CHAPTER ONE

MILITARY RULE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK

The Praetorian Armies

The military has been playing a leading role in many Third World polities since 1945. The factors facilitating armed forces' involvement in the domestic politics of a new nation are not exclusively of military origin. It also relates to the prevailing socio-political environment of a state. The prevalence of conditions like fragility of political institutions, chronic political instability, dismal economic performance of a regime, increasing authoritarianism, lack of consensus on important issues in the polity etc., often motivate the military to intervene in politics. The interventionist officers are generally referred to as praetorian soldiers. Praetorianism is a word frequently used to characterise a situation where the military of a given society exercises independent political power within it by virtue of an actual or threatened use of force.¹

The term 'praetorianism' comes from the elite Praetorian Guard of the Roman Empire which was originally established to protect the emperor against domestic unrest. During the course of imperial history, however, the guard acquired extraordinary power. It openly blackmailed governments that could not survive without purchasing its loyalty, and it often used its military power to overthrow the emperor and to control the appointment of their successors. The term 'praetorian,' Rapoport points out, has several meanings. It refers to soldiers hired by the government to police an unruly population, but it also suggests that the loyalties of these soldiers are not fixed, for they often overturn governments they were hired to defend.²

According to Perlmutter, a modern praetorian state is one in which the military tends to intervene in the government and has the potential to dominate the executive. Among its preconditions are an ineffective executive and political decay.3

Huntington argues that in a praetorian system, there is "absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group political actions. Social forces confront each other nakedly; no political institutions, no corps of professional political leaders are recognised or accepted as legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflicts. Each group employs means which reflect its peculiar nature and capabilities to decide upon office and policy. The techniques of military interventions are simply more dramatic than others."4

Praetorianism occurs, Nordlinger suggests, in various coup situations, and most particularly when the officers themselves take control of the government. In such cases, civilian regimes are transformed into military regimes, even though certain individuals and groups often enjoy a good measure of political influence.5

The praetorians portray themselves as responsible and patriotic officers who have intervened in civilian affairs to protect the constitution and nation from corrupt and incompetent rulers. The armed forces argue that they have an overriding responsibility, a crucial mission that transcends their obligations to existing authorities.6

The praetorians assert that their aim is to restore the country to political and economic good health. They claim that they are willing and able to do so because the officer corps is highly patriotic, detached from the interests of particular class and communal groups, devoid of politicians' weaknesses, and highly skilled in technical and managerial matters. Claiming these attributes, along with the determination to succeed, they announce that they will remove corruption, root out subversive elements, restore

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3 See Perlmutter, n. 1, p. 103.
political stability and rejuvenate the economy. Some praetorians declare their intention to modernize the economy and implement progressive socio-economic reforms. Finally, almost all praetorians declare their intention to hand over the reins of government to democratically elected civilians in the near or distant future.\(^7\)

Nordlinger suggests that praetorians differ from each other with regard to the level of intervention, i.e., the extent of governmental power that they exercise and the ambitiousness of their objectives. On the basis of these differences, praetorian officers may be classified as moderators, guardians, and rulers.\(^8\)

Praetorian moderators do not directly assume power, but, instead set conditions for the performance of civilian governments.\(^9\) They exercise a veto power over a wide range of governmental decisions and political disputes, without however taking control of the government themselves. Civilians govern, but their power is checked by the military that does not accept anything near total civilian control. Moderator-type praetorians act as highly politicised and powerful pressure groups in relation to the civilian incumbents, sometimes backing up their demands with explicit threats of a coup. Where necessary, they may carry out a displacement coup – one in which a government is overthrown or prevented from taking office and is replaced by another group of civilians that is more malleable or acceptable to the military.\(^10\)

Praetorian guardians are those who perform a system-maintaining role in politics. Under this model, the armed forces periodically intervene to resolve political crises and do not aim at prolonged periods of rule to effect fundamental transformations in social,

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\(^7\) Ibid, pp. 20-21.
\(^8\) Ibid, pp. 21-22.
\(^10\) For instance, in Argentina during President Frondizi’s incumbency, between 1959-62, the military acted as moderators in making numerous demands upon him. They insisted that he dismiss several cabinet ministers and replace them with men who are acceptable to the officers, that he revise the policies regarding exploitation of oil fields and educational reforms, that he sever diplomatic ties with Cuba, and that he severely restrict the activities of working class and Communist parties or outlaw them altogether. Frondizi accepted most of the military’s demands. However, his decision to allow the working class parties to participate in the legislative elections, and their surprising show of strength, prompted a group of officers to stage a coup in 1962. See Nordlinger, n. 5, p. 23.
economic, and political structures. According to Perlmutter, praetorian guardians have the following general characteristics: (i) acceptance of existing social order; (ii) willingness to return to barracks after disputes are settled; (iii) no independent political organisation and lack of desire to maximise army rule; (iv) a time limit for army rule; (v) concern with improvement of professionalism; (vi) a tendency to operate behind the scenes as pressure groups; and (vii) a fear of civilian retribution.

The Turkish Army displays most of the characteristics of the guardian-type role. In Turkey, the army has always acted as the guardian of civil authority and political stability.

The ruler praetorians, Perlmutter argues, have characteristics that are in direct opposition to those of the guardian-types. They (i) reject the existing order and challenge its legitimacy; (ii) lack confidence in civilian rule and have no expectation of returning to the barracks; (iii) have political organisations and tend to maximise army rule; (iv) are convinced that the army rule is the only alternative to political disorder; (v) politicise professionalism; (vi) operate in the open; and (vii) have little fear of civilian retribution. The armies of Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh are good examples of ruler-type praetorians.

Compared with their guardian counterparts, the ruler-type praetorians not only control the government but dominate the regime. The political and economic objectives of the praetorian rulers are exceptionally ambitious. The far-reaching nature of the intended changes and the realisation that the changes will take considerable time to become securely rooted, necessitates regime dominance and an indefinite period of military rule. Ruler-type praetorians seek to bring about basic changes in the distribution of power by eliminating nearly all existing power centres.

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14 See Nordlinger, n. 5, pp. 26-27.
In order to understand the nature and extent of military's dominance over the state apparatus, it is necessary to examine the following factors related to the attainment and exercise of governmental power: various roles played by the armed forces in the newly independent states; officer corps' socio-economic background, ideological orientations and political attitudes; structure of the military regimes and their governing style; legitimisation tactics adopted by the military regimes and their duration; and the legacy the military rulers leave for civilian successors.

The Political Role of the Military in the Developing Countries

The armed forces have exercised considerable political influence in post-colonial states mainly due to two reasons: in the first place, they perform wide ranging functions; and secondly, they possess unique organisational features.

The primary responsibility of the military is to protect country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In most of the developing countries, the armed forces play a key role in the formulation and implementation of national security policy. The civilian government deploys the military essentially for an internal security role, but the military is able to transform its subordinate role into a dominant one. Martin Edmond is of the opinion that military’s internal security role has “less to do with the maintenance of law and order, and more to do with monitoring, and indeed containing, the political ambitions and power struggles that were inherent at first in the immediate post-colonial situation, and later when regional, ethnic or class antagonisms began to break down the first optimistic perceptions of national unity and homogeneity”. 15

Armed forces’ access to the superior coercive power enables them to act as final arbiters in any dispute, or to resolve the conflict in favour of one or the other party. Moreover, the armed forces have the potential to use that power and influence to further their own ends, rather than those in the interests of the society as a whole. 16 Finer has

16 Ibid, p. 62.
pointed out that the armed forces in the Third World enjoy three distinct political advantages over the civilian institutions: (i) a marked superiority in organisation; (ii) a highly emotionalised symbolic status; and (iii) a monopoly of most modern and lethal weapons.\(^{17}\)

In the underdeveloped societies, the armed forces not only try to protect and promote their corporate interests, but are also concerned with the distribution of power and status throughout the political system.\(^{18}\) The armed forces exercise a significant degree of influence over the direction in which the society is developing, particularly in such issues as the sharing of decision making power, choices about society’s priorities, and above all, the nature of the society and its political system.\(^{19}\)

The theoretical formulations delineated above can be illustrated by the role played by the armed forces in the Indonesian, Turkish and Pakistani politics.

The Indonesian Army

In Indonesia, the army’s active participation in the struggle for independence has to a large extent shaped its role in the polity. Unlike other developing countries, in Indonesia, the army was a self-created institution. It was raised neither by the government nor by a political party. Instead, the military created, armed and organised itself out of the shambles of the Japanese-trained Indonesian militia following the surrender of Japan and the proclamation of independence in 1945.\(^{20}\)

However, the nationalist regime of Sukarno paid little attention to the country’s military and defence problems. Besides, the constant bickering among the political leaders made the regime ineffective and it was not in a position to control the already politicised Indonesian Army. All these factors prompted the army to pursue its own


\(^{18}\) See Huntington, n. 4, p. 194.

\(^{19}\) See Edmond, n. 15, p. 62.

policies independent of the government’s. In 1948, when the Dutch colonial forces attacked Indonesia, the political leadership decided to surrender to them whereas the army commanders vowed to liberate the country. Indonesia’s first Army Chief General Sudirman organized guerrilla resistance in which the armed forces fought for independence along with the civilians and finally attained it in 1949.21

During the revolutionary period from 1945-49, as Crouch has observed, the army was engaged in the struggle for independence in which politics and military action were inseparably intertwined.22 After the Dutch attack, the army in Java which was already divided into four divisions, was given the power to govern the island. General Nasution as the Commander of the Java Army was the highest military as well as government authority during the emergency. Under him were the four divisional commanders who were appointed as the military governors for their respective areas. Although parallel civilian administration existed during that period, but on most occasions, the government functionaries were subordinated to the military governors.23

With the introduction of martial law in 1957, the Indonesian officer corps acquired vast political, administrative and economic powers. In order to justify army’s continued role in the polity, General Nasution devised the concept of ‘Middle Way’ in 1958, according to which the army would neither seek to take over the government nor remain simply a spectator. The army demanded that it must be given an opportunity to participate in the decision making process and to make use of its non-military skills in helping develop the nation.24

The Indonesian Army, having played a glorious role in the struggle for independence, began to claim itself to be an ‘Army of the People’. To defend this claim, the army referred to its successful campaign against the extremist Islamic movement of

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23 For details see Said, n. 20, pp. 17-18.
24 See Crouch, n. 22; and Jenkin, n. 21, p. 20.
Darul Islam in West Java in 1962-63, its suppression of the rebellion in Sumatra and Celebes in the late fifties, its role in the liberation of West Irian in 1962, and opposition to Malaysia in 1963.  

In 1959, Sukarno discarded the liberal democratic system, revived the 1945 Constitution, and introduced a new system called Guided Democracy. To check the bitter power struggle among the political parties, an authoritarian system was established in which the president played the central role. According to Sukarno, it meant guidance from above and a consensus achieved through discussion. Guidance and democracy were considered inseparable. In his own words, “Democracy alone can defect to liberalism; guidance alone can defect to dictatorship.”

By reviving the 1945 Constitution, Sukarno in fact, institutionalised army’s political role. Under this constitution, there were three kinds of political representation: political parties, functional groups, and the representatives of the regions. The new system provided for the army to play an active role in Indonesian politics as a functional group, allocated seats to it in the People’s Consultative Assembly – the most powerful organ of the government, and allowed it to be represented in the cabinet.

In 1962, the army further sought to expand its role in the polity by formulating the doctrine of Territorial Warfare and the doctrine of Territorial Management. The doctrine of Territorial Warfare was basically a guerrilla strategy connecting external defence and counter-insurgency operations which involved close cooperation between the army and the people. The concept of Territorial Management proposed an extensive military involvement in the day-to-day administration of the country.

However, the growing influence of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) in the country’s politics during the Guided Democracy era, and even within the armed forces,

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26. Quoted from Mehden, n. 9, p. 129.
posed real threat to the army’s attempt to expand its role. To undermine army’s position, the PKI tried to infiltrate into the Presidential Guard Regiment, the Jakarta garrison, and the air force. They also called for the creation of a network of political commissars in the military, and the formation of a militia of peasants and workers.

On October 1, 1965, the PKI with the help of some disgruntled elements within the army, plotted a coup in which 6 generals including General Yani, the then Army Chief, were murdered. When President Sukarno refused to comply with army’s demand that the PKI leaders be tried for their involvement in the killings of generals, the army and its civilian allies eliminated hundreds of thousands of PKI activists and sympathisers throughout the country.29 The debacle of the PKI weakened Sukarno’s standing who so long used it as a counterweight to the army. On March 11, 1966, Sukarno was forced to transfer power to Major General Suharto, Commander of the Strategic Reserve Command – KOSTRAD and hero of the counter coup. Under the leadership of Suharto, the army emerged as the ruling elite in Indonesia.

The Turkish Army

In Turkey, it was the army which fought a war of independence and laid the foundation of a modern secular state, facilitated the transition to multi-party democracy, and played a key role in the preparation of the three constitutions of 1924, 1961 and 1982.

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire when the allied powers – Britain, France, Italy, and Greece occupied Turkey in 1919, General Mustafa Kemal Ataturk launched an armed resistance movement and finally defeated the occupation forces and established the Turkish Republic in 1923. A new constitution was introduced in the following year.

For the next 14 years until his death in 1938, Ataturk tried relentlessly to transform Turkey into a modern secular state through several radical reform programmes.

29 See Ulf Sundhaussen and Barry R. Green’s, “Indonesia: Slow March into an Uncertain Future”, in Christopher Clapham and George Philip, eds., The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes (Beckenham: Croom Helm Limited, 1985), p. 98.
Another significant contribution of Ataturk was the establishment of civilian supremacy in Turkish polity. Right from the beginning, Ataturk firmly insisted on total separation of military and civil functions. He held that military's direct involvement in political affairs would adversely affect both the military profession and the polity in the long run. He said, "As long as officers remain in the Party, we shall neither build a strong Party nor a strong Army".  

Ataturk set the example himself, by resigning his military rank upon becoming the President of the Republic. However, he did not prevent army officers from becoming ministers or deputies provided they first surrendered their commissions. Several officers resigned from the army and joined the new party – People’s Republican Party floated by Ataturk.

During the Republican rule, the military figured prominently in Turkish politics. The officers were heavily represented in the Assembly. The military group, for example, accounted for about 20% of all deputies but held 30% of the vital posts. Many retired military personnel also served as ministers for long periods. In times of emergency, the military commanders often took over the civilian administrative functions – particularly in the Kurdish area after the uprisings in 1925 and 1930, and in Istanbul during World War II.

Throughout the Republican period, the armed forces, though barred from playing an active role in day-to-day politics, were regarded as the defenders of the nation, particularly during crisis. Article 35 of the Law of the Armed Services clearly

31 See Gwynne Dyer’s, “Turkey”, in Kegan, n. 27, p. 590.
34 See Lerner and Robinson, n. 30, p. 127.
mentioned that “the duty of the armed forces is to protect and safeguard Turkish territory and the Turkish Republic as stipulated by the constitution.”

Ataturk’s successor, Ismet Inonu introduced multi-party democracy in 1946. The first free election held under the new system brought Adnan Menderes’ Democratic Party to power in May 1950. However, Menderes failed to sustain parliamentary democracy. He also began to woo the traditionalist, obscurantist and anti-Ataturkist sections of the population. This irked the Turkish Army which considered itself as the ultimate protector of the Ataturkist principles.

Menderes further antagonised the officer corps by basing promotions on personal fidelity to his party and did nothing to ameliorate the officers’ declining economic status as a result of inflation. Moreover, he did not rely on the military as a source of recruitment of cabinet members and law-makers, as had been the case under the Republican rule. The regime also tried to use the army for partisan purposes like asking infantry units to suppress political opposition and student protest demonstrations which violated the Ataturkist concept of an apolitical army. All these factors thoroughly discredited the Menderes regime and it was eventually overthrown in a bloodless coup on May 27, 1960.

The military restored civilian rule within a year and supervised the drafting of a new constitution. The 1961 Constitution institutionalised military’s role in the Turkish polity. Under Article 111 of the Constitution, a National Security Council was constituted which included the President, Prime Minister, other ministers as ‘provided by law’, the Chief of the General Staff, the Commanders of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie. Officially, the council was supposed to “assist the Council of Ministers in reaching decisions related to national security and coordination.” But in practice, it often functioned as a sort of second cabinet. It thus served as a means by which the military

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37 See Dyer, n. 31.

38 See Brown, n. 33, p. 388.
could exert some influence in politics and prevent, among other things, the degeneration of the political system.\textsuperscript{39}

The successive civilian regimes' inability to contain violence perpetrated by the right-wing and left-wing extremists in the 1960s and 1970s once again forced the military to intervene in 1971 and 1980. The armed forces claimed that they saved the nation from the brink of civil war and restored order in the polity. On both the occasions, the armed forces did not show any sign of clinging to power for long and they handed the government back to the politicians.

However, in the context of Turkey's lingering problems such as its confrontation with Greece over Cyprus, Aegean Oil and other issues; and the separatist ambitions of its own 8,000,000 Kurds in the southeastern region, the armed forces have the potential of playing a greater role in the country's decision making process.

**The Pakistan Army**

Pakistan since its inception has repeatedly been faced with threats both external and internal. According to a Pakistani political analyst, the internal threats have proved more damaging to its territorial integrity and national security than the external ones. As a result, the Pakistan Army has, on more than one occasion, been obliged as well as called upon to deal with the challenges to national security emanating from internal disorder. On other occasions, it has been motivated by a 'sense of social obligation' to control or share in their exercise of political power mainly in response to the inability of the civilian political institutions to find concrete political moorings.\textsuperscript{40}

From the time of its creation in 1947, Pakistan was confronted with a serious integration problem due to its peculiar geographical setting. Pakistan's two halves were separated by 1000 miles of Indian territory. Moreover, linguistic and ethnic conflicts

\textsuperscript{39} See Hale, n. 36, pp. 68-69; and Heper, n. 35, p. 58.

\textsuperscript{40} Najam Rafique, "Pakistan Army: Towards a New Professionalism", *Strategic Studies*, vol. XVI, nos. 1-2, Autumn and Winter 1993, p. 108.
surfaced soon after independence. The Pakistani governing elites on their part, failed to take corrective measures and instead, began to rely more on the army for tackling problems ranging from smuggling to separatist movements. The army was first asked in East Pakistan to participate in internal security operations. These operations were mainly anti-smuggling and anti-famine efforts. They were given such names as: Operation Jute (1952-53), Operation Service First (1956), and Operation Close-Door (1957). 41

The army was called to restore law and order in East Pakistan on a number of other occasions when the situation went beyond the control of police, for example, the major riots in Dhaka (1950), the Language Movement (1952), and labour unrest (1954). In West Pakistan also, the army was involved in internal security operations. The army was ordered to restore peace in Karachi (1949) and in Punjab (1953) during the anti-Ahmadiya riots. The disturbance in Punjab which culminated in the imposition of martial law in Lahore, provided the army the first experience to run civil administration directly. As a result, the social status and power of the Pakistan Army rose in the eye of the public. 42

The role of the United States' military aid in expanding the role of the Pakistan military was significant. The major objectives of such military assistance were: to mould the outlook of the non-Western officer corps, to contain the spread of communism, and to enable the military to contribute to modernisation and nation-building. In 1954, Pakistan joined two U.S.-sponsored military alliances – SEATO and CENTO. As a result of this, Pakistan received sophisticated defence equipment and training facilities for its defence personnel. Pakistan's participation in SEATO and CENTO gave the armed forces experience of warfare and increased their confidence, striking power and efficiency. 43

The two other factors which facilitated military intervention in politics were the endless bickering among the political leaders and their failure to build viable democratic

41 Ibid, p. 109.
institutions in the post-independence era. In October 1958, Field Marshall Ayub Khan, the Commander of the Pakistani armed forces, seized state power in a bloodless coup and imposed martial law throughout the country.

Under the military rule, power was concentrated in the hands of senior military officers and civilian bureaucrats, the great majority of whom were West Pakistanis. The Bengalees who constituted nearly 55% of Pakistan's total population, had hardly any representation in the defence and civil services. The Bengali politicians were also excluded from the national decision making process. These regional imbalances made the Bengalees vocal against the West Pakistani ruling elites. Bengalees' movement for the establishment of regional parity gained momentum by the end of the 1960s and it virtually paralysed the civil administration in East Pakistan. Pakistan's second military ruler — General Yahya Khan sought a military solution of the problem. The Pakistani forces unleashed a reign of terror and destruction upon the Bengalees, which turned into a civil war that culminated in East Pakistan's secession as the independent state of Bangladesh in 1971.

Following the 1971 debacle, the Pakistan Army lost much of its credibility and was forced to hand over power to the country's most popular political leader — Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He utilised this opportunity to restore civilian control over the armed forces. The White Paper on Defence Organisation issued by the Bhutto government clearly stated: "National defense policy is no longer a military affair alone.............. The evolution of national defense policy requires (a) effective political control at the top............... (b) a number of institutions and agencies at the base, to produce the necessary data and appreciations on which political decisions can be based."\(^44\)

The 1973 Constitution further specified the functions of the military. According to this Constitution, the military under the direction of the federal government would "defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat of war, and subject to law, act in

aid of civil power when called upon to do so.  

The Constitution provided capital punishment for subverting civilian rule.

However, the army was called again to contain insurgency, this time in Baluchistan. Army’s counter-insurgency operations which started in 1973, continued until the Baluch rebels were totally suppressed in 1977. Furthermore, the Bhutto regime ordered the army to restore law and order on several occasions during 1972-76: language riots in Sindh (1972), labour trouble in Karachi (1972), anti-Ahmadiya riots in Punjab (1974), and unrest in NWFP (1976). With its success in all these internal security operations, the Pakistan Army regained confidence.

By 1977, Pakistan’s political situation had reached a critical stage. Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) emerged as the single largest party in the March 1977 elections. But the opposition parties rejected the election result. They accused the PPP regime with electoral malpractices and soon launched a massive anti-Bhutto agitation throughout the country. In the face of deteriorating law and order situation, martial law was imposed in the country’s major cities – Karachi, Lahore and Hyderabad.

Once again, the failure of the ruling elite to resolve the political crisis of 1977 and the gradual erosion of civilian political institutions brought the army back to the centre-stage of Pakistani politics. In July 1977, the Pakistan Army under the leadership of the then Chief of Staff, General Ziaul Huq intervened in politics for the third time.

Zia ruled Pakistan for the next 11 years primarily with the backing of country’s most organised and powerful institution – the army. Although after Zia’s death in 1988, the Pakistan Army has restrained itself from playing any overt political role, it still has the capacity to influence the decision of the government, particularly on national security and foreign policy issues.

45 See Rafique, n. 40, p. 110.
Military's Social and Economic Role

The military also performs several social and economic functions in developing countries. The military is mainly involved in two types of activities: first, it serves as a training ground for technical and administrative skills; and second, it manages economic enterprises to meet its own requirements or for the needs of the civilian society.47

The armed forces are the repository of many skills. Most new armies have specialised training institutions which train officers in various fields. A transitional society does not have the means of imparting the same standard of training to their civilian counterparts. The former Army Chief and President of Bangladesh, H. M. Ershad claims that the officers who undergo advanced training in administration, personnel management, procurement etc., prove better administrators, managers and all round men.48

The military develops a pool of trained managers who are available for public and private industries. They are either retired officers or officers who have been assigned to public sector industries. In Indonesia, for example, former army officers are to be found in key managerial posts of such industries. Some of these officers received their rudimentary training in management at the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.49

In Turkey, the pattern of military training is much more extensive. Every year, about 500,000 men have to undergo compulsory military training. Among them, 92,000 are trained in 160 different skills (from driving vehicles to repairing machinery) that come in useful after their return to civilian life. When we add to these the 40,000 civilians employed by the army, then the number of technicians and artisans trained by

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49 See Janowitz, n. 47, p. 153.
the army every year is in excess of 130,000. Thus, the contribution of the Turkish armed forces in the field of technical education has been significant.\footnote{Melunet Ali Birand, \textit{Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces} (London: I.B. Tauris and Company Limited, 1991), p. 122.}

The military plays a dynamic role in eradicating illiteracy as well. Janowitz observes that the military, when it is not engaged in combat, is a training apparatus whose personnel spend considerable time teaching or being taught. The profession views teaching as an essential qualification for a military leader. In a few countries military personnel are available to assist civilian institutions in fundamental education which contributes greatly to a positive image of the military. For instance, the Turkish Army in 1962 had 11,000 officer cadets engaged in supporting the government's programme against illiteracy.\footnote{See Janowitz, n. 47, pp. 157-58.} With the continuous fall in illiteracy, the special literary schools within the armed forces were abolished in 1972. But even now, an average of some 20,000 men are taught to read and write every year.\footnote{See Birand, n. 50.}

In some countries, the armed forces maintain their own economic enterprises which include manufacturing plants. They are involved in the production of steel, oil, medicine, automobiles, cement etc. Besides, they are also engaged in shipping, banking, insurance, tourism etc. Generally, such economic enterprises are designed to assist the army in performing its military functions.\footnote{See Janowitz, n. 47, pp. 152-53.} But the military often expands into various other economic activities which are not directly related to its primary function. In fact, in a number of Third World economies, the military occupies a central position, and has substantial stake in the maintenance of socio-economic and political stability.

In Indonesia, for example, the military-dominated government introduced the system of 'unconventional' financing of the armed forces when the country had been facing severe resource crunch in the 1960s. Under this system, selected officers at all levels were placed in positions where they could raise funds on behalf of the army. At the
highest level, such huge enterprises as the state oil corporation, the national food-trading agency, and a giant general trading corporation were placed under the control of senior army officers. The biggest source of funds for the military in the 1960s was the state oil corporation, Pertamina. In the 1970s, Pertamina's activities expanded into the fields outside oil production. Another crucial fund-raising agency was the National Logistic Board (Bulog), concerned with trading in essential commodities, of which the most important was rice. In addition to these, a wide range of smaller scale fund-raising activities were conducted by the military personnel. In the absence of adequate funds from the government budget, individual sections and units of the army, as well as other branches of the armed forces, had set up 'welfare foundations' and other enterprises to finance their own operations and supplement the incomes of their members.54

Similarly in Pakistan, the armed forces meet more than half of their expenses through various self-financing projects. All the three defence services in Pakistan have trusts and foundations with large investments in the national economy. The army has Fouji Foundations (FF) and Army Welfare Trust (AWT), the Navy, the Bharia Foundation, and the Air Force, the Shaheen Foundation. The foundations are entirely self-supporting welfare organisations which operate in the private sector and receive no financial assistance from either the federal, or provincial government. Instead, all expenditures on their diverse activities are met from funds generated by their own industrial and commercial projects.55

At present, the FF fully owns 10 industrial and commercial enterprises and has shares in 3 other projects. These include 3 sugar mills and one of the largest fertilizer plants in Asia which gives it a near monopoly in urea in Pakistan. Moreover, it has food processing industries, and also manages natural gas fields and various other small companies. The AWT runs 7 industrial enterprises, 5 agricultural firms, 5 travel

54 See Crouch, n. 22, pp. 275-82.
55 See M. Ziauddin's, "Pakistan Army Incorporated : Guns and Butter in the Same Hand", in the Asian Age, May 13, 1997.
agencies, and has invested heavily in real estate. The Shaheen Foundation and Bharia Foundation are much smaller in comparison.\textsuperscript{56}

Being run by charitable organisations, all the commercial and industrial enterprises fully owned by foundations and trusts, do not pay corporate and income taxes. The armed forces are involved in massive social welfare activities. They run hospitals, schools, colleges, grant scholarships, manage vocational institutions and many other training centres.\textsuperscript{57}

The Pakistan armed forces play a key role in the country’s economy. The economic enterprises run by charitable organisations of Army, Navy, and Air Force together contribute more than 2\% to Pakistan’s GNP annually. In the private sector, if we put all the military foundations together, they become the single biggest industrial conglomerate. Military’s economic activities has been expanding steadily since the late 1950s. In the years of martial law, the military and the entrenched civilian bureaucracy which are the ruling elite and have a symbiotic relationship helped these commercial and industrial enterprises to grow.\textsuperscript{58}

In Turkey too, the armed forces run an extensive social security system for their members called the Military Mutual Aid Association (\textit{Ordu Yardimlasma Kurumu – OYAK}). Regular Officers and NCOs contribute about 10\% of their salaries to the OYAK funds, which is largely tax exempt. Participants may borrow from the fund for home purchases, and on retirement they receive back their investment plus accumulated interest and accrued dividend distribution.\textsuperscript{59}

The idea of OYAK was developed when a way was being sought after the 1960 intervention to prevent the recurrence of the drastic fall in income of the members of the

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{59} See Dyer, n. 31, p. 594.
armed forces in the 1950s. Today, OYAK is a gigantic institution with 88,000 members. Besides, it is the sole or part owner of 28 economic enterprises.\textsuperscript{60}

OYAK has emerged as one of the largest industrial groups in Turkey. It has a significant influence in the country’s economy through its interests in the automobile industry, cement production, petrochemicals, textiles and other enterprises.\textsuperscript{61}

The economic function of the military also includes its contribution to developing public works, roads, and engineering projects. Moreover, the armed forces have special capacities to assist in relief and rescue operations after major natural calamities such as earthquake, cyclone, flood etc.\textsuperscript{62}

Hans Daalder argues that the military plays a positive role in the socio-economic development of new nations. Whatever the military’s ulterior motives, many military undertakings have benefited social and economic life generally. When army engineers build roads for reasons of strategy or supply, these can also be used by civilians; this has far-reaching social and economic consequences as it increases social mobility, extends the division of labour and leads to a greater specialisation of functions. Where military considerations dictate improved communications, these may also be available to civilian administration. The strategic location of military settlements may, unintentionally, help to develop neglected outlying areas.\textsuperscript{63} For instance, the Turkish armed forces in the early 1950s, constructed communication system between Iran and Turkey. This project was of substantial importance to the Turkish economy by opening up the easternmost provinces of the country, wherein are found rich mineral resources.\textsuperscript{64}

Likewise, the contribution of the Pakistan armed forces to the country’s economic development, particularly in the field of infrastructure, has been remarkable. The

\textsuperscript{60} See Birand, n. 50, pp. 147-48.
\textsuperscript{61} See Dyer, n. 31, p. 594.
\textsuperscript{62} See Janowitz, n. 47, p. 153.
\textsuperscript{64} See Lerner and Robinson, n. 30, p. 138.
Pakistan Army was actively involved in the construction of roads and bridges in the remote and neglected areas of Baluchistan. Another important project under the supervision of the army was the construction of Karakoram Highway to provide a road link with China. Army's other projects included making of permanent arrangements for the supply of water for drinking and agricultural use, and supply of rations in the food scarcity areas of Baluchistan.65

The expansion of military's economic activities has serious political implications. Janowitz argues that the ability of the military to act as a political force often depends upon the extent of its own economic base. The more economic resources it has at its command, the greater is its scope for domestic politics. In turn, the scope of its economic enterprises seems to expand with the broadening of its political involvement.66

In Indonesia, for example, the army took over the Dutch enterprises following the expulsion of the Dutch in 1957 in order to forestall the communist trade unions.67 The nationalisation of Dutch agricultural estates and industrial units gave the army new responsibilities and enabled its officers to gain valuable experience in the management of the economy. Through its control over Dutch enterprises the army became a part of the ruling elite which position it has zealously preserved ever since. In the words of an Indonesian scholar, the army emerged as "a new ruling class with an economic interest."68

Organisation, Socio-Economic, and Political Background of the Military

The political role of the military in any society is determined to a large extent by the nature of its organisation and socio-economic and political background of the military personnel. While analysing the increasing political role of the military in newly independent states, experts in civil-military relations have emphasized the sociological factors related to the military establishment. Janowitz argues that the internal social

65 See Rafique, n. 40, p. 112.
66 See Janowitz, n. 47, p. 153.
67 See Drummond, n. 27.
68 For details see Ghosal, n. 25, p. 26.
organisation of the military conditions much of its political capacities. By ‘internal social organisation’ of the military, he means its organisational format, skill structure and career lines, social recruitment and education, professional and political ideology, and social cohesion.69

The sociological factors such as the officers’ class backgrounds, their present class and status positions etc. determine military’s relationship with other dominant socio-economic and political groups in the country. The officer corps is recruited predominantly from the middle class families. The middle class includes teachers, civil servants, lawyers, technicians, shop owners, traders, medium and small entrepreneurs and land owners, military officers and so on.70

In developing nations, most of the military officers are drawn from these middle income groups. In Turkey, for instance, more than half of the army cadets come from middle and lower-middle class backgrounds. A recent study has shown that 58.4% of the total cadets who entered the Turkish Military Academy between 1980-84 were born into middle and lower-middle class families. Among them, 20.5% had fathers who had themselves been military men; another 17.9% were the sons of former civil servants; and the rest came from families in agriculture or trade.71

For men with middle class origins, a military career not only offers educational opportunities and good salary, but also provides one of the most important avenues of status improvement. Men from solidly middle class families who become officers maintain, and often enhance, their social and economic standing. For those from lower-middle class families, an officer’s commission constitutes an upward step on the mobility ladder.72

69 See Janowitz, n. 47, p. 100.
70 See Nordlinger, n. 5, pp. 31-33.
71 See Brown, n. 33, pp. 398-99.
72 See Nordlinger, n. 5, p. 34.
Like the military officers, the political elites in most of the developing countries come from almost similar socio-economic strata – the middle and upper-middle classes consist of civil servants, urban professionals, landowners, traders, industrialists etc. Janowitz has observed that in some respects, the military is no different from other professions in the new nations in its kinship ties. After receiving commission in the military, the officers try to maintain contact with their relatives and friends in other occupational and professional groups which make up the small middle class. This situation often results in the convergence of political and economic interests between the military and other socio-economic forces in the country.

The officer corps' education, training, and socialisation patterns mould their attitudes toward politics and society at large. The recruitment and training of the officer corps is important as a baseline to understand their interests and preoccupations. The military academies all over the world recruit and socialise the officer corps. The recruitment of cadets to the military academy has two sources: military high schools or cadet colleges and the civilian institutions. It is the military high schools that serves as a major source of recruitment of cadets for the army. In Turkey, for example, the army draws more than 60% of its candidates from the military high schools. There is a marked difference between cadets having military school background and others who come from the civilian institutions. The quality of instruction at the military schools is higher than their civilian counterparts. The military schools provide free education; but since they are boarding schools, the student must serve some years of compulsory service in the ranks. After about four years of military training in the boarding schools, the young men enter the Military Academy at Ankara as cadets. They undergo training for another four years and graduate with the rank of second lieutenant and finally join their regiments.

74 For details see Nur Yalman's, "Intervention and Extrication: The Officer Corps in the Turkish Crisis", in Henry Bienen, ed., *The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968), pp. 128-29; Brown, n. 33, pp. 392-93; and Birand, n. 50, pp. 6-42.
The Military Academy instills professional ethics among the cadets and throughout the four years, they are taught to identify with their nation’s sense of purpose and history. The Military Academy also moulds the mentality, life style and outlook of the cadets. Officers of all ranks enjoy high prestige in Turkish society. In fact, during the training period, it is inculcated in the cadets that they are superior to their civilian counterparts. In the recent years, there has been an increase in the teaching of socio-political and economic subjects which are necessary for ‘managers’ rather for officers directing troops. The military officers consider themselves, by virtue of their long and disciplined training, to be an elite corps in the Turkish state. The only group whose political attitudes closely approximated those of the officer corps is the higher civil service, which helps account for the latter’s considerable influence with military governments in Turkey.\(^75\)

Like any other institution or organisation operating within a state, the military is seriously concerned with the protection and promotion of its interests. Military’s corporate interests include: adequate budgetary support; autonomy in managing its internal affairs; preservation of its responsibilities in the face of encroachments from rival institutions; continuity of the institution and further strengthening it; and to ensure that there is justice in promotion and respect for seniority.\(^76\)

Finer argues that the military is very ‘zealous’ of its corporate status and privileges.\(^77\) Any encroachment on or negligence of military’s professional integrity and corporate exclusivity could turn the military against the civilian regime.

The military often relates its corporate interests with that of the interests of the nation. Such belief of the armed forces develops from the fact that they consider themselves as the selfless and dedicated guardians of the nation’s interest. Since the armed forces identify themselves with the nation, and since the nation’s honour,

\(^75\) See Birand, n. 50, pp. 33-50; Brown, n. 33, p. 392; and Yalman, n. 74, pp. 129-30.
\(^76\) See Nordlinger, n. 5, p. 65.
\(^77\) See Finer, n. 17, p. 30.
sovereignty and power reside within the armed forces, the military elites think that what is good for them is also good for the nation.78

According to Finer, all the armed forces which have become politicised, hold, in some form on the other, a similar belief: that they have some special and indeed unique identification with the 'national interest'.79

The military may be politicised as a result of the inculcation of certain doctrines or ideologies among he armed forces personnel, which confers a distinct identity upon the military establishment. The objective of indoctrination is to influence or control attitudes, opinions, and behaviour of the officer corps. Such indoctrination is deemed necessary because the officer corps is often permeable to outside influence like the contemporary political currents, and military's formal organisational structure is sometimes barely capable of containing factionalism stemming from personal rivalries and ambitions, differences in age, training and rank, and conflicting attachments to political leaders, parties, and policies.80

Ideological indoctrination of the officer corps has assumed great significance in some developing countries. In Turkey, for example, Ataturkism is instilled almost as a religion among the military officers during the training period. The six principles of Ataturkism—nationalism, secularism, republicanism, etatism, populism and reformation are covered extensively in textbooks and curricula of the Military Academy. With the rise of Communism and Islamic fundamentalism in the Turkish polity since the 1960s, which brought about the military interventions of 1971 and 1980, more emphasis is given to the teaching of Ataturkism. Currently the total number of hours of instruction in the Military Academy amounts to 960 per annum. Of these, 160 hours (i.e. about 20%) are devoted, directly or indirectly, to the study of the principles and reforms of Ataturk or of Ataturkism in general. The cadets are taught that Ataturkism is not a static ideology but

78 See Nordlinger, n. 5, p. 65.
79 See Finer, n. 17, p. 30.
80 See Nordlinger, n. 5, p. 32.
one that undergoes a 'dynamic' development according to the conditions of the time. Therefore it is not inflexible like other ideologies, but keeps changing in the light of previous experience and progressing towards the 'ideal'. This is emphasised as the 'Dynamic Ideal'.

The concept of a powerful state is presented as the most striking feature of Ataturkism. That the state must intervene wherever necessary and that such a powerful state serves as the most effective means of achieving the 'Dynamic Ideal' is inculcated in cadets and officers throughout their careers.

In Indonesia too, the army is thoroughly politicised and is marked for its anti-Communist and anti-Islamic orientations. In the 1950s and early 1960s, civilian politicians frequently intruded into the military sphere. The army resisted civilian encroachment, and especially the efforts by the civilian parties and cabinets to indoctrinate it with the particular ideology of the government of the day, by declaring the 1945 Constitution and the Pancasila, proclaimed by Sukarno in the early 1945 to be state ideology of the Republic to come, as its sole ideological foundation. The Pancasila, or Five Pillars, include nationalism, the belief in one God, international cooperation, democracy, and social justice. The Indonesian Army claims that it has fought anti-nationalist separatists, atheist Communists, and intolerant religious fundamentalists, in defence of the Pancasila and the values they stand for. The army sees itself above 'divisive' party politics and has acquired a strong distrust of civilian politicians.

Kenneth Fidel argues that in some developing countries, men enter the officer corps with specific political goals in mind. Political participation as a sequel to a military career is often a national tradition. In other countries, men are politicised while on active duty. Political awareness, goals and ambitions may emanate from interaction with other politicised soldiers or be a product of military socialisation; as increasingly, officer

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81 For details see Birand, n. 50, pp. 52-67.
82 Ibid, p. 62.
83 See Sundhaussen and Green, n. 29, p. 101.
training includes exposure to political and social issues as well as a consideration of purely military matters. The curricula of military schools now almost universally include courses dealing with major social issues and problems, development and development theory and politics; military journals regularly publish essays dealing with these topics; military leaders actively seek media outlets for their personal and corporate views; and political groups of all sorts are forming at military installations. Whatever the route to politicisation, there is little doubt that today most military men are deeply involved at both an individual and corporate level of awareness in political and social issues and it is naive to believe that politics is a secondary concern of military men in the contemporary Third World.  

Nordlinger is of the view that heightened professional expertise may engender interventionist depositions when civilian governments are performing inadequately. In Indonesia, for instance, military’s seizure of state power was prompted by the failure of Sukarno to achieve either development or national unity. During the Guided Democracy period, Indonesian politics revolved around three centres – Sukarno, the PKI and the army. President Sukarno’s attempt to counterbalance the army by strengthening the PKI further antagonised the officer corps. The Indonesian Army ruthlessly suppressed the PKI-inspired coup attempt in 1965 and eventually removed Sukarno from power.

But the army did not assume power suddenly in Indonesia. Before capturing the state power, the army tried to consolidate its position in the polity and enhance its professional competence with military assistance from advanced nations, particularly the United States. The U.S. Army has had a clear impact on the development of the Indonesian Army. U.S. assistance has enhanced the technical skills and influenced the political orientation of the officer corps. It is the U.S. Army training that has been primarily responsible for the orientation of the Indonesian officer corps in a pro-Western direction. The major concern of the U.S. in the 1950s and 1960s was the rise of PKI’s

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85 See Nordlinger, n. 5, p. 51.
influence in Indonesian politics. Throughout the Kennedy years and to a lesser extent under the Johnson Administration, the army was to be perceived as the key to maintaining a non-Communist Indonesia. The U.S., therefore, decided to assist the army in order to prevent the possibility of a Communist takeover in Indonesia. The assistance was provided largely in the form of military training for Indonesian officers. The most notable impact of the U.S. Army influence on the Indonesian Army’s educational system was the creation of the Military Academy at Magelang. The Indonesian Military Academy’s courses, structure, and organisation were derived almost in entirety form the U.S. Military Academy. 86

Moreover, the Armed Forces Command and Staff College at Bandung has also played a key role in shaping the political attitudes of the Indonesian officer corps. Along with military training, several economic, administrative and political subjects are taught at the college so that the officers can take up civilian assignments in the future. Sometimes it is difficult to make any fundamental distinction between military training and training for the role in society. In 1974, the Staff College was preparing its officers for the elections to be held in 1977 and providing them with ideological view points, as for example, a bias against Islam in politics. 87

The political role of the military in the newly independent states is also governed by the conditions of liberation and the military’s role in it. It has been noticed that the countries where the armed forces played a leading role in the national liberation, they developed a penchant for power that normally went beyond their professional role. Kenneth Fidel says, “In nations that gained independence through revolution, military leaders are likely to have become politicised during the period of revolt, and once drawn into politics they are not likely to voluntarily retire from political participation,

87 See Drummond, n. 27, p. 276.
subordinate their political views to the dictates of civilian leadership or abjure personal political ambitions."^{88}

In each county, the military has used the past to legitimise both its own appropriation of the state, and the state's reassertion of itself over the social forces competing with each other in the nation's name.^{89} Mehden observes, "Where the army has been in the vanguard of the struggle for independence, as in some parts of Asia, it may enter the political arena because of a belief that the ideals of the independence movement have been betrayed by self-seeking and corrupt civilian politicians whose factional quarrels have led to confusion and turmoil."^{90} Hence, the potential for revolutionary military leaders emerging as national rulers is not only present it is highly probable. The route to political leadership may be through channels of legitimate political competition or by way of a coup 'd etat, but the former independence fighters will be politically active is almost a certainty.^{91}

Janowitz typifies these armies as the 'armies of national liberation'.^{92} The Indonesian and the Bangladesh armies are examples of 'armies of national liberation'. The Indonesian Army's emergence as a powerful political actor in the post-independence era was to a large extent determined by its revolutionary origin. During 1945-49, the Indonesian armed forces fought valiantly against the Dutch forces and finally liberated the county.

However, it should be noted that the revolutionary years left Indonesia with an officer corps of heterogeneous background. The fighting units were very different in their origins and subscribed to very different political ideologies. They were in many cases ill-disciplined and several sections were not totally under the control of the army

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^{88} See Fidel, n. 84, p. 15.
^{90} See Mehden, n. 9, p. 99.
^{91} See Fidel, n. 84, p. 72.
^{92} See Janowitz, n. 73, pp. 10-13.
commanders. Sometimes sections backed particular political parties and so entered into
disputes over leadership and political strategy, while at others the army or major parts of
it played an independent role at odds with the civilian government. As a result of this,
there was no unity of outlook in the army, no sense of any subordination to civilian
powers, but rather a tradition of being involved in politics, and above all a sense that the
army was at least equal to political parties in its contribution to the direction and ultimate
success of the revolution. The struggle for independence produced an attitude of mind as
a consequence of which the army came to believe that it had as much right to help in
shaping the destiny of the nation as any other group or institution. 93

At its first seminar, held in April 1965, the army formulated a doctrine which
announced that the armed forces in Indonesia constituted both, a ‘military force’ and a
‘social-political force.’ As a ‘social-political force’ their activities included participation
in the “ideological, political, social, economic, cultural and religious fields.” During the
Suharto period, this doctrine became known as the Dwi Fungsi (Dual Function) of the
armed forces - referring to the military and socio-political roles played by the armed
forces. The military’s continued domination of the state since the Suharto takeover has
been justified on the ground that civilians still need the strong leadership that only the
military can provide. 94

The Structure of the Military Regimes

Military coups often bring about immediate and fundamental changes in regime
structure. At the outset, the praetorians establish an authoritarian regime that is closed to
popular participation and competition. In doing so, they destroy or alter those structural
features of the previous regime that do not accord with their own preferences. 95

Robin Luckham has pointed out that the military takeovers transfer the
institutional locus of power form the state’s ideological apparatuses (political parties,

93 See Drummond, n. 27, p. 269.
94 See Crouch, n. 22, pp. 24-25.
95 See Nordlinger, n. 5, p. 7.

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legislatures, civilian politicians etc.) to its repressive apparatuses (the military, police, security bureaucracies etc.). They also alter the rules of the political game, for instance by introducing martial law, banning political activity, abolishing constitutional checks and balances, curtailing press freedom, disregarding human rights and using coercion.  

No criticism of the regime may be tolerated. Mass arrests, seizure of property and outlawing of organisations of all types are standard procedures for destroying opposition both real and potential. If and when these techniques prove ineffective, large-scale terror campaigns with indiscriminate persecution typically occur. For example, in Indonesia, the army launched a massive campaign following the 1965 abortive coup to destroy the PKI, arresting large number of its cadres and fanning the Islamic groups and local anti-Communists to physically eliminate the Communists from the country's political arena. The brutality of the Indonesian Army has no parallel in Asian history. Reports indicate that at least 1 million Communists and their sympathisers were massacred by the army and its allies.  

One of the first acts of the coup leaders is to outlaw the political party from which power is seized. In some cases, the prohibition is soon extended to all other political parties. The immediate reasons for the elimination of competition and the clampdown on participation are quite obvious. The armed forces have seized power to bring about or prevent certain changes. They are then not about to permit the former incumbents or their supporters to challenge them. Since the praetorians publicly justify their coups in terms of failure of the civilian regimes to perform, they neutralise the power or restrict the activities of those charged with responsibility for these failures.  

In Turkey, for instance, the main purpose of the three military interventions had been the reconstruction of the polity. After the 1960 intervention, the Democratic Party was dissolved, its members arrested, and its prime minister hanged along with his

96 See Luckham, n. 89, p. 12.  
97 See Fidel, n. 84, p. 19.  
98 For details see Ghosal, n. 25, pp. 40 and 59.  
99 See Nordlinger, n. 32, p. 112.
ministers of finance and foreign affairs. The military also brought down the First Republic by abrogating its constitution and laid the foundations of the Second Republic by promulgating a new constitution in 1961 and introducing other basic reforms, namely: a bicameral legislature; an electoral system based on proportional representation; and judicial review.\(^{100}\)

The 1971 intervention, directed against the left-wing extremists and some of their allies, purged all of them and strictly prohibited their participation in politics. The military then looked for help to the liberal politicians, in whose hand was left the task of forming governments and enacting restrictive amendments to the 1961 Constitution.\(^{101}\)

In 1980, the military leaders restricted the participation of both the Communists and Islamic radicals, and various other political forces whom they blamed for the crisis that had led to the intervention. The leading political figures were arrested and martial law was imposed throughout the country. The military rulers then drew up a timetable for a gradual transition back to pluralism, by way of a referendum, new laws on political parties, and the creation of a new political elite.\(^{102}\)

The primary objective of the 1958 military intervention in Pakistan, as in Turkey, was the reorganisation of the political system. After seizing power, Field Marshall Ayub Khan imposed martial law throughout the country, suspended the 1956 Constitution, dissolved the parliament, abolished political parties, and curtailed civil liberties. According to a political analyst, Ayub harboured an inborn fear and distrust of politicians, particularly those with a popular base. He, therefore, tried to disarm all opposition by having political leaders disqualified from holding any elective and public office. He introduced two new measures — Public Officers (Disqualification) Order and Elective

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\(^{100}\) See Hurewitz, n. 32, p. 211-15.

\(^{101}\) See Bener Karakartal’s, “Turkey: The Army as Guardian of the Political Order”, in Clapham and Philip, n. 29, p. 57.

\(^{102}\) Ibid.
Bodies (Disqualification) Order. These orders stipulated that politicians found guilty of misconduct or corruption would be barred from public office. 103

For about 4 years, Ayub ruled as President and Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA), with no politics and political parties in the country. Even in the Constitution drafted by President Ayub and promulgated on March 1, 1962, Article 170 continued the ban on political activity including the formation of political parties and the projection of any candidate at elections. The new constitution also introduced an all-powerful presidential system in Pakistan. Under the 1962 Constitution, the President was not accountable to the National Assembly, and had the power to veto any decision taken by its members. 104

Political Institution-Building Under Military Rule

When military personnel assume power, they immediately suspend civilian political activity. By using the coercive apparatus of the state, they temporarily silence dissidence. However, it should be noted that political activities do not stop altogether when military regimes come into power in the developing countries. Military intervention may result in the suspension of participatory structures, but the coup makers can not decree an end to participation despite their frequent proclamations to this effect. Nelson Kasfir observes, “There can not be political system without some civilian participation on some issues, though the possibilities vary enormously.” 105

In an age of widespread political awareness, mass mobilisation and popular revolt, a military regime can not survive solely through the use or threat of force. In the longer run, the military grows increasingly out of touch unless it can design and implement new participatory structures through which it can maintain its support. 106

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103 See Gowher Rizvi’s, “Riding the Tiger: Institutionalising the Military Regimes in Pakistan and Bangladesh”, in Clapham and Philip, n. 29, p. 205-208.
104 See Kukreja, n. 42, pp. 82-83 and 92-93.
106 Ibid, p. 67; and Fidel, n. 84, p. 13.
However, there are dangers in taking such steps since the design of participatory structures is an unfamiliar task for military leaders - as it is for most other citizens. If the structures succeed, there is the possibility that the military will be unable to control them. If they fail, the manifest absence of support may prove unsettling for the rulers. As a result, the armed forces are likely to be hesitant and half-hearted about their new experiments in popular politics. They are likely to try a variety of participatory 'experiments', discarding them at the first sign of trouble, expanding them where they seem to redound to the advantage of the regime, but seeking always to maintain as tight a degree of control over these structures as possible.  

In some developing countries, the military takes over as a reforming force and endeavours to create new political institutions. The programme of 'Basic Democracies' initiated in 1959 by the Ayub regime in Pakistan is a notable case in point. After banning parties and parliament, Ayub systematically restructured political institutions from the grass-roots level. Under the Basic Democracies Order 1959, a 5-tiered system was established to provide the people with experience in voting and administration. Each province was divided into 40,000 constituencies, and each constituency elected by universal suffrage one 'basic democrat'. The 80,000 basic democrats and half of that number of government nominees sat in 8,000 union councils (each representing a cluster of villages) or in their urban equivalent called town or union committees. Above the union councils were successive levels of county, district, division, and provincial councils. Each of these consisted of members elected from the councils of the next lower tier and of civil servants sitting ex officio, so that at the summit only a small portion of the members reflected popular choice, those originally elected by union councils or the town committees.  

107 See Kasfir, n. 105, p. 67.  
108 See Mehden, n. 9, p. 103.  
109 See Hurewitz, n. 3, pp. 203-204.
Some military rulers fail to recognise the fact that political and economic transformations can not be accomplished in a developing country without a mass party. Their anti-political attitudes, bureaucratic background, and political inexperience foster a belief that “all problems can be overcome if the right orders are given.” They assume that their monopoly of power is sufficient; decisions taken at the top not only will be implemented at the grass-roots but will have a decisive impact upon political and economic life.\textsuperscript{110}

Other military rulers are more aware of the need for a mass party if their socio-economic and political objectives are to be achieved. Nordlinger argues, “The realisation of their far-reaching objectives requires high levels of control and penetration, which in turn depend upon the creation of a mass political organisation capable of mobilising the population. Only through a well-organised mass party (or movement) that is securely rooted in the population, can the governors uproot existing attachments, neutralise local power brokers, break down ‘traditional’ attitudes, elicit widespread support for their formidable goals, and shape political and economic activity at the grass-roots level.”\textsuperscript{111}

In some Third World nations, the military rulers attempt to mobilise the population by creating mass parties over which they have exclusive control: such as Ziaur Rahman’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party and H.M. Ershad’s \textit{Jatiyo Party} in Bangladesh.

Sometimes military rulers have set up front organisations: such as \textit{Golkar} in Indonesia. After his seizure of power, General Suharto created a new party called \textit{Golkar}, out of a loose federation of functional groups like professional associations, trade unions, and youth, veterans and women’s organisations. However, the Suharto regime made no attempt to build \textit{Golkar} into a political party with a coherent ideology of its own. Instead, the regime tried to create a patronage network that would win over various functional groups affiliated to different political parties.

\textsuperscript{110} See Nordlinger, n. 5, p. 114.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.

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The Indonesian armed forces personnel are prohibited from becoming members of political parties. But in practice, Golkar's executive boards at the national, regional and local levels had been dominated by active military officers. In order to win elections, Golkar functionaries had often resorted to widespread intimidation and coercion. As a result, in all elections held in Indonesia since the military came to power, Golkar has consistently outpolled all other parties together securing over 60% of the votes. The Golkar's overwhelming victories in the successive elections have reduced organised civilian opposition to the Suharto regime. Apart from Golkar, only two other parties-Indonesian Democratic Party and Development Unity Party are legally permitted to contest elections in Indonesia.

In some cases, the military rulers establish de facto coalition with existing parties, just as General Ziaul Huq did by forging an alliance with the Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan.

The Military Rulers' Governing Style

The military rulers tend to adopt a governing style that has been described by Nordlinger as "decision making without politics." Most of the military rulers try to follow an apolitical approach to problem solving. Military's negative attitudes toward civilian politicians and political activity grow out of the officers' training and socialisation experience within a rigidly hierarchical and bureaucratic environment. The military rulers transfer what has been learnt in a bureaucratic organisation with its high regard for rationality, efficiency, and sound administration, to the governmental sphere.  

The demands and views of politicians are largely ignored by the praetorian rulers. They deemphasise the entire notion of inputs into the political system — human supports, demands, and mobilisation stemming from political parties, interest groups and popular ideologies. They try to exclude the mass leaders from the decision making process. Janowitz has elaborated this point further. He says, "Interest in politics goes hand in hand

with a negative outlook and even hostility to politicians and political groups. It is the politics of wanting to be above politics ....... Among officers, there is no glorification of, or even respect and understanding for the creative role of the politician and political process. 113

The military rulers dislike political bargaining and compromises which are frequently resorted to by the political leaders. They tend to believe that all problems are soluble if only correct course of action is identified in a rational, task-oriented manner, and then forcefully pushed. The Third World military commonly views itself as the most 'modern' group in society; it sees itself as a highly capable and efficient organisation. 114

Mehden argues that training in advanced countries of the officer corps of the developing countries and the latter’s association with the military groups in the former provide them with distinctive attitudes and values – one of which is an extreme consciousness of the concept of nationalism and unity. This is revealed in the writings of politically active military leaders throughout the developing world – writings in which the 'national' interest supported by the military is contrasted with 'factional' interests attributed to civilian politicians. In military parlance, the politicians are blatantly opportunistic, self-serving, corrupt, factious, and incompetent. The military often claims that it is only under conditions of stable government – such as the military can provide – that the desired level of economic and social advance may be achieved. 115

The Pakistan military displays most of the characteristics of praetorians' governing style. Ayub Khan tried to rule the country without political parties. He argued that parties "divide and confuse the people", and open them "to exploitation by unscrupulous demagogues." 116 In his style of governance, good government was efficient

113 See Janowitz, n. 73, p. 65.
114 See Nordlinger, n. 5, p. 123.
115 See Mehden, n. 9, pp. 98-99.
116 Cited in Huntington, n. 4, p. 243.
and honest government, not popularly elected government.\textsuperscript{117} He held that the people of Pakistan were too unsophisticated and illiterate to exercise their democratic rights.\textsuperscript{118}

Ayub, therefore, sought to create a new political system that would bring the peasantry and urban masses constructively into politics, and that would continue employing the electoral principle while avoiding the need for political parties, which were anathema to him. "To my mind", President Ayub said, "there are four prerequisites for the success of any democratic system in a country like Pakistan:

(i) It should be simple to understand, easy to work and cheap to sustain.

(ii) It should put the voter only such questions as he can answer in the light of his own personal knowledge and understanding without external prompting.

(iii) It should ensure the effective participation of all citizens in the affairs of the country up to the level of their mental horizon and intellectual calibre.

(iv) It should be able to produce reasonably strong and stable government."\textsuperscript{119}

With these considerations in mind, Ayub had introduced 'Basic Democracies' – a pyramidal scheme designed to give expression to the 'genius' of Pakistan by mobilising popular support without politicians.\textsuperscript{120}

Another important aspect of military's governing style has been the tendency to accord technocrats prominent place in the decision making process. Lacking in administrative skill and political experience, the military rulers find it difficult to solve various socio-economic and political problems without the assistance of civil servants, economists, engineers and urban planners. Nordlinger observes, "It is rare for the influence of higher civil servants to be reduced after the soldiers take power; it either remains at about the precoup level or is enhanced. Over and above their usual role of providing the governors with information and advising them on the technical feasibility of


\textsuperscript{119} Quoted from Hurewitz, n. 32, p. 203.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
policy options, senior bureaucrats have served as almost equal partners in the decision making process.”

In Pakistan, for instance, the military rulers depended heavily upon technocrats. During the Ayub period, the civil servants not only monopolised all policy-making jobs in central and provincial governments but also gradually took over the different corporations and autonomous bodies that had been established. Of the 280 members of the 33 major commissions formed by the regime for suggesting substantive policy changes, nearly 60% were members of the civil bureaucracy.

The Military Rulers’ Quest for Legitimacy

The praetorians initially claim that they will hand over the reins of government to the civilians after restoring order in the polity and improving the economic situation. However, it has been noticed in many Third World countries that once power is captured, they are reluctant to leave the political arena and return to their barracks. They adopt various strategies and tactics to sustain themselves in power. They often discard their ranks and don civilian clothes in their bid to garner popular support. The military regimes generally try to legitimise their rule by civilianising the administration, democratising the polity, and pursuing populist policies.

On their assumption of power, the military leaders do not necessarily receive support from all sections of the society. This forces them to allow some degree of civilian involvement in administration and accept the intrusion of civilian interests and points of view. It is argued that even a powerful military regime must have widespread recognition of its right to rule and at least a modicum of popular support.

In their effort to gain legitimacy, the military rulers resort to various democratic facades like holding referendum and local body, parliamentary and presidential elections.

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121 See Nordlinger, n. 5, p. 121.
122 See Kukreja, n. 42, p. 79.
123 See Fidel, n. 84, pp. 13-14.
In Pakistan, for example, the military rulers adopted most of these strategies for perpetuating their rule. The referendum, a well-known tactic of gaining constitutional legitimisation, was first employed by Ayub. After introducing the 'Basic Democracies' system, he held a referendum on February 15, 1960, through a ballot paper simply marked 'yes' or 'no'. Each ballot was numbered and registered against a specific voter so that the government could identify defaulters. Without a choice of candidates, Ayub overwhelmingly won 95.6% of the votes cast, and declared himself the first 'elected' President of Pakistan.\footnote{See Kukreja, n. 42, pp. 248-49.}

The military rulers in Pakistan first held non-party local council elections. It was only after securing a local support base that they organised parliamentary and presidential elections. This 'safe' strategy earlier developed by Ayub Khan had been followed with almost mechanical precision by his successors.

The praetorians also try to legitimise themselves by supporting, adopting and conforming to traditional practices and symbols. In some Muslim countries, the military rulers have projected themselves as the defenders of Islam, a role that had previously been the exclusive prerogative of the ulemas. The military rulers have often organised religious congregations to uphold and promote the message of Islam. Islam has been adopted as state religion, civil courts have handed down verdicts in accordance with religious laws, and Islamic rituals have been respected by the men in uniform who quote liberally from the Quran.\footnote{See Nordlinger, n. 5, p. 131.}

These actions had some positive impact upon an Islam-conscious people, but they apparently did not sufficiently buttress the government's legitimacy.\footnote{Ibid.} In Pakistan, for example, the slogan of Islam has been repeatedly used and can always be relied upon to provide a considerable political mileage. Under the Zia regime, the Islamisation process

\footnotesize{124 See Kukreja, n. 42, pp. 248-49.  
125 See Nordlinger, n. 5, p. 131.  
126 Ibid.}
reached a new height in Pakistan. To garner popular support, Zia frequently used Islamic rhetoric and promised to introduce a government based on Quran and Shariah.\textsuperscript{127}

Zia established Islamic advisory councils called \textit{Majlis-i-Shoora} both at the national and regional levels. In order to consolidate his power, he sought to transform the economy and society according to the basic tenets of Islam. Some of the Islamic measures introduced by Zia were: \textit{Mudaraba} (interest-less banking), \textit{Muzaraa} (sharecropping ground-rent), \textit{Zakat} (state-administered assistance to the poor through collection of 2.5% taxes levied on bank holdings, savings and assets), and \textit{Ushr} (5% tax on agricultural produce).\textsuperscript{128}

However, by initiating these Islamic reform programmes, the Zia regime could not bring about fundamental socio-economic and political changes in Pakistan. The ‘Islamisation’ of Pakistan by the Zia regime did not ameliorate the conditions of the under-privileged sections of the society. Instead, it promoted obscurantism, and feudal, reactionary and comprador elements, rigid and fossilised class structure, intolerance of other religions and sects, and reinstated feudal value system. Zia’s so-called ‘Islamic State’ was a legitimising device to give religious cover to what may otherwise appear to be the arbitrary and tyrannical acts of the regime.\textsuperscript{129}

\textbf{Political Performance of the Military Regimes}

The military rulers lack the ability to govern. They can not effectively tackle the intractable problems facing the underdeveloped countries. They may tide over political instability for a transitional period and introduce certain social and economic reforms, and accelerate the pace of economic growth but they fail to tackle the real problem of creating a viable political framework, which would function independently, without using the umbrella of military hierarchy. Military rulers generally believe in ad hoc measures and seldom aim at long-term political or economic development.

\textsuperscript{127} See Rizvi, n. 103, p. 221.
\textsuperscript{128} For details see Kukreja, n. 42, pp. 89-90.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid, p. 246.
In the periodic elections that military rulers hold to gain legitimacy, they resort to such practices as the hiring of thugs to terrorise opposition candidates, the intimidation of electors, the partisan intervention of the state, the illegal disqualification of candidates, and the large-scale impersonation of electors.\textsuperscript{130}

In the field of political institution building, the performance of the military rulers has been dismal. They seem incapable of creating and sustaining effective political institutions. The martial virtues of bravery, discipline, and obedience have little relevance for the governing of states. Janowitz argues that the organisational logic of the armed forces is different from that of political formations. Military personnel can bring only specialised skills to the political process. The development of political organisations, however, requires political skills that transcend functional specialisations and can be acquired only through long and hard experience in public life.\textsuperscript{131}

The political skills needed for developing a viable and self-sustaining political system involve, among others, ideological commitment, the capacity to respond to new challenges, and the arts of administration, negotiation, representation, and bargaining. The period of military rule is usually a total waste so far as the development of political skills is concerned. The military rulers severely restrict the free flow of political process and force the would-be politicians into long periods of hybernation.\textsuperscript{132} The military rulers impose restrictions upon mass participation and political competition. They denude the people of basic political liberties and rights, and often their right to take recourse to judicial due process. They generally try, to legitimise themselves by fabricating constitutional democratic structures. Formal arrangements and institutions are created to give the impression that people are able to articulate and press their demands upon the government.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{131} See Janowitz, n. 47, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{132} See Maniruzzaman, n. 11, pp. 5-7.
\textsuperscript{133} See Nordlinger, n. 5, p. 133.
Most of the military rulers in the Third World exercise their power through the formation of patron-client relationships with high-ranking civil servants, wealthy businessmen, and large landholders. In fact, the institutionalisation of a military regime depends on its capacity to acquire civilian allies who are willing to accept subordination to military leadership in exchange for some share in running the state and especially some share in the benefits which it provides. The nature of such a relationship is inherently clientelistic: it is an essentially transactional arrangement, in which the military patron offers some of the resources derived from its control over the state, notably physical protection and economic payoffs, and in return receives political support from the civilian client.¹³⁴

It has been observed that the military regimes are no less corrupt and self-serving than the civilian ones. Some are even more corrupt and self-indulgent than their civilian predecessors. Military leaders blatantly use their power for personal economic aggrandisement. For instance, the direct involvement of Indonesian military officers in business, administration and politics has led the Indonesian society into a state of uncontrollable corruption and moral degradation. It is widely known that officers act as patrons for the wealthy Chinese businessmen who literally surround them. In return for their influence with governmental agencies, the businessmen handle the details of tapping into lucrative ventures for the officers. Out of these and other corrupt practices, senior officers have amassed huge wealth.¹³⁵

Socio-Economic Performance of the Military Regimes

A number of political scientists in the 1950s and 1960s argued that it was the slow pace of modernisation and political development in the newly independent states that led to military takeovers. According to them, the military is relatively the most modern group in the developing societies and best suited to undertake economic and social reforms.

¹³⁵ For details see Crouch, n. 22, pp. 350-51; and Nordlinger, n. 5, p. 128.
In several scholarly studies, soldiers have been depicted as representing progressive forces. Hans Daalder holds that the military is often the most successfully Westernised of all the institutions in developing countries.\textsuperscript{136} Lucian Pye is of the view that the continuing modernisation of the military’s organisation and weaponry has instilled in the officers the belief that their society ought also to be modernised. In his words, “Above all else, ... the revolution in military technology has caused the army leaders of the newly emergent countries to be extremely sensitive to the extent to which their countries are economically and technologically underdeveloped. Called upon to perform roles basic to advanced societies, the more politically conscious officers can hardly avoid being aware of the need for substantial changes in their own societies”.\textsuperscript{137}

Similarly, with respect to West Asia and North Africa, Manfred Halpern has noted, “the more the army was modernised, the more its composition, organisation; spirit, capabilities, and purpose constituted a radical criticism of the existing political system”.\textsuperscript{138}

Some political scientists are of the opinion that the officers’ middle and lower-middle class backgrounds have engendered progressive political and economic attitudes. Edward Shils has observed that in the developing societies officers tend to be recruited from lower-middle class families of petty traders, small craftsmen, and cultivators of small holdings, and that these men are painfully aware of the distance separating them from the rich and the political elite. When these officers achieve political influence they are not sympathetic to big businessmen and conservative politicians, and are more inclined toward the redistribution of wealth.\textsuperscript{139}

\textsuperscript{136} See Daalder, n. 63, p. 1.


Referring to the officer corps of Southeast Asia, Guy Pauker states that they “are not the product of social classes with feudal traditions”. Rather, their participation in the struggles for national independence and modernisation, has produced an officer corps that is unlikely to become “the natural allies of feudal and other vested interests. Their natural propensities are progressive.”

With respect to Latin America, Johnson claims that the increasing recruitment of officers with lower-middle class and working class backgrounds means that “the armed forces may be expected to be more inclined than formerly to gravitate toward positions identified with popular aspirations and to work with the representatives of the popular elements”. Moreover, as officer recruitment penetrates to lower social strata, “the industrial-commercial bourgeoisie in Latin America will be surrendering control of the armed forces, which are maintained by their taxes, to groups more radical than themselves.”

Halpern observes that in West Asia and North Africa, the officers showed “an acute awareness of the chronic ills of their countries”, having joined the military to escape the frustrations of civilian life aggravated by the traditional elites’ failure to generate economic growth. He maintains that these officers act as agents of socio-economic change because of their close connection with “the new middle class”. The most salient feature of this new class is its salaried position, in contrast with the propertied and land-owning middle class. It is composed of managers, administrators, teachers, engineers, journalists, lawyers and military officers. This class is said to be committed to the refashioning of society; it is only through social and economic reforms that careers will be opened and secured for people like themselves who constitute a meritocracy rather

142 See Manfred Halpern’s, “Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class”, in Johnson, n. 137, p. 285.
than an established class. Acting with, for, and as members of this new middle class, the military becomes the vanguard of socio-economic reform. 143

All the above mentioned studies attempt to establish that military rule has beneficial consequences for the underdeveloped nations. However, these political scientists have not presented enough documentary evidence while developing models of progressive-modernising soldiers. Later research on the actual performance of military regimes has shown that there is no profound relationship between economic development and the political role of the military.

It has been pointed out that the military regimes do not differ significantly from their civilian predecessors, either in their social base, or policies, or capacity to manage the economy. An empirical study of 74 non-Western and non-Communist countries, made by Nordlinger, showed negative and zero-order correlations between political strength of the military and social and economic modernisation. He came to the conclusion that compared with their civilian counterparts, the military rulers do not generate significant increases in per capita GNP, improve agricultural productivity, or increase enrolments in high schools, technical institutes and universities. They also do not expand public investments that contribute to future economic growth. 144

In another cross-national aggregate study covering the period 1961-70 for all independent countries of the Third World, McKinlay and Cohan found that there was no significant difference between economic performance of military and civilian rulers. They showed that in some developing countries, civilian regimes had performed even better than their military counterparts. 145

On the whole, the socio-economic performance of the military regimes in the developing nations has not been satisfactory. A Bangladeshi political scientist says that

143 See Halpern, n. 138, pp. 52-54, 253, and 258.

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military regimes may appear to perform better than their civilian counterparts in bringing about social and economic development, but it may not stand the scrutiny of closer examination. In countries where a comparatively higher rate of economic growth have taken place under military regimes, development might not have been the result of the military rule, but of coincidental factors, such as massive infusions of foreign aid (Pakistan under Ayub), availability of a valuable natural resource like oil (Indonesia), or the sudden price increases for certain exports.146

Some studies have also focused on the negative aspects of military rule. It has been argued that the military regimes prevent the structural changes necessary for fostering self-sustaining socio-economic development. Militaries in the Third World have acted as guarantors of a status quo which favours the interests of local and international capital, even when more progressive elements in the armed forces have been in control. As a result, many developing nations have become subservient members of the international capitalist system.147

The development strategies adopted by the military rulers have hardly been innovative. Most of the underdeveloped countries are beset with several intractable socio-economic problems like illiteracy, unemployment, poverty, overpopulation etc. The military regimes generally seek short-term solutions of these problems. The models of development devised by them do not aim at improving the overall socio-economic conditions of the vast majority of the people.

The military rulers often attempt to impose solutions from above. In most Third World countries, argues Luckham, “development has usually denoted capitalist development presided over by a strong state, not socialist development nonparticipatory development organised from below”.148

146 See Maniruzzaman, n. 11, p. 3.
The armed forces in many Third World nations have shown little or no inclination to share economic and political power with the majority of their own population but have instead shown considerable enthusiasm for expanding their own economic and political power by entering into close relationships with Western governments and corporations. In general, militaries rarely ally themselves with non-elite groups.149

For example, some of the striking features of the Indonesian and Pakistani armed forces have been their strident anti-communism, adherence to IMF and World Bank inspired development strategies, and close alliance with civilian elite groups such as technocrats, landed aristocracy, and big businessmen and industrialists.

Nordlinger argues that as members of the middle class by birth, officer-politicians act in accordance with their class interests and identify with its civilian members. The extent to which they pursue modernising and progressive economic goals or defend the status quo is partly dependent upon the nature of middle class interests, which vary markedly depending upon the prevailing distribution of political power and the shape of the class structure. The middle class is interested in the preservation of its privileged material position where it is firmly entrenched economically, and the enhancement of its position through economic expansion where it is not yet securely established.150

In Latin America, for instance, the military aligned itself with the middle class during the 1950s to break the hold of the landed aristocracy and its lackeys. In the subsequent years, the military defended the status quo by preserving middle class domination against efforts by the working and peasant classes and progressive politicians to democratise Latin America.151

The economic decisions of the military rulers are also motivated by their corporate interests. Military regimes almost invariably increase defense budgets soon after takeover.

149 See Ball, n. 147, pp. 21-23.
150 See Nordlinger, n. 5, pp. 36-37.
Once raised, defense allocations usually remain at high levels in the subsequent years. An increase in military spending, however, has negative effects on the country's economy. High defense expenditures not only hamper the rate of growth, they also decrease the likelihood of progressive-type changes, and for the very same reason, i.e., increased allocation to one programme or group entails a loss of funds for others, especially in situations of economic scarcity.\footnote{152}

**Duration of Military Regimes**

There are vast differences in the longevity of military regimes. Some regimes (such as the Suharto regime in Indonesia) survived for a long period without effecting any fundamental change in their structural or elite characteristics. Others are highly unstable, lasting only a few years as authoritarian structures give way to democratic structures, or as military officers by civilian elites.\footnote{153}

In Pakistan, for instance, Ayub failed to create legitimate political institutions and ensure meaningful participation by the people in the political process. His 'Basic Democracies' system was designed to depoliticise the people of Pakistan, particularly in the urban areas. Despite much publicity and patronage from the government, the system failed to establish itself as a popular institution. The majority of those who found a place in the system were neither 'political' nor 'professional' but were businessmen, contractors or landowners, and touts who jumped on the bandwagon, seeing in the new institutions the opportunity for securing government benefits, particularly under its works programme. As a result, the basic democrats became the targets of mass discontent and the system eventually collapsed in 1969.\footnote{154}

The military rulers initially claim that they will bring about rapid socio-economic transformations in their countries. However, on most occasions, they fail to effect any fundamental change in the socio-economic conditions of the people, particularly the poor.

\footnote{152} See Nordlinger, n. 5, pp. 171-72.
\footnote{153} Ibid., p. 138.
\footnote{154} See Rizvi, n. 103, p. 206.
and under-privileged sections of the society. The kind of development strategy followed in the military ruled countries has instead led to a highly uneven distribution of income and wealth. The result has been the generation of severe social and regional tensions, which often force the country concerned into political and social turmoil.\footnote{See Maniruzzaman, n. 11, p. 3.}

Under such circumstances, the military rulers frequently resort to coercive measures against their critics and opponents in order to maintain themselves in power. But excessive use of force not only alienate the regime from the politically significant sections of the society, but also erodes its legitimacy. The only option then left for the military rulers is to hand over power to the civilian elites and return to the barracks.

Military's Withdrawal from Power

According to Nordlinger, there are three possible circumstances in which military regimes give way to civilian regimes. These are as follows:

1. The praetorians are forced to relinquish their power by extensive civilian opposition.
2. The military incumbents are overthrown by officers outside the government who then turn the reins of power over to civilians.
3. With or without considerable pressure from civilians or officers, the praetorian rulers 'voluntarily' disengage.\footnote{See Nordlinger, n. 5, p. 139.}

He argues that the first possibility is not only the least likely of the three, it has rarely if ever occurred in its pure form. It is only under tremendous civilian pressures, demonstrations, strikes, and riots that a military regime transfers the reins of government to the political leaders.\footnote{Ibid.}

There has not been a single instance in which civilians alone demonstrated the strength to overthrow a military regime backed by a unified officer corps intent upon
retaining power. They simply do not have sufficient numbers, organisation and weapons to defeat the military.\textsuperscript{158}

Sometimes it happens that the officers outside the government stage a coup and then hand over power to the civilians. It has occurred in many countries, particularly in Latin America. The Argentine military overthrew Peron in 1955, Columbian officers ousted Rojas Pinilla in 1957, and Perez Jimenez was removed by Venezuelan officers in 1958, with civilian governments being brought to power in each instance. The soldiers’ motivations in overthrowing military governments include personal ambition, policy disagreements, communal resentments, the governors’ assumption of excessive power, divisive politicisation of the officer corps, and the use of the army as a police force.\textsuperscript{159}

It is also not unusual that the military rulers voluntarily disengage themselves from power. The praetorians are often impelled to disengage due to the unexpected difficulties they encounter as governors. To govern is hardly as simple as straightforward as the officers had imagined prior to the coup, and certainly not as easy as they would have liked. Instead of being able to govern according to their apolitical predilections, they find themselves dealing with incompatible goals, responding to group pressures, and confronting recalcitrant problems which force them to depart from their original principles. Their apolitical self-image becomes soiled. As they see themselves becoming more and more like politicians whom they overthrew, withdrawal from government appears more attractive. Military believes that withdrawal may help preserve or enhance its public standing.\textsuperscript{160}

Turkey provides a good example of this pattern. The Turkish military has not shown any tendency to prolong its stay at power. On three occasions, the military intervened – in 1960, 1971, 1980, and in each instance, it returned power to the civilian politicians immediately after restoring order in the polity. The Turkish officers are quite

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., p. 140.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., pp. 141-45.
aware of the fact that they lack the skills to govern. Besides, they also fear that military's direct involvement in politics would be detrimental to its professional integrity.

**The Consequences of Political Intervention for the Military Organisation**

Political scientists maintain that military's role expansion has adverse impact on the military structure itself and professional standards of the armed personnel. Huntington says, "Politics is beyond the scope of military competence and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtailing their professional competence, dividing the profession against itself, and substituting extraneous values for professional values."\(^{161}\)

The military's direct involvement in politics corrodes its unity, cohesion, and morale. Particularly in case of militaries which are weakly institutionalised, a highly politicised officers corps is likely to become factionalised. The corrosive effects of political participation on military unity have been noticed in a number of countries.

The involvement of military officers in the politico-administrative and economic affairs of the state leads to relative neglect of defence responsibilities. As the instruments of coercion and distribution of patronage are in their hands, political and economic duties may appear more pressing, or more attractive than the internal administration of the armed forces.\(^{162}\)

Referring to the Indonesian armed forces, Crouch has pointed out that one consequence of the involvement of army officers in fund raising was the spread of a 'commercial' orientation within the officer corps. The officers assigned to fund raising acquired money-making skills, which they used on behalf of the army and increasingly on their own personal behalf. If originally army officers had been forced into commercial activity by necessity, they soon adjusted themselves to their new responsibilities. Many


officers felt much more at home dealing with Chinese and foreign businessmen than commanding troops in the field.\textsuperscript{163}

The modern military profession is highly technical and specialised and requires continuity in training. But some research findings show that the role expansion of the military creates both internal and external vulnerabilities. As armies indulge in politics and become attached to civil pursuits, their martial spirit and fighting skills decline and may even lead to their suffering humiliating defeats at the hands of other armies. For example, the prolonged political involvement of the Pakistan Army was largely responsible for its sagging morale, inadequate fighting skills, and consequent failure to mount effective challenges to the Indian armed forces in 1971.\textsuperscript{164}

Although Pakistan inherited a highly professional army, the professional competence of the army rapidly declined as a result of its “involvement in making and unmaking regimes”. A political scientist has noted that this was an extraordinary waste of skill and experience. A large number of senior officers assumed politico-administrative roles. Several others were compulsorily retired for political reasons. Arbitrary selection and promotion of officers for other than merit affected the morale and efficiency of the army, especially in the officer corps. Acute factionalism developed among the senior officers; interservice relations became highly strained. These developments had virtually immobilised the high command by the time that war with India broke out in 1971.\textsuperscript{165}

Impact of Military Rule on Third World Polities

Nordlinger argues that praetorianism does not derive its importance solely from the seizure and exercise of governmental power. It also has important consequences for the polity after the soldiers withdraw to the barracks. Before doing so, military governors attempt to establish a certain type of civilian regime.\textsuperscript{166}

\textsuperscript{163} See Crouch, n. 10, p. 285.
\textsuperscript{164} See Hossain, n. 162, p. 87.
\textsuperscript{165} See Maniruzzaman, n. 11, pp. 9-10.
\textsuperscript{166} See Nordlinger, n. 5, p. 191.
The praetorians generally try to shape the successor regime’s structure. In most cases, authoritarian military regimes are replaced by more or less open (or democratic) civilian regimes. While still in power, the praetorians often facilitate the formation of successor regimes that allow for considerable political competition and popular electoral participation in choosing among the competitors, be they political parties or individual politicians. Prior to their withdrawal the praetorians sometimes appoint a commission, or arrange for the election of a constitutional body to draft a democratic constitution. National elections for executive and legislative offices are held just before or immediately after the soldiers disengage.\textsuperscript{167}

However, the military does not always play a positive role in the evolution of a civilian regime before it withdraws. If the military perceives that a freely elected government is likely to roll back the polity to the precoup framework and threaten its corporate interests, the praetorians usually exact certain guarantees before they disengage. They often obtain assurances that their past actions would not be publicly criticised, and that their corporate interests would be fully protected. Those military rulers who are particularly concerned about the unhappy consequences of mass participation and competition sometimes impose certain restrictions upon their successors prior to disengagement. These include restrictions upon the kinds of political appeals that may be made by the competing parties; the exclusion of “objectionable” parties and leaders from the electoral process; and the promulgation of electoral laws and arrangements that are advantageous to the “acceptable” political parties. By imposing such restrictions the praetorians are, of course, turning the successor regimes into less than fully open ones.\textsuperscript{168}

In Turkey, for example, the military junta – National Unity Committee, which staged the coup on May 27, 1960, imposed certain limitations on the freedom of action of the political parties. The leaders of political parties attended several military-sponsored all-party meetings after the coup and finally on September 5, 1961, issued a joint

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid, p. 200.
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid, p. 203.
declaration in which they promised: i) not to question or exploit for political purposes the Revolution of May 27; ii) to protect Atatürk’s reforms; iii) not to exploit Islam for political ends; and iv) not to question or exploit for political purposes the execution of the deposed Prime Minister Menderes and his associates.

Only after a protocol was signed between all the parties was the parliament allowed to convene. 169

Similarly, following the September 12, 1980 intervention, the Turkish military imposed several restrictions upon mass participation and competition. In November 1982, a new constitution was introduced. It contained a provisional article which stipulated that all those who had been in positions of leadership on September 12, 1980, were barred from participating in politics for 10 years and those who had been members of the Grand National Assembly were barred for 5. Restrictions were also imposed upon political participation by all non-governmental organisations, including labour unions, private associations, and the press. 170

Moreover, the 1982 Constitution strengthened the role of the President and the National Security Council vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers and the Grand National Assembly. The constitution made it easier for the President to dissolve the Assembly. According to the new constitution, the Council of Ministers has to give “priority” to the recommendations made by the National Security Council. 171

The military’s actions and inactions as rulers affect the problems, capabilities, and performance of the successor regimes. The performance of democratic governments – particularly their legitimacy and popular responsiveness – very much depends upon the existence of fairly well organised political parties with significant grass-roots support. Yet this is exactly what has been weakened or eliminated with the imposition of martial law.


171 See Heper, n. 35, p. 61.
The scores of objectionable political leaders and activists that some military governments have eliminated can not be revived or quickly replaced. The political parties and organisations that have been emasculated, banned, or destroyed can not be easily reconstituted, especially where the rapid withdrawal of the military has not allowed civilian politicians sufficient time to regroup and reorganise themselves. Nor is the regeneration of a meaningful party politics abetted by the praetorians’ public disparagement of politics, politicians, and political parties, which may well have made the civilians more reluctant to participate in the competitive political process that constitutes the linchpin of democratic regimes.  

Furthermore, due to their inadequate performance, military governments have not eased – and often exacerbated, the problems confronting the successor governments, without having enhanced their capabilities for dealing with them.  

Pakistan, for instance, faced such a situation following the death of the country’s third military ruler – General Zia ul Haq, in an air crash on August 30, 1988. Ayesha Jalal, the noted political analyst of Pakistan has characterised Zia as “ringmaster of a subservient, fragmented, highly monetized, corrupt and violent political system”. The bankruptcy of the central exchequer and the astounding affluence of privileged segments of society, civil and military, presented real obstacle to a reordering of the state’s economic priorities. Together with the prolonged suspension of representative government, growing provincial and intra-provincial disparities heightened tensions between the Punjab and the non-Punjabi provinces as well as significant linguistic minorities within them.  

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172 See Nordlinger, n. 5, p. 204.
Socio-economic and political measures taken by military regime failed to receive widespread support from the people. The civilian political forces continued to oppose military rule in Pakistan. One of the most vocal critics of the Zia regime was the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). With the assistance of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Zia regime formed the *Muhajir Quami Mahaj* (MQM) as a powerful bulwark, in the city of Karachi and Hyderabad, against the PPP.\(^{175}\) In Sind, armed cadres of the MQM fought skirmishes against Pathans and Punjabis and then declared total war on indigenous Sindhi population.\(^{176}\)

The Zia regime actively supported the Afghan resistance movement in the 1980s. Zia’s support for the Afghan cause brought in much needed foreign aid, but failed to improve the overall economic situation in Pakistan. The presence of over 3 million Afghan refugees on the Pakistani soil sharpened the lines of social conflict by creating a parallel arms and drug economy widely believed to be linked with the army’s notorious Inter-Services Intelligence wing.\(^{177}\)

The behaviour of the military officers after they have relinquished power to the civilians also to a large extent shapes the nature of the political system. Generally, after disengaging, the officers play an important role as moderator-type praetorians. In Pakistan, for instance, the military has acted as a powerful pressure group since its withdrawal from power in 1988. The military wants no interference with the nuclear programme, or with its support for Afghan and Kashmiri guerrillas. Nor is it willing to accept cuts in the defence expenditure running at 40% of the budget.\(^{178}\) All the popularly elected governments in the post-Zia period have been forced to accept these conditions.


\(^{176}\) See Jalal, n. 174, p. 108.

\(^{177}\) Ibid.

\(^{178}\) See Samad, n. 175, pp. 194-95.