary

Pramāṇa is that, by which something is measured i.e. known. Grammarians accepts three types of pramāṇas namely pratyakṣa, anumāna and śabda. Direct perception is judged as liable to be erroneous, and at times inference is seen as superior to perception, But śabda or āgama, which consists of the revealed (Śruti) and remembered (Smṛti) scripture, is a strongest pramāṇa. Bhartrihari recognizes the usefulness of inference and reasoning in every day life. Āgama is the only source of knowing, what is dharma and adharma. Scripture and popular tradition are the only medium of knowledge for common man. Such knowledge of common man can never be defeated by mere dry logic. Those to take recourse to mere logic even in such situations, where the object of knowledge is beyond its purview, their fall is certain. Thus the key for the successful application of inference lies in the fact that, it should be in conformity with the scripture and the popular tradition.

1 Bhāratiya darśana bṛhatkoṣa, vol- 1, Bhacchulala Avasthi (Jñāna), p. 211
Chapter- III Concept

2 The three kinds of evidence i.e. perception, inference and the sacred institutes, which comprise and the tradition of many (school), must be fully understood by him who is desirous of perfect correctness with respect to the sacred law.

(The sacred book of the East, edited by G. Bühl, p.508

3 Bhartṛhari, K.A.S. Iyer, Deccan college, p.84

4 anumiti karaṇaṁ anumānaṁ, TS

5 Sāmkhya-kārikā: 4, Sāmkhya-sūtra 1:88 and Yogasūtras 1:7

6 Ganganatha Jha, Pūrva-Mimāṁsā in its sources, p. 80

7 vide: Mbh. on P. 1.2.64

8 bhavati vai pratyaśādaṇyanumāṇanabāṇyastvaṁ | tad yathā

alātacakraṁ pratyaśaṁ dṛśyate numācca gamyate naitadasīti || Mbh.

On P. 3.2.124

8vedaśāstraṁ ca tarkaśaṣṭiṣapasyatāṁ ||

rūpaṁstrāddhi vākyārthaḥ kevalaṁ nātitiśthati || Bk. 1.151

10 sabdānāmeva sā śaktistarko yāḥ purūṣāśrayaḥ || Bk. 1.153

11 na cāgamāḍṛte dharmastarkena vyavatiśthate || Bk. 3.301

12 adṛśṭārthānāṁ ca karmanāṁ phalaniyame svabhāvasaṁvid

āgamapratibaddha || Vṛtti on Bk. 3.301

13 avasthādesakālānāṁ bhedābhinnāśu śaktiṣu ||

bhāvānāmanumāṇena prasiddhīratidurlabhā || Bk. 3.321

nirjñātaśaṅkterdṛavyasya tāṁ tām arthakriyāṁ prati ||

viśiṣṭaṁdṛavyasambandhe sā śaktiḥ pratibadhyate || Bk. 3.331

14 yatnenaṁnumiḥ pyarthaḥ kuśalirunumāṭrḥbhīḥ ||

abhiyuktatarairanyairanyathaivopapādyate || Bk. 3.341

15 paresāmasamaṅkhyeyamabhyaśādeva jāyate ||

manirūpyādīvijñānāṁ tadvidāṁ nānumāṇikaṁ || Bk. 3.351
pratyākṣamanumānam ca vyatikramya vyavasthitāḥ

prītrākṣahpiśācānāṁ karmajā eva siddhayāḥ || Bk. 36||

āvīrbohitaprakāśanāmanupaplutacetasāṁ

aṭitānāgatajñānaṁ pratyākṣānāṁ viśiṣyate || Bk. 37||

aṭīndriyāñasaṁvedyāṁ paśyantyārṣeṇa caksusā

ye bhāvāṁ vacanam teṣāṁ nānumānena bādhyate || Bk.38||

yasya svamiva jñānanāṁ darśanaṁ nābhiśaṅkate || Bk. 39||

idāṁ punyāmidāṁ pāpamityetasmin padadvaye

ācānḍālaṁ manusyaṁnalpāṁ śāstra-prayojanāṁ || Bk. 40||

caitanyamiva yaścāyamavicchchedena vartate ||

āgamastamupāsino hetuśādairna bādhyate || Bk. 41||

hastasparsādīvānḍhena viśame pathi dhāvata ||

anumānapradhānena vinipāto na durlabhāḥ || Bk. 42||
2.1 Apabhramśa: A Historical Overview

The word ‘apabhramśa’, is formed by adding the prefix ‘apa’ in the sense of ‘going away’ to the root ‘bhramśa’ meaning ‘to fall’. Thus, *apabhramśa* means ‘to fall away’ i.e. ‘falling down’. The first reference of the term *apabhramśa* is found in *Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa*, where it is used in its literal sense of ‘falling down’.

The term *apabhramśa* is an example of the shift in the approach of the grammarians in dealing with variations in Sanskrit language. In literature the word *apabhramśa* is used in several senses. From its original sense of ‘falling down’ it came to signify an incorrect or corrupt form by the time of Patañjali. Later, from 4th century onwards, it principally denotes standardized literally language different from Sanskrit and desi. In *Kāvyālaṅkāra*, Namisādhu mentions “prākṛtameva *apabhramśa* ‘apabhramśa is nothing but prākṛta’2. In *Śabdārthacintāmaṇi*, *apabhramśa* is defined as ungrammatical word, crude word and language of countryside or vulgar language.

Pāṇini never used the term *apabhramśa* or *apaśabda* in the *Aṣṭ*.* The variations, as he has described, are the part of the standard language and are treated as such. Pāṇini does not refer to them as sub-standard but only as optional forms.
Deepti Tripathy, in the article ‘Apabhramśa in Sanskrit Grammar, (Aligarh Journal of Oriental Studies No. 3: p.81-92) mentions that, “Pāṇini has used two methods of incorporating regional variations in his grammar. These two methods are:

1) By referring to the region in which particular word is exclusively used;

2) By referring to grammarians of different region and mentioning the variations acceptable to them”.

Kātyāyana also does not use the word apabhramśa or apaśabda in his Vt., but when he wrote his Vt., the Pāṇinian Sanskrit had undergone a considerable change. Kātyāyana took note of these changes, which were phonetic, morphological, and semantic in nature. These changes can be considered to be the first step towards apabhramśa.

In Pāṇinian School of grammar, the term apabhramśa is found for the first time in Mbh. of Patañjali. There it is used in the sense of incorrect form. Patañjali observes that people use several corrupt forms (apabhramśa) in the place of standard form. Thus, one word has many apabhramśas.

Thus it is said:

“A single correct word has, in fact many corrupt words arising from it. For instance, the correct word gauḥ has many corrupt words such as gāvī, gonī, gotā, gopatlikā etc.”
Here, it should be noted that, Patañjali uses the word \textit{apabhramśa} side by side of \textit{apaśabda}. In grammatical tradition, we find that both \textit{apaśabda} and \textit{apabhramśa} are used to denote incorrect usage. Therefore, they are synonyms \textit{(apabhramśa apaśabda syāt)}. The difference between the two is very subtle. Both \textit{apaśabda} and \textit{apabhramśa} are formed by adding the prefix ‘\textit{apa}’ in the sense of (going away) to the roots \textit{śabda} and \textit{bhramś} respectively. \textit{Apabhramśa} does not have value either positive or negative attached to it, but \textit{apaśabda} is always used in a derogatory sense.\footnote{It appears that the concept of \textit{apabhramśa} was already developed at the time of Patañjali. According to him, one can use the \textit{apabhramśa} in day to day life but it is not allowed in sacrifice.}

For Patañjali, Pāṇini’s language is a sacred language and any deviation from that is \textit{apabhramśa}. According to him, by using correct word one can attain glory even in the yonder world, whereas by using the corrupt forms one becomes impure.\footnote{2.2 Bhartṛhari on \textit{apabhramśa}}

\textbf{2.2 Bhartṛhari on \textit{apabhramśa}}

Bhartṛhari (5\textsuperscript{th} century A.D) also portrays Pāṇini’s language as divine language \textit{(daivī vāk)} viz. the standard ideal form, and the rest is corrupt.
Thus it is said:

daiśi vāgyyatikīṃneyamaśaktairabhidhātṛbhīḥ ||
anityadarśinām tvasmin vāde buddhiviparyayaḥ || Bk.182 ||

According K.A.S. Iyer, "for Bhartrhari, the word apabhramśa does not stand for a particular stage in linguistic evolution as it does for modern Indian linguists for whom it represents that stage, which follows the prākṛta and precedes the development of modern Indian languages."

2.2.1 Definition of apabhramśa

Bhartrhari starts his exposition of apabhramśa with a precise definition of the term. He defines apabhramśa as a word denoting a particular meaning but devoid of the derivation through grammatical procedure.

śabdaḥ samśkāraḥino yo gauriti prayuyukṣite 1
	tampabhbhramśāmicchanti viśiṣṭārthaniveśinām 1 Bk. 175 ||

The commentary provides another definition, which is traditionally considered as statement of Vyādi viz., 'śabdaprakṛtiḥ apabhramśa' (i.e. the correct word is the original and it is the source of the corrupt one).

However, some modern scholars do not agree with the interpretation of vṛtti i.e. According to them, the apabhramśa is the source of the correct word.
K. A. Subhramaniyam Iyer mentions “It is true that the word \textit{sabdaprakṛtiḥ}, if taken as \textit{tatpuruṣa}, that is, \textit{śabdānām prakṛtiḥ}, such an interpretation is possible. But it is to be emphasized that Bhartrhari and the ancient commentators take the word only as a \textit{bahuvrihi} i.e. \textit{śabdah prakṛtiḥ yasya saḥ} and explain that, according to Vyādhi, it is the correct word which is the source of the corrupt one”.

2.2.2 Meaning: The principle ground for deciding standard and corrupt form

According to Bhartrhari, the correctness or corruptness of a particular form depends upon the meaning context. The same word is corrupt in a particular sense and correct in another sense. Bhartrhari clarifies this point by giving the example of \textit{goṇi}, \textit{asvā}.

Both \textit{goṇi} and \textit{asvā} are correct forms, when used to denote other objects i.e. other than the cow and horse. \textit{Goṇi} and \textit{asvā} are incorrect \textit{(apabhramśa)}, when they are used to convey the meaning cow and horse respectively, but if the speaker’s intention is to convey the idea of “a lot of milk” and “one who has nothing” respectively then both are correct because in this sense they are not the corrupt form of \textit{āśva} and \textit{go (cow)}. In \textit{Vṛtti}, Bhartrhari clearly mentions that, a word becomes an \textit{apabhramśa} only when the speaker tries to pronounce the correct one to convey the intended meaning, but, due to incapability, he eventually utters the corrupt one.
Thus it is said:

tatra gauriti prayoktavye'saktya pramadadibhirvā gāvyādaya statprakṛtayoh'pabhramśāh prayujyante || vṛtti on Bk. 175 ||

2.2.3 Difference between standard and corrupt forms

Another point, which Bhartṛhari makes, is that even though corrupt form (apabhraṃśa) conveys the same meaning as its counterpart, it can not be considered as a synonym of it, because the apabhraṃśa forms are not explained by the grammar. In this regard the only authority is the tradition of the culture people, recorded in the science of grammar.¹¹

Further, Bhartṛhari records views of different schools on the context of ability of the corrupt forms to convey the meaning. According to the view of Naiyāyikas, incorrect word can not denote meaning directly. When an incorrect word is uttered, then the related correct word is recollected and that correct word alone can denote the meaning. Thus, according to this view, here understanding of the meaning come through the process of inference.¹²

Sometimes the corrupt form gives a clue to know the correct the one. Here, Bhartṛhari gives an example of effort of a newly born baby. Due to the deficiency in the vocal organs the baby utters indistinct sounds, which give clue for hearer to understand the distinct form, which is original.¹³
There are certain circles in the society, where the use of corrupt form is the habit of the people. Actually they are quite ignorant of the correct forms. They know only the corrupt forms through long tradition, for them corrupt form expresses the intended meaning.\(^{14}\)

Bhartṛhari makes it clear that, when people are not cultured, if correct words are used in their presence, they would not understand the meaning, they would have doubts and those would have to be removed with the help of the corresponding corrupt forms.\(^{15}\)

The most illuminating fact about *apabhramśa* presented by Bhartṛhari is that, these forms have been handed down uninterruptedly.\(^{16}\)

They are used side by side with standard form. The only difference between these two is that, the latter are generated by great sage Pāṇīni, whereas the former are not.

**2.3 Summary**

To sum up, the derivative meaning of the *apabhramśa* is falling away or falling down. Latter on, at the time of Patañjali, it came to signify the incorrect or corrupt form. Bhartṛhari uses it in the same sense. The idea of *apabhramśa* is missing in Pāṇīni’s *Ast.* and Kātyāyana’s *Vt.*, where the variations are treated not as substandard but as optional forms.
Bhartrhari considers standard forms as the original forms and *apabharṁsa* as its derivative. According to him, the correctness or corruptness of a particular form depends upon the meaning context. Both correct as well as corrupt forms are capable of conveying the meaning. The only difference between these two is that, former is derived by grammar and therefore capable of merit, whereas the latter is not.

1. viśvāḥ ṛṭanā abhibhūtarantarā ityajagaṇi varṣiyayaścchanda ākramate'napabhraṁśāyā || TāṇBra 1.5 ||
2. *Apabhraṁśa Hindi Dictionary*, Dr. Naresha Kumar, P.xviii
3. "aśāstra śabde , asaṃskṛta śabde . grāmyam bhāṣāyāṁ" *Apabhraṁśa Hindi Dictionary*, Dr. Naresha Kumar, P.xix
4. "ekaikasya hi śabdasya bahavo'pabhraṁśāḥ || tadyathā ||
gaurityasya śabdasya gāvī , goṇī , gotā ,
gopotalikyevamādayo'pa-bhraṁśāḥ || Mbh. 1.1 ,p.2 ||
5. The concept of *apabhraṁśa* and *apaśabda* in *Amarakoṣa* as described in *Apabhraṁśa Hindi Dictionary*, Dr. Naresha Kumar, P.xviii.
6. mlecco ha va eṣa yadapaśabdaḥ || Mbh . 1.1,p.2 ||
7. yastu pravuṅkte kuśalo viśeṣe śabdāṇyathāvadavyavahārakāle
   so'nantamāṇopi jayaṁ paratram vāgyogavid duṣyati ca
   apaśabdaiḥ || Mhb.1.1, p. 2||
8. Only Vyādi has dared to say the statement (śabdaprakṛtiḥ apabhraṁśaḥ), Bhāṣātattva aur Vākyapadīya, Satyakāma Verma, p.13
9 asvagonyādayaḥ śabdāḥ sādhavo viśayāntare
nimittabhedātsarvatra sādhūtvam ca vyavasthitaṁ || Bk.176 ||

10 asva iti nirdhane śādūḥ | naikāśaphādilakṣaṇe || Mbh. Dīpikā, ABORI 43, 1962, p.11

11 na sīṣṭairanugamyante paryāyā iva sādhavaḥ ||
te yataḥ sṁtiśāstreṇa tasmātsāksādavācakāḥ || Bk.178 ||

12 te sādhusvanumānena prayayotpattiḥetavah |
tādātmayamupagamyeva śabdāThusya prakāsakāḥ || Bk. 177 ||

13 aṁvamṁviti yathā bālāḥ śikṣaṁano' pabhāṣate |
avyaktam tadvardamtena vyaktau bhavati niścayaḥ || Bk.179 ||

14 evam sādhau prayoktavye yo'pabhramśaḥ prayujyate |
tena sādhūvyavahitaḥ kaścidartho'bhidhiyate || Bk.180 ||

15 pāramparyādapanbhramśā vīguṇeśvabhidhātrśū |
prāsidhihimāgataḥ yena teśanā sādhuravācakāḥ || Bk. 181 ||

16 ubhyesāmaviśchedādanyasaabdavivakṣaya |
yo'nyaḥ prayujyate sabdo na so'rthasyābhidhiyakaḥ ||Bk.183 ||
Apoddhārapadārtha

3.1 Apoddhāra: A historical overview

The word ‘apoddhāra’ is derived from the root ‘dhṛ’ by adding the prefixes (apa + ud), and means taking something away. Dictionary of technical terms by Abhyankara & Shukla records following meanings of the term:

1) Disintegration 2) analysis 3) separation 4) division and 5) detachment. The first occurrence of the term apoddhāra is found in Padārtha-saṃgraha (A Vaiśeṣika text from 4th century). There it denotes a cause of an act as, taking away from. In grammatical parlance it denotes the separation of the stem and suffix. Sometimes it also denotes a separated morpheme that is either stem or suffix.¹

While commenting upon the Bk. 24, Bharṭṛhari says “apoddhāraḥ vibhāgah” apoddhāra means separation.²

In philosophical context the word apoddhāra is used in the sense of analysis. Whenever what is united in reality is divided merely for practical purposes, it is called apoddhāra. For example: when a word conveys meaning in the form of a denoted object, it is called grāhaka, but when it conveys it’s own form it is known as grāhya. Thus the very single word plays two different roles, that of grāhya (named) and grāhaka (name). In other words when a word plays a role of grāhaka it acts as a name (samjñā) , where as when it plays the role of grāhya it acts as a named (samjñin) , though the word
basically is one. It is looked upon as two things by means of apoddhāra.

3.2 Indivisible Sentence- the minimum free unit of language

The doctrine of the grammarian is that, both the sentence and the sentence meaning are indivisible units, which are used for the purpose of communication.

It is a common experience that our thought can not be dissected into various parts. It is a partless whole. When we think of an incident like “Rāma killed Rāvaṇa”, we think of entire incident which took place in hoary antiquity. Both the speaker and the listener of above-mentioned sentence take it as a single indivisible idea. It can not be dissected into three independent parts i.e. Rāma, Rāvaṇa, and the act of killing. Thus, both the fact and its ideational thought–construction, which figures as the direct meaning-content of the sentence, are indivisible units of reference, the one direct and the another indirect. Seen in this light, the meaning of a sentence is always indivisible.

As we communicate our ideas or thoughts through sentence, the study of language should begin with sentence and sentential meaning. In any discourse, only sentences are uttered and not unrelated words. Words having no bearing upon sentences cannot be imagined. A word is and was never found except in a sentence. The linguistic reality belongs to the sentence and not to the words. Similarly the reality of meaning
belongs to the sentential meaning and not to the word-meaning. What we call the constituent parts of a sentence and its meaning did never reside as independent units.

One can not imagine a time in the history of mankind, when individual and independent words that were afloat assembled together to constitute sensible sentences. On the contrary, the indivisible sentence is rendered into some divisible and apparently independent meaning units. This breaking through of the sentence and its meaning is done by logical analysis called *apodhāra*.

The fact is that a sentence is not made of several meaningful independent words. And the sentential meaning is not a sum-total of the meanings denoted by different words in a sentence. The linguist-philosophers have undoubtedly established the theory of *Akhaṇḍapakṣa* headed by Vākyavādins, refuting *Sakhaṇḍapakṣa* headed by Padavādins.

### 3.3 Padavāda

The upholders of this doctrine have established that, the words alone are real. And they alone express the meaning. This is generally said to be the opinion of the *Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsakas*. According to their theory, the sentence and its meaning are result of grouping together of different words and their meanings. The words are the source of a sentence. They have quoted following the aphorism (*Padaprakṛtiḥ samhitā*) from the *Rk prātisākhya* 2.1 to support this doctrine.
The aphorism ‘Padaprakṛtiḥ saṁhitā’ means, the connected text saṁhitā of the Vedas has the words as its source. According to this doctrine, the words of Vedas have been revealed to different Rṣis and the saṁhitā in the form of different sentences is an artificial structure made by men. This type of interpretation is possible in the case of bahuvrihi compound.

The following statement in Nirukta also supports the Padavādin.

“Now what are the four classes of words? They are namely: nouns, verbs, preposition and particle, with reference to this, they prescribe the definition of noun and verb: the verb has becoming as its fundamental notion, nouns has being as their fundamental notion”.  

Yāska’s division of words (parts of speech) into four categories and his assignment of meanings to verb and nouns clearly indicates that words have real existence and their division is not artificial.

3.4 Vākyavāda

The upholders of this doctrine want to establish that sentence and its meaning are indivisible. It is only through logical analysis that one can render an indivisible sentence into many parts which are thought to be the constitute elements of the sentence. And these constituent elements are also thought to
be meaningful entities through the operation of the same logical analysis, which has been as styled *apodhāra* by the upholders of this doctrine.

There are innumerable words. It is very difficult to learn each and every word, because it consumes lot of time. In *Paspasāhnika*, it has been stated by Patañjali that, *Bṛhaspati* had taught *Indra* orally each and every word for thousand years and still the learning had not come to an end.⁴

The above statement from the *Mbh.* indicates the indivisibility of the sentence and its meaning. Division of the sentence into different words on the basis of artificially divided sentence meaning is also artificial and not real. This artificial division is made as means to explain easily and conveniently the indivisible sentence and its meaning. For this doctrine also the same aphorisms of the *Ṛk prātisāksya, (Padapraṇṛtiḥ samhitā)* 2.1 is the authority. This type of interpretations is possible in the case of *tatpuruṣa* compound. In this case the *saṃhitā* becomes the source of different individual words. It means the *saṃhitā* of Veda has been revealed to *Ṛṣis* and therefore, it is eternal and real one. The upholder of this doctrine is called *akhaṇḍapakṣavādin*. According to this doctrine sentence and its meaning is indivisible in reality. Their division is artificial and is for the sake of convenience and grammatical purpose. Bhartṛhari supports this doctrine. The statement of Audumbarāyaṇa quoted by Yāska in his *Nir.* also supports it.⁵
“According to Audumbarāyaṇa, speech is permanent in the organs only. In that case, the fourfold division of words will not hold good, nor the grammatical connection, nor the mutual reference of sounds which are not produced simultaneously. Words are used to designate objects with regard to everyday affairs in the world, on account of their comprehensiveness and minuteness.”

This shows the eternality of sentence. In this context Bhartrhari presents two kārikās as follow:

“Therefore, the word does not exist as more than its phonemes, nor is there is a sentence existing as more than the phonemes and the words” ⁶

“There are no phonemes in the word nor are there parts in the phonemes. There is no absolute difference of the words from the sentence.”⁷ (See K. A. S. Iyer, English translation of VP., 1965, p.75-77)

By refuting the Padavādin’s standpoint, the grammarian concedes that even though the individual word and its meaning are not of much use for vyavahāra (communication), they have other uses. But not like padavādin’s standpoint. The other uses are

i) They (words) are the means for the understanding of the sentence as well as it’s meaning.

ii) In order to accommodate others like the Mimāṃsakas, who believe in reality of individual word and its meaning and to analyze sentence into words and their meanings.
Though the grammarians accept indivisibility of sentence they do not reject the individual words and its meanings. According to them, however, the individual words are unreal, as they are only means to an end. For a hearer, it is very difficult to understand the indivisible sentence and its meaning instantly. In that case sentence is analyzed. This artificial analysis is called *saktibheda*.

### 3.5 Apoddhāra: The principle of intellectual abstraction

Finally, the grammarians climb down to analyze the indivisible sentence for practical purpose. The basic question is by which method and ‘how one can analyze the sentence?’ The answer can be found in *Vt.* of Kātyāyana and the *Mbh.* of Patañjali. The word used for analysis is *apoddhāra*.

Bhartṛhari has not done the analysis himself. He explains certain ideas already found openly expressed in the *Vt.* of Kātyāyana and *Mbh.* of Patañjali.

In BK 24-26⁸ Bhartṛhari introduces eight main topics of the science of grammar. One of them is *apoddhārapadārtha*. The analyzed meaning is *apoddhārapadārtha* and on the other hand unanalyzed meaning is *sthitalakṣaṇa* i.e. static in character. No analysis is possible in the case of *sthitalakṣaṇa*, where the meaning of the sentence is indivisible. Before the analysis takes place, the word meaning is well fitted into the
sentence meaning. It is artificially analysed out of sentence by a kind of reasoning, says the *vṛtti*.9

The principle of intellectual abstraction (*apoddhāra*) is applicable to any given language, though we have taken up Sanskrit to suit our purpose. In the light of the theory of *Ākhaṇḍavākya*, all the grammatical categories like noun, pronoun, adjective, verb, adverb, conjunction, interjection, different case relations and other grammatical usage are unreal, the indivisible sentence being the only ‘Reality’.

3.6 Anvaya and Vyatireka: The two ways of intellectual abstraction

Now let us apply the process of intellectual abstraction to bring out separate words along with their meanings from indivisible sentence. The grammatical analysis of the word (*apoddhāra*) consists in dividing the sentence–meaning into and ascribing each of them to one of the divisions of the audible part of the sentence. The recognized method of doing this is that of agreement and difference (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*). *Kātyāyana* had already referred to this method10. Whether it be the analysis of sentence into word and word meanings or the analysis of the word into root and suffix or stem and suffix and their meaning, the method is to assign recurrent parts of the meaning to recurrent parts of the speech and certain meanings, is *anvaya* and the disappearance of certain audible element and their meanings is *vyatireka*. 
To explain it further, take any sentence and you will find that words in the sentence are syntactically related to each other. To abstract away a word from a sentence means not only to bring out a particular word from a particular sentence but also to ascertain its meaning when it is not syntactically related to any other word.

To make it clear, if we logically analyze the constituents of a sentence, we shall find that there is no word denoting only 'cow' what we get is only a nominative singular ‘gauh’ or an accusative singular ‘gām’ or an instrumental singular gavā etc, from which some common formal and semantic element i.e. ‘go’ (cow) is to be abstracted. Thus, from any given language, various words and verbal roots may be logically abstracted. We, however, should stick to any particular language like Sanskrit for uniformity.

In language we always come across verbal forms like ‘pacati’ (he cooks), ‘pacanti’ (they cook), ‘apacat’ (he cooked) etc. but we never get a word that simply denotes the sense of cooking or time of cooking. So it is evident that the verbal root ‘pac’ (to cook) is abstracted from various utterances like ‘Devadattaḥ pacati’ ‘te pacanti’ etc. Thus, we come to discover the common element ‘pac’ a verbal root, and ‘go’ a nominal stem which permeate pacati, apacat, pakvavān, etc. and gauh, gavi, etc. form respectively.
By applying this logical abstraction it becomes possible for us to discern the verbal suffixes like ti, anti, syati, etc. on one hand and ‘su’ ‘bhyam’ ‘anam’ ‘esu’ etc. on the other.

Some points should be noted while analyzing of the meaning of a sentence. When we take a sentence like ‘Devadattaḥ sthālyām odanam pacati’ (Devadatta cooks rice in a metal pot.) and analyze its meaning, we find that it includes many notions.

First of all the idea of cooking is conveyed by the verb ‘pacati’ then there is a notion of particular person Devadatta, who does the cooking and is, therefore, agent. He does it in a metal pot which thus become the adhikaraṇa. The result of the cooking is the cooked rice (odana), the object of action (karma).

In addition to these notions one understands, from the meaning of the words in the sentence, the notions of singular number, and present time. Thus, from the analysis of this sentence emerge the notions of action, agent, object of action. These notions are called the formation of words i.e. anvākhyāna. In fact, they are analysed out of the sentence for that very purpose.

According to Bhartṛhari, this type of analysis is only meant for popular convenience.\(^{11}\)

Bhartṛhari has devoted the entire third kāṇḍa, the Prakṛṭakāṇḍa of Vākyapadiya containing more than thirteen
hundred kārikās, to deal with different philosophical aspects of artificial division of sentence on the basis of the artificial division of the sentence-meaning (apoddhāra)

According to Vaiyākarana, division can be possible on the basis of the meaning and its feature. Introducing the artificial division of sentence into words i.e. different part of the speech, Bhartrhari states:

dvidhā kaiściptadāṃ bhinnaṃ caturdhā pañcadhāpi vā 1
apodhrtyaiva vākyebhyah prakṛtipratyādiyat 11 Pk 1.1 11

It means: Just as stems, suffixes, etc (are artificially divided from words), in the same way, having artificially been divided from sentences indeed, by some scholars, the word has been declared to be two fold or three fold or four fold even five fold. Meaning is the substratum of their division. Sentence is an indivisible unit, words and phonemes are extracted from that, and therefore they are illusory.

3.7 Summary

Whenever what is united in reality is divided merely for practical purposes, it is called apoddhāra. The grammarians strongly advocate the sentence as the absolute indivisible entity, they accept the reality of individual words for practical purpose by using the word apoddhāra. According to Bhartrhari, this type of analysis is only meant for popular convenience. Finally, the grammarians climb down to analyze the indivisible sentence for practical purpose.
1 Abhyankara Limaye p.372
2 See vṛtti on BK 23
3 Nir. 1.1
4 brhaspatirindrāya divyam varṣasahasraṁ pratipadoktānāṁ
śabdānāṁ śabdapārāyaṇāṁ provāca nāntam jagāṁ II Mbh. Vol- 1, p.5 II
5 indriyanityaṁ vacanamaudumbarāyaṇaḥ | tatra catuṣṭyaṁ
nopapadyate | ayugadūtpannanāṁ vā śabdānāmitaretaropadesaḥ
| śāstrakṛto yogasca | vyāptimitvāttu śabdasyāṇīyatvācca śabdena
samjñākaranam vyavahārārtham loke | II Nir.1.1 II
6 padavede'pi varṇanāmekatvaṁ na nivartate |
vākyeṣu padamekam ca bhinnesvapyupalabhyate II Bk. 72 II
7 na varṇavyatirekena padamnyacca vidyate |
vākyam varnapadābhyaṁ ca vyatiriktam na kiṇcana II Bk. 73 II
8. see the Bk. text
9 K.A.S. Iyer , VP. kānda 1 , p. 65.
10 siddham tvanvayavatyerekābhyaṁ | Vt. 9 on P. 1.2.45 II
11 śāstre padārthāḥ kāryārtham laukikāḥ pravibhajyate | II Pk. 3.88 II
Chapter III Concept

Itikartavyatā and Śabdabhāvanā

4.1 Itikartavyatā: A historical overview

The term ‘Itikartavyatā’ means 1) affairs of the world 2) any proper or necessary measure 3) obligation 4) any proper or necessary duty.¹

The first occurrence of the term Itikartavyatā is found in Carakasamhitā, 6.1.43 (2nd Century B.C), where it is used in the sense of 1) dealings 2) things to be done. It is found also in the Śābarabhāṣya, where it is explained as:

1) An accessory which helps the efficient cause

2) A mass of the details of the procedure (of an act)

3) The procedure consists of the subsidiaries etc.

Bhartṛhari uses the term in its literal sense. Here kartavya means the work to be done. The imagination that this work has to be done like this, is called ‘itikartavyatā’.

4.2 Role of Śabdabhāvanā in human life

Bhartṛhari’s primary assumption is that ‘there is no cognition in the world in which the word does not figure’.² If this is accepted to be true then, even the knowledge of what is to be done (itikartavyatā) in this world depends on the word. It is a common experience that a newborn baby which does not
have clear-cut idea of producing any sound does so without any training.

According to Bhartṛhari, the baby is able to apply its mind to make of particular sound or to do particular act. That is because, it is born with the germs of knowledge and know-how. This *sāṁskāra* in the baby is called *Śabdabhāvanā*. It is the result of its knowledge of a language in a previous birth\(^3\). When due to the working of *adṛṣṭa*, it is aroused in this life, the baby is able to understand and act. It is assumed that, when the baby acts, he has understood the situation and known what he has to do, just like a grownup.

4.3 *Śabdabhāvanā* and *Pratibhā* (intuition)

In this context the commentary points out that baby acts through *pratibhā* \(^4\) and it would have no *pratibhā* if *Śabdabhāvanā* is not there.

*Pratibhā* (Intuition) seems to be another name for *Śabdabhāvanā*. It stands

i) For the residual traces of the exercise of the faculty of speech in the previous birth;

ii) For the faculty of speech with which the child is born;

iii) For the child’s instinct to do some things in response to a situation.
4.4 How does the Pratibhā work?

In this context Bhartrhari says that the functioning of *pratibhā* is by no means describable to others as such. (In such terms as it is like this). Everyone within himself experiences it, but even he who experiences is not able to render an account of it to himself.

It is emphasized that no human effort can impart this *pratibhā* to the baby. It is that stage in which the word and the object are mixed together as one without differentiation.

*Pratibhā* and *Itikartavyatā*, are not same things. The latter (*itikartavyatā*) is the result of the former (*pratibhā*). The whole world considers the flash of understanding (*pratibhā*) to be the authority in daily life. Even the activities of the animals develop because of it.

The *itikartavyatā* is there, related to each object (*padārtha*), as without such imagination, it is not possible for anybody to do anything. Such an imagination is a mental process and the same may not be audible to others. But in the mind of the thinker it reveals itself in the form of śabda. It is true even in the case of newly born babes who do not know any language yet. Even their cognition is intertwined with the word. Otherwise, they would not be able to understand and to act as soon as they are born.
If the knowledge of the newly born baby which does not know any language, yet is intertwined with the word, it is natural that what is called *avikalpakajñana* should also be so, as it is usually considered to be that moment of perception in which the name of the object does not figure.

For Bhartrhari, if it is knowledge at all it has to be intertwined with the word, not, of course, the specific name of the object, but a general word as pronoun. Otherwise, one cannot explain the clear cognition of the name in the second stage, the *savikalpakajñana* in which what was subtle in the previous stage becomes clear.

When one hears a verse recited for the first time, one does not grasp it clearly, but rather vaguely. Even this vague cognition leaves an impression, which help to remember previous vague cognition. In this case one does not remember the verse itself but only remembers that he had a vague cognition of it before.

The form of this remembrance proves that, the previous cognition was intertwined with the word. If it were not so intertwined, it could neither reveal itself nor could it reveal the object vaguely. Therefore, it is said that the knowledge is intertwined with the word.
4.5 Summary

To sum up, for Bhartrhari, *itikartavyatā* means the imagination that this work has to be done like this. The inborn knowledge of how to act is known as *Śabdabhāvanā*. *Pratibhā* (intuition) is said to be another name of *Śabdabhāvanā*. *Itikartavyatā* reveals itself in the form of *śabda*. All the knowledge of what is to be done (*itikartavyatā*) in this world depends on the word.

1 Abhyankara and Limaye, *Vākyapādiya of Bhartrhari*, p.376
2 *na so’sti pratyayo loke yah śabdānugamādṛte* |

   anuviddhamva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena bhāsate || Bk. 131||

3 *itikartavyatā loke sarvā śabdavyapāśraya* |

   yāṃ pūrvāhitasamskāro bālo’pi pratipadyate || Bk. 129||

   ‘anādiścaśā śabdabhāvanā pratipurūṣamavasthitajñānabija- 

parigrahā || na hyetasyāḥ kathāṅcit paṃsyevatvaṃ saṃbhavati ||

   tathā hyanupadeśasadhyāḥ pratibhāgamyāḥ eva karaṇavinyā-

   sādayaḥ || Vṛtti on Bk. 130||

   ‘smṛtikāle’pi ca tādrśānāmupalabdhivijijnānābhimukhye smarta-

   vyeṣu ślokādiṣu prakāśanugamamātrārūpamiva buddau viparivar-

   tate ko'pyasāvanuvākaḥ śloko vā yo'yaṃ mayā śrutimārteṇa 

   prakānta iti || Vṛtti on Bk. 132||
5.0 **Introduction:**

'Time' is an important factor that governs human life. Every one of us understands time. Everyday we use it and we also realize it. In general, everybody is acquainted with it.

5.1. **Time: A historical overview**

Numerous viewpoints have been put forward by various thinkers to solve the mysterious character of time. These viewpoints are based upon numerous philosophical systems. Both Indian and western thinkers have given a special status to time in their philosophical outlook.

The original conception of 'time' seems to go back to *Vedic* period of Indian thought. The earliest reference to time is found in *RV* (10.42.9), where it is used in an adverbial sense 'in time'.¹ In *AV* it is also used in the sense of an “ultimate cause” of the world.² *Maitri Upanishad* clearly mentions the two forms of *Brahman* i.e. time (*kāla*) and timeless (*akāla*).³

Pāṇinian grammatical tradition is basically related with the morphological and syntactical aspect of time.

Kātyāyana who has followed Pāṇini did not discuss the concept of time as such. His advancement consists in making some remarks on ‘*vartamāne lat*’ (P.3.2.123). Since Pāṇini has
not explained *vartamāna* (present), Kātyāyana has devoted five of his *Vārttikas* for the explanation of present and division of time.

It was Patañjali who for the first 'time' incited a philosophical discussion on time. He says that through *kāla* 'time' the growth and decay of material objects are perceived.

> "yena mūrtināmupacayāpacayācśa lakṣyante tām kālamityāhuh" \[Mbh. on P.2.2.5\]

*Kāla* is divided into days, nights, months, etc which is an artificial process of calculation. It is the movement of the sun, which is the basis of our conception of the perceived division of time. (Vide *Mbh. On P. 2.2.5*)

### 5.2 Bhartrhari on Time

Bhartrhari for the first time has paid special attention to time as a concept in the history of grammar. He accumulated the main idea from his predecessors and gave a new approach to time in his philosophical discourse. He introduced this concept to explain another important dimension of the phenomenal world, i.e. the idea of change. He conceives of the reality as one and unchangeable. The phenomenal world being characterized by change owes an explanation in terms of unchangeable reality. To explain this issue Bhartrhari introduced the concept of the time.
Bhartrhari has identified the notion of time with power (śakti). He does not confine himself only to the explanation of time with reference to a verbal system as done by Pāṇini. He raised some fundamental questions such as: What time is and how it is related with the ultimate reality?

5.2.1 **Time: A creative power of Brahman**

For Bhartrhari the ultimate reality is nothing but the expression of the *Brahman* itself, which is reflected in the form of *Śabdhatattva* from which the whole cosmos is manifested in the form of object⁴. Time (kāla) is an independent power (śakti) of *Śabdabrahman*. In Bk 2 he says “*Śabdabrahman* though one, has many powers and one of the powers is time ‘kālāśakti’.” These powers are actually not different from the *Śabdabrahman*.⁵ It is due to our ignorance that, we conceive these powers as different from the ultimate reality.

Time is a creative power of *Śabdabrahman* and thus it is responsible for creation, destruction, and continuity of every thing in the cosmos.⁷ This manifestation in the universe is an evolution, which involves actions and processes. According to Bhartrhari, all animate and inanimate things are liable to change and this change according to Vārsyāyaṇi (quoted by Yāska in his *Nir.*) can be analysed into six states⁸, as follows: jāyate
(genesis), *asti* (existence), *viparināmate* (alteration), *varddhate* (growth) *apakṣiyate* (decay) and *vinaśyati* (destruction).

It can be illustrated:

![Diagram of the sequence of events]

### 5.2.2 Prohibition and permission: The two powers of time

Time functions with its two prominent powers called *pratibandha* and *abhyanujña*. These are the powers through which the sequence in the manifestation is brought about. Of these, *pratibandha* is a preventative power, which prevents or hides things from appearing and *abhyanujña* permits a thing to appear. In this way time functions like a puppet–operator or a string holder who causes opening and closing of an act. Thus, time works through its two powers in such a systematic way that automatically things get priority and posteriority through their activities and everything become ordered. In the absence of these two prominent powers called *abhyanujña* and *pratibandha*, all the functions would take place at one time and
there will be no order. Thus ordering or making a sequence is also one of the powers of time

5.2.3 Time and action

Time is also called the operator of this mechanical world and measurement of the course of activity. Coming into existence, the appearance and disappearance of all the objects are due to time alone. Therefore according to Bhartrhari, time is the cause of the motion. Since it is an instrumental cause of the activities, it is treated as being identical with activity, though in reality different from it.

Again time is comparable to water wheel, which drives the beings and hence designated as kāla. From the explanation given by Helārāja it is understood that the only true being is Parabrahman (which can be considered as Śabdabrahman here). It has definite powers through which it produces all kinds of effects and again since it creates effects in cyanic manner (kālayati) it is called kāla.

5.2.4 Past, present and future: An illusion

About the three divisions of time i.e. present, past, and future, Bhartrhari says that these are not three different times but the same single time appears, as three through its three powers. Time is a relative term. It is determined by the action.
Bhartrhari explains this by giving an example of a balance. In the center of the balance rod there is a needle. One side of balance contains the weight value; where as the other side contains a thing to be weight. When the weight value is equal to weight of other side then the needle remains in exact vertical position. When it remains like that we consider it as the correct weight. Thus we impose the correct weighting process on the action of needle. In the same way we impose the action of the needle in a watch on time.\textsuperscript{21}

According to M. Srimannārāyaṇa Murti, Bhartrhari exposed two points regarding the notion of time

a) He has introduced a dual function of time i.e. \textit{abhyanujñā} and \textit{pratibandha}.

b) His mode of treatment though mainly argumentative has a poetical tinge with a host of similes and metaphor.\textsuperscript{22}

Thus in view of Bhartrhari the \textit{kālaśakti} holds the similar relation with the \textit{Śabdabrahman} as \textit{māyā} does with the \textit{Brahman}

5.3 Summary

i) In the grammatical tradition divergent views regarding time are found.

ii) Being a formal grammar, Pāṇini’s \textit{Aṣṭ} does not talk any thing about the nature of time. Though it recognizes different times past, present and future, they are not
treated as particular philosophical notion. It was Patañjali, who for the first time incited a philosophical discussion on time.

iii) Bhartrhari has given further consideration to this concept in his VP. According to him, Time is a creative power of Śabdabrahman and thus it is responsible for creation, destruction and continuity of everything in the cosmos. Being an independent power of Śabdabrahman it functions through its two powers, namely: abhyanujñā and pratibandha i.e. permission and privation.

iv) It is an instrumental cause of the activities, Therefore generally it is treated as being identical with activity, though, in reality different from it.

Thus in view of Bhartrhari the kalaśakti holds the similar relation with the Śabdabrahman as māyā does with the Brahman.

---

1 According to St. Petersburg Sanskrit German Dictionary.
2 AV. xix, 53-54
3 Maitri Upanisad Vi.2
4 anādinidhanam brahma śabdatattvam yadakṣaraṇaṁ |
   vivartate 'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ | Bk.1

5 kālākhyā svātantryāsaktirbrahmaṇa iti tatra bhagavadbhārtr-
harerabhiprāyāḥ II Prakāśa on PK. 9.62
6 ekameva yadāṃnātaṃ bhinnāsaktivyāpāśrayāt l
7 aprthakatveśī saktibhyāḥ prthakatveneva vartate II Bk.2ll
8 utpattau ca sthitau caiva vināśe cāpi tadvatām l
9 nimittam kālamevāhurvibhaktenātmanā sthitam II Pk. 9.3ll
10 adhyāhitakalāṃ yasya kālaśaktimupāśritāḥ l
janmādayo vikārāḥ saḍ bhāvabhedasya yonayaḥ II Bk. 3ll
11 pratibandhābhyanujābhyaṃ tena viśvaṃ vibhajyate II Pk. 9.4 ll
12 tamasya lokatantrasya sūtradhāram pracākṣate (loc. cit)
13 Mishra k. k , "Time according to Bhārtṛharit" " Viśvesvarānda
14 ciraksipravyavasthānaṃ kālādhikaraṇaṃ tathā II Pk 9.47
15 tamasya lokayantrasya sūtradhāram pracākṣate II Pk. 9.4ll
16 gurutva parimiyeta kālādevaṃ kriyāgardhi II Pk. 9. 28ll
17 mūrūnāṃ tena bhinnānāmācayāpacyāḥ prthak l
laksyante pariṇāmena sarvāsāṃ bhedayoginā II Pk. 9.13ll
18 tatāstau samavāyākhyā śaktirbhedasya bādhikā
ekatvamiva tā vyakṭrāpādayati kāraṇāḥ II Pk. 9.18ll
19 kecit kāraṇavyatiriktam kāryaṃ necchanti l
bhedapratyayāviśayebhyaḥ 'bhedapratyayaviśayasyāvayavino vayave
bhyo vastuto 'bhedānnaikatvamiti iva śabdaḥ II Prakāśa on Pk.9.18ll
20 jalayantrabhramāveśasadrśibhiḥ pravṛtibhiḥ l
sa kalāḥ kalayansarvāḥ kālākhyāṃ labhate vibhuḥ II Pk. 9.14ll
21 See vṛtti on Bk. 3
22 ekasya śaktayah tisrāḥ kālasya samavasthitāḥ l
yacchambandhena bhāvānāṃ darśanādarśane satām II Pk 9.49ll
Chapter III Concept

21 tasya kramavadbhirāmātrārūpāiḥ kartṛśaktiḥ pravibhajyamānā
vikāramātrāgataṁ bhedarūpaṁ tatradhyāropayati tulasūtra iva
saṁyogidravyāntara guru vratabdhi pratibandhakāle daṇḍalekhāvacchedam ||
Vṛtti on Bk.3||

22 Mishra K. K. “Time according to Bhartṛhari”, Viśvesvarānanda
6.1 Dhvani: A historical overview

The term *dhvani* (sound) is derived from the root ‘*dhvan*’ to make sound. *Dhvani* is an older term going back to AV, where it was used in the sense of sound, tune, noise etc.\(^1\)

In the *Veda* and *Upaniṣad*, there are many mythical and magical speculations regarding speech and sound. The *Brāhmaṇa* texts have also given some focus on analyzing the words into their elements in the context of meaning.\(^2\) The problem regarding the relation between sound and meaning is fully discussed by the ancient Indian thinkers. Thinkers like Audumbarāyaṇa and Vārttākṣa\(^3\) were the pioneers in this field. Even Yāska in his *Nir.* records, the view of Audumbarāyaṇa regarding the eternal character of the sound.\(^4\)

Pāṇini’s grammar does not talk anything about eternity or non-eternity of *dhvani* because it is not related with the philosophical problem of language.

Patañjali has, however, presented a systematic discussion on *dhvani* by accumulating various ideas from his predecessors. He makes an important statement regarding the nature of *dhvani* and *sphoṭa*. i.e. *dhvani* is heard by the ear and *sphoṭa* is grasped by intellect. Therefore, both *sphoṭa* and *dhvani* are essential for the knowledge of meaning.\(^5\) He mentions that the
language (śabda) has two aspects i.e. sphoṭa and dhvani. The former is the permanent unchanging element, where as the latter refers to the non-permanent element of the speech associated with length, tempo and various peculiarities of individual speaker, therefore dhvani is the actualized and ephemeral element and an attribute of the former.\(^6\)

Commenting upon the rule ‘krpo ro laḥ’ (P. 8.2.18), Patañjali further states that dhvani stands for ordinary sounds and sphoṭa represents the class sounds. To explain the above aspect Patañjali gives the analogy of drumbeat.

"When a drum is struck, one drum-beat may travel twenty feet, another thirty, another forty, but the sphoṭa is precisely such and such a size, the increase and decrease in the steps is caused by the difference in the duration of dhvani.\(^7\)

Thus, the term sphoṭa stands for the initial sound of the drum while the term dhvani stands for the reverberation of the initial sound. This reverberation is called dhvani and it is responsible for the increase and decrease in length.

The above discussion makes it clear that, for Patañjali, the sphoṭa is a unit of sound as an isolated letter or a series of letters, which can be analyzed as a succession of sound unit, it has a normal and fixed size. The difference in the speed of
utterance does not affect the sphota, but it is felt to be associated with it, due to the difference in the sounds, which manifests the sphota.

6.2 Bhartṛhari on dhvani

Bhartṛhari in his Vākyapadiya and Mahābhāṣya Dīpikā exhaustively discusses the dhvani theory. In this regard, he not only gives his own views, but also records the views of others without mentioning their names.

According to Bhartṛhari the physical audible sound manifests the sphota, which is nothing but the mental articulated image of the sound through which the meaning is conveyed to the listener. Thus dhvani is the physical body of the word, whereas sphota is the conceptual entity of sound.

6.2.1 Nature of dhvani

An important feature of sound is its fixed capacity to express a particular phoneme. For instance, a particular sound, produced by its particular articulated efforts, reveals a particular phoneme.\(^8\)

Dhvani is a divisible entity. It is produced and grasped in a particular sequence and generally by mistake the same qualities of sound are superimposed on sphota.\(^9\)
The sound-wave emanating from its origin is compared to a light-wave starting from the original flame. Once the first flame has been produced by the fire-producing machinery, the light-wave continues to spread in all direction, even after the fire-producing machinery has stopped.  

The sound, which contains vibration in it, travels in all directions. The range covered by the sound depends upon loudness (intensity) of the sound. The area covered by the sound may be smaller or larger, but that does not change the duration of the \textit{sphota}.  

According to another view, \textit{sphota} is the first sound. It results from the conjunction and disjunction of the vocal organs with points of articulations. On the other hand, sounds, which originate from the first sound and spread in all direction and travel over a certain range, are the \textit{dhvanis}. In short, the articulated sound is \textit{sphota}, and its continuation in the form of sound-waves is called \textit{dhvani}.  

\textbf{6.2.2 Two types of sounds: The primary and the secondary}

Bhartṛhari makes a new distinction within the manifesting sounds: \textbf{primary sound} (\textit{prākṛta dhvani}) and \textbf{secondary sound} (\textit{vaikṛta dhvani}).
6.2.2.1 Primary sound

Primary sounds are those, without which the form of sphota would remain unmanifested and therefore unperceived. The primary sounds are considered to be the root cause of sphota, because, as soon as we hear the primary sounds, sphota is perceived. Due to this close relationship between the two, the features of primary sounds are often attributed to the sphota.

Another character of primary sounds is that, they determine exact nature of the sphota, as short, long or prolonged, for example a, a, a. Length of the vowel as short, long or prolonged is considered as the primary feature of sounds because, in the case of length, we find some significant differences in articulating position of vocal organ.

Duration seems to be the basis for this distinction. According to this distinction, primary sounds are classified into three i.e. apacita, pracita and pracitatara. When a primary sound is apacita (brief in duration) it manifests a short vowel; when it is pracita (long in duration) it manifests a long vowel; when it is pracitatara (longer in duration) it manifests a prolated vowel:

kānicidapacitarūpāvṛttigrāhyāni | tathā svabhāvabhedāداد-
pacitadhvanidyotyo hrasvaḥ | tāvatā‘bhivyaktinimittena
svarūpasya grāhikā buddhistatrotpadyate prácitadhvan-
dyotystu dirghaḥ | pracitataradhvanipratipādyastu plutaḥ | sa
6.2.2.2 Secondary Sound

The second type of sound is called *vaikṛta dhvani*\(^{15}\). It arises out of the primary sounds after the manifestation of *sphoṭa*, and therefore does not affect the quality of *sphoṭa*. It can be perceived again and again uninterruptedly for a longer period of time. The duration of the period depends upon the tempo, (*vṛtti* of the speaker). *Dr̥tavā* (rapidity); *vilambita* \(^{16}\) (slowness) are the properties of secondary sound. These qualities depend on the movements of the vocal organ from one position to another at slower or faster rate.

These properties of secondary sounds are not superimposed on the *sphoṭa*.\(^{17}\) The length of the time of continued cognition of *sphoṭa* fully depends on the tempo with which the secondary sound is associated.

The term never refers to a single phonemic unit taken by it-self, but it refers to the relation of sounds within a series.

6.2.3 Relation between dhvani and sphoṭa

Bhartrhari records three different views regarding the relation between *dhvani* and *sphoṭa*. 
Chapter-III Concept

“sphoṭarūpāvibhāgenadhvanergraṇaṁśisyate. kaiścid
∴ dhvanirasaṁvedyaḥ svatantro’nyaiḥ prakalpitak’h  || Bk. 83 ||

6.2.3.1 Sphoṭa can not be divorced from the sound

According to first view the sphoṭa perceived by the listener is not different from dhvani produced by the speaker. In this context, sphoṭa means auditory perceived sound, as there is no gap between the perception of sphoṭa and dhvani. According to more orthodox view, it is the sphoṭa, which is perceived as one with dhvani, so that the properties of the dhvani are wrongly attributed to sphoṭa.

6.2.3.2 Sphoṭa refers to the distinctive perception of Sound

According to the second view, dhvani refers to sounds emitted from the speaker’s vocal organ; whereas the sounds reaching to the ears of the listener is called sphoṭa. Here the relation between sphoṭa and dhvani is that of manifester and manifested.

6.2.3.3 Sphoṭa represent the generic aspect

According to the third view, sphoṭa represents the constant distinctive phonetic features revealed to the listener’s ear, whereas dhvani represents the gross sound.

Thus it is said:
anekavyaktyabhivyāṅgyā jātiḥ sphoṭa iti smṛtā

kaiścid vyaktaya evāsyā dhvanitvena prakalpitāḥ ॥ Bk. 96 ॥

6.2.4 Nāda and dhvani

As in ordinary language, Bharṭṛhari uses the terms nāda and dhvani as synonyms, even the adjectives praṅkṛta and vaikṛta are found added to nāda as they are to dhvani, without any apparent difference in the meaning. However, at another occasion he has differentiated the dhvani and nāda.¹⁸ In a passage from vṛtti, dhvani and nāda are distinguished, as follows:

nityapakṣe tu samyogavibhāgajadhvanivyāṅgyah sphotaḥ ekeśāṁ samyogavibhāgajadhvanisambhūtanādābhivyāṅgyah ॥ Vṛtti on Bk 78 ॥

According to this view, the word is eternal the sphoṭa is revealed by the sound produced by the contact and separation of the vocal organs. However, according to some, it is manifested by nāda resulting from the dhvani produced by the contact and separation.

Thus, according to this view nāda is the product of dhvani. In the vṛtti on Bk. 47, nāda is looked upon as a gross form or an accumulation of dhvanis.¹⁹
However, since it is a minority viewpoint, it is neither emphasized nor further elucidated.

### 6.3 Summary

To sum up, *dhvani* (meaning sound) is the term of an earlier origin. Though, thoughts about its nature are already met with in the works of scholars like Audumbarāyaṇa and others, its role in the ordinary verbal usage, and its relation with the abstract level of *sphoṭa* was defined only at the time of Patañjali. Bhartṛhari has thrown more light on this entire issue by expounding the ideas already met with in *Mbh.* and by providing original theory about the two fold nature of the sound as primary and secondary. He has also elucidated the relation between *sphoṭa* and *dhvani* by explaining it from the standpoint of the speaker as well the listener. Another merit of his work is that, he has also provided viewpoints of other scholars on the same issue. Bhartṛhari’s theories about the *prākṛta* and *vaikṛta dhvani* and the explanation of the *dhvani sphoṭa* relationship are very significant as they provide the solution to some of the linguistic problems.

---

2. *Sphoṭa Dhavani and Pratibhā*, (thesis) A. Hota, University of Pune, p. 78
3 Vīk. 344

4 indriyanityaṃ vacanamaudumbarīyaṇaḥ Nir. 1. 1

5 dhvanīḥ sphaṭāśca śabdānāṃ dhvanistu khalu lakṣyate, alpo

6 mhamśca keśāṃcidabhyayaṃ tatsvabhāvataḥ Mbh. Vol. 1. P. 181

7 sphaṭā śabdāḥ dhvanīḥ śabdagunaḥ Mbh. Vol. 1 p. 181

8 tadyathā bheryāghātaḥḥ bherimāhyta kaścidvinśati padāni

9 gacchati kaścitrīṇśatściccaatvāriniśat Mbh. Vol. 1. p. 181

10 dhvaniḥ sphotasca sabdandm dhvaniṣṭu khalu laksyate, alpo

11 mhdmsca keśdmciddubhayam tatsvabhāvataḥ Mbh. Vol. 1 p. 181

12 yah saṃyogavibhāgabhyaṃ karaṇairupajanyate

13 sa sphaṭāḥ śabsajāḥ śabdā dhvanayo’nairudāḥṛtā Mbh. 105

14 śabdasya grahaṇe hetuḥ prākrto dhvaninirisyate

15 sthitibhedanimitattavāṃ vaikṛtaḥ pratipadyate Mbh. 78

16 tadā prākrto nāma yena vinā sphaṭāśrūpamanabhyaktaṃ na

17 paricchidyate Mvr. on Mbh. 77

18 vaikṛtastu yenābhivyaktaṃ sphaṭāśrūpam punah

19 punaravicchedena pracitataram kālamupalabhyaṭe Mvr. on Mbh. 77

20 sthitibhede nimittattavāṃ vaikṛtaḥ pratipadyate. Mbh. 78

21 tasmādupalakṣitavyatirekena vaikṛtena dhvaninā

22 samsrjyamāno’pi sphaṭāśtā tāḍṛṣpyasyānadhīyopāt śāstre

23 hrasvādivat kālabhedavavyavahāram nāvatarati Mvr. on Mbh. 79
18 nādairāhitabijāyāmantyena dhvaninā saha | Bk. 86ll
19 tacca sūksme vyāpini dhvanau karaṇavyāpāreṇa pracīyamāne
sthūlenābhrasamghatavadupalabhyaṇa nādātmanā prāptavivartena
tadvivartānukārenātyantamavivartamānāṃ vivartamānmiva grhyate
ll vṛtti on Bk. 48ll
Sabda

7.1 Sabda: A historical overview

The first reference to the word *śabda* is found in *Madhyandina Saṃhitā* 30.19, where it is used to refer to god.\(^1\)

The word *śabda* has been used in different senses in different contexts. In general, *śabda* is used in the sense of sound (*dhvani*) of any kind, which is perceived by the auditory sense organ.\(^2\) In a specific sense of a spoken word, it signifies a meaningful utterance. Thus, for example when the word 'cow' is uttered it brings in the understanding of an animal having a dewlap, a tail, hoofs and horns etc.\(^3\) More specifically, *śabda* is used in the sense of a sentence spoken by a reliable person (*āpta vākyam*), which is taken as authority or testimony.\(^4\)

The word *śabda* has been of a great interest to different systems of Philosophy as well as the science of grammar for different reasons. The system of philosophy has twofold interest in it.\(^5\)

i) The philosophers and grammarians had an epistemological interest in *śabda*. They had to decide whether or not to recognize it as an independent means of knowledge.

ii) They had to determine the nature of it as a purely physical phenomenon. They had to make up their mind as to whether it is a product of waves of ākāśa, as the Naiyāyikas held or whether it is a product of a
combination of atoms or whether it is somehow derived from consciousness.

The grammarians, who, as linguists began to take interest in śabda as a means of communication, ended in dealing with it, as a psychologist and metaphysician. They look upon śabda as an eternal entity as opposed to the logician and Buddhists, for whom it is impermanent. In the present work we are focusing on the śabda, as it appears to grammarians.

In Aṣṭ., Pāṇini has used the term śabda in the sense of sound (gatibuddhipratyavasānārthaśabdakarmakārmaṅkāṇamaṇī kartā sa nau, P.1.4.52)

Patañjali has used the term śabda in three different senses:

1) A mere sound.
2) Meaningful word.
3) The conceptual sound entity otherwise known as sphoṭa

In the introductory chapter of Mbh., Patañjali provides two alternative definitions of śabda. The first definition (yenoccdtitena sāsnālāṅgūlakakudakhuravishāṅināṁ sampra- tyayo bhavati sa śabdaḥ. Mbh. 1.1 p.13)6 tells us that the term ‘śabda’: ‘word’ stands for a meaningful segment. According to second the definition (pratitapadarthako loke dhvaniḥ śabda ityucyate tadyathā (Mbh. 1.1 p.13) 7 any meaningful or meaningless sound is designated as śabda. This shows that Patañjali knows the two-sidedness of word.
One side represents ‘sound’ and the other, ‘content’. Then he proceeds to contrast this sense of śabda with the other sense of śabda namely sound, which is accepted by the lay man. Sounds are of two kinds: dhvanyātmaka (inarticulate) and varṇātmaka (articulate).

i. Dhvanyātmaka, e.g. the sound produced by the beat of a drum or the ringing of a bell etc.

ii. Varṇātmaka i.e. sound produced by the vocal organs i.e. the throat palate etc. e.g. the sound of the letter. (ka, kha etc.)

While commenting on P. 1.1.70 (taparastatkālasya), Patañjali uses the term śabda in sense of sphota word (evam tarhi sphotaḥ śabdaḥ, dhvaniḥ śabdagunah Mbh. 1.1 p.180). According to him, sphota word represents the structure of expression, which may or may not have meaning.

Patañjali makes another important statement about the nature of śabda. (ṣrotopalabdhirbuddhinirgrāhyah prayoṣeṣahbijvalitaḥ ākāśadeśaḥ śabdaḥ ekam ca punarakāśam, Mbh.1.1, p.18). Here Patañjali gives an adequate description of the process of communication. Firstly, the articulated process reveals sound. Secondly, it is perceived by the listener’s ear and thirdly the auditory perception of the sound is translated into thought. Here, it should be noted that, these ideas form the basis for Bhartrhari’s deliberations on śabda.
7.2 Bhartṛhari on śabda:

Bhartṛhari has dealt with various aspects of śabda in his VP. He has used the term in the following five senses: speech, word, sphoṭa word, sound and one of the means of knowledge (pramāṇas). In the present work we have restricted ourselves only to the first four of the meanings.

7.2.1 Śabda: The ultimate reality

Bhartṛhari, starts his philosophical exploration with the discussion of the concept of Śabdabrahman. For him it is the unique and ultimate reality. He speaks about the Brahman not only because it is the ultimate reality to be reached, but also because it is the ultimate source of everything. It is, therefore, the source of Vākya and Pada, the subject matter of Vākyapadīya. It is obvious that Bhartṛhari offers primacy to the concept of unity in his metaphysical scheme. Therefore Śabdabrahman signifies supreme unity rather than supreme existence. All along, his attempt has been to show the pluralities of the phenomenal world and direct us towards an ultimate form of unity. Bhartṛhari’s main metaphysical approach to Śabdabrahman is given in the first four kārikās of Bk. There are many other kārikās, where the main idea is supplemented or elaborated. In fact, one can say that right through the VP., Bhartṛhari has this ultimate reality at the back of his mind, even when he is dealing with what appears to be purely linguistic or grammatical topics. It runs like a thread through his work and gives
it a kind of unity. When he is speaking about jāti or dravya, sādhana, dik and kāla etc, he somehow connects it all with Brahman.\textsuperscript{12}

Bhartṛhari's philosophical inquiry about the nature of language culminates in the idea of Šabdarahman as the ground of all-phenomenal multiplicities and changes. It is a form of monism in which the principle of language is identified with the reality otherwise known as Šabdadvaitavāda. Then he goes on to unravel the structural concepts of language and thought and ends his inquiry with an analysis of the nature of utterances. In this sense his VP. consisting three parts is a complete book in the area of language analysis.
The main ideas regarding Šabda Brahman are:

1) The ultimate reality, Brahman, which is without beginning and end, is of the nature of the word (Šabdatattava) and from it proceeds the whole universe.\textsuperscript{13}

2) The ultimate Reality i.e. Brahman is one, but it manifests itself as many because of its many powers. It is not different from its powers but appears to be different.\textsuperscript{14}

3) Time is one of the powers of Brahman, in fact, the important of them. It is one, but divisions are superimposed on it. On it depend all the different kinds of actions and changes (ṣaḍ bhāvavikārāḥ) which bring about multiplicity in Existence or being.\textsuperscript{15}
4) The ultimate reality, which is one, contains all the seeds of all multiplicity. It manifests itself as the Experiencer, the Experienced, and the Experience itself. 16

7.2.2 Eternality of śabda:

Grammarians are generally of the opinion that the speech is of eternal character. Ancient thinkers like Audumbarāyaṇa17 and Vyādi18 may be treated as first thinkers of this view. It was then supported by other thinkers like Kātyāyana, Patañjali and Bhāratṛhari. Under the Vā. “siddhe śabdārthasambandhe”19 Patañjali established that words as well as their meaning and their relation is eternal. He has brought out the exact meaning of the term nitya (eternal) with the epithets such as kuṭastha, avicāli20 etc. In Vedāntic conception all these epithets are frequently used to signify the Supreme Being. Patañjali extends the meaning of the term nitya further and says ‘that is also eternal where the essence is not really destroyed’.21 Here essence means existence, thus when one says the word is eternal it means that it exists all the time.

Bhāratṛhari also supports this concept of eternality. He declares ‘śabda may be produced or may perish but it is there in uninterrupted currency’. words look like a stream and therefore they are eternal. It is called pravāhanityatā or vyavahāranityatā’.22
7.2.3 Sound and meaning: Two aspects of śabda

A word has two aspects: sound and meaning. The first aspect refers to the phonetic form while the second aspect refers to the thing meant by it. In the grammatical context, a word stands for its own form while in communication we understand from a word a thing meant.

These two aspects of word are compared to two aspects of knowledge and light. Knowledge and light both reveal their own form as well as that of the object to be known and illuminated. Similarly, words while revealing their own form reveal the meaning to be conveyed.

But the sound-form is regarded as secondary with regard to meaning because the sound-form is only instrumental in conveying meaning to the listeners. Although the listener has to hear the sound-form carefully, his attention is mainly directed to the meaning conveyed.

Words do not make meaning known independently i.e. before they become the objects of audition. If the listener does not grasp the form of a word, he will not understand the meaning. Mere existence of words does not convey any meaning unless they are uttered by the speaker and heard by the listener.
7.2.4 Two types of words: Mental and audible

Bhartṛhari assumes two types of words: mental and audible. The mental word is an abstract form known as *sphota*, whereas the audible word is a phonetic form known as *dhvani* or *nāda*.

The abstract form is a conceptual image of the phonetic form. According to some, the difference between these two is real whereas according to others it is superfluous. According to Bhartṛhari, there is a cause and effect relationship between these two types of words. If viewed from the speaker's point the abstract form is the cause of phonetic form. However, if viewed from the listener's point, it is the exact opposite. When a speaker intends to speak, he first selects a word related to a particular meaning in his mind. And then expresses it with the help of articulated sound. The nature of the abstract word is such that it is devoid of any sequence and parts. However, since the articulation of sound is done in sequence and in parts, these qualities are superimposed upon it.

7.3 Origin of śabda

Bhartṛhari presents different views with regarding to the origin of śabda. This includes the views of *sikṣākāra*, jainas and Patañjali. The cause of śabda according to *sikṣākāra* is air, according to Jaina is atom and according to grammarian it is knowledge.
7.3.1 The theory of Śīkṣākāra:

When a speaker intends to express his mental thought, certain internal process takes place in order to express it. The desire of expression leads the speaker to make an effort i.e. pushing the air upwards in the direction of the mouth, tightening the vocal chords, opening the lips, stretching the jaw etc. The air set in the motion by these efforts, strikes at the different places of articulation and transforms into sounds. The impact of the forceful air caused by the desire and effort of the speaker is such that even the solid masses are broken up due to its accumulation.

7.3.2 Jaina Theory:

According to this theory, atom is the cause of śabda. There are distinct qualities in atoms. They have all the powers. On account of their separation and association, they assume various forms such as shadow, sunlight, darkness, and sounds. The blue atom changes into shadow and darkness, while the white atom changes into sunlight and śabda atoms change into solidified sounds. When the power of śabda atoms is manifested by the effort of speaker, they are set in motion and start gathering like rainy clouds urged by the wind. The śabda atoms gathered in this way take the shape of solidified audible sounds.
7.3.3 The theory of Grammarians

According to this theory the knowledge, which is in the form of subtle speech, takes a form of śabda. When someone wants to express his knowledge to others, first his knowledge, which is in the form of subtle speech, (suksma vāgātmā) comes in contact with the mind. Then with the help of some special saṃskāra of the fire in the stomach it reaches the stage of maturity where it can assume the form of an audible speech. It then transforms into prāṇavāyu, life-breath and is thrown in the upward direction. The life-breath, which is the substratum of the mind, carries its intention with it, and gets ready to assume the form of audible speech. At this stage all the phonetic distinctions are in the latent stage. These distinctions become manifest only when the life-breath reveals itself in the form of phoneme. After manifestation it merges into them. It means, it is revealed to the listener in the form of phoneme and not in the form of air. This view is different from the first view, which holds that the air assumes the form of phoneme, in as much as it lays down more emphasis on the various components of the knowledge such as knower, mind, knowledge and their capacity to manifest. Moreover in this view, prāṇavāyu is simply treated as the medium or physical means of expression.

7.4 Four views on nature of Śabda:

Verse 71 of Bk. records four different views on the nature of śabda as follows: Some scholars considered the word to be one whether it is accepted as to be produced or eternal; others considered it as many, whether it is accepted as produced or eternal.
Thus the four views are:

i) word is produced and one (kāryatve ekatvam)

ii) Eternal and one (nityatve ekatvam)

iii) Produced and many (kāryatve nānātvam)

iv) Eternal and many (nityatve nānātvam)

7.4.1 Word is produced and one (kāryatve ekatvam)

It is our common experience that words are produced as a result of various articulated efforts. Thus the view, that words are produced agrees with our common experience. In the same way the unity among many individual utterances of the same word does not contradict with our verbal usage. People always say that, this is the same word agni which is in use since the time of Veda. Thus on the basis of our common experience and generally accepted usage it can be said that the word is produced and one.

7.4.2 Eternal and one (nityatve ekatvam)

According to this view the relationship between the sound and word is that of revealer and revealed. The meaningful words such as: ghaṭa, paṭa etc, which permanently exist in the mind of the speaker are manifested by those particular phonemes, which are produced by the speaker with the help of several articulated efforts. Thus sounds only manifests the words that are already there in the speaker’s mind, in the same way as the light manifests the already existing forms. Here it cannot be said
that, the forms are produced by the light. In the same way words cannot say to be produced as they always exist in the mind of the speaker. Thus, according to this standpoint, words are eternal. At the same time they are also one following the conventions: ‘This is the same word as the other’.

7.4.3 Produced and many (kāryatve nānātvam)

According this view, words are produced by the effort of the speaker. Thus at one moment they are born and next moment they perish. Every time a word is produced it can be treated as new word on account of the diversity in speaker, place and time of production. Thus word is produced and many. The oneness of the word is simply figurative and not real.

7.4.4 Eternal and many (nityatve nānātvam)

According this view, the basic form of the word, which is manifested through the phonemes such as ‘gha’ etc. is eternal, but at the same time its each manifestation by one or the different speakers is different from the other. This is similar to the view held by the Naiyāyikas with regard to individual soul (Jivātman). According to them, individual soul is eternal and at the same times many as it is different in each individual body. ‘jīvatmā tu pratiśaritam bhinno vibhurnityaśca’, (Tarkasamgraha, pratyakṣakhanda). Thus, according to this fourth view the word is eternal and at the same time it is multiple. Here too the idea of
oneness among the words is said to be figurative and not based on the reality.

Out of these four views the view: *nityatve ekatvam* is the view of *Mimamsakas* and Grammarians. *Karyatve nanatvam* is the view held by the *Naiyiyikas*. The other two views namely *karyatve ekatvam* and *nityatve nanatvam* are not ascribed to any particular school or scholar. It seems that they are mentioned here as the remaining two possibilities.

7.5 Greatness of Šabda

The basis for the expression of a meaning is that the speaker wants to communicate it, no matter whether it has an external existence as an object or not. Desire to communicate depends upon the existence of suitable word for every meaning which when desired comes to the mind. The expression of what one wants to say depends upon the word.

‘arthaprayrttitattvaṇāṃ śabdā eva nibandhanaṃ’ I Bk. 13

There is no cognition in the world in which the word does not figure. All the knowledge is as it were, intertwined with the word.

\[na so'stī prayoyo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte \]
\[anuviddhamiva jñānaḥ sarvaḥ śabdena bhāṣate \] I Bk. 131

It is the word, which is the basis of all the sciences, crafts and arts. Whatever is created due to it can be analyzed (and communicated).

\[sā sarvavidyāśilpānāṃ kalanāṃ copabandhāni \]
\[tadvaśādabhinispanṇāṃ sarvaḥ vastu vibhajyate \] I Bk. 133
The consciousness of all beings going through transmigration is in the nature of the word; it exists within and without. The consciousness of all types of beings does not go beyond this essence.

\[\text{saïśa saṃsāriṇāṃ saṃjñā bhīrantaraśca vartatel} \]
\[\text{tanmātrāmvyatikrāntaṃ caitanyam sarvajātiśu || Bk. 134||} \]

It is because consciousness is of the nature of the word that the distinction between sentient and insentient is made in the world.

It has been said:

It is the word, which urges all beings towards purposeful activities. If that were absent, every thing would be insentient like a piece of wood or a wall.

\[\text{arthakriyāsu vāk sarvān samihayati dehinah} \]
\[\text{tadutkṛāntau visañjno'yaṃ dṛṣyate kāṣṭhakud̄yavat || Bk. 135||} \]

\(\text{Śabda}\) is the soul of all the transactions in the world. The power, which creates and regulates this universe, rests on word. It is through it, that all this diversity of understanding is perceived. It is the word which sees the object, it is the word which speaks, it is the word which reveals the object which was lying hidden, it is on the word that this multiple world rests and it is this very word which enjoys all the differentiation.
7.6 Summary

To sum up, the word *śabda*, which originally meant sound, was later used by the grammarians to denote different levels of the speech. Such as: Articulated sound, word, *sphoṭa* and the speech itself. Bharṭṛhari, raised the word to the level of ultimate reality. As all human experiences are intertwined with the word. The word is said to be the principle cause of existence. According to grammarians, word is eternal in two ways: one because it is a permanent, non-changing entity. Two because it is in use since the time immemorial. Word has two aspects, the first aspect is in the form of sound pattern whereas the second aspect is in the form of meaning. When a word is uttered both these aspects are revealed simultaneously, Patañjali and Bhaṭṭhāri speak of two type of words: mental and audible. The mental word popularly known as the *sphoṭa*, is the abstract form of audible word. Whereas the audible word popularly known, as *dhvani* is the manifestation of the mental word. To conclude different *śāstraṅkaras* have their different theories about the origin and nature of the word in accordance with their accepted standpoint. However, in spite of the differences in their viewpoints they all agree on the unrivaled importance of the word in the human life.

\[1\] *Pratiśṛtkayā artanam ghoṣāya bhaṣamantāya bahuviḍiṇamanatāyamūka śabdāyāḍambarāghātaṁ mahase viṇāvādaṁ koṣāya tuṇavadhmavarasparāya śaṅharavadhma vanāya vanapamanyatoranyāya dāvapaṁ \| Māḍhyandina saṃhitā 30.19 \|
2 'śrotragāhyo 'ṛthah śabdaḥ, Vākyavṛtti of Laugāksi Bhāskara.

3 yenoccaritena sāsnā-lāṅgulakhura-viśaṅiṇāṁ sampratyayo bhavati saḥ śabdaḥ \( \text{|| Mbh.1.1.p.1} \)

4 āptopadeśah śabdaḥ , Vātsāyana Bhāṣya

5 Shastri Charudeva, *The philosophy of Bhartrhari*, p. 102)

6 Word is that which, when uttered, gives rise to the knowledge of objects possessed of dewlap, tails, humps, hoofs and horns.

7 word is that sound from which there arise the knowledge of things in the affair of the world.

8 dhvani viśeṣasahakṛta kanṭhatālva \( \text{I} \)

bhīghāta janyaśca varṇātmaka \( \text{|| śabdārthā Ratnākara} \|\)

9 Or may it be thus śabda is sphaṭa, an quality of that sound is śabda.

10 He says śabda is what is perceived by the auditory organs, grasped through intellect, revealed by the sounds pertaining to the region of the sky.


12 ibid. p.2)

13 anādinidhanam brahma śabdatattvam yadaksaram \( \text{||} \)

vivartate 'ṛthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yathaḥ \( \text{|| Bk. 1} \)

14 ekameva yadāmnātaṁ bhīnaśaktivyapāśrayāt \( \text{||} \)

apṛthaktve 'pi śaktibhyaḥ prthaktveneva vartatē || Bk. 2

15 adhyāhitakalāṁ yasya kālaśaktimupāśritāḥ \( \text{||} \)

janmādayoḥ vikārāḥ śaḍ bhāvabhedasya yonayaḥ \( \text{|| Bk.3} \)

16 ekasya sarvabijasya yasya ceyamanekadhā \( \text{||} \)
bhokṣṭbhokṣṭavaryuṇeṇa bhogarūpeṇa ca sthitih || Bk. 4

17 indriyanityaṁ vacanamaudābarāyaṇaḥ || Nir. 1.1

18 kim punah nityaśabdaḥ ahosvit kārya? samgrhahe etat pradhānyena
pariśītāṁ || Mbh. 1.1, p.7

19 Mbh. 1.1.p.6
20 yatkūṭaṁ śesavācāliṣu bhāvesu vartate ||Mbh. 1.1.p.6

21 aṅkṛtāvapi tattvam na viññante || Mbh. 1.1, p.7

22 nityatve kṛtakatve vā teṣāṁādirna vidyate
prājñāṁiva sā caīśa vyavasthānityatocyaṁ || Bk.28

23 bhedenāvagṛhītāu dvau śabdadharmāvapōdhrtau
bhedaśāryeṣu hetutvamavirodhena gacchataḥ || Bk. 59

24 vrddhyādayo yathā śabdāḥ svarūpoopanibadhanāḥ ||
ādaichpratyāyitaṁ śabdaṁ sambandhaṁ yānti samjñībhiḥ || Bk.60

25 ātmaraṇaṁ yathā jñāne jñeyarūpaṁ ca dṛṣyaṁ artharūpaṁ tathā śabde svarūpaṁ ca prakāśe || Bk. 51

grāhyatvaṁ grāhakatvaṁ ca dve śaktī tejeso yathā tathaiva sarvasabdāṇāmete prthagavasthite ||Bk. 56

26 yathā pravoktaḥ prāg buddhiḥ śabdesveva pravartate vyavasāyo grahiṇāmeva teṣeva jāyate || Bk. 54

27 viṣayatvamanāpnaṁ śaśaṁnārthāḥ prakāśyaṁ || na sattayaṁva te’ṛthāṁmaṅgrhītāḥ prakāśakaḥ || Bk. 57

ato’niṁjñātarūpaṁtvaṁ kimāḥyābhidhiṁyate
nendriyānāṁ prakāsyे’ṛthe svarūpam gṛhyate tathā || Bk. 58

28 avibhakato vibhaktebhya jāyate’ṛthasya vācakaḥ śabdastatrārthārūpaṁ sambhedamupagacchati || Bk.45

29 vāyoranūṇāṁ jñānasya śabdavāpattirisyate
daśściddārsanabheda hi pravādeśvanavasthitam ||Bk.110

30 labdhakriyāḥ prayatnena vakturičānuvartina
sthāṇeṣvabhiḥato vāyuḥ śabdatvaṁ pratipadyate || Bk. 111
31 tasya kāraṇasāmarthyaḥ vegapracyadharmanah ||
saṃnipātadvibhajyante sāravatyo'pi mūrtayah || Bk. 112||
32 anavaḥ sarvaśaktīvād bhedaṃsargavṛttayāh ||
chāyātapatamaḥsabdabhāvena pariṇāminah || Bk.113||
33 svaśaktau vyajyamānāyāṁ prayatnena samīrītāḥ ||
abhrāṇīva praciḥante sabdākhyāḥ paramāṇvāḥ || Bk.114||
34 athāyamāntaro jñātā sūkṣmaṅgātmapi sthitāḥ ||
vyaṁtaye svasya rūpasya sabdatvena vivartate || Bk.115||
35 sa manobhāvamaṇḍapya tejasā pākaṃgataḥ ||
vāyumāviṣati prāṇamathāsau samudāryate || Bk.116||
36 antakaranaṭtatvasya vāyurāṣrayatāṁ gataḥ ||
taddaharmena samāviṣṭasteṣaiva vivartate || Bk. 117||
37 vibhajan svātmāno granthiṃchṛṛtirūpāḥ prthagvidhaiḥ ||
prāno varṇāmbhīvyajya varṇesvebopaliyate || Bk. 118||
38 kāryatve nityatāyāṁ vā kecidekatvavādinaḥ ||
kāryatve nityatāyāṁ vā kecinnāṅvatvavādinaḥ || Bk. 71||
Sphota

8.1 Sphota: A historical overview

The term ‘sphota’ is etymologically derived from the root *sphut*, which means ‘to burst’, or become suddenly rent asunder (with a sound).¹

The word *sphota* is explained in two ways. ²

i) Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa defines *sphota* as *sphutati prakāśate rtho’smād iti sphotaha* (that, from which the meaning bursts forth, i.e. shines forth, in other words the word as expressing a meaning is called *sphota*).

ii) Sphota, according to Mādhava, is that which is manifested or revealed by the phonemes (*sphutyate vyajyate varṇairiti sphoṭaha*)

It has been suggested by Gaurinatha Shastri that, the original Greek conception of logos best conveys the meaning of *sphota*. ‘The fact that logos stand for an idea as well as a word wonderfully approximates to the concept of sphota’.

The concept of *sphota* is the unique contribution of Indian grammarians to the philosophy of language. This is the theory, which explains the working of the speech process. We do not have sufficient evidence, in our hand, to establish who was the first founder of the *sphota* theory. Haradatta in his *padamañjari* and Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa in his *sphoṭavāda* claim that the *sphoṭāyana* was the first founder of the *sphota* doctrine.⁴
Vyādi, (the author of *saṃgraha*) might have recorded some discussion about the *sphota* theory; as the distinction between the *prākṛta dhvani* and *vaikṛta dhvani* mentioned in the *VP.* is supposed to have been made by him. Some scholars believe that the indirect reference to *sphota* theory is found in the writings of Audumbarāyaṇa quoted by Yāska in his *Nirukta.* Here it should be noted that, Yāska did not use the term *sphota* and seems to have known little about it. Audumbarāyaṇa also does not mention the term *sphota* directly, his awareness of *sphota* is speculated on the basis of the *sphota* concept of Bhartrhari.

Some grammarians even claimed that the germs of the *sphota* theory are present in Pāṇini’s *Aṣṭ,* as he mentions the name of *sphotāyana.* The specific mention of the name *sphotāyana,* neither sufficiently indicates that Pāṇini knew anything similar to the *sphota* theory, nor does it point out that this doctrine originally belonged to the sage *sphotāyana.*

The *Vārtikakāra,* Kātyāyana does not mention the word *sphota* in his *Vt.* He only established the great principle that *śabda* is *nītya,* *artha* is *nītya,* and their mutual relation i.e. *vācyā- vācaka-bhāva* is also *nītya.* While explaining upon Pāṇinian rule *taparastatkālasya,* P.1.1.70, he says that the letters are fixed and the style of *vṛtti* depends upon the speech habits of the speaker. This statement of Kātyāyana, regarding
the nature of word and the difference in tempo takes us near to
the *sphota* doctrine.

8.2 Patañjali on *sphota*

Here it should be admitted that though earlier thinkers
talk of the eternal and pervasive character of the word, the clear
picture of *sphota* theory is not found before Patañjali. He
discusses the idea of *sphota*, under P-1.1.170 (*taparastatkālasya*), and P-8.2.18 (*krpo ro laḥ*), where the word
*sphota* is not applied to the meaning bearing element, but to a
permanent aspect of phonemes.

According to Patañjali, *sphota* is not identical with
*sabda*. It is rather a permanent element of *sabda*, whereas
*dhvani* represents its non—permanent aspect. The *sphota* is not
audible like *dhvani*. It is manifested by the articulated sounds.
The *dhvani* element of speech may differ in phonetic value with
reference to the variation in the utterance of different speakers.
Differences in speed of utterance and time distinctions are
attributes of *dhvani*, which can not affect the nature of *sphota*
revealed by the sound. When a sound passes from the speaker’s
lips, *sphota* is revealed instantaneously. But before the listener
comprehends anything, *dhvani* elements manifest the
permanent element of *sabda*. So *sphota* comes first and
manifesting *dhvani* also continues to exist after the revelation of
*sphota*. That is why Patañjali remarks that *dhvanis* are
actualized and euphemeral elements and attributes of *sphota*.10
Patañjali points out that the sphota, which is revealed by the articulate sounds, can be presented through phonemes only. A phoneme (vowel) which represents sphota remains the same in three modes of utterance, i.e. slow, fast and faster, whereas dhvani (articulate sound) differs in different utterances.\textsuperscript{11}

It is just like the distance, which remains the same, even if it is covered by various means, which travel slow, fast, and faster. Regarding the unaffected nature of sphota, Patañjali gives the analogy of a drumbeat. When a drum is struck, one drum-beat may travel twenty feet, another thirty feet, another forty feet and so on. Though the sounds produced by beating the drum differ, the drumbeat remains the same. Sphota is precisely of such and such a size, the increase and decrease in step is caused by the difference in the duration of dhvani.\textsuperscript{12}

According to Patañjali, sphota is a conceptual entity or generic feature of articulated sounds, either in the form of isolated phonemes or a series of phonemes. It is permanent element of physical sounds which are transitory in nature, and which vary in length, tempo and pitch of the speaker. It is an actualized replica of euphemeral sounds.

\textbf{8.3 Bhartṛhari on sphota}

In interpreting the doctrine of sphota, Bhartṛhari follows the tradition handed down by his predecessors like Patañjali and
others. While explaining the notions of *sphota*, he not only gives his own view but also gives the views of others (using *kecit* and *apare*)\(^{13}\) without mentioning their names. Traditionally it is believed that, they may be *Mimāṃsakas* and *Naiyāyikas*.

The notion of *sphota* is part of Bhartṛhari’s monistic and idealistic metaphysical theory. The term *sphota* occurs nine times in the *Brahmakāṇḍa*,\(^{14}\) the use of the term *śabda*\(^{15}\) in different senses namely, *pada*, *vākya*, *sphota*, *dhvani*, *nāda*, *prākṛtadhvani*, and *vaikṛtadhvani* pose certain difficulties in determining the actual nature of *sphota*.

### 8.3.1 Nature of *sphota*:

Bhartṛhari begins the discussion of the nature of *sphota* with the observation that words or sentences can be considered under two aspects as sound –pattern or it’s generic feature. He recognizes two entities, both of which may be called *śabda*: one is the underlying cause of the articulated sounds, while the other is used to express the meaning. Thus it is said:

\[
\text{dvāvupādānaśabdeṣu śabdau śabdaviduḥ/}
\]

\[
\text{eko nimittam śabdānāmaparo’ṛthe prayujyate/ Bk. 44/}
\]

The former, called *sphota* is the conceptual entity and permanent element of word whereas the latter, called *dhvani* is a sound –pattern, which is the external aspect of the language
symbol. Thus *sphota* which is mental impression of an audible sound pattern is the cause of that sound pattern.

### 8.3.2 Two views regarding the relation of sphota and dhvani

Bhartrhari records two totally contradictory views about these two different elements of the word: *Sphota* and *Dhvani*. According to some, there is an absolute difference between these two elements, with cause and effect relationship between them. This agrees with the view held by the logician, who assumed total distinction between the cause and effect. According to the second view the difference between these elements is mere psychological and not real. This said to be the view held by Vedántins, Sāmkhya and grammarians, who believe that the effect is inherited in the cause.¹⁶

*Sphota*, according to Bhartrhari, is always intimately related to *dhvani*. As soon as the sounds are produced the *sphota* is cognized instantly. Thus sounds are manifesters and *sphota* is manifested.¹⁷

It is the articulate sound, which reaches the listener’s ear in the form of the *sphota*. To put it differently *sphota* is a replica of *dhvani* having phonetic features. That’s why it is an “auditory image of the sound”¹⁸

According to Bhartrhari, *sphota*¹⁹ is one and without sequence. Therefore neither the question of parts nor the order can arise in the conception of *sphota*. It is sound or *nāda*, which
is produced at different moments of time, and the notions of sequence of plurality that really pertain to sounds are wrongly attributed to *sphoṭa*.

Bhartṛhari elucidates this point with the illustration of reflection. The reflection\(^{20}\) of moon in the water, though actually immovable, appears to be moving due to the movement in the water. Here is the property of water; i.e. movebality is superimposed on the reflected image of the moon. Similarly sequence which is a property of sound is superimposed on the *sphoṭa* which in reality is without sequence.

The temporal distinction\(^ {21}\) and variations in the speed of utterance\(^ {22}\) are the properties, which provide many varieties and hereby they explain continuity of the perception of *sphoṭa*. But the properties of the secondary sound do not affect the intrinsic form of the *sphoṭa*.

8.3.3 Three views on the relation between *sphoṭa* and dhvani\(^ {23}\)

**First view:** The sound, which is closely bound up with the *sphoṭa*, is not perceived separately, like the colour, which is not separately perceived from the object.

**Second view:** The sound, without getting itself perceived, causes the perception of the *sphoṭa*, as the sense organ and their qualities, which being themselves unperceived, cause the perception of objects.
Third view: Sound is also perceived without giving rise to the apprehension of the form of sphota. In other words, the perception of sound is not regarded as identical with the perception of the sphota.

8.3.4 Three views on Sphota

Bhartṛhari records three different views on the nature of the sphota. He says that according to some the term sphota stands for the initial articulated sounds produced by the various degrees of contacts of articulatory organs with the point of articulation. The sounds, which are produced, from the initial sounds that spread in all directions in the two ways i.e. ‘vīcitарамङ्गन्याया’ (like ripples) and ‘kadambagolakanyāya’ (like blossom of kadamba tree). They are like the reflections of the original sound. The first sound in each chain is the result of vibration of the vocal organs, while the others are produced, not by the movement of the vocal organs but by the sounds immediately preceding them. The former is the sphota and the later is called ‘dhvaniḥ’. Thus, according to the thinkers of this view, even after the organs have ceased to vibrate, other sounds also originate from the sphota like the series of flames which stream forth from other flames.\(^24\)

The second view put forward by Bhartṛhari, both\(^25\) dhvani and the sphota are said to be produced at a time. This is explained by the analogy of the flame and the light. The flame
and light are produced at the same moment. However, from a
distance we see the light without seeing the flame. In the same
manner from the distance we may perceive the sound and not
the sphoṭa. According to this theory there is no interval between
sphoṭa and dhvani.

According to the third view, sphoṭa stand for the
universal concept, which is manifested by many individual
sounds. The varied individual sounds are called dhvanis, while
the universal nature of these varied individual sounds is
considered to be sphoṭa.26

8.3.5 The process of communication (vāgyyavahāra)

The sphoṭa remains in the intellect of both the speaker
and the listener with no motion before its manifestation. There
is an inter-link between sound and sphoṭa, as soon as the
speaker produces the sound through articulate organs, the
sphoṭa is revealed. But listener can not understand sphoṭa
immediately. Each sound unit contributes some thing to the
total perception of sphoṭa. The listener receives the phonemes
in a sequence and grasps the form of a word in his mind, when
the last phoneme is heard. The last sound helps the listener to
recognize the sphoṭa absolutely. This entire process of
manifesting sphoṭa is compared with the act of painting. Just
as an artist reproduces his mental27 idea of the form of an object
on a cloth, similarly the speaker reproduces the mental verbal image of a word through articulated phonemes.

The process of communication (vāgyyavahāra) is the combination of four steps.\textsuperscript{28}

i) The speaker selects in his mind a particular word form, which is related to particular meaning.

ii) The sound-form of the word is revealed through the phonetic act.

iii) The sounds are emitted in sequence by the speaker and are received by the listener in sequence.

iv) From these sounds a listener receives the mental idea of the uttered word.

8.4 Some misconceptions about Bhartrhari's Sphota theory

Later grammarians treat sphota as meaning conveying power of the language. S.D Joshi after studying carefully all the nine occurrences of the term sphota in the VP, has stated that:

"Bhartrhari does not say that sphota is an indivisible entity. He does not treat it as a meaningful aspect of the language. The term does not occur in connection with the sentence and word in the second and third kāṇḍa of the VP". It is always related to the sound (dhvani). The idea of indivisibility of sphota can be traced in Bk.74\textsuperscript{29}"
Accordingly ‘there are no phonemes in the word nor are their parts in the phonemes. There is no absolute difference of the words from the sentence’.

On the basis of the verse, S.D. Joshi states that significative units can not be broken into parts. But phonemes have no relation with the meaning. He argues that, an indivisible nature is assigned to sphota by the latter grammarians, which goes against the intention of Bhartṛhari. They have deliberately interpreted the term varṇa sphota in the sense of stem, roots, suffixes etc, to justify the indivisibility and meaningfulness of sphota. Thus, they have imposed their own idea on Bhartṛhari.

Bhartṛhari’s statement pointed out that the śabda is self-revealing, i.e. it reveals its own phonetic form as well as the meaning. The later grammarians have wrongly applied this self-revealing character of a word to sphota. But Bhartṛhari does not say that, sphota is self-revealing.

According to S. D. Joshi the sphota is comprehended by the listener through the sound produced by the speaker. The sphota represents class of individual sounds, whereas dhvani represents a particular sound. The sphota is a sound or a type of sound, which may or may not be meaningful. The meaning-conveying nature of the word in the Bk.44 has been wrongly
identified with the feature of sphoṭa by the later grammarians and some modern scholars.\textsuperscript{33} Joshi is fully justified in interpretation Bhartrhari’s views on sphota, as this interpreting also agrees with the with Patañjali’s description of sphoṭa.

8.5 Summary

To sum up, there is no agreement among the scholars, on ‘who was the profounder of the sphoṭa theory’. The first systematic discussion on sphoṭa is found in Patañjali’s \textit{Mbh}. According to Patañjali sphoṭa is a conceptual entity or generic feature of articulated sound. However, there is no such other ancient work, which deals with the nature of sphoṭa as satisfactorily as does Bhartrhari’s \textit{VP}. According to Bhartrhari, sphoṭa is an auditory image of sound. It is indivisible and without inner-sequence. It does not stand for the meaning-bearing aspect of the word. It is not over and above the sound. Many grammarians and modern scholars have misunderstood Bhartrhari’s position on the nature of sphoṭa. They misunderstood sphoṭa to self-revealing and meaning conveying power of the language. In fact, sphoṭa merely represents class of individual sounds, whereas dhvani represents a particular sound. The sphoṭa is a sound or a type of sound, which may or may not be meaningful. The meaning-conveying nature of the word in the Bk.44 has been wrongly identified with the feature of sphoṭa by the later grammarians and some modern scholars.
Chapter III Concept

1 A Sanskrit – English Dictionary, Monier –Williams , p.1270
2 Nāgęśabhaṭṭa, Sphoṭavāda, P.5; & Mādhava, Sarvadarśanasamgraha (edited by Abhyāṅkar ) , p. 300
3 Gaurinatha Shastri, The Philosophy of word and meaning, p.102-103

4 sphoṭayanasya sphoṭapratipādanaparo vaiyākaraṇācāryaḥ SK. vol. iv. p.6

vaiyākaraṇanāgeśaḥ sphoṭayanarṣertmatam

pariśkṛtyoktavāṃstatra priyātm jagadīśvarah SV. p. 12

5 śabdasya grahaṇe hetuḥ prākṛto dhvanirisyate

sthitibhedanimittatvam vaikṛtaḥ pratipadyate Bk 78

6 indriyanityam vacanamaudumbarāyaṇaḥ Nir.11

7 avaḥ sphoṭayanasya P.6.1.123

8 siddhe śabdārthasaṃbandhe lokato arthaprayukte śabdaprayoge

śāṭreṇa dharmaniyaṁ yathā laukikavaidikesu Mbh.,Vol.1. 6

9 dhvaniḥ sphaṭaśca sabdānāṁ dhvanistu khalu lakṣyate

alpo mahāṅca keśāṃcidubhayaṁ tatsvabhāvataḥ

Mbh.,vol.1 , p.181 )

10 evaṁ tarhi sphaṭaḥ sabdo dhvaniḥ sabdaguṇaḥ Mbh. Vol. 1., p.181

11 kathāṁ avsthitā varṇā drutamadhyamavilambitaśu kīṃkṛtastarhi

vrṭtivīśeṣaṁ vaktuoṣcirācirvacakān ādvrtyayo viśisyante vaktā

kaścidāśvabhidhāyī bhavati āśu varṇānabhidhatte kaścicciṅreṇa
kaścicciratāreṇa tadyathā tamevādhvānaṁ kaścidāsū gacchati
taṁca kaścicciratāreṇa gacchati rathika āśu
gacchatyāsvikāścireṇa padātiṣchiratāreṇa viṣama upanyāśaḥ
adhiṣṭhānamatrādhvā vrajatikriyāyāḥ tatrāyuktam
yadadhiṣṭhānasya vyādhhihrāsaus syātām


12 katham bheryāghātavat tadyathā bheryāghātah bherimāhatya
kaścidvīṁśati padāni gacchati kaścitrīṁśatkaściccatvāriṁśat
Mbh. 1.1, 181 II for detail see , Joshi S. D , Sphoṭa Nirṇaya ,1967, p.14)

13 ibid , p.20


15 Satyakama Verma, Vākyapadīya aur Bhasātattva ,p.23

16 ātmabhedaṁ tayoḥ kecidasthitīyāhuḥ purāṇagāḥ!

17 buddhiḥbhedādabhināsya bhedameKE pracaKṣate Bk.46II

18 S. D Joshi , SN p.23

19 nādasya kramaḥāvatvānna pūrvo na paraśca saḥ
akramaḥ kramaḥupeṇa bhedavāṇīva jāyate Bk. 49II

20 pratibimbaṁ yathānyatra sthitāṁ toyakriyāvaśāṁ
tatpravṛttimivāṅveta sa dharmāḥ sphaṭanādayoḥ. Bk.50II

21 sphaṭasasyabhinnakālasya dvāṇaṁkālaṁupātinaḥ
grahaṇopābhedena vyṛttihedam pracaKṣate Bk. 76II

22 svabhāvañhenerator nityatve hrasvadīrghaḥplutāduśu

prākṛtasya dhvaneḥ kālah śabdasetyupacaryate Bk. 77II
23 sphotarūpāvibhāgena dhvanergraṇaṃamisyate
kaiścid dhvanirasamvedyāḥ svatanto 'nyaiḥ prakalpitaḥ || BK.83||

24 anavasthitakampe 'pi karaṇe dhvanayo 'pare ||
sphotādevopajāyante jvālā jvālāntaradiva || Bk.109||

25 dūrātprabheva dipasya dhvanimātraṁ tu laksyate ||
ghaṇṭādināṁ ca sabdeṣu vyakto bhedaḥ sa dṛṣyaṁ || Bk.107||

26 anekavyaktyabhivyangaṁ jāṭhī spota iti smṛtā ||
kaiścid vyaktya evāsyā dhvanitvena prakalpitaḥ || Bk. 96||

27 yathaikabuddhiväsayaṁ mūrtirākriyate pate ||
mūrtyarantarasya tritayamevaṁ sabde 'pi dṛṣyaṁ || Bk. 53||

28 vitarkitaṁ purā buddhyā kvacidarthe niveśitaḥ ||
karaṇebhyo vivoṭṭena dhvaninā so 'nugṛhyate || Bk. 48||

29 pade na varṇā vidyante varṇeṣvavayava na ca ||
vākyāṭpadāṇamatyaṁam pravibhāgo na kaścan || Bk. 74||


31 S. D. Joshi, SN, p. 37.

32 ibid. p.40-43.

33 ibid. p.37,38,46.
9.1 Vāk: A historical overview

The literal meaning of the word ‘Vāk’ is ‘speech’ and it is derived from the root ‘vac’ meaning ‘to speak’. It is an older term going back to RV, where it has assumed the form of goddess and has been described as the queen of the Devas'. The Devas created her and animals of all forms “speak” her. This Vāk is related to brahman as well, which is not a mere sacred formula but supreme word, and also powerful activity. In Rg-veda, hymn 10.144.8, Vāk appears as co-extensive with it. “yāvad brahma viṣṭitaṁ tāvat vāk”, It means :As much as brahman did expand as large is the word. This formula is implies a subordination of the word to brahman. In Rgveda 1.164.46, vāk is refereed to as the one real “ekam sat”. This formula will indeed be eventually interpreted as identifying brahman with word “brahmavai vāk” (aitareya brāhmaṇa 4.21). Even in the later Hindu scriptures, the Āranyaka and Upaniṣadas there is a continued equitation of speech and Brahman. As the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad states: Vāg vai brahmeti, ‘speech truly, is Brahman’. A great advance in the conception of Vāk is seen in the Upaniṣad, where the syllable ‘Om’ is identified with Brahman. Omiti Brahma | Omitīdaṁ sarvaṁ “Om” is Brahman; ‘Om is this all” Says the Taittiriyopaniṣad || 1.8||
Prof. W. Norman Brown in his article ‘The creative role the goddess Vāk in the Rg Veda’ has analysed the various metaphysical concepts relating to Vāk and the means of realizing its essence and observed enpassant⁴:

“Vāk produced the raw material of the universe, the means for organizing it and taught the gods how to use those means. The capstone of the process was the provision that the instruction should be imparted to men so that they could constantly renew creation and thus perpetuate the existence of the universe.”

As per the Pāṇinian grammatical tradition, Patañjali, in his Mbh. has praised speech as great god (maho deva) residing in immortals.⁵

9.2 Bhartṛhāri on Vāk

Bhartṛhāri portrays speech as everything in the universe. It is the speech, which is the basis of all science, arts and crafts. It has capacity to produce and classify everything⁶, the same speech remains within and out side with all living beings in the form of consciousness. There is no living being without the speech.⁷ The speech prompts the human beings in different deeds, when the same speech is gone, human being looks like a log of wood or piece of stone.⁸ Speech regulates everything. Thus, the speech does not go beyond oneness, the speech is eye of speech, the speech is bound with speech and the divisions of speech ‘cow’ etc. are seen differently.⁹ Speech has six doors, six places etc, those who
attended on death can not reach to them. In the state of dream speech manifests itself in the state of subject, object and instrument.

9.2.1 Vāk and language:

Bhartrhari has used the term *vāk* in various senses. In *Bk.* 12 (yo vācaḥ paramo rasaḥ’) and 132, (*vāgrūpatā cedutkrāmedavahodhasya śāśvatī’*), *vāk* is used in the sense of language. However in *Bk.*182 ‘daivi vāgavyatikārṇeyam aśaktairabhidhārybhīḥ ‘ Vāk is used in the sense of speech and language. On some other occasion he used the term Vāk in the sense of sentence. Here it should be noted that apart from the term Vāk, Bhṛṭhari used the term *śabda* in the same capacity.

The relation between speech and language is little confusing due to their overlapping nature. Speech is the medium to express the language. It is a series of sounds produced from the vocal organ. Commenting upon the root *vac* in *Dhātupāṭha, Dhāturuttikāra* clearly mentions that ‘bhāṣā vyaktāyāṃ vāci’ Language means uttered speech. Thus speech and language are the two sides of the same coin. However, the scope of the speech is wider than that of the language.
9.2.2 Levels of speech:

From the standpoint of the philosophy of grammar, there are two traditions regarding the levels of speech i.e. Pre-Bhartṛhari and Bhartṛhari. The Pre- Bhartṛhari tradition accepts four levels: parā, paśyantī, madhyamā and vaikharī. According to this tradition, parā is the ultimate reality. However, according Bhartṛhari they are only three in number i.e. pasyantī, madhyamā and vaikharī. For him paśyantī is the ultimate reality.

The first reference regarding four different levels of speech is found in Rk. saṃhitā:

“ The four kinds of words form the constituent of speech; the learned Brāhmaṇs, who have got control over their mind know them thoroughly; three out of four stages of speech being closed in caves do not twinkle; It is the fourth one (vaikharī) that manifests in the talk of men.”

According to Tantrāgama 2.13, these differences in speech are caused by the difference in the place of air. The different places are: mūlachakra for parā, nābhi (navel) for paśyantī, hṛd (heart) for madhyamā and kaṇṭha (throat) for vaikharī.”

As said earlier Bhartṛhari accepts only three levels of speech namely: paśyantī, madhyamā and vaikharī. In this context, Satyakama Verma feels that, Bhartṛhari has accepted these three only because they alone are the subject matter of the grammar.
While expounding *sphota* doctrine, Bhartrhari, gives a more penetrating and minute analysis of the speech. At the first level there are audible sounds which are called *vaikṛta-dhvani* or secondary sound. They reveal permanent sounds, which are called *prākṛta dhvani* or primary sounds. The primary sounds are the abstraction from the various secondary sounds. They may also be considered as the linguistically normal forms devoid of the personal variations, which are linguistically irrelevant. This may be called the second stage. The third stage is that of *sphota* which is the whole utterance considered as an integral unit as an indivisible language symbol. It is this *sphota* that reveals the meaning, which is in the form of an intuition. Strictly speaking both the *sphota* and meaning are different aspects of the same speech-principle.

Bhartrhari seems to synthesizing these various aspects of speech with the three-fold nature of the revelation of speech. Thus, the three levels of speech i.e. *paśyantī, madhyamā* and *vaikhari* stages correspond respectively to *sphota, prākṛtadhvani* and *vaikṛta dhvani*.  

**Analysis of the levels of speech:**

A common man can never understand these categories of Vāk (speech). In fact, it is the subject matter of grammatical philosophy. The speech, which we utter, is the manifested form of speech, which undergoes many modifications. Some of them are visible but others are very subtle. This visible level of speech is called *vaikhari*. It is manifested in the form of phonemes and
heard in the form of sounds\textsuperscript{17}. Ancient thinkers recognized two or three stages prior to this visible stage.

It is common experiences that, in spite of the innumerable variations in the mode of utterance, the form of understanding remains the same. In order to explain this situation the ancient thinkers have proposed an existence of an abstract level of speech called madhyamā vāk\textsuperscript{18} i.e. intermediate speech. It exists in the mind of a speaker before the speech-process has started. At this level both the word and its meaning have their own identity. For example: the word ‘cow’ denotes both word form as well as meaning. If someone asks ‘write cow’ either the word ‘cow’ can be written in script or the form of a cow can be sketched.

The fact that there are many words in our mind that are not heard outside, suggest the existence of another level of speech earlier to madhyamā. This level is called pasyantī by the ancient thinkers. At this stage word and meanings are inseparable. It is the most obscure and the subtlest form of speech. The vṛtti states ‘the pasyantī is that, in which sequence is merged and even though it is one, the power to produce sequence has entered it. It is restless and also still in concentration, hidden and pure; the forms of object of knowledge have entered it or merged into it, or it has no form at all. It has the appearance of limited objects or of connected objects or the appearance of all objects has come to an end in it. Thus it has infinite variety’.\textsuperscript{19} The vṛtti further says ‘the supreme form of
paśyānti is devoid of all correct forms, it is not mixed up and it is beyond worldly use’.  

Vṛtti again defines ‘the paśyānti is indivisible and is entirely without sequence. It is the inner light, the subtle word, and the imperishable.’

Thus according to the vṛtti, the paśyānti stage of speech is abstract in nature. It has no sequence and no form. It is invisible and beyond worldly use. But even in this stage yogins have an understanding of division of words.

9.2.3 Paśyantī and Pratibhā:

A person, who has a desire of realising the paśyantī form of speech passes through various stages and ultimately arrives at an undifferentiated state known as pratibhā. The pratibhā is a means to attain the supreme good. It is derived from the word principle (Śabdatattva). It is identical with being. It is the source of modification. It has the power of accomplishment and things to be accomplished. In an ordinary verbal communication one starts from paśyantī and goes up to vaikhari. But in śabdapūrvayoga or vyāyoga one has to commence from vaikhari and ascend up to paśyantī.

The vṛtti states ‘after having reached the undifferentiated states of the word, in pratibhā, one comes to the source of all differentiation. From that pratibhā, in which all being is latent and
which, due to the repetition of the union tends to produce its result, one (the aspirant) reaches the supreme source in which all differentiation is completely lost\textsuperscript{24}.

The \textit{paśyanṭī} form of speech and \textit{pratibhā} are literally the same. The \textit{pratibhā} is undifferentiated form of speech. It is the source from all the differentiation of speech begins. It is identical with the \textit{prakṛti} or \textit{paśyanṭī}, which is subtest form of speech. But there is difference between \textit{paśyanṭī} and \textit{pratibhā}.\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Pratibhā} is a means whereas \textit{paśyanṭī} is the end. By virtue of \textit{pratibhā}, the \textit{paśyanṭī} form of speech is activated. Thus the relationship between \textit{pratibhā} and \textit{paśyanṭī vāk} is that of cause and effect.

9.3 Summary

i) To sum up, \textit{Vāk} is an older term going back to \textit{Vedic} period where it has assumed the form of deity.

ii) Although grammarians like Patañjali and Bhartṛhari have given it the same status, they being grammarians have taken a step further by way of its analysis. Bhartṛhari uses the term \textit{Vāk} in various senses such as the speech, language and even the sentence. Here it should be noted that the concept of the language is wider than that of the sentence whereas, the idea of speech is still wider than it. Considering the \textit{vāk} from the holiest point of view Bhartrhari has analyzed it into different levels of \textit{vaikharī}, \textit{madhyamā} and \textit{paśyanṭī}. 
iii) Though the idea of dividing of speech into different levels has its root in र्क samhitā, it was Bhartrhari who evolved it into the form of theory in order to solve some of the linguistic problems faced by him.

1 rāṣṭri devānām  Vi. 90.10
2 devī vācamajayantā devāstām viśvarūpāḥ paśavo vadanti.  || Vi. 90.11
3 Brhadāraṇyaka Upanisad  4.1.2
4 Bishnupada Bhattacharya, Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapādiya and linguistic monism, BORI, p.3-4
5 maho devo martyāṁ ā viveṣa  || Mbh. 1.1.3
6 sā sarvavidyāśilpānām kālānām copabandhanī  ||
7 tadvaśādbhīnispānām sarvām vastu vibhayate  || Bk. 133
8 saṅsāriṇāṁ saṁjñā bahirantaśca vartate
   tanmātrāmavatikrāntam caitanyam sarvajātiṣu  || Bk. 134
9 arthakriyāsṛ vāk sarvām saṁihayati dehinaḥ
tadutkraṇtau visajño'yaṁ dr̥ṣyate kāṣṭhakudayavat  || Bk. 135
10 ekatvamanatikāntā vānnetrā vān nibadhanāḥ
dṛthak pratyavabhāsante vāgvibāga gavādayaḥ  || Bk. 137
11 saddvārām śaadhiṣṭhānām ( satpra) bodhāṁ śdavyayām
   te mṛtyumatvartante ye vai vācamupāsatell Bk. 138
12 pravibhajyātmanātmānaṁ sṛṣṭvā bhāvān prthagvidhānī Bk. 140
13 Satyakāma Verma , Bhāṣātattva aur Vākyapādiya, p.22
14 ibid p. 23
14 catvāri vākparimitā padānī
tāni bidurbrahmaṇā ye maniśiṇah

guhā triṇi nihitā nengayanti

turīyam vācā manuṣyā vadanti ||Rg Sāmhitā 1.164.45||

15 Satyakam Verma, Bhaṣātattva aur Vākyapaḍīya, p. 13

16 ‘Indian theories of meaning’ by K. Junjuni Raja, Adyar library and Sanskrit Research center. 1963)

17 paraiḥ sāṃvedyaṃ yasyāḥ śrotraviṣayatvena pratiniyatam
śrutirūpaṃ sā vaikhari || vṛtti on Bk. 159||

18 madhyamā tvantahṣaṃniveśini pariḥṣaṅkrameva
buddhimāropādānā || sā tu suṣkmaprāṇāvyṛttyanugta
kramasamāḥaraḥbhāve ’pi vyaktakramaparigrahaiva keśānicī || vṛtti on Bk. 159||

19 pratisamāḥṛtakramāḥ satyaprabhade samāviṣṭakramaśaktaḥ paśyanā ||
sā calācalā pratilabdhasamādhiḥ cā śūnā viśuddha ca,
sanniviṣṭajñeyākāraḥ pratilakārā nirākāra ca,
paricchinnārthatprayavabhāsā saṃśṛṣṭārthatprayavabhāsā
praśāntasarvārthatprayavabhāsā cetayapraśāntahbhedaḥ || Vṛtti on Bk. 159||

20 parantu paśyantirūpamanapabharṣaṃsamaṃkīrṇe
lokavyavahārāntam || Vṛtti on Bk. 159||

21 avibhāga tu paśyanā sarvataḥ saṃḥṛtakramāḥ
svarūpajyotirevāntaḥ sūkṣmā vāganapāyinā || Bk.167||

22 For details see K.A.S Iyer, Bhaṭṭarhaḷi, p.139-142

23 tadabhyaśacca sābdapūrvakaḥ yogamadhyagamya pratibham
tattvaprabhavāh bhāvavikāraprakṛti sattam śādhyasaśādhanaśaktiyuktam
samyagavabuddhya niyatā kṣomaprapāptirī || vṛtti on Bk. 144||
so 'vyatikīrṇāṁ vāgavasthāmadhīgamya vāgyikārāṇāṁ prakṛtim
pratibhāmanupara iti | tasmāc ca sattānu guṇyamātrat
pratibhākhyācchabdāpūrvavayogaḥbhāvanābhyāsākṣepatpratyastamita sa
rvavikāro lkehamātrāṁ parāṁ prakṛtim prati padyate Il Vṛtti on Bk.14 Il

24 Coward H. G., *Bhartṛhari*, p.44 -45