IV. Vasubhandhu on the nature of person and the problem of personal identity in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*

It is said that the two main philosophical systems of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism are the Mādhyamika school of Nāgārjuna and the Viśnūnātivāda school of Vasubandhu. Both schools have close involvement with the Sarvāstivāda school which admits the existence of entities. While the former is based on the radical criticism of the doctrine of the Sarvāstivāda, the latter is established on the Mahāyānic modification of the philosophy of Sarvāstivāda. As will be seen below, since the theoretical construction of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (henceforth: AKBh) is based on that of Sarvāstivāda, the AKBh has been regarded to belong to the tradition of Sarvāstivādin. Therefore, Vasubandhu, the author of AKBh, is in fact the most eligible person regarding the transformation of Sarvāstivādic view into Mahāyānic view, if there is such. Although there is a claim that Vasubandhu of AKBh is not the same person with the master of the Viśnūnātivādin, the fact that AKBh contains the germination of the philosophy of the Viśnūnātivāda cannot

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219 His brother Asaṅga is regarded as a founder of Yogacāra school. Later, together with the Viśnūnātivatara, it is called as Viśnūnātivāda. Warder (2000), p.414. Vasubandhu is regarded as a founder or a representative of this school.

220 The word ‘Sarvāstivādin’ refers to the upholder of the view called Sarvāstivāda and also to the school consisting of those upholders. Vasubandhu uses ‘Sarvāstivāda’ as the meaning of the ‘Sarvāstivādin’ also in the AKBh. But, to avoid the confusion, it is recommended to follow the general usage, i.e. Sarvāstivādin. In this work, unless it is required to distinguish between the Sarvāstivādins in general and the Viśhāṣikas of Kāśmīra the word Sarvāstivādin is used in broad sense comprising all the Viśhāṣikas.

221 Fruwaffner sets up a hypothesis that there are two Vasubhandhus. The one is Vasubandhu ‘the elder’ (cir.320-380 A.D.), who is identified with the younger brother of Asaṅga and the head of the Yogacāra school. The other is Vasubandhu ‘the younger’ (cir. 400-480 A.D.), who is identified with the author of the *Abhidharmakośa*. Fruwalfner (1951); Fruwaffner (1969). This will be discussed in the following section.
be denied. Besides, it is to be noted that most of the Indian commentators of AKBh belong to the Vijñānавādin.²²²

In this chapter, we will focus on the nature of person and the problem of personal identity shown in the AKBh, and on the understanding made and the solution given by Vasubandhu on these matters. For that, there will be a brief examination regarding the author and the textual background of the AKBh prior to the section dealing with the philosophy of the AKBh, where the views of Vasubandhu related to personal identity are studied. In order to understand Vasubandhu’s concept of person presented in the ninth chapter of the AKBh called Pudgalaviniścaya – refuting the pudgala of the Pudgalavādin is the main issue of this chapter – the pudgala concept of the Pudgalavādin will also be studied in the section that follows it. Through the study, we will come to know how the author Vasubandhu digests and criticizes theories of the Sarvāstivādin, especially those related to personal identity, on the one hand, and how he manages to disprove theories of the Pudgalvādin regarding person and personal identity on the other hand. Based on this, the position of Vasubandhu as the author of AKBh in the history of Buddhism can be understood in a clearer way.

1. Abhidharma tradition

Buddhism went through several stages of modification in the course of time before its disappearance in India. Abhidharma²²³ can be said as the

²²² Dignāga, Shiromati, Yaśomitra, GUñamati, and Vasumitra are all known as authors of commentaries on AKBh. “The facts that they belonged to the Yogācāra School suggest that the Kośa was studied in the Yogācāra School, which means the doctrine of the Kośa is similar to the doctrines of Vijñānavāda.” IAKBh, Introduction, xl.
representing feature of the second stage of the Buddhism, i.e. the sectarian Buddhism. Unlike the texts of the early Buddhism, i.e. Pāli Nikāyas and Chinese Āgamas, Abhidharma texts focus on analyzing the dharma explicitly. This is why the sectarian Buddhism is also called Abhidharma Buddhism, which is characterized by scholastic feature.

After the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha, the followers of the Buddha not only collected the teachings of the Buddha but also analyzed and classified them. This has been well explained by Pruden:

... the transmitted doctrines were collected together, formalized, and their vocabulary became technical terms; these terms came to be analyzed through vibhaṅgas (long, explanatory definitions) and niruktas (etymologies); these same terms were also organized on the basis of numerical categories or on the basis of similarities (saṃyuktas) into mātrikās. So the tendencies that led ultimately to systematic Abhidharma literature led in this same process to the systematization of the Āgamas (the traditions) into Nikāyas (formal literary compilations).

In summary, the Āgamas are doctrinal compilations from an early stage of Buddhism, and their recensions (Nikāyas) are in a sense Abhidharmic compilations and, being largely abhidharmic in tendency, they led ultimately to the growth of the Abhidharma as a separate literary genre.224

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223 Literally, Abhidharma means ‘about the dharma’, or ‘study on the dharmas’. The word abhidharma is defined in Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra xi.3 as “that by which the meaning of the sūtra is best understood” (abhigamyate sūrārtha etenety abhidharman). The Āṭhasālinī also remarks that the Abhidharma surpasses the dharma presented in the sūtras, because the various classifications of the elements of existence are listed haphazardly in the sūtras, while the Abhidharma gives them in their definitive catechetic forms... This same sense of “abhidharma” is also alluded to by Vasubhandhu, who in the AKBh (I.2ab) notes that Abhidharma means that unsullied wisdom (prajñā ‘mālā) which analyzes factors (dharmanāprvacaya). Buswell and Jaini (1996), p.74. Cf. Āṭhasālinī 1.2,3; AKBh & AKVī(Shastri), p.9.

224AKBh(Poussin/Pruden), xlii.
This process, however, brought about disagreement on certain crucial points, resulting a series of further schism. Concerning this, the influence from outside as well as within should not be overlooked. The former concerns the interaction of the Buddhist schools with non-Buddhist schools, and the latter the variety of interpretations done by its own members. We see that there had been continuous endeavor among the Buddhists to present clear and definite answers to the philosophical inquiry, especially in the period when the trend of organizing thoughts in a systematic way was prevailing. It is very much likely that coming across with the situation in which one has to answer to the sharp, contentious questions from various schools of outside, the Buddhist monks could not but have been impelled to be armed with concrete answers based on different interpretations of the teaching of the Buddha. We have seen in chapter III that the Buddha rebuked Bhikṣu Sati for his belief in vijñāna as an agent of the rebirth. In spite of the strong rejection of the Buddha against this kind of view his followers started to discuss it again after his parinirvāṇa. We may say that this has been furthered during the Abhidharma Buddhism. In fact, most of the sects of the sectarian Buddhism have developed a theory related to this. The only difference is under which name the related concept has been referred and how much it has been elaborated in accordance with transmigration. Theravādins established the theory of the bhavāṅga, not different from the vijñāna in neutral state, which takes a minimum but crucial role to make the personal identity continue. Mahāsaṃghikas and Mahāsāvakas also developed their own theories. Related to the former is mūlavijñāna (basic

225 Cf. MN (38) I, p.256ff.
consciousness) and to the latter āsamsārikaskandha (a group which continues until the end of transmigration)\textsuperscript{226}.

It seems that all the schools of Buddhism had their own Abhidharma texts. But, most of the texts we have at present are in Pāli, transmitted through the Theravādin tradition of the south. Those are such as Dhammasaṅgani, Vibhaṅga etc. of Abhidharmapiṭaka of the Theravādin.\textsuperscript{227} The Sarvāstivādin was the most influential school in northwest India at that time. It is said that a large number of Abhidharma treatises had been written by this school, presumably in Sanskrit. Most of these texts, however, are lost. Only some of them remain in Chinese and Tibetan translations. Yaśomitra offers a list of names of Abhidharma texts belonging to the Sarvāstivādin in his commentary on the AKBh.\textsuperscript{228} Unfortunately, none of these are preserved in Sanskrit. All of these excepting Prajñaptibhāṣya, along with some other texts of the Sarvāstivādin, are available in Chinese translation; those belonging to other sects are very few.

\textbf{2. Philological aspect of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya}


\textsuperscript{227} The Theravādins possess Abhidharmapiṭaka consisting of seven books: Dhammasaṅgani, Vibhaṅga, Dīṭṭhikathā, Puggalapaṇḍita, Kathāvavīthu, Tamaka and Paṭhāṇa, which are quoted by Buddhaghosa in the fifth century CE. Lamotte (1988), p.181.

\textsuperscript{228} The followings are the list of Abhidharma texts introduced by Yaśomitra in his commentary on the AKBh: 1) Jñānapraṣṭhāna by Kātyayānīpūtra 2) Prakaraṇapāda by Vasumitra 3) Vīṭhānakāya by Devakarmā 4) Dharmaskandha by Sāriputra 5) Prajñāptiśāstra by Maudgalyāyana 6) Dīṭṭhikāya by Pūrṇa 7) Sāṅgītipāryāya by Mahākauśithila. Cf. AKBh & AKVy(Shastrī), p.13. “The most important, the Jñānapraṣṭhāna of Kātyayānīpūtra, was regarded as a ‘body’ (sarīra) and the other texts as its ‘feet’ (pañcika). Jñānapraṣṭhāna was translated into Chinese in 383 A.D. by Saṅghadeva (T.1543) and in 657-660 A.D. by Bhūmatsang (T.1544). Three commentaries on it exist, called vībhāṣās. According to the Buddhist tradition, the Mahāvibhāṣā or Great commentary (T.1545) was compiled by 500 arhats at a council held in Kashmir during the reign of Kaniṣṭha...It has been proved that Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa is directly dependent on the Abhidharmahṛdaya (or Abhidharmasthāra, T.1550), an intermediary link between the Mahāvibhāṣā and Kośa itself.” Marek (1991), pp.19-20.
2.1 Vasubandhu as the author of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

Since the date of Vasubandhu has not been confirmed, one of the answers can be the hypothesis raised by Frauwallner, which assumes the existence of two different Vasubandhus. One of the main reasons for assuming two Vasubandhus is the apparent discrepancies of the Chinese dating of the master. But, according to Anacker, these had already been resolved by Peri, and have subsequently been thoroughly explained by Le Manh, that depending on different calculations for the date of parinirvāṇa of the Buddha accepted by Chinese tradition at various times the date of Vasubandhu had been made. By examining all the materials which contain information regarding the matter, both Peri and Le Manh conclude that the fourth century CE is the approximate date for Vasubandhu. In the introduction of Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Hirakawa also rejects the possibility of two Vasubandhus, and agrees with Hikata who asserts the date as 400-480 CE, and his opinion is broadly accepted in academic field. The accuracy of the date of Vasubandhu is not the main task in this study. So, the general agreement mentioned above will be taken here.

According to Tāranātha, Vasubandhu was born in Puruṣapura, in the kingdom of Gāndhāra after his elder brother Asaṅga's ordination. While learning Buddhist philosophy, Asaṅga was exposed to the Prajñā-pāramitā-sūtras of the Mahāyāna, which are very much different in character from the analytic and scholastic texts of Abhidharma. They emphasize active

229 Anacker (1984), pp.7-11.
230 Hirakawa etc., Introduction, ii-iii.
232 Tāranātha’s History of Buddhism in India.
compassion towards living beings based on profound realization of *anātman* or *sānyatā* through the wisdom of perfection (*praṇāṇa*-pāramitā).

Vasubandhu, on the other hand, entered the Sarvāstivādin school and learned the theoretical system of the Vaibhāṣika school.\(^{233}\) The Sarvāstivādins and the Vaibhāṣikas believed that Abhidhammas were the word of the Buddha. The Sarvāstivādins in the northwest of India regarded the Vaibhāṣikas, who adhered exclusively to the *MViḥh*, as the representatives of orthodox Buddhism. Although the Sarvāstivādins thrived across the northwest of India, it seems, Kaśmīra, a stronghold of the Vaibhāṣikas, was the center of the school at that time.\(^{234}\)

After some time, however, Vasubandhu seemed to have been doubtful about the validity and relevance of certain theories of the Vaibhāṣikas. Perhaps he could have come into contact with the theories of the Sautrāntikas who had a stronghold in Gāndhāra and had no regard for the *MViḥh*. The masters of Kaśmīra, on the contrary, looked down their noses at the Gāndhārans as quasi-heretics.\(^{235}\)

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\(^{233}\) The word *Vaibhāṣika* means, ‘one who follows the *Vibhāṣa*, i.e. the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣa* (a massive commentary-cum-compendium of Sarvāstivādin doctrine preserved only in Chinese translation; henceforth: *MViḥh*), and refers to the Buddhist sect itself also. There is difference between *Vibhāṣa* (T 1545) and *Mahāvibhāṣa* (T 1546) – both of them are extant only in Chinese translation: the former in shorter form (14 fascicules) and translated earlier, 437-439 CE, from the text of Gandhāra origin, the latter much voluminous (200 fascicules) and translated, 656-659 CE, from the text of Kaśmīra.

\(^{234}\) “The Sarvāstivādin school had the widest geographical distribution on the Indian subcontinent of all the early schools. After migrating from Pātaliputra in the second century B.C., they made their home in the Mathurā region. The school soon spread to Kashmir in northwest India, which ultimately became the orthodox base of the school: unless otherwise stated, most references to the Sarvāstivādins in later Buddhist literature refer to this Kashmir branch.” Buswell and Jaini (1996), p.100. See also Dutt (1970), pp.126-128.

\(^{235}\) Anacker (1984), pp.14-15
Bu-ston, in his *Chos Byun*, says that Vasubhandhu went to Kaśmīra and entered the school of Sanghabhadra\(^{236}\) and learned the theory of the Vaibhāṣika. After having acquired erudition in it, but thinking that it needs to be supplemented, he returned to Puruṣapura. He then composed over six hundred verses (*kārikā*), which gave an extensive outline of the entire theoretical system of the Vaibhāṣika. These constitute the *Abhidharmakośa* (henceforth: AK). When he sent it to his old teachers in Kaśmīra, initially they might have been exulted at his brilliant work, but soon came to know that it is in fact a critique of the theory of the Vaibhāṣika from the viewpoint of the Sautrāntika. Vasubandhu, who was a follower of the Sarvāstivādin, actually adopted the more progressive views of the Sautrāntika to write a general survey of the theories of the Sarvāstivādin with a critical approach to the views of the Vaibhāṣika. In his treatise, the frequent use of words such as *kīla* (it is claimed) and *ity āhuḥ* (so they say) is meant for the Vaibhāṣikas. The AKBh, which is in prose form equivalent to 8000 *kārikās*, was composed by him when Kaśmīrian scholars asked him to write its commentary for a better understanding. It is said that, as a response to this work, Sanghabhadra wrote *Abhidharmanyāyānusāra* in order to establish the orthodox theory of the Vaibhāṣika.

In his early age, Vasubandhu already achieved certain fame among contemporary scholars. Vasubandhu used to have little regard for the Yogācāra treatises of his elder brother Asaṅga. When Asaṅga decided to lead him to the Mahāyāna Buddhism and introduced him the *Dāśabhūmika-sūtra*,

he came to realize how ignorant he had been. Having become overwhelmed by the Mahāyāna literature, he subsequently wrote abundant commentaries on Mahāyāna sūtras and treatises. Vasubandhu after the conversion to the Mahāyāna is not our concern; here, we will study Vasubandhu only as an author of the AKBh.

The position of the text AKBh is peculiar. It is an abridged encyclopedic manual of the Abhidharma as taught by the Vaibhāṣika of Kaśmīra with critical commentary. Therefore, we can say that the text itself belongs to the Vaibhāṣika or to the Sarvāstivādin in broad sense. This, however, does not mean that Vasubandhu of the AKBh is a Vaibhāṣika or a Sarvāstivādin. He is rather closer to a Sautrāntika.

Can we, then, say that Vasubandhu in AKBh belongs to the Sautrāntika? When we analyse the text, we can find his view reflecting that of the Sautrāntika. In the AK, as mentioned above, he uses the word kila (it is claimed) for expressing his disagreement with the theory of the Vaibhāṣika indirectly. But, he maintains somewhat reserved manner, so that his real intention is not revealed clearly. It is in the AKBh that he begins to pour out his own opinions frequently, alluding to the theories of the Sautrāntika. According to Hirakawa, it is not clearly stated in the AKBh whether Vasubandhu belonged to the Sautrāntika, or not. But, the biography of Vasubandhu written by Paramārtha states that Vasubandhu modified the inappropriate doctrines of Sarvāstivāda according to the doctrines of

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238 Cf. AKBh(Poussin/Pruden), p.513, fn.163.
So, although the AKBh does not teach the doctrines of Sautrāntika directly, it can be said that Vasubandhu of AKBh belongs to the Sautrāntika school.

2.2 Texts and translations of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

The original Sanskrit texts of the AK and the AKBh were lost in India. Only fragmentary quotations had been preserved in Yaśomitra’s Sphuṭārtha Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (henceforth: AKVy). This was the only Sanskrit commentary that has been preserved in complete form, which also exists in Tibetan translation. The AKVy, along with other Buddhist texts, was discovered by B. H. Hodgson in Nepal in the nineteenth century CE. The first and the second chapters of this text were edited by S. Lévi and Th. Stcherbatsky in 1918 and by U. Wogihara and Th. Stcherbatsky in 1931 respectively. Wogihara, then, edited the whole AKVy in Roman script, 1932-36. In 1934, Rāhula Saṅkṛtyāyana discovered the Sanskrit texts of the AK and the AKBh at the Śa-lu Monastery in Tibet. He brought back those texts to India in photographs. In 1946, V. V. Gokhale collated and published the AK in Roman script; and P. Pradhan edited the full Sanskrit text of AK and AKBh in Devanāgarī script in 1967. The whole text of AKVy, together with AK and AKBh, was edited in Devanāgarī script by D. Shastri, 1970-74.

239 Cf. T.50, No. 2049, p.190b, 15-16.
240 Hirakawa etc. (1973), Introduction, xxiv.
241 The philological aspects of AKBh is thoroughly explained in the introduction of Index to Abhidharmakośabhāṣya by Hirakawa etc. (1973), the introduction of Analytical Study of the Abhidharmakośa by Chaudhuri (1976), and “The Abhidharma: The Origins, Growth and Development of a Literary Tradition” by Pruden (1988, Vol. I). This section deals with basic information required for the study, and thus does not go into details.
The AKBh was considered to be the most authoritative treatise of the Sarvāstivādin after the MVibh. Accordingly, a large number of commentaries were written on AK and AKBh. These are still extant, either in the original Sanskrit or in a rendered form. In the Chinese Tripitaka, there are two translations of the AKBh. One is *A P‘i Ta Mo Chu She Shih Lun* (阿辯達磨俱舍釋論) in twenty-two volumes translated by Paramārtha (Chen-ti, 眞諦) in the sixth century CE, and the other is the *A P‘i Ta Mo Chu She Lun* (阿毘達磨俱舍論) in thirty volumes translated by Hsūan-tsang in the seventh century CE. The AK alone is also preserved in the Chinese Tripitaka. It is entitled *A P‘i Ta Mo Chu She Lun Sung* (阿毘達磨俱舍論頌) and was translated by Hsūan-tsang.

In the Tibetan Tengyur, or Tanjur, there are each translation of AK and AKBh. They have been translated by Jinamitra, and by Dpal-brtsegs, a Tibetan, in cir. 800 CE. Stcherbatsky has edited the first chapter and the first half of the second chapter of the Tibetan version of the AKBh. Uighur version of the AKBh has also been discovered by Stein from Turkestan.

There exist a number of translations in modern times. A complete French translation of the AKBh was carried out by Poussin from 1923 to 1931. The

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244 T 1559, pp.161-310.
245 T 1558, pp.1-160.
246 T 1558, pp.310-325.
247 *Chos mgon pa'i bstan'i gnyis le'bur byas pa (Abhidharmakośakārikā)* Peking No.5590. *Chos mgon pa'i bstan'i bsdod pa (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya)* Peking No.5591.
translation is of the Chinese text of Hsüan-tsang's translation, primarily working with the Sanskrit text of Yaśomitra's *AKV*y and the Tibetan translation of the *AKV*y, and frequent reference is made to the Chinese translation by Paramārtha and commentaries of Fa-pao and P'u-kuang. Th. Scherbatsky translated the ninth chapter, the Pudgalaviniścaya, from Tibetan into English, under the title "The Soul Theory of the Buddhist" in 1920. Recently, J. Duerlinger also translated the same chapter from the Sanskrit text under the title of "Refutation of the theory of selfhood; A resolution of questions about persons".249

3. *The philosophy of Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*

It has been declared by the Buddha that there is not a single thing to be attached to since everything is impermanent. Impermanence is another expression for transitoriness. This transitoriness is explained through the concept of momentariness in the Abhidharma Buddhism.250 The basic presupposition of Buddhism that everything is impermanent relates two points. The first is that whatever is impermanent cannot be reduced to anything substantial. Buddhism does not suppose any kind of ultimate reality as the cause of all phenomena. Therefore, viewing the phenomenal world as impermanent, consequently, leads one to the speculation of insubstantiality. The second is that the problem of identity rises to the surface when the impermanent nature of phenomenal world is accepted. This point can be

249 Duerlinger (1989). Due to the insufficient information the translation carried out into other languages, especially those in East Asian languages, has been omitted in the present study.
250 This point will be discussed in the section 3.4 below.
made on the basis of the first point. How can the identity we observe in the
world be assumed without any substantial element? What could be taken as
identical when there is not any real, final substantial element to be connected
together to form a certain similarity? Much effort had been made to offer a
reasonable and convincing explanation related to these two points in the
Abhidharma Buddhism. In pursuing so, it seems, one is apt to be entangled in
the problem of metaphysical inquiry, which had been rejected by the Buddha
and thus labeled as ‘unexplained’ (avyākta). In this regard, the two
controversial doctrines of the Buddhists at that time, i.e. the Sarvāstivāda and
the Pudgalavāda, draw our attention. We will see below how they handled
this matter and in what point they were defective so to be refuted by
Vasubandhu.

3.1 The main doctrine of the Sarvāstivādin

As we can see from the name of this school, the Sarvāstivādins claim that
‘everything’ exists throughout the three time-periods. They say that as a
real entity (dravya) or as an intrinsic nature (svabhāva; own-nature) dharmas
always exist traversing the past, present and future. Rhys Davids states that
dharma in singular and in plural had different value in the Tipitaka. She also
says that the plural dharmas may be considered as a moment and that

\[ \text{ye hi sarvam astiti vadanti aśīmānāgataḥ pratyutpannaḥ ca te sarvāstivādaḥ.} \]
\[ \text{AKBh} \text{(Pradhan), p.296, line 4 (V.25; ). Henceforth, the page number in brackets}
\[ \text{refers to that of AKBh & AKVy (Shastri).} \]

\[ \text{251 See Cox (1995), p.139. I am indebted to this book in dealing with some of the detailed}
\[ \text{discussions. Except that the author does not make clear distinction between the view of the}
\[ \text{Sarvāstivādin or the Vaibhāṣika and that of Vasubandha, the book is helpful regarding the}
\[ \text{subject matters of 3.6; it offers abundant information especially from Chinese translations of}
\[ \text{Abhidharma treatises.} \]

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psychologically the term is of interest, and has various renderings like ‘truths’, ‘states’, ‘phenomena’ etc.\textsuperscript{253} Oldenberg, referring dhārman as a synonym, says that its original meaning is ‘the order of nature’ which always follows regularity.\textsuperscript{254} In the Nikāya / Āgama, the term dharmas are used whenever components of skandha, āyatana, dhātu etc. are enumerated. It is further explained that their nature is anitya, duṣkha and anātman. It is to be noted, though well known, that when the Three Characteristics are mentioned, the word ‘dharma’ is used for the last only – in the first and the second, the word samkṣhāra (P.; Skt. saṃskāra conditioning formation, complex formation) is used – thus, sabbe dhamme anattā (P.).\textsuperscript{255} This implies that the last characteristic, i.e. anātman, should not be restricted to phenomenal world only. It covers both the saṃskṛta-dharma and asaṃskṛta-dharma. Beside the Three Characteristics, there are also the three characteristics of the saṃskṛta: origin (utpāda), cessation (vyaya), and change of state (sthityanyathātva). The Sarvāstivādin, however, accepts four, viz. jāti (origination), sthiti (duration), jarā (decay), and anityatā (impermanence / destruction). These will be discussed in the section below dealing with the momentariness.

Dharmas explained in the treatises of the Sarvāstivādin do not appear simple. It is not only because of the number of dharmas and various additional concepts required for the explanation of the working of the dharmas but also because of the long tradition that has produced numerous, successive treatises marked with different interpretation on certain issues.

\textsuperscript{253} Rhys Davids (1978), p.259. It is preferred to use the word dharma without translating it into a confined, corresponding word in English.
\textsuperscript{254} H. Oldenberg, \textit{Die Weltanschaung der Brāhmaṇa Texte}, pp.188,192.
\textsuperscript{255} \textit{Dhammapāda}, Chap. 20, 277-279; T 2 p.66a.
May be, this was one of the reasons Vasubandhu wanted to produce AK Bh, for thanks to this text modern scholars were able to clear many vague points — although we have to accept that still much is remained for the clarity. The Sarvāstivādin regards dharmas as the ‘factors / elements’ that compose things in the empirical world temporarily by the intricate law of causation. They have their intrinsic nature (svabhāva) that distinguishes themselves from others.256 They exist as immutable entities (dravya) at the base of phenomena. Although they exist throughout the three time-periods it is the present dharmas that are actualized; and their actualization is considered to be momentary. Therefore, it will be examined how the Sarvāstivādins have constructed their theory of three time-periods, the theory of momentariness and the theory of causation. They will be the subject matter of different sections below viz. 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5. Theories related to identity will be dealt with after this, i.e. in section 3.5. Before we proceed, the basic taxonomy of the Sarvāstivādin will be introduced first to help us understand the position of each dharma in the whole structure of dharmas understood by the Sarvāstivādin.

3.2 The Taxonomy of the Sarvāstivādin

From the early Buddhism, dharmas have been classified into saṁskṛta, asaṁskṛta, sārava, anārava, five skandhas, twelve āyatanas, eighteen dhātuḥ, and so on. The Sarvāstivādin has its own classification of dharmas based on seventy-two saṁskṛta-dharmas and three asaṁskṛta-dharmas, thus

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256 svabhāvena parabhāvavyogataḥ. AK Bh & AKVy(Shastri), p.44 (l. 18).
altogether seventy-five dharmas in five categories. Except *asamskṛta-
dharmas*, all the dharmas can be comprehended as *nāmarūpa*. That is why
the Sarvastivādin was once known as ‘a subtle investigator of *nāma-rūpa’
during Aśoka’s reign in Magadha.\(^{257}\) However, the well-known ‘seventy-five
dharmas’ in five categories is a later development. It is the outcome of the
long history of discussion on dharmas reflected in the seven Sarvāstivādin
Abhidharma texts, the *MViibh* and the texts thereafter up to the *AKBh*. Cox
explains that the acceptance of a new category consisting of dharmas called
conditioned forces unassociated with mind/thought (*citta-viprayukta-
samskāra*) in the period of these texts contributed in forming the fivefold
taxonomy:

This newly established category of discrete factors dissociated from both
thought and form presented a challenge to the traditional methods of
classifying all experienced phenomena. The traditional lists of the five
aggregates (*skandha*), the twelve sense spheres (*āyatana*), and name and
form (*nāmarūpa*) were ill-suited to incorporate factors that are neither
thought nor form, nor associated with either. ...  

The challenge presented by these discrete dissociated forces to the
traditional categories of factors contributed significantly to the creation of
new taxonomies: specifically, the new fivefold taxonomy of form (*rūpa*),
thought (*citta*), thought concomitants (*caïtta*), dissociated forces
(*cittaviprayukta-samskāra*), and unconditioned factors (*asamskṛtadharna*).\(^{258}\)

The seventy-five dharmas in five categories are as the following: \(^{259}\)

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\(^{259}\) This classification is based on the Abhidharma texts in which Vasubandhu follows the
typical classification of five categories which was fixed by Vasumitra.
I. 11 rūpas (material dharmas), viz. 5 indriyas, 5 viñayas and avijñāpti (non-intimation).

II. 1 citta (mind/thought), it is also called manas or viñāṇa. This is a state of pure consciousness, without any content.

III. 46 caittas (citta-samprayukta-saṃskāras; conditioned forces associated with mind/thought; thought concomitants; mental dharmas). They are psychic concomitants to thought co-operating with it. They are grouped in six classes:

   i) 10 mahābhūmika-caittas. They accompany every thought whatever: vedanā (reception), cetanā (motivation), saṃjñā (recognition), chanda (passion), sparśa (touching), prajñā (intellect), smṛti (memory), manaskāra (attention), adhimokṣa (determination) and samādhi (concentration).

   ii) 10 kuśala-mahābhūmika-caittas. They accompany every good thought: śraddhā (faith), apramāda (earnestness), praśrībdhi (tranquility), upekṣā (neutral feeling), hṛi (modesty), āpattīrya (shame), alobha (non-greed), adveṣa (non-hatred), ahiṃsā (non-violence) and viṣya (effort).

   iii) 6 kleśa-mahābhūmika-caittas. They accompany every impassioned thought: moha (delusion), pramāda (carelessness), kauśīdya (indolence), āśraddhya (absence of faith), styāna (languor) and audhhatya (restlessness).

   iv) 2 akuśala-mahābhūmika-caittas. They accompany every bad thought: āhrikyā (lack of self-respect) and anapattīrya (shamelessness).

   v) 10 parīṭa-kleśa-bhūmika-caittas. They accompany minor passion: krodha (anger), upānāha (enmity), śāṇya (trickery), īrṣyā (jealousy), pradāsa (afflict), mṛakṣa (hypocrisy), mātsarya (stinginess), māyā (deceit), mada (arrogance) and vihiṃsā (violence).

   vi) 8 aniyata-caittas. Undetermined mental factors which are sometimes associated with a good thought, sometimes with a bad or undetermined thought: kauktīya (remorse), mīḍḍha (torpor) vitarka (initial application), vicāra (sustained application), rōga
(attachment), pratigha (anger), māna (conceit) and vicikitsā (doubt).

IV. 14 citta-viprayukta-saṃskāras (conditioned forces unassociated with mind/thought). They are neither material nor mental.

i) Prāpti (attainment): a power linking an acquired dharma with the next.

ii) Aprāpti (non-attainment): a power not linking an acquired dharma with the next.

iii) Sabhāgatā (homogeneous character): a power causing the resemblance of living beings.

iv-vi) Āsāmyātā (state of non-conception), asamjñī-saṃśāpatti (equipoise of non-conception), and nirodhasaṃśāpatti (equipoise of cessation).


viii-xi) The four saṃskṛta-lakṣanas (characteristics of the conditioned dharma): jāti (origination), sthiti (duration), jarā (decay), anityatā (impermanence or destruction).

xii-xiv) Nāma-kāya (name or word set), pada-kāya (phrase set), vyañjana-kāya (syllable set).

V. 3 asaṃskṛtas.

i) Ākāśa (space).

ii) Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha (extinction obtained by knowledge).

iii) Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha (extinction obtained not by knowledge but by nature).

These are introduced in the AKBh, but not as in arranged manner as we see above. The five categories and seventy-five dharmas are the origination of the AKBh, which follows the traditional way of classifying dharmas since
the Dhātukāya, and takes the stand in the Prakaraṇapāda. The above systematization, however, is according to the Chu-she-lun-chi 俱舍論記, a commentary in Chinese on the AKBh by P’u-K’u’ang in later period.

These classifications of seventy-five dharmas in five categories are the result of detailed investigation on skandha, āyatana and dhātu, especially on samskāra-skandha, dharma-āyatana and dharma-dhātu. As can be seen above, samskāra-skandha of the five skandhas in early Buddhism is here divided into two: citta-samprayuktas (the conditioned forces associated with mind/thought) and citta-viprayuktasamskāras (the conditioned forces dissociated from mind/thought). The first can be seen as a function of mind (cāitta). But, since vedanā and saṃjñā are already established as different skandhas in early Buddhism, they should not have been included in this category of samskāra. According to this classification, however, they are seen as being combined with the citta, and thus included in the category of citta-samprayuktasamskāra. The second is meant for specific dharmas of relationship or force between dharmas, which are neither mind nor matter. In rūpa-skandha, avijñapti is added to the five sense organs and their five corresponding objects to make altogether eleven. This dharma is devised to provide some explanation for the karma that affects the doer even after the termination of it. This is understood by the Sarvāstivādin as a kind of rūpa which is not captured by the doer. According to this categorization, the

260 IAKBh, xvi.
261 “The five groups are systematized at first in the Prakaraṇapāda (品類足論, T 1542, vol, 26, p.99b, 20-21; T 1541, vol.26, p.627a, 7-8), and the Kośakāra took them from it. Only when counting all dharmas in the Kośa, do they amount to seventy-five. They were systematized in the later period by 着光 (Puguāng, -633-), who was disciple of Xuánzàng.” IAKBh, xii. Here, Puguāng is same as P’u-K’u’ang, and Xuánzàng, Hsū-tsan. See also Kimura (1920), p.14.
asamskṛta-dharmas are grouped separately to form another category that does not belong to the five skandhas of the early Buddhism. Thus, all the dharmas according to the Sarvāstivādin come under five categories, viz. (1) rūpa (in broad sense),\(^2\) (2) citta, (3) caitta (or citta-samprayukta-samskāra), (4) citta-viprayukta-samskāra and (5) asamskṛta-dharma. Unlike the earlier classifications of the early Buddhism, viz. five skandhas, twelve āyatanas and eighteen dhātus, according to Cox, this new five-fold taxonomy reflects a concern for completeness, an interest in classification, and a desire to demonstrate the individual, distinctive characteristic of each of the factors classified.\(^3\)

3.3 The theory of three time-periods

Everything exists throughout the three time-periods does not mean that the three time-periods themselves are eternal existence, nor does it mean that time is a real substance. It means that all things or elements, i.e. dharmas, are real in the past and in the future as they are in the present, without enduring from one period to another.\(^4\) From the discussions recorded in the AMVi we could see that great importance has been laid on the distinction between the

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\(^2\) It has been widely believed that the rūpa of the five skandhas in the Nikāya means the physical constituents of a person. Consequently, rūpa has been understood as the five sense organs. It is not certain whether this understanding is the genuine teaching of the Buddha or not. The Buddha explains the five skandhas only when he preaches the anātman. In most cases the five skandhas appear to be related to the person. We can assume that when the five skandhas are explained, the most convenient and representing example for that would be 'oneself', moreover the subject is none other than anātman. The rūpa came to mean the five-fold objects of consciousness. Finally, in AKbh, avijñapti is also included in the rūpa. Therefore, It is clear that rūpa is also regarded as a part of mental process since rūpa comprises five sense organs and their objects.

\(^3\) Cox (1995), p.68.

\(^4\) Takakusu (1947), p.64.
three time-periods and the activity (kārita) upon which it depends.\footnote{265}{T 1545, p.393c14ff., p.396b6ff. See Cox (1995), p.140.} The Sarvāstivādin understood the dharmas to exist in the three time-periods as real entities (dravya) determined by intrinsic nature (svabhāva), which is itself defined as the particular inherent characteristic (svalakṣaṇa). From the appropriate assemblage of cause and condition a particular activity (kārita) is manifested, which defines the present. The future is referred to when a dharma does not have the activity, the past when the activity of a dharma has passed away.\footnote{266}{Ibid.}

When the existence of dharmas as real entities possessed of, or determined by, intrinsic nature in the three time-periods is accepted, the question is how the dharmas of one time period are distinguished from those of another. Vasubhandhu introduces the four interpretations of the authoritative masters of the Sarvāstivādin on the three time-periods. They are bhāvānyathātva of Dharmatrāta, lakṣaṇānyathātva of Ghoṣaka, avasthānyathātva of Vasumitra, anyathānyathātva of Buddhadeva. They have suggested different criteria, viz. the difference in existence (bhāva), the difference in characteristics (lakṣaṇa), the difference in state, or condition (avasthā), and the difference by mutual reference (anyathānyathā), by which the difference between the present, the past and the future are explained. They are as follows:

1. Dharmatrāta defends bhāvānyathātva. He states, it is said (kila), that in the time-periods there is differentiation in existence (the state of being; bhāva), but not in real entity (dravya). Just as a gold vase which one breaks

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{266}{Ibid.}
\end{footnotesize}
shows the difference in figure, but not the difference in color. And, just as when milk becomes curds, its taste, force and digestibility change, but not its color. In the same way, when a future dharma passes from the future into the present, its future existence is abandoned, but not the existence as real entity. When it passes from the present into the past, its present existence is abandoned, but not the existence as real entity.

2. Ghoṣaka defends laksapanyathātva. He states, it is said, that the past dharma occurring in the time-periods is associated with the past characteristics (lakṣapa), but it is not deprived of the present and future characteristics. The future [dharma] is associated with the future characteristics, but it is not deprived of the present and past characteristics. Likewise, the present [dharma] is associated with present characteristics, but it is not deprived of the past and future characteristics. For example, a man attached to one woman is not detached with respect to other women.

3. Vasumitra defends avasthānyathātva. He states, it is said, that the dharma occurring in the time-periods shows the difference after having taken up different states (condition; avasthā); it is due to the difference in state, not due to the difference in real entity (dravya). For example, a token placed on the mark of one, is called one; placed on that of ten, ten; and placed on that of hundred, hundred.

4. Buddhadeva defends anyathānyathātva. He states, it is said, that the dharma occurring in the time-periods is called differently with regard to the former and the latter due to the difference in the state (avasthā), not due to the difference in real entity (dravya). For example, the same woman is called a mother or a daughter.\textsuperscript{267}

Among these four, the avasthānyathātva of Vasumitra is considered to be the best. However, Vasubandhu is not fully satisfied with this view. If ‘everything exists in the three time-periods’, he argues, kārita also should exist along with the dharma at all times. Since it is not separable from the dharma, the kārita should not be distinguished as past, present and future. Like svalakṣapa, according to the Sarvāstivādin, kārita cannot be different

\textsuperscript{267} AKBh (Pradhan), pp.296-7 (V. 26ab; pp.633-4).
from the dharma. If kārita is identical with the dharma, it always exists. How can one say that sometimes it is past, some times future?

He finally says: We also say that the past and future exist. But the past is that which existed previously. The future is that which will exist when there are causes. Taking it in this way, it is said that [the past or future] exists, but not as a real entity. The ‘present existence’ has been explained by Vasubhandhu that it refers to the dharma which ‘exists after not having existed (abhūtvā bhavati), and after having existed, no longer exists (bhūtvā ca punar na bhavati). The theory of three time-periods seems to be based on two assumptions: the first is that there is no such thing as cognition without the object of cognitive activity; the second is that our cognition does not arise out of something that does not exist. Williams traces the theory back to the early Buddhist epistemology:

Philosophically, the Sarvāstivāda doctrine was essentially built on the intentionality of consciousness, the theory that all consciousness must be conscious of something, combined with an a priori assumption that therefore the intentional object must exist. This doctrine is originated from the earliest stage of Buddhist epistemology, i.e., in the theory of the twelve āyatana – six sense bases and their corresponding objects of sense – and the doctrine

268 vayam api brīma’sty afitāṅgatam iti. atitam tu yad bhūtapūrvam. anāgatam yat sati hetau bhavisyati. evam ca kṛtvāśtī’ty ucyate na tu punar dravyataḥ. Cf. AKbh (Pradhan), p.299, line 1-2 (V. 27; p.637).
269 Ibid. p.299.
270 This is clearly seen in the AKbh “Consciousness (viṣṇāna) occurs if the object (viṣaya) exists, not otherwise. If past and future were non-existent, then consciousness would have a non-existent as an objective support (ālambana). Therefore consciousness would not occur because its objective support does not exist.” Ibid. Ch.5.25d, p.633.
of the eighteen dhātus - the preceding twelve āyatanas plus six sorts of resulting consciousness.\textsuperscript{271}

Consciousness (vijñāna) occurs only when the object (viṣaya) and its counter sense organ (indriya) exist. The present event is cognized by a sentient being having consciousness and sense organs when the object comes into contact at the present moment. But, it is acknowledged that the event of the past or the future is also cognized at the time of meditation. This point had been a theoretical footing for the Sarvāstivādins who find the support from the sūtra. In AKBh, it is clearly mentioned:

“There exist all of the time periods” “Why is this?” “Because the blessed one has said, ‘Monks, if past rūpa did not exist, the learned holy śrāvakas would not take into consideration past rūpa … If future rūpa did not exist, the learned holy śrāvakas would not delight in future rūpa. It is because future rūpa exists that the learned holy śrāvakas …”\textsuperscript{272}

“Because consciousness proceeds from two.” “The Blessed One implicitly teaches the same doctrine when he says, ‘Consciousness is produced by reason of two. What are these two? The eye and forms… the manas and the dharmas.’”\textsuperscript{273}

If dharmas of the past and the future do not exist, consciousness that depends on them would not arise. A consciousness can arise provided that

\textsuperscript{272} 比丘。若無過去色者。多聞聖弟子不顧過去色。以有過去色故。多聞聖弟子不顧過去色。若無未來色者。多聞聖弟子無不欣未來色。以有未來色故。多聞聖弟子不欣未來色。若無現在色者。多聞聖弟子不於現在色生厭。離欲。滅盡向。以欲現在色故。多聞聖弟子於現在色生厭。離欲。滅盡向。Cf. Sathiyuttikāgama, T 2, p.20 a 14 ff. The content of corresponding sutta of the Nikāya is little different. Here, the similar content is explained in relation to ti-lakkana (P.; anicca, dukkha and anattā) in order. So, we cannot trace any ontological sign in this sutta. Cf. SN III. P.19.
\textsuperscript{273} Cf. SN II, p.72
there is the object and the sense organ. If it is asserted that the object belonging to the past and the future does not exist, then there would be consciousness without an object; and this is against the basic assumption shown in the sūtra mentioned above. Moreover, if dharmas of the past do not exist, how could there be the result of good and bad action done in the past? In AKBh, it is said:

If the past does not exist, how could there be in the future the effect of good and bad deeds? For at the time when the effect arises, the present cause of its fruition (vipāka-hetu) does not exist. Therefore, the Vaibhāṣikas maintain that past and future exist.\(^{274}\)

Hence, the Sarvāstivādin affirmed the existence of the past and the future, just as that of the present, based on the authoritative description in the sūtra and the reasoning quoted above.\(^{275}\)

Kalupahana points out that it is the Sarvāstivādin, whose name itself means “everything exists”, who posits substantiality in the elements. So, if there is anything to be blamed that the misconception (viparyāsa) of perceiving self in things without self, thinking of non-existent things as existent, it may be attributed to the Sarvāstivādin. He also asserts that the

\(^{274}\) yadi cāṭitaṁ na syāt subhāśubhasya karmāṇāṁ phalam āyatyāṁ katham syat; na hi phalotpattikāle varṇamāno vipākahetu astīti. tasmād asty evātāntāgatam iti vaibhāṣikāḥ. AKBh(Pradhan), pp.295-6 (V. 25; p.633). In Sanskrit text of the concerning kārikā, there is no specific mentioning of ‘the past, present and future’. According to the original Sanskrit text and the Tibetan translation, it is “all the time-periods (S. sarvakāla, Tbt. rnams kun tu)”. In the AKBh, only “past and future (atāntāgata)” are mentioned without the present (pratyutpanna), because it is basically understood there. Using of the word 三世 (the three time-periods) in the Chinese translation of AKBh would be due to the usage in Chinese. The expression 三世 (all the time-periods), which would fit for sarvakāla, is not actually used in Chinese. 三世有由說 二有境果故 說三世有故 許說一切有. Cf. T 29, p.104b.

\(^{275}\) AKBh & AK Vy(Shastrī), p.632.
early Buddhism does not refer to the past and the future, or, for that matter, to any conception of time.\textsuperscript{276} According to him, the early Buddhists accept only the present sensory experience and their causal co-relation.\textsuperscript{277} This point, however, needs to be considered further. We cannot argue that only the present has been accepted in the early Buddhism. We should not jump that the dealing with and the analysis of our sensual experience are matters related to the present only. In fact, this discussion has close relation to the theory of momentariness.

The Sautrāntika and the Theravādin claim that acknowledging the existence of three time-periods is quite contrary to the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of anitya (impermanence) saying that if dharmas exist subsequently in a future phase, then in a present phase, and finally in a past phase, it means that they have a history, in fact a history of infinite regress; and this makes dharmas eternal substances.\textsuperscript{278} It is argued that they exist rather provisionally. This can be supported by the sutta (P.) in the Samyutta-nikāya:

There are ‘three (past, present and future)’ which can be conveyed by the pathways; pathways of language (P. niruttipathā), pathways of designation (adhivacanapathā), pathways of description (pabbāpatti pathā), that are not to be confused, that were never confused, that are not being confused, that

\textsuperscript{276} Kalupahana (1975), p.76.
\textsuperscript{277} Here, Kalupahana quotes a sūtra and assures that the following passage clearly shows that the reference is to the present sense experiences and their causes. Cf. T 2, p.91b “The visual organ and the visible object produce visual consciousness and contact. As a result of visual contact there arise feelings of pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral. This is what is meant by ‘everything exists.’” 有 色 有 眼 識 有 眼 触 有 眼 触 因 經 生 聲。若 色 若 識 若 不 色 不 識。若 言 若 有。若 聲 堆 堆 銳 耳。鼻 香 身 意亦 如 是 言。” Although he has offered the evidence quoting this sūtra, and it seems to be plausible, however, we should countercheck another sūtra which AKBh quotes. See footnote 52.
\textsuperscript{278} Bastow (1994), p.492.
will not be confused, that are not rejected by wise ascetics and Brahmins.

Then, what are ‘three’? Whatever form (feeling,...) has passed, ceased, changed; the term, label, and description ‘was’ applies to it, not the term ‘is’ or the term ‘will be’ Whatever form (feeling,...) has not been born, has not become manifest; the term, label, and description ‘will be’ applies to it, not the term ‘is’ or the term ‘was’. Whatever form (feeling,...) has been born, has become manifest; the term, label, and description ‘is’ applies to it, not the term ‘was’ or the term ‘will be’. 279

This sutta (P.) is quoted in Kathāvatthu as a support for the Theravādin’s argument against the Sarvāstivādin. 280 It is very clear that this statement is a kind of precaution for the people who believe that dharmas of the past, present and future are real. They are just explanatory words, designations and descriptions for the conventional, worldly usage. However, we need to check why the Sarvāstivādins have reached to this point, what has made them to conclude so with confidence.

3.4 The theory of momentariness (Kṣanikavāda; P. Khanikavāda)

As mentioned earlier, the impermanent nature of the phenomenal world is the basic presupposition of Buddhism. This is the first and basic axiom for the next two in the Three Characteristics. According to Buddhism, all that is subject to arising is subject to cessation, 281 and all phenomena are impermanent. 282 One of the peculiar aspects of the Abhidharma Buddhism is that this impermanence is explained through the concept of momentariness.

279 SN III. p.71.
280 Cf. Kathāvatthu 141 or 150.
282 AN I. 286.
According to D. J. Kalupahana, the theory of momentariness is not only foreign to early Buddhism but also contradicted by some statements in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas. He says that according to early Buddhism things are impermanent not because they are momentary but because they are characterized by birth, decay and destruction. What he wants to point out is that the word anitya (impermanent) stands for the ‘arising and passing away’ feature of the nature, and not for the kṣaṇika (momentary) aspect precisely. 283 Rospatt would not be opposing to this view on the whole when he states thus: There can be no doubt that the theory of momentariness cannot be traced back to the beginning of Buddhism or even the Buddha himself. It does not fit the practically oriented teachings of early Buddhism and clearly bears the mark of later doctrinal elaboration. 284 However, can we say that such a conclusion is justifiable? We need to examine further on this matter.

In the course of time when Buddhism had been developed as a philosophy, the theory of impermanence had also been criticized by the non-Buddhist schools of philosophy along with the theory of anātman. When the followers of the Buddha attempted to respond accordingly after having elaborated and interpreted what the Buddha taught, they did not give the answer with one voice. It is during this period that the doctrine of impermanence had been explained with the technical term momentariness and developed as a theory. The momentariness as a destination of the process of analysis on phenomenal world characterized as impermanent seems quite natural. All the phenomena being intrinsically bound with time and space is in any case having temporal

283 Kalupahana (1975), p.84.
and special aspects. When our thinking faculty analyzes the phenomenal world, the former becomes in accordance with the latter in the sense that the former follows the characteristics of the latter. Focusing on the temporal aspect, when our analysis reaches the farthest point where things are almost in still, one would observe that an instance gets substituted by another almost simultaneously, or in other expression, that an instance is connected with another instantaneously. Here, there is no room for simultaneousness, because it nullifies temporal sequence, the essential aspect of phenomenal world. At the point where the closest simultaneity operates, the assumption of a discrete entity, which stands for that instance, takes place. The reliability or credibility of the assumed entity is another matter that gets involved in the argumentation among the Abhidharmists. Since detailed explanation on the mechanism of the momentariness can be different, theorizing of the momentariness could have branched forth. Thus, in summary, we can say that the extreme point of the temporal aspect of the changing world reached by the analysis of the Abhidharmists is explained by the word ‘momentary’ (kṣanika); and, though Buddhist sects were not unanimous in the details related to this, they were commonly accepting this as an explanation of the impermanence. It may be right to say that the theory of momentariness developed in Abhidharma Buddhism is foreign to early Buddhism. However, we should not go too far to the level of separating the two rigorously. We cannot deny the essential connection between the two; the two can either be distanced or neared by the different understanding of certain crucial points. In fact, the doctrine of momentariness can be regarded as a logical
consequence of the doctrine of changing character, i.e. impermanence, of all phenomena.

It seems that there is a close relation between the understanding of the momentariness and the division of the *sanskṛta-lakṣaṇas* (the characteristics of all phenomena). The *sanskṛta-lakṣaṇas* are mentioned in the *sutta* as the following:

*Monks, there are these three condition-marks of that which is conditioned. What three? Its genesis (*P. uppāda*) is apparent (*P. patiṣṭhīyatī*), its passing away (*P. vaya*) is apparent, its changeability while it persists (*P. phitassa anīkathatta*) is apparent. These are the three condition-marks ...*\(^{285}\)

According to the Sarvāstivādin, the *sanskṛta-lakṣaṇas* are four, viz. *jāti* (origination), *sthiti* (duration), *jarā* (decay), and *anityatā* (impermanence or destruction). The Theravādins accepts three: *uppāda* (*P., or jāti*, origination), *jarā* (*P.*) and *vaya* (*P., or bheda*, disappearance). The AKBh quotes a passage from the *sūtra* which looks the same as mentioned above: *of the sanskrta there is known the origin (utpāda), cessation (vyaya), and change of state (sthyanyathātvam).*\(^{286}\) The difference in the division seems to lie on the difference of the interpretation of the *sthyanyathāva*. While the Sarvāstivādin thought that the two in the middle, i.e. *sthiti* and *jarā*, are joined together to form one compound word *sthyanyathāva* in the *sūtra*, the Theravādin considered only *jarā* as the meaning of it. The Sarvāstivādin

\(^{285}\) AN I, p.152. This *sūtra* is introduced in the AKBh also. AKBh(Pradhan), p.76. See also Jaini (1959c), p.543.

\(^{286}\) AKBh(Pradhan), p.76. AKVy, p.171. See also AN I, p.152. Jaini (1959c), p.543. The translation is taken from this.

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argued that the characteristics of all phenomena can be applied to each moment (kṣapa) also. Therefore, the existence, having not existed, in every moment is the origination; the non-existence, having existed, in every moment is the disappearance; and the continuous connection of the earlier moment with the next moment is the duration.  

287 The AKBh offers quite a long discussion on these samskṛta-lakṣaṇas. Vasubandhu introduces the view of the Sautrāntika contending the view of the Sarvāstivādin, precisely the Vaibhāṣika, who accepts these lakṣaṇas as the real dharmas. Jaini summarizes one of the points argued by the Sautrāntika as the following:

The term samskṛta in the sūtra quoted by the Vaibhāṣikas does not refer to a momentary dharma but to a series of them (pravāha). The series or stream itself is called subsistence (sthitī), its origin is called jāti, its cessation is vyaya, and the difference in its preceding and succeeding moments is called sthityanyathātva.  

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It is also stated that the four characteristics of all phenomena are not proven by any scriptural authority, and that neither are they perceived directly nor inferred.  

289 Vasubandhu asserts that they are merely characteristics, merely designations with no objective reality.

If, as the Sarvāstivādins claim, dharmas exist as real entities characterized by intrinsic nature in the three time-periods, the momentariness would refer to the transitory character of dharmas of the present.  

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dharmas of the present pass away instantaneously to become the dharmas of the past. And, since the dharmas are known to exist throughout the three time-periods, they are also in the position of a participant for presently arising dharmas. This makes a continuous series of dharmas that belonged to the future to appear at the moment, and immediately to become those of the past. The theory of momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda), therefore, implies that the world is not materially preserved from one moment to the next, but rather consists of a series of discrete ‘instants’ (kṣaṇa) of existence, followed by complete annihilation before the next instant begins.291 But, how could one explain convincingly any connection between these separately existing dharmas? Because of this problem, the Sarvāstivādin introduced the theory of prāpti (attainment), which is one of the citta-viprayuktā-saṃskāras, for explaining the inherent problems of continuity and identity in the momentariness. Conze seems to have observed rightly when he states as follows:

Just as the dogmatic assertion of non-existence of a ‘self’ had to be supplemented by various ‘pseudo-selves’, so the dogmatic assertion of instantaneousness could be made credible only by introducing a number of pseudo-permanencies. These doctrines owe their origin to a desire to nullify those implications of the doctrine of instantaneousness which threaten the fruitfulness of the spiritual life. They are (1) the ‘pan-realism’ of the Sarvāstivādins, (2) their doctrine of ‘possession’ and ‘dispossession’, (3) the Sautrāntika doctrine of germs (bija), suffusion (vāsanā), and kindred concepts.292

For Vasubandhu, the theory of momentariness refers to the transitoriness of the *dhärma* as a whole in a stream of contiguous conditioning called *santāna*. Therefore, the causal operation becomes meaningful only between the present and its immediately preceding moment, and all present arising can be explained only through the concept of *santāna*. By this, he seems to have escaped the problem caused by the discreteness of momentary *dharmas*. ‘Everything’ is understood simply as the twelve *āyatanas* of the present moment.\(^{293}\) However, it should be noted that Vasubandhu of AKBh basically follows the view of the Sautrāntika that all *dharmas* exist as *prajñāpti* (provisional designations).\(^{294}\) Therefore, to him ‘everything’ as the twelve *āyatanas* of the present moment is also *prajñāpti*.

The Sarvāstivādin has made enormous effort to solve the problem they had from the beginning, that is, *dharmas* exist throughout the three time-periods as reality and the theory of momentariness is explained accordingly; or, may be it is the other way round, on the basis of the analysis that had formed the theory of momentariness the realistic theory of three time-periods had been established. This, however, issued further problems that cannot be answered with clarity, which could have been one of the reasons that motivated Vasubandhu to commence the work on AKBh.

Under the assumption of momentariness, it is the appearance of continuity which forms the epistemological basis for the principle of *pratītyasamutpāda* (dependent origination), because it is the basis for the shared commonness in our experience. Without this apparent continuity there

\(^{294}\) Ibid. xxii.
would hardly be any agreement in our experience with others. The pratītyasamutpāda of twelve links is one of the basic principles of early Buddhism. Four types of pratītyasamutpāda, including the kṣanika, are introduced in AKBh, showing that they were acknowledged in the Sarvāstivādin tradition. How this momentary pratītyasamutpāda works in relation to the twelve parts of pratītyasamutpāda is explained as the following:

How [is it] momentary? In one moment, indeed, the twelve parts are there. For example, when [a person,] out of passion, takes away the life of a living being: 1. the ‘stupidity’ (moha) is ignorance (avidyā); 2. the ‘volition’ (cetanā) are the saṅskāras; 3. the discerned consciousness of a certain object is consciousness; 4. the four, skandhas coexisting with the consciousness is nāmarūpa; 5. the sense organs in relation to nāmarūpa are the six āyatanas; 6. the application (or activity; abhinipāta) of the six āyatanas is contact (sparśa); 7. experiencing contact is sensation (vedanā); 8. desire (lobha) is thirst (ṭṛṣṇā); 9. the wrappings (paryasthānas) associated with thirst are attachment / clinging (upādāna); 10. bodily and vocal action sprung up from that is bhava; 11. the emergence (utsarjana; unmaijjana; upāśā; production) of all these dharmas is jāti; 12. their maturity (paripāka) is jarā (old age); and their rupture is maraṇa (death).

295 Cf. AKBh(Pradhān), p.132-3 (III. 24; p.347). The four types of pratītyasamutpāda are: āvasthika (of the state), kṣanika (momentary), prākarṣika (prolonged) and saṁbandhika (relational). The four types of pratītyasamutpāda are explained in the AKVy: kṣanikaḥ kṣaṇa bhavaḥ kṣaṇa sāyastī kṣanikaḥ prakṛṣeṇa dīviyati carati vā prakṛṣikaḥ. prabandhajukta ity arthaḥ sa evaṃvasthikaḥ prakṛṣayogat prakṛṣikaḥ. aneka kṣaṇikavād anekajānanikavād ca saṁbandhikah hetuphalasātriḥbandhayukta ity arthaḥ āvasthikaḥ. dvādaśa pañcaśkandhikā āvasthā ity arthaḥ. AKBh & AKVy(Shastri). See also AKBh(Poussin/Pruden) p.513, fn.157.

296 Hsūan-tsang renders it as, ‘the three skandhas coexisting with the consciousness are altogether called nāmarūpa’. Cf. vijñānasahabhuvāsāvatvāraḥ skandhā nāmarūpam. AKBh(Pradhān), p.133, line 4 (III. 24; p.347). It is curious why Hsūan-tsang translated like this. Cf. “識俱三種總稱名色” T.29, p.48 c.12.

297 Cf. AKBh(Pradhān), p.312 (V. 47-8; p. ). According to Prakaraṇapādāśāstra, there are eight, viz. ārāja, anaparāja, ērya, mātsarya, auddhatya, kākṛtya, svārtha and miḍadhā. The Vaibhaṣikas add two more, i.e. krodha and mrakṣa, making ten in all. See also AKBh(Poussin/Pruden), p.841-2.

298 Ibid. p.133 (III. 24; p.347).
Here, we need to think over what exactly is meant by ‘a relation of causal
dependence between the moments of existence’. We need also to examine a
defining aspect around this point that will be considered further in the section
below dealing with theories related to identity in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.

3.5 The theory of causality in the Sarvāstivāda

What makes dharmas arise from the realm of the future to the present? In
the realm of future there are innumerable dharmas, but they are not in orderly
and coherent pattern since we cannot anticipate what belongs to the future
order unlike that of the past. Among the dharmas in the realm of the future
one certain dharma arises at certain time. Only the causation can decide
which dharma arises at what time.

In the theory of the Sarvāstivādin, the intricate interrelationship between
six hetus (causes), four pratyayas (conditions) and five phalas (effects) are
analyzed in detail yielding a complex structure of inter-related causal
relations. 302 The causal relation is established between one dharma and
another dharma. Thus, in broad sense, all the dharmas can be the cause for
other dharmas except for its own self. 303 This cause is called kāraṇa-hetu
(efficient cause), and its effect is called as adhipati-phala (predominant
effect). This way of thinking comes from the idea that if others do not
interrupt when something arises, all the others are sharing the causal function

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302 From Chap.II. 49 to the end of this chapter, all the portions of AKBh are dedicated to
explain these causal relations.
303 Ibid., p.83. (II. 50; p.224).
for it. Even when there is no positive role for others, if it is not in obstructing position then it comes to be a cause for them in passive sense. So, it is said that the causal relation can be found between any things, even between those where we cannot think of any causation such as the moon and the desk. In fact, the general condition of the material world is adhipati-phala. And, it is also the result of ālambana- (object-support), samanantara- (contiguous) and adhipati-pratyayās (predominant condition). All phenomena can be accounted for by kāraṇa-hetu (efficient cause) and also regarded as adhipati-phala (predominant effect).

According to the Sarvāstivādin, the causation can be explained in two ways. One is the case that cause comes beforehand, and effect comes later. The other is the case that cause and effect come simultaneously. While sabhāga-hetu (homogeneous cause) and nisyaṇḍa-phala (uniform outflow-effect), and vipāka-hetu (maternal cause) and vipāka-phala belong to the former, samprayuktaka-hetu (associational cause) and puruṣakāra-phala (anthropomorphic effect), and sahabhū-hetu (simultaneous cause) and puruṣakāra-phala belong to the letter.

In the case of sabhāga-hetu and nisyaṇḍa-phala, we can have an example in this way. There is a cup on the table. The cup existed at the preceding moment and it exists at the subsequent moment also. Various dharmas that constitute a cup at the first moment of time has passed to the past at the second moment, but the cup still remains due to the same kind of dharmas which come from the future by the preceding dharmas. The cup remains through the preceding and the following. The preceding dharma is the cause and the following the effect; they are called sabhāga-hetu and nisyaṇḍa-
phala. As far as this causal relation is working, this cup remains there, but once it is cut off, the cup would be changed or perished.

As a similar case, there is sarvatraga-hetu (the universally prevalent cause) and nityanda-phala. Sarvatraga-hetu is a cause always connected with wrong views, doubts or ignorance that produce all the errors of men. Both of these hetus and phalas are always consecutive and are the same kind.

In the case of vipāka-hetu and vipāka-phala, vipāka-hetu is generally understood as the cause ripening in a different life. Thus, it is believed that this cause produces its effect in a different life and its effect comes when retributions are obtained in the life after death. But, in broad sense, this causal relation is not confined being related to previous birth or after death, in this very life also we have this cause and effect. Vipāka hetu is actually no other than karma. The relationship of this vipāka-hetu and vipāka-phala is the essence of the karmic theory in Abhidharma Buddhism. Unlike the other two causal relations, this one is not consecutive; it operates only at once, but is needed to have some interval between the cause and effect. As the word vipāka indicates, this cause and effect are different kinds of dharma since the effect itself cannot be the cause of the other consecutive effect. The Theravādins avoid this dilemma by postulating a theory that the akuśala and kuśala-cittas never follow each other without an intervening avyākta (indeterminate, i.e. vipāka) citta. An akuśala-citta-vīthi can be succeeded by a kuśala-citta-vīthi only after the intervention of a bhavaṅga-citta, which is necessarily a vipāka-citta.304 But, in the case of the Sarastivādin, the problem still remains. Waldron Rightly points out: How could a cause which is

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already past, and therefore no longer existent, exert a causal influence on the present? In Abhidharmic terms, what present dharma constitutes the link between the vipāka cause and result necessary for such long-term karma to operate? And how or where exactly does it factor into the other momentary processes of mind?  

Samprayukta-hetu, purusārtha-phala and sahabhū-hetu, purusakāra-phala are the same from the angle of simultaneity, and both sides of hetu and phala are interchangeable. The difference is that, in the case of the former the causal relation operates only between citta (mind) and caittra (function of the mind). The dharma of citta is only one, i.e. citta itself, and the dharmas of caittra are forty-six in number. From the point of caittra, whatever the function of mind occurs, it always works together with citta. So, they are mutually the cause and the effect.

Meanwhile, these citta and caittra are also caused by another citta and caittra which had occurred just before their arising. This chain of the causality is called citta-santāna. This santāna of the citta is no other than the stream of the consciousness of the individual, and it has been regarded as a subject of person or personal identity. In this citta-santāna, the causal relation in process of time between citta and caittra is similar with sabhāga-hetu and nisyanda-phala. However, since its cause and effect are not always of the same kind, due to the distinction between them, this cause is called

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Waldron points out further, “The problems surrounding the maturational cause and effect, then, involve much more than the mere succession of heterogeneous states, since it entails origination from non-homogeneous or non-immediately antecedent conditions, of which the potential for karmic results over extended periods of time is crucial.” It seems that all the problems involving vipāka is hardly explainable on the basis of momentariness.” Waldron (1994), p.209.
samanantara-pratyaya (contiguous condition) and the effect is called adhipati-phala (predominant effect).

Thus, when one thought arises at present, it could be the puruṣākāra-phala caused by the samprayukta-hetu which always accompanies it. At the same time, it is also adhipati-phala caused by samanantara-pratyaya which is like current of river, without any interval of citta and caitta, flowing immediately and equally after antecedents.

In the case of sahabhū-hetu and puruṣākāra-phala, more than two factors are always working together. This cause and effect have broad scope unlike samprayukta-hetu and puruṣākāra-phala which work only between citta and caitta. First of all, this cause and effect work between all the satīskṛta dharmas and the fourteen kinds of citta-viprayukta saṃskāras (conditioned forces unassociated with mind/thought) which always accompany them. They also work within the interaction of the four dharmas of mahābhūtas, and so on. While Sarvāstivādins maintain this sahabhū-hetu, the Sautrāntika rejected it on the ground that it contradicts the accepted principle that cause and effect necessarily follow one another.\textsuperscript{306}

The list of the six hetus (cause), four pratyayas (condition) and five phalas (effect) are as follows:

1. Kāraṇa-hetu (efficient cause)
2. Samprayuktaka-hetu (associational cause)
3. Vipāka-hetu (maturational cause)

4. Sahāga-hetu (homogeneous cause)
5. Sarvatra-ga-hetu (universally prevalent cause)
6. Sahabhā-hetu (simultaneous cause)

1. Adhipati-phala (predominant effect)
2. Niṣyanda-phala (uniform outflow-effect)
3. Vipāka-phala (maturational effect)
4. Puruṣakāra-phala (anthropomorphic effect?)
5. Visāmyoga-phala (disjunctive effect)

1. Hetu-pratyaya (causal condition)
2. Samanantara-pratyaya (contiguous condition)
3. Ālambana-pratyaya (support-condition)
4. Adhipati-pratyaya (predominant condition)

It was the Sarvāstivādin that appears to have distinguished between hetu and pratyaya. In fact, this distinction is not seen in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas. Thus, when the Sarvāstivādin deals with the six hetus, they give an excuse that the sūtras from which they could quote are lost. In AKBh, there is a quotation from an unnamed sūtra: Oh, monk. For the arising of eye consciousness, eye is the cause (hetu) and forms are condition (pratyaya).\(^{307}\)

Here, it appears that eye, i.e. visual organ, is depicted as the direct cause, and forms, i.e. external objects, the condition.

\(^{307}\)AKBh(Pradhan), p.464 (IX.; p.930).
Stcherbatsky takes hetu and prayaya to mean ‘first cause’ and ‘second cause’, respectively.\(^{308}\) And, Takakusu refers to the six hetus as the chief causes and the four prayayas as the four sub-causes.\(^{309}\) So, Kalupahana simply concludes that the Sarvāstivādin’s distinction between hetu and prayaya corresponds to the distinction between cause and condition in the common-sensual notion of causation since our common sense would suggest that the sense organ is more important than object as a cause in the working of perception.\(^{310}\)

These various kinds of causal relationships of the Sarvāstivādin offer different dimensions of the intertwining of conditioned dharmas. As David Bastow points out, the most important relationships are of course between karmic action and its fruition, and between the various dharmic participants in the causal complex which leads from perception to motivated action.\(^{311}\)

Through the study on the causality of the Sarvāstivādin, we could understand its model of mental process which operates in each moment of thought, associated with a number of citta-samprayukta-samskāras (mind concomitants; conditioned forces associated with mind/thought). Each moment of mind acts as saṃbhāgata-hetu (homogeneous cause) and saṃmanantara-prayaya (contiguous condition) in the arising of mind and mind concomitants in the subsequent moment. But this kind of classification of theory of causality seems to be a mere analysis of it. This does not give any clear solution for explaining continuity of individual. That is what

\(^{308}\) Stcherbatsky (1920), p.23
\(^{309}\) Takakusu (1956), p.71.
\(^{310}\) Kalupahana (1975), p.62.
Vasubhandhu points out. For Vasubhandhu the causal interaction can become meaningful only as a relation between the present and its immediately preceding moment, and all present arising can be explained only through a stream of contiguous conditioning.

3.6 Theories related to personal identity in the Abhidharmakośabhaṣya

Like other schools of Abhidharma Buddhism, the Sarvāstivādin was concerned about the dharma-analysis in order to explain our empirical individual life in a more sophisticated and systematic way. For a satisfying explanation regarding our empirical individual life, it seems, one has to enter into the discussion of personal identity inevitably. For such a discussion, the Pudgalvādins depended on the concept of pudgala, which will be dealt with in the next sub-chapter. The Sarvāstivādins, who were also obliged to participate in the discussion, had to offer suitable explanations under the coverage of their doctrinal position. It means that they had to maintain their doctrine of three time-periods and momentariness, and at the same time explain the matter of personal identity without exposing any contradiction.

It appears that the category called citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra (conditioned forces unassociated with mind/thought) has much to do with this situation. As mentioned above, i.e. 3.2, this category presented a challenge to the traditional method of classification. The establishment of this new category consisting of dharmas which are regarded as being unassociated with either mind/thought or form brought about significant changes in traditional Buddhist taxonomies resulting in the five category
classification. However, this category and the dharmas thereof became the subject of controversy among the various Buddhist schools. The introducing of new category in the Sarvastivadin tradition seems to have close relation to the introduction of a new category by the Pudgalavadin in its system. The main characteristic of the dharmas in this category, i.e. being unassociated with either mind/thought or form, allows these dharmas to exist simultaneously with other dharmas. This is a crucial feature required for adhering two successive, discrete, momentary dharmas, which is again an essential point related to the problem of personal identity. It is most probable that the former had been influenced by the latter, but the detailed explanation should be a subject matter of future investigation.

Vasubhandu mentions citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra in AK Bh thus: *These conditioned forces are called ‘unassociated with mind’ because they are not associated with mind and they do not have form as their intrinsic nature (ṛūpa-svabhāva).* As we have seen in the section dealing with taxonomies, fourteen dharmas are included in this category: i) prāpti (attainment), ii) aprāpti (non-attainment), iii) sabhāgatā (homogeneous character), iv) āsatiṣṭikā (state of non-conception), v) asamjñi-samāpatti (equipoise of non-conception), vi) nirodhasamāpatti (equipoise of cessation), vii) jīvitendriya (vital organ / life vitality), viii) jāti (origination), ix) sthiti (duration), x) jarā (decay), xi) anityatā (impermanence or destruction), xii) nāma-kāya (name or word set), xiii) pada-kāya (phrase set) and xiv) vyātiṣṇa-kāya (syllable set).

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313 *ime saṃskārā na cittaṃ saṇhupā na ca rūpasvabhāvā iti cittaviprayukta ucyante. AK Bh(Pradhan),* p. 62, line 14 (II. 33; p.166).

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Among these, we will examine only prāpti and sabhāgata here, since they appear comparatively more relevant to our study.

3.6.1 Prāpti (attainment)

According to the AKBh, prāpti is of two kinds: (1) Obtainment (lābha) of that which has not been attained (aprāpta) or of that which had been abandoned (vihīna); (2) being endowed (samanvāgama) with every acquisition (pratilabdха). And, aprāpti (non-attainment) is explained simply as the opposite. It is said that the first definition is applicable to the first moment of attainment, whereas the second definition to the second and the succeeding moments. Although this interpretation is based on Abhidharma texts, it is not fully convincing. It appears that the first definition is for a single unit of moment and the second for the collection or group of those units including the first moment.

When the present dharma and its prāpti pass away, that prāpti serves as the sabhōga-hetu (homogeneous cause) for the arising of subsequent prāpti. It connects the next dharma to the life-stream it belongs, enabling contiguous arising of dharmas within that life-stream. When this is accepted, the problem is how the substitution of a dharma by a heterogeneous one within a given life-stream can be explained. For example, when an akuśala-citta (unvirtuous thought) is followed by a kuśala-citta (virtuous thought), how can this be explained with the prāpti and the aprāpti? According to Jaini, the

\[314\ dvividhā hi prāptir aprāptivihīnasya ca lābhah pratilabdhaena ca samanvāgamaḥ | viparyayād aprāptir iti siddham | AKBh(Pradhan), p.32, line 16 (II.36; p.167). See also Conze (1962), p.139, and its footnote 19.

prāpti controls the collection or obtainment of certain dharmas in a given santāna (stream of life), and the aprāpti is a ‘force’ which prevents this prāpti.\textsuperscript{316} Thus, in the above case when an ākusāla-citta is followed by a kuṣala-citta the latter is brought into operation by the aprāpti which prevents the rise of ākusāla dharmas.\textsuperscript{317}

By this explanation, we can see that the prāpti and the aprāpti are intimately connected with each other. We can see this from the example of a specific moment of our mental process when the next state is to be that of noble ones (ārya) and the present state is of ordinary person (pythagjana) succeeding the same previous state. These two states can be explained in terms of both the prāpti and the aprāpti. In the first state, there is certainly the prāpti of the dharmas of ordinary person, and it can be expressed as that there is aprāpti of the dharmas of noble ones. The latter is possible only when the moment of change of mental stage is considered, as in the example. In the second state, on the other hand, there is prāpti of the dharmas of noble ones, and it can be said that there is aprāpti of the dharmas of ordinary person. Likewise, the latter is possible only when the moment of change of mental stage is considered.

It is stated in the AKBh that this prāpti is applicable to the dharmas of the stream of an individual sentient being. It is not relevant to the dharmas of the stream of other sentient beings or the dharmas of insentient beings that do not have the stream. It is also mentioned that all the living beings are endowed with pratisamkhya-nirodha (extinction obtained by knowledge),

\textsuperscript{316} Jaina (1959c), pp.536-537.
\textsuperscript{317} Jaina (1959b), p.238.
and that all the Āryans bound with all the bonds and found in the first moment of the path, and some of the ordinary people are endowed with apratisamkhya-nirodha (extinction obtained not by knowledge but by nature). Nobody, however, is endowed with ākāśa, and therefore, there is no prāpti of ākāśa.

Vasubandhu offers a lengthy discussion on different ways of understanding the concept of prāpti before introducing the kārikās that mention various types of prāpti according to the Vaibhāṣika. Here, samanvāgama (being endowed with) or samanvāgata (endowed with) as a synonym of the prāpti occurring in the sūtra as well as in the Abhidharma text is introduced. In this discussion, the intention of the author is to demonstrate the inappropriateness of the prāpti — in whatever way it may be explained — for the explanation of the obvious change of the mental status in a given life-stream, and to lead one to the seemlier concept of bija instead. Detailed discussion related to the bija will be dealt with in the section below. Through that discussion we can figure out some of the different opinions of the prāpti in the Sarvāstivādin tradition.

The Sautrāntika criticizes the concept of prāpti for being not persuasive when it explains how the adhesive element works in one’s individual santāna. It is not possible for prāpti to glue the experienced dharma together so that they are experienced in a coherent way. The prāpti cannot usher in a new dharma independently of the experienced dharma to form a single stream of experience. Jaini, referring the AK Bh, says: the Sautrāntikas reject prāpti

318 These appear to be the understanding of the prāpti in earlier texts of the Sarvāstivādin. The detailed tracing back has not been carried out in this study.
and aprāpti on the grounds that these in turn need to be produced by another prāpti and aprāpti, a position which leads to an infinite regress. According to the Sautrāntika, new kusala-citta cannot succeed akuśala-citta without the seed of kusala; a kusala-citta can arise only out of its seeds.

3.6.2. Sabhāgatā (homogeneous character)

When we think of individual ‘continuity’, whether sentient or insentient, we generally have two presuppositions: first, each ‘continuity’ is unique, and is distinct from others; second, it is there constantly, though it keeps on changing. The former is concerned with the distinctiveness derived from different categories to which the ‘continuity’ belongs, and thus involves the particularity aspect. The latter has a connection with the generality aspect, because what appears to be constant is related to the commonness of a being. The Sarvāstivādins have developed the concept of sabhāgatā (homogeneous character) that offers some explanation regarding these two points.

In the AKBh, it is said: *What is this sabhāgatā? Sabhāgatā is the homogeneity of living beings* (II.41) Sabhāgatā is the real entity (dravya). Its terminology (satiṁţha) in the Šāstra (Jñānapratsthāna etc.) is nikāyasabhāga (homogeneous aggregate of a being). the similarity of living beings. Further, it is stated that the homogeneous character is divided into two categories: abhinna (general) and bhinna (specific). The first is called homogeneous character of sentient being (sattva-sabhāgatā) belonging to all

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319 Jaini (1959b), p.239
320 It is said that nikāyasabhāga is the term used in Abhidharma treatises but for the sake of metre the word sabhāgatā is used. AKBh & AKVy(Shastrī), p.181, lines 31-2.
321 AKBh(Pradhan), p.67, lines 11-13 (II.41; p.181).
sentient beings; it exists in every sentient being. The second is called homogeneous character of dharma (dharma-sabhāgatā). It is fixed, in every case, by difference of sphere (dhātu), realm of rebirth (gati), birth (yoni), class (jāti), female (stṛ), male (puruṣa), Upāsaka, Bhikṣu, Śaikṣa, AŚaikṣa (=Arhat) etc. It determines the characteristics that define the commonality of a particular group, and thus distinguishes that group from others.\(^{322}\)

By this, we can see that the tendency or inclination in the philosophical atmosphere surrounding Buddhist circle since early Buddhism, i.e. focusing on the empirical individual living being while analyzing all phenomena, was still predominant among the schools of Abhidharma Buddhism, even in the Sarvāstivādin tradition. The sabhāgatā, which can also be applied to non-living beings, is used basically for living beings. The term dharma-sabhāgatā is applied here to a particular group to which a living being belongs. May be, the fact that the concept of sabhāgatā was meant for the living being from the beginning explains it.

Vasubandhu, while introducing the position of the Sarvāstivādin, explains why sattva-sabhāgata is needed: *If the homogeneous character of sentient being (sattva-sabhāgata) did not exist as a non-particular real entity, in the case of sentient beings distinguished through mutual distinctions, there would be no notion (buddhi) and designation (prajñāpiti) in general as ‘sentient being, sentient being’.*\(^{323}\) This means, without a general category of ‘homogeneous character’, it would not be possible to think of or use a concept that covers all the sub-categories of homogeneous character. This

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\(^{322}\) Ibid.

makes the assertion that the sabhāgatā of the Sarvāstivādin is the result of the influence of the sāmāṇya (generality) of the Vaiśeṣika plausible.\textsuperscript{324}

In the portion dealing with jīvitendriya (vital organ / life vitality; the seventh dharma in the list of citta-viprayukta-samskāra) in the AK Bh, the word āyus (life) is used for the definition of the term: What is jīvita (life vitality)? Jīvita is āyus (life). (II. 45a) Indeed, it is mentioned in the Abhidharma, “What is the jīvitendriya? The āyus of the three spheres of existence (dīhātu).” Later, in explaining what āyus is, the word nikāyasabhāga appears. There, it is said: We do not say that it is not there, but it is not another dravya. Then what? The power (āvedha) for the time of duration (sthiti) of the nikāyasabhāga (homogeneous aggregate of being), [produced] by the action (karma) of the three spheres of existence (dīhātu).\textsuperscript{325}

We can see that the nikāyasabhāga is connected with previous action (karma) in determining its āyus (life). The relation between the nikāyasabhāga and the action is described later in the AK Bh in a discussion of the process of rebirth.\textsuperscript{326} This nikāyasabhāga, as we have seen at the beginning, is treated as a synonym of sabhāgatā, which is distinguished into two: general (abhinna) and specific (bhinnā).

Vasubandhu, who does not admit homogeneous character as a dharma of real entity (dravya), presents five objections to the Sarvāstivādin position:

(1) Homogeneous character is not different from the nature of an ordinary person; (2) since homogeneous character has no form and cannot be directly perceived, its activity can not be known; (3) the homogeneous

\textsuperscript{324} Jaini (1959c), p.537.
\textsuperscript{325} AB Bh (Pradhan), p.74, lines 3-4 (II. 45b; p.197, lines 4-5).
character of insentient object should also be admitted; (4) since another homogeneous character is required to account for the similarity among all varieties of homogeneous character, infinite regress would result; (5) homogeneous character is nothing other than the Vaiśeṣika categories of generality (sāmānyā) or of particular generalities (sāmānyavīṣeṣa).\textsuperscript{327}

3.6.3. Bīja (seed)

In the Abhidharma Buddhism, it seems that one of the main concerns of the Saṅgha had been how to reconcile the impermanence understood by momentariness with the anātman. With the development of the doctrine of the Sarvāstivādin, according to which all dharmas that constitute experience are discrete and radically momentary, the reconciliation of the two came to be more a challenging issue.

According to the Sautrāntika, personality is a succession of moments, or a series of moments (ksana-santāna). The Sautrāntika which accepts the reality of moments, but refuses to accept the reality of any of the citta-viprayuktasamskāras, explains the inherent problems of continuity and identity of the moments and the attendant problems such as memory, moral responsibility and rebirth by postulating a theory of seed (bīja). In fact, Vasubandhu introduces the Sautrāntika’s concept of seed in order to avoid the consequences of the prāpti theory of the Sarvāstivādin. The continuity to which the Sautrāntika refers here is always in the process of modifying itself; it is a changing complex of mental states.

\textsuperscript{327} Cox (1995), p.109. The author arranges the content of the AKBh in this way. Cf. AKBh(Pradhan), p.67-8 (II. 41a; p.182ff.).

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After defining bija as nāmarūpa, which operates by means of a special kind of evolutionary process (parināmaviśeṣa) of the stream (santāna) of moments, the Sautrāntikas argued that the seeds of kusala and akuśala, accumulated in a stream, determine the character of the latter. Their power to produce (upādanaśakti), which is in a state of potential for development, is identified as their seed-state (bijabhāva). Since the Sautrāntika presented a theory that substitutes the theory of prāpti, it should be having a distinguishing feature. It is samtati-parināma-viśeṣa (specific transformation of the life-stream)

Vasubandhu’s own interpretation of the samtati-parināma-viśeṣa is as the following:

And what is continuum? What is the transformation? What is the specificness? The rise of mind/thought (mind-occurrences) one after the other before the action is called continuum. Transformation is its arising in another form. Further, the transformation which is capable of producing the result immediately is this specific transformation, because it is specified by the last transformation. For example, the consciousness at the time of destruction is the cause of next birth.

The samtati-parināma-viśeṣa appears first when the definition of bija is given by Vasubandhu in the AKBh.

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329 AKBh (Pradhan), p.278 (V. 2; p.600).
330 kā punaḥ samatatiḥ kah pariṇāmaḥ ko viśeṣaḥ. ... Ibid. p.477 (IX. 2; p.953). The translation is from the Appendix.
But, what is this so-called ‘seed’? [It is] that nāmarūpa which is capable of generating the fruit, either directly or indirectly, due to special change of stream (samātā-paraṇa-viśeṣa).

What is this so-called pariṇāma (change)? The characteristic of [being] otherwise (= the otherwise-ness) of the stream.

And what is this stream? The samskāras (latent impressions) related to three periods which have become cause and fruit.\textsuperscript{331}

Here, seed is defined as nāmarūpa which has the capability of producing a fruit. So, it is rather mental and material aggregates of which the life-continuum consists, which does not exist separately. Cox offers an explanation on it:

Since this seed-state is a potentiality and not an actualized event manifesting definite qualities, seed states of any moral qualities can coexist in one life-stream. Like all conditioned factors, these aggregates and their potential capability as seed-states are momentary, and this potentiality is passed along through the contiguous conditioning by which aggregates are produced in each successive moment. Thus, the actualization of a seed’s potential at a later time is not the direct result of the original factor or action by which the stream of that seed-state was initially implanted. Rather, the later actualization is conditioned indirectly through the successive reproduction of the efficacy of the original action in each consecutive moment in the form of a seed-state. At a certain moment, when the appropriate causes and conditions coalesce, the seed’s potential is actualized. That moment is referred to as the distinctive characteristic in the transformation of the life-stream (saṁbhātipariṇāmaviśeṣa). By means of this process of successive transmission and transformation through which a seed develops and sprouts.\textsuperscript{332}

\textsuperscript{331} Ibid. p.64 (II. 36; p.171).
\textsuperscript{332} Cox (1995), p.95.
It seems that Vasubandhu has used the concept of *sāṃtati-parināma-viśeṣa* to supplement the *bīja* theory. The *bīja* theory, which appears to be fit for the explanation of the identity of individual life-continuum, does not find difficulty in explaining *sabhāga-hetu* (homogeneous causation) and *nisyanda-phala* (uniform outflow-effect). Vasubandhu seems to use *bīja* and *sāṃtati-parināma-viśeṣa* in different context. In the case of seed (*bīja*), *sabhāga-ta* (homogeneous character) might have occurred in his mind while explaining the identity of individual life-stream as would be suggested by the seed-sprout analogy. *Sāṃtati-parināma-viśeṣa* is used in the case of *vipāka* (heterogeneous causation), as in the arising of *vipāka-phala* (maturational effect) from *vipāka-hetu* (maturational cause).

**But**, the problem is that how can the theory of seed explain the relationship between *citta* and *caittra* which occur at one moment only. And at the same time, how can synchronically linked *citta* and *caittra* re-link with diachronic concept of *sabhāga-ta* or *vipāka* for continuity? The theory of seed can explain only diachronical continuity not the synchronous identity at the present when *citta* and *caittra* work. The Sarvāstivadin has a solution on it. *A person cannot be endowed with kuśala and akuśala in one moment, these two are samprayukta dharmas. But their prāpti being viprayukta can co-exist and thus cause the rise of kuśala and akuśala dharmas in favorable circumstances.*

**But**, in the case of seed theory, the function of seed is not outburst at the present moment but for the later moment either immediately or mediately. The seeds of *kuśala* or *akuśala* accumulated in a *sāṅtāti*

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determine the character of the latter. According to Jaini, the theory of seed is subjected to a severe criticism in the Nyāyānusāra of Sanghahadra:

Sanghahadra’s main criticism of the theory of bija (as a sakti-viśeṣa) is that it could be either different from or identical with the mind. If it is a separate entity, then it is prāpti, for the dispute then is only on naming it. If, however, it is identical with mind, then it will result in the fault of mixture or confusion (sānkarya-doṣa) of good and bad seeds. ... If they are all accumulated in one citta what is there to determine the nature of a particular citta as kuśala or akuśala or avyākṛta?\(^{334}\)

Thus, we can see that the defect of the seed theory had been already raised immediately after the AKBh. Later Yaśomitra attempted to explain it in his commentary. He says that a seed is neither identical with, nor different from the mind, because seed is not a separate dravya (entity) but only a prajñāpti (nominal) dharma.\(^{335}\) However, in AKBh, there are no further details like what Yaśomitra gives. In the Pudgalaviniścaya, Vasubhandhu himself raises the question and gives answer to it:

“We say that the fruit arises from the seeds. We don't say that it arises from disappeared seeds nor does it arise immediately from the seed. What then? That arises from the special kind of evolutionary process of the stream of moments (saṃstātipariṇāma-viśeṣa) which arises by certain order, i.e. sprout, stem, leaves etc., and which is completed by flower. How then the fruit which actually arises from flower is said to be the fruit of that seed? Because the power [to produce the fruit] is put in the last flower by the seed.

Because if flower had not arisen from the earlier cause (i.e. seed), then it would not have been capable of producing fruit of that kind. So it is said that

\(^{334}\) Ibid. p.243.
\(^{335}\) Ibid. Cf. AKBh & AKVy(Shastrī), pp.169-170.
fruit arises from an action. Neither that (fruit) arises from the destroyed actions nor from immediately after the action. How then? It (fruit) arises from the special kind of evolutionary process of the stream of moments of that (=action).\footnote{AKBh(Pradhan), p477 (IX. 2; p.953). The translation is from the Appendix.}

In this passage, it is indicated that the power to produce the fruit is seed. It is easily assumed that the seed theory can explain the heterogeneous nature of continuity. However, it seems that the seed theory could not offer reliable reason as the theory of prāpti does when it is related with the momentariness. In AKBh, along with its appendix Pudgalaviniścaya, we come across the theory of seed several times, but not so in a developed form. Soon after, the seed theory of AKBh had been developed into the theory of ālaya-vijñāna of the Vijñānavādins, which stands for a continuous and subtle type of mind that carries the seeds of nāmarūpa.

4. The Pudgalaviniścaya of Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

4.1 Textual survey

As mentioned above, AKBh might be one of the earliest works of Vasubandhu. Among the nine chapters of this text, Pudgalaviniścaya\footnote{This chapter, while Yaśomitra entitles it Pudgalaviniścaya, Vasubandhu himself entitles Āvatārādapiśeṣedha in his AKBh. Cf. tapūrvokāta santānaviśeṣādy āvatārādapiśeṣedhe sampravedasyāmoh. AKBh(Pradhan), p.300, lines 20-1 (V. 27; p.642). The word pudgalavāda appears to indicate the chapter, but it is Yaśomitra who explains it as pudgalapraśīdetapraśūṣanam. Cf. AKBh & AKYy(Skastr), p.341, lines 5-6 and 25-6. See also AKBh(Poussin/Pruden), p.1356.} ‘A discussion for the refutation of Personality’, may be the only extant work by Vasubandhu with the different style having no auto-commentary. According to Anacker, it was written prior to the AKBh. This seems likely in view of the
fact that its arguments and solutions are less developed compared to other chapters of the text.\textsuperscript{338} But, his opinion does not seem to be plausible. The difference between them is rather the style adopted than the quality which he claims less developed, since this chapter contains no \textit{kārikā} of its own. The other point is that unlike other chapters, this chapter is made from the view of the Sautrantika thoroughly. In fact, he does not disguise himself as a Sarvastivādin in this chapter. Thus we hardly come across systematic theory of Sarvastivāda here.

Some say that it is a later addition or an appendix\textsuperscript{339}. According to this opinion, it was originally an independent treatise, but was finally attached to the AKBh as its last chapter by the author himself. However, we see that in another chapter of AKBh, Vasubhandhu himself refers it – he kindly informs that one would see some theory at the end of this work that is ‘Ātmavādaprātiṣedha’-. It indicates that at least it is not later addition.

The main opponent of this chapter is Pudgalavādins and in later part, Saṁkhya and Vaiśeṣika also appear as opponents, or it can be assumed that Pudgalavādins utilized the theories of those schools for the debate.

The main theories of the Pudgalavādins revealed in \textit{Pudgalaviniścayah} are; \textit{pudgala} is neither the same with \textit{skandhas} nor different from it. And \textit{pudgala} is ineffable (avaktavya). Though this kind of careful definition has been dedicated to it, according to them, the role of the \textit{pudgala} is like the individual person which is a doer, an agent of transmigration and the locus memory takes place, the one getting a fruit of karma, and it could be cognized

\textsuperscript{338} Anacker (1984), p.17.
\textsuperscript{339} Cf. Chaudhuri (1976), Introduction.
by the six kinds of consciousness, and finally it could enter \textit{nirvāṇa}.^{340}

According to Chaudhury, \textit{Pudgalavādins} distinguish between the terms ‘pudgala’ and ‘ātman’. They give the name of \textit{a} Pudgala to something conditioned by the elements at a given moment in a personal life. Thus they believe in the existence of a Pudgala or individual and not in the existence of an Ātman. Therefore they call themselves \textit{Pudgalavādins}, but not Ātmanavādins.^{341}

In the \textit{Pudgalavinīścaya}, quoting \textit{Manusya-sūtra}, Vasubandhu asserts that the name \textit{pudgala} applies to \textit{skandhas} only.^{342} It is said that eye consciousness arises depending upon the eyes and visual forms. Contact is coming together of these three. These four formless \textit{skandhas} (\textit{arūpinah skandhas}), i.e. eye-consciousness, \textit{vedanā}, \textit{samjñā}, and \textit{cetanā} are born along with that contact. Eye-sense organ and the matter (\textit{rūpa}) are the having form (\textit{rūpinah) skandhas}. This much is called the personhood (\textit{manusyatva}). \textit{Sattva}, \textit{nara}, \textit{manuṣya}, \textit{mānava}, \textit{poṣa}, \textit{puruṣa}, \textit{pudgala}, \textit{jīva} and \textit{jantu} are all its designations. They are nothing but conventional designations mere words. They are all impermanent and conditioned and are of dependent origination.^{343}

Quoting several other \textit{sūtras} and debating on various issues, Vasubandhu attempted to prove that the doctrine of \textit{anātman} is really true, and concludes that this \textit{selflessness} (\textit{nirāmatā}) is the only way to reach the \textit{nirvāṇa}. The Sautrantika’s theory that the seed is neither identical with nor different from the mind bears a close resemblance to the \textit{Vāsīputrīya} theory.

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342 We should remind of us that each of five \textit{skandhas} is not said to be \textit{ātman} in the Nikāya. See. Chapter III.
343 \textit{Akṣhī(Pradhan)}, p.465.
of *pudgala* which is also described as neither different from nor identical with the five *skandhas*. But whereas the Vātsīputrīya claims reality for his *pudgala*, the Sautrāntika insists on the nominality (*prajñapti-mātra*) of the *bīja* and thus escapes the heresy of which he accuses the former school.\(^{344}\) In relation to this, further consideration is needed on the following statement of Jaini:

> But whereas the Vātsīputrīya claims reality for his *pudgala*, the Sautrāntika insists on the nominality (*prajñapti-mātra*) of the *bījas* and thus escapes the heresy of which he accuses the former school.\(^{345}\)

We have to be more discriminative: the modification of the assertion of the Vātsīputrīya should be considered too. The above statement is applicable only to certain period of the development of the Pudgalavādin. As Wallser states, *the salient feature of the Pudgalavādin position was that they believed the pudgala to be "ultimate and true" and yet indeterminate and a prajñāpti at the same time.*\(^{346}\) It is argued by Priestley that the Pudgalvādins abandoned the thesis that the *pudgala* is a *prajñāpti* and adopted the thesis that it is a substance around the time of Vasubandhu.\(^{347}\)

End of this thesis the translation of the *Pudgalaviniścaya* is attached as an appendix.

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\(^{345}\) Jaini (1959b), p.244.  
\(^{346}\) Walser (2008), p.201.  

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4.2 The Pudgalavādins

4.2.1 The historical aspect of the Pudgalavādins

After the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha about 100 years later, there was the First council in Vaiśālī caused by the disputation which questions the cash donations to the monks. Not before long, the first schism in the Buddhist communities occurred.\textsuperscript{348} \textit{The exact date has been much discussed, since the various schools differ in their chronologies. The Vinayas do not continue their historical records beyond the Vaiśālī Assembly.}\textsuperscript{349}

Soon, Pudgalavāda emerged and Vatsīputrīya which is the representative sect of it became one of the most powerful and flourishing sects in early Buddhism.\textsuperscript{350} It is said, in the 7\textsuperscript{th} century A.D Hsuan-tsang counts 66,000 Pudgalavādins monks, out of a total 254,000 in the whole of India.\textsuperscript{351} However, the Vatsīputrīyas themselves have not left much trace of their occupation in India or elsewhere at the present.

“According to the agreement of all the sources, the school of the Vatsīputrīya is the first derivation from the Sthavirian trunk, possibly, however, after that of the Haimavatas. The schism that gives rise to it would have occurred about 200 years after the Nirvāṇa, that is, about 280 BCE, according to the Sāṃmitiya tradition which is one of the sub-schools of the Vatsīputrīyas, or at the beginning of the third century of the Era of the nirvāṇa, that is shortly after 280 BCE, according to the North-Western traditions, we would not go far wrong in placing that event in the reign of Bindusara Maurya (289-

\textsuperscript{348} Cf. \textit{History of Buddhism (Chos-hbyung) by Bu-ston, Vvol. II, p.96. Tārānātha's History of Buddhism in India, pp.71-4.}

\textsuperscript{349} Warder (2000), p.207.

\textsuperscript{350} In the \textit{Tarkavāda} of Bhāvaviveka, it is also said that Vatsīputrīyas, Bhadrāyānikas, Dharmaguptas and Sāṃkrāntivādins admit the reality of the individual self. Obermiller, \textit{Analysis,III, p.380.}

\textsuperscript{351} Conze (1962),p.123. Cf. he continues that Pudgalavādins fall into two principal (Vatsīputrīya, Sāṃmitiya), and five subsidiary sects (Dharmottārīya, Bhadrāyānīya, Sannaparika, Avantakas, Kaurukūlīs).
264 BCE). The Vātsiputriyas derive their name from the founder of their school, Vatsiputra.  

The Sāṁmitiyas were also known as Vātsiputrikas, according to Dutt, referring Ašokan edict, in about the 3rd or 4th century A.D. the Sāṁmitiyas became more popular than the Sarvāstivādins at the Sarnath in which the Theravāda schools made their center at first. This sect is also recorded in the Theravāda tradition related with the third council. Only Pali sources transmit the third council, which is alleged to have taken place at Pātaliputra in 247B.C. during the reign of King Aśoka. This council was presided over by the Elder Tissa-moggaliputta, and the outcome of it is the compilation of the Kathāvatthu. This is for the preservation of the definitive Theravāda tradition from the heresies who infiltrated into the school and attempted to split it. Interestingly, however, their opponents in the Kathāvatthu are not heresies but insiders. Among them, two schools are the main opponents of the Theravādins in the Kathāvatthu. They are the Sāṁmitiyas along with the Vātsiputrikas (P.Vajjiputakas) and Sarvāstivādins (P. Sabbatthivādins). From this, we can assume that these two schools are the biggest rivals of the Theravādins at that time.

4.2.2 The text of Pudgalavādins

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355 Dipavamsa VII 34-41.
The texts of the Pudgalavādins are virtually all lost, except for a few post-canonical treatises. Consequently, it is difficult to delineate their collections of canonical texts. We have not found any text of the type of *Abhidharmapitaka* under the name of Pudgalavādins yet. However, from the treatises which will be mentioned below, we learn that the Pudgalavādins assuredly possessed *Abhidharma* texts.

Due to the lack of any Pudgalavādins’ canonical literature, most of the interpretations of its doctrinal position are not fairly estimated or have been exaggerated. Moreover, by considering it as a heretic,\(^{356}\) its own trial of solving the inherent problems of Buddhist doctrine has not been properly appreciated.

According to Bhikshu Thich Thien Chau,\(^{357}\) among the literatures of the Pudgalavādins of early Buddhism, there exist only four treatises today:

The San Fa Tu Lun 三法度論 (*Tridharmakaśśāstra*), T 25, No.1506.
The Ssu A Han Mu Ch’ao Chieh 四阿輸覆抄解, T 25, No.1505.
The San Mi Ti Pu Lun 三彌底部論 (*Sāṃvātiyanikāśāstra*), T 32, No.1649.
The Lu Ėrk-Shih-Erk Ming-Liao Lun 律二十二明了論 (*Vinayadvāvimśati-vidyāśāstra*), T 24, No.1461.

Beside these, indirect sources such as the *I Pu Tsung Lun Lun* (異部宗輪論, S. *Samayabhedoparacananacakra*), T.49, No.2033, translated by

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\(^{356}\) “Advocates of *pudgala* doctrine who think that they can see *pudgala* by eyes are committed to the (wrong) view that we see self by what is not self (*anātmanātmanam*).” *Kośa* IX, Appendix p.12

\(^{357}\) Bhikshu Thich Thien Chau challenged exhaustive research on the literature of the Pudgalavādins. When the literature of the Pudgalavādins are dealt in this section, it will be mainly depended on his book ‘The literature of the Personalists of early Buddhism’.
Paramārtha, and the *Ta P' I P'o Sha Lun* (大毘婆沙論. S. Mahāvibhāsā), T 28, No.1545, also presents the existence of the *pudgala* as the main thesis of the Vātsīputrīyas. The *Vijñānakāyapādāśāstra* gives definition of *pudgala* as that which performs action, receives pleasure and pain, etc., and cites four *sūtra* passages used by the Pudgalavādins in support of their position. 358 Furthermore, the *pudgala* thesis is subjected to refutation in a large part of the *Kathāvatthu* and the whole of Chapter Nine of the *Abhidharmakośa*. In this way the concept of *pudgala* is the main thesis of the Vātsīputrīyas, the mother school of the Pudgalavādins.

4.2.3 The doctrine of the Pudgalavādin

a. The problem of the individual self in the early Buddhism

In order to understand the conception of *pudgala* of the Pudgalavādins, we should differentiate it from the concepts of the metaphysical self (*ātman*). By relying on the three texts of Indian origin, preserved in their Chinese translation, viz. the *San Fa Tu Lun* 三法度論, *Ssu A Han Mu Ch'ao Chieh* 四阿鈎纂抄解 and *San Mi Ti Pu Lun* 三彌底部論, we come to understand how the *pudgala* has been conceived in this school.

The Pudgalavādins also have accepted the fundamental teachings of the Buddha, particularly the *anātmavāda* which rejects the belief in a substantial and permanent self (*ātman*). Their concept of the *pudgala* is different from the sixty-two views concerning the self and the universe found in the

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basic doctrines. This can be seen in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, in the argument with the Vātsīputrīyas.

"If there is idea of 'I', then the idea of 'mine' follows", the (wrong) conception of ātman with reference to skandhas would be more operative in the case of such person. This would be their belief in the existence of permanence. When there would be wrong view about mine, there will be affection for mine. Thus emancipation will go away from those who have accumulated bondages due to the very strong affection for 'I' and 'mine'.

If you maintain, one never has any affection for ātman (then we ask,) what kind of reasoning is this, "affection is generated with respect to non- ātman by it as ātman, but no affection is produced with respect to ātman."? Therefore, a wrong view has arisen like a tumor in this discipline: viz. the misconception of some is that there is person (pudgala); the misconception of other is that everything is non-existent. The defect of non-existence of mokṣa is non-waveringly applicable to the philosophers of other schools who maintain that ātman is another substance.\footnote{AKBh IX, Appendix.}

In the Pūṭhapādasutta, the Buddha announced that there are three acquisitions of selves (attapaṭṭilābha) ; material (olaliko), immaterial (manomayo), and formless (arūpa).\footnote{DN I. p.195} Though the Buddha refuted the blind attachment of Pūṭhapāda to the self in relation to 'the three time periods', he did not oppose to the designated self. He approved of the use of the word 'I' or 'self' as long as there is no attachment to it. It is said that these acquisitions of selves (attapaṭṭilābha) are names, expressions, figures of speech, designations of common worldly usage which the Tathagata uses without being astray by them.\footnote{DN I. pp.200-202}
Even though the Pudgalavādins had clearly accepted the essence and importance of the doctrine of anātman, they had established the thesis of the pudgala. Why should they have devised this doctrinal invention? They could not have ignored the self as a reality of the empirical world. When one accepts the doctrine of anātman, he should show that it is not contradictory to the reality of the empirical world.

b. Outset of the conception of pudgala

According to Monier-William's dictionary, the word 'pudgala' means an individual, a person, man, the Ego, the body, or the soul. We can find that it means individual person in general cases as opposed to a multitude or class, a creature. But, for certain time before the emergence of Pudgalavadins, Buddhists had used pudgala together with ātman. With reference to this substitution of pudgala for ātman, Mrs. Rhys Davids says, "It would almost appear as if atta had, at least for a time, come to signify merely the personal appearance or visible self." ³⁶⁵

Pudgala has never been understood as 'transcendental self'. Therefore, the knowledge of the true nature of pudgala could not guarantee the liberation neither was the former regarded as necessary for the latter like in the case of the knowledge of ātman in Vedānta. The refusal of pudgala by Buddhists should not be confused with the refusal of a transcendental self. About that, we can ask whether the Buddha said anything regarding a transcendental self. This brings us to the problem of the ten unexplained (avyākṛtta) questions.³⁶⁶

³⁶⁵Rhys Davids (1914), Buddhist Psychology Quest Series, 1914, p.159.
The ten unexplained (avyākṛtta):
1,2. Whether the world is eternal or not.
After Buddha's *parinirvāṇa*, the question has been raised: 'For whose interest we practice the meditation, if there is no self?' It seems that the conception of *pudgala* was presented as an answer to this question. According to Hajime Nakamura, the ultimate purport of the teaching of non-self was to get rid of selfish desires, and it was nothing but enlightenment.\(^{367}\) Whether the Buddha accepted the existence of self or not, he did not explain the knowledge of transcendental self as an essential way leading to enlightenment. In that sense, Lamotte's understanding of the Buddha seems to be adequate. He asserted that the Buddha is a healer of universal suffering, rather than a teacher of philosophy.\(^{368}\) So, in order to interpret certain texts, it is necessary, along with scholasticism, to take into account the intentional teaching of the Buddha.

c. *The pudgala related to the five skandhas*

We all know that *rūpa.vedanā.samjñā.samskāra.vijñāna* are five *skandhas*, applicable for person. It can be said that all of them together make up body and mind of a person. However, any of them is not to be said as 'this is mine, I am that, that is myself'. What does this tell us? First of all, this sentence points out that any of these *skandhas* is not identical with a person. If so, is there any being beyond the five *skandhas*? It gave rise to great attention for those who tried to achieve their liberation through the right knowledge of

\(^{34}\) Whether the world is infinite or not.

\(^{56}\) Whether the self (*sīva*) is identical to the body, or different from it.

\(^{7-10}\) Whether the Tathāgata still exists after death or he disappears with it.


the self, and accelerated them to seek correct knowledge of it. In this way, the enlightenment through the intuition regarding the self has been replaced by that regarding non-self. It has nothing to do with the intention of the Buddha.

Among the arguments about person and five skandhas, following is one of the most well-known passage.

"That's because something is not designated as fire without fuel. Fire can neither be designated as different from fuel nor as non-different. If it is different from fuel, fuel would not be hot and if it is non-different from fuel, what is burned would be identical with what burns. In the same way, person is not designated without skandhas. It can not be designated as different from the skandhas, because the problem of eternality will arise. Nor can it be designated as non-different, because the problem of annihilation will arise."

In fact, pudgala has been regarded neither as identical with nor as different from the five skandhas by Pudgalavādins. The following is the argument from the Pudgalavādins on it in the Hsien Yang Sheng Chiao lun 顯揚聖教論. 370

"Why should one know the unreality of the pudgala as a person? - Because, if the person exists, is it identical to the skandhas? Does it dwell in the skandhas? Does it dwell somewhere else? Is it different from the skandhas? If you admit that the person is identical with the skandhas, (it) should be a hypothesis; that is contrary to your doctrine; that is why that is an

369 AKBh IX, Appendix.
370 顯揚聖教論, 丁 31, No.1602, 533c 20-554a 16:
復次云何應知補特伽羅我無所有 若有我者諦觀相在住處處有住於處處非處相 願曰 唯假過失故 我無我過故 無身過故 三我不應理 論曰 若所計我即是我相屬唯是假濁 汝自宗故成過去 以即於諸論假立我故 若離諸論住處處者 我應無我 是亦有過 於諸論中無有我故 若非論 故 所計之我有無身過 無身之我不應理故 是故三種不應道理 復次若計實我住諸處 中 是亦不然 何以故願曰 如竟明空 形異依他過 無常無常用 非因非有我 論曰 所計實我住諸論中 諦如主住處當如火在薪 爲如明依燈 為如虛空處種種物 如一切皆不應理 何以故 有五種過失故 何者為五 若如主住處中者 形相異舍異舍主異舍形相異故 若如火在薪者 有依他過 火依薪力不自在故 若如明依燈者 有無常過 焰燈有無明起滅故 又前五者亦有無常過失 不見舍主有常住者 舍雖久住而彼舍主或住於處處或死滅故 火隨薪力有無不定無常性故 若如虛空者 應有棄用顯然過去
error. The reason is that you presuppose a person by basing yourself on the skandhas themselves. If (the person) is separated from the skandhas and dwells elsewhere, it has no relation to the skandhas; that also is an error. The reason is because, in the skandhas, no person exists."

'(In short), these three hypotheses do not conform to the truth..."  'Moreover, if you admit that the real person dwells in the skandhas, that also is not correct! Why?

'Because the real person dwelling in the skandhas which you admit, is it like the owner of a house dwelling in his house? Fire in relation to wood? Light depending on a lamp? Space sheltering things? If it is so, everything is incorrect! Why? Because there are five kinds of errors. Which are they?

1. 'If (the person) is like the owner of a house dwelling in his house, its shape should be different (from the skandhas), since the owner of the house and the form of the house are different.'

2. 'If (the person) is like fire in relation to wood, there is an error in the dependence on others (the person depends on the skandhas), since fire depends on the power of the wood and has no freedom'.

3. 'If (the person) is like light depending on a lamp, there is a fault of impermanence; since, in depending on the existence or non-existence of the lamp, light appears or disappears.'

'Furthermore, the first two examples are equally commit an error of impermanence: the owner of a house who dwells permanently (in his house) does not exist; since, although the house exists for a long time, its owner either stays in another place or else disappears. Fire exists in relation to the power of wood, its existence and non-existence are indefinable since its nature is impermanent'.

4. 'If (the person) were like space, that would be an error of evident function. Space has a patent nature, which means that one can come and go in it unobstructed. The person would be the same. That is why there is an error...'

Thus the hypothesis that the person dwells in the skandhas does not conform to the truth. 371

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371 This translation is done by Bhiksu Chau (1999), pp.154-155.
There is another example in the text of *pudgalavādins*. San Mi Ti Pu Lun\(^{372}\) explains the thesis of the *pudgala* in related with the doctrine of the middle.

'If the person could be described in terms of existence or non-existence, one would fall into nihilism (*ucchedadrṣṭi*) or eternalism (*sasvatadrṣṭi*), but the Buddha does not allow us to uphold these two opinions. If one says that the person does not exist, it is committing a fault in the order of the questions to be avoided. That expression is not justified. If one affirms that no person exists, that is a false view (*mithyadrṣṭi*). If (on the contrary), one affirms that the person exists (conditionally), that is a right view (*samyagdrṣṭi*). That is why it is possible to say that the *pudgala* exists.'\(^{373}\)

From this passage, we could see that they persist to justify that their view is right with the sophistry in which they misuse the doctrine of the middle.

d. Is *pudgala* identical with the five skandhas or not?

According to *San Mi Ti Pu Lun*, some schools admit that the person is identical with the *skandhas*. But, some other schools admit that the person is different from the five *skandhas*, since it is like a person bearing a burden.\(^{374}\) They give the evidence with *Bhārahārasūtra* in which burden (*bhāra*) refers to the *skandhas* while their carrier (*hāra*) is the *pudgala*. Unloading of the burden is effected by the cessation of desires, attachment and hatred. This 'pudgala' bears a name, belongs to a family and is the enjoyer of happiness and unhappiness.

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\(^{372}\) *San Mi Ti Pu Lun*, T 32 p.464c 15-19.

\(^{373}\) This translation is done by Bhiksu Chau (1999), p.158.

\(^{374}\) *San Mi Ti Pu Lun*, T 32, p.465b 9-12.
“The five skandhas are truly burdens, the burden-carrier is the person (pudgala). Taking up the burden is suffering in the world, laying the burden down is blissful. Having laid the heavy burden down without taking up another burden. Having drawn out craving with its root, one is free from hunger, fully quenched”\textsuperscript{375}

The Pudgalavādins appealed to this sutra as proof for the existence of the person as a real entity. This will be discussed later. \textit{San Mi Ti Pu Lun} refutes the view that person is identical with skandha as follows:

It is impossible to say that the person is identical with the skandhas or that the skandhas are identical with the person, since the person is ineffable (avaktaṇaya) but the skandhas are not. Moreover, if the person were identical with the skandhas, when the skandhas disappear or appear, the person should also disappear or appear.\textsuperscript{376}

As for the refutation of the opinion maintaining that the person is different from the skandhas, the \textit{San Mi Ti Pu Lun}\textsuperscript{377} divides it into several arguments as follows:

\textsuperscript{375} SN III 25.

\textsuperscript{376} Bhiksu Chau (1999), p.106. “(Certain people maintain that) the person exists by admitting that the skandhas are identical to the person or that the person is identical to the skandhas. If the skandhas were identical to the person, the skandhas would be ineffable, (since) the person is ineffable. If the person were identical to the skandhas, the person would be expressible, (since) the skandhas are expressible. (If both were describable, the skandhas would cease to be identical to the person)” Cf. \textit{San Mi Ti Pu Lun}, T 32, p.465b 4-7 有我為殊是我 我是殊。若陰是我。陰可說可說。可說我不可說。若陰可說。我可說
陰不可說。亦可兩可說非五陰 是我如是。
"If the person were identical to the skandhas, when (the skandhas) disappear or appear, the person would also disappear or appear. When part of the body is cut off, a part of the person would also have to be cut off. Hence, one part would form several parts, one part and several parts would combine in a (single) part. Depending on the existence of the body, life (jīva) exists. When life exists, the body also exists. That is why the thesis according to which ‘the person is identical to the skandhas’ should be refuted\textsuperscript{376} (\textit{San Mi Ti Pu Lun}, T 32 p.465b 10-13).

\textsuperscript{377} San Mi Ti Pu Lun, T.32, p.465b3-c17
It is impossible to say the person is different from the skandhas, since:

1. The discourse never teaches the separation between the life of man and the person, but it says that there is a person who bears the burden; that is why the burden exists;

2. When thirst (tr̥ṣṇā) is eliminated, there is no further transmigration in the cycle of birth and death; this means that the person and the skandhas are not separate;

3. The 'T' of which the Buddha speaks is a designation marking transmigration between the different existences of a person.

4. The characteristic of things (dharmaśāsana) cannot be defined as permanent or impermanent. It is the same for the person. If the person were different from the skandhas:

   a) The person would either be found in the body, or enclose the whole;

   b) When the sense organs are destroyed, the five objects should still be known;

   c) The person could go from this body to another, then return to the first body;

   d) The person should not be reborn in different destinies; otherwise it would be reborn in all the destinies at a given moment; consequently, it should not always reside in the body; hence, liberation would be difficult to obtain; if the person were to pass from one destiny to another, it should not create actions (karma); if there were no actions or results, neither would there be any merit (puṇya); equally, there would be no detachment from the bonds, nor the practice of meditation; it is thus that liberation should operate.\(^{378}\)

It seems that Pudgalavādins tried to fix their middle position by the concept of the pudgala which is neither identical to the skandhas nor different from them. By taking this position, Pudgalavādins wished that the pudgala would not fall into this dilemma.\(^{379}\) However, though they wished to avoid both extreme ways, they could not take middle way due to their stand for pudgala. It means they have already had a certain position, which could never

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\(^{378}\) Bhiksu Chau (1999), p.106-107

\(^{379}\) If the pudgala is different from the skandhas, it must be a permanent substance and have no relation to life; if the pudgala is identical to the skandhas, it must be impermanent like the skandhas.
be regarded as a middle way but another edge. About this argument, we can find many similar ideas in Pudgalavādins' works.\textsuperscript{380}

In the \textit{Ssu A Han Mu Ch'ao Chih}, there is another style of explanation of it.

"... is the \textit{pudgala} different or is it not different from the characteristics (\textit{lakṣana})? The \textit{pudgala} is the \textit{ineffable} (\textit{avaktavya}); (that is why), if it is different, it is permanent (\textit{nitya}); if it does not differ, it is impermanent (\textit{aniyta}). Both are errors in regard to the \textit{ineffable}\textsuperscript{381}

The state of \textit{pudgala} is based on Buddha's attitude towards the \textit{ineffable} (\textit{avaktavya}). Pudgalavādins must have been familiar with the \textit{ineffable} which are seen in conversation between Buddha and the wandering recluse Vacchagotta.\textsuperscript{382} The Buddha's silence over questions on the existence or non-existence of the self asked by Vacchagotta could constitute a significant basis for the conception of \textit{pudgala},

\textbf{e. The Pudgala related with unexplained (avāyākṛta)}

\textsuperscript{380} For example, in \textit{San Fa Tu Lun} "It is impossible to say that the being (sattva=\textit{pudgala}) is different from the characteristics. If it were different from the characteristics it would (in consequence) be eternal (\textit{sāśvata}); and if it were identical to the characteristics it would be non-eternal (\textit{aśāśvata}). These two errors cannot be made". Cf. \textit{San Fa Tu Lun}, T 25, 1505, p.19c 3-5, . "答衆生者。於相是無可說 若異有常 若是即無常 是二過不可說"

\textsuperscript{381} \textit{Ssu A Han Mu Ch'ao Chih}, T 25, 1505, p.5a 28sq. "當為說我相 我相異不異 是不說若異有常 若不異無常 俱過於不說"

\textsuperscript{382} \textit{SN} IV, pp.400-401.

... Now, master Gotama, is there a self? At these words the Exalted One was silent.

"How, then, master Gotama, is there not a self?" For a second time also the Exalted One was silent. Then Vacchagotta the Wanderer rose from his seat and went away. Now not long after the departure of the Wanderer, the Venerable Ananda said to the Exalted One: - "How is it, lord, that the Exalted One gave no answer to the question of the Wanderer Vacchagotta? If, Ananda, wen asked by the Wanderer: "Is there a self?"

I had replied to him: "There is a self," the, Ananda, that would be siding with the recluses and brahmans who are eternalists. But if, Ananda, when asked: "Is there not a self?" I had replied that it does not exist, that, Ananda, would be siding with those recluses and brahmans who are annihilationist. Again, Ananda, when asked by the Wanderer: "Is there a self?" had replied that there is, would my reply be in accordance with the knowledge that all things are not-self?"

"Surely not, lord." "Again, Ananda, when asked by Vacchagotta the Wanderer: "Is there not a self?" had I replied that there is not, it would have been more bewilderment for the bewildered Vacchagotta. For he would have said: "Formerly indeed I had a self, but now I have not one any more."
There is another well known passage about unexplained in Cūla Mālāṅkya Sutta\textsuperscript{383}, wherein Buddha uses metaphor that one man who is almost dying for being wounded by poisoned arrow, insists on asking a question what sort of arrow stuck him, whence it came, who aimed it etc. even though he needs urgent medical aid. Instead of facing the reality, we keep on pursuing metaphysical inquiries. More precisely, the wounded man reflects those contemporary religious scholars who would have focused on metaphysical issues. The Buddha puts weight to the moral aspect rather than theory. As a matter of fact, many of the western scholars claimed that the Buddha is more like a philosopher than a religious leader. It could be presumed from the fact that Buddha emphasizes right knowledge and that he declares that our suffering comes from ignorance. At least, early Buddhism follows a practical way. All of the Buddha’s teachings come from his experiences; he would reject anything beyond that. Among his first sermons, the Noble Eightfold Path supports the fact that his way to the enlightenment had great moral background.

It seems that from the beginning Pudgalavādins have been very concerned about the Buddha’s attitude towards unexplained. Their main thesis about pudgala is usually depicted as related with the ineffable. According to Pudgalaviniścaya, Pudgalavādins distinguished five kinds of cognizables (jñeya). The first three are conditioned (samskṛta) dharmas, i.e. the past, future and present; the fourth is the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) ; and the fifth the ‘ineffable’, in other words the Pudgala.\textsuperscript{384} On this view, Conze comments,

\textsuperscript{383} MN I, 426 ff. Cf. AN IV, 67ff.
\textsuperscript{384} Cf. AKBh IX, Appendix. "There are five kinds of knowables; past, future, present, unconditioned and ineffable. It should not be stated because this (the category of ineffable) can not be stated as fifth or
“The Person can not be conditioned, because then he would have only a momentary existence, and could not function as the abiding substratum of a succession of momentary dharmas. Nor can he be unconditioned, because then he would be inactive, and could not do anything. The pudgala is therefore in a category by himself.”

In AK Bh Vasubhandhu explains the unexplained with a simile. He points out that the Buddha regarded some questions as the unexplained because he penetrated the intention of the questioner. He was concerned with saving our life from samsāra, what’s more important and more urgent, while our karma has already been encroaching us. The Buddha’s position is that unsolvable problems should be set aside meanwhile we should do our best for our ultimate goal. The theory of unexplained can be understood in this sense.

**f. The pudgala related to three designations**

According to San Mi Ti Pu Lun, the thesis of the pudgala is based on the following three kinds of designations (prajñāpīti): 1. The pudgala designated by the support (依説人, āśrayaprajñāpīti pudgala). 2. The pudgala designated by transmigration (度説人, sankramaprajñāpīti pudgala). 3. The pudgala designated by cessation (滅説人, nirodhaprajñāpīti pudgala).

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386 "If you say pudgala is nothing but skandhas, why didn’t the lord elucidate the question, viz. “Is living being identical with body or different from it?”

"Relative to the intention of the questioner. Because questioner asks the question with respect to living substance which is the person operating inside (the body). Such a person does not exist in any one. How can it be elucidated as different (from skandhas) or identical (with them). It would be (elucidating) like the internal hardness or softness of the hair of the tortoise”

387 San Mi Ti Pu Lun, p.466bff.
1. The pudgala designated by the support (依說人, āśrayaprajñapti pudgala).

The support here consists of compounded things (sanskāra). This relationship is similar to that of fire in relation to fuel, or of milk in relation to its colour. In this sense, the person and form (rūpa) are two things which are neither identical nor different. They exist and perish together. The self is named or described on the base of its āśraya or ālambana. That means he is called in accordance with the type of body possessed by him such as a serpent or a god. So, the person is also the receiver of the type of body possessed by him. If the pudgala were identical to the supports, when the supports disappear at death, it would disappear. If the pudgala is different from the supports, then the pudgala has no connection with life, moreover, the rebirth can not make sense.

San Mi Ti Pu Lun\textsuperscript{388} says:

"... if the person were different from the skandhas, the person would not be reborn in the various destinies. If we consider rebirth is the various destinies, the person would be reborn in all the destinies at the same time. Hence it could not always reside in the body, and deliverance would then be difficult to achieve. If the person passed from destiny to destiny, it could not create action (karman). If there were no action or result, there would equally be no work, attachment, detachment and practice of meditation. That would indeed be deliverance!".

2. The pudgala designated by transmigration (度說人, sankramaprajñapti pudgala)

\textsuperscript{388} San Mi Ti Pu Lun T 32, p.465c13-16.
There is another reason for Pudgalavadins to set up the conception of *pudgala*. They also could not avoid the problem of transmigration. Transmigration is the continuity of a living being in the three time-periods; past, present and future. Without this designation, there are no means of recognizing the identity of living beings from one existence to another.

In *San Fa Tu Lun*, it is mentioned that he who entered the stream (*śrotāppanna*) has to be reborn seven times at the most to attain full emancipation. This conception of *śrotāppanna* comes from the utterance of Buddha. If the transmigration is not accepted, it can not be brought into.

Besides, Buddha often spoke of the acquisition of super powers or knowledge (*abhijñā*). Pudgalavadins also admit five super powers which can be obtained by wordlings (*prthagjana*). One of which was the power of remembering one's previous lives. Buddha himself referred to his previous lives and said "I lived in certain era with the name of *Chū Hsün T'ā*," It shows that there must be a person (*pudgala*) continuing through lives. Memory of past lives is not possible for the *skandhas* which change every

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389 *San Mi Ti Pu Lun* T 32 p.466b27ff. "What is *pudgala*-designated by transmigration? When, at a given moment, a being passes to different existence, then the Buddha called that *sattva* in transmigration. What is it called *sattva* designated by transmigration? Because of the past, future and present. (問曰云何度說人 答以是時度異有是時 佛說度衆生 云何度說衆生。過去說未來說現在說。云何過去說)

390 *San Mi Ti Pu Lun* T 32 p.466c15. "It should be understand that the Buddha, base on the compounded things (*samskāra*) of the three times, established these three designations That is why the designation of the transmigration of compounded things is called the designated by transmigration. (佛依三世行制三說 如是應知以是行度說是名度說)

391 *San Fa Tu Lun*. T.25, p.21a

392 AN I,p.233

393 *Stu A Han Mu Chiao Chieh*, T 25, p.5c 11-12.

394 *San Fa Tu Lun*. T 25, p.24b 3-4. "The designation of the past is information concerning the *skandha, dhātu* and *fāyatana* of the past, such as when (the Buddha) said 'I lived in certain era with the name of Chū-Hsün-T'ā."

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moment. Pudgalavādins indicate that admission of memory (smanṭi) also implies the existence of 'pudgala'.

Moreover, the Buddha also predicted future lives of others\(^{395}\) and admits the divine eye can perceive what will happen in the next lives\(^{396}\). But, if the person be different from skandhas, it would have nothing to stand by in his future existences. According to the Pudgalavādins, the pudgala, whose mind (citta or vijñāna) carries with it the effects of his moral observances (śīla) and meditational practices (samādhi), can be reborn in a higher sphere. His meritorious deeds and spiritual acquisitions follow him in his next existence.\(^{397}\)

3. The pudgala designated by cessation (滅說人, nirodhaprājñāpti pudgala)

Cessation is the extinction of the five skandhas or defilements (āśrava).\(^{398}\) Only when a person achieves Arhathood, he ceases and has no more rebirth and attains nirvāṇa.\(^{399}\) According to the Pudgalavādins’ interpretation, nirvāṇa is absolute truth (paramārtha).\(^{400}\) There are two aspects of nirvāṇa: nirvāṇa with a remainder (sāpadhiśeṣanirvāṇa) and nirvāṇa without a remainder

\(^{395}\) AN I, p.146.

\(^{396}\) MN I,35.


\(^{398}\) Cf. San Mi Ti Pu Lun T 32, p.466c19 佛說滅說人 如過去身壞時 是名滅說如是如佛所說滅盡比丘五陰無常滅 是名滅說。

\(^{399}\) Cf. San Mi Ti Pu Lun T 25, p.24a 4“說施設者 若已滅是因受說 如所說 世尊般涅槃”。

(nirupadhiṣeṇaṁnirvāṇa). The continuity of a person stops only when the thirst (trṣṇā) has ceased. The cessation of the thirst is possible by the practice of the middle path. But, the Buddha refuses to explain the nature of the nirvāṇa. Pudgalavadins could not deny the subject who can attain nirvāṇa through the right practice taught by the Buddha. Otherwise, to whom all the merits of the practice of good deed and meditation go?

The main features of the pudgala from the texts of the Pudgalavadin

The commonly known features of the pudgala of Pudgalavādins can be summarized as the following; pudgala is an individual person as a designation (prajñāpti). It is neither identical with nor different from the skandhas. It is the one that transmigrates and the one that enters into the nirvāṇa.

*Pudgala is unknowable to common people.

The Buddha states that the cycle of existences has no beginning and deducing it is also unknowable to the unenlightened. It has been argued by the Pudgalavādins that the existence or non-existence of an object should not be questioned because of the fact that it is unknowable by men of average intelligence. Pudgalaviniścaya also said that only the Buddhas can understand that the continua (santati) which are scented by different karma having various kinds of powers (śakti). Pudgala is unknowable by the ordinary people, but that does not mean that pudgala is non-existent. The Pudgalavādins did not take the reticence of the Buddha on ātman as the denial of a pudgala.

**Pudgala is the ineffable like nirvāṇa.
The Buddha rejects all discussion on the nature of nirvāṇa. His reaction viz. silence on the questions regarding nirvāṇa as ‘unexplained’. The Pudgalavādins held the same position with the pudgala which the Buddha held with regard to nirvāṇa. They said that the pudgala as well as nirvāṇa are not identical to the characteristics, nor different from the Characteristics. About this problem, San Fa Tu Lun argues that if both possess Characteristics, it is a fault since they become impermanent. And if they do not, it is also a fault (since pudgala does not belong to asamkrța nor samkrța in the category of the Pudgalavādins). In fact, the characteristics; arising (utpāda), enduring (sthiti) and decay (vyaya) are said to be the compounded (samkrțalaksana).\(^{401}\) And it is said,

It is impossible to say that the living being is other than the characteristics (since), if it were different from the characteristics, it would (in consequence) be eternal (śasvata); if it were identical to the characteristics, it would be non-eternal (asśasvata). These two faults cannot be explained. It is the same for nirvāṇa. That is why it should be surely understood that the characteristics are certainly characteristics of the compounded (saṁskṛtalaksana).\(^{402}\)

***Pudgalavādins follow the doctrine of middle path of the Buddha.

As we have seen above, Pudgalavādins carry their arguments on the basis of the doctrine of middle path. Inevitably, this caused them to establish their main thesis that pudgala is ineffable. After all, in the highest sense (paramārtha) pudgala is just designation (prajñapiti). Whatever real meaning

\(^{401}\) Cf. San Fa Tu Lun. T 25, p.19c. “若者有者無大過即有無常若不者此經有過應當說起住理是亦有為相”

\(^{402}\) Cf. San Fa Tu Lun. T 25, p.19c “答生者此相是餘不可說若異即有常若是即無常是二過不可說涅槃亦如是是故分別當知相者一向有為相.”

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of *anātman* may be, the Buddhists had to explain it some how since it was the main concern of philosophers and saints in those days. Thus, they could not help uttering it with the designation. Because, according to Vasubandhu, the laymen of that time were unable to understand ‘*śūnyatā*’.

Through these arguments, we can see that they tried not to slip from the main tenet of the Buddha while maintaining the fundamental doctrine of Buddhism even though they were regarded as a threat among the other Buddhist schools.

**4.3 Vasubandhu on the doctrine of the Pudgalavādins**

Now, we study how Vasubandhu deals with the theory of Pudgalavādins through out the *Pudgalaviniścaya*.

Refutation of the doctrine of Vātsīputrīyas: *pudgala* is neither identical with nor different from the *skandhas*.

Vasubandhu starts by arguing that whatever exists individually, should be known through *Pratyakṣa* (*direct perception*) and *Anumana* (*inference*), but *ātman* is not such a case. Thus, he asserts that there is no *ātman*. Vātsīputrīyas established the *pudgala* as an individual person. They accept the existence of *pudgala* but say that *pudgala* exists neither as a substance (*dravya*) nor as a designation (*prajñapti*).

Vasubandhu argues that *pudgala* should be either a substance or a designation and he says, if something is a separate thing like *rūpa* (*i.e. visual form*) etc, then it exists as a substance. If it is a collection like milk etc then it exists as a designation.
If *pudgala* exists as a substance (*dravya*), then it will have to be called different from *skandhas* because of its distinct nature, like each *skandha* which is different from each other. Moreover, we have to state its cause, or call it unconditioned (*asamaskṛta*). If one accepts *pudgala* as a designation, its existence is arising from the *skandhas* and then it can not have any independent existence of its own. On this, Vātsīputrīyas persists that *pudgala* is neither different from nor identical with *skandhas* just like fuel and fire.

**Arguments from fire and fuel**

We have already gone through various arguments relating this subject in the texts of the Pudalavādins. In *pudgalaviniścaya*, Vātsīputrīyas argue that *pudgala* is not designated without *skandhas* saying that they are just like fire and fuel. They say that fire is designated as arising from fuel (*indhanam upādāya*). Vasubandhu demands that Vātsīputrīyas should state the meaning of 'arising from (*upādāya*)'. If the meaning is 'by making *skandhas* as the object', the designation *pudgala* applies to them (*skandhas*), like the designation milk which applies to visual form, and other things, by making them the object. If this is the meaning (of *skandhan upādāya*), namely "depending on the *skandhas*", then the same fault occurs, because *skandhas* are the cause of the designation 'pudgala'. Vātsīputrīyas respond that *pudgala* is designated just as (the designation) fire is designated as arising from fuel. Fire can neither be designated as different from fuel nor as non-different. In the same way, *pudgala* is not designated without *skandhas*. It can not be designated as different from the *skandhas*, because the problem of eternity
will arise. Nor can it be designated as non-different, because the problem of annihilation will arise.

Vasubhandhu asks, “what is 'to be burned' and what is that 'which burns'”? Vātsīputrīyas reply that wood, etc, which is not (yet) kindled, is called fuel. It is also called the thing to be burned. Which is kindled is called fire and it is also called the thing which burns. Whatever is shining, hot, intense, inflames and burns fuel that is fire since it brings about alteration in the continuum. Though both of them are made up of eight substances, depending on fuel of that nature (fuel & fire), fire arises. Like depending on milk, curd arises. And depending on honey, wine arises.

Vasubandhu asserts, when we say that fire is designated as arising from fuel, fire is different from fuel because they belong to different time. If pudgala arises depending on skandhas in this way, it will be different and non-eternal. How is that fire designated as arising from that fuel? Indeed fuel is neither the cause of fire nor of the designation of fire. Fire itself is indeed the cause of its designation. If the meaning of the word 'arising from (upādāya)’ is 'locus (aśraya)', or 'co-existence (sahabhava)', in that case skandhas also will become 'loci of pudgala' or 'co-existent with pudgala'. Hence pudgala is clearly asserted as different from the skandhas. However, in the absence of those (skandhas), the absence of pudgala follows. Like the absence of fire which follows in the absence of fuel. But Vātsīputrīyas claim, if fire would be different from fuel, then fuel would not be hot; what is the meaning of the word ‘hot’ there? If the word ‘hot’ means heat (hotness), then fuel is not hot (in that sense) because its own nature is different. If hot means that which has hotness, then apart from fire which is essentially hot, other
things will prove to be hot because they are associated with hotness. There is no fault in otherness. Then, is it justifiable that everything kindled, whether it is wood etc. or fuel, is fire?

Meaning of the word "arising from" should be stated in that case. If skandhas themselves are pudgala then inevitably identity obtains between them. Therefore this proposal cannot be established, namely that as arising from fuel fire is designated, so is pudgala designated as arising from skandhas.

Refutation of the Vātsiputriyas’ statement that pudgala is perceived by all six kinds of consciousness

Vasubandhu asks, “Out of the six (types of) consciousness, by which consciousness should pudgala be known?” Vātsiputriyas reply that it is perceived by all the six consciousnesses.

Vasubandhu refutes it that if visual form (rūpa) is the cause of cognition of pudgala, one should not say that visual form and pudgala are different, then in that case, visual form also should not be stated as different from light, eye, and attention, because they are the causes of that (cognition of visual form). But, Vātsiputriyas insist that they would neither regard the perception of visual form as identical with the perception of pudgala nor as different from it. How can they be distinctly known as "This is the visual form, this is the pudgala."? If pudgala is not distinctly known in this way, how is it claimed that visual form also is there, and pudgala also is there? Because its existence can be subject to its apprehension. The same thing should be said with reference to all dharmas. If by another apprehension, pudgala becomes
different from visual form, because it is apprehended at different time, like yellow which is different from blue, and a moment which is different from another moment. The same thing should be said with reference to all dharmas. Here, Vasubandhu reminds us of momentariness that the eye consciousness which apprehends visual form and the one which apprehend pudgala can not be established at the same time, Thus pudgala should be different from visual form. Vasubandhu argues further, if Vātsīputrīyas claim that apprehensions of the two should be said to be neither different nor non-different in the case of the visual form and pudgala, then in that case the conditioned one (samskṛta) also becomes ineffable. This would be a deviation from the (Buddhist) doctrine.

Vasubandhu continues, if pudgala is claimed to be knowable by six types of consciousnesses, it will become different from visual form, because it is knowable by ear consciousness like sound. It will become different from sound, because it is knowable by eye consciousness, like visual form. The same thing is applicable to other forms also. He gives the evidence from the sutra ; "Oh, brāhmaṇa. These five sense organs (indriyas) which have various spheres (gocāra) and various objects (viṣaya). (They) experience their own respective spheres and objects. One (indriya) does not experience sphere or object of another (indriya). They are the organs called eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin organs. Mind experiences spheres and objects of the five organs. Mind is their refuge."⁴⁰³ Pudgala will not be the object (of five organs) then. If it is not object, then it is not knowable.

⁴⁰³ Madhyamāgama T 1, p. 791b, SN. V. 218.
Quoting sūtras for demonstrating that everything internal and external is empty.

Again Vasubandhu quotes Manusya-sūtra, as it has been mentioned before. Subsequently he quotes Bimbisara-sūtra, the sūtra on female arahant Sāila and Kṣudrakāgama. There's no being, no self in this world, all these elements are caused. Only twelve parts constitute the world, viz. skandha, āyatana, and dhātu. After considering all these, pudgala is not obtained. Therefore, he asserts that everything internal and external is empty.\(^{404}\)

The Burden and the bearer of burden: Bhārahāra sūtra.

Vātsiputriyas raise the question as the evidence with famous Bhārahāra sūtra. If skandhas themselves are pudgala, why did (the Buddha) say this, "Oh, Monks. I will explain to you. The burden, the acceptance of burden, the abandonment of burden, the bearer of burden." They intended that burden (bhāra) refers to the skandhas while their carrier (hāra) is the pudgala. Being understood their intention, Vasubandhu says that the lord indicated the bearer of the burden as the following; "Whosoever is this fellow having such a name, staying for such a long time, living for such a period of life, so that he is properly understood." It should not be understood differently as either something permanent or ineffable. The previous skandhas become the cause of suffering to later skandhas so they are expressed (respectively) as burden and bearer of burden. Because burden is the cause of (meant for) suffering. That

\(^{404}\) Here, 'empty' probably means non-substantial or selfless and not Šunya in the sense of the Mādhyamika.
means the preceding moment of skandhas have been conventionally called ‘the burden’ and the following one is ‘the bearer of burden.’

As Hoffman points out, this is not to suppose a permanent ātman under the description of puggala (P.), nor is it to suppose an ontological distinction between puggala (P.) and five skandhas any more than does ātta (P.) as reflexive pronoun mean ātman.\(^{405}\) There is only causal relation.

The apparitional being (upapāduka) does exist.

Vatsīputrīyas admit the existence of apparitional being (upapāduka) and intermediate being (antarābhava)\(^{406}\) with the intention that it can prove the existence of pudgala. Vasubandhu says that apparitional being is nothing but skandhas. He affirms that antarābhava is also nothing but skandhas in earlier chapter of AKBh\(^{407}\) The Sarvastivādin admits the existence of antarābhava and Vasubandhu gives the long discussion on this issue.\(^{408}\) It is curious why he does not give any single explanation about it in this Pudgalaviniścaya while he deals with various issues on the problem of person and personal identity here. As mentioned above, the position of Vasubandhu here clearly stands on the side of Sautrantika. It can be postulated that he does not wholly support the idea of intermediate being of the Sarvāstivādin even though he introduces and interprets it at length.

\(^{405}\) Hoffman (1987), pp.54-55.
\(^{407}\) AKBh III. 13cd, 18 a-d.
\(^{408}\) AKBh III. 10-19
Vasubhandhu argues that there is no agent who takes up and gives up five skandhas.

Vātsīputrīyas claim that pudgala is not produced like skandhas which are produced without previous existence. According to them, pudgala is produced by taking up another set of skandhas. Just as it is said that a gramarian is born, because he has taken up the relevant knowledge, and a monk is born because he has taken up some marks. Similarly it is said that he has become old because he has taken up other conditions.

Vasubhandhu disagrees and quotes Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra. "Oh, monks. karma exists and its vipāka exists, but the doer (kāraka) who gives up these skandhas and takes up other skandhas is not obtained except the pseudonym (samketa) for dharma" Subsequently in Phalgusūtra it is said, "It's meaningless to say that somebody takes up. Hence I don't say that pudgala takes up new skandhas." Therefore there's no one who takes the skandhas up, nor anyone who gives them up. After quoting these sūtras, Vasubhandhu asserts that mind and mental states as well as body (śarira) are produced every moment without previous existence.

Again Vātsīputrīyas claim, if you say pudgala is nothing but skandhas, why didn't the lord elucidate the question, viz. "Is living being identical with body or different from it?" Vasubhandhu replies that the lord did so relative to the intention (āśaya) of the questioner. The questioner asks the question with respect to living substance which is the person (puruṣa) operating inside (the body). Such a person does not exist in any one. How can it be elucidated as

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409 Cf. Samyuktāgama T.2, p.92c
410 Ibid., p.182 (or102?a17. Cf. SN II.14
different (from skandhas) or identical (with them)? It would be like (elucidating) the internal hardness or softness of the hair of the tortoise. Moreover, this difficulty has already been solved by the earlier scholars. He also quotes the well known similes about Mango tree from Milindapañhā and Vatsagotrasūtra subsequently. This shows the fundamental doctrine of unexplained (avyākṛta) the Buddha maintains whenever he was faced with the metaphysical inquiry. Because those laymen of that time were unable to understand ‘śūnyata’, Vasubandhu says.

Then, who is the one who transmigrates?

Vātsīputrīyas argue persistently, if then there’s no pudgala, who transmigrates? It is not proper to say that the transmigration (samsāra) itself transmigrates. The lord has stated, “Of the beings who are misled by ignorance, and who are having thirst, transmigrate.” Vasubhandhu says: Just as the momentary fire is said to be moving from fuel to fuel, the fire never remaining the same, the mass of skandhas which is called ‘sattva’(being) is said to be transmigrating because of the craving (trṣṇa) and clinging (upādāna).

Vātsīputrīyas argue, if this is nothing but skandhas, why did the lord say "I myself was a preacher, named 'Sunetra' in that period'. Therefore, by these words the lord indicates oneness of continuum to which skandhas belong, like (one can say): “The same fire has come burning.” Moreover, how does recollection or recognition of an object experienced long before occur in the momentary mind?
How does memory take place?

Vasubhandhu replies that it is due to the particular mind (*cittaviśesa*) which is connected with the cognition of the object of memory. Memory takes place due to (1) the mind which is bent towards (*abhoga*) the object of memory, and (2) the mind which is resembled or connected to that (object). (3) The mind should also be such that its influence is not obstructed by the particular support (*aśraya*) such as grief and distraction.

The particular mind which is similar to the earlier one but not related to it is not capable of generating the particular memory. Similarly, the particular mind which is related to the earlier one but similar to something else is also not capable of generating the particular memory. But the mind is capable, if both the conditions are fulfilled. Memory occurs in this way, because the capability of producing memory is not seen in any other kind of mind.

Why one mind does not recollect what is seen by another's mind?

Vātsiputraśyas ask, "Is it possible for a mind to recollect that which is seen by another mind? Can Yajñadatta's mind recollect what is seen by Devadatta's mind?" Vasubhandhu answers; No, that is not the case, because of non-relation. Because there's no relation between the two (i.e. the minds of Devadatta & Yajñadatta). Because there's no cause-effect relationship between them. We are not saying that one mind remembers what is seen by another mind. But we are saying that from perceptual mind a different one, i.e. recollective mind arises. On this issue, Sarvastivādins say that *prāpti* works only within one and the same continuum.
What does it mean to say that Caitra remembers?

Memory happens by means of evolutionary continuum (saṃtati pariñatyā), as we have said before. Present memory is connected with previous recognition and what becomes recollection now gives rise to another recognition. Therefore no agent is required for the memory. Vātsīputrīyas argue: then what about the statement that Caitra remembers?

Vasubandhu says, "The statement 'Caitra remembers' is made from the point of view of that recollection arises from the continuum called Caitra." And he tries to prove it with the techniques of grammar. He asserts that the owner becomes the cause, and the effect is the owned object since cause has the mastery over the effect, and because of the effect cause becomes the possessor. Vātsīputrīyas insist on asking who is indeed the cause of memory.

The Memory belongs to the one who is the cause of it. The series of the conditioned things which is named as Caitra is called the owner of something called that name. In that example also there is no relation of ownership setting aside the causal relation. The same thing can be said in the cases like who knows, who has cognition, etc. Here the difference is that the cause of the cognition are sense organ (indriya), objects (artha), attention (manaskāra) etc, as they may be applicable.

Who is the doer?

Vātsīputrīyas obstinately argue that since every action requires some agent, all actions are related to agents. In the sentence "Devadatta goes", going is the act which requires the goer, namely Devadatta. Similarly cognition is an act. Therefore, there has to be someone who cognises.
Vasubandhu argues, who is this Devadatta? If he is \textit{ātman} then this itself is to be proved. If he is as person (\textit{puruṣa}) as called in common usage, then even he is not a single entity. They are just conditioned things which are called by this name. In that case, as we say "Devadatta goes", in the same way, we say "Devadatta cognizes." The conditioned things are momentary, which are unbroken series, and which are confused as Devadatta by ignorant persons by taking it to be a single being or organism. They are described as 'Devadatta goes' when they become the cause of their own series in another place. Going is the production (of the series) in another place. It is like the use of the words "goes" or "going" in the case of flame series and sound series.

The problem of the description, "cognition cognizes."

Vātsīputrīyas again ask, "What does the cognition do when it is described in the \textit{sūtra} as ‘cognition cognizes?" Vasubandhu says that it doesn't do anything. For instance, we say that effect follows the cause because it attains its own identity through similarity without doing anything. Similarly, we say that cognition cognizes because it attains its own identity through similarity without doing anything. Then, what is the similarity of cognition with what it cognizes? It is ‘having the same shape as the object. Therefore we say that cognition cognizes the object’, and not the sense organ, although cognition is produced from the sense organ. Or, as we have seen before, the series of cognitions are the cause of (individual) cognition. So the statement "cognition cognizes" is faultless, because the word ‘agent’ can be used in the sense of a cause. This is like the statement "Bell rings." And also we say "cognition cognizes",

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We should focus on the above passage since it conveys the concrete view of the Sautrāntika. While the Sarvastivādins insist that mind (citta) is originally pure unless accompanied by mental factors (caitta), Sautrāntika says that mind (citta) is full of images (ākāra). Here, Vasubandhu here is expressing a similar view that the effect follows the cause because cognition attains its own identity through similarity without doing anything. With this as a turning point Sautrāntika changes its direction to the idealism of Yogacāra.\textsuperscript{411}

He continues that it is like one says "lamp moves". Then how does the lamp move? The word "lamp" is used indirectly to mean the series of flames. When it arises in another place, we say that it moves to the other place. In the same way, the word 'cognition' is also used indirectly to mean the series of mind. When it arises in another object, we say that it cognizes that object. It is just like when we say, 'the visual form arises' or 'it stays', when there is neither separate agent (bhavatr of. visual form) nor its existence (bhavati of visual form). The case of cognition would be similar.

**The problem of heterogeneous nature of a person**

Vātsiputṛyas ask a question about the heterogeneous nature of a person that if cognition arises from [previous] cognition and not from ātman, why does it not arise always resembling the earlier cognition? Or why does not it follow the proper order like sprout, stems, leaves, etc.?

Vasubandhu replies, because lasting and continuous change (sthityanyathātva) are the defining characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of conditioned

things. It is the very nature (svabhava) of conditioned things that its series necessarily undergoes change (prabandhasyānyathātva). Mind has a regular order. Because the mind arises from that cause alone, from which it should arise. Among (different) similar minds, only a particular mind is capable of producing (certain other mind) though it is similar to another mind because it has a different route (gatavīśeṣa). Whenever an ascetic thinks of a woman, immediately the hatred-mind regarding her body follows. Or, in the case of a layman, a thought about her husband and son, etc arises, and subsequently by the maturation of succession (samtatiparinatyā), the thought about the woman arises again. Depending on route (guna), the hatred-mind about body arises, or the thought about her husband, son, etc. arises. It is not capable otherwise. Again, the thought (citta) about woman may be changed by various minds arising one after another according to the (order of) powerfulness. Whatever is more common, whatever is more intense, whatever is more proximate, that only arises because the meditative cultivation (bhāvanā) of that is more powerful. This happens except in the case of the specific immediate bodily or external experience.

Controversy with Vaišesika

Vaišesika claims that mind (citta) arises because mind depends upon the specific conjunction (samyoga) of ātman with manas. Vasubandhu says that the things having conjunction are limited in size, and conjunction by definition (lakṣaṇa) is attainment (prāpti) of one thing by the other after non-attainment (aprāpti) it. Hence, Vaišesika will have to accept a contrary
position that ātman will be limited in size. In that case [if ātman has a limited size], when there is movement of manas, there would be movement of ātman also. Or there would be destruction of ātman [and arisal of it again at the time of conjunction]. Vaiśesika argues that there is a conjunction of manas with the region [of ātman]. A thing can not be the same as its region, according to Vasubandhu. But if manas is always the same, how is a different specific conjunction possible? Vaiśesika answers that it is possible depending upon the different cognition (buddhi).

Vasubandhu argues with the Vaiśesika that the same is being objected (namely) how is different cognition possible.

Vasubandhu argues that the same is being objected (namely) how is different cognition possible?

Vaiśesika replies, [There is a different cognition] because of the conjunction between ātman and manas which is relative to different mental formation (samskāra). Vasubandhu objects, then, no power is seen in ātman. Just as the recitation of the 'Pha! Svāha! etc.' by a cheating-doctor has no power in bringing about the effect of a medicine. If you say, “When ātman exists, they (citta & sāmskāra) are possible”, it is only words [without truth]. If you say, “Ātman is the support (āśraya)”, we may ask "Who is the support of whom?" They are not the substrata like the picture or a jujube fruit. Nor is ātman properly a substratum like wall or vessel [respectively]. It can not be the support [of citta & sāmskāra], due to the two defects, namely resistance
(pratīghāṭi) and conjointness (yuktaṇa) [that is existence in different places].

Why do not all the cognitions arise simultaneously?

Even though it (the connection between ātman and manas) depends upon a specific kind of saṃskāra, why do not all the cognitions arise simultaneously?

Vaiśeṣika says, out of those a specific kind of saṃskāra whichever is powerful obstructs other saṃskāra. And ātman should indeed be postulated, because memory, etc, belong to the category of quality (guna), and that category of quality resides necessarily in a substance (dravya). And they can not have any other thing as a support (āśraya). In the absence of ātman, what is the purpose behind starting any action? Who is this 'I' which is the object of this notion of 'I'?

Vasubandhu says that the skandhas are the object [of the notion of I]. Because of the attachment towards them (skandhas), this notion of I is seen as identical with the notion of fair complexion, etc. As due to the identification with the notion of fair complexion etc., [we say]: I am fair; I am dark; I am fat; I am thin; I am old; I am young etc. These kinds are not seen in ātman. Therefore, for this reason too, this notion of I is known to be applicable to skandhas.

Vaiśeṣika raises the problem of identity: if the notion of 'I' can assume body as its object, why does it not accept other bodies as its objects

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412 These are two defects, namely, remaining in a different place and bringing them together.
Vaiśesika raise the problem of identity. The body which is useful to ātman is also called ātman in derivative sense. If the notion of 'I' can assume body as its object, why does it not accept other bodies as its objects?

Vasubandhu says, Because of the absence of connection (asambandha). The notion of I arises only with the body or mind (citta), with which it has a connection. And what is the connection here? The relation of cause and effect. The notion of I belongs to that whatever is its cause. And the cause is [nothing but] a defiled mind which is influenced by earlier notion of I and having its own continuum for its object. It is the support (āśraya) in which pleasure or pain arises. It (=the expression, one is pleased or displeased) is like the expressions "tree is flowery" and "forest is full of fruits".

Vaiśesika asks who is the support of these two (pleasure and pain)? Vasubandhu replies that six (internal) āyatanas are the support. How they are so is already explained. Vaiśesika says that Grammarians explain the definition of doer as "doer is the one who is a self dependent." Someone has self-dependent role in some actions. In the world, it is seen that Devadatta (some person) has freedom in the actions like bathing, sitting and going. Vasubandhu holds that the agent here has a reference to the set of five skandhas, he is the doer. This action is threefold, namely bodily, verbal and mental action. Out of them in the bodily action, body becomes active depending upon mind. Mind is also active depending upon body. This is because all the things are active depending upon their own causes. Ātman can not be proved to be independent because he can not be accepted as a cause independently [of other factors].

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From memory (smṛti), there arises a desire (chanda); from that desire arises thought (vitarka); from thought arises effort (prayātana); from effort arises motor energy (vāyu); from motor energy arises action (karma). What does ātman do in this [process]? What is the enjoyment of result by doing which ātman is regarded as an enjoyer?

If you say the enjoyment is experience (upalabdhiḥ), then (we say), ātman has no capacity for experience, because the capacity of ātman to have consciousness (vijñāna) is refuted.

If ātman does not exist, why does not the non-sentient being (asattva) accumulate merit and demerit?

Vaiśeṣika asks if ātman does not exist, why does not the non-sentient being (asattva) accumulate merit and demerit? Vasubhandhu says, this happens because of the absence of support (of merit, demerit etc) for sensation (vedāna) etc. The support of demerit and merit is the six āyatanas, not ātman. How ātman is not the support is already stated.

How is the production of result in future possible from the action which is destroyed?

Again Vaiśeṣika asks, in the absence of ātman, how is the production of result in future possible from the action which is destroyed? The production of result according to Vaiśeṣika is from the merit and demerit which reside in ātman.

Vasubhandhu finally reveals his own idea which comes from Sautrantika; it arises from this specific transformation of continuum
(santatipariṇāmaviśeṣa), like the fruit (which arises) from seed-continuum. Sautrantika says that the fruit arises from the seed not from a disappeared seed. Nor does it arise immediately from the seed. That arises from the specific transformation of continuum which arises by certain order, i.e. sprout, stem, leaves etc., and which is completed by flower. Then how is the fruit which actually arises from flower said to be the fruit of that seed? It is because the power [to produce the fruit] is put in the last flower by the seed. If the flower had not arisen from the earlier cause (i.e. seed) then it would not have been capable of producing fruit of that kind. So it is said that fruit (phala) arises from an action (karma) neither from the destroyed actions nor immediately after the action. It (fruit) arises from the specific transformation of continuum of that (=action).

But, what is continuum (santati)? What is the transformation (pariṇama)? What is the specificness (viśeṣa)? The occurrence of mind one after the other before the action (karma) is called continuum. Transformation is its production in another form. Now the transformation which is capable of producing the result immediately is this specific transformation, because it is specified by the last transformation. For example, the mind at the time of death is the cause of next birth. Although the fruit is preceded by three kinds of karma, the capacity (to produce the fruit) is indicated to be product of that action which is either heavy or proximate or repeated and not as the product of any other actions.

The capacity of actions to produce the effect by maturation which is deposited in the action by the maturation cause (vipākahetu) ceases after giving the mature result. The capacity of defiled actions to produce the
uniform outflow-effect (*nisyandaphala*) which is deposited in them by the homogeneous cause (*sabhāgahetu*) ceases after the rise of the opposing factors. In the case of non-defiled actions, the capacity ceases due to complete cessation of mind series (*cittasantāna*) when one obtains *parinirvana*.

Then, why does not maturation (*vipāka*) arise repeatedly from one maturation, just as another fruit arises from the fruit that arises from the seed.? Everything does not similar from an analogy, but in this case another fruit does not result from the fruit itself. It arises from a particular transformation caused by particular wetting (*viklitti*). The kind of element (*bhūta*) which produces the sprout is its seed, nothing-else. Even the earlier continuum (for example, dry seed) is called the seed either by way of future indicating term or due to similarity. In the same way, if from a mature fruit there arises transformation of mind which is either impurely (*sāsrava*) good or bad, and which arises from the particular causal conditions such as listening to right or wrong moral teaching. Then (by the final moment), there will arise another *vipāka*. It will not arise in another way just as another kind of fruit does not arise from the fruit arising from the seed. Or this idea may be understood in this way. A red saffron arises in a fruit due to a particular transformation of the continuum caused by being sprinkled by the red liquid of matulinga flower. but from the red saffron, no other saffron arises. Similarly from the *vipaka* which arises from action, there is no arising of another *vipāka*.

Finally he concludes that the Buddhas only can understand that these are the continua which are scented by different actions (karma) having various kinds of powers (*śakti*).
An appraisal of Vasubandhu’s argument

Vasubandhu maintains the theory of the early Buddhism that rūpa is regarded as a locus of the faculty of sense organ and the materiality as an object of sense organ. In the concept of five skandhas, rūpa does not simply mean the body. It comprehends aspect of nāma which interrelated with the sense organ through the mental process which occurs immediately after the contact with the object of the sense organ. So, there is no distinctive role of the body apart from other mental factors which is believed to constitute the personal identity together. However, in southern tradition of Theravadins, their understanding of this matter seems to be different. According to Kalupahanna, rūpa, or form, came to be regarded as non-mental (P. acetasika, cittavippayutta) in the Dhammasangani⁴¹³. Such definitions, as he points out, led to a clear demarcation between mental and physical events comparable to the division of reality into mind and matter, i.e. nāmarūpa⁴¹⁴. But, As we already examined chatter III, the early Buddhism does not agree the dualism. We can rightly say that Vasubandhu also in a same stream. Through the reading of the Pudgalaviniscaya, it is assumed that Vasubandhu also admits that ontologically person cannot be reduced since it cannot be said to be identical with mind and body nor different from them. But he rejects the argument of the Pudgalavādins that person is neither identical with nor different from the skandhas. Then, could it be said that ‘mind and matter’ and skandhas are different? It is rather to say that skandhas are not simply ‘mind

⁴¹³ Dhammasanganī 125, 206-207. *
and matter. To Vasubandhu, *skandhas are identified with bīja of santatipariṇāma-viśeṣa.*

Hume has been criticized that there is no room for body when he deals the identity of person. For Vasubandhu, however, there is no dualistic concept of body and mind from the beginning. For him body can be established only related with mind and its objects. When Vaiśesika asks who is the support of pleasure and pain? Vasubandhu replied that six (internal) āyatana are the support. Although body might be regarded as the support of the person, its role is merely the pathway for the cognition to connect outer objects, six external āyatanas. Again there raised the identity issue. The opponent asks if the notion of ‘I’ can assume body as its object, why does it not accept other bodies as its objects. Vasubandhu says, Because of the absence of connection (*sambandha*). The notion of I arises only with the body or mind (*citta*), with which it has connection. This connection is none other than the relation of cause and effect. The cause is a defiled mind which is influenced by earlier notion of ‘I’ and having its own continuum for its object.

Here, we should give attention that there is no mentioning of antarābhava in the Pudgala viniścayah. As mentioned already, unlike other parts of the Abhidharmakosabhāsya, Vasubandhu pours out his own philosophy which mainly based on Sautrantika in this chapter. From the various angles he analyses all the theory about person. But he does not handle this problem which has crucial position in the Sarvastivādins. It shows his disagreement with that issue. Through the study of the early Buddhism, we have examined that the idea of antarābhava is not from the main stream.
of the teaching of the Buddha.\textsuperscript{415} Again, we should note that the attitude of the Buddha towards metaphysical matter was firm. It can be understood as the similar line that the Buddha did not reject the concept of personal God in those days. Or, May be the compiler of the Nikayas can not avoid that concept of antarābhava which was quite prevalent at that time.

Besides the concept of antarābhava which can not be regarded much developed nor very much main tenet, Sarvastivādin established the concept of prāpti which makes the causal relationship between dharmas to be possible. Being not satisfied with it, Vasubandhu adopts the seed theory from the Sautrantika and establishes the theory of the specific transformation of continuum.

The controversy between Pudgalvādin and Vasubandhu can be understood on the following lines. Vasubandhu holds that ‘person’ is a logical fiction; a conceptual construct and in reality there is no ‘entity’ called person. There are only skandhas. Now, logical fiction / conceptual constructs have conventional reality and logical significance – In language and conventional practice, the notion of person has a kind of ‘inevitability’. This pragmatic inevitability of a logical fiction can be taken to be a logical necessity and it could be projected on ontology. And, this is exactly what Pudgalvādins are doing. They project this so-called logico-pragmatic necessity on ontological reality and start saying that pudgala exists. But, at the same time, they have to call it avyākta, because it cannot be identical with or different from five aggregates. This problem arises because what has only logico-linguistic status is given to ontological status.

\textsuperscript{415} According to Cousins, Pudgalavādins were the original promoters of the antarābhava. Cousins (1994), pp.20-21.
Vasubandhu is not against calling *pudgala* a logico-linguistic construct or a fiction which has a conventional utility. He is against giving *pudgala* an ontological status. Vasubandhu is objecting that as soon as *pudgala* is given an ontological status over and above five *skandhas* or *nāmarūpa*, it starts behaving like Ātman and if we deny this status to it, it simply ceases to exist.